THESE EVENTFUL YEARS
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN THE MAKING
COPYRIGHT
IN ALL COUNTRIES BUBBGRIBINO TO THE
BERN CONVENTION
BY
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA COMPANY, Ltd.
AU Rights Reserved
THESE EVENTKUi; YEARS
THE TWENTIETH C^i^TURY
IN THE MAKING
AS TOLD BY MANY OF ITS MAKERS
BEINO THE DRAMATIC STORY OP ALL THAT HAS
HAPPENED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD DURING
THE MOST MOMENTOUS PERIOD IN ALL HISTORY
With 160 FvU-Page Ittustrations
and Numerous Maps
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME I
LONDON
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA COMPANY, LTD.
NEW YORK
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, INC.
COFTBIGHT, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AmEBICA, 1924
BT
Enctglopabdia Bbitannica, Inc.
PREFACE
The aim of this work is to tell what has happened in the years of this
century, where the world stands to-day, and what the outlook for the future.
The authors of the various chapters, ei^ty-four in number, are those who by
their personal part in the events, or by study of them, are best qualified to
tell the story, whether regarding the past, the present, or the future. The
Editor takes pleasure in referring the reader to the list of writers ; so far as
he knows, no work of the size has ever been published for which so many and
such eminent contributors from all over the globe have united in cooperation.
It is doubtful if even the great need of such a work could have induced these
writers to contribute, were it not that the Encyclopaedia Britannica has at
intervals, for upwards of a century and a half, called upon experts and scholars
the world over to aid in the compilation of that work. Without the organisa-
tion and the experience thus gathered during 150 years, the present work
would have been impossible.
These two volumes have, however, no connection of any kind with the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, They have been prepared quite independently
and with an entirely different purpose. They are intended primarily, not for
consultation or reference, but for connected reading. They form one con-
tinuous story, the truth and vividness of which cannot fail to impress the
reader. Each chapter is written for this work, and for this alone, and has
not appeared elsewhere. It is an original contribution to the world^s knowl-
edge, and often contains new and striking information never before in type.
The contents and arrangement of These Eventful Years are so simple that
only a few words are needed here. The first four chapters form a sketch — a
bird^s-eye view — of what has taken place the world over in the unprece-
dented years of this century. They present a picturesque narrative written
by the master-hand of one who knows what has been going on, whether in
the limelight or behind the scenes, better probably than any other one person
anywhere. They are the natural introduction to the chapters that follow.
The reader will find them extremely interesting as well as informative.
Following these four introductory chapters are eleven others covering
the World War, its causes, its diplomacy, its fighting. Each of the authors
is, the Editor believes, the ideal selection for the chapter written by him.
Each has shown an impartiality that is most commendable, but the "Editor
in an endeavour to depict both sides of this world conflict has asked contribu-
tions from them both. Thus, for example, the reader can view the battle of
Jutland through the eyes of the two Admirals commanding the two contending
fleets.
Following these chapters are eight which deal with some of the results
of the war, directly or indirectly, and cover such subjects as the League of
Nations, Allied Debts, Taxation, Social Unrest, Wages and Prices, etc.
Then comes a series of chapters dealing with the principal coimtries of
the world and telling what has happened in each during the years of this
century. These are written, in many cases, by persons who have been promi-
nent leaders of affairs, but sometimes by scholars who have made the study
of those particular countries their speciality.
VI
PREFACE
Next there follows a series of chapters on such movements, events, and
phases of thought as have played a large part in the world’s affairs during
the years in question: as Science, Invention, Spiritualism, Journalism, Psy-
choanalysis, Big Business, the Progress of Women, Prohibition, Education,
Literatine, the Arts, etc. These, too, have been for the most part written
by the very men and women who have taken the chief share in the move-
ments or events described. The Editor believes that these chapters will help
the reader to a solution of many of the leading present-day problems.
Finally, the chapter by Mr. H. G. Wells (the first of the Second Volume)
deals with the future and what it has in store for us. The reader will find
in this chapter not only the interest which attaches to all of Mr. Wells’s
writings, but a suggestiveness that makes its own special appeal.
Never before in all history has there been such an upheaval, such changes
of a fundamental character, such an advance in science and investigation,
such a multitude of events — each of them startling in its way — as in the
last few years. It is time that we stop for a moment to consider what has
really happened and take bearings of our present and future.
The need to-day for an authoritative, impartial history of recent times
is the greater because of the intense nationalistic feeling awakened by tiie
war and by the propaganda — not to say falsification — fostered by the vari-
ous Governments during the conflict. Propaganda is no new thing, as is
shown in the interesting chapter on the subject in this book. Herodotus
praised Athens because he was in the pay of Athens. Shakespeare’s Henry
VIII was propaganda for Elizabeth, and Macbeth, for James I. But propa-
ganda on the vast scale on which it has been carried on in recent years is
new. It was hard enough in the years preceding the war to learn the truth;
it was practically impossible during the heat of the conflict; even now it is
extremely difficult. But the very fact that the difficulty is there and that
the propaganda and falsification have been so extreme, make it all the more
necessary that the situation should be faced, the task attempted, the real
facts brought to light.
The present moment is especially opportune for such a book as These
Eventful Years. After every great crisis in world history, a work that
tells what has happened and what are the probabilities for the future, is
Urgently needed. But in the past such a book was not possible until many
years after the crisis that it describes. 'This was because, in earlier days.
State secrets were divulged much more slowly than to-day. It was not until
almost a generation after the Franco-Prussian War that the world learned
with astonishment who was the real aggressor in that conflict.^ As regards
the crisis through which we have just passed, there has been this difference:
that each contestant has felt bound to justify his action in the eyes and
conscience of the world. Each, therefore, published much that in previous
times would have been kept secret. Even more important than this, how-
ever, is the fact that since the World War the Governments of many coun-
tries have been changed by revolution. Those that have come into power
have not been interested in the suppression of the truth regarding their prede-
cessors; on the contrarv, they have been interested in pointing out their
mistakes as a justification for the change of governments. We, therefore,
know more of the real reasons of the crisis and of the way in which it was*
met, than was true in similar cases after a much greater interval of time.
All the chapters in These Eventful Years are signed. The Editor wishes to
state that the opinions given are those of tiie authors, for which he is in no
way responsible, and with which, as a matter of fact, he often disagrees. No
writer was chosen because he held this, that, or the otiier belief, or in order
to promote any particular view. On the contrary, the endeavour of the Editor
PBEFACE
vii
was to select the best writer, and then to give him a free hand to express
his opinions fully and fearlessly. Accordingly, the reader will find that at
times one writer may differ from another in his interpretation of facts — in-
deed may differ regarding the facts themselves. In this connection, one may
well recall the story told by Sir Walter Raleigh. He watched from his win-
dow in the Tower of London a riot in the yard below. Seven witnesses of
that riot told what they saw, and each one differed from the other. Sir
Walter, himself, seeing events from his particular viewpoint, gave yet another
and different description.
Truth is many-sided, and in this world absolute truth is imobtainable.
The Editor believes strongly that he serves the cause of truth best when he
unites in this book the differing viewpoints of men coming from many coun-
tries scattered over the continents of the world, each giving his version of
events as he has seen them. He hopes that the reader will get a better, a
fairer, and a more impartial idea of what has happened and what will happen,
because of this very divergence in the views of the contributors.
The Editor wishes to thank the many friends — too many to mention
individually — who have aided him in the preparation of the volumes. He
must, however, make two exceptions. He is indebted to his collaborator, Mr.
Herbert Brande, for suggestions, ideas, and help, which have aided greatly in
the preparation of the book. He is also indebted to the publishers who have
given unstintingly of their time and money, and whose only desire has been
to make These Eventful Years as useful to the reader as possible. To them
are due also the many and interesting pictures which appear in the work and
which add to the value of the text.
If this book reveals the truth as to what has happened in the agonising
years of this century, and tells us where we stand in the parting of the ways
that confronts us to-day, it should be a contribution towards a better under-
standing of the future, and will help in some degree to make that future clearer
and brighter.
Franklin H. Hoofer.
T
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I
PAQS
Preface v
CHAPTERS I TO IV
HISTORY OF OUR OWN TIMES 1
I. World Policy ter^vs World Explosion 1
II. War Engulfs the World (1914-1918) 58
III. Peace Without Settlement 102
IV. Present and Future 147
By J. L. Garvin
Editor of Th£ Observer (London) since 1908. Author of Economics of
Empire; Maintenance of Empire; Economic Foundations of Peace; etc.
CHAPTER V
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR 104
By Carlton J. H. Hayes, Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of History, Columbia University. Captain U.S.A. Military
Intelligence Division, General Staff, 1918-1919. Author of PolUkal
and Social History of Modem Europe; Brief History of the Great War;
Co-Author of The League of Nations: Its PrincipUs and Pradsce.
CHAPTER VI
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS 209
By Charles Seymour, Litt.D., LL.D.
Professor of History, Yale University. Member of the American Peace
Commission. Author of Diplomatic Backgrounds of the War, Editor
with Colonel E. M. House, What Really Happened at Paris,
CHAPTER VII
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON 228
To the Battle of Verdun
By Major-General Sir Frederick B. Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Commander of the Legion of Honour. Croix de Guerre. First-class
Order of St. -Stanislas of Russia. Director of Military Operations,
Imperial General Staff, 1915 to 1918. Author of Forty Days in 1914:
The Last Four Months. Contributor to Cambridge Modem History,
CHAPTER Vra
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON (Continued) 248
From Verdun to the Armistice
By Major-*Gbnbral Sir Frederick B. Maurice. K.C.M.G., C.B.
ix
z
TABLE OP CONTENTS
CHAPTER IX
PAGB
GERMANY NEVER] DEFEATED 269
By Major-General Erich Lxjdendorff
Chief Quarter-Master-General. Author of Ludendoiffs Own Booh.
CHAPTER X
THE VICTORIOUS ARMIES OF FRANCE 284
By General Charles Marie Emmanuel Manoin
Member of the Superior War Council. Captor of Fort Douaumont,
October, 1916. Commander of the French 10th Army; Grand Cross
of the Legion of Honour.
CHAPTER XI
AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR 294
By Frank H. Simonds
Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. Military Editor of the Review of
Reviews. Formerly Editor of the Evening Sun. Author of the History
of the World War; They SkaU Not Pass — Verdun, 1916.
CHAPTER XII
THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY ON AND UNDER THE SEAS ... 304
By Oswald T. Tuck
Instructor-Commander in the British Navy; Head of the Admiralty
Historical Section.
CHAPTER XIII
THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE WORLD WAR 313
By Grand-Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
“Father of the German Navy”. From 1897 to 1916 Secretary of
State for the Imperial Navy. Author of the Naval Bills of 1898, 1900,
1906, 1908 and 1912.
CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 327
(The Personal Narrative of the British Commander-in-Chief)
By Admiral Jelucob
First Viscount of Scapa, O.M., G.C.B., Admiral of the Fleet. In
Command of the British Fleet at the Battle of Jutland. Governor-
General of New Zealand since 1920.
CHAPTER XV
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 354
(The Personal Narrative of the German Admiral in Command)
By Admiral Rbinhard Sghber
Commander-in-Chief of the German High Sea Fleet, from January,
1916, to the end of the World War. In Command at the Battle of
Jutland. Author of DewtsehUmd^s HochseefioUe im WeUkrieg.
TABLE OF CONTENTS xi
CHAPTER XVI PAOB
MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN NAVY 309
By Rear-Admiral William S. Sims, U. S. Navy
Commander of American Naval Operations in European Waters, April,
1917, to end of World War. Formerly President of the Naval War
College.
CHAPTER XVn
GOVERNMENT BY PROPAGANDA 380
By Bertrand A. W. Russell
Late Fellow and Lecturer, Trimty College, Cambndge. Author of
Problems of Philosophy; Principles of Social ReconstnuAton; Prospects
of Industrial Cimlisalion.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: WHAT IT HAS ACCOMPLISHED 386
By L£on Bourgeois
President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1902-1903. President of the
Senate, 1920-23. At vanous times Minister of Pubhc Instruction, of
Justice, of Labour and of Foreign Affairs Premier Delegate of France
at the Hague Conferences. Member of the Council of the League of
Nations, in which capacity he was chiefly responsible for the drafting of
the Covenant of the League. Author of Pour la SocUti des Nations:
Le Pads de 1919 et la SocUU des Nations, Le TraiU de Versailles,
CHAPTER XIX
REPARATIONS: THE LARGEST BILL EVER PRESENTED 395
By John Foster Dulles
Counsel to the American Comnussion to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1919.
Member of the Reparations Commission and Supreme Economic
Council, 1919. Chevaher of the Legion of Honour.
CHAPTER XX
THE INTER-ALLIED DEBTS 406
By Bernard M. Baruch
Chairman of the War Industries Board. Member of the Supreme
Economic Council. Economic Adviser for the Amencan Peace Com-
mission. American Delegate on Economic and Reparation Clauses.
Author of Making of the Economic and Reparations Sections of the
Peace Treaty.
CHAPTER XXI
THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION 411
By J. Laurence Laughlin, Ph.D.
For twenty-four years Professor and Head of the Department of Politi-
cal Economy of the University of Chicago. Editor of The Journal of
PoUtical Economy. Author of History of Bimetallism: Principles c/
Money: Credit of the Nations: Money and Prices.
TABLE OP CSONTENTS
CHAFTEat XXn PAOB
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT 426
By Edwin R. A. Sbliqman, Ph.D., LL.D.
MoVickar Professor of Political Economy and Finance, Columbia
University. Chairman of the Mayor’s Tax Commission, City of New
York, 1914r-1916. Expert Adviser to Jomt Legislative Tax Com-
mittee, 1919. Formerly President of the American Economic Asso-
ciation and of the Nationsd Tax Association. Author of Progressive
Taxation; Essays in Taxation; Shifting and Incidence of Taxation;
The Income Tax; Economic Interpretation of History; etc. Editor of
PoUHcal Science Quarterly,
CHAPTER XXIII
SOCIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY UNREST 440
By The Rt. Hon Philip Snowden, M.P.
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Chairman of the Independent Labour
Party, 1903-1906 and 1917-1919. Author of The Socialist Budget;
Socialism and Syndicalism; The Living Wage; Labour and the New
World; etc.
CHAPTER XXIV
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 448
By O. P. Austin, A.M.
Statistician, the National City Bank of New York. Formerly Chief of
the Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce Professor of
Commerce and Statistics, George Washington University, 1903-1914,
Author of Steps in Our Temtorial Expansion; National Debts of
the World; Economics of World Trade; etc.
CHAPTER XXV
HAVE REAL WAGES GONE UP? 456
By A. L. Bowlbt, Sc.D., F.B.A.
Professor of Statistics, University of London at the School of Economics
and Pohtical Science. Author of Wages in the United Kingdom in the
Nineteenth Century; National Progress in Wealth and Trade, Change
and Distribution of Income; The Course of Prices and Wages During the
War.
CHAPTER XXVI
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH 468
By SiE John A. R. Marriott, M.P. for York
Late M.P. for Oxford. Honorary Fellow, formerly Fellow and Lec-
turer, of Worcester College, Oxford. Author of The Remaking of
Modem Europe; English Political Institutions; England Since Water-
loo; etc.
CHAPTER XXVn
IRELAND’S PROBLEMS 614
By The Rt. Hon. Sir Horace Plunkett, K.C.V.O., F.R.S., LL.D.
Founder of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society. Formerly
Member of Parliament, 1892-1900. Commissioner of Congested
TABLE OP CONTENTS
xm
PAcn
Districts Boards, Ireland. First Vice-President of Department of
Agriculture and Technical Instruction, Ireland. Chairman of Irish
Convention, 1917-1918. Author of Ireland in the New Century; etc.
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER 525
By John H. Latan£
Professor of American History and Creswell Lecturer on International
Law in Johns Hopkins University. Author of America as a World
Power; The UnUM States and Latin America; History oj the United
States,
CHAPTER XXIX
“CANADA A NATION”
568
By W. S. Wallace
Librarian of the Umversity of Toronto. Formerly Professor of History
at McMaster Umversity, Toronto. Editor of The Canadian Historical
Review, Author of The United Empire Loyalists {Chronides of Canada).
CHAPTER XXX
FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT ... 579
By Albebt Thomas
Director of the International Labour Office, League of Nations,
Geneva. Minister of Mumtions in French War Mimstry; etc.
CHAPTER XXXI
BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
611
By Brand Whitlock
Amencan Minister — later Ambassador — to Belgium. Member of
the American Academy of Arts and Letters, and of the Royal Academy
of Belgium. Author of Memories of Belgium under the German Occupoh
turn,
CHAPTER XXXII
HOLLAND’S THANKLESS ROlE AS NEUTRAL 623
By Pieter Gbyl
Professor of Dutch Studies in the Umversity of London.
CHAPTER XXXIII
DYNAMIC ITALY 634
By Francesco Nitti
Formerly Premier of Italy.
CHAPTER XXXIV
JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA 657
By M. Hanihara
Japanese Ambassador to the Umted States. Formerly Vice-Minister
for Foreign Affairs. Japanese Delegate to the Washington Conference.
sir TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXXV page
FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC: A CRITICAL PERIOD IN CHINESE HISTORY 673
By Vi Ktuin Wellington Koo
Minister of Foreign AffairSi China. Chinese Ambassador to the
United States 1915-1921; to Great Britain 1921-1923. Head of
Chinese Delegation to Paris Peace Conferenoo; etc.
VOLUME II
CHAPTER XXXVI
A FORECAST OF THE WORLD’S AFFAIRS 1
By H. G. Wells
Author of The Discovery of the Future; The Future in America;
Mr, BriUing Sees tt Through; Outline of History, Men Like Oods; etc.
CHAPTER XXXVII
GERMANY’S PLACE IN THE SUN 18
By Maximiuan Harden
Founder and Editor of Die Zukunft, Berhn.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
“HOLY” RUSSU
59
By Michael S. Farbman
Russian Correspondent of The Observer (London). Author of Bolshe~
msm in Retreat; Russia and the Struggle for Peace; The Russian Revo^^
hdion and the War,
CHAPTER XXXIX
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: THE DISSOLUTION OF AN ANCIENT EMPIRE . . 106
By Carl Pribram, J.D.C.
Chief of the Statistical Section of the International Labour Office,
League of Nations, Geneva. Formerly Professor m the Umversity of
Vienna.
and Karl Brocehauben, J.U.D.
Professor in the University of Vienna. Formerly Imperial-Royal
Austrian Government Councillor. Author of Austrian Administrative
Reform,
CHAPTER XL
TURKEY: A STORY OF COLLAPSE AND RECOVERY 127
By Philip M. Brown, M.A.
Secretary American Embassy, Constantinople, 1907-1908. Charg6
d’ Affaires, October, 1907, to February, 1908. Professor of Inter-
national Law, Princeton University. Associate Editor American
Journal of International Law, Author of Foreigners in Turkey; Inhere
national ReaUUes; International Sooiety,
TABLE OP CONTENTS
CHAPTER XLI
THE TRUE GREATNESS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES . .
By Geobq Bbandbb, LL.D.
Leading Critic of North of Europe.” Formerly Docent at the
University of Copenhagen. Author of Main Streams in the Literature
of the Nineteenth Century, etc.
CHAPTER XLII
THE LITTLE REPUBLIC OF THE ALPS 160
By Robebt C. Bbookb, Ph.D
Joseph Wharton Professor of Pohtical Science, Swarthmore College.
Author of Government and Politics of Switzerland.
CHAPTER XLIII
SPAIN GROPES FOR NEW OPPORTUNITIES 168
By Chableb E. Chapman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Umversity of Cahfomia Exchange Professor to
Chile, 1920 Member of the Board of Editors, Hispanic American
Historical Review. Corresponding Member Hispamc Society of Amer-
ica. Author of The Founding of Spanish California; A History of
Spain; A History of California; The Spanish Periods.
XV
PAGE
. . 150
CHAOS IN PORTUGAL
CHAPTER XLIV
176
By Aubbey F G. Bell
Author of In Portugal, Portugal of the Portuguese.
CHAPTER XLV
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE MAKING OF A NEW REPUBLIC 182
By Jacob Wittmer Hartmann, Ph D
Formerly Assistant Professor, The College of the City of New York.
CHAPTER XLVI
THE DELIVERANCE AND REUNION OF POLAND 103
By Roman Dybobki, Ph D
Professor in the University of Cracow Sometime Lecturer on Polish
History and Literature, University of London.
CHAPTER XLVII
SELF-DETERMINATION ON THE BALTIC: FINLAND, ESTHONIA, LATVIA
AND LITHUANIA 207
By Baron Alexander Metendobpp
Reader in Russian Law, Institutions and Economics, King’s College,
Umversity of London. Formerly Member of the Russian Duma and
Senator. Privat-Docent at Petrograd University.
xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER XLVIII paob
THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES 219
By Hamilton Fish Ahmstronq
Military Attach^ at the American Legation, Belgrade, 1918-1919.
On Editonal Staff of the New York Evening Post, 1919-1921. Corre-
spondent in Eastern Europe, 1921-1922. Managmg Editor of Foreign
Affairs, 1922.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE COUNTRY THAT GUESSED WRONG 232
By H. Charles Woods
Special Correspondent of The Times (London) in the Balkans, 1911.
War Expert of the Evening News dunng the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913.
Mihtary and Diplomatic Correspondent for the Evening News, 1914-
1915 Lecturer before the Lowell Institute, Boston, 1917-1918.
Author of The Danger Zone of Europe {Changes and Problems in the
Near East); War and Diplomacy in the Balkans; The Cradle of the
War; etc.
CHAPTER L
RUMANIA RUINED AND REESTABLISHED 241
By Nicholas Jorga, JD.
Professor at the University of Bucharest Member of the Acad6mie
Roumame. Author of numerous books on Rumama.
CHAPTER LI
GREECE: A RECORD OF TRIUMPH AND DISASTER 249
By J. N. Mavrogordato, M A
Author of England in the Balkans, Cassandra in Troy; The World in
Chains, etc.
CHAPTER LII
FIRST AND SECOND BALKAN WARS: THE PROLOGUE TO THE WORLD
WAR 261
By H. Charles Woods
Special Correspondent of The Times (London) in the Balkans, 1911.
War Expert of the Evening News during the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913.
Mihtary and Diplomatic Correspondent for the Evening News, 1914-
1915. Lecturer before the Lowell Institute, Boston, 1917-1918.
Author of The Danger Zone of Europe {Changes and Problems in the
Near East); War and Diplomacy in the Balkans; The Cradle of the
War; etc.
CHAPTER LIII
THE BALKANS: TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW 276
By H. Charles Woods
TABLE OP CONTENTS xvii
CHAPTER LIV paob
THE STORY OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 284
By Thb Rt. Hon. William M. Hughes, P.C., K.C., LL.D.
Prime Minister of Australia, 1915-1923. Delegate to Peace Conference.
Joint Author of Federation of Australian States.
CHAPTER LV
PALESTINE FREED FROM TURKISH RULE 295
By Albert Montefiore Htambon, F.R.Hibt.Soc.
Corresponding Member of the Amencan Jewish Historical Society.
Formerly joint Editor of Zionist Remew. Author of Palestine; The
Rebirth of an Ancient People.
CHAPTER LVI
MEDIAEVAL PERSIA IN A MODERN WORLD 301
By Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B.
Formerly Bntish Consul-General in Persia. Late Inspector-General,
South Persia Rifles. Author of History of Persia; Glory of the Shia
World.
CHAPTER LVII
INDIANS ARDUOUS JOURNEY 308
By Sir Thomas W. Holderness, G C B., K.C.S.I.
Late Permanent Under-Secretary for India. Author of Peoples and
Problems of India; Narrative of the Indian Famine. Editor of the
Fourth Edition of Strachey’s India.
CHAPTER LVIII
THE DARK CONTINENT AS IT IS TO-DAY 324
By Sir H. H. Johnston, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.Sc.
Gold Medalhst of the Zoological Society, Royal Geographical Society,
Scottish Geographical Society and the Afncan Society. Formerly
Special Commissioner, Commander-in-Chief, and Consul-General for
the Uganda Protectorate Author of life of Livingstone; A History
of the Colonisation of Africa; The Uganda Protectorate; A History of
British Empire in Africa; and A Comparative Study of the Bantu
and Semi-Bantu Languages.
CHAPTER LIX
FERMENT AND FANATICISM IN EGYPT 332
By Sir Valentine Chirol
Formerly Director of the Foreign Department of The Times (London).
Author of The Middle Eastern Question; The Egyptian Problem; etc.
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER LX pagb
BOER AND BRITON IN SOUTH AFRICA 330
By Frank R. Cana, F.R.G.S.
Member of the Editorial Staff of The Times (London). Author of
South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union; Problems of Exploration;
Africa in 1911; The Sahara in 1914; etc.
CHAPTER LXI
FROM MEXICO TO ARGENTINA 348
By Clarence H. Haring
Professor of Latin American History and Economics, Harvard Uni-
versity. Formerly Associate Professor, Yale Umversity Investigator
of reactions of World War in Brazil, Argentma and Chile for Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Secretary for Venezuelan Group,
Second Pan-Amencan Financial Conference. Author of Trade and
Navigation between Spain and the Indies; The Buccaneers in the West
Indies; etc.
CHAPTER LXII
TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERATURE 381
By Henry Seidel Canby, PhD.
Editor of the Literary Review of the New York Evening Post; Lecturer
in Enghsh, Yale Umversity.
CHAPTER LXIII
THE NEW POETRY 392
By John Gould Fletcher
Poet and Critic. Author of Fire and Wine; The Tree of Life; Breakers
and Granite; Some Contemporary American Poets.
CHAPTER LXIV
DECAY OF THE DRAMA 403
By St John Ervine
For several years Dramatic Critic of The Observer (London). Some-
time Manager of the Abbey Theatre, Dublin. Author of numerous
plays and novels including: Changing Winds; John Ferguson; and
Jane Clegg.
CHAPTER LXV
MAIN CURRENTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY MUSIC 410
By Henry T. Finck
Musical Critic of the New York Evening Post since 1881. Author of
Songs and Song Writers, Success in MusiCf and How It*s Won; Grieg
and His Music; Chopin and other Musical Essays; etc.
CHAPTER LXVI
AESTHETIC TRUTH AND FUTURIST NONSENSE 416
By Clive Bell
Art Critic. Author of Art; Poems; Since Channe.
XIX
TABLE OP CONTENTS
CHAPTER LXVII page
WHAT SCIENCE CAN DO FOR MAN 428
By J. Arthur Thomson, LL.D.
Professor of Natural History, Aberdeen University. Editor of The
ChdLine qf Science, Author of Progress of Science in the Nineteenth
Century; The Wonder of Life; The System of Animate Nature,
CHAPTER LXVIII
RADIUM: ITS DISCOVERY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES 449
By Madame Curie
Doctor of Science, Professor of Radiology, who first discovered and
isolated the element Radium. Author of Recherches sur lea Substances
Radioactivea
CHAPTER LXIX
INDUSTRY AND INVENTION 455
By Harrison E. Howe, M S.
Editor of Indmtnal and Engineering Chemistry Formerly Chairman
of the Division of Research Extension, National Research Council.
Author of The New Stone Age
CHAPTER LXX
MAN^S EARLY HISTORY IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT REVOLUTIONARY
DISCOVERIES 475
By James Henry Breasted, Ph D , liL D
Professor of Egyptology and Oriental History, and Director Haskell
Oriental Museum and the Onental Institute, University of Chicago.
Director of the Egyptian Expedition and of the Archaeological Survey
in Mesopotamia, sent by the Umversity of Chicago. Formerly Presi-
dent of the American Oriental Society. Author of Ancient Records of
Egypt; Ancient Times, A History of the Early World.
CHAPTER LXXI
THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN IN MIDDLE AMERICA 493
By Marshall H. Saville
Professor of American Archaeology, Columbia University. Member
of Staff of Museum of the Amencan Indian, Heye Foundation. Ex-
plorer in Guatemala, Honduras and Yucatan for the Peabody Museum
and the Amencan Museum of Natural History. Author of numerous
books and papers on Amencan Anthropological and Archaeological
Subjects.
CHAPTER LXXII
THE HARVEST TIME IN MEDICINE AND SURGERY 501
By Ray Lyman Wilbur, M.D., LL.D.
President of Stanford University. President of the American Medical
Association. Formerly Chief of Conservation Division, United States
Food Administration.
PAQB
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER LXXIII
PSYCHOANALYSIS: EXPLORING THE HIDDEN RECESSES OF THE MIND 611
By Sigmund Frbud, M.D., LL.D. (Vienna)
The founder of Psychoanalysis, whose revolutionary views have mark-
edly influenced the mental sciences. Authonsed Translation by
Dr. A. A. Bnll, of New York.
CHAPTER LXXIV
PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND THE INVISIBLE WORLD 524
By Sir Oliver Lodge, F R S , D.Sc , LL.D.
President of the Bntish Association, 1913-1914. President of the
Society for Psychical Research, 1901-1904 Prmcipal of the Umversity
of Binmngham, 1909-1919. Author of Pioneers of Science; Life and
Matter; The Ether of Space; Raymond^ or Life and Death; Man and the
Universe; The Survival of Man; etc.
CHAPTER LXXV
DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES IN EDUCATION 531
By James R. Angell, Litt.D , LL.D.
President of Yale University Former President of the Carnegie Cor-
poration. Author of Psydiology; Chapters from Modem Psychology .
CHAPTER LXXVI
MODERN RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES 543
By Shailer Mathews, D.D , LL.D.
Dean of the Divimty School, University of Chicago Formerly Editor
of The Biblical World Author of The Social Teaching of Jesus; The
Church and the Changing Order; Dictionary of Religion arid Ethics; etc.
Editor of The Bible for Home and School; Dictionary of the Bible,
CHAPTER LXXVII
SOME REFLECTIONS ON BIG BUSINESS 553
• By Charles M. Schwab
Supermtendent of the Homestead Steel Works, 1887-1889. General
Superintendent Edgar Thompson Steel Works, 1889-1897. President
Carnegie Steel Company, Ltd., 1897-1901. iSresident of the United
States Steel Corporation, 1901-1903. Chairman of the Board of the
Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Formerly Director-Greneral of Ship-
buildmg, U. S. Shipping Board, Emergency Fleet Corporation.
CHAPTER LXXVIII
THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF WOMEN 557
By The Viscountess Rhondda
Leader in the movement for the adnussion of women to membership
in the House of Lords. Chairman British Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.
Director Cambrian CoUienes, Ltd.
TABLE OF CONTENTS mi
CHAPTER LXXIX pagb
THE BREAKDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 671
By James Brown Scott, A.M., J.U.D., LL. D.
Solicitor to the Department of State, Washington, 1906-1910. Amer-
ican Delegate to Second Hague Peace Conference, 1907. Special
Adviser, Department of State, and Chairman, Jomt State and Navy
Neutrahty Board, 1914-1917. Technical Delegate to Paris Peace
Conference, 1919. Legal Adviser to the Amencan Commission to the
Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921-1922.
Editor-m-Chief of The Amencan Journal of International Law, 1907.
Author of The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907; Survey of
InlernatioTiQl Relatione between the United Stales and Germany.
CHAPTER LXXX
THE GREATEST SOCIAL EXPERIMENT OF MODERN TIMES 683
By Thomas N. Carver, Ph.D., LL.D.
Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University. Adviser in
Agncultural Economics for the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Formerly President of the Amencan Economic Association. Author of
Government Control of the Inqu Borustness in Great Britain and the
United States; The Conservation of Human Resources.
CHAPTER LXXXI
INTERNATIONAL SPORT
601
By Lawrence Perry
Editor of Yachting, 1906-1910. Sporting Authority, New York Eve-
ning Post, 1912-1920. Author of FvUrBack; For the Gamers Sake.
CHAPTER LXXXH
THE INTRICATE WEB OF WORLD COMMERCE 606
By Julius Klein, Ph.D.
Director of the United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com-
merce, Washington, D.C. Formerly Assistant Professor at Harvard
Umversity,
CHAPTER LXXXIII
EXPLORATION WRITES ‘‘FINIS” TO DISCOVERY 640
By Gilbert Grobvenor, LL.D.
Editor-in-Chief of the National Geographic Magazine. President of the
National Geographic Society. Author of Historical Summary of
Polar Explorations; The Explorations of the Nineteenth Century; etc.
CHAPTER LXXXIV
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE PEACE OF THE WORLD . , 666
By Colonel Edward M. House
Personal representative of the President of the United States to Emo-
pean Governments, 1914, 1915 and 1916. Representative of the
United States in Supreme War Council, Paris. Member of the Ameri-
can Commission to Negotiate Peace. Joint Editor with Professor
Charles Seymour of What Really Happened at Paris.
Index .
663
© International Newsreel
A remarkable photograph showing the explosion of a mine at sea. An enormous number of mines
were laid by both the German and Allied Naval forces, the British alone having placed some 35,000
mines in the Dover area. The perils of mine-laying and mme-sweeping were very great, but the
use of mines was found to be one of the most effective weapons against the submanne.
THESE EVENTFUL YEARS
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN THE MAKING
CHAPTER I
HISTORY OF OUR OWN TIMES
By J. L. Garvin
Editor of The Observer. Author of Economics of Empire; The
Mamtenance of Empire; The Economic Foundations of Peace;
etc.
World Policy versus World Explosion
1890-1914 — FROM Bismarck’s pall to the world war
The greatest epochs have raised civilisation to a higher power. They
have enlarged life and enriched it — extending knowledge, renewing genius,
deepening thought, enhancing ideals. Quickening all the active faculties of
man, they have sometimes embodied the spirit of period and place in im-
mortal shapes of literature and art, breathing inspiration into subsequent
ages. In this sense, will our modern phase count amongst the greatest epochs?
We can not aflSrm it, but it would be too soon to deny. The seething solution
of the world has yet to give its precipitate. Only after an interval do the
events of any age show their real effect on mind, art and institutions. What
we yet see of the history of our time is the segment of an unfinished circle.
As often as optimism has been deceived, pessimism has been undeceived.
After a Niagara of war the world is still in the rapids of transition.
Throughout the broader part of human society there is unexampled dis-
ruption of the normal order, and moral disarray. The morasses of disillusion-
ment seem to range beyond sight; the mass of ills seems mountainous. The
hazard of final catastrophe to white civilisation, or at least to its oldest
and most populous sphere, seems distinct and measurable. On the other hand,
the reaction from evil has hitherto proved the strongest force of social and
political progress, though that reaction has frequently threatened for a time
to plunge men and nations into worse calamities than they were attempting
to remove. It is not impossible that the magnitude of the difficulties and
dangers following the ravages and the passions of war may lead, by reaction
from evil, to one of the greatest creative eras of civilisation.
Meanwhile what is already indisputable in any historic estimate of our
time is big enough. It has been the mightiest and most tragic of all periods of
human action. In little more than two decades, since the close of the nine-
teenth century, the earth has been forever changed. All the continents and
oceans have been involved together in one conflict beyond the wit of any
T B. T. — VOL. I — 1 1
2
WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
former generation to conceive. Empires and dynasties have been swept away
in a flood of ruin. New States and systems have emerged. Whole peoples
have paid the crushing forfeits of defeat. The conquerors have been stricken
by the price of victory. Dominating powers have been broken down, whilst
races, subject and oppressed, have been lifted up. The proudest have been
thrown from their seats and the humble have been exalted. A few tremen-
dous years have
“Cast the Kingdoms old
Into another moidd.”
The final results of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars were
puny by comparison with these transactions. The maps of Europe, nearer
Asia, and middle Africa, have been altered out of all semblance to the atlases
of the last century. There can be no confidence that all these novel boundaries
are permanent. New wrongs have been too freely substituted for old wrongs.
A durable resettlement of the international order has not yet been achieved
by the twentieth century. It never was more important for men in general
to study the recent past in order to be prepared for the future.
These things have been brought about by the efforts of organisation,
invention, heroism, endurance, and by a pitilessness of mutual slaughter, far
beyond what was previously guessed of human capacity Man has amazed
himself by the revelation of his powers and appalled himself by the disclosure
of the primeval terrors that slept in his heart. The external changes wrought
on the map and on the dynastic tables are strange enough; yet the inward
changes are more formidable and profound. Revolutions and counter-
revolutions, Bolshevist and Fascist, have attacked the basis of all accepted
ideas concerning social relations, the meaning of liberty, the validity of
dictatorships, the principle of majority-rule, the method of representative
institutions as hitherto understood. Everywhere the whole economic and
political structure is more or less challenged. Everywhere the fundamental
conceptions of the nineteenth century are denied. In these issues, and in
other social consequences of the last decade, there may lie the seeds of
controversies the deepest since the Reformation. The question of solutions
must engage us at the end of this survey.
ORIGINS OF WORLD POLICY AND WORLD CONFLICT
“ We live in deeds not words, in actions not in figures on a dial.” Before
the twentieth century has reached its second quarter, as much action has
been crowded into it as a whole century has usually contained. Things have
happened which were incredible even to those who foresaw some enormous
conflict. In the same way, we may be pretty certain that the sequel, good
or bad, will exceed in the long run all present ideas. Under modern condi-
tions the scale on which history works is not likely to diminish. Irrevocably
the world has become one — in fate as in connections. For any society,
temporary isolation from a series of large international events is possible,
but isolation from the consequences is not possible. That is the moral
stamped across the record of the twentieth century up to the date reached.
We have now to see how this situation has been brought about — how nations
and peoples formerly going their own ways were drawn into a common orbit;
how the affairs of different continents and their most distant regions became
interlinked; how a thousand threads, spun apart, were brought closer, and
caught up into one web of world-destiny.
The object of this short introduction to the history of our time is to
J. L GARVIN
3
disengage the lines of main significance from a multiplicity of interacting
influences and converging forces such as no previous epoch presents. Before
striking into the narrative of the twentieth century we muk examine those
antecedent conditions which gave it birth. Fateful stars prevailed over its
nativity and decreed its horoscope.
The last phase of the nineteenth century transformed the world and
made it a single arena by breaking down the partitions hitherto dividing its
affairs into geographical groups. Before the period 1890->1900 was half
through, the young German Emperor could say with truth: “ We stand under
the sign of world-policy and world-traffic.” To this end several mam in-
fluences working together must be distinguished; —
First, the guiding personalities of the two expanding military empires had
changed, bringing Germany and Russia under the dynastic control of less
wise heads and less capable hands. The intentions of a vain Kaiser and a
weak autocrat were not evil, but advanced civilisation was fatally perverted
by the glittering survivals of mediaevalism in government.
Second, the relations of the Great Powers were altered, making for less
stability and increased armaments.
Third, a new era of naval and mercantile expansion was opened.
Fourth, the interaction of politics and economics became more intense
and more universal.
Fifth, to the almost complete partition of Africa — which itself had
threatened war and inflamed national antipathies — was added the full ex-
tension of colonial and commercial rivalries to the far more dangerous sphere
of Asia; especially to the Far East, after the rise of Japan and the overthrow
of China. This finally brought all the Powers, including America, on the
scene together The ultimate consequences, in unexpected ways, were
decisive for the fate of the world
EUKOPE AFTER BISMARCK — WILLIAM II AND NICHOLAS II
Let US now trace the events bringing these factors into simultaneous play.
The fall of Bismarck as a world-event was a far-reachmg disaster. A giant
of craft and skill he had maintained a complicated system of international
equilibrium. It vanished with him. His faults were massive; in foreign
politics his sagacity was surpassing. While creating the Triple Alliance to
which Britain was friendly, his Reinsurance Treaty with St. Petersburg
balanced Russia against Britain and maintained the real isolation of France
for all purposes of revanche, Bismarck had made the Prussian crown
all-powerful despite the forms of a Constitution too largely an adroit
sham. It was his self-prepared punishment that he could be dismissed in
a moment without reference to the German people. In the prophetic despair
of his soul, after the Ides of March, 1890, he knew that the master who
had dropped the pilot would wreck the ship. The Reinsurance Treaty lapsed.
The new Kaiser and self-ruler was surrounded by favourites who thought
that a consolidation of the Russo-Prench alliance was inevitable. Their
counter-schemes promoted what they fear^. An original germ of tragedy
was in this situation. The world was disquieted. Obviously William II,
gifted and rash, mystical and vain, meddling and demonstrative, was neither
a solid character nor a safe temperament. How untrustworthy the character,
how perilous the temperament, were never guessed until his secret corre-
spondence with the more honest, more unhappy Tsar was recently revealed.
Full of anti-British feeling from the beginning, as we now know, his policy
nevertheless seemed at first pro-British, guided by the desire for more security
4
WORLD POLICY venta WORLD EXPLOSION
against France and Russia. Apparently cordial to England, visiting his
mother's country frequently, he drew closer to Austria-Hungary and became
the patron of Turkey.
The fateful change began in 1894 when he had reigned five years. The
course now adopted soon altered the whole European and Asiatic system.
The aim was to achieve super-Bismarckianism without Bismarck — not only
to revive the Iron Chancellor’s reinsurance method but to extend and im-
prove it by working both with France and Russia. M. Gabriel Hanotaux,
the new and remarkable Foreign Minister at the Quai d’Orsay, was ready
for colonial cooperation against England in Africa. Russia was ready for
similar cooperation in Asia. In November the accession of the new Tsar,
Nicholas II, was the most significant personal event in the world since the
Kaiser himself had mounted the throne. Between these two began a dubious
intimacy dexterously based by the German Emperor on encouragement of
the Tsar’s ruling motives — his ambition to complete the Trans-Siberian
railway by carrying it to warm water on the Pacific Ocean, and his filial
determination to maintain, like his sombre, immovable father, the autocratic
system. As a further lure the Kaiser’s private letters were saturated with
anti-British suggestion. A Machiavelli minor in his means, merely exag-
gerating a common practice of many sovereigns and diplomatists in his day,
William II believed that he was serving as a diAunely appointed instrument
the most sacred of purposes — the greatness of Germany and the prosperity
of its people.
ENTER JAPAN — FROM SHIMONOSEKI TO KIAOCHOW AND PORT ARTHDTt
To complete our understanding of 1894 as a year of significance like a
landmark, we must remember that the summer had seen an epoch-making
thing. The Far East had become the scene of a startling war on the question
of Korea, further destined to play a strange part in causing larger and
larger wars. Young Japan, yet an unknown quantity in arms, had attacked
the Chinese Empire — a monstrous bulk but weak. The result changed all
speculation on the future of Asia, and soon worked wider. Peking had looked
upon the modernised islanders with overweening fatuity. Local claims were
the pretext, but it was a conflict between two types of civilisation, an ancient
and a new. The West expected China, in spite of initial reverses, to crush
a slight, presumptuous antagonist by slow-gathering weight It was a
delusion. There was no such capacity in reserve. In seven months Japan
had shattered the forces of China bv land and sea, compelling Peking to
purchase an abject peace by abandoning Korea and yielding to the conquer-
ing islanders a commanding position on the mainland itself with Port Arthur
as a stronghold.
This meant, before the new Tsar had been six months on the throne,
a death-blow to hopes whereon Nicholas II had set his heart. He loathed
and despised the Japanese. On his travels as heir-apparent he had escaped
assassination by a Japanese fanatic. He had turned the first sod of the
Vladivostock section of the Trans-Asiatic railway. He had been President
of the Imperial Committee for promoting that vital project. Now Japan
threatened to bar Russia’s way to warm water in the Far East as Turkey
had blocked it in the Near East. The ancient barrier in Europe was irksome
enough. The sudden obstacle on the Pacific side must be removed with a
rough hand.
At once, in the spring of 1895, the new diplomatic combination tacitly
formed in the previous year came into strong play. Russia, Germany,
J. L. GARVIN
5
and France vetoed the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan, ordered to evacuate
the mainland, had perforce to obey and wait for a day of reckoning.
Burning for vengeance and alarmed by a menace to her future existence,
but masking her feeling with impassive composure, she concentrated in the
following years upon doubling her army and trebling her fleet. This episode
was welt-pohtik with a vengeance, and the germ of all tragedy. The
Shimonoseki crisis was of crucial importance in modem history. Part of
the cynical sequel may be conveniently anticipated in this place. Never
was the maxim of “ Ote^toi de Id que je m^y mette ” applied with franker
brutality. Russia, as a first payment for services rendered, was granted the
right to run the Trans-Asiatic line straight across Chinese territory to
Vladivostock. This already meant in effect the cession of Northern Man-
churia. France received some small gains at the southern extreme of the
Celestial Empire. Germany’s advantage did not at first appear. But on
April 26, 1895, immediately after the coup of the Three Powers, the Kaiser
had written to the Tsar in one of the early Willy -Nicky letters
That is clearly the great task of the future for Russia to cultivate the
Asian Continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the great yellow
race. In this you will always find me on your side. ... I will gladly help
you to settle the question of eventual annexation of portions of territory
for Russia; you will kindly see that Germany may also be able to acquire
a port somewhere it does not gene you ”
With a view to such a port for Germany, thorough surveys of the
Chinese coast were carried out. Kiaoehow was found to be the ideal naval
and commercial base. A lucky murder of missionaries in its neighbourhood
enabled it to be promptly annexed in November, 1897. A few weeks later,
Russia seized Port Arthur, which Japan had been compelled to renounce on
the plea of Chinese integrity Port Arthur was unmistakably meant to be
the warm- water terminus of the Trans-Siberian line. From that moment
an ultimate life and death struggle between Russia and Japan was almost
a certainty. Britain took Wei-hai-wei as a watching position between the
new Russian and German bases. From 1898 the end of the century was
filled, in the Far East, by bitter squabbles between the European Powers
and fierce scrambles for railway concessions and spheres of influence. The
break-up and partition of China was threatened. We shall see how internal
chaos and revolt and international intervention were the sequel in China —
with a sinister repercussion upon the rest of world policy.
BEGINNINGS OF ANGLO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM
Buttressed for the moment, as it seemed, by France and Russia, believing
himself to have attained a more brilliant position than Bismarck had ever
occupied, the Kaiser rose to a new height of self-confidence and began more
openly to reveal himself. In the destined year 1895, he made “ world-policy ”
a catchword, inspired the German people with the thought, and bestirred
himself to translate it into action. At the beginning of that year he formally
placed himself at the head of a new naval movement From the first
moment of his reign he had resolved to create for Germany a great sea-
going fleet and to do for his navy what his grandfather had done for the
army. Hitherto he had been thwarted by popular indifference, and by a
Reichstag with no enthusiasm for increased taxation. Now events were to
force his own intentions and sweep him upon a vehement current of popular
support into the most hazardous of his undertakings. At the end of this
crowded inaugural year of world-policy came the Cleveland manifesto and
6 WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
the Jameson Raid to bring America and Africa into the widening picture
with Asia and Europe.
Jameson’s irruption into the Transvaal was a puny fiasco, but like the
Shimonoseki coup it was another step toward a world-tragedy. By the
Kruger telegram the Kaiser rushed in where a Bismarck in his prime might
fear to tread. We have only very lately learned that his diplomatic challenges
in London were such that war between Britain and Germany was only missed
by an ace. He not only congratulated the Boer President on his success in
squelching the Raid, but he challenged in effect the whole British position
in South Africa where two races inextricably mingled were bound to find
some peaceful means of federation or to fight to the death. Had the Kaiser
already possessed his relative naval strength of 1914 or anything like it, the
Kruger telegram must have led to a World War at once, France and Russia
fighting for their different African and Asiatic objects on the side of Germany
against Britain. As Germany was still impotent at sea, her friends in the
Shimonoseki combination at the beginning of 1896 refused to form an anti-
British bloc. The spectre of Alsace-Lorraine rose like Banquo’s ghost to
disperse the banquet.
The Kruger telegram was an act of infatuated misjudgment, characteristic
of the new Imperial system from Bismarck’s fall to the world’s catastrophe,
but it was no mere act of personal impulse. It was drawn up by Baron
Marschall, the Foreign Secretary, and approved by the permanent Under-
secretary, Herr Holstein — that “ Grey Cardinal ” behind German foreign
policy — in the presence of high naval officials. Now, as upon a still more
momentous occasion, many years later, Baron Marschall’s reasoned incite-
ments spurred the Kaiser’s rashness. Between nation and nation this case
was far more serious than a flash of personal impulse. In the previous year
two German warships had been sent to Delagoa Bay — the Portuguese door
to the Transvaal — as a hint to Great Britain that Germany was henceforth
to be reckoned with in this sensitive region Before the Kruger telegram
was dispatched, Portugal had been requested to allow a small German landing
party to march from Delagoa Bay to Pretoria. This would have meant
immediate hostilities between Britain and Germany, but fortunately Portugal
returned no answer. The Kaiser and his advisers seem to have been in-
explicably confident, as on later occasions, that Britain would back down
if confronted by an accomplished fact. Instead, that slower country re-
plied with volcanic wrath to the German outbreak of popular passion.
Irreparable mischief was done. War in South Africa was made more probable.
Germany had encouraged the Boers; yet could do nothing to help them.
The British “ flying squadron ” was a naval hint to which 20 German army
corps could not retort. After years of disappointment the Kaiser’s desire
for a great fleet was assured of popular support. But the price was por-
tentous. Between Britain and Germany was opened a gulf of hostility
never bridged. The British felt that Queen Victoria’s Imperial grandson
had been revealed in a flash of lightning as one whose ennaity might be
deadly if his weapons ever became equal to his will. The Germans, navally
helpless for the time, waited and worked for a day of power and reckoning
as against England; just as the Japanese waited for their chance against
Russia; and as the French, though wearied by a quarter of a century of hope
deferred, still dreamed in their inmost hearts of a chance against Germany.
The ill-omens were multiplied.
J. L. GARVIN
7
KRUGER — FASHODA — CUBA — NEW NAVAL ERA
In 1896 the Kaiser stimulated still further the new consciousness and
aspiration of his people by proclaiming: '‘The German Empire has become
a world-empire.” It was not advisable to apply immediately the naval
moral of the Transvaal fiasco. If Jameson, who was to prove on all other
occasions so honest and wise in making amends, had allowed himself to be-
come a fool at filibustering, William II had been equally as foolish as a
marplot of diplomacy. A considerable interval of public quiescence passed
while ofiicial activity was rife in Berlin. In the summer of 1897, Tirpitz
became the redoubtable organiser of German sea-power. The first Navy
Bill, proposed in the autumn of that year, became law in the following
year. It was a model for its successors, in so far as it laid down for years
ahead a programme to be automatically completed by annual instalments,
exempt from such fluctuations and uncertainties of party strife and financial
provision as are characteristic of the English-speaking democracies.
A coincidence of unrelated events led some European observers to believe
erroneously that the new German naval movement was directed against the
United States. In the spnng of 1898 — shortly after the seizures of Kiao-
(*how and Port Arthur — the “ Maine ” blew up in Havana harbour, and
the Spanish-Amerioan War broke out. The United States in its turn appeared
upon the stage of world-policy. In a few months, the remnants of the
oldest colonial empire in the world, dating from Columbus, had disappeared.
Historic Spam, wrapped at that time in an inert dream of the past, had
fallen more helplessly before the United States than China before Japan.
America was established as a World-Power not only in the West Indies
commanding the Panama Isthmus, but in the East Indies many thousand
miles from her shores. The further naval development of the United States
was inevitable, Australia and New Zealand rejoiced to have the power of
the United States planted on the Philippines between the English-speaking
antipodes and the yellow races like the sands in number. Russia also had
been brought into close proximity to the Chinese question, which at that time
was the chief problem of the world's politics. These were further fateful
events in the last crowded years of the nineteenth century. Henceforth it
was easier for Washington to abjure entangling alliances than to escape
entangling circumstances.
The Spanish-American War gave a strong push to the naval movement
in Germany. The friction between the American and German admirals in
the Philippines had been momentary and tnvial in itself. But the annihi-
lation of the Spanish squadrons at Santiago and Manila, with the consequent
transfer of territories in both hemispheres, was held up to the German people
as a spectacular lesson upon the peculiar dangers of naval weakness in the
modem world and the eminent advantages of sea-power.
That moral was held to be emphasised with vivid force by the simultaneous
Pashoda crisis between France and Britain. M. Gabriel Hanotaux, the
French Foreign Minister, who readily acted with Germany, had sent the
Marchand mission to the Upper Nile despite the ^ave British declaration
that such a lodgment on the head-waters of the river of Egypt would be
regarded as an unfriendly act. At the pinch, France found no more support
from other Continental Powers than Germany had received after the Kruger
telegram. Again, “sea-power was trumps” — at Fashoda as at Santiago
and Manila. The naval agitation began to saturate the German mind with
this impression. The relative strength of Britain at sea was at that time
unassailable with any prospect of success. No Power wished British naval
8 WORLD POLICY versw WORLD EXPLOSION
predominance broken down in order to increase the strength of any more
militaiy rival. There was still no basis for a “ Shimonoseki Combination ”
against Britain. The Third Republic withdrew its flag from the Upper Nile.
M. Hanotaux’s system of association with Germany suffered its death-blow.
It was replaced under M. Delcass4 by a very dffierent and far-reaching
method pursued for years afterwards with a patience and profound dis-
cretion of which German diplomacy under William II had become incapable.
The garish blunder lay in connecting the beginnings of the Hoch-see
Flotte with a disquieting coup like the Kiaochow seizure, and with resounding
proclamations suggesting larger ambition; while exciting naval enthusiasm
by stirring up popular passion “ from above " in a way that could only
end by rousing the vigilance and precaution of those peoples against whom
a great German fleet might possibly be directed.
The justice of history must always admit that the German case for
naval development was very strong. World-economics stimulated world-
policy. After the universal depression of the early nineties, the commercial
rise of Germany, as of the United States, was upon a scale of grandeur.
Hamburg was the chief port of the European continent, and in 1896, for the
first time, the bulk of its tonnage was German and not British. The marvel-
lous progress of German shipping in extent, technique, and enterprise re-
vived proud national memories of the Hansa, and seemed to justify brilliant
hopes. The sea-borne commerce of Germany trading with all parts of the
globe, was only second in volume to that of Britain ; and imports of food and
raw material were necessary to a nation whose manufacturing cities were
growing with American rapidity. These maritime and industrial interests
mi^t be ruined at one fell swoop in time of war. By comparison with the
territories of the British Empire, the United States, Russia, France —
even with the Dutch East Indies and the Belgian Congo — the Germans
were not satisfied with their share of the earth. The Kaiser’s people felt
a yoimg people. Yet without a formidable increase of naval power there
could be no considerable chance of further acquisition. The British navy,
hitherto a shield to cover German interests, might become a sword to smite
them. Grumbling and girding, Bismarck had preserv’^ed cool, good relations
with Britain. The historic friendship between the two peoples had been
deeply injured in the middle of the last decade of the nineteenth century,
and was soon to be destroyed.
THE BOEB WAB AND EUBOPEAN DIPLOMACY
Steadily the South African situation drifted towards war, each side be-
lieving itself to be in the right. The two little Dutch Republics, arming
heavily since the Jameson Raid, had built up a military predominance. The
rustic Boers, afraid of being swamped, refused to concede political equality
to a large colonial element very mixed but mainly English-speaking — the
new mining population and town-dwellers of the gold-fields. Yet the Dutch
in the older communities under British sovereignty enjoyed political equality
as a matter of course. These were untenable conditions. The whole region
was destined to form under one flag or another such a Union as has since
been achieved. The choice for all South Africa lay between Dutch as-
cendency with German support, and British suzerainty. Had the struggle
been deferred the former solution might have been the sequel. The Northern
Republics were prepared to fight at any cost for absolute independence;
Britain was as determined to assert that general sovereignty in South Africa
which she believed the disputed treaties conferred. The ultimate alternative
J. L. GARVIN
g
was the expulsion of the British flag from the whole sub-continent. By the
smnmer of 1899 war was inevitable, and in October it broke out. The
struggle raged for two and a half years. In a way little realised at the time,
it became another tragic factor in the whole world's destinies.
The last few months of 1899 were charged in secret with world-issues
such as seldom had been at stake. Britain and her cause were loaded with
odium throughout the world. The war was easily imagined as the heroic
stand of a handful of Biblical farmers against the forces of an empire
manipulated by unscrupulous financiers. This was a telling caricature, and
most of mankind took it for truth. But in Germany, above all, anti-British
feeling exploded with an unparallelled violence which completed the breach
between the two peoples. Had Germany possessed already a fleet strong
enough to face the risk, it might easily have become at this time or later the
spear-head of a European Coalition against the British Empire. As matters
stood the German Government, after patronising the Boers, could do nothing
for them.
The inward relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg at this critical
time are still obscure in the sense that we have no direct revelation of the
ofiicial secrets. What we know is significant enough. The Continental
bloc against England was mooted in Paris — probably on the suggestion
of Berlin — by the Tsar's Foreign Minister, Count Mouraviev, a personage
of notorious levity. Russia hoped for gains in the direction of India, while
England was plunged to the neck in South African difficulties The price
desired by M. Delcasse was Alsace-Lorraine. Germany's condition, on the
contrary, was that France should guarantee the possession of Alsace-Lor-
raine by its conquerors. It was perhaps the highest opportunity of the Em-
peror William's life, but he was not of the calibre to seize it As a diplomatic
chess-player following Bismarck he was devoid of the elements of skill. He
would not sacrifice a piece to win a game. It was believed, however, in
Berlin that the British system might receive its death-blow in South Africa
and that at least it would emerge from the struggle as a \reakened and de-
caying empire. A favourable moment must be utilised. Germany must be
prepared for all eventualities. Yet Britain must be soothed.
To the bitter dudgeon of his subjects, the Kaiser paid a celebrated visit
to Windsor and London a few weeks after the Boer War had broken out.
He never had been more genial and persuasive. He enlisted English official
support for the Bagdad railway — part of the magnificent project of an in-
ter-continental line stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. The
British Cabinet was attracted. Immediately after the Imperial visit, Mr.
Chamberlain, the most powerful Minister of the day, made the famous
speech in which he urged an alliance between Britain, the United States,
and Germany, as the proper hope and safeguard of the world. Queen Vic-
toria's Government still dreamed vainly of German support against Russia,
and thought the project of the Bagdad railway would assist that purpose. It
was to work out to a very different result — then as little imagined by
British statesmen as by the Kaiser himself.
GERMANY DOUBLES HER FLEET — THE PREAMBLE ”
In a few days the other and more portentous side of German policy
was disclosed, and in the mind of the British people — though not yet aware
of the ** Willy-Nicky Letters ” nor of the recent pourparlers for a Continental
League against Britain — conviction deepened that the Kaiser was not a
safe friend. At the moment of British disasters on every side in South
10
WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
Africa, Count Billow introduced the new German Navy Bill which proposed
at a stroke the doubling of the lighting strength fixed in 1898. The method
was too clear, and would obviously be employed again at another suitable
opportunity. The world-renowned Preamble ran:
“ In order under existing conditions to protect Germany’s maritime trade
and Colonies, there is only one means: Germany must possess a battle-fleet
BO strong {mms eine so starke Schlacht-'jlotte besitzen) that a war would
involve dangers of such a kind even for the mightiest of naval antagonists
as to bring its own power into question.”
The Preamble went on to explain that any probable antagonist would be
compelled to divide its squadrons throughout different regions of the world,
so that even a German fleet, inferior in total strength, might be strategically
superior at the chief centre of action. These words left no doubt. More
fateful words were perhaps never uttered in history. They were a bid for a
naval supremacy in the North Sea and for succession to the British Empire
whose dissolution from various internal and external causes — including
ultimate war with Russia and France — was confidently anticipated. The
immediate struggle in South Africa was itself expected to inflict a mortal
injury. As a diplomatic method, the unnecessary sensationalism of the Pre-
amble was enough to make the Iron Chancellor groan in his grave. At the
outset of their most perilous adventure, the Germans with both hands had
rung the alarm bells in the ears of England But the sense of triumphal
energy and self-confidence which then filled the German nation and their
Imperial leader is not easy for historical retrospect to describe. All the
superficial evidence seemed to be in their favour. Never were a people or its
rulers more deficient in the sober estimate of underlying forces. We have
seen that their real case for naval development was very strong. The demon-
strative rashness of their procedure was to be fatal William II had begun
the total destruction of Bismarck’s diplomatic basis. He was now to lose
more in the sphere of alliances and understandings than he could ever gam
in ships.
THE FATEFUL END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The new Flottengcsetz became law at the beginning of the closing year
of the nineteenth century. Up to the very end of that last year, signs and
portents thickened. Chinese trouble burst into flame. Since the Japanese
War there had been a seething desire for reform. The great Empress-Dowager
had deprived the visionary Emperor of his vermilion pencil. The seizure
of Kiaochow and Port Arthur, the scramble of alien exploiters for conces-
sions, had roused anti-foreign feeling far and wide. The corruption and
incompetence of the Manchu Court were incurable. The Boxer rebellion
broke out. Peking was presently cut off from the sea. The German Minister,
Baron von Kettler, and M. Sugiyama, Chancellor of the Japanese Legation,
were murdered. The Legations were besieged. Their fall was feared, as
well as the massacre of the foreign Ministers and refugees — a Sicilian
vespers of the yellow world secretly instigated by the Empress-Dowager and
the extreme Manchu faction. In all the hundred years of nineteenth-century
politics, no wilder, more fantastic episode had been known.
This glaring sidelight, however, did more than anything before it to
reveal the nature of the new age of world-policy. All the Great Powers
were brought into action together, and the United States found itself with
the rest. After the failure of Admiral Seymour’s first attempt to relieve
Peking — with a small world-force including American and Japanese, as
well as Russians, French, Germans, Austrians and Italians — strong reinforce-
J. L GARVIN
11
meats had to be awaited. Common action had been delayed by friction and
jealousies. Japan was nearest, strongly urged by the British Government to
act. This was distasteful to Russia and Germany alike. Early in July the
Japanese Government decided to send two divisions. A month later the
relief column of 20,000 men was on the march, and on the afternoon of
August 14, after two months of bravery and terror, the Legations were
delivered. The repute of the civilised Powers was stained by the wholesale
looting of Peking. Count von Waldersee had been recognised at the Kaiser’s
wish as a grandiose generalissimo of the nations. With a German force of
20,000 troops — a marked episode of world-policy — he arrived too late to
play that chief r61e in the Chinese drama for which he had been cast.
The harmony of the Powers broke up in 1900 as soon as the military
emergency had been met, and in Far-Eastern affairs the very end of the old
century left another evil legacy to our own. The disorders had brought
Russia into military occupation of Manchuria, and she was determined to
keep it. In December the Tsar’s agents extorted from the Manchus a pre-
liminary agreement by which their ancestral province became a Russian
Protectorate in all but name. This policy pointed to ultimate war with
Japan It was not yet realised that such a conflict in Asia, however it went,
would have a far-stretching influence upon Europe and upon all world-affairs.
Meanwhile Lord Roberts had swept through South Africa, breaking up the
Boer armies and occupying their capitals. A long and dreary guerilla war-
fare in these spaces had yet to be faced; but the British were already assured
of final success, despite the difficulty of managing a heavy and thankless
campaign 7,000 miles from their island-base. Nearly all Germans, then and
long afterwards, refused to believe that the end could be anything but a
virtual British defeat and political surrender. The new naval movement
was pushed on with increasing vigour and ability. Popular imagination was
seized by the Imperial watchwords “a place in the sun”; “our future lies
on the water ”; “ bitter is our need of a strong German fleet ”; “I will not
rest until I have brought my navy to the hei^t whereat my army stands.”
While the Kaiser dreamed of supremacy in the North Sea, the Tsar ‘
dreamed of a Far-Eastern supremacy stretching to the Yellow Sea and com-
manding North China. Japan was alarmed for her existence. The United
States was concerned for the open door. At Damascus in 1898 the German
Emperor had capped his special patronage of Turkey by proclaiming him-
self the protector of Moslems throughout the world; and now the Bagdad
railway project promised to become the strategical instrument of this ex-
tensive gospel. It introduced a secret but mortal discord into Russo-
German relations. Though French feeling had never been more bitterly
hostile to England than during the Boer War, French statesmen began to
foresee dimly the possibility of new conditions, even new combinations, which
would make the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine no longer a hopeless cause.
The prospects of the British Empire seemed obscure and even precarious.
The Tsar’s Peace-Rescript, very mixed in its origin, had worked out to
nobler purpose than light-minded worldlings like Mouraviev intended; but
the ideals of the Hague Conference and Court were before their day. Amidst
these conflicts and armaments, ambitions and fears, appetites and dreams,
open movements, cryptic intri^es, and rival purposes intertangled through-
out the world, the nineteenth century ended. It had sown far and wide the
dragon’s teeth.
12
WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
TWENTIETH CENTURY OPENS — QUEEN VICTORIANS DEATH — BEHIND
THE SCENES — FAILURE IN 1901 OP LAST EFFORTS FOR
AN ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE
New Yearns Day, 1901, was hailed by the Teutonic race with sanguine
enthusiasm as the dawn of an age of promise. The feeling was perhaps
over-expressed by a spokesman like General von Liebert when he declared
later that the twentieth century would belong to the Germans. But the older
theory that the English-speaking races and the Russians were destined be-
tween them to rule the earth and its future was no longer accepted. Rather
it was more and more believed that partly by the pressure of accumulating
power, partly by the influence of commercial penetration, the Teutonic stocks
in Central Europe, increasing in numbers by a million a year, would create
somehow a world-empire stretching to the East. The second centenary of
the foundation of the Prussian Kingdom was celebrated on January 18. The
marvellous expansion of the Hohenzollern system from the tough little
nucleus of Brandenburg to the headship of a united Germany, to military and
commercial predominance m Europe and the Near East, and to maritime
progress in all seas, seemed to make reasonable the larger visions of further
achievement.
Just four days later, the Emperor’s grandmother, Queen Victoria, died
after the 64 years which had been for her people an unprecedented reign of
long success and prosperity. Was this the sunset for Britain and the sunrise
of Germany? The critical negotiations between London and Berlin during
the next few months went far indeed to give the answer and to decide finally
the future relations of the two peoples, though in ways hidden from the
public knowledge of either. The Emperor hurried to the death-bed of the
old Queen. His visit deeply moved the whole British nation, and when in
his red cloak he rode through London behind the low gun-carriage, draped
with the Union Jack, that bore Victoria to her grave, there was a wave of
memories and regrets. It was a chance for reconciliation such as would never
come again.
It was seized by British statesmen. They saw that the days of “ splendid
isolation ” were over unless a European combination against England were
to become inevitable. They had to link up with one side or the other of
the Continental system. They undertook strenuous efforts to arrive at an
agreement with Germany. Again and again they had made open and private
advances in this sense. Mr. Chamberlain, the most incisive and decisive
personality among them, had been for several years the conspicuous ad-
vocate of a rapprochement with Berlin. Some of his chief colleagues were
in emphatic sympathy. They believed they could carry the Cabinet for an
epoch-making change in the British tradition throughout the previous 50
years — aloofness from foreign entanglements. Even before Queen Victoria’s
death and the Kaiser’s visit, the Wilhelmstrasse had been sounded. It
was even suggested that with British aid Germanv might be provided in
Morocco with one good place in the sun.” The Wilhelmstrasse was cool,
cynical and evasive to the chagrin of its London agents who dreaded the
evident under-estimate of British reserves and the profound psychological
misjudgment of the British temper. At the moment the Kaiser was irritated
by Russia’s high-handed proceedings in Manchuria. But in reality the
Wilhelmstrasse under Biilow and Holstein had already made their choice in
favour of the Tsardom, and they carried the Emperor with them. It is, in-
deed, improbable that his own views were ever seriously divergent.
These negotiations went on very busily from March to the end of May,
1901, and they have been well called a turning-point in the history of the
Copyright reserted for artitt or ovmer by Walter Juddt Ltd., Pubhaher of Royal Academy lUuatrated;
portrait by A L Nowell.
i
H. M. KING GEORGE V.
J. L. GARVIN
13
world. Geraiany was possessed by the belief — it was the foundation of her
whole foreign and naval policy at this time — that Britain was bound at
no very distant date to be involved in war with Russia, perhaps also with
France; that this conflict would shake, if not break, the British Empire; that
Germany, guarding neutrality in the beginning, would be the arbiter in the
end, able to dictate terms to both sides, perhaps to secure dazzling gains by
land and sea without firing a shot. At no price then obtainable would Ger-
many commit herself to a position which might compel her to fight Russia
in Europe for the purpose of supporting Britain's Asiatic interests. This
was no mere Machiavellian plan. It was not indeed the deepest, surest con-
ception. But it was an intelligible and defensive policy if it had been con-
sistently pursued. It was so ill-managed that in the end it lost British
support without winning Russian. Nevertheless, British statesmen in general
had an insular and not a European mind. For long it was almost impossible
for them to understand the historic and practical strength of the connection
between Germany and the Tsars.
Chamberlain even complained that every suggestion made in confidence
to Berlin was passed on to St. Petersburg. The Wilhelmstrasse would promise
nothing more than benevolent neutrality in case England were involved in
an Asiatic conflict. England’s neutrality towards Germany was desirable but
less important. The Dual Alliance, if embroiled with Britain, could make
no attack on Germany. Believing that he held all the cards, the tone of
Holstein at the Wilhelmstrasse was brusque and satirical. England must
come to us.” Holstein ridiculed the suggestion that there was any alternative
in the shape of peaceful settlements between London on the one side, St.
Petersburg and Pans on the other. If the British think they can go with
Russia, let them try.” King Edward’s statesmen in their turn became scep-
tical and indignant. Yet for the last time they increased their concessions,
and were ready at the end of May, 1901, for a defensive alliance on a basis
,of absolute reciprocity. But the dream faded and disappeared. There is a
critical passage in the Eckardstein memoirs, which contains the detail of
these transactions:
Alfred Rothschild in a long letter to me dated June 14th, 1901 . . ,
says: *Joe (Mr. Chamberlain) who dined with me is quite disheartened.
jHe will have nothing more to do with the people in Berlin. If they are so
shortsighted, says he, as not to be able to see that the whole new world system
depends upon it, then there is nothing to be done for them.’ ”
In fact, the new German naval movement in conjunction with Far-Eastern
dangers had made the situation such that the British and German peoples
were bound to be friendly or hostile. British statesmen thwarted in these
anxious approaches, turned to their alternatives with a resolution, patience
and skill which in a few years were to stagger Berlin. Before the end of the
year, even Chamberlain, repelling sharp provocation, was turning his trench-
ant style against the German Chancellor in open controversy.
RUSSIA, CHINA AND GERMANY — THE ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE
Public events had already explained the fruitlessness of these secrei
negotiations. In the autumn of 1900 Britain and Germany, on lines which se-
cured general international adhesion, had entered into an agreement to pre-
serve the integrity of China. The British maintained that this instrumeni
applied to Manchuria as well as to the Middle Kingdom proper. The Ger
mans protested that they had meant it as a safeguard against separate
British designs in the great Yangtsze valley, and that it had no point agains-
14 WORLD POLICY versxus WORLD EXPLOSION
Russia in Manchuria. Count von Biilow^s declaration in this sense spread
the impression in England that the Wilhelmstrasse was bent on playing a
double game and could not be trusted. This episode was big with conse-
quences. The Far-Eastern question was becoming the overshadowing issue
of world-policy.
Already, before the twentieth century was two months old, in February,
1901, Russia had endeavoured to secure from Peking an agreement establishing
her complete ascendency in Manchuria. There was a wide revolt of Chinese
opinion. Public feeling in Japan beat fiercely; most of the Powers protested,
but more or less weakly for, as we have just seen, no real opposition was to
be expected from Germany At last the Russian Government withdrew its
proposals for legal recognition of its ascendency in Manchuria, but for all
practical purposes remained entrenched in that territory.
This situation led directly to that momentous event of the beginning of
the century — the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. The immediate origins of that
compact are singular. Mr. Chamberlain — never inclined to helplessness in
any predicament — had as far back as March, 1898, suggested such an
alliance after the German and Russian seizures of Kiaochow and Port Arthur.
The idea slept for three years and was then revived in a very odd manner.
Baron von Eckardstein, German Charge d’Affaires in London, called on Count
Hayashi, Japanese Ambassador, and urged that the only way to maintain
Chinese integrity and the open door was an Angle- Japanese alliance to
which Germany might adhere This latter attraction, Eckardstein explains,
was a purely “ personal suggestion of his own.’^ We now know that Ger-
many’s adhesion was out of the question. That the Wilhelmstrasse desired
the combination of Britain and Japan is certain But whether the main
motive was to check Russia; or to make more certain that Asiatic conflict
on which the Kaiser, Billow and Tirpitz were depending for the working out
of their own plans; or whether the simple object was to make Russia more
dependent on Germany — in any case it cannot even yet be determined with
certainty.
Once started on German suggestion, the negotiations between London and
Tokyo soon went forward in profound secrecy. The British saw no solid
alternative. The Japanese handling of their side of the affair was masterly.
Eckardstein alternately stimulating both sides, suggested to the British For-
eign Office that if the British were not quick, Japan might make an alliance
with Russia. Japan showed an apparent inclination in this sense. The cue
of her diplomacy was to play off London and St. Petersburg against each
other; and, confronting Russia with the draft of a treaty with Britain, to
wrest from the Tsar’s Government by diplomatic pressure advantages which
otherwise could only be sought by the hazard of arms. If Japan could
have secured a free hand in Korea, in return for leaving Russia a free hand
in Manchuria, the Marquis Ito would have settled with St. Petersburg
rather than with London. Ito reported that diolomatic prospects on the
Neva were superior to those on the Thames. There has never been any
convincing proof that Russia was prepared for adeauate concessions in Korea.
It is in any case certain that the Ito mission to St. Petersburg was used as
a lever on London by the Tokyo Cabinet in order to ensure the acceptance
of important amendments fully recognising the Japanese claim to Korea.
On this basis the long discussions were concluded and the Ando- Japanese
Treaty was signed on January 30, 1902. Its main article provided that if
the defence of the Far-Eastern interests should involve them in hostilities
with more than one Power, the high contracting parties would wage war and
make peace in common. In case of one Ally being in conflict with any single
Power, strict neutrality on the part of the other Ally would be enough.
J. L. GARVIN
IS
THE END OP " SPLENDID ISOLATION ” — A GREAT PEACE IN SOUTH AFRICA
This contract on equal terms between a western nation and a yellow race
whose full capacity in arms was not suspected even yet except by a few,
ranked as one of the remarkable documents in diplomatic annals. If its
ultimate import was unguessed by anyone, even its immediate effects proved
to be of more practical significance than had been expected. Britain had
emerged from “ splendid isolation ” and, relieved from the worst dangers of
the Asiatic situation, she could presently begin the greater work of revising
her other connections and strengthening her safeguards in Europe. First,
peace had to be restored in South Africa. The two and a half years' struggle
was closed at last by the wise Treaty of Vcrocniging leading up to the recon-
ciliation of Britons and Boers as a wliolc and to the Union of South Africa,
on the Canadian and Australian models, under the British flag. It was a
pattern of constructive statesmanship after war, and soon proved to have
been in its different way as important as the Japanese Alliance in strengthen-
ing the position of Great Britain and the Empire The mother-country and
the self-governing Dominions had fought shoulder to shoulder. It began
to appear already as if the British Empire might not be displaced so soon
or so easily as most Continental estimates at the outset of the century had
supposed. King Edward's short reign, for instance, by comparison with what
the Kaiser and his advisers had anticipated, was to be fortunate and even
glorious; largely because of the gravity of the new dangers against which
far-sighted precaution had to be taken. This was done with a steadv and
continuous sagacity which will always stand as a classic instance of good
method in foreign affairs Germany, on the other hand, with all her magnifi-
cent technical organisation, continued to be too self-confident and became
more and more the victim of preconceived ideas which lurned out to be
delusions. Of Bismarck's searching judgment and inexhaustible dexterity,
not a trace remained.
THE kaiser’s visions OF A GENERAL ANTI-BRITISH COALITION
In London and Paris alike far-sighted thinkers had begun to advocate
a rapprochement between France and Britain, rivals for the greater part oi
six centuries and bitter enemies in recent years. Baron Eckardstein reports
King Edward as having remarked as earlv as February, 1902: ‘^We are
being urged more strongly than ever by France to come to an agreemeni
with her in all colonial disputes, and it will probably be best in the enc
to make such a settlement, because Britain only wants peace and quiet anc
to live on friendly footing with all other countries.” This idea made itseli
felt more and more in its atmosphere, though it made little practical progres*
for more than a year. The German Emperor, meanwhile, in his private
correspondence with the Russian autocrat, was extolling the growth of hh
own fleet, and seeking to excite the Tsar's prejudice against Britain:
“ The behaviour of the Foreign Power at Koweit sets into a strong relie'
the enormous advantage of an overwhelming fleet which rules the approaches
from the sea to places that have no means of communication over land, bw
which we others cannot approach because our fleets are too weak, anc
without them our transports are at the mercy of an enemy. This shows
once more how very necessary the Bagdad Railway is, which I intenc
German capital to build. If that most excellent Sultan had not beei
dawdling for years with this question the line might have been begun years
16 WORLD POLICY ver^ua WORLD EXPLOSION
ago and would now have offered you the opportunity of dispatching a few
regiments from Odessa straight down to Koweit and then that would have
turned the tables on the other Power.” (The “Willy-Nicky Correspond-
ence,” January 3, 1902.)
Later in the year the Kaiser writes as if assured not only of the solidarity
of Russia and (Germany against Great Britam, but of a general diplomatic
combination of Europe in the same sense.
‘^We must look at our two navies as one great organisation belonging
to one great Continent. For as the rulers of the two leading powers of the
two great Continental combinations, we are able to exchange our views on
any general question touching their interests, and even as we have settled
how to tackle it, we are able to bring our Allies to adopt the same views, so
that the two Alliances — tc., five powers — having decided that peace is to
be kept, the world must remain at peace and will be able to enjoy its bless-
ings.” (September 2, 1902 )
This letter was signed Willy, Admiral of the Atlantic ” France was
not to be so easily taken in tow, nor Alsace-Lorraine to be so lightly
renounced. The British people felt they were in danger, and in fact they
were in more danger than they knew. If the German people themselves
had known the tone of this secret correspondence they would have been less
surprised by the subsequent moves which turned all the diplomatic tables.
VENEZUELA — ROOSEVELT — GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES —
THE PANAMA CANAL
Opinion was widely confused for a short time by an interlude which
seemed contrary to the general tendency. At the end of 1902 the German
Government delivered an ultimatum to Venezuela The flamboyant dictator
Castro, snapping his fingers at foreign Powers, had maltreated and defrauded
their nationals. United States citizens had been mishandled like the rest.
Germany, joined by British warships, took the lead in forcing redress by a
blockade. This was thought to indicate a phase of better relations between
the two Governments. It only illustrated the estrangement of their peoples.
British public opinion for the most part protested vehemently against part-
nership with Berlin in action which could not be welcome to the United
States, and might even be intended by the Wilhelmstrasse to drive a wedsre
between the English-speaking Powers. America was far from desiring to shield
Castro, much less to encourage him in a remme of violence, corruption and
repudiation of debts. None the less, the blockade was a dangerous precedent
for the Monroe Doctrine.
The distinction was very quietly and firralv drawn at Washington, for
American affairs were in strong hands. After McKinley’s assassination, the
powpful personality of Theodore Roosevelt appeared on the stage of world-
affairs as President of the United States. This in its wav was one of the cre-
ative accidents of history. A few months before he had thought himself side-
tracked for life when elected Vice-President in spite of himself. For long he
was to play a resounding part, and his accession was as significant as that of
King Edward in the same year. By America’s intervention the Venezuelan
blockade was terminated and the question referred to the Hague Court. It
decided that the European claims were just; but forcible European action
was henceforth eliminated from American waters.
From this time, the Kaiser spared no pains to win the good-will of the
United States, their President and their distinguished citizens. Though his
methods were not always fortunate, he had considerable success. Immedi-
J. L. GARVIN
17
ately after the Venezuelan affair, Prince Henry was sent on a voyage of
conciliation. The “ exchange of professors ” followed, and this was the
admirable idea of William II himself. The new German Ambassador at
Washington, Baron Speck von Stemburg, was married to an American, and
he was often reproached by Junkers and other reactionaries for seeking
popularity by methods which vulgarised the traditions of German diplo-
macy; but there is no doubt that Stemburg rendered valuable service to
his country.
The practical guarantees for the inviolability of the Monroe Doctrine were
clinched soon afterwards when Washington acquired the right to make and
control the Panama Canal. The United States, with Roosevelt at its head,
was a Great Power for all the world to reckon with and destined for a part
it little dreamed. A considerable degree of public opinion in Germany be-
lieved that America would help them, directly or indirectly, in a struggle with
England. Though the inwardness of dynastic policies in Europe remained
for long unsearchable, events were to prove that the ideals and aims of the
American Republic and the Hohenzollem Empire were not the same.
KING EDWARD — BRITISH REVIVAL — THE ENTENTE CORDIALE — THE FIRST
CHECKMATE
It is probable that the tenor of the Willy-Nicky Correspondence ”
was known to the British Court. The Venezuelan blockade was no sooner
over — the last episode of that Anglo-German comradeship in arms which
had been a tradition of centuries — than efforts changing the whole system
of European diplomacy began in earnest. In the spring of 1903 King
Edward made his first European tour. It was a political demonstration
like no appearance of a Bntish Sovereign abroad for more than 40 years
It was another sign that the old order was changed. When Queen Victoria
died, Britain in the Boer War was the most hated of nations. Her moral
isolation was more complete than the political. Before the coming of King
Edward, human, genial, shrewd, above all genuinely conciliatory in tem-
perament and mind, Anglophobia began to lift on the Continent as a dark
cloud rolls away. Appearing first at Lisbon, King Edward revitalised the
oldest of British alliances, that with Portugal, a small nation, but the
Atlantic outpost of Western Europe, and with a wide colonial empire
surviving that of Spain. The long-standing German idea of acquiring the
larger part of the Portuguese colonies in Africa was now checked, and was
to be extinguished
Next, the British Sovereign had equal personal success in Rome, where
his civilian dress and simple retinue pleased the people by comparison with
the helmeted figure amidst a military cavalcade presented by the German
Emperor on similar occasions. This visit was another proof that Italy^s
adhesion to the Triple Alliance was no longer so firm as in Bismarck's time.
And now, after giving time for impressions at the two other Latin
capitals to work, facing the critical enterprise of his whole life. King Edward
went to Paris in the early days of May, 1903. No one knew what would
happen. As Prince of Wales the King had been a favourite in the French
capital, but in the previous ten years the colonial friction between the
two nations, culminating at Fashoda, had repeatedly brought them to the
edge of conflict; and afterwards the feeling against England had risen to
a pitch of bitterness during the Boer War. A series of wise settlements
had much improved relations between the two Governments, but in the
Paris press and theatre and on tiie boulevards the habit of disliking and
T. B. T. — VOL I — 2
18 WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
ridiculing England was still strong. At first the balance of Parisian feel-
ing wavered; then it soon bent on the side of the King; and within forty-
eight hours, his gracious manners and above all his conspicuous homage
to the French flag, proved irresistible. Doubt had changed to enthusiasm.
This was the true beginning of the Entente Cordmle and one of the very
notable hours of modem history. A few weeks later President Loubet was
welcomed in London. King Edward as a constitutional monarch, unable
to pursue any policy not authorised by his Ministers, had been a symbol
for his statesmen, but a persuasive symbol.
The Governments of London and Paris now came to real grips in the
momentous and not facile negotiations which filled the next twelve months.
France agreed at last — and it was a hard sacrifice of sentiment — to
recognise the established fact of Britain^s position in Egypt; while Britain
gave France in effect a free hand in Morocco, except on the coast opposite
Gibraltar. This document was signed by M. Delcasse in Pans on April
8, 1904. It was a thunderclap to Berlin If this compact were allowed to
hold good, all that was left of the Bismarckian system might founder;
the whole basis of German naval and diplomatic calculations might be
shattered. Already the obstinate dream of a complete Continental bloc
against Britain was destroyed. France and Britain were bound together
by an agreement extinguishing their historic antagonism, sweeping away
their differences in all parts of the globe, and basing their relations, instead,
on broad grounds of common interest. Further, the Mediterranean effects
of the Entente Cordiale must be such that Italy could no longer be reckoned
as a sure member of the Triple Alliance which had been nominally renewed.
Franco-British cooperation would be a factor to reckon with in the East
and at Constantinople, in the Balkans, and across the line of the Bagdad
railway.
And what else? If the British had settled with France, might they
not settle with Russia, though amongst the fixed ideas of the German mind
nothing had been more rooted than the theory of an inevitable conflict
between “ the whale and the bear ? What might now become of the
confident assumption on which the Kaiser had staked all — as almost
openly expressed in the Preamble of the Navy Bill — that conflict in other
regions would compel Britain to divide her navy in a way that would give
the German fleet, concentrated in home waters, a strategical superiority,
enabling it to seize the mastery of the North Sea, the mastery of Britain
and the mastery of the world The sublime self-confidence of William II
was shaken at last. Not for long. For the moment it was best to keep a
bright face at a bad turn of the game. But the game was not yet lost.
Berlin was soon sanguine that it would be fully retrieved. The next ten years
were to be dominated by convulsive attempts to break, first, the Entente
Cordmle, and then the Triple Entente. These challenges became more and
more dangerous and were finally fatal.
THE KUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
To read the heart of affairs in the decade of history preparatory to the
World War, the decisive influence of Far-Eastern affairs on Western des-
tinies must be remembered always. Simultaneously, a new and graver era
had been opened in Asia as in Europe. We must now turn our eyes away
from Paris and London and towards the surpassing drama already opened
on the other side of the world. The Russo-Japanese War had broken out.
Blindly risked by the Tsar and evilly encouraged by the Kaiser — the word
J. L. GARVIN
19
is harsh but compelled by the histone evidence — it was in the long lyn
to ruin both their dynasties and empires. No more impressive warning
has been written by Nemesis upon the records. But at first, as the Fates
often allow for the undoing of their victims, the stars in their courses
seemed to favour Potsdam.
After Germany — amongst the other Powers — had withdrawn oppo-
sition to Russia in Manchuria, the latter, though on paper she had promised
evacuation, in fact refused to quit. The Tsar^s beloved and splendid enter-
prise, the Trans-Siberian railway, spanning a solid sixth of the whole earth,
now stretched on to Port Arthur, intended to be the Pacific terminus of
his Eurasian Empire. Japan was willing to make a broad compromise on
a question which filled her with apprehension Tokyo offered, in effect,
on the lines of Ito’s idea before the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, to recognise
Russia’s Protectorate of Manchuria, if St Petersburg would recognise Japan’s
Protectorate of Korea. The Tsar’s Government not only refused to con-
sider with full seriousness this offer, but a wretched clique round Nicholas
II, amongst other speculations, began to meddle with Korea itself for the
sake of timber concessions on the Yalu. During the second half of 1903
and into 1904 the negotiations went on between Tokyo and St. Petersburg
with increasing tension, while between London and Paris the negotiations
for the Entente Cordiale were pursued. It is admitted that the Japanese
tried by every means to come to a peaceful arrangement, but Nicholas II
could not be induced to believe that they would dare to fight. Ten draft
treaties were prepared in vain, one after the other, in the six months before
hostilities. Strange, childish, hopeless mixture, as he was, of vacillation
and obstinacy, of wavering will and infatuated delusions, the Tsar was
devoted to peace, but he would not concede the terms that the ablest of
his statesmen and soldiers, men like Witte and Kuropatkin, knew to be not
only wise but imperative And the sinister influence breathed from Potsdam.
“ Willy ” affected to warn Nicky ” that the ' Crimean combination ’
(France and England) is forming and working against Russian interests in
the East. The democratic countries governed by Parliamentary majorities
against the Imperial Monarchs! History always repeats itself.” (Novem-
ber 19, 1903 ) Again: “ I get a report that the Japs are clandestinely
arming the Chinese behind your and my back, against us.” (December 4,
1903 ) Again, when peace or war hung in the very balance in the Far
East, the Kaiser wrote a firebrand letter: May God grant that everything
may come off smoothly and that the Japs may listen to reason; notwith-
standing the frantic efforts of the vile Press of a certain country (England) ,
that also seems to have money left to sink it in the Japanese mobilisation
abyss ” (January 9, 1904 )
Korea, like a long arm, thrusts out towards the coasts of Nippon in
such a way that a Russian mastery of the peninsula would be as deadly
to Japan, as would be a foreign control of Florida to the Caribbean interests
of the United States. While the negotiations dragged out interminably
and fruitlessly, Russia was speeding out to the Far East more warships by
sea and more regiments by land. On February 5, 1904, negotiations were
broken off. For nearly ten years Japan, with concentrated energy and
consummate discretion, had been preparing for the possibility of this crisis.
A mysterious and perhaps formidable people, ancient yet renewed, was about
to be put to the test. Was Japan a bubble to be pricked, or was she to
emerge from combat with the vast Tsardom as one of the Great Powers
of the world? Ten years before, the majority of mankind had expected
China to win by slowly-gathering weight after initial reverses. Now a
similar opinion in favour of Russia was generally held. The Russian view
20
WORLD POLICY vema WORLD EXPLOSION
was that the Japanese were ** monkeys with the brains of birds.” A few
British oflBicers, after close study, had formed the contrary opinion: that
the Japanese were Ghurkas — with brains.” The Ghurka in fight is a
cheerful tiger, but not clever. The Mikado’s armies, framed on the German
model, with modern uniforms and modern weapons, were directed by leaders
who m their youth had worn chain armour amidst feudal conditions like
those of the thirteenth century in Europe. For drama, history had known
few things like it since Hannibal; and in this case, Europe, represented by
its largest but least efficient race, was not to win.
THE ASIATIC TRIUMPH
Both sides had been instructed to fire without warning if an opportunity
offered. The Japanese took the opportunity. On February 8 their torpedo
boats made a daring attack upon the Russian warships in harbour at Port
Arthur. The war was largely decided by this instantaneous assertion of
naval superiority. The Tsar’s damaged fleet was weakened by further
alternating passivity and rashness. The Japanese, leaving as little as pos-
sible to chance, transported their armies to the mainland and disposed them
with slow, meticulous care. On the Yalu, April 30, 1904, Russia was beaten
in a first battle relatively as small and significant as Valmy, when Goethe
wrote: “ This day opens a new epoch of history.” A few weeks later took
place the battle of Nanshan, when the Japanese, by weight of numbers
and contempt of death, stormed positions of enormous natural strength
northward of Port Arthur. The immediate sequel was the isolation and
investment of that fortress Kuropatkm, the Russian eeneralissimo, was
disastrously embarrassed by Imperial orders to relieve Port Arthur. Pre-
mature attempt ended in bloodv failure and compromised the main campaign.
Kuropatkin himself well knew that initial loss of territory, though includ-
ing Port Arthur itself, was nothing by comparison, and that it was necessary
to refuse battle until Russia, depending on the limited facilities of a single-
track railway thousands of miles long, had gradually accumulated in the
north decisive superiority of numbers. The Japanese were painfully deliber-
ate, but in spite of extreme difficulties caused by the ground and the weather,
and equally in spite of some heavy repulses, the general advance of their
converging columns was as sure as death. Kuropatkin, still meditating a
conquering counter-stroke at some suitable time, fell back on broad and
fortified positions at Liao-yang. There on the anniversary of Sedan — as
the Mikado’s officers told their men — the Japanese, under Marshal Oyama,
after a week’s fighting overthrew the Russians in a main battle. There were
over 40,000 killed and wounded and the Japanese casualties were more than
half the total. This time the Japanese had won their great victory with
inferior forces. Their success was less than they hoped. There was no
Sedan. Kuropatkin retreated towards Mukden in solid order.
Elsewhere through the autumn and winter the siege of Port Arthur went
on. The defences, thou^ defective to begin with, were soon terrific. Suc-
cessive lines of wire entanglements, backed by numbers of machine-guns and
the employment of hand grenades on both sides, foreshadowed the methods
of the World War. The Japanese attacked with a sacrificial fanaticism as
yet unknown to the whites. They were compelled to settle down to more
gradual methods of eating their way into the defences. At the beginning
of December, the Japanese stormed decisive positions looking down upon
the harbour, and the fire of their howitzers soon destroyed or disabled nearly
all tiie Russian warships. This was the tmming point. On January 2, 1906,
J. L. GARVIN
21
the fortress surrendered. The Japanese had nearly 60,000 casualties and
over 30,000 sick in the great siege, but after nearly ei^t years the Russo-
German-French ultimatum which turned Japan out of Port Arthur after
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, was wonderfully avenged.
The rest is soon told. In the north, Kuropatkin^s strength was growing
every day and in the October battle on the Shaho the Japanese, though
pressing back their massive enemy in the end, did little more than foil
Russia’s hopes and hold their own. The winter stopped active operations.
By the end of January, 1905, the Russians were at last in superior force
and their offensive in a terrible snow-storm nearly won the battle of
Sandepu. A few weeks later came the crowning conflict. Operations at the
end of February led in March to the long battle of Mukden. In this huge
grapple, fought across a front one hundred and forty miles wide, over 600,000
troops were involved. In the end Kuropatkm was once more compelled to
retreat to the north; once more he drew off in fine order; the Japanese utterly
failed in their efforts to envelop according to the ideal of their German
teachers; but on land the results of this huge dull butchery proved decisive.
The Russian casualties were nearly 100,000; the Japanese less than half that
number.
The next and final disaster was at sea. For half a year Rozhdestvensky’s
fleet from Europe, carrying Russia’s last hopes, crawled round the three
continents from the Baltic towards the Yellow Sea. By the end of May
the doomed Armada reached the apt scene of its fate in the Straits of
Tsu-shima, between Korea and the Japanese islands. There it was out-
manoeuvred and outfought by Togo, nearly all the Russian ships being
sunk or taken. The Japanese victory was by far the most momentous naval
event since Trafalgar. Nominally, Russia had still prodigious military
masses in reserve, but she was morally exhausted because the war from
beginning to end was against the instinct of her people.
AMERICA INTERVENES — Tipj TREATY OP PORTSMOUTH
America, a World Power permanently involved in world-politics, was now
marked out as the acceptable arbiter. In June, 1905, President Roosevelt
intervened. Both belligerents embraced his offices. In August, the little
naval town of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, became the unexpected cynosure
of international diplomacy. The resultant Treaty of Peace in September
saved Russia from having to pay a ponderous indemnity, but entrenched
Japan on the Asiatic mainland and made her the predominant Power in the
Far East. She obtained all Korea, Port Arthur, Southern Manchuria, and
half the island of Sakhalin; and thus, absolutely dominating the Yellow
Sea, and enclosing the Sea of Japan, she achieved what is unquestionably,
so far as geographical advantages are concerned, the strongest strategical
situation possessed by any nation in the world.
This was amongst the outstanding events of all time. Japan henceforth
by a marvellous exertion had to be reckoned amongst the eight Great Powers
of the world and placed in the middle of this list, not at the bottom. With-
out disclosing fresh genius in the western sense, her people had shown them-
selves capable of dazzling personal heroism and of a solid collective efficiency.
In the early years of the twentieth century an Asiatic power had vanquished
a European empire by excelling it in political intellect as well as in modern
weapons. A thrill of exultation and excitement passed through all native
Asia: through China, through India, through Turkey; through all those races,
forming two-thirds of all mankind, whom the white nations call coloured.
22
WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
The leaven still works. The ultimate outcome is an enigma of the far future.
The general results so far make for anarchy rather than order. Japan only
amongst the non-white nations, shows a unique gift of political order and
stability with cumulative progress in the assimilation of western science and
technique.
WILLY AND NICKY " — THE TSAR FOR THE GRAND ALLIANCE AGAINST
BRITAIN — THE KAISER COUNTS ON TRIUMPH
We have now to see how these astounding results on the furthest fringe
of Asia made directly for the ruin of Europe and a conflagration of the world
Wrong in every psychological sense with regard to foreign affairs, wrong in
every antecedent calculation regarding the result of intermediate wars,
whether in the Far East, South Africa, or the Balkans, the German Emperor
and his people, though assuming that the Tsardom would be usefully shaken,
expected the eventual victory of Russia in the conflict with Japan. William
II, as we now know, had helped to launch Russia upon Japan at least two
years too soon. For nearly twelve months or so, while the final issue hung
in doubt, Germany was cautious and the Kaiser ingratiating. He took the
tone of an only friend and sympathetic adviser, ceaselessly attempting to
prejudice the Tsar against both France and Britain. France, almost driven
to despair by the suicidal aberrations of her Russian partner and the tem-
porary paralysis of the Dual Alliance for European purposes, was the more
warily resolute to preserve neutrality, holding to the new Entente Cordiale
with Britain as an anchor to windward. This trying policy was brought to
the pinch in October, 1904, by the Dogger Bank incident. Rozhdestvensky's
luckless Armada, obsessed from the start by the dread of Japanese torpedo
attacks, was ready to shoot at shadows On the night of October 24, when
passing through the North Sea, a mad hallucination, like that of Don Quixote
amongst the wine skins, led it to fire into an English fishing fleet with
damage to humble vessels and loss of some lives. The British nation shook
with anger. Its Government and the more responsible part of its Press
remained cool. France was active in conciliation. Both Britain and France
were resolved not to be drawn into the war. The incident was referred to
a special international board of arbitration. But the Tsar was furious
against England and displeased with French neutrality. William II tele-
graphed the following incendiary falsehood: “Heard from private sources
that Hull fishermen have already acknowledged that they have seen foreign
steam craft among their boats ... so there has been foul play."
Under a similar impression the Tsar was actually led to accept the
Kaiser's proposal for a new Continental Alliance. Nicholas II telegraphed
four days after the Dogger Bank incident: “The only way, as you say,
would be that Germany, Russia and France should at once unite upon
arrangements to abolish English and Japanese arrogance and insolence.
Would you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a Treaty? As
soon as it is accepted by us, France is bound to join.” (October 28, 1904.)
As we shall see, secret negotiations in this startling sense went on for months
and came to a climax. They led the Kaiser to believe that in spite of the
Entente Cordiale he had retrieved all; and finally won the great world-game.
We soon find him suggesting (November 17, 1^) such a widening of the
war as might leave neutral Germany supreme:
“ Last not least an excellent expedient to cool British insolence and over-
bearing would be to make some military demonstrations on the Persian
Afghan frontier, where the British think you powerless to appear during
J. L. GARVIN
23
this war; even should the forces at your disposal not suflBce for a real attack
on India itself — a pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will do wonders
in England.”
GERMAN EMPEBOB^S ZENITH — 1905 — TANGIER — DELCASS^'S
FALL — BJORKO TREATY
The extraordinary plot now thickened fast until it exploded in a manner
that shook Europe with the first clear menace of universal war. After the
surrender of Port Arthur and the battle of Mukden, the sufficient defeat and
temporary collapse of Russia were certain in the spring of 1905. The Tsar-
dom was in the throes of a violent internal movement which foreshadowed
the final revolution a dozen years later. Russia as a Great Power was
crippled for a decade — perhaps for a generation. The Dual Alliance was
paralysed; Russia’s historic check on German action removed. The Kaiser
thought the hour had come to throw off reserve, and to attack the Entente
Cordiale openly and with a sledge-hammer. Count von Billow first gave
an ominous hint that France in Morocco was going too far. Demands
presented by a French mission at Fez were assumed to be a plan not merely
for the pacific penetration of Morocco, but for a protectorate amounting
to veiled annexation. This was indeed M Delcasse’s purpose, fully accom-
plished in the sequel His affectation of ignoring Berlin had been excessive
and irritating, but he thought of himself as resisting a domineering veto
on French rights. The Kaiser now undertook a southern voyage. Suddenly,
on March 31, he made his thundering descent on Tangier, where he pro-
claimed that his visit meant the recognition by Germany of the Islamic
sovereignty of the Sultan and the independence of the land.
For nearly twelve months Berlin had seemed to recognise the special
position and interest of the Third Republic in the disorderly and backward
Shereefian Empire lying next to Algeria But Russia was now out of action
Morocco was the pretext — the aim was to smash the Entente by an ultima-
tum to France such as had never been addressed by one Great Power to an-
other. France was staggered by the gravity of the menace and by the violence
of an insult never afterwards forgotten or forgiven. Delcasse was nerved
to resist; Britain was prepared with all her strength to support France if
necessary. We now know that Europe stood on the brink of war. The
Rouvier Cabinet yielded and accepted the German demand for an interna-
tional conference on the Moroccan question. Delcasse resigned. The
statesman who had held office for seven years — longer than any other
Foreign Minister under the Third Republic — had been practically dismissed
by a foreign Power. But his work and policy survived him. They w^ere to
destroy the Bismarckian system of diplomacy, once overwhelming. The
Kaiser had only rivetted the Entente by hammering on it.
Just before Delcasse’s fall, the Tsar’s last fleet had been annihilated in
the Far East. As Count Reventlow has revealed, many German military
experts held that Germany then ought to have forced war and that William
II, loud in words, weak in action, had thrown away an unparalleled situa-
tion. They believed that at this moment of the paralysis of the Dual
Alliance, the triumph of the Kaiser’s armies would have been swift and
sweeping enough to establish once for all a German military hegemony over
Europe. The chances in 1909 were unquestionably less favourable than in
1905; they were still less so in 1911; and least of all in 1914 when the Kaiser
cast the die at last.
24
WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
But m this summer of 1905 he believed that a further success and one
even more astonishing, though secret, had completed his ascendency. Ger-
many had already turned her eastern neighbour’s troubles to profit by
exacting a commercial treaty which all Russians thought rapacious. Further,
since Nicholas II in his misinformed irritation after the Dogger Bank in-
cident had offered to throw himself into Germany’s arms, the Kaiser had
vehemently urged the clinching of the compact. He insisted that France
must on no account be taken into confidence. When confronted with the
accomplished fact she would have to acquiesce. The feeble Tsar dallied and
wavered, loath to betray his Ally, yet swayed by dire need of a period of
assmed safety. Personal feelings mingled. The Kaiser had seemed to be
his only sympathetic friend abroad, and was giving him at this time excellent
advice in favour of constitutional reforms in time to make the Russian
people share with their ruler the responsibility for a peace of defeat. On
July 24, 1905, at Bjorko, Nicholas II with incredible weakness signed, without
consulting France, the clandestine treaty of alliance against Britain. It
was only seven weeks after Delcasse’s fall. Well might William II believe
that the stars in their courses were on his side. His exultation was un-
restrained, his imagination unbounded. Shortly after his capture of the Tsar’s
signature he wrote of the Treaty as follows:
“ In times to come it may not be impossible that even Japan may feel in-
clined to join it. This would cool down English self-assertion and imperti-
nence. The 24th July, 1905, is a comer stone in European politics and turns
over a new leaf in the history of the world. . . . Holland, Belgium, Denmark,
Sweden will all be attracted to this new great centre of gravity. . . . They
will revolve in the orbit of the great block of Powers (Russia, Germany,
France, Austria, Italy) and feel confidence in leaning on and revolving
around this mass.” (“ Willy ” to “ Nicky ” July 27, 1905.)
Presently he goes still further:
“ America will stand on the side of this combination. . . . The Continen-
tal Combine flanked by America is the sole and onlv manner to effectively
block the way to the whole world becoming John Bull’s private property,
which he exploits to his heart’s content, after having by his intrigues without
end, set the rest of the civilised nations by each other’s ears for his own
personal benefit.”
But the Tsar soon learned his lesson, and, recognising the tempter, he
escaped from the snare into which he had been led. His Ministers, aghast,
brought him back to his senses and his duty. He was always well-meaning,
but fated to perish through feebleness of understanding and character. The
tone of this disastrous correspondence was never so intimate again. The
secret treaty remained of no effect and in due time was formally annulled.
What William II took for Hesperian apples were Dead-Sea fruit. As
“ Bjfirko ” had failed, Tangier was to fail.
DEAD-SISA FBtJlT — ALGBCIBA8 — BEVAL — KAISEB’S CONTINENTAL PLAN BBOKEN
— HIS ALABM AND AWAKENING — GEBMAN CBY OF ENCIBCLEMENT
The Algeciras Conference, won by Delcasse’s overthrow, proved in 1906
an utter disappointment for Germany, and was, in fact, a heavy diplomatic
defeat. Nearly all the participating Powers, including Italy, helped to con-
firm French supremacy in Morocco. The Entente Cordiale was consolidated.
France and Britain exchanged military and naval views, with a view to con-
certing arrangements in case of need, and strengthened themselves against a
J. L. GAEVIN 25
renewal of surprises like the Tangier threat Europe had now definitely en-
tered the danger-zone. In London and Paris alike diplomacy pursued its steady
constructive work while the Kaiser’s hopes, cherished for so many years, of a
European coalition imder German hegemony were finally broken up. Brit-
ish statesmen had removed the causes of war with France. They now set
themselves to remove causes of war with Russia. Neighbours in Asia, they
were equally interested in providing against the possible use by Germany
and Turkey of the Bagdad railway, and especially of its end-sections towards
the Persian Gulf, as an instrument of war.
London and St. Petersburg, in 1907, came to an agreement upon the whole
Persian question — a very sensitive sphere of their relations. When the
Wilhelmstrasse in 1901 had rejected British approaches, Holstein had thrown
scorn and mockery upon every suggestion of the possibility of an Anglo-
Russian settlement. No German of influence believed in that possibility.
The obsolete theory of an inevitable conflict between the whale and the
bear ” had once prevailed even in Pans, as in every other Continental capital.
In Germany it still remained not only a view, but an obsession. As we have
seen, the naval Preamble of 1900 was based on it.
Now what the fixed ideas of a whole generation had assumed to be im-
possible was about to become a fact Anglo-Russian relations were drawn
closer. King Edward had always been liked at the Russian Court, as in
Republican Paris. In June, 1908, he met the Tsar at Reval and the Entente
Cordiale broadened into the Triple Entente King Edward again spoke for
his statesmen. Cordial relations were established between the two rulers.
They came to an agreement about reforms to be conceded by Turkey to
Macedonia, seething more and more with tyranny and revolt, brigandage
and outrage, a ceaseless peril to the peace of Europe Details were discussed
between Sir Charles (now Lord) Hardmge, who accompanied the King on
behalf of the British Foreign Office, and the Tsar’s Minister, M. Isvolsky.
Next, Edward VII went to see his Imperial nephew at Friedrichshof and
afterwards met Francis Joseph at a charming little Austrian holiday-place,
Ischl. The Balkans were discussed again ; the aged Habsburg sovereign prom-
ised to take no one-sided action; well had he kept to that mind. Francis
Joseph was asked whether he could not advise William II against the con-
tinual increase of the German fleet
As a result of these various monarchical conversations in the summer of
1908 a spreading legend sprang up like a banyan tree. It is untrue that King
Edward at Ischl attempted anything so futile as trying to withdraw the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from its basic alliance with Germany. It is
untrue that the King and the Tsar at Reval had concerted measures against
Germany. The Tsar at this time was more than ever devoted to peace, a
desperate necessity for Russia and his dynasty. His personal friendship with
William II remained genuine, though no longer on the autocrat’s side so
ardent and credulous as in the period leading up to Bjorko. King Edward
was utterly for peace, though seeing the plain signs of disaster to Europe,
and doing his duty by seeking peace with safety. French diplomacy was
minutely prudent. Britain under the extreme democratic coalition, Liberal-
Labour-Irish, was incapable of aggression and even of thorough resolution in
naval defence. Again, Britain was not bound by any hard and fast engage-
ment to side with France in case of war, but scrupulously reserved her right
to judge of the circumstances. The consent of a Cabinet and of a House of
Commons, each containing strong pro-German influences, would first have to
be won.
Nevertheless, the cry was raised and believed in Germany that King
Edward, apparently a sensible, adroit, and very well-dressed gentleman, was
26
WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
really an ogre in a silk-hat, who sought with ruthless astuteness the “ encir-
clement” of Germany. Now as throughout, the German people were more
sinned against than sinning. They knew nothing of the Potsdam-Petersburg
correspondence and the Kaiser’s efforts to create against Britain a European
coalition — flanked by America ” — as a means towards Germany’s un-
parallelled double supremacy by land and sea. Britain and France, living
under the deepening shadow of an incalculable danger, were trying to increase
their safeguards by eliminating old enmities, extending friendships. In short,
following Burke’s suggestion they were seeking to make “ provident fear the
mother of safety ” Early in the same year, 1908, the British Cabinet in its
almost nervous desire to placate, had actually communicated to the German
Emperor the British naval programme before it had been laid on the table of
the House of Commons. After Reval and Ischl, however, William II rushed
from optimism to alarm, and on October 28 the author of the Bjorko Treaty,
as of anti-British letters to the Tsar for 20 years, publicly protested in the
celebrated authorised interview in the London Dady Telegraph that he had
always been the friend of England and during the Boer War had even
suggested an eventual cooperation of the British and German fleets in the
Far East, where such cooperation could only have been directed against
Russia, whom, for ten years, he had been inciting to aggression and war in that
region. The interview aroused universal mistrust, excited a storm of con-
temptuous protest in Germany itself, and the Kaiser’s personal prestige never
quite recovered
1908 — Europe’s thunderclap — the young turk revolution — Balkan
UPHEAVAL — RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA
Meanwhile, as an unexpected result of the Reval meeting between King
Edward and the Tsar, events elsewhere were sweeping like a great river be-
ginning to speed towards a cataract. The dull roar of its waters was heard ;
it might be distant or near; the farther the worse Turkey m Europe had
survived chiefly because of the rivalries between Britain and Russia If
these Powers now agreed, Ottoman rule over the Balkan Christians would
come to a sure doom unless the Turks themselves could create in time a
wholly new situation. The Young Turk movement had long been conspiring
for the overthrow of the old order prolonged by the cunning tyranny of
Abdul Hamid. The movement had been commonly regarded as the pathetic
delusion of westernised cliques preaching futile constitutionalism or academic
treason from Paris or Geneva It was everywhere underrated and often
ridiculed. The blindness of ordinary mankind, btit especially of experts, to
the true significance of coming forces, good and bad, m Europe, was one of
the curious features of this epoch. The Young Turks, aided by Jewish ability,
spread their propaganda in spite of the efforts of Yildiz Kiosk to root it
out, and at last transferred their secret directorate to Salonika where the
Coinmittee of Union and Progress was formed to prepare the revolution
Military conspirators were now the soul of its action. Fear of the Reval
programme” of reforms hastened all plans. At the beginning of July the
standard of Turkish revolt against the Sultan was raised in Macedonia. Re-
actionary officers were killed. The Constitution was proclaimed at Salonika
and elsewhere. Abdul Hamid could no longer rely on the army. On July 24,
after a despotism of 30 years, the master of wiles was netted at last. His
decree restored the Constitution suspended since 1878 and summoned a
Chamber of Deputies
For a few weeks idyllic enthusiasm prevailed in Turkey and elsewhere.
Not only did Turks and Christians embrace. Different kinds of Christians,
J. L. GARVIN 27
whose mutual antipathies had been unmatchable, embraced each other. All
men seemed to be transported by a dream of ideal liberalism. In Britain,
for instance, a Liberal statesman like the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward
Grey, declared that, as a result of this marvellous fraternisation of races and
religions, “ the Macedonian question and others of a similar character will
entirely disappear.” Unfortunately, in the main respect — the determination
to assert, to increase Ottoman and Moslem ascendency — the authors of
the revolution, patriots according to their mixed lights, were not Liberals, but
Nationalists and even Chauvinists of the reddest stripe. The Young Turks
were Old Turks “writ large.” They showed every desire to put back the
clock by reasserting Ottoman suzerainty m quarters where under Abdul
Hamid it had been, long dormant and was assumed to be extinct. The
recoil of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria — doubtless acting in collusion —
led to that sinister and convulsive Balkan crisis which gave an irreparable
shock to the old European system and was the real introduction to the
World War. Through the autumn of 1908 and the spring of 1909 Europe
skirted the precipice.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for thirty years occupied and administered by
Austria-Hungary with excellent material results, were still subject in mere
name to a faint shadow of the Sultan’s sovereignty. The Prince of Bul-
garia was as nominally the Sultan’s vassal. On October 5, Ferdinand
declared his sovereign independence as Tsar of Bulgaria; and two days later,
the Emperor Francis Joseph proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. By that stroke, long meditated, the Habsburg Foreign Min-
ister, Count Aehrenthal, unchained a wild tempest of conflicting winds
Formerly Ambassador at St Petersburg, and speculating safely on Russia’?
weakness after the Manchurian struggle, he had brusqued and humiliated
the Tsar’s Foreign Minister, M Isvolsky, a more brilliant mind but a
much less sinewy and wary character. Isvolsky had consented to the annex-
ation on terms of simultaneous compensation for Russia by the opening oi
the Dardanelles, which would have been a great historic stroke. Nov
Aehrenthal had abruptly incorporated the provinces occupied since 1878 and
ignored St. Petersburg There was no compensation for Russia on the side
of the Dardanelles. These, as a result of the Far-Eastern debacle, were
galling slights to crippled Russia Before plunging into the Manchurian con-
flict with the Kaiser’s encouragement, Russia had never regarded the Habsburg
medley as an equal Povrer.
The Young Turks boycotted Austro-Hungarian commerce. The BritisV
Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, pleaded in a manner little appreciatec
at the time for a principle vital to the world — that treaty-engagement?
entered into by a number of Powers ought not to be changed without con-
sultation among them; and that no one signatory Power ought to be able
to turn any treaty into “ a scrap of paper ” by single and arbitrary action
That w^as the great contention on which peace or war for the world de-
pended in July, 1914 The Treaty of Berlin, bad from the beginning, was
now quite decayed and untenable No international conference would have
refused to alter the articles concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
sense desired by Austria-Hungary. By all the diplomatic standards acceptec
at that time, the substantial claim of Vienna was unanswerable. But ir
form the Aehrenthal coup at Russia’s expense was too like the Kaiser’s fata
Tangier method of bidding for diplomatic success by the open humiliatior
of another Great Power. The Tsardom had been overbearing in its day
Trading on Russia’s temporary disability, Aehrenthal in turn abused hi?
advantage. Above all, he forgot that there was now a Duma and a public
opinion in Russia and that he was incensing, not merely an autocrat, bui
an immense people.
28
WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS — GERMANY’S VETO ON RUSSIA — '^SHINING ARMOUR”
All this, in significance for the future, was mild compared with the
volcanic flare of Serbian nationalist passion. The Yugoslavs then and
afterwards were even more underestimated by all other peoples than had
been the Young Turks. They were all the time an extensive race broken
up into fragments, aspiring passionately to unity like the larger German
and Italian races half a century before. Some of the fragments were under
Austrian rule, some under Himgarian, some, as in the occupied provinces,
under a mixed Imperial administration, some still under the Turkish yoke,
as for nearly six centuries past. The independent Serbian Kingdom was
only a political nucleus of the racial aggregate, but the free Serbs regarded
Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Alsace-Lorraine of their racial cause. There,
Croats and Slovenes — Catholic, Orthodox, Mussulman — in spite of bitter
religious differences, spoke the same eloquent language and belonged to one
physical stock. Above all, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia were the sea-
provinces of the race and gave that access to the west which was the key
to the economic liberty as well as the political union of the Yugoslavs.
Held in a noose by the Austrian command of her trade-outlets, little
Serbia,” whenever daring to show political independence, was always liable
to be politically throttled by pig-wars” and other tariff measures.
Driven now to frenzy by the prospect of increased Austrian pressure, the
free Serbs demanded the concession of a strip of territory which would
connect them with their Montenegrin kinsmen and give them a road to the
sea, while at the same time barring further Austrian advance through the
Balkans towards Salonika. This, let us note again, was the very issue of
July, 1914, throwing its shadow before. Towards the frantic clamour of
the hot-headed Serbs, Vienna was contemptuous and adamant Germany
was behind Austria. Russia, in spite of a genuine national outbreak of
pan-Slav emotion m favour of Serbia, could do nothing but sympathise.
Sure of his game, and playing with as much skill as firmness, Aehrenthal
knew that the Tsar would not and could not fight Yet the Serbian chal-
lenge to the Dual Empire continued, and outwardly the danger of a general
war seemed to tremble in the balance for months
Cool observers saw that the Triple Entente in this early stage of its
existence and at this first test of its strength, was in sight of a diplomatic
rout. Britain, France and Russia led the proposal for an international
conference. Aehrenthal accepted the conference on condition that the an-
nexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbian claims to compensation were
excluded from its purview. This was amongst the notable ironic strokes
of European history. The Triple Entente retreated. France was rationally
lukewarm in the cause.
Serbia remained recalcitrant and continued to arm on the desperate
calculation that if Austria was provoked to attack, the war must become
general, because Russia would have to join in at any risk rather than allow
her prestige in the Balkans to be destroyed. But the Kaiser was satisfied
that the time had now come to appear as arbiter — ‘‘ in shining armour ”
as he expressed it a year later — and to confront the big Slav brother with
the choice between abandoning the little brother and facing war with
Germany. In this sense on March 23, 1909, Count Pourtalte, the German
Ambassador in St. Petersburg, delivered an ultimatum in the guise of
friendly advice, informing the Tsar’s Government that the Hohenzollem
Empire stood with the whole of its strength behind the Habsburg Monarchy.
Unless Russia accepted Austro-Hungarian policy without delay or reserve,
© FrulL llollyer © ht ij-^tone View Co
Mr. C. P. Scott, the veteran editor of the Viscount Northchffe, who for many years
famous Liberal newspaper. The Manchester wielded immense power as proprietor of The
Guardian. Times, and numerous other journals.
© Keystone View Co
Mr. J. L. Garvm, one of the great editors of all times. He has made the London
Observer a great organ of opimon and his influence is deeply felt throughout the
pohtical world. To this book he contributes the opening essay.
THREE COMMANDING FIGURES IN MODERN JOURNALISM
J. L. GARVIN
29
there would be war. Russia surrendered. For the moment, there was no
choice. Serbia had to yield in humble terms. Montene^n submission
followed.
As Morocco at the time of the Tangier coup was the pretext for an
attempt to break the Dual Entente between France and Britain, so the
more veiled ultimatum to St. Petersburg used Serbia as the pretext for an
equally miscalculating attempt to break the new Triple Entente which in-
cluded Russia. The inwardness of the situation is brought out with unmis-
takable clearness in a letter from “Willy ” to “ Nicky ” a short while be toe:
“ It is the patent fact that for the last two years Russian policy has been
gradually drawing away from us more and more, evolving always closer
towards a combination of Powers unfriendly to us. . . . As for other questions
in which we are interested, such as the Bagdad railway, where we expected
to count on Russia, she in her policy gave us a wide berth.” (January 8, 1909.)
This last sentence shows such mental immaturity on the part of a man
of fifty that we pity the writer as well as the nations whose destinies
were at the mercy of a superficial imagination and meddling restlessness
divorced from solid, sober ability.
HOW 1909 FREPASED 1914
This crisis must be followed in a detail disproportionate to the general
scale of our survey, because it is impossible to over-estimate the im-
portance of events in eastern Europe between the summer of 1908 and the
spring of 1909. The World War quickened in the womb of that period.
This time the Central Empire had a practical case that with all imper-
fections was as sound on its merits as the case of France in 1905. But
the final German intervention in “ shining armour ” was another example
of the ominous method peculiarly characteristic of the Emperor William’s
reign. He confronted Great Powers and peoples with the choice between
humiliation and war. When they had to yield they never forgave. Thrice
he won, as after Shimonoseki, Tangier, and the eastward apparition “ in
shining armour.” Thrice he failed. The Kruger telegram, the Agadir coup
the last ultimatum in 1914 were not followed by the diplomatic surrendei
of other Powers The risk of this method, as we shall further see, was dire
and cumulative It was certain sooner or later to bring about diplomatic
deadlock and the catastrophe of a general war.
At the head of a powerful clique the Chief of the Austro-Hungariar
General Staff, Conrad von Hotzendorff, had been vehemently in favour ol
crushing Serbia by force of arms. This wish, though thwarted for the
time, remained a military ideal in Vienna and Budapest during 1909-1914
the last half-decade of the world’s peace. The kindred states of Serbia anc
Montenegro were, on their side, henceforth resolved that the Habsburg Empiri
was the great enemy and that the fight for life would have to be faced
And Russia? Sullen, remembering, Russia, to adapt a celebrated phras<
out of her history in a previous generation, only recoiled to bide her time
Just after the triumph of “ shining armour,” the remark of one of th'
shrewdest of European diplomatists to the present writer was: “ 'This wil
bite into the flesh of the Slavs.”
Above all, the Kaiser did for the Triple Entente in the spring of 190!
what he had done for the Entente Cordiale in the summer of 1905. H
consolidated what he thought to disrupt. Russia was fundamentally alien
ated like Britain and France. Italy, though temporising in appearanc
to some years longer, was in reality detached. The last vestiges of Bis
30 WORLD POI.ICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
marck^s diplomatic work had now been wiped out by 'William II, though
without that work Germany’s military successes in 1866 and 1870 against
isolated opponents could not have been won, and the greatness of Germany
in the years afterwards never could have risen to the height it reached.
The Iron Chancellor succeeded to the end because he maintained close
confidence with Russia and tolerable relations with Britain. The Kaiser
might have succeeded by settling definitely with one or the other, but he
antagonised both For an anti-Russian policy under the old conditions
Bismarck would not have given the bones of the Pomeranian grenadier. For
an anti-Russian policy under the new conditions he would not have given
the bones of what is called a Pomeranian dog If the Kaiser’s naval policy
was to be pursued at almost any price, then it was life and death for
Germany to make sure of Russia. If the Berlin-Bagdad line of influence
was to be strengthened at almost any price, then it was life and death to
make sure of Britain. To court Russia and urge her into war before the
Manchurian debacle, yet to exploit her weakness afterwards, was a supreme
satire upon the “ 'Willy-Nicky ” correspondence and one of the crudest
blunders in history. After the Muscovite discomfiture, Berlin and Vienna
alike were misled by an illusion of almost measureless power. As a result
the two Central Empires and their dynasties on one side, the Russian
Empire and its dynasty on the opposite, were destined to drag each other
into the abyss. And little Serbia was to be as fatal to William IT as
little Portugal had been to Napoleon. No moral law is more surely to be
deduced from the history of our time, as from all history, than this:
“ m tragic Iifo God
No villain need be; passions spin the plot,
We are betrayed by what is fal^e \Mthin ”
1905-1910 — BRITISH FLEET AND GERMAN PERIL — APPROXIMATING
STRENGTHS — OFFERS AND REFUSALS — BRITISH PARTY STRIFE
AND Germany’s fixed method
We must now turn from the Continental to the maritime side of this
unprecedented massing of rival world forces. Immediately after the Balkan
crisis just described, Britain was shaken by a violent naval agitation. Her
fleet, as her poet wrote long before, was “ her all in all.” Her Cabinet was
internally divided. The extreme Radical group fought to restrain the in-
crease of naval expenditure in order to have more money for social reforms
The burning question was whether several battleships and battle-cruisers,
more or less, ought to be provided. The liiberal Foreign Secretary, Sir
Edward Grey, had to warn the House of Commons, in some of the gravest
words ever addressed to it, that any failure of the democratic parties to
maintain naval supremacy in the home seas must result in making Britain
‘Hhe conscript appendage of a foreign power” The rumours of Germany’s
achieved strength at sea and of her secret preparation for naval expansion
in emergency were considerably exaggerated Yet there was no further doubt
that in less than a single decade the rise of the German fleet and the magni-
tude of the whole technical organisation behind it had become portentous
beyond anything anticipated, except by a very few, at the opening of the
century.
A sketch of some antecedent events must be briefly given. Dependent
on a huge and advanced democratic majority the Liberal Government in
Britain sought for a limitation of armaments with a sincere eagerness which
defeated its purpose. Immediately after entering upon office in December,
J. L GARVIN
31
1905, the Cabinet offered to make a friendly naval compromise with Ger-
nany upon the basis of a settled relative strength of 6 to 3. This offer,
though supported by the German Ambassador in London, Count Wolf-
VIetternich, was imprudently refused by the German Emperor and Admiral
lirpitz. So the proposals of the Unionist Government for an Anglo-German
Entente had been almost satirically declined through Biilow and Holstein
in 1901 at the very outset of the naval competition. To prove its modera-
tion, King Edward^s new Government proceeded to reduce somewhat the
rate, and in the same limited measure to interrupt the regularity, of British
naval construction. The German law, on the contrary, worked with un-
deviating fixity for years ahead.
The Kaiser and his advisers were led to think that their automatic,
cumulative method would wear down Britain under her now conditions of
known Ministerial dissension and apparent democratic instability. The
Germans never understood the tremendous underlying strength of British
libertv, and they had a blind belief in the unchanged efficacy of Prussian
tradition in modern circumstances. They knew that their organisation,
ponderous and exact, was in every mechanical sense the greatest fighting
system that the world had seen They underestimated the determination
of other peoples not to submit to it; and above all the rallying power of
free institutions energised by a free Press, the dangerous potentiality
inherent in great moral causes. At the second Hague Conference in 1907
Germany defeated the proposals of the British Liberals for a limitation of
armaments, and equally desisted attempts to check the perversion of civilisa-
tion through the appalling additions by modern science itself to the horrors
of war. Both conferences were failures in the technical sense, but by their
moral effect they helped in the long run to create counter forces whereof
the mechanical Prussian War-School had little dreamed.
LORD FISHER VCrSlLS TIRPITZ — BRITAIN'S TREMENDOUS REORGANISATION —
RAIjLY OF THE NATION FOB THE NAVY
If the British Ministry, with other democratic and religious elements
of opinion, strove for the better at this time, though the effect was on
the whole contrary to their hopes, the British nation prepared toughly for
the worst and showed its maritime instinct to be worthy of its strongest
historic days. In half a decade the rise of the German danger had brought
about what was nothing less than a revolution in the whole naval organisa-
tion of the older sea-power. The plan of the German Preamble counted
on seizing supremacy at the decisive point because of the world-wide dis-
location of British squadrons. Britain replied by the tremendous concen-
tration of its forces towards the North Sea until, as Admiral Mahan said,
over 80 per cent of its gun strength was trained on Germany. The Japanese
Alliance, the French Entente^ the Russian rapprochement enabled strength
to be withdrawn safely from distant stations. For the purposes of this naval
revolution, Britain found a sailor of genius known later as Lord Fisher. A
man of volcanic energy, of ruthless will, of original imagination and endless
technical resource, combined with a matchless knowledge of the Bible, he
initiated the Dreadnought age, built the first ship of that type with un-
parallelled rapidity, and in many other ways he enforced new methods and
promoted new men. His whole mind was on the North Sea: '"Let your
battle-ground be your drill-ground.” No single man in centuries had ever
stamped so broadly his personal impress upon the building, arming, station-
32 WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
ing training and leading of the British fleet. At the end of the first decade
of this grim competition between the two countries, Geman continuity and
ability had made it certain that in case of conflict Britain, in the home seas,
would have to grapple with a more massive antagonist than she had ever met;
but on the other hand, the more facile and sanguine calculations with which
the Kaiser had challenged this epic rivalry at the beginning of the century,
had been shattered as completely in the strategical sense as m the diplomatic.
POLITICAL WEAKNESS IN PRANCE, BRITAIN, RUSSIA — THE POTSDAM AGREE-
MENT — GERMANY STILL COUNTS TO WIN
But this, SO evident in the retrospect, did not seem so clear in 1909 and
1910. Owing to that seething conflict between autocracy and reform, which
will be best sketched at a much later point, Russia was still powerless
without and distracted within. France was shaken by labour troubles under
the trenchant Briand Ministry. Britain was for long in the throes of a
tumultuous constitutional and social struggle. The Radical Budget raised
the largest revenue known up to that time, and while making the least
relative provision for the fleet it was accused of introducing Socialistic legis-
lation, in the disguise of certain taxes. The House of Lords threw out
the Budget, which had not been done for 200 years, and compelled reference
of these issues to the people at a General Election. The Peers, in their
turn, were accused of challenging in their own class interests the historic
supremacy of the House of Commons in finance. In the General Election
at the beginning of 1910 the Unionists, who demanded a stronger navy,
a tariff and an effective Second Chamber, did not win, but they gained 100
seats in the House of Commons. Henceforward there was a sure prepon-
derance in that ruling body for increased naval estimates. The hereditary
House of Lords, on the other hand, was reduced in power and status. But,
again, in the House of Commons, though now more sovereign than any
other representative assembly in the world, the former overwhelming
Liberal-Labour majority was broken down, and between the British parties
the balance of power once more fell into the hands of the Insh Nationalists.
As a result, Irish Home Rule, with the threat of Protestant Ulster to resist
by civil war unless excluded, had to become once more the dominant issue of
British domestic politics. Even this, as we shall see, played its part amongst
all those countless factors throughout the world which were converging towards
the World War.
Amidst this insular upheaval King Edward died and Germany breathed
more freely. In a few years the sagacious, conciliatory monarch, coming
to the throne so late, long regarded by his flamboyant Imperial nephew as
a dandified mediocrity, had contrived by the quietest means to outshine
and outplay the Kaiser, who had formerly engrossed the political stage.
In Germany King Edward had become a legend like ^‘Malbrook,” in old
France, but as they made a nightmare of his motives they exaggerated his
personal influence. The inferences they drew from his death were equally
erroneous. He had been the crowned interpreter of a national policy. It
was to remain.
German hopes, however, thus revived in 1910 by political changes in
England and in France, were further strengthened* at the end of the year
by an event on the Russian side, so remarkable, that it almost revived
for one last interval the soaring optimism encouraged half a decade before
by the Bjorko Treaty itself. Russo-British relations were still not too settled
or easy. There were renewed rubs in the Middle East and the friction
J. L. GARVIN
was to become worse. All over Asia, in China and India, as in Persia and
Turkey, new ideas of reform were working since the victories of Japan
over a white Power. In Persia the British were on the side of “progress,”
such as it was, distorted by tribal anarchy ; the Russians were very naturally
on the side of “ order ” and of monarchical reaction, such as at Tehran tb^
could more readily control.
The wavering Tsar, desiring to maintain the Triple Entente for European
purposes and to recover some measure of German support for Asiatic pur-
poses, entered into another separate negotiation at Berlin. On the German
side the wish for sure friendly relationship with Russia was constant and
anxious, though no decisive way of realising that wish was ever taken. The
end was willed, but not the means. The Russian Foreign Office was partly
influenced by more subtle motives. It desired to gain time for re-armament
by keeping Germany in better humour. Towards the close of 1910, in
November, Kaiser and Tsar met once more at Potsdam. This opened be-
tween the two Governments a long negotiation, ending in the celebrated
Potsdam Agreement. Russia engaged to support the Bagdad railway, Ger-
many to support the Tsar’s interests in Persia. A cross line, the Kh a niki n
branch, was to link up the Bagdad track with the railways of the neighbour-
ing Russian sphere. Prince Biilow had been succeeded by the morel sober
but more luckless Bethmann-Hollweg. The new Imperial Chancellor, how-
ever, now believed himself entitled to make a large statement. Germany and
Russia were agreed that neither would enter into any kind of combination
directing an aggressive point against the other. They were equally at one
in upholding the atatus quo in the Balkans and the Near East generally.
They would support no policy, from whatever side attempted, which might
aim at a disturbance of the status qua.
MOROCCO AND BERLIN — PREPARING AGAIN TO EXPLODE THE ENTENTE CORDIALE
In the beginning of that echoing year of 1911, Britain and France, as
they might well be, were profoundly alarmed by these proceedings on the
part of Russia, which threatened to reduce the Triple Entente to a nullity
Their protests prevailed. The Potsdam Agreement became in the end a
dead letter, like the Bjorko Ticaty. But in Persia, Mr. Morgan Shuster,
an American, had appeared, in a manner abhorrent to the Tsardom, as
financial reorganiser, a task which demanded the political powers of a dic-
tator. As a consequence, Anglo-Russian dissensions became yet more acute,
even grave, in a manner vigilantly watched from Berlin. Britain and Prance
were still rent within by continued domestic controversies of unusual vio-
lence. The Briand Ministry fell, but the brief Monis Ministry had no
better luck. When the brilliant, forceful but ambiguous Joseph Caillaux
came into power in June, 1911, he was inclined, like his fellow Radicals in
the contemporary British Cabinet, to risk weakening the Entente in the
interests of negotiations with Berlin. Once more the diplomatic conjuncture
viewed from the Wilhelmstrasse seemed favourable. If Germany was sure
of Russia’s neutrality, Britain and France might be safely — profitably —
confronted by an accomplished fact. They would not and they could not
fight. King Edward was dead; the time had come to inter his system with
his bones. Events in Morocco seemed to offer a conspicuous opportunity
of compelling France to liquidate that controversy once for all, on terms
of extensive and even splendid compensation for Germany.
The result of these circumstances was the sudden Agadir crisis — perhaps
the most ominous explosion by which the general fabric of European peace
34 WORLD POLICY verstis WORLD EXPLOSION
had been shaken for a generation. After that nothing was the same. A
sense of security never existed again for a single day. It was one link in
a far-stretching chain of fatality. Other things had been hard to remedy,
but this, as we can now see, was irreparable. Agadir wrote the first para-
graph in the preface to Armageddon. Yet undoubtedly the real aim of
Germany, despite the huge blunder of its method, was to force a compre-
hensive settlement with France. Berlin never was surer of the justice of
its own purposes, or of the peaceful triumph of its procedure. By this time
the ironic gods were mocking men.
We have seen how the Tangier coup failed The Algeciras Conference
in 1906 was a diplomatic defeat for Germany in the mam Nevertheless,
the resultant act beset with many hindrances the French path in Morocco
and enabled Germany to keep in reserve many pretexts for renewed inter-
ference at a likely time. Prince Biilow could write confidently: “ In future
dealings with Moroccan affairs Germany thus retained for herself a decisive
vote — a vote which she will not relinquish without adequate compen-
sation.” This was the guiding thought in the inner mind of the German
Government during the next few years The one thing certain about the
French policy of pacific penetration was that it must either cease to be
pacific or fail to penetrate. The fierce tribes assailed the French and weje
at feud with each other In 1907 Europeans were slaughtered at Casa-
blanca; and the French, after storming the town, had to advance in force
into the country beyond. At Casablanca again, in the very next year, the
German Consulate, a busy centre of small conspiracy against the French,
seemed to have become an agency for inducing members of the Foreign
Legion to desert Meanwhile the general anarchy was ag^avated when the
former Sultan, Abd-el-Aziz, was deposed in favour of his brother, Mulai
Hafid, victorious in the consequent civil war.
The Germans expected that the new Sultan would be more under their
influence. He had other views In February, 1909, France and Germany,
after incessant diplomatic chaffering, arrived at an agreement professedly
designed to remove all further cause for misunderstanding Declaring that
her interests were economic only, Germany, on condition of security for
those interests, agreed not to contest French political predominance Once
on the throne the new Sultan, Mulai Hafid, surrendered himself altogether
to French influence in return for a fat loan; and at the same time, in
February, 1910, his entire revenues were handed over to French control.
M. Delcasse's daring dream, the “ Empire of the Atlas ” as a French Pro-
tectorate, was in near sight of being realised German policy watched this
development with concern, but deliberately allowed the situation to mature
and waited for a better moment to strike. It soon came Mulai Hafid
was regarded as a French creature; the tribes rose and he was besieged in
his capital. A French force marched to his relief and occupied Fez on
May 21, 1911. Berlin regarded this occupation of the Moroccan capital
as a final and flagrant act in the assertion of French supremacy. German
policy at first made no formal objection and studied its course The secret
dealings of the next few weeks are still obscure A version widely received
in France is that Caillaux’s private communications led Berlin to believe that
France would yield to a repetition of the Tangier coup. On the German
side Count Reventlow, claiming special knowledge of this episode, broadly
hints at the Kaiser’s belief that the attitude of Britain after King Edward’s
death, and in view of her convulsive party-conflicts, would be weaker than
before, and that Germany from beginning to end of the affair would have
to deal with France alone.
J. L. GARVIN
35
AGADIR — WITHIN A HAIR^S-BREADTH OF WAR — GERMANY'S GREAT DREAM AND
RETREAT — THE COMPROMISE
The German concessionaires in the preceding years of uncertainty had
strengthened their footing in Morocco. Especially the Mannesmann brothers
had got nearly the whole of the mines. On the allegation that German
firms had appealed to Berlin to protect their lives and property, the Kaiser’s
Government startled the world once more by a threatening gesture. A
warship was abruptly despatched to Morocco On July 1, 1911, the gun-
boat “ Panther ” dropped anchor in the little Atlantic port of Agadir, far
southward in that part of Morocco which lies towards the Canary Islands
and the long coast belt of Spanish territory on the mainland. At this
time Spam too was fretted by French expansion.
This was playing with war as never before With another of the
extraordinary flourishes which had excited the world since Bismarck’s fall,
Germany clapped a pistol to the head of a proud people, and prefaced
by intimidation and humiliation, a demand for concessions The habit of
this unprecedented and intolerable procedure was the mortal blight on the
European situation. For weeks peace was in jeopardy. Was it intended
to seize Agadir as a naval base — another Kiaochow^ on the mid-Atlantic?
The extreme naval party m Germany entertained this dream The Entente
was in disarray The British Government was not at first united any more
than in the critical weeks of July, 1914 In France, the Premier conducted
secret negotiations wath Berlin through a subordinate* German diplomatist,
Baron von Lancken, and this without informing his Cabinet or even con-
sulting his owm Minister of Foreign Affairs But the British Ministry, after
its manner, came to a sufficiently united mind. Its significant spokesman
was the new’ popular leader, Mr. Lloyd George, at that time the admiration
of advanced democrats all over the globe As Chancellor of the Exchequer
and guardian of the public purse, he had led the resistance to increased
naval estimates Upon him, above all, the Germans had relied to weaken
British naval preparation Now in a momentous speech in the City of
London on July 21, 1911, it was Mr. Lloyd George himself who warned
Germany that she had gone too far, and that if she pressed the method
of armed ultimatum symbolised by the “ Panther ” at Agadir, she would
meet an unyielding people At this, the world held its breath. There wras
an explosion of approval in Britain There was an explosion of wrath in'
Germany. The German Ambassador made to the British Foreign Minister
a communication ‘‘ so stiff ” that Sir Edward Grey thought “ the fleet might
be attacked at any moment.” Every nation in Europe began to look
hurriedly to its armaments. The German Government, however, repudiated
any intention of creating a new Kiaochow on the Atlantic or establishing
itself in any way in Moroccan territory. With this, the worst of the diplo-
matic tension was over, but the resulting moral evil amongst the rival peoples
was immeasurable
German bargaining for colonial compensation now began. Kiderlen-
Wachter, the Foreign Secretary, was not one of the naval fanatics. Instead,
he seems to have hoped seriously on this occasion to acquire, in return
for the complete relinquishment of Morocco, the whole of the French Congo,
with a transfer by France of her prior right to purchase the Belgian Congo
if little Belgium were ever induced to part with that great region. In
such an eventuality, Germany, linking up with her then existing East African
colony, would possess in the Dark Continent a magnificent Middle Empire
stretching from ocean to ocean. But the broad beginnings of this grand
36 WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
plftTi depended upon taking from France an amount of colonial territory
that she would never concede except, possibly, under the immediate threat
of war. Strong German militarists thought it would have been better to
mass troops on the French frontier than to send a gunboat to Agadir. The
last arbitrament being once more postponed, Germany had to content herself
with relatively small territories as compensation, and even these were only
given up by French opinion with extreme reluctance and bitterness.
AOADIR AND ABMAQEDDON — DECISIVE EFFECT ON FRENCH AND GERMAN
FEELING' — BOTH NATIONS RESOLVE TO FIGHT NEXT TIME
Other consequences were graver than any which could be shown upon a
map. The German people had been allowed to count on triumph, expecting
at first nothing less than a territorial footing on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.
They felt the settlement to be a sorry discomfiture.
In spite of commercial conquest, technical ascendency, a swarming in-
crease of population, the clanking and glitter of arms, the unbroken primacy
assumed by Germans for 40 years to be their national birthright, had re-
coiled before defiance and suffered open discomfiture. Was this the nation
of Bismarck and Moltke? The man at their head, with plumed helmet
and high boots, raised hand and minatory rhetoric — was it possible that
this Emperor might be a sham Paladin whose cuirassier’s corselet covered a
heart of lard? Was the fibre unequal to the pose? So or not so, the
German nation must take its honour into its own keeping, and the next
trial of strength must be made good, if need be, by force of arms.
But the French were now, 40 years after 1871, brought to just the
same mind. Sick of sabre-rattling, they were resolved to try conclusions
once for all, rather than live under perpetual menaces. At the next crisis
like Tangier or Agadir, there would be no more hesitation before the
German challenge. France would fight. At the end of 1911, the lingering
fear of Germany passed away. Since 1870-1871 a new generation had arisen.
In literature, as in arms, a systematic revival of the older, greater memories
of French genius and heroism thrilled and steeled the nation
The British people, as usual, were far less effective in national attitude
and far less generally awakened. At this time their public life was an
orgy of factions, male and female, and might well have seemed a chaos of
decadence to any observer who did not know them well; whereas modem
Germany — unlike its fathers — had ceased to know them at all. The
British Liberal Government, though more anxiously resolved than ever to
make last efforts for compromise with Germany, appointed Mr. Winston
Churchill to be political head of the fleet with the direct duty of completing
its organisation for the contingency of war. Lord Haldane at the same time
was to perfect his preparations for throwing a small but intensely trained
army of 150,000 men into the Continental fighting front within three weeks
from the mobilisation of Europe.
THE TRIPOLI THUNDERCLAP — ITALY ATTACKS TURKEY — HENCEFORTH WAR
FOLLOWS WAR
While this cloud of apprehension was thickening over the old world no
one realised its full significance. So little, that when the first shots rang
out no one at first or for long afterwards knew what had really happened.
Yet the rifles and guns were hardly again to be silent in Europe and
© Keystone View Co,
DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
J. L. GARVIN 37
the Near East for more than eleven years. Least of all did those know
by whom the first shots were fired. Before the Agadir controversy was
settled, Italy declared war on Turkey like a bolt from the serene. Before
that inaugural struggle was composed, the nations of the Balkan League
had plimged into their first war with Turkey, followed by their second war
with one another. As an automatic result of this latter satire on human
purposes, another twelve months brought the universal catastrophe. That
is the epitome of fate during 1911 to 1914.
Since the riaorgimento, imited Italy’s colonial experiences had been less
fortunate than those of any other Power. Yet her need was more and her
tradition strong. By comparison with the stationaiy population of France,
she had a swarming surplus of hard-working, intelligent immigrants. They
throve under other flags, settling in the United States, the Argentine and Tunis,
seeking livelihood in Germany and France. The African shores of the
Mediterranean made a vivid appeal to the historical imagination of the
Italian people as well as to their political and social interests. These dreams
had been defeated by the rapidity of French extension. Especially on
Tunis — ideal for their purposes and lying so near to Sicily just across the
Mediterranean narrows — the Italians long fixed their hearts. But in the
early ’eighties this, too, was taken by the French, a seizure causing bitter-
ness for many years between the two Latin peoples. The Turks were des-
tined to be stripped of the last remnant of their suzerainty on these shores,
so long the scene of a great Roman civilisation after the fall of Carthage.
Between the British in Egypt and the immense French colonial empire, only
Tripoli remained open for European occupation. Stretching far south desert-
wards through tracts sparsely peopled by the tribes of the fanatical Senussi
sect, this region is more spacious than rich.
Through 30 years and more Italy’s right of reversion had become generally
acknowledged — first by Britain, then by France, later by Russia, and, at
last, though unwillingly, even by Germany and Austria-Hungary, irksome
partners with Italy in the Triple Alliance. Opportunity had been long
delayed, but in the autumn of 1911 there was a chance to strike and it
seemed now or never in the matter. The Agadir crisis was just over.
Morocco was finally French ; Germany was assured of some colonial com-
pensation elsewhere. Austria was distinctly stronger and more aggressive
on the Adriatic, and that question might not always leave Italy free hands
for any other. In accordance with the rising temper of every nation, public
opinion was urging a more vigorous foreign policy. Finally the Young
Turks were obstructing Italian commercial interests in Tripoli and treating
Italy generally with a certain contempt.
King Victor’s statesmen took their temerity in both hands. They had
protested against Turkish conduct for some months, but had given no
sign of their intentions. Their resolve to risk war was probably decided
by the German example at Agadir which cut away the ground for protest
on the part of the WiUielmstrasse and the Ballplatz. The diplomatic world
was confounded when, on September 28, 1911, an Italian ultimatum sum-
moned Turkey to consent within 24 hours to the cession of Tripoli. In the
precarious state of the whole Eastern Question at that moment, all men
felt that the consequences might be incalculable; and they were.
The Italo-Turkish War in itself was of minor importance and may be
very shortly summarised. Italian sea-power made the situation of the Turks
strategically hopeless and severed the Ottoman armies altogether from the
scene of action. The invaders soon carried the coast, but then met stiffer
and slower work than they expected. Enver Bey and others threw them-
selves into the interior and rallied the tribes for attack. But the Italians
38 WORLD POLICY venm WORLD EXPLOSION
routed these attempts and steadily broke up all resistance in the plains,
though the farther interior remained long unsubdued.
The danger to general peace was not in Libya, as the Italians classically
called their new sphere, but in the Aegean and the Balkans. Aware of this,
the Italian Government proclaimed its desire to localise the conflict and
discountenance any movement against European Turkey. In the first days
of hostilities two Turkish torpedo boats had been sunk in the Adriatic;
Preveza and San Giovanni di Medua had been bombarded. But when
Vienna protested, the Italian fleet was at once recalled from these waters.
This restriction of sea-power became irksome; as the struggle in Tripoli
dragged on, the temptation to bring naval pressure to bear on European
Turkey became stronger. Again Austria-Hungary firmly intervened.
French mail steamers were stopped by Italian cruisers; once more there was
imfriendliness between the Governments of Paris and Rome, with bitter
recrimination between their peoples. In April, 1912, Italian warships en-
gaged the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles and their torpedo-boat
flotilla, by a daring exploit, went far up that crooked and perilous channel.
Italy was thereupon informed by Vienna that further attempts of the same
kind “ might have grave consequences,” and that if Italy meant to resume
freedom of action on the Balkan side Austria could do likewise. In May,
Italy, as a temporary measure, occupied in the Aegean those purely Greek
islands — though up to then under Turkish rule — Rhodes and the
Dodecanese, which she still retains in illustration of the familiar maxim that
nothing is so permanent as the provisional.
To realise the gravity of the peril created by the European reactions of
the Tripoli campaign and the undermined state of the whole European conti-
nent, we must vividly remember that the Austrian war party, headed by
Conrad von Hotzendorff, the Chief of the General Staff, was at this time
hotly in favour of attacking Italy or at least of seizing the moment
when her hands were tied to establish Austrian supremacy in the Balkans.
Aehrenthal, though he had curbed Italy sharply, resisted these extreme
views and with the support of the Emperor Francis Joseph, carried the day,
though no more than the day. To complete the troubled picture, the
Italo-Turkish War, by closing the Dardanelles, had inflicted severe injury
upon Russian trade and had increased the historic desire of the Tsardom
for “ the freedom of the Straits ” in the sense of free ingress and regress
not only for Riusian trading ships, but for Russian warships, though not
for other warships. More and more, this war was becoming a general
nuisance and menace. Tripoli was lost. Yet Turkey, as often before, and
as afterwards with amazing effect, was incomparably obstinate. Her hands
were forced by a new danger threatening immediately her very life in
Europe. At last, on October 18, 1912, Tripoli and Cyrenaica were ceded
to Italy by the Treaty of Lausanne. As her eloquence phrased it, “the
Roman eagles had returned to the fields of Libya.”
That peace came too late. Before it was signed, another war, far more
ominous and darkly destined, was in full blast. The efforts of all the
Powera to localise the Italo-Turkish conflict had failed. The whole Eastern
Question was re-opened with a vengeance by the combined armies of the
Balkan Lea^e. It was the portentous apparition. It was that one thing in
this uncertain field which the statesmen of all Eui'ope had thought to be aroo-
lutely impossible.
J. L GARVIN
39
THE NEAR-EASTERN CAULDRON — 1909--1911
We must go back to those idyllic transports at the dawn of the Young
Turk Revolution when a rainbow bent over the world^s worst cockpit of
inveterate hatreds, and all races and creeds fraternised. The illusion soon
vanished, but by contrast reality was less bearable than before. Abdul
Hamid after an attempt at counter-revolution was crushed in April, 1909.
Henceforth the inner junta of the Committee of Union and Progress con-
trolled the State. But by “ Union ” of an empire which was a medley, they
meant their own ascendency, and by “ Progress ” they meant Turcification.
The Young Turks, one must repeat, proved to be old Turks writ large.''
They were not reconcilers but masters; not Liberals but Chauvinists; not
emancipators but centralisers. Formerly, the Christian races had assumed
that the Old Turks would either disappear of themselves or would be grad-
ually eliminated, at least from Macedonia and the larger parts of Thrace,
by cumulative reforms under the auspices of the Powers Now the Young
Turks on set theory were more methodically tyrannical, while the Powers
in the new circumstances were more divided, uncertain, dilatory. The watch-
word for the Balkan Christians was coming to be this:
“ Hereditary bondsmen I Know ye not,
Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow? ”
Even the mainly Moslem Albanians were roused to revolt by the new
Turcification, not only levying taxes from which the tribes hitherto had
been exempt, but attempting to displace the native schools and language
in a manner constituting a more formidable threat to the new Albanian
consciousness of nationality than Abdul Hamid's less doctrinaire despotism
had ever suggested Distracted Greece had begun an astonishing national
recovery bv calling to its head, in the autumn of 1910, the great Cretan
statesman Venizelos, but the Young Turks, with suicidal fatuity, still vetoed
the full reunion of Crete with the Hellenic Kingdom, though island and
motherland passionately felt themselves to be part of each other's flesh and
blood Above all, in the Balkans, with the exasperation of Christian rival-
ries and the new Turcification so abhorrent to them all, the state of Macedonia
after so many abortive schemes of reform, so many years of hope deferred,
was plunging from bad to worse
A BALKAN LEAGUE — THE IMPOSSIBLE " HAPPENS
Was it impossible for the Balkan Christians to do for themselves what
the Great Powers had not only failed to effect, but by their rivalries had
prevented? The conception of a Balkan League was not new. It had been
a dream for generations. Up to the Young Turk reaction it had seemed as
impossible to frame a working compromise between Greeks, Bulgars and
Serbs as to square the circle But unusually able and broad-minded states-
men were now prominent in all three nations — Venizelos in Athens, Gueshov
in Sofia, Milovanovitch in Belgrade — and the need for common action
was dire. In the midst of the Bosnian crisis, M. Isvolsky on Christmas
Day, 1908, made a speech advocating a Balkan alliance between Turkey
and the three Slav states. This ideal floated across the vision of all the
statesmen just named until it was made hopeless by the peculiar revelation
of what the Young Turks meant by “Union and Progress."
40 WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
In the winter of 1910 the first promising pourparlers seem to have been
initiated by an Irishman — Mr. J. D. Bourchier, the celebrated Balkan
correspondent of The Times, and probably the only ioumalist whose por-
trait has appeared on postage stamps. Devoted to Bulgaria, yet an old
personal friend of Veniselos, he acted as a secret intermediary in the earliest
overtures. They had been going on for many months when the war between
Italy and Turkey forced the pace of all thoughts and plans by suddenly
opening an opportunity such as might never offer again. Negotiations now
went on with a direct view to action. A treaty of alliance between Bulgaria
and Serbia was signed on March 13, 1912. On May 29, a similar treaty
was concluded between Sofia and Athens. Bulgaria and Serbia adopted a
definite scheme for the partition of Macedonia, the arbitration of the Tsar
of Russia to be invoked in case of dispute about certain districts. On the
other hand, the arrangement between Greeks and Bulgars simply provided
for mutual aid in case of war and contained no territorial compact. With-
out the consent of all three states peace could not be concluded, nor even
an armistice granted.
The Young Turks had sown the wind and nothing could save them from
the whirlwind. Albania rose in even more determined insurrection than in
the previous year. Bulgars and Serbs alike were excited by truth and
rumour concerning Turkish massacre and outrage in Macedonia and else-
where. The Albanians were overrunning the very districts promised to
Serbia by the secret treaty. In July, unofficial negotiations had been
opened in Switzerland between Italy and Turkey and before a definite peace
could be concluded between these belligerents it was critically important for
the Balkan League to make a daring move.
Too late the Powers, though not fullv realising what was coming, began
to awaken. Aehrenthal had unfortunately died a few months before. His
weaker successor, Count Berchtold, broueht forward new proposals for
administrative reform in Macedonia, but these suggestions framed on the
old va^e and venerable model were far behind the needs and facts of the
new situation. Between Turkey and the European Concert there was
negotiation and delay, while the members of the Balkan League in disregard
of these august fumblings, and stimulated by the fear of half-solutions, more
than deterred by the chances of European intervention, were completing
their military plans. They were resolved not to be content with anything
less than the full Macedonian autonomy which nothing on earth but force
of arms could induce the Young Turks to concede.
On September 30, the order for mobilisation was issued simultaneously
in Sofia, Belgrade and Athens. Turkish mobilisation renlied. The Powers
were now in full alarm. They not only warned the Balkan League against
challenging hostilities but declared that in case of conflict whatever its issue
they would allow no alteration of the status quo. They were soon glad to
forget that sounding formula This time the old Olympians were impotent
to control events. On October 8, little Montenegro, by undoubted arrange-
ment with the other members of the League, seized the picturesque privilege
of declaring war on Turkey. Next day the men of the Black Mountain
fired the first shots. On October 13 Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece delivered
their ultimatum at Constantinople in the shape of identic notes, demanding
in effect full self-government for the non-Turkish races still under Ottoman
rule in the Balkans and immediate Turkish demobilisation. Filled with
sublime contempt for those who had been their slaves or vassals for cen-
tunes, the Turks disdained to reply. They were not alone in their esti-
mate. Nearly all Europe expected an Ottoman victory. Berlin and Vienna
were absolutely confident that the Turks would shatter the League.
J. L. GARVIN
41
THE FmST BAIiKAN WAS — EOBOFBAN TUBSEY DI8APFBABS — THE LEAflUS’S
BBILLIANT CAMPAIGN
By contrast with assumptions like these the result was amongst the
most dramatic revelations in history. The three Allies put more than
600,000 men into the field, Bulgaria contributing nearly half. The Turks
were deprived of adequate transport by the Greek navy. In spite of
German instruction they were not only outnumbered but out>thought and
out>fought at every point. The success of the League was as rapid as
overwhelming. Each member of the League in turn astounded a world
which stood spell-boimd and breathless before this transformation. It was
as brilliant as the conquest of Granada by Spain and seemed more decisive
than the defeat of Islam before Vienna by Sobieski. As the Balkan Chris*
tians went down before the Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
the Turks went down before the Balkan Christians in the twentieth.
On the whole the achievement of the Bulgars, though far exceeding the
highest hopes of their friends, caused least astonishment. Shrewd experts
had called them the Japanese of the Balkans and they proved their title.
Attacking without hesitation the main Ottoman armies in Thrace, they
swept the enemy into ruin in a fortnight — first by the battle of Kirk
Kilisseh on October 23, immediately afterwards by the shattering victory of
Liile Burgas, a huge struggle engaging a total of about 350,000 men, which
began on October 28 and raged for several days. Ill-found, half-famished, the
Turkish masses broke into a disorderly rabble streaming towards Constanti-
nople and its covering lines of Chatalja.
The advance of the Serbs through Macedonia was as irresistible and
swift though more unexpected. The Turks were routed in a battle at
Kumanovo (October 2.3-24). and this victory above all, nearly six centuries
after the “ fatal field ” of Kossovo, revived the pride and aspiration of a
whole race, and had the deepest effect uoon the future. It was, as we now
know, the death-knell of the Austrian Empire, as well as of Turkish rule
in the heart of the Balkans. As confident henceforth in their artillery as
in their valour, the Serbs pressed onwards. On October 26 the Crown
Prince rode into Uskub, the capital of the wide Serbian ’empire in the
Middle Ages and a legendary citv of their race; and in the middle of
November, Monastir, key of central M.acedonia, was captured after another
pitched battle. Fragments of the Ottoman western army remained; but
none the less, Turkish rule was annihilated in Macedonia and doomed in
Albania. The Serbs were now in a more favourable military position than
in their wildest dreams they had imagined or Austria-Hungary in her worst
nightmares had feared
But even these epic strokes were capped in one vital respect by the
surprising Greeks. In three weeks they were in Salonika itself and had
thus won the chief prize of the whole war. After the fiasco of their
Thessalian campaign in 1897, their military virtue had been rated low,
and their prestige had not been raised by spasmodic and theatrical politics.
Few foreign critics realised that in the temper, training and equipment
of the army there had been remarkable progress, while the fieet was ready
to play a signal part. The Turks themselves were most deceive, and
assumed that with absurdly inferior forces they could hold their own in
this part of the peninsula. King George opened his campaign on October
18. In a week his northward advance through southernmost Macedonia
threw the Moslem out of it. In the battle of Sarandoporon the much
smaller Turkish force, trying to hold the defile, was routed with a loss of
42
WORLD POLICY 2;erm‘ WORLD EXPLOSION
20 guns and many prisoners. The confidence restored by this victory
made an almost magical difference to Greek morale. It took wings for
the set purpose of reaching Salonika before the Bulgars. Swinging round
towards that goal, they had first to face a more formidable Turkish con-
centration and were heavily checked; but by fine generalship and soldier-
ship together they broke the last barrier. On November 9, the Turks in
Salonika surrendered with their general and 29,000 men, and in a scene
of indescribable enthusiasm King George and his army entered the great
seaport — that potential “ Hambmg of the Aegean,” according to Pan-
German dreams — a day before the competitive arrival of their unbeloved
Bulgarian Ally.
The Hellenic forces had likewise conquered districts in Epirus ardently
coveted since the War of Liberation nearly a century before. At sea, they
delivered many of their islands. The greater islands of Crete and Samos were
reunited to the mother-coimtry. Their fieet bottled up the Ottoman war-
ships in the Dardanelles, and hampered the Turks m every way by depriving
them of sea-transport. Above all, from the national point of view they hoisted
the Greek flag over the holy promontory of Mount Athos and its monasteries
— that Gibraltar of orthodox religion.
While the other two Allies were sweeping the western half of the peninsula,
the Bulgars, after their more massive and principal deeds, had come to their
limit. They were tired, they had outmarched their supplies, and their
ranks were full of cholera. On the other hand, they had brought up reinforce-
ments, and nothing but the Chatalja lines stood between them and Constanti-
nople itself. Fir^ by a supreme ambition they underestimated both the
defences and the enemy. Their able leader, Savov, said: ** In a week we shall
be dining in Constantinople.” It was not to be. On November 18, only
a month after the outbreak of war, the attempt to storm the Chatalja lines
was severely repulsed. The Bulgarian Command learned its lesson at once,
and resolved not to waste the reserves henceforth needed for very different pur-
poses. There was no further assault.
At the beginning of December, 1912, an armistice was signed between the
Porte on the one side and Bulgaria, ^rbia and Montenegro on the other.
Greece continued hostilities, not on a large scale, but with the shrewd aim
of consolidating her extensive gains by small operations Thus in six weeks
this dazzling campaign of the Balkan League, unique in modern war, totally
destroyed European Turkey outside Constantinople itself Elsewhere only
a few besieged positions remained like island specks emerging above some
disastrous flood — Gallipoli, Adrianople, with Yannina and Scutari in distant
Albania.
THE TRUCE — DIPLOMACY IN LONDON — EUROPEAN WAR OVER SERBIA
AGAIN AVOIDED — TURKS UNTEACHABLE — HOSTILITIES RESUMED —
ADRIANOPLE FALLS — TURKEY SURRENDERS — TREATY OP LONDON
European diplomacy now entered on the scene with sombre anxieties.
The momentary harmony of the Great Powers in seeking to prevent the
struggle had disappeared. It was now impossible to restore the status quo
which they had sworn nothing would induce them to change. The map of
eastern Europe,” said Mr. Asquith, the British Premier, on November 9,
has to be recast, and the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which
have cost them so dear.” But Austria-Hungary, notably, was as determined as
ever to prevent the Serbs from keeping an independent outlet on the sea.
Achieving their ideal in the crisis of 1908-1909 the Serbs had reached the
J. L. GARVIN
43
Adriatic through northern Albania. The Russian Government declared for
the cession of an Adriatic port to Serbia and was supported by Britain and
France. Russia and Austria alike mobilised and prepared for war; and Vienna
recalled the avowed war-maker, Conrad von HoWndorff, to his former posi-
tion as Chief of the General Staff. The general peace of Europe was in im-
minent peril. But the Habsburg Monarchy upon this occasion was deterred
by German moderation from throwing down the gauntlet in the fatal temper
displayed in July, 1914. Russia was equally calmed by British moderation.
London in the middle of December became the centre of the formal
negotiations. While the delegates of the belligerents met at the Peace Con-
ference in St. James’s Palace, the ambassadors of the Great Powers sat in
simultaneous council under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey. For the
sake of peace all the Powers decided for the Austrian view by setting up
Albania as an independent State in a manner that once more cut off Serbia
from the sea. There was much to be said for this, both on the grounds of
averting general war and recognising Albania’s national rights, but it led
directly, as we shall see, to the crash eighteen months later.
The conference between the Balkan belligerents failed. A revolution
in Constantinople, led by Enver Pasha, brought the Young Turks back to
power and they refused the terms of the League
On February 3 hostilities were resumed. The new campaign had none
of the brilliancy and inspiration of the former, and may be dismissed in
a few words. Yannina fell to the Greeks, but King George, at the height of his
glory, was assassinated at Salonika by a Greek subject with a private grudge.
Had that wise sovereign lived, he might have prevented many subsequent
misfortunes, but then and for long after the new King Constantine was
idolised by his people Little Montenegro still besieged Scutari. Warned off
by the European Concert which had included that town in the new Albanian
State, King Nicholas resolved to capture Scutari, and did. The Montenegrins
defiantly hold it for several weeks before the menaces of Austria-Hungary,
supported more or less willingly by the other Great Powers, compelled them
to withdraw. Meanwhile Adrianople, the greatest of the besieged Turkish
fortresses, had fallen before the Bulgars, who however had been forced to sum-
mon a large Serbian force to their aid. On March 26 its Commandant,
Shukri Pasha, after a fine defence, surrendered with 50,000 men and nearly
600 guns. This was the last triumph for the joint forces of the League. The
Turks had had enough, and sued for a second armistice, signed on April 19,
1913, at the lines of Bulair covering Gallipoli. The Peace Conference was
resumed in St. James’s Palace. By the Treaty of London, signed on May 30,
Turkey in Europe ceased to exist outside a small wedge of territory covering
Constantinople and Gallipoli, the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.
As this was amongst the greatest events in the annals of Christendom, so
it was in itself amongst the noblest. The results might have brought not
only a new glory to civilisation, but an assurance of safety unknown to
Europe for many years. From this pinnacle of chance the hopes of the world
fell in a moment and were dashed to pieces. As had often happened before
in human affairs, and as was to happen again on a vaster and more sombre
scale, the sequel of inspiration, vision and of achievement beyond dreams,
was to be one of the saddest and most baleful chapters in the record of
human affairs.
44
WORLD POLICY verna WORLD EXPLOSION
THE VICT0B3' QUABSEL — 8EBBUN AND GBEEK COMPACT — BCLGABIAN
MADNESS — THE SECOND BALKAN WAR
As an ironic study of motive and circumstance ther story of the break*
up of the Balkan League and Bulgaria’s ruin would deserve a volume to itself.
No psychological passage of the World War itself throws more light upon the
recesses of the human mind. The actual situation was such as no one had
conceived when the basic treaties of the Balkan League were signed. The
victors were plunged into mortal quarrel by the excess of the spoils. The
Bulgars had advanced almost to the gates of Constantinople and acquired
Eastern Thrace which no one had exj^cted them to win. If, as well, they
annexed the bulk of Macedonia as originally provided, they would become
an overshadowing power in the Balkans, and it was clear enough that some
subterranean understanding existed between Sofia and Vienna. The Bulgars
had put by far the largest force into the field, and against the main Ottoman
armies they had borne the brunt of the war and its losses. A virile and dogged
race, their exploits had made them unbounded in their self-esteem and un-
yielding in their arrogance. In spite of their broad conquests in Thrace,
they were adamant in insistence on the letter of the Macedonian bond, instead
of making concessions to their Allies out of the plenitude of their gains as
sober wisdom and substantial equity demanded. Nor was this attitude merely
one of vulgar rapacity. They regarded the bulk of Macedonia as part of their
racial flesh and blood.
But the Serbs and the Greeks by the course of events had come into actual
occupation of what Bulgaria claimed, and in their heart of hearts they meant
possession to be nine points of the law. The Serbs, with nearly 50,000 men
and a heavy siege train, had powerfully assisted in the capture of Adrianople,
and for this service over and above their obligations they expected a hand-
some reward. They demanded broad compensation for a further and more
important reason. The Austro-Hungarian veto, supported by all the Powers,
had deprived them of a seaport on the Adriatic. They were determined to
assure themselves of an outlet through Salonika by advancing as far as pos-
sible towards that city and by establishing direct contact with the Greeks,
instead of being widely removed from that contact by the intervening Bul-
garian zone, which the strict terms of treaty would create The Greeks, for
weir part, vigilant and dexterous, had refused to bind themselves by any
territorial bargain. Resolved to keep Salonika and as much of southern
Macedonia as they could secure, they were eager for a common frontier with
the Serbs. Both Greeks and Serbs wished to prevent the rise of Bulgaria
to a crushing predominance. As early as the middle of March they had agreed
to make common cause against Bulgaria at need. This fact must always be
remembered. The Bulgars had reason to believe that they were to be robbed
of their dearest desire and what they held to be their indisputable right under
their treaty with Belgrade, by a furtive and faithless bargain between the
other Allies. In their intrigues with Vienna and in other ways, their own
counsels were as unscrupulous and more imprudent.
Bulgaria made every mistake in procedure. Instead of frankly submitting
the result to Russian arbitration according to the most vital article of the
engagements. King Ferdinand and his soldiers relied on force to put them-
selves in equality of possession in the disputed districts before invoking the
Tsar’s judgment. After the final armistice with Turkey, their troops were
removed from Eastern Thrace to the west, where Serbia and Greece, wilb
better facilities, were concentrating every man and gun they could muster.
On June 8, the Tsar telegraphed to Sofia and Belgrade a solemn appeal, re-
© Keytftone Vtnt> Co
In 1913 King George V and Queen Mary were present in Berlin for the marriage of William IPs
only daughter Victoria Louise with Prince Augustus of Cumberland. Seated in the carriage are
Tgifig George and the former German Emperor.
J. L. GARVIN
45
minding them of their engagement to accept Russia's oflSces as arbiter. But
Bulgaria had good reasons for not placing unconditional trust in the neutral-
ity of St. Petersburg, where pro-^rb influence prevailed. Sofia demanded
again and again that arbitration should be preceded by the admission of
Bulgaria to an equality with her ex- Allies in the joint occupation of the dis-
puted districts. This from the Bulgarian point of view was a just request,
but it was rejected by Serbia, acting in harmony with Greece.
A few days afterwards Bulgaria admitted the blunder and the crime. The
second Balkan War opened on a front about 70 miles wide. Overestimating
themselves and far underestimating their opponents, on the ill-starred night
of June 29, the Bulgars fell without warning on their Allies. The latter needed
no warning. They were thoroughly prepared for all contingencies; for them,
as the side in possession, superior morality was easy. The Bulgarian gamble
led to military bankruptcy and national downfall. Never was cynical violence
followed by a swifter and more merciless punishment The rank and file of
King Ferdinand's armies had not the same heart in this fight. The strategical
illusion of the assailants was that they would at once break the connections
between Serbs and Greeks, defeat the Serbs first, and deal easily with the
Greeks afterwards. This conception proved a prodigious fiasco. The Serbs
withstood the first assault, then smashed the Bulgarian front by coimter-
attack in triumphant battle. The despised Greeks instantly suppressed the
Bulgarian detachment in Salonika and struck northward in a course of un-
interrupted victories. Next Rumania intervened. Her armies crossed the
Danube without opposition, and their blow in the back was a death blow.
The Rumanian armies marched without opposition to within twelve miles of
Sofia The Serbians were pouring through the mountains into old Bulgaria.
The Greek armies reached its frontier, while the Greek fleet annulled their
doomed ex-Ally's fleeting conquests on the Aegean coast. By the climax of
irony and tragedy the defeated Turks under Enver Bey walked back over the
battlefield of Liile Burgas and retook Adrianople. With savage atrocities on
both sides, the fighting between the ex-Allies had been conducted in murder-
ous disregard of life. Beset and beaten, Bulgaria cried for mercy. She was
granted peace but not mercy.
1913 — EUROPEAN PEACE DOOMED
The Peace Conference met at Bucharest on July 30, and the resulting treaty
was signed on August 10. In the two wars Bulgaria had lost 45,000 killed
and over 100,000 wounded. She was now stripped of nearly all her conquests
and otherwise mutilated. Rumania, without losing a man, obtained the Do-
brudja on the north, giving her a far stronger command of the last 200 miles
of the Danube before it flows into the Black Sea; westward the Serbs took
nearly the whole of Macedonia ; southward the Greeks took the rest of Mace-
donia and all the richest part of the Thracian coast; and eastward, by the
supineness of the Powers, following the Treaty of Bucharest, the Turks were
allowed to retain the larger part of Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople and
Kirk Kilisseh. The punishment was more ruthlessly immoral than the Bul-
garian folly and crime which had provoked it, and the results were to be in-
finitely more disastrous.
So ended the second Balkan War; and with its strange outcome vanished,
as some brooding critics then declared, but as the mass of mankind would not
believe, the last probability that the world's peace would be long main-
tained. European statesmen in many capitals claimed that with much
difficulty they had localised the Balkan struggle. They had only for a brief
46 WORLD POLICY WORLD EXPLOSION
period postponed a general conflict by means certain to enlarge it. They had
made Armageddon inevitable at a second, and not distant remove. Said the
wise old King Charles of Rumania about the sinister instrument concluded
in his own capital: “This is no peace but a truce and it cannot last.” In
the Balkans the sparks were never trampled out; in Austria-Hungary and
Russia alike the embers remained hot and glowing; within a year the world
was in flames.
FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS —
NAVAL RATIOS AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIPS
In one respect there was a lull, and as often happens it deceived many who
had been previously sure-sighted. The one great hope for peace — if any-
thing could now preserve it — was in the remarkable improvement of Anglo-
German relations. What had been the gravest of all the dangers in the heart
of affairs was mitigated, and to many it seemed to be removed As between
Berlin and London, a new habit of consultation and cooperation had been
formed. By one of the supreme ironies of mortal things the Anglo-German
improvement only precipitated the catastrophe. We must look closer for
a moment into this curious chapter of world-history. After the Agadir crisis
when they had stood on the brink of war and looked into a fiery abyss, the
Liberal Government in Britain determined on a very strenuous and far-
reaching attempt to arrive at a better understanding with the German Empire.
The German Government, especially the Chancellor, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg,
and the Foreign Secretary, Herr Kiderlen-Wachter, were as eager for it,
though their ideas of what it meant were not the same.
In February, 1912, the British War Minister, Lord Haldane, undertook his
mission to Berlin. His attachment from old student days to German life
and mind was deep. His chief aim was to end the naval rivalry between the
two countries by stabilising the relative strengths of their fleets. He proposed,
in vain, a ratio of 16 to 10 for battleships in home waters Germany thought
this would leave her great maritime neighbour too strong in the North Sea,
whereas for Britain anything less meant being no longer safe in the North
Sea. As Count Reventlow has put it, the Kaiser and Admiral Tirpitz be-
lieved that “ silent unswerving insistence ” had w^orn down the British margin
considerably and would wear it down more. The next and more critical
question — as the European situation now stood — was that of diplomatic
relations. Lord Haldane had asked in effect: “ If we settle with you will
you fall on France and annihilate her? ” Germany’s first proposal was one
of unconditional British neutrality in case of war. This was too blankly
impossible. The next proposal was for neutrality if Germany were not the
formal aggressor. This would not quite do. The real aggressor can sometimes
force or provoke another country into the formal initiative.
In short, Germany insisted that while she retained her alliances, Britain
must desert her friends. The Kaiser’s fixed objective, as for years past, was
to break up the Triple Entente. Less than ever could the Triple Entente be
disi^lved in this way without any simultaneous dissolution of the Triple
Alliance. The only result of Britain’s isolated neutrality, as Berlin well knew,
would be her ruin. France and Russia, indignant at what they could only
regard as a British betrayal, would throw themselves into the arms of the
Central Empires; and this would mean more certainly than ever before a
solid Continental coalition to settle the accumulated accounts of world-policy
at the expense of the British Empire. Bethmann-Hollweg was sincere, but
like Billow in a less airy way, and like every German statesman since Bis-
J. L. GARVIN
47
marck, he was in himself profoundly inadequate to the situation. In havinj;
to appear hopelessly one-sided by trying to retain Germany’s alliances with
one hand while breaking British friendships on the other, he could not help
himself. He was the Emperor’s mouthpiece and not the guiding statesman
of a free Germany. Sir Edward Grey would not and could not break up Uie
Entente, but he and the whole British Government declared their resolve not
to join nor countenance any improvoked attack on Germany; and the whole
state and temper of democratic politics in Britain were a sufficient guarantee
of the effectiveness of that pledge.
But though the Haldane negotiations were ineffectual for main purposes,
relations between Britain and Germany became more friendly in a way that
was temporarily of saving service to the world in the more perilous and even
desperate situation created by the Balkan Wars.
THE CLIMAX OF ARMAMENTS — 1913
Nevertheless, though the immediate conflict was localised, the first vic-
tories of the Balkan League had an effect upon the fears and precautions of
the Great Powers which made the general situation far graver and more pre-
carious than ever. Since the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, all Europe had been
turned more and more into an unexampled scene of national armies, barracks
and fortresses, gun factories and naval arsenals, strategical railways and
great manoeuvres These armaments now reached a stupendous climax. In
the spring of 1913, Germany not only raised her peace-strength to 875,000
men, but adopted an extraordinary measure demanding from her citizens a
capital levy equal to £50.000,000 sterling (or 250 million dollars) for that
increase of equipment which revealed in the World War a terrifying mass and
novel ingenuity of weapons such as no one outside Germany fully suspected.
France had to reply, though with no growing surplus of population to call
upon, as against the giant-vitality of her neighbour. The Third Republic in-
creased its peace-strength by demanding sterner sacrifice from her individual
citizens and went back to three years’ service for every young conscript.
It was perhaps the most iron thing yet done in peace by any democracy.
The patriotic appeals necessary on both sides stirred up national passions
and antagonisms. Russia, wretchedly deficient in railway transport, now
borrowed from France two and a half milliards of francs (£1W,0(X),000 sterling
or 500 million dollars) , to provide a more adequate strategical network such
as in a few years would make her far more formidable. Austria-Hungary was
startled and panic-stricken by the victories and expansion of the Serbs; and
the war-party in Vienna was henceforth in the ascendant, believing that the
existence of the Danubian Empire depended on attacking and crushing Serbia
before she could consolidate her new strength for further efforts to emancipate
the millions of her race under Habsburg rule. Russia from top to bottom
was resolved to fight rather than suffer Serbia to be smashed. Germany was
resolved to attack Russia and face a World War rather than allow Austria-
Hungary to suffer the fate which had just fallen upon Turkey. For the
Great Powers, and for lesser nations like the Serbs, these contingent resolves,
with all their terrible implications, seemed to be matters of life and death
necessity. “ Tragedy,” said Hegel in a noble and mournful phrase, “ is not
the conflict of right and wrong but of right and right ” — as seen differently
by conflicting minds.
48
WORLD POLICY veram WORLD EXPLOSION
FINAL EFFORTS FOR A NEW PEACE SYSTEM
So the ponderous systems of European armaments, towards the end ol
1913, stood in vast array, throbbing but not yet moving. The stroke of an
imperial pen, the touch of an oflScial button, following perhaps the private
impulse of some madman, might set this fearful machinery in motion. More
than ever. Sir Edward Grey and the Liberal Cabinet in Britain (let it be ever
remembered to their honour, despite their internal divisions and their conse-
quent fatal tardiness at the last) strove for the improvement of Anglo-German
relations as the only hope. After all the years of dispute, London and Berlin
arrived at an agreement on the Bagdad railway, whereby the construction of
the great line would be assured, Britain herself building the last link con-
necting with the Persian Gulf. Further, to give more colonial scope to
Germany without war, the old question of the reversion of the great Portu-
guese territories in Africa was revived, and a secret compact provided that
Britain would regard these regions as a German economic sphere. German
pacific exploitation was to be unhindered by British competition. Even the
polemics of the British and German press were now moderated. In London,
Prince Lichnowsky, as sincerely devoted as Sir Edward Grey himself to the
cause of conciliation, enjoyed more liking and influence than any German
Ambassador had done for many years. Grey^s policy, in a word, was to
restore by degrees a new European Concert in which the Triple Alliance on
one side, the Triple Entente on the other, would be like six pillars sup-
porting the majestic entablature of the temple of peace.
BUT AUSTRIA-HUNGARY HAD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE — MAZZINf B PROPHECY —
GERMANY VERSUS RUSSIA
Why were these efforts thwarted? They were thwarted as we shall now
see by one simple fact, but of an enormous and sinister simnlicitv. The
World War was now to come — swiftly in a few months, as with “Tarauin’s
ravishing strides — because, as a result of the Balkan Wnrs the evicstence
of Austria-Hungary was impossible. When Mazzini bad declared 60 vears
before, “the Turkish question will no sooner be settled than the Austrian
question will be opened,” he was at the height of his vision, and prophesied
the manner of the end of the old order in Europe.
We now take up the mam thread where we dropped it at the Treaty of
Bucharest. When we seek a clue through the maze of small events be-
tween the fatal August of 1913, and the merelv consennential August of
1914, we shall find that clue in the conviction of the Habeburg war-party
that before the new Serbia could consolidate, and before recovering Russia
became too strong again, a stniggle for existence must be faced and even
precipitated. At least the Balkan League was broken. Its maintenance
would have been the insuperable barrier.
The ink was no sooner dry on the Bucharest Treaty than* the war-party in
Vienna pressed Italy to join in the attack on Serbia. Italy refused Austria
then pressed for a diplomatic revision of the Treaty in favour of Bulgaria.
This was prevented by Germany. The Kaiser thought it more important to
support Rumania and Greece. He expected those nations to be more useful
Allies in case of ultimate conflict, and his personal feeling played its part.
He was intimately friendly both with King Charles and King Constantine,
while he detested Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Revision was defeated and the
Treaty stood, though, as we recall, the wise old Charles himself had said:
J. L. GARVIN 49
This is no peace but a truce and it cannot last.” Albania set up by all
the Powers to keep Serbia from the sea, was a cockpit of anarchy. Not be-
fore October 20, 1913, could the Serbs, still occupying a portion of Albanian
territory despite the Treaty, be induced to withdraw by renewed Austrian
menaces. But Serbian agitation on that accoimt flared only the more violently
both within and without the Habsburg Monarchy. The Greeks were still
slower in withdrawing their troops from that southern area of Albania
which they looked on as part of their own Epirus. Worst of all, from the
standpoint of Vienna and Budapest, on the side of the Rumanian people they
had lost an old ally and made a new enemy. The Rumanians, like the
Serbs, now agitated for reunion with the millions of their race living imder
Magyar oppression, but these aspirations could only be realised by the
break-up of Austria-Hungary. This seething situation in the last winter of
peace was aggravated by a direct and malign quarrel between Germany
and Russia.
The defeated Turks, who had so unexpectedly recovered Adrianople and
Eastern Thrace, had set themselves to strengthen their forces by sea and
land. For this latter purpose, towards the very end of 1913, a German
military mission arrived in Constantinople. Its head, General Liman von
Sanders, was appointed for five years not only to reorganise the Ottoman
army but to command personally the Turkish First Army Corps at Con-
stantinople. In the sensitive circumstances of that moment there could
have been no ruder challenge of St. Petersburg. All the Entente Powers
protested. In Russia there was an explosion of wrath. Within five years
great railway extensions in Asiatic Turkey under German auspices would
be constructed. Turkey, equipped for mobilisation and strategical movement
as never before — and certain to be the more anti-Russian — would be a
military as well as economic appendage of Germany. All this threatened
Pan-Germanism in action with a vengeance, in the manner afterwards
realised. Germany gave way; Liman von Sanders remained in Turkey as
adviser and inspector, but his appointment to command the Constantinople
army corps w^as revoked The relations between Berlin and St. Peters-
burg were not again good. Russia believed that Germany had revealed
herself as the real antagonist looming behind both Austria-Hungary and
Turkey. After nearly a quarter of a century the situation most dreaded
by Bismarck had come to pass.
OPENING OF 1914 — JANUARY TO JUNE — AUSTRIANS NIGHTMARE — FEVERISH
DIPLOMACY TO ISOLATE SERBIA — THE VIENNESE WAR-PARTY — WAITING
FOR A PRETEXT — THE KIEL FESTIVITIES — PEACE DOOMED
Under these deep shadows 1913 closed, and 1914 opened. Believing in
the nearness as well as inevitableness of war, and dreading the simultaneous
hostility of Russia, Rumania and Serbia together, Viennese diplomacy
worked incessantly to prevent ‘‘ encirclement.” This was no longer a pretext
of aggressive statecraft. On the part of Austria-Hungary, with its eleven
discordant races and sub-races — a polyglot medley of elements mutually
repellent, a loosening mosaic — the fear of envelopment and total de-
struction was now a real nightmare. Differences with Berlin increased the
distractions and anxiety of Vienna. William II was still belated in his
views, unwilling to believe that Rumania after 30 years of adhesion to the
Central Empires must be written off as a sure asset and inscribed as a
probable liability. In March, 1914, a more urgent view of the seriousness
T. B. T — VOL I — 4
50 WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
of Russian developments brought Berlin into line with Vienna on the policy
of trying to secure at all costs alliances with Bulgaria and Turkey.
At St. Petersburg as at Vienna, it had been secretly decided that war
being unavoidable and perhaps rapidly approaching, preparations must be
made in that sense. This tendency was revealed and denounced in the
German press obviously on semi-official suggestion. Amongst Germans in
their turn, this meant a further definite increase of the feeling that they
would have to face war, sooner rather than later. Throughout the spring
and early summer, surcharged with fate, the rival agitations and negotiations
went on. For Vienna, working night and day to isolate Serbia, the imme-
diate results were disappointing. Bulgaria could not be brought into a
definite alliance, still less Greece.
On the other hand, the defection of Rumania became as evident as
alarming. The Tsar visited that country and the exchange of toasts on
June 14, 1914, left no further doubt that Rumania was finally lost to the
Central Empires. Italy they less than ever could depend upon. Count
Czemin, then Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bucharest, warned Vienna that
King Charles of Rumania, though a Hohenzollem, could not hold his people
to the Triple Alliance, and might be unable to restrain them from fighting
against it.
In Vienna as in Berlin on the other hand, Britain’s neutrality in case
of a European war was taken for granted. Britain for one thing had trouble
enough on her own hands, for an Irish civil war seemed certain to break
out in a few weeks. Russia’s internal organisation, it was thought, could
not stand the strain of war but would collapse in revolution. Reckoning up
the advantages and disadvantages, the Austrian war-party had come to the
conclusion that it was “ now or never,” and that the first good pretext for
drawing the sword must be seized. Events following the murder of the
Archduke Ferdinand cannot be understood unless wc realise the pre-deter-
mined and urgent character of Austrian views on the very eve of that crime.
On June 12, the German Emperor and the Habsburg heir-apparent met
amidst the latter’s famous rose-gardens at Konopischt in Bohemia, and,
talking of more than flowers, they even discussed “ every possible question
and were able to arrive at complete agreement.” What a^eement? We can
only guess it from the immediate procedure in Vienna. On June 22, General
Conrad von Hotzendorff drew up a memorandum expressing once more the
views of the General Staff. The peril of “ encirclement ” was intolerable and
must be grappled with before it became fatal. In the first place the uncer-
tainty on the side of Rumania must be cleared up. That nation must be
forced to declare whether it adhered to the Triple Alliance or not. If not,
Bulgaria must be gained as a substitute whatever the promises required to
win this priceless Ally against Serbia at least and against Rumania at need.
Following the soldiers, the Austrian statesmen drew up a second memorandum
intended to convince the German Government. (It only arrived in Berlin
after the assassination.) Count Berchtold represented that the most urgent
efforts must be made to gain over Turkey and Bulgaria at least, Greece
and Rumania, if possible, with the object of destroying Serbia as an inde-
pendent Power in the Balkans.
Note again that all this happened a few days before the Serajevo murders.
These were a pretext, not a cause. Peace was already doomed. The Austrian
war-party were determined to strike, but let tis do justice even to their part
in the supreme human tragedy of all time. They wished to fight like cavaliers
for loyalty, as they understood it, no less than for existence. Austria-Hun-
gary had become impossible in the old shape. It was the fact that nothing
J. L. GARVIN
51
but battle and victory could give the Habsburg Monarchy a chance to per-
petuate itself on a new basis.
While “ the hour had struck though they heard not the bell,” mankind
allowed itself to be misled and even amused by outward shows. The curious
external irrelevancies which usually accompany the great strokes of human
destiny, public and private, did not fail. The Kiel Canal had been enlarged,
chiefly that it might serve at need as a bigger instrument of war. Its
completion at that moment was one of the factors helping to hasten war.
The festivities, however, were attended by the beflagged ships of many
nations, including a British naval squadron. Not for a decade had Anglo-
German relations seemed more cordial. Upon the music and the gaiety
broke a thunderclap and dispersed the revellers. Black news came from
Austria. William II was aboard his yacht when a telegram was put into
his hands. He read it aghast. To the Prince of Monaco who stood beside
him, he exclaimed: “ Now everything I have done has to begin all over
again.” The Austrian heir-apparent, with whom he had agreed on all
questions in the rose-gardens of Konopischt only 16 days before, was dead
and the world’s peace with him. Eclipse fell on the Kiel festivities. The
German Emperor left for Berlin.
MURDER OF THE HABSBURG HEIR-APPARENT BY SERB FANATICS — AUSTRIANS
NOW OR NEVER ” — BERLIN AGREES
The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, with his consort, was murdered on Sun-
day, June 28, at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian
agitation regarded these lands, not only as captive provinces held by Austria,
** the gaoler of the Slavs,” but even as the most precious parts of unredeemed
Yugoslavia. The two actual assassins were Bosnian subjects, fanatical strip-
lings aged twenty. Two of the accomplices came from the Serbian King-
dom, but no grain of evidence was ever found by Austrian agents to justify
the charge — partly passionate, partly calculated and unscrupulous — that
the Belgrade Government and its ofBcials were the authors of the crime.
Yet the Serbian racial movement, like every other movement of its kind,
whether in the Balkans in the east or in Ireland in the west, was full of
murderous propensity, and the Serajevo murders were a crime of barbarous
atrocity. By wholesome human instinct, the general opinion of the world
for the moment was estranged from the Serbian race after this murder
most foul. The more natural and furious was the rage of the German and
Magyar elements in Austria-Hungary.
These various revulsions of sincere human feeling and passion, though
genuinely shared by the Viennese war-party in the first instance, were in
the next exploited by it with a mixture of ruthless perception and infatuated
blindness. In their military and political memoranda of a few days earlier,
they had urged the isolation and annihilation of independent Serbia before
it was too late. They had been waiting for a good pretext. Here was a
pretext favourable beyond their dearest dreams. The Archduke, though
devoted at the core to his own nearest, and to a high sense of Imperial
duty, had promised to be a rash, hard and thankless master. Little re-
gretted, the pathos of his death might be used to invaluable purpose by those
who had not loved him. Serbia seemed in moral quarantine. The Tsar,
living in dread of his grandfather’s fate, would be repelled by the Serajevo
assassinations. It was “ Now or Never.” Berlin agreed.
After the assassinations there never was a chance for peace. The diplo-
matic distractions of the following month must be shown in dated order:
52 WORLD POLICY verms WORLD EXPLOSION
June SO, 1914- A report bearing this date from his ambassador in Vienna
was annotated on receipt by William II as follows: “ It is exclusively
Austria’s business to decide what she ought to do. If things turn out badly
we can say Germany did not want this. . . . The Serbs must be finished as
soon as possible . . . now or never! ”
July 2. The Austrian case, mostly drawn up just before the assassina-
tions, for a final reckoning with the Serbs, was sent to Berlin.
July 6 and 6. The Austrian case, received in Berlin by the Emperor,
then considered by the Imperial Chancellor and other leading personalities,
military and political, was approved without reserve. Austria-Hungary
must be supported against Serbia, even at the risk of war with Russia, which,
however, was thou^t to be unlikely owing to Russia’s general incapacity
and to the Tsar’s particular feeling against regicide assassins. With a
view to any eventuality, preliminary war-measures were ordered from Pots-
dam. This unrestricted encouragement to Vienna was fatal.
July 7. William II left for his holiday in Norwegian waters. A Coimcil
of Ministers held at Vienna decided to send Belgrade an ultimatum framed
in terms to make acceptance impossible, and war with Serbia certain. Count
Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, opposed so extreme a course,
but was overborne. Herr Tschirsky-Bogendorff, the German Ambassador
at Vienna, reiterated assurances of unwavering support.
July 8 to IS. Austrian agents, sent to investigate, reported from Bosnia
that no connection between the murderers and the Serbian Government could
be traced. But Conrad von Hdtzendorff, Chief of the General Staff, pro-
nounces that tlie crisis is the last good military opportunity — less favour-
able than in previous years but more so than could be expected in the
future. That settled it.
July 14- The die was cast: it was decided in Vienna to send Serbia an
ultimatum with a short-time limit, but so framed as to make peaceful
acceptance impossible.
July 17. The final draft of the ultimatum was approved by the Emperor
Francis Joseph.
July 19. A conference of Austrian Ministers decides that Serbia must
be dismembered, the territory taken from her not to be annexed to the
Habsburg Monarchy but to be distributed between Bulgaria and Albania.
(The Kaiser’s marginal comment on this question was: “ Austria must be-
come preponderant over the smaller States at the expense of Russia, else
there will be no peace.” On this date he ordered the German battle-fieet
not to disperse.)
July 22. The text of the Austrian ultimatum was communicated the
German Foreign OflSce. But the day before it had nrobably been telegraphed
from Vienna direct to the German Emperor whose first feelings were elate.
He had thought Austria incapable of so much pluck. As for Slav States,
“ just tread firmly on the feet of this rabble.”
July 23. The ultimatum was presented to Belgrade at six o’clock on
Thursday afternoon. It demanded the condemnation and rooting out of the
^tation for Greater Serbia. Societies and publications in connection with
it must be dissolved and suppressed. OflBcers, officials and teachers, to be
named by Vienna, must be dismissed from the army, the administration, and
the schools. Austro-Hungarian representatives on Serbian soil must be
allowed to collaborate with the native Government in extirpating the Greater
Serbia movement and to take part in judicial investigations and criminal
proceedings concerning persons suspected of complicity in the Serajevo
murders. A reply was demanded in 48 hours — that is, by six o’clock on
the evening of Saturday, July 25.
J. L. GARVIN
53
July H. The world began to awake. The Austrian demands meant the
im^ilation of Serbian independence with irreparable humiliation and
lebacle for Russia in the Near East. Persistence in these aims by the
Central Empires meant forcing a general war. But on this day Berlin took
he wrong step. A German note announced that the Austro-Serbian dispute
nust be settled by Vienna and Belgrade alone; any intervention by another
Power might have “ incalculable consequences.^* This was indirectly an
iltimatum to Russia, even graver than the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.
3n the one hand it destroyed the basis of that Anglo-German mediation
ivhich had done so much to preserve the peace in 1912-1913 and whereon
3ir Edward Grey was relying to preserve it still. On the other hand the
iesertion of Serbia by Russia was impossible as involving unparalleled shame
md abasement in the sight of all Slavs. Russian intervention in some shape
was inevitable, war or no war. Nevertheless, Britain and Russia began at
Dnce to work for the extension of the time-limit allowed to Serbia. Only
24 hours remained.
July 25. Russia announced in effect that if necessary she would resist
the Austrian war-party by force of arms Vienna refused to prolong the
bime-limit. To its disappointment, the Serbian answer, delivered within the
appointed hours, was not the hot-headed defiance expected and desired by
Vienna but carried conciliation to the extreme. It accepted everything
except the dismissal from their posts of all Serbian subjects whom Austria
might choose arbitrarily to indicate; and the mortal injury to Serbian sover-
eignty and self-respect that would be inflicted by submitting Serbian judicial
proceedings to the domination of foreign delegates. Further the Belgrade
Government offered to submit to arbitration. As Vienna*s object was
rupture, not settlement, the Austro-Hungarian Minister by pre-determined
policy, without giving the answer half an hour’s consideration, declared it
to be unsatisfactory and left Belgrade.
July 26. Austria mobilised eight army corps for the execution of
Serbia.
July 27. Active military preliminaries in Russia. The German Ambas-
sador at St Petersburg, Pourtales, declares his conviction that Russia will
give way; and this emotional, muddling diplomatist seriously misleads his
own Government. On the afternoon of this date, the Kaiser returned and
learned the full text of the Serbian answer. He realised that Austria has
no longer any grounds for war, but yet thinks she ought to complete a bril-
liant diplomatic victory by a limited invasion and by the occupation of
Belgrade. He still vetoes Russian interference. Sir Edward Grey, however,
now makes the firm proposal that, as at the end of 1912, the question shall
be submitted to a conference of ambassadors in London. Prince Lichnowsky
warned Berlin that if the Central Empires refused all concessions they would
be regarded as deliberately aiming at war, and British neutrality could no
longer be assumed.
July 28 Germany disastrously rejects the Grey proposals. ‘^Austria
could not be asked to appear before a European Court of Areopagi^.” The
Kaiser, however, is now uneasy and advises Vienna generally against war,
yet at the same time still urges what would make war inevitable: the limited
invasion of Serbia. “ This must be done in such a manner as to give Austria
a pawn — Belgrade. This is necessary also in order to give to the army which
has been three times mobilised in vain, the appearance of a success in foreign
eyes.” William II also remarks, “The Serbians are Orientals and conse-
quently deceivers, liars, and hypocrites.” In the evening Austria by open tel-
egram declares war on Serbia.
July 29. The Austrians not wholly knowing what they do, begin the
54
WOKLD POLICY venm WORLD EXPLOSION
World War, firing its first shots by bombarding Belgrade. Russia orders the
mobilisation of 13 army corps to be sent against the Austro-Hungarian fron-
tiers. The German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, still relying upon the effect
of a second appearance “ in shining armour,” as in 1909, warns Russia that
if she does not stop her military preparations, Germany must mobilise and
that would mean war. For technical reasons, partial mobilisation, against
Austria-Hungary alone, would leave Russia helpless against Germany, and
accordingly the Tsar consents to general mobilisation.
Late that night he revokes this order upon receiving a telegram from the
German Emperor, who states that he is using “ all my influence to induce
Austria to come to a loyal and satisfactory understanding with Russia.” The
Tsar’s orders to suspend general mobilisation were disregarded by his Min-
ister for War, General Sukhomlinov, who believed Russia was drifting into
deadly danger as a result of “ order — counter-order — disorder,” and who
“lied to the Tsar”; but this disobedience had no real influence on events,
since the Central Empires still insisted that Russia should stand helpless while
the bombardment of Belgrade went on.
Late that night the German Chancellor sent for the British Ambassador,
Sir Edward Goschen, and made a bid for England’s definite neutrality by
proposing the “ shameful bargain ” — that Britain should stand aside if Ger-
many promised in case of the defeat of France not to annex any part of it
(no similar engagement with regard to the French colonies was suggested) .
July SO. “ Willy ” in an early hour received from “ Nicky ” the following
pathetic telegram which was long concealed from the knowledge of the German
people:
“ I beg of you to clear up the cause of this difference. It would be much
better to submit the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. I
rely on your wisdom and friendship. Ton Nicky qm f’otme.”
Herr Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, now thoroughly
alarmed, telegraphs to Vienna his fear “ of a conflagration in which, from all
appearance, Italy and Rumania will not be with us, and Britain will be
against us. . . . The political prestige of Austria, the honour of her arms
and her justifiable complaints against Serbia may be sufficiently safeguarded
by the occupation of Belgrade or other places. By humiliating Serbia, the
monarchy would strengthen its position both in the Balkans and in regard to
Russia. . . . We are compelled to recommend most urgently for the consider-
ation of the Cabinet of Vienna the acceptance of mediation.” This only
repeated the previous contradiction in terms — moderation and peace were
enjoined, yet Austria was to continue the challenge to Russia by continuing
the war on Serbia. The German Government then, as previously, and often
later, was psychologically blind. The world’s peace hung on a single thread.
That thread was broken by German refusal to advise Austria to discontinue
the armed onslaught on Serbia.
Russia telegraphs to Berlin that she will stop her military preparations
if Austria will cease the attack on Serbian independence and submit the dis-
pute to some manner of European tribunal. Germany merely insists in return
upon the imconditional discontinuance of Russia’s milita^ preparations. The
Tsar who throughout these days had been in a state of pitiable trouble, finally
ordered the general mobilisation entreated by his advisers, and it was decreed
at four o’clock in the afternoon. This was a political mistake for two reasons:
It gave a very strong argument to the German General Staff with whom it
was a cardinal principle that Germany’s life or death depended upon lightning
rapidity of mobilisation by comparison with Russia; and German popular
opinion even amongst the Socialists was naturally indignant and misled.
Up to this black day, Britain, by a firm declaration that in case of war
J. L. GARVIN
55
it would stand with all its strength by the side of France and Russia, could
probably have saved the world^s peace; but such a declaration by the irony
of fate had been prevented by the section of the British Cabinet most friendly
to Germany and least friendly to Russia. Now it was too late.
Jvly SI. The Russian mobilisation decree issued at dawn was received
with enthusiasm. The Tsar tele^aphed to the Kaiser: It is technically im-
possible for me to suspend my military preparations. But so long as conver-
sations with Austria are not broken off my troops will refrain from taking
the offensive anywhere. I give you my word of honour on that.” This was
sincere. It was certain that the hapless Tsar would not without further and
extreme provocation proceed from mobilisation to hostilities. Germany, how-
ever- — and so far she could do no otherwise — at once announced:
Kriegsgefahrzmtand^^ which meant the immediate calling up of the re-
servists, and the closing of the frontiers. On learning this, the Tsar’s last
appeal to the Kaiser entreated that these measures do not mean war and
that we shall continue our negotiations to save the general peace so dear to
our hearts.” The mobilisation of all men between the ages of 19 and 42
was decreed by Austria-Hungary. The decree had been framed on the pre-
vious day, and was issued before the Russian decree was known. Germany
without formal order had been intensely mobilising in vital respects for some
days.
What was happening was the fatalistic result of more than 40 years of
European history, and it was a tremendous thing surpassing all that had
been imagined by Samuel Butler in his symbolic romance Erewhon. The
machines were in motion.” Austria-Hungary at the last moment accepted
the general principle of Sir Edward Grey’s proposal for mediation by the four
Powers, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, at a conference in London; but
accompanied this by the old impossible condition that while Russian measures
must cease, the attack on Serbia must continue.
In fact all was over. “ The machines were in motion,” and nothing could
stop them. In Berlin the Great General Staff was in command. It was de-
cided to send the final ultimatum to Russia. The German Ambassador was
instructed that even if France desired to remain neutral she must hand over
to Germany for the term of the war the keys of her eastern frontier, the
great fortresses of Verdun and Toul. At eleven o’clock on this Friday
evening Count Pourtales presented himself at the Russian Foreign Office and
announced that if within twelve hours Russia did not revoke her mobilisation,
the whole German army would be mobilised and mobilisation will inev-
itably mean war.” But there was no equal and saving suggestion from Berlin
to Vienna that Austria should simultaneously demobilise. Germany, after
five years, had re-appeared in shining armour.” and it was a terrible appari-
tion; but Russia could not bow to a one-sided and unconditional veto.
August 1. Pourtales arrived at the Russian Foreign Office at seven in the
evening and presented the German declaration of war. Sazonov replied:
“ This is a criminal act of yours. The curse of the nations will be upon you.”
General mobilisation was ordered in France, almost at the same time as in
Germany; but continued British indecision in consequence of the divisions
in the Cabinet caused agony in Paris. Britain had refused repeatedly in the
previous twelve months to enter into any binding alliance with France and
Russia. Her treaty obligation was to defend the neutrality of Belgiiun. In
response to Sir. Edward Grey’s enquiries, France had unreservedly agreed to
respect that neutrality, but Germany had evaded the question.
August 2. Sir Edward Grey, on his own responsibility, agreed to defend
the northern coasts of France against the German fleet since France by ar-
rangement with Britain had long since transferred her main naval forces to
56 WORLD POLICY versus WORLD EXPLOSION
the Mediterranean. The divided British Cabinet holds agitated sittings
thm n gh niit, the day, but is finally decided to face war by the news of German
action. German forces had entered Luxemburg in violation of the neutrality
guaranteed by Germany herself. The Kaiser’s Minister at Brussels had an-
nounced the greater violation of Belgian neutrality, by demanding free pas-
sage for the German armies. Italy repudiated the Triple Alliance and decided
upon neutrality.
Avgust 3. Germany declared war on France. Belgium, though small and
weak, declared that she would fight at any cost against the unparallelled
iniquity of unprovoked invasion, and the equal perfidy of her violation by one
of the guarantors of her neutrality. King Albert appealed to Britain. Su:
Edward Grey’s great speech in the House of Commons commits Britain di-
rectly to support Belgium and indirectly to support France and Russia.
Augtist %. Britain’s ultimatum to Germany offers the choice between re-
spect for Belgian neutrality or war at midnight. The German Chancellor
in the Reichstag admits the moral wrong of violating Belgium, but proclaims
the practical necessity. Later in the day Herr Bethmann said to the British
Ambassador: “Just for a word — 'neutrality,’ a word which in war-time
had so often been disregarded, just for a scrap of paper — Great Britain was
going to make war.”
WORLD-POLICY ENDS IN WORLD-EXPLOSION
While this tragedy of all time had been moving to its climax, there had
been weeks of splendid summer, and August opened with golden days From
that warm midnight of the fourth day when Britain and her sea-power swept
into the conflict, earth and ocean were shaken by the clash of empires, and
from the first all the continents were more or less participators in the action
and wholly involved in the consequences. The control of vast territories and
economic spheres, the fate of historic dynasties and of modem democracies,
the rise or fall of many peoples, great and little — these were the stakes.
That word must be used because the struggle on the part of the Central Em-
pires was a stupendous gamble, induced by profound miscalculations
It was just about 20 years since those months of 1894, when Japan had
overthrown China; when Nicholas II, with his Trans-Siberian interests and
Far-Eastem dreams, had ascended the throne; when William II had adopted
a new course of policy revealed after Shimonoseki and looking to the creation
between the Anglo-Saxons and the Slavs of a third sphere of world-empire.
He had urged Russia towards her downfall in Manchuria. His Nemesis was
Russia’s return to the Nearer East where his Bagdad project, his patronage
of the Turk and Islam, with the Balkan consequences, crossed her path. Si-
multaneously, in a manner which Bismarck would have thought demented,
he had with deadly method, yet with foolish advertisement, challenged the
maritime conditions of British existence. Instead of dividing British forces,
he had concentrated them. He had destroyed the overwhelming Bismarckian
system of alliances and connections by losing Italy and Rumania at last, as
well as Britain long before; and instead he had built up against himself the
mighty combination of Britain, France and Russia, linked to Japan. In
all his diplomatic and military forecasts about the results of previous
cowps and smaller struggles, his judgment had been consistently
wrong. The method of humiliating menace, the methods of Tanker, “ Shining
Armour,” Agadir, and, at last, of Serbian “execution” — were certain to
lead to the end of peace. By the Tsar’s vacillating weakness and by the
revolutionary under-swell in Russia, by the divisions in the British Cabinet,
J. L. GARVIN
57
and the chaos of British politics in view of Irish civil war, he was somewhat
more excusably misled; and yet more creditably — let us admit it — by his
belief with the Habsburg war-party that in July, 1914, it was a question of
‘‘ Now or Never ” for Austro-Hungarian existence. He was tied by every bond
of real loyalty as well as of false sense of interest to the obsolete Habsburg
system whose existence in the old shape — on terms of German and Magyar
ascendency over the majority of other races in that medley — had become
impossible, yet which could not be changed without war. In these circum-
stances, the final alienation of Russia was suicidal, and worse had come about
than the worst that the Iron Chancellor’s prophetic instinct had foretold so
long ago, when the man who had made the German Empire was so thank-
lessly dismissed.
There was more than that. National fears, passions, and resolves had
been aroused on every side. National armaments had been raised to an
unparallelled magnitude. Under the push of the Serbian ultimatum the arma-
ments began to move of themselves and resistlessly. The Tsar entreated that
mobilisation might not mean war. It would have been an effectual argument
in any former generation. Now it was null. If it came to the worst, all would
depend for Germany upon the instant swiftness of superior organisation.
Three days’ hesitation at Berlin might turn the scales against Germany for
ever. To restrain Austria firmly in the last days of July was the only wisdom,
but it would have required a Bismarck to do it. These lesser men held Ger-
many to be so deeply committed, that to retreat would be fatal to the prestige
and prospects of both the Central Empires alike. And in spite of all, they
counted on dazzling victory in a short war. The German machine was the
readiest and mightiest of all, and whether anything on earth could stand
against it had yet to be known. As M. Maurice Paleologue, the French Am-
bassador at St. Petersburg, writing in his diary, says: “ Compared with the
underlying and remote causes which have produced the present crisis, the
incidents of the last few days were nothing . . . there was no longer any
will capable of withstanding the automatic mechanism let loose.”
World-policy had come to the world-explosion. The long-gathering, pent-
up forces and passions, whose growth we have seen in these pages, burst
out in conflagration and terror, more like the Apocalypse than like any real
chapter of mortal transactions. As surely as the outbreak of the wars of the
Reformation or those of the French Revolution, it was the end of an age
and the beginning of that new incalculable epoch of human destinies whose
main purport no one living can yet begin to measure.
CHAPTER II
HISTOKY OF OUR OWN TIMES—
By J. L. Garvin
War ENaui;FS the Woru) (1914-1918)
We are concerned here with the interpretation of the forces and move-
ments of our time — with the great relations of cause and effect — with the
philosophy of latest history rather than its detail. The World War itself
towers over all this period like a mountain-range with a long approach on
one side and a broken precipitous descent on the other. But events themselves
on their giant scale are clearer; their subsequent effects must chiefly engage
us; and though it is necessary to indicate the essentials of the martial nar-
rative, the survey here of this climax of human action must omit a thousand
things of significance or attraction.
SEA-FOWEB IN HISTOBY AGAIN
When the struggle began, Mahan’s famous phrase about Nelson and the
Chrande Armee gave the keynote. The British fleet, on which the German
armies never looked, stood between them and the dominion of the world.
Sea-power was not yet the certain pledge of final victory, far from it; but
it was the assurance of a long fight. The Admiralty in Whitehall had gripped
the initiative. A few days before the European rupture, the far-stretched
line of British ships, measuring leagues from end to end, had steamed north-
ward and was safely concentrated at its war-stations. For all decisive pur-
poses, its command of world communications, held from the first hour, was
never shaken. The original Tirpitzian theory, that its strength would be
^spers^ in distant regions, or that at least its squadrons might be attacked
in detail before effecting concentration, was a dream withered in a night.
Even so, it might have been better for Germany to force naval battle at once
against heavy odds before these odds became more hopeless; but injury
to German military confidence in case of defeat was feared. The German
High Sea Fleet, for which all had been risked, a ponderous and masterly
creation, resigned itself to the dullest part, and remained a cipher, relatively
to the conditions of the world-struggle. The U-boats were its fierce substitute
too late. Receiving with wrath and execration the news that Britain stood
by her friends and engagements, the German Emperor remarked: “They
are an obstinate people; the war cannot be short.” Henceforth his own r61e
was insignificant, except that his inadequacy was of disservice to his people.
THE MIGHT OF GEBMANY
That great people had now to be reckoned with. The war was to be an
epic of Germany against the world. Magnificent in every element of fi ghtin g
and working strength, but ill-informed and politically helpless, they were
told that the struggle had been forced unon them by the aggression of the
58
© KeyMone View Co,
Corfu, the lovehest of all the isles of Greece, was bombarded by the Italian Fleet on August 31,
1923. The photograph shows the httle bay where the Itahan vessels anchored, with the islet of
Achilles m its centre.
© Keystone View Co © Keystone View Co
Viscount Haldane, Secretary of State for War Eleutherios Venizelos, ez-Premier of Greece
from 1905 to 1912 ; Lord Chancellor from 1912 to and an outstanding figure amongst modem
1916, and agam in the first Labour Cabinet European statesmen. He exercised great
formed by Mr. Ramsey MacDonald m January, influence at the Peace Conference.
1994 .
J. L. GARVIN 59
Slavs and the perfidy of Britain Believing their cause to be just and right,
they rose for it with the Teutonic fury.
In the west, the worst anticipations of the German shock were staggered
by its speed and mass. For a moment, little Belgium was an irritating ob-
stacle. The defence of Liege threw back the German time-table by about
three days and this was serious. But after that, the Schlieffen plan, revised
and perfected for so many years, went like clock-work. By mid-August the
German armies were sweeping through Belgium, and as they passed through
Brussels and elsewhere, their order and weight and endless numbers seemed
like some irresistible mechanism, which nothing else in human power could
withstand; and this had an almost hypnotic effect upon observers. Smashing
in 48 hours, by their new siege-howitzers, the key-fortress of Namur, they
entered singing. Namur, though almost impregnable and at least certain to
be a stubborn bulwark, was the pivot of the Allies^ plans in the critical
quarter. Its fall was like a knell.
From Charleroi and Mons, after brave but hopeless battle, the inferior
French and British forces were driven into desperate retreat They were
threatened with envelopment and destruction by the colossal wheeling move-
ment of the enemy. Nothing like it had been conceived. In the last days of
August the Germans were over the French frontier — pouring like an inimda-
tion through northern France and furthest in advance upon the roads bear-
ing straight on Pans. Next, news from East Prussia reported the annihilation
of the Russian invaders at Tannenberg. On Sedan Day, September 2, 1914,
the German people and its troops reached the highest pitch of exultation
and confidence they were to know. The British contingent — the Old
Contemptibles — they thought already broken beyond repair and, not yet
knowing some other facts, they expected within a few days to undo the French
armies in a way that would throw the Sedan of 1870 into the shade.
This expectation might well seem to the Germans most reasonable. So
far the French Command, after 40 years for reflection, had been more com-
pletely surprised than in 1870. The French nation had been admirable in
composure and celerity. It had mobilised well. It had equal numbers in the
field; but the Higher Command, misled by vivid pre-conceived ideas, had
made every mistake in disposition and manoeuvre. They did not think the
enemy would throw more than 22 army corps into the western theatre, but
the Germans had launched 35. Unprepared for anything like the breadth
and magnitude of the invasion through Belgium, the French had massed
towards the east, leaving themselves utterly weak against the real and over-
whelming peril on the other wing. Joffre^s sanguine offensives were pre-
maturely attempted in the wrong direction Awakened fully though late,
instead of losing nerve, he rose to the height of his task and won fame. Hold-
ing on at all costs to the solid rampart of the eastern fortress line, he ordered
all the rest of his battle front to abandon the defence of the frontiers. They
eluded the German swoop by retreating pell-mell. Even to this backward
rush, which might have broken the military morale of any people, the steadi-
ness of this new France was equal. Following that September 2, Sedan Day
of 1914, which found the Germans counting with unquestioning exultation
on another Sedan, the French ranks were beyond the Marne, solidly re-align-
ing for immortal battle.
THE MIRACLE OF THE MARNE
German strength, though nearly overwhelming, fell just short. It was
not equal to the grandeur of the conception. They had been compelled if>
send two army corps from the west to East Prussia. Under-estimating their
60
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
antagonist, then as so often after, they caused their right wing to swerve
inwards when it was bearing direct on Paris. Drawing closer together, they
risked the attempt to thrust in between Paris and the French armies. That
confident manoeuvre changed the course of history. From the side of the
metropolitan fortress, the exposed flank of the invaders was attacked. The
battle of the Marne began. For days the world held its breath. The Germans,
abruptly awakened to alarming possibilities in their turn, strove, while guarding
their threatened flank, to batter through the French defence. Strained to
the limit it was heroically held, above all where Foch commanded. Playing,
according to their modest numbers, a subsidiary but essential part, the British
were in the battle, not out of it. Six weeks had been allowed for the destruction
of France. Precisely at the end of those six weeks, the German plan, matured
for 40 years and then wonderfully attempted, had failed. The “ miracle of
the Marne ” was a French victory. The war was now certain to be long in-
deed, even on land. If this could have been foreseen, the conflict never
would have been faced. Nothing could bring back that yesterday when delay,
mediation, the submission of the whole dispute to The Hague or to a confer-
ence, had been successively refused.
Yet the Marne was but a victory of prevention. While it saved the
Allies, the invaders were foiled, not overthrown. The retreat of the German
armies was unbroken, defiant, purposeful. The Allies^ hopes were deceived.
The German nation facing the crisis of its being with iron fibre, rose to its
most formidable capacity.
On the eastern front, also, the visions of a short ‘^Hurrah-war'' were
3 ver. On that side, too, for a moment the hopes of the Allies had risen to
?enith Bv the gallant promptitude of their irruption into East Prussia,
the Russians had helped the Allies, but bruised themselves. After spreading
3onstcrnation in the beloved Hohenzollern province, of two Russian armies,
3 ne was hoodwinked when within two days march of Konigsberg, while the
Dther was dealt with, Enmeshed amongst the Masurian lakes and marshes,
Samsonov's group was totally destroyed. Over 80,000 prisoners and hundreds
)f guns were taken by the Germans. Tannenberg was a Napoleonic victory,
von by tw^o men, of whom more was to be heard — the rugged veteran Hm-
lenburg and his younger Chief of Staff, Ludendorff, who was to prove one of
he dominant personalities of the World War. But even the eastern picture
vhen it seemed radiant was suddenly darkened.
Trenchantly as the Germans had triumphed in East Prussia, far to the
outh great Habsburg armies as disastrously fell before the mam Russian at-
ack under the Grand Duke Nicholas. The Austro-Hungarian forces had been
hrusting into Russian Poland, hoping to conquer that region, and further to
laralyse Russia by breaking even such wretchedly deficient railway communi-
ations as she possessed for the purposes of movement against the Central
empires. The Tsar's generals, by admirable combined strategy on a front
ver 200 miles wide, baffled the long-studied plans of Conrad von Hotzendorff
-the most urgent of European war-makers as we have seen — and shat-
ered the hosts of Francis Joseph. In Galicia, the Habsburg frontiers were
orced. Lemberg, the key of all the region, was taken on Sedan Day, though
be news did not arrive in time to cloud German rejoicing. While the battle
f the Marne swayed in the west, what may be called the battle of Galicia
aged in the east. Both grapples were begun and ended almost simulta-
eously, but the Austro-Hungarian armies were far more heavily vanquished,
broken right, left and centre, some were driven through the Carpathian
lountains, some were thrown back on Cracow, and some were isolated and
esieged in the fortress of Przemysl. Expecting to thrust before long into
ilesia — part of Germany’s industrial vitals — and deep into Hungary, the
J. L. GARVIN
61
Russians were at this moment even higher in hope than the Allies in the west
and were even more deceived. For France and Britain the goal was still
years away. For Russia it was never to be reached.
FROM THE MARNE TO THE SEA
In ability and technique German organisation now showed its supremacy.
Advancing from the Marne, the Allies, within little more than 48 hours, were
brought up short. They found the enemy impregnably fortified upon the
bold heights, with their spurs and ravines across the river Aisne. Crossing
the stream in hard fighting, the French and British found frontal attack use-
less. Each army began to extend its lines in the attempt to outflank the
other. In this way, a sudden and astonishing development of the war came
almost of itself. For weeks a continuous battle, like nothing yet known,
rolled northward and still northward further and further, until at last it
reached the sea, nearly 150 miles away from the stalemate on the Aisne.
No movement of the war was stranger; none more sinister for both sides as
foreshadowing a war of years — Kitchener already thought three years —
murderous beyond all record, demanding millions of lives thrown in like
coals into a furnace. For hundreds of miles the rival lines of trenches and
barbed wire stretched unbroken from the coast of Flanders to Switzerland.
Antwerp fell. Except for one last little nook, containing Ypres, the conquest
of Belgium by the invaders was completed. Since the Marne they had
pulled a drag-net through the German population to bring up fresh reserves,
boys and middle-aged alike At the same time, realising that munitions would
henceforth mean even more than troops — superior as they had been in equip-
ment from the beginning — they began the production of war-material in
unparallelled quantity.
Then in the last week of October and through the first half of November,
the invaders, resuming their offensive with more than its primal impetus, with
convulsed energy, tried to do in the north, what they had failed to on the
Marne. They hoped to break through the Allies' seaward wing, to resume
an enveloping movement, and at the very least, by capturing Dunkirk and
Calais, to bring the Straits of Dover under their long-range guns and jeopard-
ise British communications with France. The Germans had superiority of
force as never yet in the west. Their new levies fought with sacrificial en-
thusiasm contemning death. It was in vain. The Franco-British defence
under Foch's chief command proved impenetrable. Round Ypres, the sector of
most peril, the British army, when almost hopelessly outnumbered and out-
pounded, shot to rags, held the trenches with unyielding fortitude in one of
the most characteristic passages of their history. Following the battle of
Flanders towards the end of November, after four months' war, the last Ger-
man hope of forcing a speedy conclusion in the west was gone. Amidst mud
and slime, in their parallel lines of wired ditches stretching uninterruptedly
from the North Sea and the Flemish flats to the foothills of the Alps, these
immeasurable armies settled down to trench warfare through the grimmest
winter that armies had ever faced.
THE END OP 1914
A little later the eastern situation solidified in the same way. In that far-
extending theatre, where the spaces begin to be truly continental and on
an American scale by comparison with the close ranges of more western
62
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
Europe, there was accordingly a wider ebbing and flowing of armies. Twice
in October and December, Hindenburg swung his forces like a battering-ram
towards Warsaw — coveted for political and strategical reasons alike — and
towards the vital complex of Russian communications around it. But the
Grand Duke’s entrenched defences held. The Germans made strenuous efforts,
wading through the loose ice of the streams in the hope of presenting the
Polish capital to the Kaiser as a Christmas-box, but by Christmas Eve the
adventure had to be abandoned. Hindenburg left a waste behind him. He
had intended his movements to relieve the dire pressure on Austria-Hungary,
and partly it did; but though the Grand Duke’s grip on the Carpathian
passes and the near approaches to Cracow w^as weakened, it was not removed.
On the eastern frontier, while all over the world Christians were mumbling
of “ peace and goodwill,” the lines were stabilised as in France and Flanders
— though never so rigidly — and between the burrowing armies in the wired
ditches it was deadlock for a thousand miles.
Just then the triumph of the Serbs was a romance. So far, they had
escaped “ execution ” after all. Driven into their mountains and pressed
to extremity, they turned to conquer or die. In December they broke the
Habsburg army and swept it before them out of their country over the
Danube. Heroic old King Peter, whose legendary appeal had fired them,
spent his Christmas Day in Belgrade. In the cathedral ten days before he
had thrown himself on his knees.
Like 1789, 1914 had been a peak-year of history. The strong contrast,
as in Napoleon’s time, was between sea and land Before British sea-power,
German colonies and German shipping were disappearing throughout the
world. The Kaiser’s navy was shut up. It could move a little, but only like
a condemned man in a prison-yard The whole British Empire had rallied
for the war. There was no secession of South Africa, no revolt of India, no
rising of all Islam for the cause of Hadji Wilhelm Japan had squared ac-
counts for the Shimonoseki coup of 1895, the Kaiser’s first signal stroke of
weltpolitik. Nearly 20 years after, the Japanese flag floated over Kiaochow.
But in the heart of Europe, where fate would be decided, the German nation
loomed strongest and was to dominate more and more. All belligerents were
thinking, working; but the Germans, as we shall see, were thinking and work-
ing best. Austria-Hungary was not yet done It had great fighting reserves
And on the side of the Central Empires, Turkey, since October, had joined
the war. It had been bound to Berlin by a secret alliance since July. Above
all, the inner organisation of the Tsardom, in spite of its imposing fagade,
was rotten to the core owing to the incurable corruption and incompetence of
the autocratic system.
1915 — HOPE AND REALITY
Thus, though 1915 opened for the Allies with high hopes, it was to be
their year of general disaster on land and partly of disaster irretrievable.
Various influences made for optimism. Command of the sea gave the Western
Powers unlimited access to the world’s supplies for martial and civil needs.
The French General Staff had returned to gallant delusions. For munition-
making and all other purposes, France was keyed to the pitch of efficiency.
More slowly but surely, industrial Britain was turning itself into a mightier
arsenal, and while multiplying its naval weapons of all kinds, was steadily
raising its military strength in Flanders, and training new armies by the
million. Russia on the other side was still expected to prove a steam-roller.
It seemed impossible to sanguine temperaments that Germany could long
J. L GARVIN
stand against all this. Above all, the French General Stafif had at this time
a mathematical theory of wastage. Putting the enemy's relative of loss
much higher than it was, they thought Germany would come in sight of her
last reserves within a measurable period; and that in any case the Allies, by
accumulating superior numbers and munitions, would be able soon to break
the German lines.
A luring mirage, it was to mean much death to little puipose, but we
must note how it faded before we look towards darker events in the east.
The Allies in March had been over-elated by the prefatory action at Neuve
Chapelle where their artillery smashed well into the enemy's trenches. It
was a small affair and misleading. When the continuous fighting season
opened, it was the Germans who took the real initiative even in the west.
On April 17, they opened the second battle of Ypres by attacking with poison
gas as well as stronger artillery. With poison gas, flame-throwers and the
rest — the Lusitania " was sunk while this new grapple was swaying — the
Germans had begun to stamp this war of nations and empires by an infernal
perversion of human science and ingenuity. Above the trenches and their
hinterlands, the air squadrons were now circling and firing in ever-growing
swarms, though for number, nothing yet to what they were to become. The
second battle of Ypres lasted over five weeks, but though the Allies gave
ground slightly they lost in that respect nothing appreciable. They adopted
gas masks and poison gas manufacture with a rapidity which startled the Ger-
mans in their turn. Before this, the long-planned Allies’ offensive, on which
the French and British headquarters had staked their optimism, had been
launched on a wide scale, chiefly in Artois. By the middle of June, after
bloody fighting it had failed. It made no serious impression on the depth
and strength and intricacy of German fortification on the surface and under-
ground. But the Allies' Higher Command were still hypnotised by these prema-
ture dreams of a great break-through. They renewed their attempt in the still-
wider conflict of September waged in Champagne as well as in Artois and at
Loos in Flanders. French and British troops fought magnificently, but the
Germans were of equal temper and kept their advantage in every kind of
thoroughness The relative loss to the Allies was excessive, but there was no
approach to an effective break-through and nothing to suggest its possibility
at this stage. The western Allies, in fact, throughout 1915, were doing what
the enemy desired. Falkenhayn's was a bold judgment: “Hold the solid
wall in the west and let the French and British dash themselves against it:
strike down Russia in the east." It was done.
Russia's jeopardy
The result was the catastrophe of the Tsardom. Russia's numbers, her
15,000,000 men of fighting age and fitness, were never brought into play,
because Russia's position with regard to munitions was hopeless. Initial
deficiency when war broke out had been aggravated by unbelievable care-
lessness and procrastination. As early as October, 1914, the good old soldier
who was head of the artillery went weeping to the War Minister and said
that Russia would have to make peace owing to the shortage of ammunition.
The lack of rifles was so bad by December that while units at the front were
now only half-strength, drafts in training had only one rifle to three men. For
the artillery the scarcity of shot now reached famine. For some time the
Russian factories had been producing less in a month than the batteries
used in one day. From now all the Tsar's guns together dared only to fire
a few thousand shells, for in the whole country there were not enough reserves
64
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
of anmiunition for an average week’s war consumption. And hapless Russia,
in spite of the heaped sacrifice of life she had so far given, was largely cut
off from those resources of the world open to the western Allies who, at the
same time, were incomparably better equipped within themselves. Russia’s
natural wartime outlets were m the grip of her enemies. Germany closed the
Baltic, Turkey the Black Sea. Her Arctic coast was ice-locked for half
the year, and in the other half connections with it were miserable. Vladi-
vostock was almost 8,000 miles away from the Polish and Galician scenes of
war. This most perilous situation seriously reduced the effects of sea-power
itself and might enable the enemy to overcome it.
In these circumstances, a few British minds, led by Mr. Churchill, then
First Lord of the Admiralty, conceived the greatest strategical conception of
the war — the plan of forcing the Dardanelles, seizing Constantinople and
entering the Black Sea. Certainlv the thing was achievable, given suflBcient
determination. Victory here would have delivered Russia from her isolation,
broken Turkey, roused on the side of the Allies all the Balkans, including
Rumania. Victory here would have subjected the Central Empires to crush-
ing pressure all round, shortened the war by two years, while averting the
political and economic chaos fated to come as a result of peace. The project
was adopted by the British Government with French consent. It was hope-
lessly marred in the execution There was none of the quality required —
concentrated enerey of resolution and control : but instead hesitation, vacilla-
tion, and dribbling half-hearted measures The British navy was too quick,
and forewarned the Turks. The British army was too slow, mainly owing
first to Kitchener’s over-work and indecision in London; then to acute dis-
sension on the subject within the British Government; and between it and
the French General Staff, possessed, as we have seen, by the mirage of the
early break-through in the west, and claiming every man and gun for the
purpose. The result was an adventure as glorious and ill-starred as anything
in the tales of daring and tragedy The rocky edges of the Gallipoli peninsula
were seized, but its commanding heights — the keys not only of the Straits
and of Constantinople but of the Balkans and Russia — were never stormed.
After a few months of partial successes ending in final repulses, the enter-
prise began to be paralysed for lack of support Liman von Sanders has
admitted that it came within an ace of full success By August, in this year
of the Allies’ disasters, it had failed as completely as the Franco-British
offensives in the west and with more ruinous consequences, though at less cost.
Russia’s first d^bAcle
Accordingly Russia’s ultimate fate in the war was sealed She was already
in utmost jeopardy. Through the first months of 1915 her leaders had their
own mirage in spite of the shortage of munitions. She had broken and flung
back the Turkish advance through Armenia upon her provinces south of the
Caucasus. She had captured the great fortress of Przemysl in Galicia. By
Easter the Grand Duke was hoping to push through the Carpathian passes
— the gates of Vienna and Budapest — and to advance by the short Cracow
route into Germany. Then came a reversal, not merely complete, but in its
way tremendous and spectacular past example. After Easter the Central
Empires under German direction and with consummate mastery, accumulated
a powerful army with a crushing weight of guns towards a well-chosen point
south-east of Cracow. This point was on the little river Dunajec. Macken-
sen was the German commander. At the beginning of May, a bombardment
like the crash of doom fell upon the Russians and shattered them. Their
J. L. GARVIN
65
front was breached. Mackensen's army poured through. The breach
widened. In a few days the whole Russian line upon a front about 300 miles
wide was reeling back in desperate retreat with terrible losses. In a few
weeks the gains of nine months were lost for ever. Swept backward and still
backward, far away from Cracow and the Ca^athian passes, the Tsar^s
armies by the anniversary of their first triumphs in Galicia had lost not only
Lemberg and all Galicia, but Warsaw, even Brest-Litovsk far behind it, and
nearly all Russian Poland. They soon lost the rest. Russian leaders and
men did all in human power. In retreat they maintained a front. At close
quarters against German and Habsburg rifles and bayonets, many of the
Russian soldiers fought with sticks. When the Grand Duke towards the
end of September began to stabilise his line once more, its centre had to be
drawn through the Pripet marshes 200 miles behind Warsaw. With illimitable
millions of men still nominally available, Russia had only about 650,000 rifles
left. Removing the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Tsar himself took nominal
command of his armies. The change meant a further weakening, political
and military. All authority was weakened. In Petrograd the Empress, de-
voted and infatuated, ruled with the aid of Rasputin. The prestige of autoc-
racy had perished; and from the autumn of 1915 onwards the discontent of
the Russian people from top to bottom began to ripen for the revolution
which came in eighteen months.
ITALY AND BULGARIA ENTER — SERBIANS DOOM
One broad gleam had cheered the Allies in May. Simultaneously with
the beginning of the Russian debacle, Italy had entered the war. It was a
signal event. On the one hand, however, it roused a fiercer temper in the
antagonised races nearest her frontier. On the other hand the Italian offen-
sives valiantly urged were soon to be checked like those of her Allies in France
and Flanders. Italy on the Carso had to learn like them the meaning of de-
fences in depth, and that to carry outer lines of wire and trenches was of
little more immediate effect than to scratch a wall with a penknife.
For the entry of Italy the Central Empires soon had a redoubtable off-set.
When the Tsar’s armies had been flung back into the depths, and when the
British failure in Gallipoli was certain, Bulgaria in her turn entered the war,
but against the Allies. She could not be blamed. It wa«? the Npme^is of
the Treaty of Bucharest by which she had been mercilessly mutilated two
years before. The aid of the Bulgarian army could have changed the fate of
the Gallipoli enterprise and ensured the capture of Constantinople and the
salvation of Russia by the reopening of the Black Sea Her hostility was the
knell of Serbia. But the Serbs were now as fanatically blind in politics as
dauntless in the field, and nothing could induce them to yield to their ominous
neighbour even that part of Macedonia recognised by the treaty which
founded the Balkan League as unconditionally Bulgarian. An evecrable
muddle followed. The western Allies were again purblind and fumbling in
dealing with an eastern emergency. Before they could send sufficient assist-
ance the Serbs were attacked and annihilated between Mackensen’s army
and the Bulgarian army thirsting for vengeance. Their whole land — except
a corner in the south like the free nook of Belgium — was lost for the time.
Their surviving columns, with masses of fugitives, escaped over snowclad
mountains after frightful sufferings, leaving a long trail of dead. No tragedy
of nations ever had been worse than this.
Too late to save Serbia, the Allies, basing themselves at Salonika in Hel-
lenic territory, despite King Constantine’s ill-boding resentment, built up a
T. K. Y. — VOL. 1 — 6
66
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
limited but strong front against such an advance of the Central League as
would make the Aegean Sea a nest of submarines. The British in December
decided to evacuate Gallipoli. This hazardous movement was carried out
with wonderful dexterity. It was, however, a dextority in abandonment. In
Mesopotamia there was no better fortune. The British, advancing with
temerity on Bagdad, were flung back and besieged in Kut. Henceforth
Turkey was secure for some extended period. Russia remained isolated from
her Allies; her full potential strength could never be put forth. Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey — with the conquered territories in
Belgium, France, Serbia and Russia — held from Antwerp to Bagdad the
whole line of Pan-German dreams. Thus when 1915 closed, the Allies seemed
far further from victory than when it opened. Henceforward for all belliger-
ents, it was now to be the war of exhaustion, which means that at the end of
all, victors, whoever they be, are as exhausted as the vanquished.
1916 — VERDUN
As yet, however, it was more like the situation of the American North in
the midst of the Civil War than like any other example From that and
from Lincoln’s speeches, Britain took a large part of its inspiration The
western Allies were not at the end but at the beginning of an ordeal which
for a year, a further year, and another, was to test them to the core of their
hearts. They were hardened and sharpened by adversity. If they changed,
it was from bronze io steel. Indomitable, far-sighted spirits held the theory
that if the Allies generally were still deceived about the length and cost of
the appalling process required for victory, Germany was as deceived about
the final issue. They were right; but greater was the absolute will of the
prevailing type of men and women to fight and work to the end, whatever the
issue. Great Britain had raised millions of men by voluntary enlistment,
but in January she adopted conscription, exempting Ireland.
Otherwise 1916 opened as an enigma Less than ever could most men
attempt to guess what twelve months might bring forth Those who at-
tempted were remote from guessing right. The Allies were counting upon the
power of the combined offensive by France, Britain, Italy and Russia.
Britain martial, but not military, abhorring the conscript system in peace,
had created in 18 months armies worthy of a Continental Great Power for
size, though still not raised to the veteran competence they were to reach
before the end Further, the British production of munitions had enormously
increased. It might well be reckoned that in the course of 1916 a combined
offensive by all the Allies would by sheer weight break down the Central
Empires. Even in Russia, so soon after the debacle of the previous year,
there was in externals a wonderful recovery. Everything seemed improved
except the decaying despotism, incapable and unteachable. Through the
winter the Allies managed to pour in more than a million rifles of miscella-
neous types, and in addition, there came 120,000 Winchesters from America,
while home output had risen respectably. Reserves of shell were amassed
in the same way. The spirit of the soldiers, though dully questioning now the
reason of the butchery and doubting its result, could still be kindled by signal
leadership. As early as February the promise of victory gleamed again when
amongst the Armenian mountains Yudenich smote the Turks right and left,
and crowned by the capture of Erzerum a shining feat of arms.
These were the calculations of the Allies on the coming event. They were
forestalled. Suddenly, the siege of Verdun opened a struggle, which for heroic
grandeur and wringing pathos surpassed all that had gone before in the war
J L GARVIN
67
of wars and all that was to come. The new German plan in its inception was
a rational and strong project. Falkenhayn thought that the method of massed
batteries and surprise which had broken Russia on the Dunajec might be
employed to bring about equivalent if not similar results in France.
Consider his ends and his means. His ends were first to bleed France
at a vulnerable point, to break her spirit, if not her lines, and secondly,
to force the Franco-British armies as a whole into premature counter-attack,
which would meet ruinous repulse. His means were an unparallelled concen-
tration of artillery secretly accumulated and supported by chosen in-
fantry specially trained on a new tactical model for the economical occupa-
tion of the ground conquered by the guns Verdun was the centre of a salient
markedly exposed, and its entrenched area was the conspicuous bastion of
that long eastward wall of fortifications hitherto impregnable. At very least
the effect of a blow here might be like shattering a man's elbow. The woods
around favoured German concealment, but French armies amidst the lighter
cover saw at least one spot where guns were as thick as apples in a tub.
On Monday morning, February 21, the German artillery belched devasta-
tion never imagined till then, and is computed to have rained on the attacked
sector over a million shells in the first twelve hours. It seemed to change the
face of the earth The country side was left a bare wilderness of churned
soil, with craters like the pitted surface of the moon. Woods disappeared
leaving only stumps and splinters with a few blackened sticks standing up
here and there. Wire entanglements were abolished, trenches crushed out and
communications cut everywhere. In the evening the German infantry walked
forward. . . .
The battle ensuing lasted for nearly seven months Its intense detail and
murderous fluctuations defy epitome. In this place we can only in a few
sentences suggest the general character of the struggle and its results. Ac-
cording to plan, the assailants were to take in four days the ancient city
overlooking the Meuse. At first it seemed they must succeed. On the fourth
day, Thursday, the question of abandoning Verdun had to be faced by the
French. General Joffre — and it is his brightest title to fame — determined
that it must be held at all costs. Friday was black. Within five miles of
the city Fort Douaumont fell, and the German Emperor, vratching the action,
proclaimed in effect to his people that the key of the Verdun defences had
been captured. But Castelnau had already arrived to breathe invincible
calmness, as when, during the Marne battle, he held unshakably in an hour
more perilous for the Allied cause the Grand Couronne of Nancy. Next day,
Saturday, Petain came to take over the command and with the appearance
of that iron soldier, a man of saturnine insight, competent at all points, full
of devices, Falkenhayn, after long months of preparation, had in a moment
met more than his match. Now they would not pass."
Grave as the situation remained for three months afterwards, nearer and
nearer though the enemy pressed, first on one side of the Meuse, then on the
other, the German failure in that first week to achieve what they hoped was
fatal to their purpose. Petain's celebrated plan was to sell ground, but at
a price, and never too much at one time, so as to make the Germans pay
for every disputed inch far more than it was worth. Though for long the
French losses were the higher, those of the assailants were so terrible that
Falkenhayn's original calculation was shattered. He had hoped that his
method would mean limited casualties on his own side, while forcing the
French to stake their last man. Towards the end of April, Petain and his
staff thought that the enemy could not go on with the game. Petain, promoted
to command the French armies of the centre, was succeeded at Verdun by
Nivelle. But German headquarters held that with their whole military pres-
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
tige at stake they were committed too deeply for retreat. The struggle was
resumed, and though its former fury had seemed impossible to surpass, it
only now rose to its pitch. On June 7, when the fall of Fort Vaux uncovered
the approach to Fort Souville, the last rampart, French heroism seemed almost
powerless before the ponderous mechanism of the assault. On June 11, even
Petam dreaded the worst. Again the mass of the German artilleiy was in-
creased, and on June 20, opened a bombardment which was the climax. On
June 23, the German infantry began its crowning effort to force the last ram-
part at Souville. The emergency for the French was now so extreme that
Petain and Nivelle prepared down to the last detail for the evacuation of
Verdun and the right bank of the Meuse. By the resolution of the German
onsets, the last ramparts were nearly reached, but they were not taken, and
now they never were to fall. With July the battle of the Somme broke out
and drew off German pressure. There were to be other occasional and surg-
ing assaults, but for all historic purposes we may say in the language of older
wars that the great siege was raised Far as the eye could see round Verdun
the hills and slopes, once green and pleasant, were so torn and flayed by shell-
fire that they stood as bare of vegetation as ridges of sand.
Two types of warlike genius often pitted against each other through a
thousand years had been opposed, not only as army to army but as nation to
nation. Never, as French historians have written, had an attack been pre-
pared with more organising power, launched with more ability, or sustained
with a more epic vigour. Never, in spite of almost overwhelming surprise at
the outset, had an attack been met with swifter resource in counter-organisa-
tion, with more sagacity and ingenuity together, more indomitable fortitude
in sacrifice From this conflict, appalling for both sides, Germany emerged
weakened in man-power and defeated France emerged more sadly weakened
in her lesser reserves of men, but unconquered and henceforth unconquerable.
What she had lost in life she had gained in inspiration. A city had become
an idealised personality like a woman. Verdun had become a symbol for
ever, like Jeanne d^Arc.
1916 — ITALY INVADED — RUSSIANS GREAT RALLY AND LAST VICTORIES
Meanwhile on all sides, and on land and sea alike, other dramatic devel-
opments in this year of extraordinary contrasts had appeared one after
another. The Habsburg armies in their turn took the initiative in order
to anticipate and dislocate the Allies^ plans for a combined offensive By a
grand effort to surprise and restore the Italian front, Conrad von Hotzendorff
sought to emulate Falkenhayn^s blow at Verdun. Italians and Austrians,
deadlocked at the head of the Adriatic, were also waging a fantastic struggle
amongst the peaks and glaciers of the northern Alps. The plan of the Austro-
Hungarian offensive was trenchant. If, by a sudden coup, they could thrust
through the mountains towards Vicenza and Castelfranco, then descend a
short distance into the Venetian plains, they would cut the railways behind
Cadorna’s main army. On May 14 with 2,000 guns the Habsburg forces
opened a blasting fire, and, thrusting onward for some days, they were at
first as sure of success as were the Germans in the opening week of the Verdun
struggle. The Italians rallied rapidly like the French. Fighting desperately
and at bloody sacrifice, in three weeks they gained the upper hand. Before
recoiling at the beginning of June the Austrians had reached to vrithin 18
miles of Vicenza and the main railway across the north of Italy.
Instantly on this and arising from it, followed one of the sweeping trans-
formations peculiar to the broader eastern theatre. Italy had pressed Russia
J. L. GARVIN
69
to help by attacking the Habsburg Empire. Russia, though still short in
artillery and especially lacking in heavy guns, was otherwise so well re-
equipped that her armies were able to strike again. They moved with an
effect equally astonishing to friend and foe. The exultation of the Allies was
matched by the consternation of the Central Empires. Brussilov, after a short
artillery preparation, the more effectually deceiving his opponents because
it seemed to them only the prelude of minor action, loosed his armies like
a hurricane on the fourth of June. They swept over the Austrians, taking
fortresses and rivers in their stride. In three weeks, after a whirlwind advance
rarely matched in the annals of war, they had taken 200,000 prisoners and
masses of war material, while recovering the Bukowina, and a large part of
Galicia. They menaced once more the approaches to Lemberg. Above all,
their advance into the adjacent Bukowma went far towards deciding Rumania
to enter the war on the Allies’ side. More northern successes towards Poland
went as far forward though in less significant country. Through July into
August Brussilov ’s armies improved their progress though at a slackening rate.
After ten fabulous weeks they had taken 300,000 prisoners and, adding dead
and wounded, they had probably put nearly a million Habsburg and Hohen-
zollem troops out of action. Austria-Hungary reeled under the blow. It
was a triumph, however, such as Russia was not again to know in the war.
In political effect it only encouraged autocracy to plunge towards its internal
destruction, while German leadership under Hmdenburg now took firm mili-
tary command of both the Central Empires and soon redressed the balance.
SOMME BATTLES — THE TITANIC GRAPPLE ”
Meanwhile in the west, a more massive and broader conflict had immedi-
ately followed Verdun, and northern France resounded with the battle of
the Somme. Planned months earlier, as the mam shock of the combined
offensive, it had been fixed to begin about July 1. When the fate of Verdun
trembled in the scales, Petain urged earlier action ; Haig in order to increase
his strength, wished delay. Joffre was resolved above all not to be hurried
into the premature action which Falkenhayn had played to provoke. Verdun
had reduced the expected power of French cooperation. Instead of the 39
divisions originally destined for Foch, he had only 16. None the less, on the
date of July 1, pre-arranged so long before, this colossal struggle began. The
British forces, raised and trained in less than two years, were now a vast
army with an equal equipment. At last the Allies exceeded their enemies
in men, guns, aircraft, and in everything with two exceptions. In fighting
ability the Germans were still at least equal; in the advantage of position
they were still dominant. Joffre hoped indeed that “ a hard and long battle ”
would end by exhausting the enemies’ reserves for western purposes, opening
a wide breach in his front and deciding the war. Not even yet did the French
and British Higher Command come near to realising the full power of the
defensive under western conditions. No charge lies against them on this
occasion. The time had come when with the whole of their strength they
had to assault at any cost. The German defences in successive lines of posi-
tion with interlacing connections, with deep labyrinths of under^ound works,
with a mighty array of artillery, and nests of ambushed machine-guns, was,
beyond question, a system of fortification more elaborate and formidable than
men in battle had ever yet ventured to assail. They were assailed with such
effect — though far short of original expectation — that German confidence in
the issue of the war was never the same again. The quality of the French was
the same as it bad been: there can be no higher praise. The new British
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
70
armies — men of the mother-islands, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders
and South Africans alike — now tested on a scale such as the English-speaking
races had not yet known, bore themselves with that “ deliberate valour firm
and unmoved by dread of death ” which Milton’s lines commend. They had
50,000 casualties on the first day alone, but went on as usual for more than
four months.
It is impossible in any summary to suggest the character and movement
of the battle of the Somme which was indeed a series of huge battles grinding
slowly forward. In magnitude it far exceeded Verdun and all former examples
of human conflict. As at Verdun, though over a wider area, the earth was
changed to an abomination of desolation. The results must not be measured
by gam of ground. That was of no main consequence. In the middle of
September one startling fantastic detail showed how the Allies were now
rising to technical superiority. For the first time the British “ tanks ” ap-
peared like pre-historic saurians with guns in their ribs and shambling
through all obstacles while roaring hard. They scared the hardened enemy
and on their first day helped to bite a large piece out of the German positions,
but were not fully used until a year later. Their debut was premature.
The results to the Allies of this “ Titanic grapple,” to quote Ludendorff’s
impression, let us repeat, must not be measured by gain of ground. That
was very limited and disappointing by comparison with the human sacrifice
and the mechanical effort By November 16, when the struggle died down,
stifled by the mud, the Allies after over four months’ effort at frightful cost
had advanced only half a dozen miles along the Albert-Bapaume-Cambrai
road which Joffre in his imperturbable optimism had marked (June 20) as
“ the axis of our progress ” Even Bapaume — and it was to be the prize of
the first days — never was reached, and as for Cambrai it lay nearly 20 miles
bevond But what then? Ludendorff himself makes sombre answer in
his ** Memoirs.” He gives a curious picture of distraction, alarm and sense
of permanent injury. For the first time Germany was desperately strained.
Her troops on the Somme had done all men could do, but they were tried
to the limit of endurance. “ The troops were getting exhausted.” Again, he
writes of ** Somme fighting ” that “ even our troops would not be able to
withstand such attacks indefinitely. ... If the war lasted our defeat seemed
inevitable.” Once more he writes of this battle: ‘‘Not only did our morale
suffer but in addition there was a fearful wastage in killed and wounded.”
Germany’s reserves were so depleted that the Higher Command was at its
wit’s end to meet the clamour for help on every side. The renowned advan-
tage of the interior lines was largely gone at last; divisions could no longer
be transferred from front to front as readily as before. Now “ the longer the
war lasted, the more acutely we felt the overwhelming superiority of the
enemy in numbers and raw material . . . the flower of our fighting strength
lay under the sod.” The strategical conception and tactical management of
the Allied Higher Commands in northern France during the summer and
autumn of 1916 will always be a theme of dispute, but they shewed a strength
of character like that of General Grant. After the failure in the previous
year to seize the only means of shortening the struggle by taking Constanti-
nople and linking up fully with Russia, there was no alternative for the Allies
but the war of exhaustion. In that war the battle of the Somme, morally and
materially alike, was the turning point against Germany.
GERMAN CRISIS — REORGANISATION AND TRIUMPH AGAIN
With more astonishing energy or more sacrificial madness, that people
and its leaders aroused themselves for a grimmer struggle rather than accept
J. L. GARVIN
71
defeat. The World War was only half through. When Hindenburg and
Ludendorff, in August, 1916, were called from the eastern front to head the
whole conflict, the military and economic situation was so desperate that it
might well have seemed impossible to sustain the war for very long. Yet,
it was sustained for over two years more.
At the end of August Rumania joined the Allies. This had to be added
to the Somme battles on the west, to Brussilov’s victories in the east, to
Allied pressure in Macedonia, to the Austro-Hungarian failure on the Tren-
tino front, and collapse in Galicia ; and the stifling rigour of the sea-blockade.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff demanded and secured a complete reorganisation
of the Central Empires. In Germany itself every subject aged from 15 to
60 was conscripted for service, military or civil. Forced labour was intro-
duced into the occupied territories. The Habsburg Monarchy became a vassal
State. Unlimited submarine warfare was projected. Fighting tactics on land
underwent drastic revision. In a dozen weeks these new leaders altered the
whole aspect of the military situation, and once more dashed the immediate
expectations of the Allies to the ground.
Rumania attacked with instant rashness. Ignoring Bulgaria on her flank
and forgetting 1913, her armies poured into Transylvania hoping to deliver
at once the three millions and a half of their kin under Magyar ascendency.
After they had rushed through the southern Carpathian passes their situation
was strategical suicide. Mackensen struck from Bulgaria ; Falkenhayn at the
head of an army, assembled with notable resource, struck from Hungary.
He first cleared Transylvania of the sanguine invaders and flung them back
through the mountains into a further situation of deadly peril. Mackensen
soon crossed the Danube. He entered Bucharest on December 6. Falken-
hayn, pressing towards the coveted oil-fields, found the wells fired and all
the surface-works wrecked by a British Member of Parliament, Colonel
Norton Griffiths, and the American engineers. The Rumanians fought
gallantly in retreat; but the catastrophe could not be stayed, and by
the end of the year the greater part of their country was as completely
subjugated as Serbia. Salvation had been expected in vain from Brus-
silov’s armies, but they were firmly held by the Hindenburg-Ludendorflf
system.
There was to be no more help from Russia for any Ally: the Tsardom
was tottering to its fall. Light for the Allies came from another quarter. The
battle of the Somme had disengaged Verdun. There in late October, Nivelle
and Mangin took the offensive on a new tactical plan, regulated with scientific
minuteness, surpassing in skill the best that the Germans had yet contrived.
By the morning of November 2, Douaumont and Vaux were most gloriously
recaptured. A second action on the new system, further perfected, was
opened in the middle of December and carried to still more clean-cut success.
These sequels of the main battle of Verdun were the crowning of that victory.
THE SEA-BLOCKADE — NEW LEADERS AND PLANS
It must be remembered throughout this narrative that sea-power is the
backgroimd, and not only so. Its influence pervades and saturates all the land
operations. It re-arms Russia, furnishes Italy, builds up in France the
supremacy of the Allies in numbers and munitions, eats mortally into the
economic vitals of the Central Empires. Universal as the atmosphere in
this connection, it lends itself as little to continuous remark. Despite mines
and submarines, the British navy had maintained for naval and mercantile
purposes alike a more absolute command of the seas than had even been seen,
72
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
against risks more mysterious and incalculable than those known to the
military commands. There was one great action. For the first and last
time the British and German fieets clashed in the battle of Jutland. Von
Scheer had 16 Dreadnoughts and six older ships; Jellicoe, the far superior force
of 28 Dreadnoughts and a yet greater advantage in gun-power. It must
always be admitted by an impartial writer that the Germans fought brilliantly
and in the circumstances did as much as could be expected of men. In the
end they escaped. Though the Kaiser’s fleet was more heavily damaged than
appeared at the time, the British losses in ships and men were much the
heavier. This was no Trafalgar, and Jellicoe was not a Nelson. He had
shewn excessive caution. The disappointment of the British nation and of
the navy itself was deep and just. Their victory added nothing to the glory
of British sea-tradition, but in its unsatisfactory way it was a victory and
decisive. In Germany, as Captain Persius wrote, “ it was clear to every one
of intelligence that this fight would be and must be the only one.” The
Kaiser’s fleet was now like a force besieged and doomed to surrender. The
British sea-blockade, now accepted as unbreakable by any means hitherto
employed or then available, doomed the German nation.
On all sides there were con'^oicuous changes in the guiding personalities
of the war. In Germany even Tirpitz had resigned. The rise of Hindenburg
and Ludendorff we have noted. In Austria-Hungary the Emperor Francis
Joseph, aged 86 years, had closed in death his ill-omened reign of 68 years,
and as he had been pursued from the beginning by tragic fate, he left ruin
behind him. Tiord Kitchener perished at sea with his companions when
about to visit Russia. He had rendered momentous service in the most
diflBcult days, and though later he had been unequal to the situation, he left
the ineffaceable impression of a great character. After the fall of Rumania,
the wrath of all the Allied nations in the west rose in a storm against the
management of their affairs. They demanded changes in their Governments.
France did strange things. Joffre as generalissimo was succeeded by Nivelle,
and incredible to say, Foch was dismissed from employment. In Russian
politics worse had happened. Finally, in Britain the Asquith Government
fell; and as Prime Minister, the animating and audacious genius of Lloyd
George — full of defects but saving in the war — came into the centre of
the scene. These personal changes foreshadowed wider public movements.
The dynasties and the peoples alike were growing desperate. Far and wide
in this tremendous time, portentous developments were at hand such as
history even yet had not seen. Men thought they had crowded into the
previous two and a half years the drama of centuries, and that they had
measured the utmost height and depth of human vicissitude and emotion. At
the end of 1916 they were by comparison with what was to come, only at the
beginning of experience. We have reached here, the second period, a new
and yet more extraordinary phase in the World War and in all world affairs.
1917 — THE SUBMARINES — AMERICA ENTERS THE WORLD WAR
With 1917 the universal submarine war breaks out; America enters;
Tsarist Russia disappears.
In spite of Germany’s huge endeavours the Central Empires were shaken
to their foundations. Austria-Hungary was in fear and disarray. The sub-
ject races were claiming their own. Coming to the throne after Francis
Joseph, the young Emperor Charles knew that the Habsburg Monarchy was
a loosening fabric and at this rate must fall for ever. All neutrals longed
for the end. The Pope sighed for it as a shepherd beholding the destruction
J. L. GARVIN
73
of the fold, but Benedict XV was not one of the stronger pontiffs. Only the
President of the United States seemed a possible mediator. The method of
the Central Empires was to compel him to a different part. In December
they addressed to Mr. Wilson a note asserting their indestructible strength ”
and protesting their reasonable intentions. There was no substance in these
poierparlers. Vienna at heart wished Berlin to cede Alsace-Lorraine to France
and was ready to yield all Poland in compensation. Germany was willing
to take Poland but not to return Alsace-Lorraine, not even to restore the
full independence of Belgium. The western Allies, for their part, despite
the spread of Teutonic conquest on the surface of the map, had never felt
more assured of ultimate victory and never had been more resolved to
achieve it. No vestige of a basis for compromise yet existed. When Presi-
dent Wilson suggested thereupon that the professed principles and objects
of both belligerents seemed much the same, the Allied peoples were genuinely
astonished, as if light and darkness had been officially declared to be indis-
tinguishable. The Central Empires brushed aside the guarded hint of
America's readiness to adjudicate, and pronounced instead for negotiations
between the belligerents. The Allied Governments in their celebrated state-
ments of January, 1917, demanded without compromise from the enemy
Powers evacuations, restorations, liberations, compensations, with the final
expulsion of the Turks from Europe; and guarantees for future security by
a new international system equipped with such means of preventing or limit-
ing hostilities as would thenceforth ‘‘ give pause to the hardiest aggressor.'^
Germany replied by the last desperate resort — the unrestricted submarine
war. Irrevocably now, instead of peace by compromise, it was to be a broader
fight and utterly a fight to the death.
Tirpitz had urged long before unlimited destruction by the U-boats of
all merchant shipping, Allied and neutral, as the only means of breaking
the sea-blockade and bringing Britain to her downfall. He had thought
the best time for it was a year before, and that through weak fears of
America the best opportunity had been thrown away. Since the battle of
Jutland the question had been debated in the Kaiser's councils. The naval
staff felt certain that the last resort would mean victory in six months.
Ludendorff thought it “ safe to reckon that it would at least have a decisive
effect within twelve months, — that is to say, before America could throw
new armies into the scale." The military command, now supreme in the
State, pressed for the unshrinking decision. It was taken on January 9,
1917, at the chateau of Pless, in a council presided over by the German
Emperor in person. With a heavy heart the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg,
gave way.
From February 1 the U-boats began to sink at sight. Allied ships dis-
appeared at the rate of over a hundred a fortnight. It was soon the blackest
crisis Britain ever knew, but that nation grappled with it, never doubting,
nor did her crews fail. Seamen torpedoed again and again, were ready to
sign on as usual while life remained. At sea, neutral rights were annihilated.
The position of the United States in this matter had long been painful and
was now intolerable. The “ Lusitania " was destroyed without warning, but
Washington had hoped that this would prove an isolated iniquity. Further
loss of American lives mounted up until the “ Sussex " was struck. Americans
continued patience was secured by German promises of amendment, and by
the almost invincible refusal of the majority of the American people,
especially in the Middle West, to be drawn into the deadly vortex of the
European struggle. All the promises were now broken, and the German
Command in relation to the United States had gone mad with a method.
Unavoidably the British blockade had involved friction and difficulty be-
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
74
tween Washington and London. America, for mingled and contradictory
reasons, had home more provocation from Germany than she would have
brooked from any other Power in the world. Now the limits of restraint were
reached and passed. Diplomatic relations between Washington and Berlin
had been severed at once by the new terror at sea. That first step soon
proved to have implied the last. On April 2 the President advised Congress
to enter the war; and master of statement as always — whatever else may
be the verdict of time upon that historic person — he did this in a thrilling
yet measured strain of lofty appeal. “ Neutrality is no longer feasible ” —
“The world must be made safe for democracy.” And he concluded;
“ We shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts
— for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have
a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small
nations, for the universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples
as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world at last
free. . . . The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood
and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the
peace which she has treasured. God helping her she can do no other.”
Congress approved by overwhelming votes, and the United States entered
the World War on April 6, 1917, a date for ever notable in the fortunes of
mankind.
To understand the impression then made on nine-tenths of civilisation,
posterity will have to remember that American intervention followed imme-
diately on the Russian Revolution. The conjimction of two such events was
beyond parallel through the ages. The emotions of men of good-will in
many countries were like a tide too deep for foam. There had been nothing
like this promise of new life and li^t since the fall of the Bastille, and the
promise seemed surer than then. Political idealism stood on a pinnacle of
hope. It was much noticed that men and women amongst all the English-
speaking races were unusually inarticulate — overcome by their sense of the
inadequacy of any words.
THE FIBST BtTSSIAN BEVOLTITION: ITS OBIGIN AND 8PIBIT
We must now see how the Tsardom fell and why the Revolution soon
changed hope to dismay and dragged ail Russia into the abyss. Some pre-
disposing influences had been spreading for half a century and more. The
eflBcient causes began after the Russo-Japanese War — an event as we have
seen of universal significance for world-policy. It was the real origin of the
Nemesis which overtook the obsolete but mischievous dynastic systems of
Romanovs, Hohenzollems and Habsburgs alike. Influenced by spurious
mysticism, Nicholas II, like his consort, was at heart reactionary by pious
belief. When the agitation following the Manchurian disasters had forced
him to summon the first Duma, he soon seized the excuse furnished by its
inevitable crudities to restrict the liberties he had granted. The Tsar missed
the golden opportunity for gradual transition to constitutional government.
The Duma, after its electoral basis was narrowed, could criticise but it had no
control, 'l^^en the World War broke out, nothing like government responsible
to an electorate had been introduced; the executive was an Asiatic despotism,
and was even behind the tendencies of Asia. Yet the autocrat system was
irredeemably incompetent except for repression. The intellectuals were more
and more bitterly antagonised. This would not have been fatal without the
gathering discontent of the peasants, long ignored with dull fatuity, and then
exasperated by the remedies attempted.
J. L. GARVIN
76
When the serfs were emancipated in 1861, the proprietors retained the best
land, the peasants receiving insufficient holding, and these they had to
purchase by annual payments stretching into the twentieth century. Burdened
by redemption charges and increasing taxes, they fell into hopeless arrears;
became more impoverished as the population grew; their only means of culti-
vation were wretchedly deficient; and by comparison with western conditions
their low standard of life was appalling.
Stolypin's legislation of 1906-1911 tried to substitute individual owner-
ship and separate farms for the old communal tenure with its medley of
field-strips. The attempt largely broke up the system which, however back-
ward, was the historic basis of social life for the vast peasant-majority of
the Russian people. For all its good intentions, the new agrarian policy did
not offer such assistance as would enable the average village household to
take advantage of it. When the World War broke out the temper of the
mass of the peasants was mutinous and profoundly disturbed. The founda-
tions of their traditional ideas were broken up, and what they wanted above
all things was to seize the land of the landlords and this time without paying
for it: they regarded it as their own. The agrarian measures of the Tsardom
prepared the elemental upheaval of 1917.
Some attention must be given to these facts, for they have been of im-
measurable influence in the last seven years of war and peace, and their
consequences are still of incalculable moment for the whole world^s future.
If the political discontent of the intellectual few and the agrarian unrest
of the illiterate hundred millions ever came together, there would be an
explosive mixture of volcanic force
At the opening of the World War, national enthusiasm seemed mag^ical.
Dissensions disappeared. Classes and sects were leagued together as in a
holy cause. Disaster within twelve months began to expose the results of
former lethargy and corruption — the bottomless ineptitude of Tsarist ad-
ministration. When men in retreat month after month had to fight with
sticks unless they could snatch up a rifle dropped by a dead comrade, the
dullest peasant wondered why. The debacle of 1915 began the death of the
Tsardom. Brussilov’s marvellous victories in the next summer might have
been saving. They were fatal. The Court and its creatures were the more
infatuated, and the demand for Ministers representing the patriotic vigour
of the nation was refused. A reactionary parasite like Stiirmer became
Premier. Next, a neurotic sycophant like Protopopov became a Minister and
favourite. The morbid, imperious Tsaritsa ruled, but could only ruin. The
disreputable monk, Rasputin, was the witch-doctor of this regime of hypno-
tism and incantations and he was the power behind all. By now, Russia’s
casualties were 4,000,000. There was in the air a sense of some coming
catastrophe that no man might stay. On the night of December 29, 1916,
Rasputin was killed, and those who despatched him were not revolutionaries
but a Grand Duke, a Prince, and Purichkevich, formerly a strong-fisted
devotee of reaction. The news was received like a deliverance, but up to
the eleventh hour no advice and entreaties could move the autocracy to
announce reforms.
The factories in Petrograd now seethed with sedition; long queues
stood in the snow for hours waiting for bread and execrating the Govern-
ment. The scarcity of bread was more ominous for the Tsardom than had
been the shortage of rifles. On March 8, 1917, which was a Thursday, the
food-riots broke out. Protopopov fumbled. On Monday the troops, tying
red flags to their bayonets, began to fraternise with the people and the riot
had become an insurrection. The dykes were broken and revolution was a
rising flood. Three days later, on March 15, Nicholas II abdicated in the
76 WAR ENGTILPS THE WORLD
twenty-third year of his reign. He wished his brother to succeed, but the
Romanovs as a dynasty had already perished. But to whom or to what was
authority to be transferred? The Duma was ignored as an undemocratic
assembly. With Pnnce Lvov at its head, a Provisional Government was
formed. It included a competent organiser like Guchkov and an able doc-
trinaire like Milukov, but it had no definite basis in law or fact. A few
days made it clear that all chance of stability depended on a new man, half
Jewish, the Socialist Minister of Justice, Kerensky. He was a pallid but
inexhaustible orator, tireless in harangues and in all kinds of political activity,
dexterous in manoeuvre. The power of his eloquence over the mob was the
uncertain substitute for the power of the Tsars. Was he a Danton, a
Napoleon? As it turned out he was much less than a Danton in words and
but a Napoleon in efSgy. All real control was rapidly passing, as we shall
see, from the Provisional Government to the more sinewy hands of the
Soviet of workmen and soldiers in the Smolni Institute — from the Girondins
to the Jacobins; but otherwise this was to be an upheaval utterly different in
spirit and effect from the French Revolution.
ZENITH OF allies’ HOPES IN THE WEST — THEIR FAILURE
This could not yet be foreseen. We turn to the west. There hope was
at the zenith. America had intervened. The Russians, equipped with rifles,
artillery, and every kind of fighting material as they had never been, were
expected also to fight as they had never fought — with the inspired enthu-
siasm of a free people. The next military sequel in the west must not long
engage us. It can only be shown in the broadest strokes.
Before Joffre was removed he had concerted, with the British commander,
Haig, another but wider plan of prolonged assault on the Somme model. It
would perhaps have cost more, and come as far short of expectations; but
it could not have failed so completely as the changed plan adopted at the
price of dislocation and delay when Joffre was superseded by Nivelle, whose
confidence of being able to break through the enemies’ front in a few days
by his novel methods had hypnotised the politicians. There was a new
regime, but the German Higher Command was too much for it. First, that
command effected a strategic retreat with an impunity which made it one
of the masterly movements of the whole war. In the middle of March
their army disappeared from a wide sector, falling back upon the massive
and manifold entrenchments called the Hindenburg lines. By this, the
Germans shortened their front, and by ruthless destruction in the evacuated
area they embarrassed the advance of the Allies, while the destruction itself,
though largely legitimate according to the way of war, was in part so wanton
and malignant as to rouse in the French a will to vengeance that was to
leave its mark on the peace. Heartened in temper by the enemy’s retreat
and soon recovering touch with dogged vigour, the British at Easter opened
the battle of Arras. It lasted a month, had brilliant incidents, such as the
Canadian storming of the Vimy heights, and was pushed on with stubborn
valour to the end; but it achieved nothing decisive either in gain of ground
or by inflicting in the war of exhaustion a heavier loss than was suffered.
Meanwhile, Nivelle’s own attack, so long expected, had opened on a 50 -mile
front formi]^ a rough curve rising from near Soissons and bending round
to near Reims. All France himg breathless on the ^and plan. It had
been known to the Germans for two months and their preparations were
made with a care extraordinary even for them. Nivelle had staked his all
J. L. GARVIN
77
upon the attempt to shatter in a few days a chain of terrible positions. By
comparison with the ambition the failure was disastrous. The attack opened
on April 16; the first two days showed that there would be no break-
through. Paris was in consternation. The fight went on, but only as dull
battery and butchery of the old kind. No magic formula had been found.
The German losses were heavy, those of the French were appalling. In the
first ten days of intense action their casualties were 100,000 (not counting
the lightly wounded) and a third of these were dead. On May 16, Nivelle
was dismissed. Petain became Commander-in-Chief, and Foch found
employment again as Chief of Staff. After the ardent visions of final
triumph so rashly excited, this disillusionment nearly broke the great heart
of the French army. Grave mutinies broke out Through the ranks ran
the cry: This is murder.” For some weeks the situation was more serious
than the other Allies were allowed to know, and it was wonderfully con-
cealed from the enemy. The poilu had many grievances. Petain dealt with
them like the wise and loving father of a family. By the middle of June
the danger was over, and the whole army was again in hand. Hope was
lifted once more as on broad wings.
For in a few days the first American troops landed in France. On July
4 Napoleon^s shade seemed to look down on America’s advance-guard under
the dome of the Invalides, and when the little American column stepped
afterwards through the streets of Pans, Frenchmen were full of emotion,
women thrilled to tears. This was only a symbol; yet was it not the promise
of an immeasurable strength? The new world was coming into action to
redress the balance of the old. Surely after three years of what France had
lately felt to be a national crucifixion the worst was over — surely now?
Not yet Now at last Russia, which still loomed so huge outwardly though
swaying like a drunken giant, totally collapsed in the field and disappeared
as an Ally. Ten months must pass before the United States could throw
any appreciable aid into the western struggle. Simultaneously the submarine
struggle was raging. For France, Italy, Britain, the supreme peril, military*'
naval, political, was at last in sight.
KERENSKY — LENIN — RUSSIANS FINAL DEBACLE
To see how this unparallellcd situation had suddenly reached a climax
of dismay and menace for the Allies, we must resume Russian events. From
its first day the Revolution was on the road, not to regeneration but to chaos.
Before the Tsar abdicated, the Soviet of workmen’s and soldiers’ delegates
had been set up in Petrograd. It was hardly established than its notorious
Order No. 1,” issued on March 15, began the destruction of the army, by
abolishing discipline and subjecting officers to committees of the rank and
file. Dostoievsky’s mad under-world was breaking loose: with fantastic and
ruthless theorists impelling illiterate masses, the revulsion from Tsarism was
to be a dance of anarchy. The output of the munitions factories began to
decline. General Kornilov was a hero but no Caesar. Called to command
in Petrograd, he could base nothing on the shifting sands of its politics, and
soon left for the front. In May Guchkov, Minister of War, resigned de-
spairing, and was replaced by Kerensky, now openly supreme. Occupying at
the Winter Palace the study and even the bed of the sombre, unyielding
autocrat Alexander III, he was nicknamed Alexander IV,” and reigned in
effect, but could not govern. He was only a dictator by rhetoric.
Already the real master of destiny had appeared in Petrograd, though
78
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
few recognised the coming master in one who was to equal in power and
surpass in ruthlessness Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. With Trotsky
and other lieutenants, Lenin returned in April; and the portentous chief of
Bolshevism, though himself unluxurious and incorruptible, added to the
contrasts of this wild ballet by taking up quarters without permission in
the palace of a well-known danserise. At Geneva he had worked for Ger-
many, that the overthrow of the Tsardom might open the way for the com-
plete Communist Revolution. The Germans were happy to provide sealed
railway carriages for the journey of the Bolshevik leaders to Russia, and
they were equipped with money for propaganda. They undermined the
Allies and prepared their own triumph. The plausible formula of ‘‘ peace
without annexations and indemnities” worked like an incantation.
Kerensky, touring the front in a private uniform, used all his eloquence
to incite the army to another effort, but he had refused to risk his life for
the restoration of discipline. Mechanically equipped as never before, and
in numbers far exceeding the enemy, the army was in moral dissolution.
The ‘‘ Kerensky offensive ” opened at the end of June. Brussilov was in
command, and his plan might have proved his master-piece had discipline
and cohesion remained. For over a fortnight, though the successes were not
like the whirlwind victories of a year before, it seemed as though his en-
veloping strategy might once more conquer Lemberg and Galicia. But the
joint armies of the Central Empires under German command had now rallied
for a counter-stroke and before their first very ordinary pushes, the Russians
suddenly fell to pieces. On Thursday morning, July 19, Brussilov^s troops
eastward of Lemberg began to abandon their positions. Desertion en masse
spread. That evening the enemy was marching through a gap 25 miles
broad. By next day the army far and wide, despite the agonised heroism
of a faithful few, had changed as if by black magic into a shameless rabble
wreaking demented atrocities as it fled. Through frightful slaughter and
suffering, Russia had hitherto helped as much as the western Allies to with-
stand the Central Empires. Without that effort no final victory could have
been won, not even by the aid of America. Now Russia was wiped out as
a military power. The Central Empires would presently throw their whole
weight on the Allies in France and Italy before the American armies could
arrive.
THE allies" dark ORDEAL — THE WAR OP EXHAUSTION
Those Allies were to hold on after all, waiting for America like Welling-
ton for night or Blucher. It was not easy: it was grim. A chill wave of
doubt and pessimism ran through their peoples. All their labour parties
were urging an international meeting at Stockholm and “ peace by negotia-
tions.” The Pope blessed these vague aspirations. During July of 1917
in Germany, Erzberger’s bold speech had denounced the submarine cam-
paign as a hopeless failure; next the Reichstag in its turn declared for peace
by agreement. Chiefly through neutral intermediaries, furtive pourparlers
were exchanged between Berlin and distracted Vienna on the one side, London
and Paris on the other. There was no vestige of a basis for compromise.
So far as the Central Empires were concerned, power at this time was still
in the hands of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and they had no thought of
relinquishing Belgium absolutely and restoring Alsace-Lorraine. As little
had even the perishing Habsburgs thought of yielding to Italy the Trentino.
After the Russian collapse the Allies had less chance than ever of obtaining
by diplomacy a stable or a safe peace. Count Czernin has written of the
J. L. GARVIN
79
temper of the German militarists at this time: “ In the summer of 1917 I
spoke to several generals of high standing on the western front, who unani-
mously declared that after the war armaments must be maintained on a
very much greater scale. They compared this war with the first Punic
War. It would be renewed and its renewal prepared.” President Wilson, on
the other hand, had now absolutely declared for some new system of liberty
and justice and of world-peace secured by a “ Covenant of nations.”
The Allied peoples recovered their nerve like the French army after
the mutinies. The war must go on. Dark as the situation had looked to
all persons except those of indomitable heart and searching insight, there
were four capital arguments in the Allies’ favour.
First, there was a broad ray at sea. Could the U-boats have continued
their rate of sinkings in April, nothing could have enabled the British
Islands to maintain their war effort on the Continent. Slowly but surely,
from August, 1917, onward, anti-submarine measures began to overcome the
terror of the seas. From May American destroyers, joining the British
flotillas — the comrades worked together like brothers — were rendering in-
valuable help.
Secondly, Austria-Hungary was at the last gasp, and warned Berlin about
this time that on the Habsburg Monarchy the war of exhaustion by winter
would have done its work. Germany could go on longer in any case, but
under the cruel rigour of economic distress she, too, must soon come within
sight of the limits of human endurance — unless, as a result of Russia’s
collapse, new fields of various supply could be exploited in the east.
Tliirdly, America was making mighty efforts. She had laid under com-
pulsory levy her whole manhood of fighting age. She had voted 20,000,-
000,000 dollars. Her measures for building merchant ships and constructing
air-craft were proportionate. Whether with all this she could strike in
time was still one of the momentous and exciting questions of all history.
It was certain that she could not have even half a dozen divisions in France
before the end of this fateful year.
Fourthly, the Allies had instinctive — and as it proved somewhat exces-
sive — confidence in defensive battle should the worst come to the worst.
Meanwhile, as respects the military situation Britain must stand in liie
gap and bear the brunt pending America’s arrival. Petain insisted upon it
as a matter of course, and he was right. French numbers had passed the
maximum, were now declining, and must be conserved. Repelling German
counter-attacks, Petain’s own enterprise was guided by skilful economy. In
July, 1917, the enemy was ejected from the overlooking heights of Moron-
villers, east of Reims. In August and September, the Germans north of
Verdun were flung back on both sides of the Meuse, and the French line
became almost what it had been before the great ordeal. In October, yet
another limited offensive was carried through with the same verve and art,
when the Germans were finally thrown off the Chemin des Dames and
driven down to the lower ground northward. They had held these blood-
soaked heights of the Aisne for over three years, since the ridges were en-
trenched as part of the formidable plan of recovery immediately after the
short retreat from the Marne.
Far larger and more chequered was the simultaneous experience of the
British army. In a year of fighting on the Continental scale it had learned
much. In Jime its battle of Messines, fought a few miles south of Ypres,
had been a perfect example of the local offensive, crushing the enemy within
the limited area attacked. Soon, however, came a relapse into the dullest
yet deadliest routine of the war of exhaustion. The frightful struggle known
80
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
in oflBcial records as the “ Third Battle of Ypres,” but known to the men
as Passchendaele, opened at the end of July and was allowed to continue
for over three months. As a military aid m the anti-submarine struggle, it was
meant to clear the Belgian coast, by first taking the squat rises of ground
called hills north-eastward of Ypres. It never came near the coast.
Strategically it achieved nothing. Tactically several miles of ground were
gained, but nothing important relatively to the whole war. British hopes
were stifled in mud. Never had a battlefield been so like the slough of
despond in everything except the temper of the troops who plodded through
it to the dreariest of dooms. The men were obscurely great. The Com-
mand was in this phase obstinate and commonplace. Never did so vast a
mass of brave manhood drag itself to death or wounds through a gulf so
squalid. With all the advantages of circumstances, the German defence was
consummate in anticipation and resources It inflicted far more loss than
it suffered. The British casualties were 230,000 men. The total British
losses in 1917 were probably about twice as large. Never had a Higher
Command less to show for a price so appalling. On this, at least, French
and German opinions were at one.
Finally, in the latter part of November came the battle of Cambrai.
It was a surprise battle. The British, attacking for the first time with a
whole fleet of tanks, won at first a splendid success. It was brought to
nothing in a few days by the brains, rapidity and force with which the
Germans organised and executed one of the finest counter-attacks on record.
In intellectual zest and temperamental vigour combined, they were still
superior. Britain was bearing the brunt with magnificent and tragic stoicism
on the part of her ordinary flesh and blood; but between the Russian collapse
and the gathering of the final storm the methods of British military leader-
ship in the west had not improved the Allies' chances.
LXJDENDORFF's greatest plans — THE ITALIAN CATASTROPHE
And what had happened elsewhere might bode worse Despite their straits,
the Central Empires were ruled in effect at this time by one strong hand —
Ludendorff’s. He no sooner had Russia completely at his mercy when Von
Hutier captured Riga — by new tactical methods of which much more was
to be heard — than he began in September, 1917, to gather forces for a greater
coup. Desperately taxed, so far, to find troops for all purposes, he could
now start to withdraw divisions from the eastern theatre. Pending the final
offensive in the west, he meant to galvanise moribund Austria-Hungary by
breaking Italy. This was to be done with overwhelming surprise, not by
superior numbers, for they were not available, but by the boldness of genius.
The point chosen for assault was one of the least likely — a sector of the
Julian Alps some 30 miles north of the head of the Adriatic, where, as Luden-
dorff puts it, “ the difficulties of the ground seemed almost insurmountable
and the communications on the Austrian side were as bad as could be.” A
shattering stroke here would put the invaders almost at once upon the lines
of retreat of the Italian main armies, and for them the result might be a
Sedan. Undreaming of attack through such forbidding country, the
Italians were holding the doomed sector with weak forces. After heavy
losses in battle upon battle fought with tenacious gallantry, they had made
little progress towards Trieste and were brought to a stand-still. Their
spirit had ebbed, and peace propaganda was rife. Over-ruling the pathetic
wishes of the Emperor Charles — so low had the Habsburgs fallen — Luden-
J. L. GARVIN
81
dorflf insisted that the operations should be under German command, and the
main blow was to be struck by General Otto von Below with picked German
divisions, which had been put through a special training for mountain war-
fare.
On October 24 Von Below broke through at Caporetto, and the invaders
poured onwards, widening the breach. Within the next few days the Italian
Second Army was swept away in indescribable rout. The Third Army was
retreating for very life. No disaster so sudden and complete had overtaken
any Ally. All the gains of two and a half years were gone and Italy was
invaded like France before the Marne. Could even Venice be saved? By
a miracle, as it seemed, the Third Army escaped envelopment and out-
stripped the pursuit. The rear-guard actions were full of heroic episodes.
Allied help was on its way, but before it could reach her, Italy rose to her
crisis and saved herself. By November 10, 1917, the retreat was ended,
a front was established along the Piave, and Venice was saved. The French
and British reinforcements were soon in place. In furious efforts during the
next three months, the Central Empires failed against the new front. The
catastrophe had brought the country to within an ace of destruction, but a
great moral recovery brought a new soul into the land. Caporetto, which
was to mean the breaking of Italy, proved the making of Italy. And
Rumania? Ruined by the Russian defection, Rumania had been brought to
total surrender by the Central Empires and was a vassal state at the end of
1917. For three years the Allies had begun every year with hope and ended
it with gloom. They had now experienced cumulative disasters only relieved
by the fact of American intervention. Would America, who had come in
too late for Russia, be too late for the rest? It might be. Those were
times that try men^s souls.^^ The Allied peoples in the west held on. At
this moment they were very great.
1917-1918 — THE BOLSHEVIK ANARCHY — BREST-LITOVSK
The plunge of Russian affairs from depth to depth must now be followed
as an introduction to the supreme military crisis in Europe. The rum of
the army was the ruin of all. Far and wide, through that red summer, the
deepest passion of the peasants had broken out with elemental impulse.
They attacked the landowners, killing such as they hated, burning houses,
wiping out old scores, though chiefly bent, not on these things, but on seizing
the estates, the farm-gear, the horses, the cattle. ‘‘ The land, the whole
land ” — it was at last their own without paying for it, and they were
determined that no regime should ever take it from them. The proletarians
in the towns had been demanding more and more wages for less and less
work. Then they began to seize the factories. Kerensky became Prime
Minister as well as Minister of Marine. It was evident to foreign witnesses
that unless Russia could throw up a bigger man, or could create a stronger
system, she was doubly doomed. If Kerensky and General Kornilov could
agree to work thoroughly together and to restore the army by re-introducing
the death-penalty for desertion, there might be salvation yet. Instead,
these two ruined each other by dissensions. Bedevilled by well-meaning
marplots and ambitious intriguers — the telephone adding a peculiarly
modern means of misunderstanding — their relations came to a breach.
Kornilov was a lion in fight but in politics no fox, and his attempted cowp
d^itat was a fiasco. Kerensky denounced him as an enemy of the Revolution
and gained a momentary victory which was his own suicide. He had only
T. B. Y. — VOL. 1 — 6
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
82
played into the hands of the extreme Reds. The peasants’ fear of a reaction
to take ^e land from them led to massacres in the country.
In Petrograd and the other towns, the Bolshevik conspiracy prepared ite
triumph. In July its first attempt at a rising had been easily suppressed,
but the ring-leaders were treated with indulgence. Much had happened since
then. There had been a rush to the Left after the loss of Riga and Kornilov’s
downfall. The whole tendency made for violence within and surrender
without. The bourgeoisie and capitalism were execrated and banned. The
Haves were marked out for destruction by the Have Nots. Lenin and
Trotsky — the latter the active military spirit — formed their Revolutionary
Committee. Sure of the ferocious sailors of the Baltic fleet, they gained
over the Petrograd garrison. In action they made no mistake. On Novem-
ber 7, 1917, the second Russian Revolution broke out and succeeded as easily
as the first. After Kornilov’s fall, the dictatorship by declamation had
nothing behind it. Kerensky fell at a touch like the Tsar, but “ Alexander
IV,” more fortunate than Nicholas II, escaped to the west.
The Reign of Terror, now begun, eclipsed its Jacobin prototype of Qvatre-
vingt-treize and after. Along the loose, disorderly lines, still called a front,
officers from Dukhonin, the Commander-in-Chief, downwards, were butchered
by their men. At the same time, there was an unparallelled orgy in such
words as end with ’ation, ’ology and ’ism. The Germans could easily have
taken Petrograd, but knew that their work would be better done for them by
the Bolsheviks. Lenin and Trotsky were masters of Russia, who knew how
to keep what they had won. They at once decreed the abolition of private
property, except in the case of the peasantry — nine-tenths of the population,
who in practice had to be left undisturbed. Soon the Bolshevik jimta dis-
persed the Constituent Assembly, suppressed every vestige of Constitutional
Government, and at the head of the small Communist majority — a compact
and vigilant faction holding all the towns and railways in their grasp — Lenin,
Trotsky and the rest henceforth ruled Russia like the most despotic and
pitiless of the Tsars,
An immediate purpose of the Bolsheviks was to desert the Allies formally
and to make a separate peace with Germany — if need be peace at any price.
AFTER THE SECOND REVOLUTION
Within a fortnight they sent out by wireless the order to cease hostilities.
On December 3, Trotsky, Joffe, and the rest of a magniloquent delegation
arrived at Brest-Litovsk to meet bayonets with words. When an armistice
was arranged for December 17, the world knew that Russia would not fight
again, no matter what terms of surrender had to be digested. On December
22 the discussion of the terms was formally opened in that notable scene of
the World War, where the groomed, clanking soldiers and finished diplomats
of the Central Empires met and despised the shabby apostles of chaos. The
Bolsheviks had been received with elaWate politeness. When it came to
business they were put in their place. The hitch came upon the practical
interpretation of the facile catch-word “ No annexations.” The Central
Empires refused to evacuate the immense belt of territory formerly belonging
to the Russian Empire and now occupied by their troops. In toe XJkraine,
the Little Russians, inhabiting in toe south-west broad provinces, Amnngafc
the most populous and fertile of the old Tsardom, had set up an autonomous
State, and now negotiations in January, 1918, were opened at Brest-Litovsk
for a separate peace between the Ukraine and the Central Empires. Tlie
J. L. GARVIN
83
latter were misled into imagining that supplies from this rich south Russian
field, added to Rumania, might save their economic situation and beat the
sea-blockade. The Brest-Litovsk Conference was adjourned on January 18.
The Bolsheviks struck at the Ukraine, and their Red Guards captured its
capital, Kieff. This only threw the Ukraine into the arms of the Central
Empires, and its separate peace with them was signed on February 9.
The intolerable debate between the Central Empires and Russia proper
was resumed. The Bolsheviks threatened to talk for ever, but they were iir
a vice, and the Central Empires thought it time to tighten the screw. Trotsky
now sought to escape by announcing that the Russians would unconditionally
demobilise. For Ludendorff, who would have to grapple with the western
problem in a few weeks, it was high time to force conclusions on the eastern
side. He insisted upon the denunciation of the Armistice. Hostilities re-
opened on February 18 along the whole front of Great Russia. This
promptly brought the Bolsheviks to total surrender. The writhing sophists
knew at last that they were in the inexorable grip of an armed hand. Lenin
removed the Government to Moscow, but on March 3, the Bolshevik dele-
gates signed, at Brest-Litovsk, the most shameful and merciless terms of
submission up to then imposed upon any nation in modem times. The
Teutonic conquerors now made the terms still harsher for the prostrate
Slavs All along her European frontiers from the Arctic Ocean to the
Black Sea Russia was dismembered. After a debauch of imaginative de-
lusions, such as the world never knew; after all the verbal incantations, a
quarter of Russia’s former lands and a far higher proportion of her economic
resources, were wrenched away. It was the Nemesis of a profound mental
feebleness. Amongst the belligerents, Russia had been most largely invaded.
The cry of “ No annexations,” whereby the desertion of the western Allies
was first advocated, was, therefore, an interest spuriously exploited as an
ideal. None the less, by the usual irony of events, Russia in the end was to
be saved from the worst consequences of the peace of Brest-Litovsk by the
Allies and the associate whom the Bolsheviks had betrayed.
The Germans were always able but never wise. Incomparable almost
to the last in every kind of concrete efficiency, they seemed spiritually pur-
blind. So far from being such slaves of Prussian drill as routine criticism
suggested, they were more adaptable and elastic than any other army; but
masters of detail, they missed the essential. Their militarism employed a
prodigy of means only to defeat its own ends. In peace they had made their
capital error when they exploited the weakness of Russia after the Man-
churian defeat. In war the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the densest of their
blunders. For two reasons: Their recent peace-talk was turned to mockery,
and as they shewed no mercy when they had the chance of abusing a tempo-
rary advantage, they must expect little mercy if fortune ever turned against
them. Yet in all this the omnipotent militarists were to blame, not the people.
Responsible government, in the English sense, did not exist in Germany.
Above all, in their own self-interest by which they meant to be guided, the
German militarists ought to have restored a Russian monarchy dependent
on Berlin, as they could easily have done. If this had been accompanied
by moderation and even generosity with respect to territory, all Russia might
have worked for them. Together Hohenzollems, Romanovs, and Habsburgs
might have remained dominant to this day. Now, both the other dynasties
and Imperial systems were to fall into the gulf in which the Romanovs had
disappeared. With trampling confidence at Brest-Litovsk, by the psychic
stupidity which had dogged her statecraft since Bismark and neutralised the
giant growth of her material strength, Germany had thrown away her last
real chance.
84
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
1018 — OERMANY^S SUPREME EFFORT IN THE WEST — THE BREAK-THROUGH
AT LAST
Her indomitable militarists thought otherwise. Staking all on one last
and mightiest ordeal of battle, they had swung westward; they measured the
IVanco-British lines before the supreme attempt. The attack in the west
was fixed to open on March 21, 1918, less than three weeks after the final
triumph in the east. Into that struggle they meant to throw not only their
accumulated force to the last man, but their brain and fibre, exerted as
never yet, their perfected experience, their preeminence in surprise, their
inexhaustible powers of fresh contrivance. The chief schlachtdenker, and
his colleagues had done their battle-thinking well. It must always be allowed
that the preparation was magnificent This, at last, on the enemy^s side
was to be that thing of which the Allies as yet had but ineffectually dreamed
— the grand plan framed with solid mastery and thorough detail after tested
calculation.
To follow the workings of Ludendorff’s directing mind at this period is
an absorbing study. He considers his means. First, he had brought up 40
divisions from the east. After this “ we had 25 to 30 divisions more than
the enemy (the Allies) on the whole western front . . . our superiority was
greater than it had ever been and afforded prospects of success.” Taking the
risk of holding the rest of his front weakly, he proposed to hurl 700,000 or
600,000 men — more than half his whole force — into the actual attack.
The German commanders retained so much vital energy of mind in the
work of their profession that at this late stage of the war they worked out
a new and brilliant system of assembly and tactics The chosen divisions
were to be massed for attack at the last practicable moment before the
action. ** Lorries, lorries, lorries,” was Ludendorff^s order to German industry,
and he got them. The preliminary bombardment was to be short but
crushing, carried out with massed batteries — nearly 100 guns to every 1,000
yards — pouring a cataract of gas shells upon the Allied line Then the
infantry were to advance keeping close to the rolling barrages Special
troops in loose formation were to lead the infantry, and then the advance
must be continuously fed. Machine-guns, light trench mortars, flame
throwers, aircraft, were to be employed in a quantity and with ingenuity
of tactical combination never before seen. New methods were devised for
pushing up the artillery. Ludendorff’s only weak point was that his reserves
were nearly exhausted. It might be fatal if in the first stages achievement
came short of expectation, and this struggle, like others in the west, was
protracted for months.
For a conception of this magnitude carried out with this degree of
executive ability, the Allies' minds were little prepared. In France, the
unquenched veteran, Clemenceau, had become Premier and the old tiger of
politics was a born War Minister. Mr. Lloyd George was tireless in activity
and eloquence. He was in favor of what the Allies most required — a more
unified command — but had not yet come to the vital point in that respect,
the acceptance once for all of a French generalissimo. After Caporetto, a
Supreme War Council was set up at Versailles. It was ineffective. Foch
appealed in vain for the creation of a general reserve ready to be thrown
towards the point of danger when it was known; and equally in vain for a
single command. On March 15 he vehemently predicted disaster. In six
days it came.
Ludendorff in arraying his means, had considered his objective. The
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Nikolai Lemn, the chief agent m establishing the Bolshevist regime in Russia addressing a streei
crowd on a First of May celebration.
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Nicholas, once Tsar of all the Russias, as he appeared
during his captivity at Tsarskoe Selo after the first
Revolution. With the accession of Lenin his doom
was sealed; and he and his entire family were
assassinated July 16, 1918.
J. L. GARVIN
85
Allies* ** weakest part,” as he writes, “ was on both sides of St. Quentin.”
The final break-through he hoped would begin northward of that town.
The decisive direction was presently indicated by the long straight road
from St. Quentin to Amiens. But he hoped that the German army would
drive down the Somme towards the coast. “ If this blow succeeded, tiie
strategic result might indeed be enormous, as we would separate the bulk
of tile English army from the French and crowd it up with its back to the
sea.”
This was the immense issue for the world when the greatest and longest
battle of all time opened on March 21. It was to rage for seven months as
a drama of stupendous vicissitudes. The Germans suddenly brought up their
attacking divisions with unprecedented speed and skill according to plan.
The surprise was complete, and round St. Quentin it was overwhelming. Be-
fore Von Hutier, the victor of Riga, past-master of the new tactics, and
before his 23 divisions, the British Fifth Army, deluged with gas shells,
went down and was soon swept away. Hopelessly outnumbered, it fought
with hopeless heroism. The enemy swept on through the widening gap.
The attack had begun on Thursday morning. By Saturday, in three days
of mist, the Germans had advanced nine miles — a break-through hitherto
unknown in the west They poured over the Somme — and still pressed
forward on both sides of the straight road toward Amiens. Northward,
however, Ludendorff had met with an ominous check, where the British Third
Army stood like a rock. Modifying his plan, which had looked for a wider
collapse of the British, Ludendorff now directed the main weight of his
attack towards Amiens itself. The critical question w'as whether the city
could be saved and with it the vital point of junction between the British
and French armies. After a fortnight’s fighting, the answer was given at
the beginning of April when the first phase of the struggle closed. That
answer was not what Ludendorff hoped. The Germans had indeed pushed
almost to Villers-Bretonneux, nine miles from Amiens. They never got
further. Ludendorff had done mighty things, but not enough for Germany’s
emergency; and between the lines of his record we can read the secret
anxiety of his soul. From St. Quentin his armies had advanced 40 miles.
In ten days the British had suffered 175,000 casualties. The connection
between the British and French armies depended for the moment on one
precarious link. The link held. Ludendorff writes with honesty: “Strate-
gically we had not achieved what tiie events of March 23, 24 and 25 had
encouraged us to hope for. That we had failed to take Amiens, which
would have rendered communication between the enemy’s forces astride
the Somme exceedingly difficult, was especially disappointing. Long range
bombardment of the railway establishments at Amiens was by no means
an equivalent.” At the outeet he had missed the essential.
What he could not yet realise was that other things had happened more
memorably to his disadvantage. In place of Gough’s broken army, French
divisions had stopped the breach. After the first five days of battle a
continuous front was reestablished. ’The Allies were to be in peril again,
but never in peril so deadly. British statesmen were roused to do what
ought to have been done long before. On March 26, at the Conference of
Doullens, General Foch, whom we have seen as one of the chief heroes of
the Marne and then relegated to the retired list, became generalissimo in
everything but the name. For the first time in the west, the Germans were
opposed to a soldier of genius with full powers, and were to meet in him
that rare union of calculation and inspiration such as the 'Teutonic race had
not produced. Even if he was less than a Napoleon, he was somewhat more
than a Ludendorff. Foch’s purpose was the great defensive passing to tiie
86
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
great offensive. He would exhaust, if possible, the enemy’s reserves and wait
for the Americans to give him an assured superiority of numbers. For that
he must face at least three months of uttermost tension, borne with that
mingled fire and stoicism, of which his soul was composed. Meanwhile, he
proceeded to constitute as rapidly as possible his general reserve to reinforce
any part of the front henceforth threatened — his masse de manoeuvre. The
enemy was hardly arrested towards Amiens than Germany struck heavily
elsewhere.
BATTLES FOR LIFE — FLANDERS AND THE MARNE — AMERICA’S RUSH TO AID
The grand plan, as we have seen, had relatively failed in the north, but
the Germans could not vet bring themselves to relinquish their obstinate
dream of breaking the British in Flanders and driving them back on the
sea towards Calais and Boulogne, perhaps out of these indispensable supports.
This second main attack, the battle of the Lys, opened on April 9. Between
their front and the coast, the British had no depth of ground to give them
a chance of safe retreat in emergency. They had to hold at all costs, and
they held. Through thundering days and weeks, Haig’s great army and the
reinforcing French divisions fought “ with their backs to the wall.” Where
every mile was important, they were at first forced back dangerously between
their buttresses, the Ypres salient and Bethune. They kept both Ypres and
Bethime, and still solidly barred the roads to Calais and Boulogne. Again
the enemy had made some progress, but less than ever had he made enough
for his purpose.
Mr. Lloyd George had been able to make an announcement which was
like a trumpet of encouragement to France and Britain. By now the United
States was straining to be in it, and President Wilson’s message was that
American troops would henceforth arrive in Europe at the rate of about
120,000 a month. Even so, time pressed hard. The Germans had still well
over 200 divisions in the field, the Allies less than 170. By the end of
April, however, the enemy in Flanders, as before Amiens, was fought to a
standstill. Ludendorff was more anxious now. “ The suspension of oiu*
offensive had of course the most far-reaching results. The enemy recovered
at the same time ad ourselves. Owing to lack of drafts our losses made
themselves unpleasantly felt.” Moreover, here and there a deterioration of
fighting quality was perceptible. On Germany a chill shadow of instinctive
apprehension now began to fall. After five weeks, in spite of big local
advances, there had been nothing after all like a strate^cal break-through.
Compelled, with extreme reluctance, to abandon for the present the
attack on the British, the German Higher Command again turned elsewhere,
this time towards the centre of France, and braced every nerve to drive in,
and shatter, if possible, the French front between Paris and Reims. If
this latter aim was not achieved, at least the Allies might be compelled to
weaken their lines in the north in order to reinforce the centre. In that
case, the British might still be crushed in Flanders or their link of contact
with the French snapped at Amiens. Once more the intention was to strike
at that sector of the Allied front which was for the moment weakest in men.
The positions which included the heists of the Aisne and the Chemin dea
Dames, were thought to be impregnable, and even Foch sent weary troops
there for a relative rest. Accordin^y, with the French were four tired British
divisions. To the enemy’s Higher Command this was a situation as tempting
as Caporetto. In deliberate thorougliness the German preliminaries equalled
J. L. GARVIN
87
the masterpiece of preparation before the twenty-first of March. The surprise
was as complete. The attack began on May 27, and at first succeeded once
more beyond dreams. Storming the Chemin des Dames and the whole line
of the Aisne heights, the Germans broke across that river and pushed straight
towards the Marne itself. The French Eleventh Corps was annihilated in
the first sweep, and with it a British division. Soissons was lost. In a few
days the enemy reached the Marne and even crossed it. They captured
Chateau-Thierry less than 50 miles east of Paris. In three days they had
advanced 30 miles, taking between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners and 400
guns. It was marvellous, but again it was not enough. The wedge-shaped
area, now won, narrowed southward to a blunt apex only 15 miles wide on
the Marne, and was exposed on both flanks. Reims had been invincibly
defended on one side; the French held the forest of Villers-Cotterets on the
other. Supply was difficult. Ludendorff writes: “ It was a strategical dis-
advantage to us that we had been unable to take Reims and get our armies
further forward into the hilly country in that region.” A strong attempt
had to be made to secure more room on the other side — the sector northward
of Paris between Montdidier and Noyon. In this battle for elbow-room
a considerable result was achieved; but once more it was not enough,
and this time — note the significant moments — not all the gain could
be held. The redoubtable Von Hutier at his deepest point of penetration
in this quarter had advanced about eight miles nearer Paris, but was still 50
miles away. And in 48 hours there was a change. Mangin counter-attacked,
and the conclusion of his orders was in these phrases: “ To-morrow’s opera-
tion should mark the end of the defensive battle that we have been waging
for two months ; it should stop the Germans, resume the offensive and result
in success. Let every man understand this.” Words worthy to be engraven.
On June 11, with Dantonesque audacity, Mangin in broad dayli^t launched
five divisions and a tank flotilla from the woods. Mangin only gained about
a mile and a half, but he gained. It was new. Realising the limit of their
capacity in this direction, the Germans instantly suspended their offensive.
By now the recurrent rhythm of their fortunes was like Greek tragedy. In
their relation to every main objective they were “ so near and yet so far.”
The Allies, nevertheless, had felt this episode as a peril nearly as great
as at the end of March. Though France threw her African levies into the
struggle in increasing numbers, French reserves, after nearly four years of
massacre, were near the point of exhaustion. But now, at last, America was
arriving like Bliicher and before the night. On June 2 Pershing agreed to
send five American divisions into the front line. Already on May 28 their
first division, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the French, had captured
the village of Cantigny and held it against three vehement counter-attacks.
It was agreed at Versailles that 170,000 Americans would be landed in France
during June and 140,000 more in July. At last — at long last — the Allies
felt that they were near the turning of the tide. It had not quite turned yet.
Ludendorff had not a bad heart naturally; but, warped by the Prussian creed,
he was unchivalrous, grudging and narrow in his estimate of opponents, and
thus self-deceived. He wrote: “At Chateau-Thierry, Americans who had
been a long time in France attacked our thinly-held fronts; but they were
unskilfully led, attacked in dense masses, and failed. Here, too, our men
felt themselves superior.” There we have the vice of the German mind
under William II. They felt themselves superior until they fell as even
Russia had not fallen, and ever afterwards, alas! so deeply were the modem
Germans infected by the egotistical taint of the old system, they still at
heart felt themselves superior. But the denouement was still months away.
Between March and the middle of June^ Ludendorff had thrown the dice
88 WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
three times without strategical result. For the fourth and last time he would
cast again. He was not to be under-estimated. He might do it yet Men
mi|^t reckon to the contrary. They could not know.
1918 — ltjdendobff’s last throw fails
Awaiting the end of this last pause of imcertainty in France between the
middle of June and the middle of July, let us glance quickly at other things.
The Germans had been waiting eagerly for the opening and result of the
last Habsburg attack on Italy. It was meant partly to break the Italian
front on the Piave, partly to turn it from the rear; and so to conquer the
whole Venetian plain between the Italian lakes and the Adriatic, bringing
into Austro-Hungarian hands Verona, Padua, Venice itself. Launched on
June 15 the last convulsive effort of the dying Habsburg Empire was a total
failure. Initial successes were local and momentary. In the northern moun-
tains the turning movement under Italy’s old, rash enemy, Conrad von
Hotzendorff, was beaten at once. On the Piave, the situation for a day or
two was more anxious. The assailants in force crossed a long stretch of the
river and threatened to carry the whole of that vital front. The Piave, how-
ever, rose in flood, carried away the enemies’ bridges and seemed to take
a personal part like the rivers in Homer. The Austrians succeeded in re-
crossing it, fortunate to escape before the decisive force of the Italian counter-
attacks was strengthened by the French and British contingents. Ludendorff
might well note “ this unsuccessful attack was extremely painful to me ”
The break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy by the defection of all its subject
races was at hand.
At sea the submarine peril was mastered. British sailors, by an epic
attack on Zeebrugge, had blocked that U-boat nest, and next with equal
daring, they partly corked-up Ostend. The German navy never came out,
though Germany’s fate, foreshadowed by sea-power from the first, was now
irrevocably decided in the Atlantic. In the three months, April, May and
June, over 600,000 American troops landed in Europe On June 24, Ger-
many’s Foreign Minister, Von Kohlmann, dared to warn his country that
it was idle to look for a decision in the field. He ruined his political career,
but his speech was the writing on the wall.
The time had come when the fate of the Central Empires must be staked
on a last throw of the iron dice. Ludendorff did not know it was to be
the last throw. That the situation was bad he knew, but not how bad.
He could not guess that Foch, already resolved to take the offensive, was
now, and with consummate jud^ent, playing with his enemy. Ludendorff ’s
original scheme was ruined. His last advance had made his situation more
disadvantageous in every way, and master of preparation as he was, but
below genius in unexpected emergency, he had allowed himself to become
a self-deceiver, unsure of his strokes.
The beginning of his final crisis found him in two minds. The chief
desire of the whole Higher Command was to conquer the British in Flanders.
At present the British were too strong. The Higher Command decided on
the pjostponement, as they thought, of the Flanders offensive, not realising
that in this quarter their chance had passed for ever and that the obstinate
island was as sure to survive Kaiserism as it had survived Napoleon. Ac-
cordingly, Ludendorff looked elsewhere in his search for the weakest point.
Studying the long central stretch between Paris and Verdun, he found that
while the bulk of the Allies’ reserves covered Paris as he supposed they
J. L. GARVIN
had by now another purpose — their line was most thinly held between
Chateau-Thierry and Verdun. Here Reims with its mutilated cathedral was
the French keystone. Were that wrenched away, there might be a wide fall
extending the German salient on the Marne far along the river. Accordingly,
the German Command planned for the middle of July an attack on both
sides of Reims. They hoped the effect would be so to weaken the Allies
in the north, that the British could be attacked m Flanders a fortnight later
and the war won. By now, this was juggling with fantasies. Solid calcula*
tion had disappeared. Already Ludendorff’s own instinct — as he records
— had asked him whether the time had not come to resign himself to the
defensive; but he stifled the thought.
On the night of the national fete of France, July 14, 1918, the German
artillery began to rage from Chateau-Thierry to the Argonne. At dawn
next morning, the German infantry sprang from its trenches. East of Reims
they advanced against Gouraiid, only to fall into a deadly trap. The French
had abandoned their first positions, where only a few devoted detachments
were left to give warning and gain a little time by the use of their machine-
guns. In their second positions the French had accumulated all means to
give their enemy a crushing reception. The Germans, fighting desperately,
attacked again and again, returning to the assault only to leave heaps of
dead. But elsewhere they had done better, forcing the passage of the Marne
across a long stretch of its course, driving on for several miles southward.
Then, on this side also, the Germans were firmly held and brought to a
standstill. By this tactical success they were only more entangled. Strate-
gically, the failure of the last German offensive was absolute. Forty-eight
hours had shown that in this region the attack must at once be suspended.
Accordingly, on the night of July 17, Ludendorff and Prince Rupprecht con-
sulted about renewing the assault in Flanders. It was too late. For them
henceforth it was not to impose decisions but to submit to them. Nearly
four years after the outbreak of the war — when they reckoned on triumph
in SIX weeks — the initiative had passed for ever from their hands. Next
day Foch launched his first offensive — soon to be pursued without truce or
stay until German rum was complete. July 18, 1918, was one of the turn-
ing-points of history.
JULY 18, 1918 — THE TXniNINQ-POINT OF HISTORY — FOCH STRIKES
That morning the French force destined for the chief part under the
brilliant Mangin, thrust like a sword into the flank of the exposed German
salient between the Aisne and the Marne. The enemy, surpassed at last in
technique and resource, was taken by a triple surprise. The first was the
very appearance of the French. They had assembled in the neighbouring
forest of Villers-Cotterets, and their complete mastery of the air had helped
to prevent the Germans from guessing what was gathering beneath those
far-ranging tree-tops. The instant rapidity of attack without any warning
bombardment was the second surprise. The third laimched forward over
300 tanks, a larger swarm than had yet worked together. These craft were
light, low. fast models and, as they came on, almost invisible amongst the
crops of high summer, their machine-guns flashed over the standing com.
At one point Mangin advanced eight miles — more than the Allies had yet
made in one day. He was looking into Soissons itself, the key of the whole
salient. Further south the French and two American divisions had broken
widely and deeply into the German lines. By the evening the first triumph
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
90
was won — victory, and the herald of victory. The enemy had lost 15,000
prisoners, 300 gims, and broad positions that in the circumstances were vital.
Hmdenburg and Ludendorff, meeting at Avesnes, might well “retire imme-
diately to the oflBce.” There was only one thing to be done. “ It would
not be possible to hold the salient permanently, and a new attack on Reims
seemed hopeless.” And now, worse still: “ The offensive in Flanders could
not bring a rapid and decisive success. . . . G.H.Q. therefore decided to
abandon this offensive.” With that the last great dream was quenched.
Rushing up reinforcements in their lorries, the Germans made a vigorous
defence during the more broken fighting of the next twelve days. By the
beginning of August they had extricated themselves well from the Marne
salient and stood on a straight battle-line north of Soissons and Reims.
Ludendorff sums up: “ The impetus of the army had not sufSced to deal the
enemy a decisive blow before the Americans were on the spot in consider-
able force. It was quite clear to me that our general situation had thus
become very serious. By the beginning of August wc had suspended our
attack and reverted to the defensive on the whole front.” He adds — and
it is the first note of deep human pathos — that though “ the desire for rest
was as legitimate ” as it had always been after utter strain, “ whether the
enemy would let us have it was the question ” Inexorably negative was the
answer.
FOCH AND THE GRAND PLAN — THE FULL TIDE OF VICTORY
From now Foch was sure of a cumulative ascendency in every kind of
force. It would increase rapidly with every mouth, and if hostilities were
much prolonged Germany must succumb under a process as gradual and
terrible as the mediajval punishment of pressing to death. In numbers the
French army was now declining, though it had never been so fine an instru-
ment. The European Allies as a whole, however, had still a surplus, and the
man-power of their great American associate was illimitable relatively to
the remaining conditions of the war. Germany’s case on the other hand was
tragic. On every side she had inflicted far more loss than she had suffered,
but she had shot her bolt. Most of her reserves were immature youths
called up before their time to be the “ Marie-Louises ” of a lost campaign.
Now even the iron-hearted German Command flinched at the thought of sacri-
ficing these to Moloch. For the question of Germany’s future after defeat
must now be looked in the face. If the boys were to be preserved, the other
troons, less than a quarter of a million, would soon be used up. Nevertheless,
Ludendorff induced himself to suppose that he could hold his line by defensive
fighting and by occasional counter-strokes until the Allies were brought to a
compromise.
In any case, the task that lay before Foch was still a vast and formidable
problem. Wielding the ascendency of force, what would he do with it? His
plan was in two parts: First, in a series of preliminary battles at widely
separated points he would recover valuable railway connections and im-
prove his communications all round for the purposes of the great assault.
Next, he would attack the enemy by concentric strategy, varying the direction
of the blows so that no German sector could feel itself safe for a day, and
sustaining the whole offence without intermission so as to leave the enemy
neither rest nor respite. Above all, he hoped by advancing up the Meuse
northwards from Verdim, to imperil and sever the enemy’s main communi-
cations with Germany itself. All those communications passed through
a relatively narrow area — the rough country between Li4ge and Metz.
J. L. GARVIN
91
In this way the invaders of France and Belgium might be brought to
catastrophe upon the widest military scale. The end of the great invasion,
however, was not destined to be a Nemesis so spectacular and so salutary,
but was to come about in another manner not then foreseen by Foch. On
August 7 a resounding decree, already well deserved, had named him Mare-
chal de France.*’
Next day the first of his preliminary battles was to begin. Meant to clear
the Paris-Amiens railway and fixed for August 8, it was confided to Sir
Douglas Haig. The main British army, improvised during the war, had taken
time to learn its trade. It was now beyond dispute a magnificent fighting
machine and was henceforth directed with equal ability. Accordingly the
battle, meant to be preliminary, was to have practical and moral results be-
yond anticipation. The British had shown a curious psychology. They began
lethargic, but ended fresh. It seemed as though nothing could rouse them but
long adversity ; and that the longer it lasted the better they were. Canadians
and Australians gave a keener temper to their steel An American regiment
was with them in the great action now opened. Rawlinson was in immediate
command. The British artillery no sooner opened than the German bat-
teries were mastered. Covered by a thick mist, troops and tanks drove at
the enemy and went on without mistake or check The surprise was complete.
The German front nearest Amiens was smashed in to a depth of from seven
to eight miles The advantage was improved throughout the next few days.
Before Rawlinson’s corps were stopped, they had taken 22,000 prisoners and
400 guns. For the delivery of Amiens mass was said in the cathedral called
by Ruskin “the Parthenon of Christianity.” Men felt fortunate who had
lived to see that day, and they thought of the comrades who had gone down
by the hundred thousand in the darkest hours on the desolate old battle-
fields hard by.
Fighting in conjunction southward, the French under Debeney had harder
work, but they, too, made wide way. Foch now realised that his chance was
even better than he had thought, and he used it to the full. The main battle
had begun. His generals, Debeney, Humbert, Mangin, were worthy of him.
They handled their tasks like Napoleon’s marshals, and Haig’s generals, like
Rawlinson, Byng and Horne, were as good. The German Higher Command
felt like a man bludgeoned from every side. From August 10, Humbert’s
army was at fierce grips with the tough Von Hutier. Mangin’s army was
unleashed on the 18th, and striking between the Oise and the Aisne at a
cornerstone of the German front, to Ludendorff’s alarm he won a first foot-
ing on the heights of the Aisne Nor was this the end. Already attacked
along 100 miles of front, and menaced chiefly, as they believed, on the south
by Mangin’s thrust towards the vital point of Laon, the enemy threw in
thither what strength they could muster.
They were no sooner deeply engaged there than Foch completed their dis-
tractions by striking harder than ever in the north. Their terrible August
rose to its pitch of crisis. On the 21st, Byng’s army, between points about 20
and 30 miles north-east of Amiens, struck towards Bapaume across part of
the wilderness blasted beyond recognition in the battles of the Somme two
years before. Rawlinson, on the right, nearer Amiens, soon came into linked
action. This broad battle on a moving front nearly 40 miles wide lasted 12
days, and carried the British forces leagues onward — beyond Bapaume,
beyond all the nightmare-country of 1916, even beyond Peronne, the key of
the upper Somme, which the Germans had meant to hold at all costs. In
spite of their picked troops, the Australians seized it by a night attack,
one of the signal exploits of the whole war. But while this struggle was in
92 WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
mid'Swing, the Allies began the sixth of their main assaults since August 8.
Still further northward, Home’s army, on the 26th, opened another and
conquering battle of Arras. Here and onwards the Canadians shone in the
forefront. Winning as much ground in a day as had been taken in six weeks
during the grim struggle that raged after the Easter of 1917, Horne’s force
pounded ahead, breaking down all before it. On September 2, a British and
a Canadian corps together did one*of the biggest things yet. Midway between
Arras and Cambrai, they broke clear through the Wotan line, one of the most
powerfully and deeply fortified of all those positions to which ihe Germans
in other days had given the grandiose Wagnerian names. Thati night, be-
tween September 2 and 3, the enemy began wide movements of retreat which
lasted a fortnight. South of Ypres they disappeared from the Lys salient,
soaked with blood.
By the third week of September, the six weeks of immense battle in north-
ern France had transformed the military situation. The Germans, with
shattering loss, had been driven back to the positions whence they started in
March. Worse still, in other places they had lost sectors held for nearly four
years.
AMERICA’S BATTLE
Far away from the rest, near Verdun, the last of the preliminary battles
had now be^n. It was America’s battle entrusted to Pershing’s First Army.
After all that had hapnened, nothing could startle men in general; and yet
they paused amidst all other conflicts and excitements to realise that the
appearance of the United States as a distinctive belligerent on the Meuse
marked one of the extraordinary moments in Europe’s annals through its
thousands of years and in all world-history In September, 1914, the Germans
at one point had broken through the French fortress-line in the east At St.
Mihiel — about 20 miles south of Verdun — they had reached the Meuse and
crossed it. Wedge-shaped, the St. Mihiel salient was unique in the war. It
embarrassed communications in the rear of Verdun. It was like a spear-head
driven into the French system, and no efforts had been able to pluck it out.
TTie Germans now knew they must retire, but were not quick enough. In
the dark hours of the morning of September 12, the American bombard-
ment began. At dawn the salient was attacked from two sides. With a
fleet of tanks and swarms of aeroplanes, Pershing’s army went over the
top. Attached to it was a gallant French contingent. Through the close
woods the battle went on all day. The concern of the Germans, caught be-
tween two fires, was to get out, and by next morning, leaving behind them
16,000 prisoners, 400 guns, and the mass of stores, they were gone. Early on
the morning of the 13th, the northern and southern forces of the attack joined
hands. In 24 hours, the American battle had wiped out the St. Mihiel salient.
The army of the United States was within range of the guns of Metz. As
much as anything in the Crusades, this was the romance of history and the
efficiency of romance.
THE GEBMAK AGONT
To grasp the significance of the whole struggle — from the deliverance of
Amiens, with its main railway, to the complete disengagement of Verdun —
we must see it from the German side. Ludendorff knew what it meant, and
the iron entered his soul. Rawlinson, Debeney, Humbert, Mangin, Byng,
Home, and Pershing — these seven had rung such iron chimes for the invaders
of France and Belgium as only the Germans hitherto had rung for others. This
J. L. GARVIN
93
was the knell of doom, and Ludendorff knew it from tiie tolling of tke first
bell. August 8 was “ the black day ” of the German army in the history of
this war. So far, as he adds, “ this was the worst e:g)erience that I had to
go through.” Again: “ The balance of munbers bad moved heavily against
us: it was bound to become increasmgly imfavourable as more American
troops came in.” And yet again: “ The fate of the German people was for
me too high a stake. The war must be ended.” But it was easier to get into
it in those far-off “ Hurrah-days ” of August, 1914, than to get out of it in
Augiist, 1918. Ludendorff offered his resignation, but it was refused. Vienna
was in utter despair, but the German people in the mass were still hoodwinked.
At a dejected council under the presidency of the German Emperor, who was
supine, it was uselessly resolved to seek peace through the medium of the
Queen of Holland. The Imperial impotents, William and Charles, still dis-
puted about what was to be done with Poland. Even yet they chaffered
about territorial booty and thought they would keep their crovms. But the
bells of doom would not stop ringing. Every day brought its tidings of dis-
aster. Jjudendorff writes after Mangin’s blow towards Laon: “Again we
had suffered heavy and irreplaceable losses. August 20 was another black
day.” The whole situation became blacker and blacker as the next three
weeks passed. “ What I had gone through would have left its mark on any
man.” He still hopes to make a stand on solid winter-positions of some
kind. Behind part of the Hindenburg system the Germans were labouring
with desperation to prepare the “ Hermann line.” Behind this again they
thought of a last line, ranging straight from the Dutch frontier to Lor-
raine and passing in front of Antwerp, Brussels, Sedan and Metz.
While he was in this mood, after Foch’s preliminary victories, bulletin
after bulletin reporting irretrievable disaster in the east came upon him
like the last messengers to Macbeth. Bulgaria surrendered. The Ottoman
power in Palestine was annihilated. Turkey must surrender. After that the
collapse and dissolution of Austria-Hungary were merely a question of days
The whole fabric of the Central Alliance crashed from the Danube to the
Jordan. For Hindenburg and Ludendorff this was like earthquake rocking
the whole ground behind them. Germany was like the last fabric left stand-
ing, and swaying before its fall.
COLLAPSE OP TURKEY AND BULGARU
Here we must summarise in a few sentences the antecedents of this un-
exampled crash of the states between Vienna and Jerusalem. Long ago in
the Middle East the British, after galling vicissitudes, had taken Bagdad and
driven the Turks out of Mesopotamia. With ease they had defended Egypt
and the Suez Canal. They had raised and led the Arab national movement
against the Turks. The superficial Kaiser’s vision of a Pan-Islamic move-
ment had proved a facile mjrth. The British, according to their usual ex-
perience, met more checks when, advancing from Egypt, they opened the
offensive against Palestine. At (^za, they hammered on its gates in vain.
There, as elsewhere, they continued and retrieved. Allenby, the Sheridan of
the war if any figure in it deserves that name, was summoned from the we^
to take command in the summer of 1917. Disposing of more means than his
predecessors, in six months he achieved. On December 11, with modesty
and on foot, he entered Jerusalem. Through the next months he strength-
ened himself, waiting or moving with circumspection. He prepared very
deliberately, but had an explosive certainty when he struck. His forces were
more bronzed or blat^ than white — more Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, than Chris-
94 WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
tian. His final battle, opened on September 19, northward of Jerusalem, was
boldly imagined and, in the symmetry of its execution and results, was that
“ battle without a morrow ’’ which haimts the dreams of all generals worth
their title. Cavalry came to its own as on no other field. Three Turkish
armies ceased to exist leaving 60,000 prisoners and over 300 guns in Allenby's
hands. The victors swept Sirough Syria towards Asia Minor — northward
to Damascus, northward still to Aleppo. Though the formal capitulation was
delayed a few weeks, Turkey in the third week of September was struck out
of the war.
Bulgaria, one of the smallest of the European belligerents, had played
a disproportionate part, and since her entry into the struggle in October, 1915,
had undoubtedly prolonged the war by two years. With her aid the Allies
could have mastered Gallipoli, forced the Dardanelles, taken Constantinople
and saved Russia. By her intervention against the Allies, she had brought
about the downfall of Serbia and Rumania alike, linked up Turkey with the
Central Empires, and bolted the Balkan approaches to the Black Sea. Until
this last autumn of the war, the Allies had failed for three years to realise
their hopes on the Salonika front though, for military and naval reasons alike,
this Macedonian enclave with its great seaport was well worth holding.
King Constantine had been forced to abdicate in the summer of 1917, and
Greece under Venizelos, instead of being a doubtful neutral in the rear, had
become a militant Ally. In the Serbian divisions lived the soul of their lost
country, though the Central Empires had dealt with its body like a carcase.
The Bulgarians in their mountain positions looked as impregnable as ever;
but their soldiers were sick of the war; their wily King and doubling politi-
cians were yet more anxious to be out of it. Quickest to read the writing
on the wall, they hoped by early desertion to acquire merit with the Allies and
escape part of the impending wrath. A few months before they could have
made excellent terms; now it was too late In the middle of September
General Franchet d’Esperey attacked with the whole force of the Allies and
broke at once through the enemy's centre. It was as though an iron gate
had been blown open by dynamite. In a few days the rest of the Macedonian
barrier was swept away. Through the valleys and over the ridges of this
wild country the Serbs, above all, were rushing back to their old homes with
incredible speed. From the first 24 hours the Bulgarians knew that the long
attempt to retrieve 1913 had only ended in a deeper bankruptcy. Negotia-
tions for an armistice were soon opened. On the last day of September
Bulgaria submitted to terms of surrender which ejected her at once from all
her conquests since 1915, and placed all her fighting equipment and all her
old territoiy with its means of transport at the absolute disposal of the Allies.
The military consequences for the whole war were evidently immense.
The famous Pan-German line from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf was as
utterly broken between Berlin and Constantinople as between the Bosporus
and Bagdad. The Allies were advancing to the Danube. The Habsbiu*g
Monarchy, already crumbling within, lay open to attack. Austria-Hungary
would be the next to crash. That fall would be the ruin and vanishing of
an empire in a manner like nothing yet known in history.
THE CLIMAX IN THE WEST
^^ile these vast events were resounding in the east, Foch, after the pre-
liminary battles, had completed his grand plan, and the final battles had
begun to thunder round the whole German front from Flanders to Verdun
J. L GARVIN
95
along a range of more than 200 miles. His ambition, it will be remembered,
was to break the enemy on both wings, and especially on the side of the
Meuse, where a tolerably rapid advance towards Sedan and Mezieres would
thrust in between the mass of the invaders and Germany, jeopardising their
means of retreat. The Meuse was to be the main line of victory. The Ger-
mans were to be ^Haken in a sack,” and the American armies marching
towards Sedan — a wonderful conjuncture of ideas — were to take a chief
part in seizing the strings of the sack and drawing them tight. In this spa-
cious conception Foch proved too visionary, for against it Ludendorfif and
his armies, with all the advantage of the ground, proved too tough.
The last act of the World War was opened on the night of September 25,
by the American guns in the Argonne. Next morning, Pershing's army with
Gouraud^s on its left crossed the parapets. The joint attack stretched 40
miles wide across a line ranging from near Reims to the Meuse below Verdun.
The Americans had been cast for the hardest task in the whole war-theatre,
though they were the newest levies Fighting with dash and grip, their
first separate success was a splendid victory. By the evening of the second
day they had carried Montfaucon, that commanding height of the whole
area from which the enemy had overlooked the agony of Verdun; they had
gone beyond it; and they had taken 10,000 prisoners. For the Germans it
was life and death to keep themselves solidly buttressed on this side, and for
all the risk elsewhere they brought up reinforcements and stopped the breach.
The Americans for their part were clogged by the state of the ground, and
their communications were choked. For an interval, supply was paralysed
They had struck a great blow in the war, they had fixed enemy forces which
would have been available elsewhere. Thus they had aided the advance
of other Allied armies ; but the Argonne was a hopeless country for the pur-
poses of Foch's main plan.
Meanwhile, Gouraud on the American left was carrying line after line of
the frowning positions eastward of Reims where for years, with every re-
source of fortification, the enemy had defied attack. Gouraud m five days
took 13,000 prisoners and 300 guns. Now the French Fifth Army had its
chance round Reims itself, and on the last day of September — the day
of the Bulgarian surrender — it struck hard northward towards the Aisne.
From the beginning of October, Ludendorff was standing fast at any cost
to cover his gateposts in Flanders and the Argonne; and slowly, ably, he
was drawing in his southern lines on the Franco-American side. Now, he was
hurried into wider and deeper withdrawal by the collapse of his prepared
defences where he thought them strongest.
For on the other side, Haig’s armies since the last days of September
had been achieving their strongest exploits and, battering through the Hin-
denburg system, they were threatening the very heart of the German defence.
The three British armies included an American corps, and linked with this
powerful group was a French army under Debeney. There was yet no facile
success on any sector. The Germans for the most part remained worthy of
any steel. Even at the beginning of October, the last month of decision, the
war was still a grapple of giants. Haig’s forces were confronted by a task
perhaps the most formidable of its kind known in war. Much of the Hinden-
burg system of resistance was covered by water-lines long and broad and
deep like the Canal du Nord and the Scheldt Canal, while behind these huge
fosses — to use the mediaeval term — there was a belt from four to six miles
deep, elaborately furnished, above ground and below, with every defensive
device that labour and ingenuity coifid contrive. Ludendorff thought that
winter would give him breathing-time before such positions could be taken.
In twelve days from the opening of this massive and dexterous assault, the
96
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
thing was done. By swimming, bridging, turning, with feats as astonishing
as anything in the war, the canals were carried and the Hindenburg system
beyond was mastered in its entirety. St. Quentin was recovered on October 1.
Cambrai fell on the 8th. On that day the remaining German defences in this
zone disappeared; and Haig’s armies were entermg open country.
Foch’s crushing machinery was in reciprocal action southward. The
enemy was between the upper and nether millstones, grinding like the mills
of God, the invaders of France and Belgium. Pershing through these early
days of October, if as yet moving slowly was grinding hard. On his left
Gouraud strode across the Aisne river some 20 miles north of Reims. On
every sector the Allied armies in this chmax of combined action were fairly
closing in. Seawards, King Albert at the head of Belgian, French and British
forces was returning in victory over old fields of defeat. For the Belgians,
as for the Serbs, the road was homewards.
For the whole German army October 10 opened seven days of disaster.
The St. Gobain massif which so long had been a Gibraltar of their front was
lost. Mangin entered Laon and the Te Deum for its deliverance was sung
in the cathedral on the rook. On the enemy side October 17 was the blackest
day yet, as for the Allies the best. While they entered the great city of Lille
to the delirious joy of its inhabitants, and were about to take Bruges in their
grasp, the British navy found Ostend deserted. The Germans drank a bitter
draught when they retreated from the whole Belgian coast and abandoned
its submarine bases. Hopeless, weary, with battalions reduced to the rags
of what they had been, still the Germans fought stubbornly and thwarted the
most vivid expectations of the Allies But their plight was becoming like the
old Jacobite cadence: “ Now all is done that men can do and all is done in
vain.” The death-wound had been felt. Retreating everywhere, the enemy
by the third week of October was thrown back to that rear-line of prepared
positions whereon the German Higher Command still proposed to fight
the Allies to a standstill if first negotiations failed. The new front, so far
as it ran for over 100 miles from north to south from near Ghent to near
Laon, covering the former of those renowned cities but at last relinquishing
the latter, was called the “ Hermann line.” Swerving then south-eastward
from near Laon to the indispensable pivot facing the Americans on the Meuse,
the defensive barrier was called the “ Hunding-Brunhild Ime.”
NEGOTIATION — WILSON AND POTSDAM
Nearly three weeks before this the first negotiations had been opened,
and we must pause to follow them before we come to final events in the
field. Diplomatic effort had been urged with belated insistence by Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff themselves. Competent to the end of their military
profession they were like children on the political side. “ At six o’clock
on the afternoon of September 28,” writes Ludendorff, “I went down to
the Field-Marshal’s room which was one floor below mine. I explained to
him my views as to a peace offer and a request for an armistice. The Field-
Marshal listened with emotion. He answered that he had intended to say
the same to me. . . . 'The Field-Marshal and I parted with a firm hand-
shake, like men who have buried their dearest hopes.” Yet these jack-boot
leaders of junkerism were political babes in the wood. They still meant
to use the United States to save Hohenzollem militarism. Armistice con-
ditions would have to permit “the resumption of hostilities on our own
borders.” The German Emperor came to Spa. Long since reduced to in-
J. L. GARVIN
97
significance, in this emergency he was inert and without counsel, revealed
himself in his adversity as the weak person some shrewd observers had
always thought him. Nearly 30 years had passed since Bismarck and
Moltke had formed their inward opimon of “ the young master.” This
September 29, a real parliamentary regime was proclaimed — responsible
government” on the British and American model. The military truth had
to be told to the German nation. The task was entrusted to Ludendorff’s
acolyte, Baron von der Bussche. On October 2 he addressed the leaders of
the Reichstag. Carefully instructed by the Higher Command he declared,
“ We cannot win the war . . . each new day brings the enemy nearer to
his goal. . . . While the peace offer is being made, you at home must show
a firm front to prove that you have the unbreakable will to continue the
fight if the enemy refuse us peace or offer only humiliating conditions.”
At this, German public opinion was sunk in despair. The confession of
inevitable defeat by Great Headquarters was shattering; the appeal for a
contingent fight to the last was unconvincing and disregarded. Faith was
dead. Germany felt that no great people had ever been so irretrievably
deluded by its military leaders.
On October 5, the first supplication to President Wilson was dispatched
The President's reply demanded the unconditional evacuation of all invaded
territory. Germany's second note agreed to evacuation under conditions
that, in accordance with Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's proviso, would leave
to the militarist leaders the possibility of renewing hostilities. Mr. Wilson's
second answer received at Berlin in mid-October destroyed these easy cal-
culations. It made the final and crushing declaration; “ No arrangement
can be accepted by the United States which does not provide absolutely
satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present
military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in
the field.” This was in the military sense, as the Higher Command knew,
the stark demand for unconditional surrender. The critical Council was
held on October 17 in Berlin, Ludendorff being present His advice was for
continuing the war at all costs The sustained vigour of his career was
manifest, but its wisdom from beginning to end was not so clear. His
egotism and patriotism were too obviously mingled. His plea for a fight
to the last, rather than unconditional surrender, was perhaps sound in Ger-
man interests; but the Kaiser was a cipher, and civilian faith in Hohenzollern
tradition was destroyed. Under Prince Max of Baden, the new Government
in Berlin, staking too much on the presumptive idealism of President Wilson,
refused to throw the helve after the hatchet, and on October 20 indicated to
Washington its tendency to capitulation. On October 23, the President of
the United States demanded in effect not only the absolute capitulation of
Germany's fighting forces, but the dethronement of the Hohenzollern
dynasty and the abolition of the Prussian war-system.
THE LAST ACT — THE HABSBURG CATASTROPHE
The fighting raged ceaselessly, and it passed into a last phase. On
October 19 Foch issued his final orders. The next combined battles were to
throw the enemy out of Brussels and across the Meuse into the Ardennes,
and he further felt strong enough for an offensive through Lorraine, cutting
German communications with Metz, which would be glorious for France
and give the enemy the coup de grace. All along the front that enemy,
despite his condition, resisted desperately for still another fortnight. For the
Allies, successes of the more facile order and on the grander scale were as
T. B. y. — VOL. 1—7
WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
little to be gained as before, but every day made surer than before their
grim triumph in the war of exhaustion. On October 26 Ludendorff was
dismissed for trying to excite the army against Wilson’s terms of peace.
The new German front was battered away like the former. No need now
to multiply details. The movement of fate had become broad and intelli-
gible. Let us glance at its course from north to south, up to the decisive
day of November 5. King Albert’s armies, after hard slow days, were
near Ghent, the heart of Flanders, and with their cavalry at their head were
driving the invaders. Haig’s armies, after obstinate battles roimd Valen-
ciennes, had taken that key-position, forced the whole long line before them,
and, in broad advance down the Sambre towards Mons, they were soon
throwing the enemy across the frontier itself and out of France. The
French armies, also near their frontier, were thrusting towards the vital rail-
way junctions of Hirson and Meziferes. All French territory was cleared of
the enemy except a little rough strip along the Ardennes and the Briey comer.
There the Americans came m. On the Meuse they were fairly out of the toils.
They had done immense work building new roads and railways to supplement
the miserable communications which had fettered them. In the first days of
November Pershing’s men were going forward by leagues; holding on both
banks a long stretch of the Meuse, they were ready to strike towards Sedan.
Thus by about November 5, the Hermann-Hunding-Brunhild line, taken or
turned everywhere, had vanished like the old Hmdenburg system. By that
night tiie German armies on a front over 120 miles wide were in full retreat,
but though retreating for life, there was no rout. They never dissolved into
a rabble-flight.
It was far otherwise with their companion empire. During these inde-
scribable days, Austria-Hungary as known for centuries had disappeared as
in a moment from the face of the earth and was no more seen. Not only
the Habsburg armies but the Habsburg Monarchy had been swept away and
engulfed in a catastrophe like nothing in the history of the world. Since
Caporetto, a new Italy had arisen. Diaz had been building up his army to
strike again. With him were three British divisions and two French. The
Czechoslovaks added a division of revolt against Austria; and there was an
American regiment. Seven-eighths of the whole army, however, was Italian.
On October ^ the battle had begun on the Piave. After a week’s fighting,
the Italian army had swept far forward on the side of the Venetian Alps.
The enemy was in full retreat. The pursuers were assured of great victory,
but nothing had yet prepared them for what they were to achieve. On the
last day of October the retreat, losing all cohesion amongst the mountain
valleys, and between the successive streams, changed to a wild, unimaginable
nightmare of panic, mutiny, flight, and surrender. Guns and material,
stores and dep6ts were abandoned. When the strange work of pursuit and
collection was finished, the Italians found that they had taken 450,000
prisoners and 7,000 guns. They had avenged Caporetto over and over again
by such a stupendous spectacmar triumph as the western Allies were not
to know.
GERMANY’S FINAL DISASTERS AND SURRENDER
Yet if the western conclusion was duller to sight and feeling — even an
anti-climax in externals by comparison with the visions which had so long
sustained the souls of men — it was to the eye of the mind a thing of mass
and grandeur and historic moment far exceeding the vivid sweep of Vittorio
Veneto and well proportioned to the scale and argument of tiie World War.
What was now to come was the submission and surrender of that dominating
J. L. GARVIN
99
empire whereof Austria-Hungary had been but an appanage; and of that
mighty army beside which the Habsburg and all other subordinate levies
had been weak and dependent. Within the frontiers of Belpum and all
along the northern frontier of France, the weary but conquering troops of
the western Allies and their great Associate were on the eve of their
reward. Through the three days of the enemy's retreat after November 5,
they followed up hard. On the evening of the 6th, the American Ist
Division, after its famous forced march of 38 miles in 30 hours, had reached
Sedan. Gouraud was only half a dozen miles from the same point. North-
ward for 100 miles to Ghent, where the German pivot still stood fast, all the
other armies crushed onward and for the most part slowly. The enemy's
resistance stiffened again at the more defensible points. After losing prisoners
in masses, harassed by the Allies' flying squadrons hawking above in undis-
puted mastery of the air, in spite of the mud and congestion of their routes,
the disorganisation of supply, and messages of despair from home; under the
clouds of November and amidst its rain and winds, the Germans arrested their
general retreat and by November 9 again held a continuous front. They
could not hope to keep it long. They were lost. Forlorn, and with less than
their former discipline, their ranks were full of indomitable soldiership.
The negotiations for the Armistice had begun, but let us complete in a
few words the military narrative. Through the cold and mist of the last 24
hours frpm the morning of Sunday, November 10, the Allied armies were
all urging their marches to get as far as possible before the very end. On
that last Sabbath of German military power, the Belgians won back their
beloved Ghent. At night the British were round Mons where they had begun
to fight four and a half long years before, and they delivered it next morning
At dawn the French had occupied Rocroi, a name like a star in their military
tradition. The American armies were extending their grip on the Meuse,
and stirring up to the last minute. A restless lassitude was stealing over the
rest, more subdued by tiredness and memory. At eleven o'clock on the
eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918 firing ceased on both sides, and
far and wide a silence more strange, more significant than ever yet had
hushed human sense, stilled the clamour of the guns and the tumults of
men. When that final quietness fell on the western battlefields, it meant
that the entire fighting system of a great and misled people, whose worship
of force and ability in arms had raised military power to a height of
ascendency never equalled by a single nation, had been annihilated by
the terms of formal surrender.
END OF THE WORLD WAR — THE ARMISTICE AND THE FUTURE
For the understanding of subsequent events up to the present day, and
even the problems of the future, it is important to go back a little in
order to follow the preliminaries of peace. The American President had
made it clear to Berlin that the only Armistice Germany could expect
would be one that put it out of her power to renew the vrar. Next, Luden-
dorff fell because of his immediate appeal to the army against total military
surrender. On his dismissal by William II, he said that in a fortnight
there would no longer be an Emperor.” The German Government con-
sented to abandon the submarine campaign. Accordingly, when the High
Sea Fleet was ordered out in the next few days it mutinied, and the very
battleship called the “ Kaiser ” hoisted the red flag. Kiel started the revo-
lution. It spread from the German seaports through the industrial towns
where Socialism had always been strongest. On November 5 Berlin received
100 WAR ENGULFS THE WORLD
the American President’s decisive message. The Allies reserved their judg-
ment with regard to what “ the freedom of the seas ” might mean, but accept^
the rest of the Fourteen Points; and the Allies further insisted that for all
damage during the war to their civilian populations, Germany must pay.
That Berlin must treat on this basis, was Washington’s last word. On the
separate business of terms for Germany’s fighting forces, Marshal Foch was
ready to receive accredited representatives of the German Government.
On the night of November 7, Foch received Berlin’s appeal for a parley,
and consented. Next morning the German delegates were passed through the
French lines. Foch received them in his railway train standing in the
midst of the wide forest between Compiegne and Soissons. When they began
by assuming that there would be some discussion of terms, the generalissimo
at once made them sensible of their position. They were there solely to hear
their sentence if indeed they wished immediate peace. Foch was laconic
and imperious. It was his moment. The invaders must consent to military
annihilation by total surrender with regard to weapons and transport, with
a provisional surrender of territory giving the Allies an absolute command
of the Rhine. These terms could not be varied by one iota. They must be
taken or left by eleven o’clock on Monday morning, the eleventh. Crushed
with dismay, on this black Fnday of their nation, the Germans begged per-
mission to consult Berlin. There on Sunday an agonised conference was
held, and they bowed to fate. Next day the Germans signed at five o’clock
in the morning. Six hours afterwards the war ceased as we have seen.
The terms of capitulation were as ensuing: Within two weeks the Ger-
mans must quit all occupied territory and restore Alsace-Lorraine. They
must surrender 6,000 cannons, 30,000 machine-guns, 3,000 mortars, 2,000
aeroplanes Further within 30 days they must submit to Allied occupation
of all Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, and to Allied military com-
mand on the other side They must give up 5,000 locomotives, 150,000
wagons, 5,000 lorries. Within two weeks they must hand over 160 sub-
marines. Within one week they must yield their High Sea Fleet to be
interned. They must retire from all their conquests m the east as in the
west. They must pay by unprecedented indemnities for the unexampled
destruction they had wrought in their day of strength. It was an over-
whelming retribution but so far it was just. Had Prussian militarism
triumphed, its terms would have been more merciless. The Fourteen Points
and the supplementary principles, proclaimed by the American President,
were terms promised to the German nation. They had little to do with
the Armistice conditions devised to destroy the German war-machincs For
profound effect upon the heart and memory of mankind, it would have been
better for the Allies and their Associate to pursue the war for a few months
longer until the German armies were shattered on the field, to advance into
the heart of Germany, and to frame m Berlin itself a wiser and more
moderate peace. That would have meant a more decisive American pre-
dominance in power and settlement. In moral effect upon the mind of the
German majority, the denouement was unsatisfactory. Their armies marched
back with bands playing, and colours flying from the invaded parts of France
and Belgium. Germany had inflicted the worst consequences of invasion,
and was but mildly to suffer it. To her people as a whole the sense of real
defeat was not adequately brought home, and they hoped to evade its con-
sequences. Some indelible impress which ought to have been left on the
conscience and imagination of mankind as a whole, was lacking. But the
European Allies, by the logic of the war of exhaustion, were nearly as
exhausted as the vanquished and in some respects more so. For France no
occasion could have been more favourable than that of the Armistice, and
J. L. GARVIN
101
none could have been more ably or better used. On the morning of Armis-
tice Day the guns were silenced, but in the afternoon the bells of every
church in France rang out and every belfry left standing in the devastated
departments chimed in. Henceforth the Allies, after all their sagacious virtue
in long adversities, would be in most danger of intoxication by the wine of
triumph.
CHAPTER III
HISTORY OF OUR OWN TIMES— Continued
By J L Garvin
Peace Without Settlement
AFTER THE WAR: RUIN AND TRANSFORMATION
In truth, if the closing shock of the war had already thrown down the
old historic order over a large region of Europe, its next political conse-
quences were like the tidal wave which sometimes follows earthquake to
engulf the ruins. Empires, dynasties, ascendencies, which had seemed to
stand firm as the hills, vanished like dissolving views in the last wild weeks
of 1918. A few months before, the Tsar, the Tsaritsa, their children, and
their few faithful attendants, had been taken into a back room where in
the night they were all murdered together by Bolshevist revolvers. Now
the Hohenzollems and the Habsburgs, after all their centuries, were de-
throned and gone like the Romanovs, though by a less fearful fate. Austria-
Hungary had broken up into fragments, but with unfixed frontiers the sepa-
rate national states were still seething amongst themselves. There was no
longer a Kaiser in Germany. William II had abdicated; but no touch of
tragedy or great demeanour dignified his fall, and with entire commonplace
he sought refuge in Holland. The revolution in Berlin triumphed in a day,
and at first looked like an unpromising mixture of theatricality and Bol-
shevism. The bourgeoisie, unused imder the Hohenzollern system to indi-
vidual initiative, was helpless. The steady Socialist leader, Ebert, became
head of the State, and, in effect, the German Republic had been established.
Whether it would go the way of Russia in a next revolution was still the
question. The Russian anarchy reached to the shores of the Pacific Ocean.
And still we must extend our view to conceive the picture of the world. In
China, since the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the novel watchwords of liberty
and republicanism had become the recipes for bankruptcy, disintegration,
civil war and chaos. India, agitated by new dreams, would fall into the
same plight or worse, if the great British plan of gradual and orderly tran-
sition towards cohesive self-government were to be jeopardised by extremist
demands. Everywhere, European democracies with the Socialist and
Labour parties were heaving with unrest and threatening industrial dis-
location, unless visions were fulfilled which the condition of the world after
the war made it impossible to satisfy. Ireland notably, with the exception
of a small but solid comer in Protestant Ulster, was moving rapidly towards
full revolution. In continental Europe, the rise of many new nations from
the ruins of the old ascendencies, redeemed the general confusion by a
promise of creative romance. The resurrection of Poland was the miracle
of Lazarus.
These brighter suggestions were minor traits. Amongst victors and van-
quished alike, the World War, in less than five years, had wrought more
ravage and destruction than had been caused by all the previous wars of
102
J. L GARVIN
103
Europe for a thousand. The desolation of human hearts and homes was a
tale of sorrows beyond compute. Many millions of men had perished in
the struggle. More millions of survivors were maimed. Amongst yet more
millions of the civilian populations, hardships and disease had either ex-
tinguished existence or sapped body and soul. The children of many coun-
tries were an enfeebled generation, saddened before their time, and growing
up in an untrustful mood which has yet to set its mark upon the future.
With the spread of death we must note the prevention of life. In Germany
alone the mortality from battle and blockade together was estimated at
2,500,000 souls. But owing to the separation of the sexes when the men
went to fight, the deficiency of births, through the war and after, was at
least 3,500,000. The human mind can no more realise the extent of death
and pain and loss resulting directly and indirectly from the World War,
than it can attain to any real imaginative grasp of astronomical figures.
As for economics, nearly all Europe was wrecked by the war of exhaus-
tion. In this field there could be no victory for the victors. There, “ peace
without victory ” — to adapt the Wilsonian phrase which wounded the Allies
in their hours of darkest adversity and most settled resolution — was in
fact their comfortless portion. lYance had her devastated departments.
The livelihood of industrial and maritime Britain was more fundamentally
attacked by impoverishment and dislocation throughout the world markets.
Even that strong island which had risked financial and commercial ruin
to win the war, was left with crushing taxation and restricted trade.
In continental Europe, but especially in the centre and the east, machin-
ery was largely worn out by war-production; owing to the shortage of roll-
ing-stock even more than the state of the tracks, the conditions of transport
were worse in Europe than had been known since railways were introduced;
everywhere the agricultural yield of the earth was diminished for want of
labour and nourishment of the soil. For years before the war the growth of
consuming cities throughout the world had outstripped the production of
its harvest-fields. Now, in continental Europe, that disparity was stark as
never before. The food-shortage might be the asset of Bolshevism. The
armies were coming home. How was peace-employment to be found a gain
for them in the more industrial countries of Europe? The nations that lived
mainly by the soil were relatively safe. Was the whole development of the
industrial countries of Europe throughout the machine-age a gigantic mis-
take? The former economic interdependence of the nations of the world,
their unconscious promotion of universal prosperity by mutual service, had
come to chaos. These were the contrasting conditions of dull human misery,
economic disablement and violent political upheaval amongst mankind in
Europe, between the end of the war and the assembly of the Peace Con-
ference which was expected to bring order out of chaos.
PBB!SD>I!NT WILSON AND AMEBICA — EUBOPE EXPECTS THE NEW TtrwaaftTT — •the
SHADOW BEHIND HIM
America was more dominant than any nation in modem times had ever
been by comparison with the rest. Her President was expected to be the
real arbiter of the world and chief architect, not only of a moderate and
reconciling peace, but of the federation of the world. These were still days
when on both sides of the Atlantic the old men saw visions and the young men
dreamed dreams. All former wars in histo^ had prepared new wars. After
Armageddon, with its vast shambles and immeasurable woe, it geemod im-
possible that the nations, with the United States at their Wd, would fail
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
104
to devise and construct such a new world-polity as by its consultative, its
judicial institutions, and the reserved strength of the overwhelming majority
of its members, might substitute peaceful processes of enquiry and award
for the ancient arbitrament of war. As advocate of this supreme conception
the President of the United States stood out. Morally, at the close of the war
he was the President not only of the United States — but of the vast mass
of suffering and longing mankind. Mr. Wilson at that hour was conspicuous
above all other men. By comparison, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Foch,
seemed of minor account. The vanquished nations looked to Mr. Wilson
with credulous hope, and the Allies in Europe expected his advent with more
than a little dread. Europe in general was innocent respecting knowledge
of the inwardness of American politics. It assumed, as a matter of course,
that any American President appearing in Europe must represent the mind
and might of the American people. Mr. Wilson, a master of general prin-
ciples and verbal proclamation, had shown himself possessed of more potent
qualities than these. A thorough war-leader when once in it, he had
mobilised America with all the tremendous executive strength latent in the
presidential office. Assured, despite all his faults, of a high place for ever
in world-history, he was far below Washington and Lincoln in sagacious
procedure, grasp of detail, and, as Elihu Root remarked, in human persua-
siveness. A lofty and noble idealist in international affairs, he was in
domestic politics an inexorable party leader.
For the world outside the United States during that apocalyptic year of
1918, Mr. Wilson was above all the man of the Fourteen Points. They were
thought to be Americans Points. They were not of equal moral value, or
equally adaptable to practice Yet the majority of mankind believed that,
somewhat reduced, they might furnish enough to form what may be called a
working Decalogue for the better ordering of international affairs. He had
demanded the new system of justice and security in his epoch-making speech
of January 8. His ideas may be shortly stated. They fell into distinct groups.
He demanded: (I) abolition of secret diplomacy and secret treaties; (II),
freedom of the seas in war as in peace; (III), the largest practicable extension
of free trade; (IV), reduction of national armaments “to the lowest point
consistent with domestic safety (V), an unselfish adjustment of all colonial
claims and with special regard to the interests of the native populations. The
next group (VI-XIII), demanded good-will towards Russia and the evsacuation
of its territories; the absolute freedom of Belgium; the restoration to
France of Alsace-Lorraine; the completion of Italian union by addition of
the Italian-speaking provinces imder Habsburg rule; self-government for
all the peoples of Austria-Hungary “ whose place among the nations we
wish to see safeguarded and assured liberty for the Balkan States, and
especially free access to the sea for Serbia; an Ottoman Empire confined to
its Turkish portions, the Dardanelles to be permanently opened; the inde-
pendence of Poland, composed of “ indisputably Polish-speaking popula-
tions,” and with free access to the sea. The final Point (XIV) demanded
“ a general association of nations.”
There was here matter enough for interminable argument and differences
of interpretation. Some of the conditions were impossible to reconcile with
others. There was no real apprehension here of the facts concerning Europe
and Asiatic Turkey, of their endless complications — geo^aphical and
economic, as well as historical and racial. Not one of the Allies, after their
fearful sacrifices; not one of the new nations rising like Poland from the
dead; proposed to be content with what Mr. Wilson contemplated for them.
He would have to reckon not with European Governments, but with their
peoples. Nowhere in this tangle could rigid principle cut like a knife to
J. L. GARVIN
106
make clean and sound solutions. The races themselves were too intermixed.
Nothing but wise compromises based on thorou^ knowledge could bring a
resettlement both stable as a practical basis for future peace and in itself
approximately just. France under Clemenceau and Foch looked for much
more than the return of Alsace-Lorrame. Italy wanted much more in the
Adriatic than the full reunion of her own race could give her. As for ‘‘ the
freedom of the seas/’ Britain thought that at a staggering price she had
saved it. The weakening of her maritime arm in war would give every kind
of unfair advantage to militarism on land.
All these difficulties, however, might have worked out to better issues,
but that Mr. Wilson’s power at its hei^t received a fatal and self-inflicted
blow. In his war-management, the President had included some eminent Re-
publicans. In the Congressional elections of November, 1918, he appealed as
a strict party man against the Republicans, bitterly alienating at the least
nearly half America — it might even prove more than half. The United
States was politically split from top to bottom. Mr. Wilson’s action would
have been impossible in Europe, where national Governments had been
formed and party-method was for the time superseded. When the President
himself decided to go to Europe without equipping himself with the assistance
of eminent Republican leaders, he had ceased unhappily to be the assured
spokesman of a solid America. But it was long before Europe realised this.
In France, in Britain, in Italy, he was received with boundless enthusiasm
like a political Messiah, and his progress from nation to nation was a per-
sonal triumph such as no mortal had known before. At the same time Mr.
Lloyd George had made his own equivalent mistake. In his disastrous British
elections he had excited visions of immeasurable indemnities, and it must be
remembered that serious financiers shared his error The French people under
M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch were bent on trenchant retribution and
drastic precautions, as well as on immense monetary compensation. In
those strange weeks of imaginative tumult and vengeful emotion, when
release from the tension of the war borne with heroic stoicism had come at
last, there was fever in the blood of all the Allied peoples and emancipated
nations. There was a madness in the air. The World War had been an
unexampled tragedy of its kind. Its moral sequel was to be another.
THE PAEIS CONFERENCE — THE TRAGEDY OF THE PEACE BEGINS
In these circumstances the Peace Conference met at Paris, and under
the Presidency of M. Georges Clemenceau, it was solemnly opened on
January 18, 1919, at the Quai d’Orsay. Its main proceedings lasted five
months, and the subsidiary proceedings were not finished in two years.
No attempt can be made in these pages to describe the personalities of this
extraordinary conclave, or to track them through the endless labyrinth of
their dealings. Envoys of all known peoples crossed each other in a multi-
coloured, polyglot medley; and for this large business of refashioning the
world, politics were discussed in fashionable hotels as in the coffee-houses
of the East. No other way was possible. Each leading statesman was
accompanied by a swarm of experts. For dealing with the political,
economic, and geographical details, the British delegation, for instance, was
very powerful. The French were necessarily at more advantage than the
rest because the Conference was held in their own capital and atmosphere;
and the Paris press was of notable importance. Mr. Wilson relied less
upon his able staff and more upon himself. In externals the three dominating
figures were the American President, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George.
PEACE WITHOXJT SETTLEMENT
106
When they were agreed they were a ruling triumvirate. They were, how-
ever, three men in a hurry, desiring to get mam things settled as soon as
possible and to return to their domestic problems. Though representing a
smaller country, M. Venizelos was a statesman fully equal to any of the
Great Three, and he had a searching influence. Delegates of other small
or new nations — Poland especially did not mean to rank amongst the
small — worked with devoted persistency and skill.
The method of the Conference was unavoidably fatal to the first of the
Fourteen Points, for the work could only be done by secret diplomacy ”
of an unprecedented extent and intricacy. The Council of Four — when
Italy participated with the United States, France, and Britain — was recog-
nised as the chief organ of the Conference. No official report of its discus-
sions was published. We only know its proceedings from the invaluable
indiscretions published in many private memoirs. Vital issues were some-
times dealt with in private meetings apparently informal. In fact the
Conference never met in plenary session except to register decisions already
taken. In this way the enormous text of the Treaty of Versailles was
worked out piece-meal and disconnectedly, item by item; and until the
clauses were put together and all the defects, which had seemed small
separately, were seen in accumulation, two at least of the chief statesmen
who had made the Treaty did not know what it was like. They had not
meant to do what they had done. This part of the tragedy was( inherent
in the magnitude and maze of their task, coupled with the fact that they
had not sufficient time for a constructive work the greatest, most fateful of
its kind ever attempted in the world; while also every statesman had been
compelled to give up some principles or purpose to save others.
LEAGUE AND COVENANT — THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER
Mr. Wilson played the part of a moral giant during the first weeks in
the struggle for his greatest distinctive principle before he became lost in
the jungle of Old World circumstances, where he required a much deeper
and more discriminating knowledge than he possessed. He insisted that
the creation of the League of Nations must come first, and that it must be
established as an integral part of the whole Treaty, not by a separate
instrument. The struggle opened before the Conference met and was an
intense drama in itself. The American President knew well that if he did
not force the acceptance of the League at the outset he would never get it.
The British believed with him, that western civilisation must perish if a
supreme attempt were not made to abolish the old arbitrament of war
and to replace it by a new peace system. The British alone were in full
support of the President’s principle and took the chief part in hammering
out the plan; but even they, for the most part, were not convinced of the
wisdom of giving instant priority to the creation of the League. All dis-
tracted Europe was impatient to grapple with its immediate affairs. M.
Clemenceau, a master of the older realism, was not in love with the new
vision, and thought like France in general, that lasting peace would be
more efficiently secured if Germany were so dealt with as to be harmless
for the future. President Wilson had his way, and in the Hotel Crillon
the League of Nations, after heavy travail, came to birth. The draft
Covenant was presented to the Conference in the famous plenary sitting of
February 14. If the sequel went well, this adoption of a world constitution
for the prevention of war and the peaceful regulation of disputes, might
be the highest political achievement that civilisation had yet known. The
J. L. GARVIN
107
i3ea went back for centuries. It never had an abler advocate than William
Penn, when more than two centuries earlier he hoped to make Pennsylvania
a model for mankind. Now, an American President seemed to have wrought
the miracle, realising in fact the dream of ages.
In its final form the Covenant consisted of 26 articles. The members
of the League swore not indeed to abjure war imconditionally — and this
was a flaw — but at least to subject all disputes in the first case to peaceful
intervention and delay. They engaged to reduce “national armaments to
the lowest point consistent with national safety,^' and “ they pledged them-
selves to the enforcement by common action of international obligations.’’
Any member or members of the League resorting to war-like action in the
first instance, or refusing after arbitration to accept the award peacefully,
would be immediately subjected by the rest to the severance of all trade
or financial relations,” and afterwards at need to armed compulsion. By
Article X, afterwards the centre of political conflict in the United States,
the associated nations mutually guaranteed the integritv of their territories.
An International Labour Office was to promote more humane industrial con-
ditions throughout the world The governing bodies of the Leaerue were to
be as follows. First,^ a small Council controlled bv the chief Powers and
embodying the directing brain and will of the League; secondly, a larger
Assembly including representatives of all the associated nations;
thirdly, a permanent Secretariat. All this would involve an elaborate or-
ganisation of administrative offices, and therefore a fixed seat or capital for
the new world-system. That capital was to be Geneva. Finally a perma-
nent Court of Justice, competent to hear and determine international disputes,
would be established.
From a practical point of view, some of these articles were open to
criticism. The whole was evidently capable of improvement. It was the
work, and largely the hastv work, of human hands. The Covenant ought
never to have been regarded by anyone as a sacred ordinance almost divinely
a ^ which nothing could be taken and to which nothing need be
added. Some articles were not adequate for the establishment of lasting
peace. Others not fully relevant to that main purpose, though excellent
in themselTCs, were a weakness where simplicity and concentration were
required. But the Covenant none the less was a magnificent conception.
Unless returning wars and anarchies are surelv to destrov civilisation, and
especially white civilisation, the world in general must return to this supreme
mea though with large structural modifications of the plan. President
Wilson was to give up much indeed of what he had stood for, his limitations
were to become more marked; but so far he was immortal in attempt, how-
ever unprosperous in personal fortunes, since the broad idealist in inter-
national affairs had become the narrower party-man in domestic politics and
rent America.
j architecture of the League as thus drawn was majestic. The pro-
found defects were in the foundations. Still more in the disastrous departure
from the real moral inspiration of the project. The chief aim of the League
as urged by its most whole-hearted advocates during the war, had been,
above everything, the inclusion of all the belligerents, the reconciliation of
victors and vanquished. This was the one essential. Now, both Germany
and Russia were left out, and together they numbered 200,000,000 of white
people. It was idle to think that the adhesion of China and Liberia could
comp^sate, or that with such an omission, the basis of the League could
be sufficiently broad and solid. Above all, the great gesture of reconciliation
was lacking. Mr. Wilson, by not insisting at least upon the immediate in-
clusion of defeated Germany, had consented to lose the spiritual magic
108 PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
required for the life of his idealism. He had created the formal mechanism
of a League of Nations but he had not breathed into it that soul to which
he and many had originally aspired. Now all depended upon the American
people. If the United States adhered, all the defects in the initial system
of the League might be remedied. If the United States withdrew, while
Germany and Russia were excluded, then despite the Covenant, nothing would
remain in substance but a half League devoid of the moral and practical
authority required for the sound restoration of Europe and for the security
of future peace.
THE VICTORS AND THE SPOILS — PENAL FINANCE — THE NEW FRANCE AND THE
RHINE FRONTIER
The Paris Conference went on with its other work of assessing financial
indemnities and redistributing amongst the Allies and the new nations large
tracts of Europe and the further world. The barest summary of the results
must suffice. As to the financial question, the general view was, of course,
that Germany must pay to the last farthing for all the destruction she had
wrought. But against the plain sense of the Armistice terms, which had
required full compensation for all damage inflicted by Germany upon civilian
interests, military pensions and allowances of the Allied countries were
charged to Germany's account. In all this part of it, British statesmen were
as culpable as the French. Their ideas of what Germany could pay, and
therefore ought to pay, were still illimitable. The American President
struggled alone in this matter. It would liave been better had he disrupted
the Conference rather than give way, but under the pressure brought to
bear upon him, and consequently upon his paramount desire to save his
League of Nations, he yielded. Germany’s liability was loosely estimated at
the incredible sum of over £11,000,000,000 or over 50,000,000,000 dollars. It
was at least four times too much from the standpoint of practical possibility.
On such terms, Germany in 100 years would not be free from colossal tribute;
her unborn generations would be economic serfs. Many British as well as
American experts protested in vain against the iniquity and fatuity of
these proposals. The natural French desire was to extract the utmost that
could possibly be obtained in the years immediately succeeding, yet to
prevent final quittance, and to keep Germany in a state of financial sub-
jection for time indefinite, dissolving its political unitv if possible. Upon
French imagination the destruction wrought with blind ruthlessness by
German militarism in the invaded departments had made an overpowering
impression. The vehemence of the French reaction in victory was human
and intelligible. Mr. Lloyd George for other reasons was deeply committed
to the wrong course. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that Mr. Wilson
ought to have resisted at any cost and sternly asserted a moderating in-
fluence in the name of America. The indemnities demanded from Austria-
Hungary and Bulgaria were equally impossible. The financial arrangements
of the Paris treaties tended to destroy the very means of stable resettlement
in Europe.
While the financial articles were so largely cloud-castles, the more con-
crete work of redistributing territory and fixing frontiers was on a scale
unknown before the twentieth century. It is idle to blame, as is often
done, the Secret Treaties which fettered the Allies before they came into
court. The worst features of the settlement had nothing to do with Secret
Treaties. The open appetites were the real force. All the great European
Allies, and still more, the newly liberated peoples, meant to claim the
J. L. GARVIN
109
utmost in any case. The claims of France came first and they were of a
character which dismayed the representatives of both the English-speaking
Powers. They had not understood her position. She demanded ironclad
securities for the future even more firmly than ample reparation for the
past. In return for the grave, though temporary, destruction of her mines
in the north, she claimed the Saar coal basin, a small but most valuable
area next her frontier, inhabited by a purely German population. In the
end, France acquired all the coal mines of the Saar as her entire and
absolute property, and practically — though in the name of the League —
the possession and Government of the district for at least 15 years. The
acquisition was worth more than any German colony. This was realism
of the old stamp, not reconciling idealism of a new order. It was repugnant
to Mr. Wilson and by itself nearly led to a rupture. Alsace-Lorraine al-
ready regained by the Armistice, was, in industrial development and equip-
ment, incomparably richer than when these provinces were lost in 1870.
But also under the Armistice, Foch was already in full military command
of the Rhine, and there he and France wished permanently to stay. They
would not accept the League as sufficient security, but insisted that the
whole Rhineland must be separated from the Reich and made into one or
more buffer states. For this there were strong military arguments. But
no moral arguments. It would mean infiicting on Germany a dismember-
ment ten times worse than was inflicted on France in 1870. The Trium-
virate was consequently tom by a long and embittered struggle in which
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were together against M. Clemenceau.
After three months of tension, threatening a split, compromise was reached.
The American President and the British Premier met the demand for
security by promising France a joint military guarantee against all unpro-
voked aggression. Britain’s consent to this liability was dependent on rati-
fication by the United States. In any case, military occupation of the Rhine-
land and the line of its river was to run for at least 15 years. French
control might be indefinitely prolonged, owing to the simultaneous imposition
on Germany of financial obligations impossible to fulfil. For the future of
peace, reconciliation, and disarmament in Europe, nothing could be less
reassuring. Though the German people were to be totally disarmed, retain-
ing only relatively insignificant forces for domestic security, France could
only hold her position on the Rhine by remaining armed to the teeth. Her
new Protectorate in Syria, however, realised a dream going back to the
Crusades, and she was assured of extensions of territory in the tropical part
of her immense colonial empire in Africa. Three years after Verdun, France
had reached a result splendid beyond all imagination before the World War.
She had emerged from it as once more, and past comparison, the dominant
Power in Europe. By German disarmament she was relatively even stronger
in a military sense than in the days of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Her
debts were enormous, and her financial management unsound. Taxation was
not severely faced and undertaken in the British way. Her chief danger was
her declining birth-rate, which had more and more to be made good, on the
military side, by bringing African levies to Europe.
THE COLONIAL LIQUIDATION — BRITAIN'S OUTLOOE
Long before, the entire colonial empire of Germany had been taken
away in the World War itself, though Lettow-Vorbeck^s long struggle in East
Africa had been a shining feat of arms. A large part of these territories
was divided between the British self-governing Dominions. These had played
110
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
a remarkable part in the war. Asserting — except Canada — little Monroe
doctrines of their own, they each obtained such former German possessions
as lay nearest. The South African Union was thus enlarged. Australia
expanded in New Guinea. New Zealand was established in Samoa, The
mother-country, Great Britain, whose combined naval, military and finan-
cial effort in the war had been prodigious, received German East Africa,
now Kenya; Nauru island with its phosphates; mandates over Mesopotamia
and Palestine. These gains looked broad on the map. Over the large
additions to the Dominions, more than ever self-governing, Great Britain had
no control whatever, either political or commercial. Mesopotamia was held
in order to establish Arab self-government, and Palestine for the romantic
but difficult purposes of Zionism. As reparation for the submarine cam-
paign, Germany was to surrender her merchant ships ; but while this replaced
losses, it was in other ways a very temporary gain owing to the rapid
German construction of new mercantile tonnage. Though the German navy
was to be surrendered, British supremacy at sea could not be after the war
what it had been for two centuries before The great rise of the American
fleet meant at least a permanent equality in naval power for all purposes
of world-policy. The British preferred this rather than accept, formally,
so disabling a doctrine as Mr Wilson’s original interpretation of “ freedom
of the seas.” The world-markets, on which industrial Britain depended
far more than any other country, were dislocated far and wide, while her
load of taxation was unparallelled. For the moment the general organisation
of the British Empire was somewhat relaxed rather than reinforced — it
had become indeed within itself a League of Nations indefinitely associated
— while the mother-country was weakened rather than strengthened by
comparison with its European Allies. None the less, in material resources,
patient vigour, and wise tradition, it was a very great nation; its instinctive
faith in the future was unswerving; and it excelled in the commonplace
virtue of being determined to pay its way.
NEW NATIONS — NEW ASCENDENCIES
Other main results of the Peace Conference must be more rapidly touched.
Belgium received modest additions of Walloon-speaking districts taken from
Germany, and emancipated from former restrictions imposed by her neu-
trality, she was free to enter practically into Alliance with Prance, whose
policy towards Germany commanded the entire assent of the Belgian Govern-
ment. Greater Italy, extended beyond her racial limits by annexing con-
siderable numbers of Germans and Slavs, had secured the strongest of
Alpine bulwarks instead of her former overlooked frontiers. On the Adriatic
she not only included Trieste, but reached to Fiume. With this fell another
of the Fourteen Points, and indeed more than one Especially desiring that
Fiume should be a free city and assured outlet for Yugoslavia and the
countries behind it. President Wilson struggled hard against several Italian
claims, and at last issued a public denunciation. The Italian delegates
quitted the Conference for some days, and Mr. Wilson, so shortly after his
triumphal reception in Rome, was now execrated by the Italians though
hymned the more by the Croats and Serbs. In the ill-starred interval of
Italian absence, the other allies allowed Greece to supplant Italian claim in
Asia Minor, and Greece was thus encouraged into ruinous adventures starting
from Smyrna as a base. Where the Habsburg Empire had vanished from the
map, and in the neighbouring Balkan region, appeared new or greatly en-
larged states — Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the far-reaching
J. L. GARVIN
111
Greece of precarious configuration. None of these were homogeneous national
states, but included large subject-minorities or other dissatisfied elements.
As defeated countries, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria alike were diminished
and restricted with merciless surgery. While these Christian ex-enemies were
so dealt with, the Moslem ex-enemy had better fortune. As we shall see in
the exciting sequel, the Turks escaped the intentions of the Conference.
Elsewhere Russia’s former Baltic provinces became a series of indepen-
dent states — Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania. This had the ominous
effect of thrusting the Russian people further away from their sea-outlets
on the Baltic than for 200 years, since Peter the Great. But a problem
far graver still was created by the character of the new Poland. It was
restored not on racial principles as a genuinely national state, but on
historic principles as an empire depending like the late Habsburg system
upon ascendency over a mass of discordant minorities — Jews, Germans,
Lithuanians, White Russians, Ruthenians, — amounting probably, though
statistics are still imperfect, to much more than a third of the entire popu-
lation of the new medley state. By such means, this Poland in numbers
was brought up to about 28,000,000 of people; but its basis was rubble not
solid. Although it broke through to the sea at Danzig so as to divide East
Prussia, toughest of German provinces, from the rest of Germany; and al-
though to the eastward it projected into wide territories naturally belonging
to their Russian majorities, its future was certain to be threatened by this
inordinate extension. The new Polish empire possessed all the weaknesses
which in the eighteenth century brought about the downfall of the old Polish
empire. It was soon to appear that no other nation whatever would be
willing to guarantee these unjustified and hazardous frontiers; that these
in the long run would have to be reduced if Poland proper were to stand
safe. In all these arrangements, the interests of Russia were ignored and
her consent dispensed with, though without the heaped sacrifices of the
Russian people for three years, none of the revived and transformed states
could have existed, because no sufficient victory for the Allies could have
been won. This was a sardonic stroke of historic irony felt with equal bitter-
ness by Russian Nationalists and Bolshevists alike.
THE CRUSHING OF GERMANY — V.AIN STRUGGLES — LAST SCENE IN THE WAT.t.
OF MIRRORS
We must now return to the central problem, that of Germany, before
we can sum up the results of the Peace Conference. The summed crimes of
the former German war-lords, supported by the agricultural junkers, the
industrial magnates, the belligerent professors, against the peoples tliey had
assailed, were a nightmare of guilt. Had they won, they would have been
worse than the Allies in ordaining dismemberment, political enslavement,
and financial extortion. This must be remembered. Retribution was not
visited on the persons and p^roperty of the guilty — those who were the
hereditary servants and intelligent agents of the Hohenzollem war-system
with its elaborate creed of force, cruelty, ruthless compulsion and pitiless
suppression. These sins had resulted from an essentially despotic system;
from a dynastic legend, saving in its origins, but blindly exalted in the
twentieth century to a Byzantine superstition, obsolete yet infatuated
Again, these sins had resulted from that distortion of sound patriotism which
made Germanic nationalism and racialism the exaggerated subjects of
idolatrous worship; from the strange decline and enfeeblement of the critical
vigour of moral thought, simultaneously witii an intoxicating ascent in every
112
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
kind of material success and technical achievement. The mass of Ger-
mans, imphcitly accepting after their general manner the system prepared
for Ihem — even Socialists, however vehement in theory, were for the most
part docile in practice — were ticketed and obedient items from their birth,
atoms of the hereditary, automatic system. Upon the non-responsible or
semi-responsible mass of the German people there now fell a vengeance as
when Rome dealt finally with Carthage.
The surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France, North Schleswig to Den-
mark, most of Posen to the Poles, were just and inevitable penalties. But
the Saar, with its coal-fields and purely German population, was gone as
well as the Lorraine iron-fields. On the other side, in the mixed districts,
Germans in masses were uniformly handed over to Polish rule without any
kind of balancing inclusion of Poles in Germany or elsewhere. East and
West Prussia were wrenched apart; and this, as a practical thing, was like
driving a foreign wedge between New York and Pennsylvania. Upper
Silesia, as a result of the Peace Conference, was to be tom away though
historically and naturally it was to Germany what Alsace was to France;
while industrially it was as important to Germany as Pennsylvania to the
United States. Let us try to sum up. Politically Germany proper — apart
from its abolished ascendency over the non-Germanic fnnges wrongfully
occupied — was mutilated on every side as none of the larger races, white,
yellow, or brown, had been for generations. The French occupation of
the Rhine was morally the same as a German occupation of the Seine.
Economically, Germany’s industrial and mineral resources were reduced in
more drastic proportion than her proper racial territory was diminished.
Commercially, her colonies and other overseas assets, as well as her mer-
chant shipping, were swept away. Financially, the initial propositions of
the Peace Conference would doom her to irredeemable serfdom for a century.
Defensively, the country was laid prostrate, totally disarmed by land, sea,
and air amongst weaponed neighbours. The army of what had been the
greatest military nation ever known was annihilated; the fieet of what had
been the second greatest naval power had ceased to exist; fighting aircraft
were wholly suppressed in the country where Count Zeppelin’s achievements
in air-navigation a few years before had given more vivid colour to the
fatal mirage of universal supremacy. On the part of the Allies it was in
the total an Asiatic vengeance — a stultification and a mockery of all that
President Wilson had proclaimed in the name of America; of all that the
responsible statesmen of the European Allies had averred in the day of
adversity; of all that wise and far-seeing minds throughout the world had
urged during the war.
On May 7, 1919, the draft treaty was handed to the German delegates.
Their chief. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, made a bold and moving defence.
Though “ under no delusions as to the extent of our defeat and the degree
of our helplessness,” he and his colleagues made able criticisms while present-
ing elaborate counter-propositions. 'Their efforts were marred by a certain
undertone of useless defiance, and by such stubborn fatuities as the request
that the future of Alsace-Lorraine should be submitted to plebiscite and
that the Allied armies on German territory should be withdrawn within six
months. Nevertheless, there were now fresh dissensions amongst the Allied
statesmen. Mr. Lloyd George became the chief spokesman for moderating
the terms. He notably secured a plebiscite for Upper Silesia. Mr. Wilson
at this supremely critical juncture did not stand out in the controversy and
dominate it as his public declarations had led both high idealists and saga-
cious moderates in Europe to expect. They were dismayed. The President,
however, like many others, believed that all the faults of the Treaty could
G (/!.».
J. L. GARVIN
113
be gradually remedied through the League of Nations if America adhered to
it. But above all, his physical and mental energies were no longer what
they had been. The final arbiter of the war was to be the chief personal
victim of the peace. Summoned to sign, the Germans struggled vainly in
the toils. Nothing could mitigate their doom. They were still under the
sea-blockade, and the regretted chance for a last fight at any risk under
Hindenburg and Ludendorff was long gone. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau had
resigned, but his place had to be filled, and the German delegates set their
hands and seals to the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919. The) date
was the anniversary of the Serajevo murders five years before. The place
was that Hall of Mirrors at Versailles where, nearly 50 years before, the
Hohenzollern Empire had been proclaimed. How often since, and with an
arrogance how grandiose, had German court-painters depicted the scene of
1871 as an apotheosis of Germanic strength, shown tall and superior in
physical type, firm-standing in jack-boots and splendid with military stars.
Once more in history, but never perhaps with a grandeur so strange, almost
so mysteriouSj the wheel of Fate had come full circle:
“ The gods alone remember everlastingly ; they strike
Remorselessly, and ever like for like*
By their great memories the gods are known "
At each turn the gods allow vengeance; but they do not forgive it. The
fuiure of the world and its peoples, between 30 and 50 years hence, is not
to be read; but it is certain that what the Germans forgot in 1871, the
Allies did not remember at the end of June, 1919.
OTHER TREATIES AND PUNISHMENTS
A few days before, the Germans had suddenly sunk their warships
assembled for surrender at Scapa Flow. It must be admitted that they were
still contributing to the aggravation of their own tragedy, for they had given
no convincing sign that it was safe to be tender to them. Subsidiary instru-
ments can only receive passing mention. To complete them all and to secure
acceptance required the rest of 1919 and the larger part of 1920 — when
the interest of the general world had long been dulled or extinguished. The
bargainers for what was left of the spoil, remained to settle details quite in
the spirit, though not in the costume, of the bewigged, bepowdered, and be-
ribboned, but likewise avaricious and acute old eighteenth-century diplomatists
satirised by Carlyle. Even the professionals were wearied; public conscience
was dead ; in the end President Wilson's Fourteen Points,” his “ Four Prin-
ciples,” his “ Five Particulars ” had about as much influence upon the terri-
torial and financial settlements as the Sermon on the Mount and other
detailed formulations of Christian ethics exercise upon average conduct.
Morally, the peace of exhaustion had followed the war of exhaustion.
By the Treaty of St. Germain (September 10, 1919), Austria was dimin-
ished to the utmost, and her ancient Imperial metropolis, Vienna, was left
like a Rant's head on a dwarf’s body. By the Treaty of Neuilly (November
27, 1919) , Bulgaria was as inexorably disarmed and retrenched, deprived of
large sections of her proper population and thrust away from the Aegean shores.
By the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) Hungary, the proud kingdom of
many centuries, was not only shorn of the subject-lands where tough Magyar
minorities had wielded an oppressive ascendency, but elsewhere large num-
bers of one of the most distinctive of races were transferred, on strategical
T. B. T. — VCMU I — 8
114
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
and commercial principles, to alien rule. Finally by the Treaty of Sfevres
(August 10, 1920) the Allies intended to treat the Turks, even in their
Asiatic homeland, to a mutilation still more comprehensive; but Ibis docu-
ment by unlucky name and destiny was the “ Porcelain Treaty,” and what
happened to it we shall presently see. All five treaties, fastened on the
belligerents who had succumbed, carried to an extreme the ancient principle
of “ woe to the vanquished.” None of them was superior in ethics, mercy, or
wisdom to the compacts exacted by acquisitive statecraft after the older
wars. None of them embodied President Wilson’s original ideal of equal
and disinterested justice as between victors and vanquished. It could be
said with little exaggeration by bitter moralists that the Fourteen Points
had become the Fourteen Disappointments; yet the tragedy was, that witii-
out the power of America, terms so lacerating, so ill-boding for the future,
could not have been imposed.
HISTOHICAL JUDGMENT AND THE PEACE — NEW LESSONS AND THE OLD ADAM
From the standpoint of historical thought — with such suggestions of
political probability as may be drawn from the recorded experience of man-
kind — due criticism of these results would require a full, calm volume.
Here the shortest attempt at summary must suffice. The resurrections and
deliverances of formerly subject peoples were a gain to the political vitality
of the world, although the new states were mostly inclined to be as oppres-
sive and encroaching towards weaker populations as the vanished military
empires had been towards themselves. Europe, however, was Balkanised —
that is, broken into too many fragments, jarred by violent antipathies Of
irredentist problems like Alsace-Lorraine, more were created than were
solved. As another result, all over continental Europe, territories and posi-
tions acquired by force were only tenable by force. Accordingly, what had
seemed to be the paramount purpose of general disarmament soon proved
to be the briefest of the dreams. The British indeed ceased again to be a
people with a large military organisation, and even their Air Force they pre-
maturely dismantled under the mingled influences of financial pressure and
genuine emotional delusion. On the European side, the vanquished only were
disarmed and could only be held down by the rising armaments of the rest.
The new nations were as protectionist as military. There was a mushroom
growth of their custom houses. More frequent tariff lines and railway inter-
ruptions made travel less convenient and transport less efficient in the new
Europe than in the old. The small states ought to have been organised in
several federal groups when the Peace Conference had the power to do it.
Worst of all, for the next years following the World War, the crude financial
articles of the Treaties would make general economic recovery impossible and
plunge currencies into chaos. In the further future, sooner or later, the ex-
cesses of territorial seizure, the new partitions and mutilations, ascendencies
and subjections, would be the multiplied causes of further wars, unless some
new regulating and adjusting principle could be introduced into the inter-
national connections of the world. Above this turbid flood the League and
the Covenant alone seemed still to gleam like a misted rainbow. Would it
strengthen or fade? That was the intense, all-involving question that re-
mained when the Peace Conference in the summer, after the end of the World
War, had done most of its work. The answer was already in jeopardy.
J. L. GARVIN
115
PBE8IDENT WILSON'B FIGHT AND FAIX — THE “ LAST OF THE PBOPHET8 ” AND
HIS OWN P^PLE — AMEBICA’S WITHDRAWAL — THE CROWNING TRAGEDY
OF THE PEACE
On June 29, 1919, the day following the signature of peace without mercy,
the President sailed for America. More of the world’s political hopes were
embarked with him than had ever accompanied a voyage. The cloudy des-
tinies brooded over it. He earned the Covenant in his hand in the iimate
temper of a new Calvin holding fast the “ Institutes ” of Christian politics.
Last of the prophets, as he had been called, he did not look to suffer the more
frequent fate of prophets by finding himself without honour in his own coun-
try. From the Republican side in the United States anxious warnings had
been sent to European friends reminding them that there was, in the American
Constitution with respect to treaties, a redoubtable proviso called the power
of the Senate. It is a mistake to regard Mr. Wilson as the weak prey of
European subtleties. Nothing could prevent the European Allies, great and
small, with the swarm of their emancipated clients, from having the chief
part in determining their own destinies It is but crude melodrama to rep-
resent Clemcnceau and Lloyd George as Machiavellis of the peace One
was too clenched, the other too fluid; but both had gone through fire and
water to save the peoples from destruction. Mr. Wilson, m his heart, had no
such aflinity with either as might tempt him to be mesmerised; nor w’cre
yielding diffidence or perplexed pliability among the traits of his character.
He depended too much on his own mind and his solitary documented method.
Other influences had prevailed. He could not escape the atmosphere; his
mind could not work as clearly in Paris as in Washington. He was tiring in
body. Again, his acquaintance with the facts, and insight for the psychics,
of Europe and Nearer Asia were far behind his grasp of moral principle; and
this accounted for his consent to some things that at any price he ought to
have withstood. But in the main, amidst desperate complications, he meant
what he did. He made his deliberate choice between what he thought the
lesser evils and those which seemed to him the greater. To secure his central
purpose — the League through which he and many believed that every other
ideal might gradually be realised — he had waived the immediate application
of nearly all the rest of his doctrine. But whether the keystone of his new
world-system held firm or fell, remained still a matter whieh could not
conclusively be determined in Europe, but must depend on the result of his
appeal to the American people.
The ensuing party-struggle in the United States held breathless all the
rest of civilisation. Politically, it was like a battle of the Marne drawn out
for months. To secure American adhesion to the working system of the
League, European supporters would have been willing to modify the Covenant
to any degree and especially to modify Article X so that the United States
without its own free consent could not be called upon to support any forcible
assertion of the authority of the Lea^e. Between America and Europe,
terms of association the least binding in the letter would probably be most
efficacious in the spirit. This was not Mr. Wilson’s temper. As the Presi-
dent himself proved rigid in principle, his opponents became more implacable
in rejection. At the height of this great duel, while Mr. Wilson was still
relying upon his appeals to the people over the Senate, he sank under his
exertions, and when struck down by paralysis in September, 1919 (but not
dying until February 3, 1924) the last chance in the United States for
the League was gone. Another world figure, Theodore Roosevelt, had died
116
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
This map demonstrates the very striking fact that although the greater part of the population of the world has joined the League of
Natio^, the great-er part of its White population has not done so The immense white populations of Russia in Europe and Asia and of
the United States, combined with the white populations of Germany, Turkey, etc , considerably exceed m numl^rs the white populations
of the States which have joined the League
J. L. GARVIN
117
more than eight months before when bis regained predominance on the Re-
publican side had risen so high as to promise to carry him to the Presidency
once more. It was an incalculable loss. Since the successive deaths of Pitt
and Fox in English politics, there had been nothing like this disappearance
of Theodore Roosevelt from life and of Woodrow Wilson from action. On
November 19, 1919, the Treaty and the Lea^e were rejected in the Senate.
Its final vote a few months later made the rejection absolute. No one could
fill Mr. Wilson’s place. The American movement for the League had become
a cause without a leader.
The United States was absorbed in the ^gantic work of changing back
from war organisation to normal peace conditions. Prohibition gave it an-
other engrossing topic of its own, while the admission of women to equal
citizenship as voters changed nothing in the Mississippi roll of political ten-
dency, but, if anything, gave it more breadth and momentum. In the Presi-
dential elections of November, 1920, the Republican party gained overwhelm-
ing triumph by a popular majority of no less than seven million votes. This
in America was a formal climax; in Europe it had the effect of anti-climax.
Many months earlier, the most striving and reconciling minds amongst Euro-
pean advocates of a new system of world peace under the leadership of the
United States had realised that the political battle of the Marne was lost in
America. The one great hope of redeeming the rest of the Treaty by the
Covenant had been dead from the end of 1919. There was no blame upon
America. She had acted within the safeguards of her Constitution. Her
President alone could not pledge her. She was as free to return to her former
isolation as had been the European victors and their clients to resume the old
statecraft of aggrandisement and force, of national and racial egotisms. The
three successive tragedies, the World War itself, the Treaty on which so
many features of Hohenzollemism were imprinted by the Allies, and America’s
withdrawal — these were all inherent in circumstances, many of them long
antecedent to our owm time, for which no one nation was solely responsible
and which no spiritual or intellectual force existing had been able to control.
President Wilson’s last official act was to accompany his successor to the
Capitol on March 4, 1921. He had left a disputable record, but an indelible
name. In the height of his attempt and the depth of his fall there was a
grandeur, full of questioning, to which historic meditation for centuries
will often return. For Europe, as we shall see, the withdrawal of America
from the peace was catastrophic, as America’s entry into the war had seemed
salvation. If the action of the Senate could have been foreseen, some features
of the settlement would have been even worse, but more would have been
better. A more urgent sense of practical prudence would have had the mod-
erating and safeguarding effect that propositions of abstract virtue had
failed to accomplish. The Russian problem would have been taken more
vigorously in hand while there was time, and the smaller States would have
been more restrained. There would have been less tendency to incur present
risks, or indulge various exaggerated claims, in the hope that an effective
League would be the clearing-house of future difficulties. Now, on the one
hand, America’s military power and President Wilson’s ideals together had
brought about a more complete disintegration, and thus more numerous and
virulent antagonisms, than would else have been possible; while on the other
hand the corrective action of a predominant regulating authority could not
now exist. ^ Without the United States, Germany, or Russia — that is, without
the majority of the white race — the League might still be useful for lesser
purposes, but for greater its mainspring was broken. For the Continental
victors there was no resource but armed vigilance or action; and for the van-
118
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
quished none but suppressed hatred. Britain had her long political tradition
of reconciling compromise, reinforced in this case by commercial necessity;
but without America her mediating efforts were to become more and more
ineffective and unpopular. When Mr. Wilson fell, Europe as a whole returned
to the temper of war after the war. Nor by the more fortunate continent
which had parted company, must Europe be too rigidly condemned. She was
re-involved in a web of fate. It was too difficult for average men everywhere
to see how anything but force could be the safeguard of those who had
imposed the treaties, or how anything but the dream of force could be the
comfort of those who had submitted to them.
THE ALLIES AND RUSSIA — DEPRIVATION WITHOUT CONSULTATION — BOLSHEVISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE CIVIL WARS — TOWARDS ECONOMIC SANITY
An overshadowing question in these circumstances was that of Russia.
The larger peril in 1919 and for some time after was that Bolshevism might
spread like a forest fire through the fevered industrial masses of Europe and
especially through its defeated peoples If there was no hope from Washing-
ton, might there be more from Moscow if the desperate price of temporary
anarchy were paid? Now became clear the magnitude of the error committed
when Russia was left out of the paper-settlement. That country with all its
distractions was still twice as large as the United States, and included a
population of some 130,000,000. There could be no real stability nor full
economic recovery in the Old World until Russia was brought back into some
regular system of cooperation and intercourse. Without Russians efforts and
sacrifices, let us remember again, there could have been no victory for the
Allies, not even with Americans aid Russia could have turned the scale
against them all, had she been associated with Germany, by suppl^dng all
the economic resources required to defeat the sea-blockades. It was not only
unwise but unrightful for the Allies to dispose of Russia’s former western ter-
ritories and boundaries without consulting Russia Mr. Lloyd George felt
strongly that representatives of the great and unfortunate ex-Ally should be
included in the Peace Conference, but he received little support, and his
own instincit soon hesitated. Russians, without distinction of party, felt the
bitterness of the fate thus meted out to them by those they had saved; the
result was invaluable to the Bolshevists. It strengthened their regime. Pa-
triotic soldiers and other nationalists began to rally to it.
At the time of the Peace Conference, the Great Three could have done
either of two things. They could have recognised the Soviet Revolution with
all its horrors, or they could have overthrown the Bolshevist regime by prompt
and resolute action. It is agreed that this could have been swiftly effected
by a small, highly equipped inter-Allied army. The Constituent Assembly
suppressed by the Bolshevists would have been restored, and efficient Russian
representation included in the councils of Paris. Neither of these intelligible
courses was taken.
Instead, the Allies adopted and long pursued a futile, yet expensive policy.
They supported and armed the various anti-Bolshevist governments and
armies round the fringes of Russia from the White Sea to the Black Sea and
from the Baltic to the Pacific. This method only mutliplied tragedy. It
nourished chaos for about two years, but ended by making the Bolshevists
supreme from Petrograd to Vladivostock. They held the interior lines. They
crushed their antagonists in detail. They equipped themselves by capture
with much of the munitions that the Allies had supplied. Under Lenin and
J. L. GARVIN
119
Trotsky, they organised and marched with concentrated energy. Their oppo-
nents were annihilated in the field as completely as in the civilian sphere.
The anti-Bolshevists meanwhile were equally devoid of capacity and cohesion.
In political views they were of all stripes and colours as well as “ White.”
Least of all could they agree on the one tiling essential to any chance of
success — an absolute pledge that the peasants would be recognised as owners
of the land they had seized. There was a general feeling in any case that
the success of the Whites,” whatever their professions, would mean reaction.
The Bolshevists restored an iron discipline in their ranks with the old death-
penalty for cowardice and desertion. Soldiers of the Tsarist regime, like
Brussilov and Polivanov, reorganised and led the Red armies. Nationalists
rallied more and more to the Moscow Government against foreign interfer-
ence; in their view, the interests of Russia had been abandoned and betrayed
by the Allies at the Peace Conference. As a result of all this, Yudenich in
the west, on the side of Petrograd; Denikin and the Cossacks in the south,
like Wrangel afterwards; Kolchak in the east; the Archangel force in the
north — all were in turn totally beaten and destroyed. In 1919 the Soviet
State had been assailed from all points of the compass. By the end of 1920
it had already emerged triumphant from the Civil Wars. When Vladivostock
was captured in October, 1921, the Soviet State had completed its firm con-
quest of the whole of the old Russian Empire except the portions taken away
by the separate decisions of the Allies. Internal security was followed, as
we shall see, by a surprising ordinary and reassuring process — the gradual
return to economic sanity. The worst of this most terrible of all political
and social revolutions was over. The Communist dream had perished in the
dance of anarchy; and as individual property for the peasants had in effect
been established throughout the land, the restoration of commercial realism,
even in the towns and factories, was about to begin. To the significance of
this change we must return at another point.
THE RUSSO-POLISH WAR — IMPERIAL POLAND ESTABLISHED — HUNGARIAN AN-
ARCHY AND REACTION — RISE OP THE LITTLE ENTENTE
In dealing with one great factor strongly established on its flank, revolu-
tionary Russia was not merely less successful, but was led into its crudest
blunder by the intoxication of previous success. Between the new Poland and
the new Russia, from the first moment of their contact, the old historic feud
had been revived. The Poles dreaded Bolshevism because nearest to it; but
apart from that, they desired on nationalist grounds to annex large territories
unquestionably Russian; and generally to keep their huge neighbour weak-
ened and divided as much and as long as possible. In the spring of 1920,
while the Soviet State was still embarrassed by civil war, the Poles struck in
and advanced with exhilarating rapidity. In May they captured Kiev, the
capital of what they hoped would be a separate Ukraine. But Kiev is a
holy city in the eyes of Russian patriots, and these, as never before, rallied
to the Bolsheviks. All Russians were at one. In the summer the Poles were
driven out of Kiev, and swept back as rapidly as they had advanced. Beaten
north and south, their own racial territoiy was deeply invaded. In a few
weeks the Russian guns could be heard in East Prussia. The Red troops
northward came nearer still to linking up with Germany. By the middle
of August, the main Bolshevist forces were within a dozen miles of Warsaw
itself. By now the Soviet junta had lost their heads. Thinking themselves
as irresistible in foreign war as in domestic, they had thrown away the op-
120
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
portimity of concluding an advantageous peace. The western Allies were
rushing munitions to the Poles. Foch's lieutenant, General Weygand, was
in command. His counter-attack surprised the Russians at the height of
their hopes. Their rout and the long pursuit were a shattering disaster. By
the final Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921, Warsaw's eastern sway over non-
Polish populations was advanced so far, that Poland became half as large
again as the Allies had intended. A little later, the great industrial province
of Upper Silesia (attached to Germany by older and closer ties than those
which bound Alsace to France) was partitioned in favour of Warsaw. Poland,
between Bolshevist Russia and disarmed Germany, had become by the end
of 1921 what is called a Great Power with a population of 28,000,000 souls,
maintaining the* enormous army of 400,000 troops on a peace footing, and
able to mobilise a million men at the first call for war. Though rich in
natural resources, it was, as we have seen, like the vanished Habsburg sys-
tem — not a racial state but an Imperial power full of mixed elements.
Barely two-thirds of the whole population are Poles proper. This is a bad
basis for an exaggerated superstructure; and it is certain that when Russia's
full strength revives, she will exact a peaceful revision of these arrangements
or challenge another reckoning.
Elsewhere the picture was still less like the ideal of Wilsonian peace. It
seemed for a long time that by the main line of the Danube, the Bolshevist
anarchy would find a better way of penetration into the heart of Europe.
Amongst all peoples as a result of the downfall of the Central Empires, the
gifted, imperious Magyars had become most like the toad under the harrow.
After the crash, hoping like Germany to placate the Allies, they had declared
Hungary a republic, but it was equally in vain. Bela Kun, trained in all
Soviet methods, returned from Moscow to Budapest to play the part of a
Lenin minor. He might be described as a violent caricature of that ruthless
original. In March, 1919, the dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed
in what had been a peculiarly aristocratic State In reality the dictatorship
was that of Bela Kun at the head of a very small but very murderous minority.
Private property and private trade were abolished Houses of the better
class were plundered and their contents removed to State depots. There
were bloody attempts to bring under the communist yoke the obstinate peas-
ants; but these refused to bring their produce to the towns. The Russian
Bolsheviks had been more perspicacious. This terror lasted for nearly five
indescribable months ; and after it was overthrown in August, the Communists
were mercilessly requited in terms of the lessons they had tau^t. It was not
the end of Hungary's agony. Rumania, one of the Allies, invaded it, and
looted it for months until ordered out towards the end of 1919 by the Great
Allies. Nevertheless, in Hungary, the counter-revolutionary middle-classes
had proved well able to crush the dictatorship of the proletariat by a dictator-
ship of their own. A first example of this kind had already been given some
time before in Finland by General Mannerheim and his White Guards. These
were the real beginnings of the Fascist movement which, as we shall see, was
to have wider extensions, suggesting that in all non-Russian Europe, the Bol-
shevik peril had created a temper stronger than its own. It had roused forces
that would fight it to the death and choose, if need be, despotic order against
the Red anarchy. In these more settled circumstances, Hungary entered
amidst harsh difficulties upon the longer struggle for economic recovery. In
the spring of 1920, the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Horthy, became Regent
and still retains that office. The pathetic ex-Emperor Charles made weak
attempts to recover the Crown of St. Stephen. The Magyars could not dare
to receive him, and the Allies exiled him to Madeira, where he died in April,
1922. None the less, the Magyars remain monarchists at heart, and in con-
J. L. GARVIN
121
siderable eympaihy with Fascist Italy under Mussolini. Like Russia, Ger-
many, Lithuania and Bulgaria, Hungary is one of the states which will nev»
willingly accept their present frontiers and, in the end, will probably have
power to change them.
This latter fact was indeed so serious and inevitable that it became the
key in these regions of a remarkable system, formed and led by the ablest
of the new states — Czechoslovakia. In this republic again, as in Poland,
less than two-thirds of the population of some thirteen and a half millions,
belong to the dominant race. Its German minority especially is large and
stubborn. None the less, after its emergence from the World War, Czecho-
slovakia was guided through its first years with masterly skill by its great
president, M. Masaryk, and his trained pupil, Dr. Benes. At the expense of
several other nations, most unlikely to be always content, Czechoslovakia,
Rumania and Yugoslavia had made gains more immediately extensive than
permanently safe. As a method of mutual insurance Dr. Benes, in 1921,
organised these three countries into the famous system of the Little Entente.
It is not so little. The partnership embraces over forty million people with
a fighting power in proportion. It was at once able to ban the restoration of
the Habsburgs to the throne of Hungary. As against the Magyars alone, the
Little Entente is stronger than in any other connection. Its geo^aphical
array is so loose and disadvantageous for common action that against any
counter-alliance of the future its position would not be favourable. Mean-
while, it maintains for some purposes a supplementary agreement with Poland,
whose dubious exaggerated frontiers, however, the others are unwilling to
guarantee. The Little Entente, in addition, works in particular closeness
with France. It gave repeated signs during 1922 and 1923 that it must be
reckoned with for the present by all the larger Powers. Its best work under
the leadership of Prague has been the steady attempt to promote in eastern
Europe the resumption of normal transport and commercial intercourse.
OHXMANY AND PEACE WITH A VENGEANCE — PIGHT AGAINST BOLSHEVISTS AND
MONARCHISTS — THE MODERATE REPUBLIC ESTABLISHED — THE COMMER-
CIAL REVIVAL OF 1921
We must now return to Germany. The circumstances of eastern Europe
have been stated beforehand, so that we may obtain next a clear view of the
main question and its background. We thus touch that portentous problem
— the mortal strug^e between IVance and Germany, Britain vainly inter-
vening — which throughout the five years since the end of the war has become
more and more the dominating and the menacing issue of all world piolitics
and world economics. An unparallelled case in itself, it exceeds in sinister
magnitude and difficulty any international problem existing before the war.
For a thousand years the historic feud between Gaul and Teuton has con-
vulsed Europe, breaking out again and again with alternations of victory and
defeat for each race. Nothing has ever been able to restrain either race at
its moment of triumph, or to convince it that on these terms the slow wheel
of change must always bring a return of disaster. The crowning tragecy at
Paris in 1919 was that the Peace Conference, not attempting any moral solu-
tion of the l^anco-German Question, foimd no practical solution, but instead
gravely aggravated this secular quarrel and prolonged the arbitrament of
force.
For a just understanding of both sides of this argument it is better to
begin with the position of the defeat^. In the course of time, the Germans,
by growth of numbers, had become by far the stronger military people.
J22 peace without SETTLEMENT
capable of annihilating France in any struggle confined to the two countries;
but now after shaking the world, Germany had gone down under battle and
blockade. This time she was not only beaten but paralysed, as between the
French armies on one side, those of Poland and the Little Entente on the
other. Germany by situation is the heart of Europe, and until that organ
beats normally within some conciliatory peace system, there can be no true
health of the whole.
For some time after the war, the doubt was whether Germany, the heart
of Europe, could be saved from Bolshevism, or whether it would pass through
a more terrible experience than that of Hungary. After violent preludes the
Spartacus League in January, 1919, attempted the real Communist insurrec-
tion. It was stamped out in a few days by military force under a Socialist
Minister of Defence, the vigorous Noske. Its leaders, Liebknecht and Rosa
Luxemburg, were murdered after surrender — another example of the temper
that Bolshevism in every country outside Russia was now rousing amongst
its opponents.
"V^ile the Peace Conference was sitting, local Spartacist revolts, after
bloody confiict, were crushed in many parts of Germany. The Weimar As-
sembly established the Republican Constitution with Herr Ebert as its So-
cialist President, but the old name of the “ Reich ” was dear and it was re-
tained. The terms presented by the Allies at Paris were a stupefying blow.
A Socialist Minister like Scheidemann cried amidst passionate applause, “ Let
the hand wither which signs this peace.” But passionate applause was of
no avail against fixed bayonets With hands that dared not wither, the Treaty
of Versailles had to be signed. It came into force in January, 1920. Of the
subsequent endless distractions of German politics, only a few salient points
can be indicated Throughout that year the work of disarming Germany
went on side by side with the struggle to establish a stable social system.
In March a monarchist conspiracy, under Dr Wolfgang Kapp and General
von Luttwitz, carried through a sudden coup d^etat in Berlin. President Ebert
and his Socialist Ministers made their famous appeal to the people against
reaction — Cease work.” In 48 hours the Kapp putsch had been crushed by
a general strike throughout the length and breadth of industrial Germany, but
was especially complete in Berlin itself where the conspiracy was paralysed.
None the less, the atmosphere of excitement and alarm led to new Bol-
shevik risings and raids. The Red forces seized the great industrial district
of the Ruhr, and established a passing terror. It could only be crushed by
sending in German troops in answer to the desperate appeals of the popula-
tion. But under the Treaty, the Ruhr district next the Rhine formed part of
a neutralised zone forbidden to German troops. In punishment of this ille-
gality, despite the crisis of life and death which had caused it, the French
Government ordered the occupation of Frankfort and Homburg. This caused
virulent bitterness in Germany, especially the detail that Senegalese negroes
were quartered in the university of Goethe’s native city. British dissent from
French action was one of the first open fissures in the Entente. These cir-
cumstances did not make it easy to establish any sound Republican regime
against Bolsheviks and Monarchists alike. The moderate parties were being
weakened, while both the extreme wings, Communist and Reactionary, were
strengthened in a manner which contained the latest threat of civil war.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1920 the main thing was creditably done.
As against Bolshevism at least, the stability of the new Reich was established.
This was not shaken when fanatics, full of the criminal insanity of reaction,
murdered Erzberger in August, 1921, and Rathenau in June, 1922, though
these atrocious crimes deprived Germany of the two most vivid personalities
amongst her leaders, and were lurid flashes in the darkening drama of mid-
J. L. GARVIN
123
Europe. Bavarian particularism was defiant of Berlin in these years, but
it was still more anti-French; it was not separatist as regards the ^ich. The
general order under a moderate regime, though opportimist and inadequate,
remained more or less as it had been stabilised during 1920; and a tolerable
sense of security prevailed. The result was a feverish commercial activity
stimulated by the wild financial gambling of the Reich with its currency. All
the external appearances suggested an astounding economic recovery, even
a bounding progress in wealth-making equipment on the part of the country
which protested that it was ruined. France watched with sleepless vigilance,
with tense and insupportable anger, what she believed to be the insolent
prosperity of an openly fraudulent debtor. This was the staring paradox
which brought Germany to the extreme ordeal, and threw the economic con-
fusion of nations after the war into chaos worse confounded. The rest of the
record merges the affairs of several people in one narrative, dealing with the
efforts to exact from Germany the actual payment, in money and materials,
of the colossal indemnities imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.
PRANCE AND GERMAN REVIVAL A DOMINANT NATION AND ITS FRAUDULENT
DEBTOR ” REPARATIONS PLUS THE RHINE — THE ONLY SECURITY ”
The position of the Third Republic after the war must be shortly indi-
cated In France, social order never was for a moment endangered. Strikes
and manifestations of the small but vehement minority of labour, revolu-
tionary in settlement, were quelled with a prompt hand. The Peace Treaty
was most seriously attacked for not being drastic enough. In the elections
at the end of 1919 the bloc national swept the polls. Its overwhelming
majority has given the country, from that time to this, the most resolute
and solid patriotic regime of modern times. The sequel for the great veteran,
Clemenceau, was a strange instance of the uncertainty of political fortune
in free nations, as capricious towards their some-while favourites as sultans
towards viziers. There was a vacancy in the Presidency, he was not elected,
and in January, 1920, the born War Minister, who had left his incisive stamp
on the Peace Treaty, retired into private life. Soon, by an unhappy accident
to President Deschanel, there was another vacancy at the Elysee, and the
succession passed to President Millcrand, who became head of the State on
the understanding that he would play a stronger part than his predecessors.
His robust character was another distinct factor in inspiring France with the
uncompromising determination to assert the full logic of her legal claims.
The Third Republic had come to a definite consciousness that it was at least
as much a dominant power as the empire or the old monarchy had ever been;
and it was accordingly inspired by the most decisive and active temper that
the French people as a whole had felt for two generations. The return to
the proudest spirit of historic France before 1870 was complete. For pre-
serving this position, the political problem was evidently to keep Germany as
weak as possible for as long as possible — especially by maintaining, at any
cost, the military frontier now in fact extended to the Rhine, realising the
national dream since Louis XIV. As matters now stood, the Treaty could
easily be so interpreted as to enable that occupation of the Rhineland to be
indefinitely prolonged and to become in effect permanent, as Marshal Foch
above all insisted.
President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had refused that claim, but
America had rejected the Treaty and the military guarantee of French se-
curity. Relying on herself, France was the more resolved, from the beginning
of 1920 onwards, to provide for her own security by keeping the Rhineland
24
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
s her rampart, with tibe Rhine as its ditch. There seemed no other substan-
ial safeguard against another invasion after a few more decades. If there
rere a future war, it would have to be fought m Germany next time, not in
'ranee. This was obviously the adoption by the Third Republic of the
lerman principles of realistic statecraft as applied in 1871 and as pursued
rom 1914 onwards. They were non-moral arguments; a prophet might urge
hat sometime, somehow, French reckonings on such a basis must come to the
ame ^sastrous sequel as had followed upon the calculations of Louis XIV,
f Napoleon, and of the Hohenzollerns alike. None the less, the practical
Tgument was, as it remains, conclusive for the French mind. There must
e some security. After America’s withdrawal, a diminished League of
Nations was no security. To hold the Rhine indefinitely — or at least until
ome substantial alternative could be offered to France — was the only
ecurity.
That was the first interest. The economic part of the problem was of
nother kind. France, relatively, was considerably less impoverished by
he war than any other European belligerent. She had spent her money
luring the conflict, chiefly amongst her own people. The British and the
^ericans had spent vast sums amongst the same people. Alsace-Lorraine
lad returned as immensely enriched assets. The acquisition of the Saar
uines was in itself an indemnity which after any former war would have
>een thought fabulous. The position on the Rhineland, where Germany paid
he costs of occupation, carried with it other economic advantages. The dev-
istated departments were temporarily shattered, but in a few years their
ormer productive power, above and below ground, would be not merely
estored but enhanced by more modern building and equipment. In these
undamental respects, there was much less doubt about the economic future
»f France than about that of Great Britain, with her masses of unemployed in
lonsequence of her dependence, not upon internal and secure resources like
France, but upon a world-market universally disorganised.
There was, however, another and more shadowy side to the French picture.
Phe devastated departments were meanwhile a spectacle of ravage, apt to
nove even mild men to thoughts of retribution. The cost of restoring them
mist be borne by those who had ruined them, and borne with an ample
nargin. France was loaded with a gigantic debt. In war she had not taxed
lerself to the bone like Britain. In peace, no French Government for years
vould dare to propose taxation on anything like the same scale. The French
leople abhorred such a prospect like death. They would not face it, if
iver, until satisfied, without any philosophical doubts touching the mingled
iram of things or the more obscure elements of human fate, that the last
Irop had been squeezed out of the nation which they held to have caused
ind willed the catastrophe. Accordingly, France went on borrowing in peace
is in war; she spent annually twice the amount of her revenue; and the
iccumulating deficits of French Budgets were booked up upon the assump-
ion lhat Germany must pay. By force in the last resort she must be made
A> pay, somewhat according to those original visions of Versailles, which
lutshone all dreams of Golconda. Thus, on the economic side, it was the
inexorably mgent practical interest of France to get as much as possible
^rom Germany. It was on the political side the equal interest of France to
reep the nominal claim on Germany as high as possible, so that for a genera-
tion at least, there would be no chance of such complete payment as would
threaten what France held to be her vital military seciuity by involving
the evacuation of the Rhine. Thus, the dual objects of exacting the largest
umual payments, yet maintaining an ultimately unpayable claim — though
ibe dualism was perfectly intelligible from a French point of view — raised
J. L. GARVIN 126
for Europe a tremendous and almost insoluble problem. It was at least a
problem unlikely to be solved for years.
“ 1921 ” — A FRENZY OP INFLATION COMM^IRCIAL PROSPERITY AND FINANCIAL
BOLSHEVISM — GERMAN DEFAULT AND FRENCH RESOLVE
Why could not Germany pay, and pay to the full? When the French
looked across the Rhine and beheld from 1921 onwards, the startling
picture of roaring business combined with a frantic harlequinade of public
finance, they thought there was an evasive method in a pretended madness.
They believed that German pleas of inability were grossly dishonest, and the
French in their turn were maddened by that belief. Convinced that Germany
was trying to win the war at a second remove by juggling with the conditions
of its Peace, France was resolved to force the issue at need and to bring
about a capitulation in finance as complete as had been the surrender in the
field. To distinguish between rights and wrongs in this matter, to explain
here what we have called the staring paradox of German conditions, is per-
haps one of the hardest tasks that can be attempted in a small space. In
ships, colonies, overseas investments, in loss of home territory and natural
resources — iron ore, coal, potash, zinc, and the rest — the defeated people
had already paid gigantic forfeits. Yet in production and all internal busi-
ness they were obviously recovering at an incredible rate, and were in some
ways more powerfully organised and equipped than ever for manufacture
and shipbuilding. The working-classes and others were subsidised directly
or indirectly in respect of rent, food, and railway travel. The middle classes,
indeed, were being destroyed by low incomes and soaring prices. But the
big industrialists were profiteering in peace as in war, and at the expense
of the masses and the Government alike. Junkers and farmers were flourish-
ing on the land. The classes who had been most in favour of the war were
suffering least, or gaining most, from its consequences. One reason for the
economic recovery was solid and simple. Germany, unlike Britain, main-
tains a great agriculture side by side with a great industry, and the consequent
internal system of mutual supply gives her the strongest home market in the
world next to the United States.
But, on the other hand, were the immeasurable gambles of the Government
with the currency — the end of anything like sound money — the stampede
of paper issues towards an abyss — the glaring scandal of weak taxation.
The printing-press poured out notes in multiplying volume with accelerating
speed until the thing was like a stream broadening with rapidity and then
becoming a Niagara. The German mark swept like the Russian ruble
towards a gulf of worthlessness. The Reichsbank notes in circulation were,
at the end of the war, over 20,000,000,000, marks — already many times as
much as before 1914. The figure rose by the beginning of 1922 to over
130.000. 000.000, and before the end of that year, when the crash came, to
over 1,200,000,000,000. After the Ruhr occupation the issue rushed up to
10.000. 000.000.000 marks. The authorities of a nation which had so well
resisted Bolshevism in politics yielded utterly to Bolshevism in finance. Yet
the thing which became in this way an uncontrollable cataclysm began with
ipixed motives, of which some, in Germany’s situation, were natural and even
cogent. When the war ended inflation was already a habit; and for a time
it was likely to be a successful habit or at least the better way in a choice
of evils. The country was depleted after the blockade, and materials for
recovery had to be provided by imports. The armies were coming home, and
employment must be stimulated. The temporary but almost deadly crisis
126 PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
of 1919 must be surmounted by any immediate means available, whatever
might come afterwards; otherwise there would be, probably, a second and
anarchic revolution on the Russian model. Bolshevism in finance was a
means to stop Bolshevism in politics.
There were, of course, other motives and effects. Marks were sold for
enormous amounts to foreign speculators, who were duped, and deserved it,
after helping Germany appreciably to reestablish large credits abroad. Ger-
man exports were powerfully stimulated. They could be sold far below any
price at which it was possible for countries with sounder currencies to com-
pete. The encouragement of spending and buying increased the activity of
the home market to the utmost. German factories modernised their equip-
ment to perfection. The German State could undertake great public works
like the improvement of waterways, such as the British Treasury, facing its
problems with the sternest orthodoxy of taxation and thrift, could no longer
afford; for it was cutting down even the smallest branches of expenditure.
Towards the end, as marks multiplied and prices rose, a man could build a
house for the sum required a year later to buy a hat The system was a
windfall to debtors and ruinous to creditors. What you had borrowed in
cash, as it were, you could pay back in counters. In this way manufacturers
and agrarians were cheaply freed from their bank-loans and mortgages. Ger-
many’s internal war debt was wiped out, while the British taxpayer staggered
\mder his unparallelled burden; and in a different way in France, the huge
liabilities of the State mounted up by further borrowings. That was not the
worst. The profits of the industrialists and shopkeepers, junkers and farm-
ers, were extortionate, yet weak taxation became a farce. When the demand-
note became due to the State, the nominal sum paid in a rapidly falling
currency meant only a fraction of the value requested
We cannot wonder that when Germany in these circumstances began to
plead for relief and postponement with regard to Reparations, practically
the whole of France and a large part of Britain — though not its more re-
sponsible and expert classes — believed that the most flagrant of fraudulent
debtors was attempting final escape. It was not only an almost inevitable
view of the natural man. There was this measure of indirect truth in it
that the degree of folly to which inflation had been carried, was now having
all the effect of fraud at the expense of the Allies Yet the original blame
was theirs. They were reaping what they had sowed. They had been
warned, when the frantic finance of the Versailles Treaty was proposed and
imposed, that the results could only be some such ni^tmare of chaos and
futility as had ensued. They were urged to ask less in order to get more;
and if in moderating their total demand they had fixed a reasonable time-
limit for the evacuation of the territory left to Germany, they could have
got more still. In the case of a great country like Germany, with 60,000,000
inhabitants, large indemnities stretching over years can only be paid fully
in the long run by the cooperation of a willing people. Inducements in such
a matter must be more effective than force. After the Treaty of 1871 the
French paid the five milliards in three years to get the Germans out. Ger-
many would have made a wonderful effort to pay had she been given any
prospect that payment would mean the liberation of her soil in five years,
or in ten. Instead, she was denied every inducement. She was offered
nothing when the Peace Conference had the chance of putting matters in a
right way, but crushing tribute, economic serfdom, prolonged dismemberment,
one-sided disarmament, and national despair, stretching into the latter part
of the twentieth century and perhaps beyond it. If the position of the
present generation and the next could be made no better by the utmost effort
to pay, why should they attempt it? What worse could happen to them if
J. L. GARVIN
127
they did not pay? Upon no terms would France give a definite pledge to
relinquish the Rhine and the Rhineland. In order to keep possession of that
region for indefimte time, France would not even consent to fix the total
of Reparations definitely and finally at any figure which could be paid. In
these circumstances the whole German nation, by collective, automatic in-
stinct, undoubtedly and inevitably worked to evade and delay, hoping to
bring France and the Allies to more equitable and manageable terms. As
certainly, the excess of inflation was partly meant by German Governments
and financiers to defeat the original and annihilating terms of the Allies. In
the same circumstances any other people and Government in the world would
have done the same.
By annexations and confiscations, as we have seen, the Allies had, in fact,
taken large indemnities to begin with. Germany was further bound for ten
years to pay a coal tnbute that even when reduced in May, 1920, came to
2,000,000 tons a month. She was to pay the costs of the armies of occupa-
tion. Over and above all this, the Allies, though not yet making a final
assessment, seemed to contemplate, as Reparations proper, an impossible
total of over £11,000,000,000. It was a demand that could not be discharged
by Germany in a century. Men of just mind knew this to be nearly four-
fold more than ought to be asked; and competent experts on the British and
American side knew that the sum was four times as much as could ever be
paid. Not only was a new and almost hopeless feud created between France
and Germany, but the apple of discord was thrown amongst the Allies them-
selves From this point, we can follow the course of a struggle in which
the mixed issues of French military security and financial Reparations were
inextricably confused
Following the Great Conference at Paris, the Supreme Council of the
Allies tried to deal with the matter by a sort of peripatetic regime of sub-
sidiary conferences held in pleasant places. At San Remo, in April, 1920,
Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Nitti made the sensible proposal that Germany
should become a party to the discussions. At Spa, in July, the German
representatives appeared, but as usual they made a disappointing use of the
advantage afforded them. Then, as too often later, they came short in
conciliatory ability, sense of necessity and practical judgment. A stern sum-
mons, however, hastened in the latter part of 1920 the hated but remorseless
process of German disarmament. Throughout the next year this process was
further enforced by the Allies under threat of extended occupation. They
curtailed or repressed the popular attempt to keep up informal but large
armed forces like the Home Guards (Einwohnerwehr) , the Civic Police
{Sicherheitspolitzei) y and the ultra-patriotic volunteers of the Orgesch, But
the financial dispute became ever more dominating. At Paris, in January,
1921, the Allies still tned to keep up the Treaty claims in all their prepos-
terous magnitude, demanding not only a sum of £11,300,000,000 payable in
gold marks, but an additional tribute equivalent for over 40 years to 12
per cent of German exports. These things did more than anything else to
plunge German financial methods into recklessness. The defeated people
feared, and had reason to fear, that a sounder system of currency and Budgets
would only enable France to skin them alive. In face of a German agitation
of genuine despair the Allies, after a few months, in May, 1921, reduced
their claims to £6,600,000,000. It was still more than twice as much as the
possible; but there was a brief lull in the struggle. In September, at Wies-
baden, Loucheur and Rathenau even arrived at an agreement concerning the
delivery by Germany of materials for the work of reconstruction in France.
By the end, however, of this critical year of 1921, with its soaring commer-
cialism and financial decadence, Germany’s position as a debtor imder the
128 PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
Treaty was becoming hopeless. The Reparations controversy was reopened
in a more ominous form. The German Government announced that it must
soon begin to default in its money instalments, and requested delay. At
this, French opinion, more than ever convmced that the simple theory of the
fraudulent debtor was the sum of the truth, began to insist on more drastic
measures — measures, indeed, so drastic that they would stretch Germany
on the rack like a rich Jew in the Middle Ages, and wrench her bone and
sinew until she screamed for mercy and disclosed her hoards
1922 — BEPARATIONS AND FRANCO-BRITISH DISSENSION — ENTER M. POINCAbA
— A MAN OP ACTION — ME. LLOYD OBOBGB AND THE GRAND PLAN — THE
GENOA FIASCO
This attitude from the beginning of 1922 began to make a widening breach
between France and Britam. The embittered controversy soon came to an
unhappy pitch. Passion, though its accompaniment, was not its cause.
There was a fimdamental difference of judgment on a question of inestimable
importance for the world’s future. France, as we have seen, was adamant
both on financial Reparations and on military security obtained by keeping
the control of the Rhineland and the Rhine, no matter what Germany might
pay. France refused to see any incompatibility between these two objects.
British statesmen, far more moderate and far-sighted in economic statesman-
ship, as in a sense of ultimate consequences m politics, never faced the full
gravity of the situation created for France by America’s rejection of the
military guamntee and by the consequent lapse of Britain’s similar guarantee.
The British Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, and his colleagues in the Coalition
Government were too apt to think thit something effective had happened
when France was confronted with purely verbal dilemmas — whether she
really wanted German reparations or German ruin, whether she wanted cash
or chaos. They could not realise the crystalline resolve of France to extract
from Germany the practical maximum of financial Reparations, and at the
same time to keep a firm grip on the Rhine at least for many a year to come.
The Rhine is the permanent question for the post-war world, as was Alsace-
Lorraine for the pre-war world, but the new problem is by far the larger and
the graver. British statesmen, however, though misleading themselves by
the supposed dialectical dilemmas, and not realising the set determination of
France to obtain both her objects, knew — as indeed Germany knew — that
the Rhenish question cannot be usefully raised for a considerable period to
come. Accordingly, the Coalition Government in Britain desired, at the
opening of 1922, first, to reduce Germany’s liability once for all to a payable
figure, finally assessed; secondly, to bring about a wider settlement in
Europe; and thirdly, to create a broader League of Nations.
This inspiring plan was embodied in the British Prime Minister — the
last political survivor of the Great Three of Versailles. It was to come
to a fiasco followed by the fall of Mr. Lloyd George himself, by the separate
action of France in arms, and by a consequent German catastrophe. A few
words must enter here about a notable man. While Wilson, Clemenceau,
Nitti, Venizelos, had disappeared from power, Mr. Lloyd George had pro-
longed his tenure by miracles of agility, now intrepid, now elusive. A man
of genius in the emergencies of action — an immortal influence in animating
the British spirit through the dark years of the war — he was less successfm
as a Peace Minister, unsatisfactory and unsure in dealing with continuous
business and complicated affairs. He had been 17 years in office; his au^-
eious energies and tenacious fibre were no longer what they had been before
J. L. GARVIN
129
the war, in which he had spent himself without stint. Nevertheless, as in
the case of Wilson and Clemenceau, he was at the top of his political fortune
before the fall. At the end of 1921 he seemed for a moment, by conceding
to Ireland, outside north-east Ulster, the utmost freedom short of open separa-
tion, to have settled the question which had defied British statesmanship
for 700 years. His next ambition was, not indeed to settle Europe at one
stroke, but to make a decisive advance towards that settlement by at least
amending some of the worst errors and omissions of the Treaty of Versailles,
and so mitigating the tragedy of the Peace Conference.
The French Premier of the day was M. Briand, a man formerly as supple,
as realistic as Mr. Lloyd George himself, and in crisis as bold, though more
reflective, as more indolent. But M. Briand, too, was older, and like nearly
all other men in Europe after the wear and tear of the war, was no longer
all that he had been before it. The two Premiers met at the Cannes Con-
ference in January, 1922, to consider the situation created by Germany’s
announcement of inability to pay. They signed a draft pact by which
Britain engaged to guarantee French security for what French opinion thought
a uselessly inadequate term of years. Secondly, Mr Lloyd George secured
M. Briand’s consent to a general Conference of Nations It was to be held
on the grandest scale at Genoa, and to deal with the European question as
a whole. But Mr. Lloyd George, by now, was hated in France; and his war
services, once so ardently extolled, were forgotten. The brilliantly vitupera-
tive talent of the Paris Press and stage held him up as an advocate of
Germany. M Briand, in a moment, was thrown out of oflSce. He was
succeeded bv a very different and more formidable person, M. Raymond
Poincare. The new French Premier had been the President of the Third
Republic during the war. Great worker and master of statement, this was
a man of the most dogmatic vigour of mind. He had championed the strict
execution ” of the Treaty of Versailles, not the moderation of its provisions.
He did not admire the British Premier. He did not believe in conferences
such as, for two years, had been fertile in verbal declarations of agreement,
by Allies who were not agreed. M. Poincare held that the time was coming
to bring more trenchant methods to bear on Germany. He thought that
Germany — still at the height of her commercial revival, though its founda-
tions were undermined — was maliciously avoiding the fulfilment of her
obligations; that her pleas and excuses were trickery and camouflage. In
these very simplified, but robust sentiments, the new French Premier soon
had all France behind him As he had overthrown M. Briand in the first
instance, he overthrew Mr. Lloyd George in the next, and became the first
man upon the world stage. His convictions were quick and obdurate, but
he lacked both depth and amenity, nor was his wisdom equal to his eminence.
None the less, M. Poincar6 was determined to be the leader of Nationalist
France. He had thought out his course and was set to take the risk. He
judged it, and rightly, to be for all near purposes, what is called a safe risk.
He was no sooner in power than he knocked the bottom out of the great
Genoa project by forbidding it to deal with the central subject of its pro-
gramme — German Reparations. The French Premier had begun to shape
in his mind another method of dealing with that dawdling affair. Mr. Lloyd
George, already weakened in Britain by a submissiveness to party mutiny
very different from his former character, might have adopted either of two
courses. He might have put off indefinitely the Conference of Nations, while
declaring that the Entente with France must be suspended until M. Poincar^
abandoned the new method of peremptory veto and returned to the spirit
of equal discussion. Or, alternatively, Mr. Lloyd George might have taken
the stronger course of appealing to the British people at a General Election
T. B. Y. — VOL. I — 9
130
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
to straigthen his hands for the purpose of a Conference of Nations to con-
sider the whole European question, Reparations included, with France or
without her. Instead, the British Premier, witiiout seeking a vote of con-
fidence from his own counixymen, persisted in a dramatic scheme which had
lost its chief motive; accepted M. Poincare’s fiat, excluding the vital question;
and went abroad on his biggest adventure — as a statesman not only dimin-
ished in repute at home and abroad, but weakened within himself. The
sequel was a classical object-lesson as regards distinction between the super-
ficial and the essential elements of political action. The French Premier was
simple and unyielding. The British Premier was versatile in vain. Mr.
Lloyd George was wonderful in eloquence, momentary dexterity, dramatic
manifestation. He failed because unlike M Poincare, he was not funda-
mentally determined to fight at any cost. The great programme of recon-
ciliation and cooperation he had unfurled like a banner. To have staked all
upon it then would have been better politics for himself as well as giving
a new moral leadership to Europe.
At Genoa in April, 1922, the Conference of Nations met. Wider than
the League of Nations it included both Germany and Russia. The American
Ambassador to Italy held a watching brief. Nearly every country had sent
its Prime Minister, but M. Poincare remained in Paris. Disentangled from
detail, and unfettered by the compromises so hard to avoid in personal inter-
course, he was able to exercise, from a distance, a decisive power of check
and control. Mr. Lloyd George guided the proceedings in Genoa itself, and
for weeks they were an absorbing drama. Every attempt to evade the French
veto upon the discussion of Reparations was defeated.
Long efforts to restore full commercial intercourse between Russia and
the rest of the world were as futile. Chicherin and the other Soviet dele-
gates, regarded with jealous vigilance by the extremists at Moscow, had to
walk more delicately than Agag. They met business propositions with inter-
minable subtleties. Few amongst the other nations realised that in spite of
these necessary face-saving dialectics, the Bolshevik regime had emerged
from the terrorist stage and was seeking to reestablish by degrees a saner
economic system throughout its vast territories, forming something like a
seventh part of the whole habitable earth. There was no more practical
interest of civilisation. The Russians, for all their endless word-spinning,
were getting ready to recognise at a later stage Russia’s former debts in
return for credits. They were willing to grant to foreign capital concessions
which would be private property in everything but name. The French and
Belgians insisted on the name — one formula asserting the imprescriptible
and sacred rights of private property. Behind them were swarms of small
bond-holders, creditors of the old Tsardom. General abhorrence of the
Bolsheviks still swayed public opinion in most countries and especially in
the United States; though nothing could be much more certain than that the
time was coming when practical intercourse with Russia must be resumed,
since otherwise the full economic recovery of the world cannot be effected. The
attempt in this sense at G^oa came to total failure.
The Germans made it more grotesque. Fearing for their own interests,
they suddenly made a separate treaty with the Soviet delegates in a manner
which could only be regarded as fiouting the Allies and especially Mr. Lloyd
George, to whom the same Germans owed their chance of being present at
Genoa. This execrable blunder reduced to mingled fury and despair those
who had l^n working hardest to moderate the Treaty of Versailles.
There is no need to lengthen comment upon this last unhappy attempt
to deal in general council with the European question as a whole. The
Genoa Conference missed all its aims. Nothing came of the projects for
J. L. GARVIN
131
treaties of mutual guarantee between groups of nations. Nothing therefore
could be done for disarmament. Germany and Russia were not brought
into the League of Nations. Economic cooperation was not restored with
Russia. Above all, German reparations were not dealt with. Herr Rathenau,
so soon to meet his doom, urged passionately that the system of inflation was
coming at last to an irretrievable crash of the mark. It was true, but he
was not understood and his own constructive ideas were not equal to his
imaginative genius. M. Poincare’s veto was of an iron rigidity.
The Entente between France and Britain had been strained to the limit.
In the end M. Poincare prevailed, though it was a disastrous victory. The
British Premier had made a magnificent effort, excelling himself in the elo-
quence both of persuasiveness and defiance; but he shrank from staking his
political life upon so grave a proposition as that the Entente must terminate
unless France would make more reasonable efforts to harmonise her own
rights and claims with the desperate necessities of European re-settlement
as a whole. Mr. Lloyd George yielded at the last, and this was soon shown
to be the death-blow to the position and prestige he had held so long. Hence-
forth, beyond question, M. Poincare was the world’s dominating statesman.
The great Genoa fiasco was followed almost at once by a meeting of economic
experts at The Hague upon the continued question of Russian trade and
debts; but this was merely a smaller fiasco.
AMERICA AFTER WITHDRAWAL — THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE — FROM
HARDING TO COOLIDGE
We must break off here, to glance at some other remarkable movements
in the world before bringing this survey of events after the war to a con-
clusion by narrating the sequel of Franco-German relations.
We left American affairs at that somewhat poignant, historical scene when
Mr. Wilson accompanied his successor to the Capitol. America, withdrawn
within her spacious self, no longer filled that broad place in general human
affairs which she had occupied for four irrevocable years. France, with her
trenchancy of logic, had rightly drawn the consequences and determine to
rely wholly upon herself. Many other elements in Europe, such as the
Dutch and Scandinavian nations, eager for a more real peace, and such also
as the defeated peoples, were slower to give up hope. The British were
slower still. They did not want the material assistance of the United States,
but they wanted its decisive moral aid in the efforts for a more reconciling
and constructive policy. President Harding in his first message had rejected
the League and Covenant as a matter of course, but he did not urge isolation.
He said: We make no surrender of our hope and aim for an association
to promote peace in which we would most heartily join.” From these words
too wide a deduction was drawn in Europe. The United States made formal
peace with Germany and other ex-belligerents who had been smitten to the
ground by help of America’s potent hand. The President’s Cabinet, which
included Hughes, Hoover and Mellon, was regarded by the general world as
very strong and something more than a conventional party adminstration.
There was no surprise when the Washington Conference was summoned and
its terms of reference were known. It was thought by the world at lai*ge
to be only a beginning, though the best beginning.
The foreign nations invited were chiefly — in relation to the programme
— Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China. Assembled in November,
1921, the Conference, imder Secretary Hughes, was brought abruptly to busi-
ness not so much by a Chairman’s bell but, as was jes^ at the time, by a
132
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
Chairman’s bombshell. He at once proposed the restriction of naval arma-
ments on a basis of relative strength expressed as regards the United States,
Great Britain and Japan by the famous 5-^-3 ratio. Mr. Hughes was
immediately supported by the British delegation, and a general agreement as
regards great battleships was reached. France was not content with her
proportion, but gave way. The decision with regard to submarines, the
weapon most universally dangerous to the future use of the seas for commerce
and by passengers, was much less reassuring. Not only were the British dele-
gates unsuccessful in urging abolition, but as regards under-water craft,
neither stabilismg of relative strength nor limitation of total tonnage could
be brought about. Mr. Hughes made proposals in this sense, but the national
opinion of France was roused against them, and her delegates flatly refused
them all. On Mr. Root’s initiative, an endeavour was made to remedy this
flaw by the resolutions prohibiting the use of submarines as commerce destroy-
ers. But war, once broken out, makes havoc of rules. Submarines continue
to multiply. France, for instance, regards them as the essential means of
defending her colonial communications. Undoubtedly, modem war and free
mantime commerce cannot co-exist. Controversies regardmg the Pacific
Ocean were settled by agreements regarding possessions and spheres of in-
fluence. Further, the general principles of the integrity of China and the
open-door were reaflBrmed. Japan agreed to evacuate Kiaochow and Shan-
tung; and these, which since a quarter of a century before had played so
large a part m the destiny of our time, were restored to China at the end
of 1922. The Anglo- Japanese Alliance, which had been so memorable an
instrument 20 years before, when it began the breaking of the Kaiser’s dream
of world-domination in partnership with the Tsar, was now dissolved. From
the outset, all discussion of the present possibility of reducing military arma-
ments was eliminated by the resistance of France, whose protest against
raising the question in view of the existing state of Europe, was resolute and
cogent. It was indeed unanswerable, since America was probably more
decided than ever not to take over the responsibilities which Mr. Wilson had
proposed and the Senate had rejected.
None the less, the gathering at Washington had been, within its limits,
tiie most efficient of all conferences. It had set up a landmark in modem
history. The trenchant clearness with which it had been opened by Mr.
Hughes had struck the imagination and stirred the conscience of the world.
At the outset, also. President Harding had seemed to be in favour of succeed-
ing conferences to deal with the world’s wider, more menacing international
problems, economic and political. On the Euroi^an side of the Atlantic,
the visions of a sequel again became somewhat vivid, and, though unfulfilled,
were slow in fading. There was no sound basis for these hopes. The Wash-
ington Conference itself had convinced the President and Mr. Hughes that
direct interference in the European chaos was undesirable, and they refused
to participate officially at Genoa. After that orgy of dissension, American
average opinion, forgetting what the moral suasion of the United States
might have done had it been steadily exerted, apart from any impracticable
question of joining in the League and Covenant, had unfortunately more
excuse than ever for thinking that Europe was in a temper of militancy gone
mad, and that any American relief of its finances would mean the encourage-
ment of its armaments. The German Republic was winning a sympathy
which increased after Rathenau’s murder; but at the same time, Ihough the
traditional favouritism towards France had been weakened temporarily by
the experiences of the Washington Conference, the feeling for that country
remained so strong as to prevent any imified attitude of the American mind
in general towards world-affairs.
© Keystone View Co,
The “ Big Five ” leaving the Pan-American building in Washington after a session of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1921). In the fore-
ground (left to right) are: — Prince Tokugawa, Japan; Arthur Balfour, afterwards the Earl of Balfour, Great Britain; Charles £. Hughes, U. S. Secretary
of State; M. Briand, France; Signor Schanzer, Italy. Immediately behind these men are: — Dr. Sze, China; Dr. Van Kainebeck, Holland; Baron de
Cartier, Belgium; Viscount d’Alte, Portugal.
J. L. GARVIN
138
At the beginning of 1923, in spite of its stupendous taxation and its mass
of unemployment, Great Britain had ended an irksome question by arranging
in Washin^on the funding of its debt to the United States. This strict
example did not make it probable that other nations would be easily brought
to an equal willingness to repay the debts that American citizens meanwhile
were bearing for them — still less to repay the huger war-loans to Europe
that British citizens would otherwise have to liquidate. President Harding^s
death caused a genuine emotion of human sympathy amongst ordinary men
and women everywhere. There was a feeling that he had represented the
world's chief requirement, good-will; and that his Washington Conference
had set up a sign-post indicating the world's true direction. The former
expectancy that America would lead the further advance in that direction
had ceased to play any serious part in the European mind. President
Coolidge, as a man of singular reserve and latent force, might prove capable
of surprises before the end of his tenure. But in the months after his acces-
sion this idea was but a faintly dramatic speculation, and played no part in
the practical reckoning of the world outside America. Nations everywhere,
by unescapable necessity, had gone back to the mood of striving for them-
selves.
TURKEY REVERSES THE RESULT OF THE WORLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST — THE
GREEK DEBACLE — DISUNITY AND DEFEAT OF THE ALLIES — FALL OF MR.
LLOYD GEORGE
While the trans-Atlantic or western part of civilisation stood aloof from
the rest, there was no qmescence on the opposite side, where epoch-making
events marched with startling rapidity. In Nearer Asia, there never had been
peace. The Treaty of Sevres, at the expense of Turkey, had never been
accepted for a moment in the rugged Anatolian homeland of the Turks. As
a result the Porcelain Treaty," as shrewd witnesses had called it from the
first, was shivered to atoms Rallying in circumstances which at first seemed
hopeless to a casual view, the Ottoman clan, with all its secular obstinacy,
had reversed the Eastern situation, as that had stood at the end of the
World War. By one of the greatest die-hard fights of its kind in all history,
they had cheated death and fairly brought the Allies to surrender. This
astonishing episode followed from a main blunder of the Paris Conference
in its last, tired phase. The Turks seemed not only broken but annihilated.
There was no sense of urgency in dealing with them. It had been hoped at
first by political romantics that America would accept a mandate for all the
regions of the former Ottoman Empire, not only a legendary region of the
world but rich in every kind of political and economic possibility given sound
administration. After all, Jerusalem and Damascus, Mecca and Bagdad, in
the original region of the three faiths, Christian, Jewish and Moslem, were
only half as far from Washington as were the Philippines; and here was an
adventure that might tempt a foremost people. It was a splendid dream,
but none could have been more remote from substance, America would have
none of that mandate, not even for the limited purposes of Palestine and
Zionism. The Peace Conference dallied none the less, hoping that America
would join in the Treaties. When that hope was extinct, the Allies proceeded
alone. After fatal loss of time they made extreme mistakes.
The simple and right course would have been to expel the Turks from
Europe, including Constantinople, but to allow their full national rights in
Asia Minor. Instead, the Turks were allowed to keep Constantinople, Saint
Sophia, one of the most venerable monuments of Christian architecture re-
134
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
maining a mosque, while the Greeks were authorised to invade the Asiatic
mainland and annex its Ionian coast. Thus, by the Treaty of Sfevres in
August, 1920, the Turks were dealt with as the most negligible quantity
amongst all the defeated races. These terms were accepted by the Sultan's
Government, but never by the Ottoman race. The Greeks at first had facile
successes. But the Turks found a leader. Mustapha Kemal in the heart
of Anatolia roused a spirit of resistance to the last breath. Angora repudiated
Constantinople, entered into close relations with Bolshevik Russia, and re-
built a formidable fighting-power. The Greeks overthrew their creative
genius, Venizelos, to whom they owed all; with suicidal enthusiasm they
recalled their evil genius. King Constantine. A more fantastic chapter of
human ironies is hard to instance. The Allies had been blind. France was
the first to awaken, but her method was disastrous. In the autumn of 1921
she sent M. Franklin Bouillon to Angora, where he concluded a separate peace
without consulting Britain or regarding the Entente, When the principal
Allies were thus divided, the Turks were sure of the issue.
While the Greeks were dreaming of seizing Constantinople itself — a
hopeless ideal which always dazzled their minds — Mustapha Kemal took full
time to prepare a deadly blow. In August, 1922, he fell upon the Greek
front in Asia Minor, shattered the Greek army, swept it towards the sea,
drove it to its ships. In one fortnight he had reversed the main results of
the World War in Nearer Asia. In three weeks he had reoccupied Smyrna.
In four weeks he was back to the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Mr.
Lloyd George and the British Government, who had been deaf and blind
to all warnings that an exaggerated pro-Greek policy could only lead to the
ruin of the Greeks themselves, threw a British army across the path of the
Ottoman advance; but they were supported neither by France nor Italy.
An Armistice had to be concluded and peace negotiations opened. The Lau-
sanne Conference met on November 20, 1922. It dragged on for eight months
until July 17, i923. The obstinacy of the Turk was as redoubtable in di-
plomacy as in war. The Allies had to surrender. On the one hand France,
by yielding to quick impulse and making the separate arrangement with
Angora, had broken their front and struck a bad bargain for herself. On
the other hand, Bolshevik Russia was behind the New Turkey. The Turks
on^ more control Constantinople and the Straits. They have regained a
solid European footing in Eastern Thrace where they cover, as before the
World War, the military approaches to Constantinople. Asia Minor is
their own, as never before. Therefore, Armenians and Greeks alike have been
reduced by sombre fate to insignificance, despite the rainbow-promise of the
Fourteen Points, which now seem as far away as the sign in the heavens
after Noah's flood. The New Turkey, shaking off the capitulations and
all other traditional privileges for foreigners, has won a more complete
political and commercial independence than the old Sultanic system had
known for generations. In Greece tne consequences were like the end of
Hamlet, heaping the stage with dead. A military conspiracy ended a
regime as infatuated as that of the Hohenzollems or the Habsburgs King
Constantine escaped; his Ministers were put to death. But the wider Hellenic
dominion that Venizelos had for a moment secured, and which his genius
alone might perchance have consolidated, was gone, never in all human likeli-
hood to return.
The biggest result of these events was felt in Great Britain, where a
political earthquake overthrew Mr. Lloyd George and the Coalition Govern-
ment, which for years had wielded not merely power but omnipotence. Up
to the last shattering disillusionment, Mr. Lloyd George, by the most inex-
plicable error of his career, had encouraged the Greek hazard in Asia. After
J. L. GARVIN
136
the separate French agreement at Angora, this policy had become impossible;
but he persisted. For various reasons his former ascendency had already
ceased to exist. The Turkish triumph, with its incidental evidence of the
isolation of Great Britain in forei^ affairs, ended the long premiership of
this celebrated and baffling personality. The coalition between Conservatives
and Mr. Lloyd George’s National Liberals broke up. In October Mr. Bonar
Law became the head of a purely Conservative Government. The following
elections returned a great Conservative majority. British policy underwent
a complete change of temperament. Illness constrained Mr. Bonar Law in
a few months to resign office. He died October 30, 1923. The British premier-
ship passed in May, 1923, to Mr. Stanley Baldwin. He was a cousin of Mr.
Rudyard Kipling, had funded the American debt, and bore the mint-mark
of sterling honesty. Otherwise he was a relatively untested man. Like his
predecessor and President Harding, he desired above all a return to nor-
malcy.” He was to find it, in bedevilled Europe, not to easy to secure. Quiet
bravery and sincerity of attempt were hoped from him.
THE SOVIET EMPIRE AND ITS RETURN TO ORDER — THE ECONOMIC RETREAT FROM
COMMUNISM — “ FROM THE TERROR TO THE DIRECTORY ”
By the middle of 1923, there was a more epoch-making change in the
world, little appreciated by the greater part of it. By now, outside the
boundaries of Russia, nearly all thought concerning it was behindhand. The
Soviet system, though still littered with the results of Communist ruin, had
become in effect an established empire, ruled with comparative order by a
junta of highly intelligent Tsars instead of one duller and feebler despot.
Civil war was over. External war would be avoided unless Poland attacked
Germany, in which case Russian intervention would be inevitable. The
change of temper and method was as striking as the change in the French
Revolution from the Terror to the Directory. There was still no true Con-
stitutional liberty. The Bolsheviks still held all power. They were less
than one per cent of the population, but they controlled absolutely the
towns, the railways, and all the other key-points of a territory which, as
one may repeat, is twice as large as the United States. The system did not
apparently depend on Lenin alone. His long illness did not paralyse or con-
fuse it. The peasants had defeated every attempt to levy tribute upon them,
whether cash or kind, in the abstract name of communist ownership They
felt assured of their ownership of the land. They possessed nearly nine-
tenths of the whole land of Russia. In the abstract, private propertv was
still not recognised; practically it was indisputable. The Communist Revo-
lution had paradoxically resulted in the creation of the widest peasant-
proprietorship yet known. There were here the broad foundations of a
healthy society in the future. Consequently, the Bolshevik regime survived
even the great famine.
Free trading between town and coimtry was restored. Peasants once
more brought their carts to market and sold their produce to the highest
bidder. This was inevitably followed by more freedom of private buying
and selling for shops and factories in the towns. The convenience and
benefit following the first decided movements of the new policy gave the
whole process a vital momentum of its own. The State keeps an excep-
tional control of main services, but neither principle nor practice are radically
different from the familiar example of western Europe where some of the
most individualistic of nations maintain State railways as well as State
services, postal and telegraphic. Above all, money is being restored as a
136
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
real medium of exchange, instead of barter. The “Tchemovetz” promises
to command confidence like the dollar or the pound in place of the ruble,
annihilated like the mark. At present the Soviet State, with all the economic
destruction it has still to repair, seems surer of social equilibrium than
Germany. Russia of to-day is full of what is called the business spirit.
Exporting capacity in respect of agricultural products is growing steadily.
There is a strong desire to promote foreign trade and to attract foreign
capital and enterprise, in order to develop the immense natural resources of
the Soviet Empire. Amongst the leading Bolsheviks, though they cannot
be expected to confess it, the dream of a world-revolution is dead. They
know now that even the despair of Germany, whereon they counted most,
would bring about the triumph of the Nationalist Right, not of the Com-
munist Left. In early autumn of 1923, Bolshevik foreign policy was more
attracted to France than to any other country; but it had become certain
that all the commercial nations, even those most vehemently opposed to
Bolshevism in the time of the Terror, would seek to resume normal inter-
course with Soviet Russia.
OBDER OR ANARCHY? — ITALY IN DANGER — SPREAD OP THE COUNTER-REVO-
LUTION IN EUROPE
Meanwhile, the spreading resistance to Moscow had reached a climax at
Rome. A dictatorship was established in Italy by a triumph of counter-
revolution. It still presents in the closing period of this survey an imposing
and enigmatic spectacle. The recoil from anarchy in Russia itself could
not stay the extraordinary movement, throughout the rest of Europe, in
defence of social order. To call that movement merely reactionary m the
old sense would be superficial. It was self -preservative and inevitable.
Though it included an element of determined repression, and in the end will
doubtless become an evil in its turn as the selfish instrument of the cruder
nationalism of the capitalist and military classes, it must rather be judged
up to the present as a reassuring proof of the capacity of western societies
to save themselves from anarchy. This is the index indeed of a higher and
stronger civilisation by comparison with the Soviet State. The spirit of
counter-revolution, roused by the Communist peril, has built up all across
Europe a dam of concrete against the Bolshevik flood threatening a few years
before to sweep all before it. Lenin, Trotsky, and their colleagues, in the
end, were more likely to be the authors of a world-reaction — in the sense
just defined — than of their world-revolution. If mankind in the mass, wher-
ever tolerably educated, must choose with open eyes between anarchy and
order, they will choose order even at any temporary cost to liberty itself.
This is a vivid and familiar lesson of universal history.
We have seen how the end of the war and the break-up of the old order
in a tumult of wild change, were accompanied by impoverishment, dislocation
of trade, searching bereavement, fevered visions and immeasurable fears;
with endless questioning of all the principles whereon human society had been
founded. In these circumstances Lenin and the Bolshevik junta were con-
fident that they would sweep tiie earth — at least outside America — by a
Red movement more rapid than anything known since the spread of Islam
after Mahomet. Their miscalculation was as profound in external politics
as in internal economics, but at first many signs were in their favour. In
France, indeed, authority was never shaken. It was soon established with
rather more diflSculty in Great Britain where strikers were menacing and
socialism rife; the miners in particular having made a distinct attempt to
J. L. GARVIN
137
master the State by withholding fuel from the general community. The
nations nearest Russia could only save themselves by the more drastic method
of organised coimter-revolution. Little Finland led the way, where General
Mannerheim raised over 100,000 White Guards to maintain the existing
social order. Next, Hungary, as we have seen, trampled out the Communist
terror. The German Republic put down the Spartacists.
Italy seemed in graver danger. Ihrivation in town and coimtry was
acute. Even during the war, anti-patriotic propaganda had done more mis-
chief than anywhere out of Russia. The northern provinces seethed, in the
cities, with extreme socialism, openly proclaiming Lenin as its apostle and
his methods as true doctrine. There was wide agrarian discontent amongst
the peasants. As against this, successive Governments were feeble. The
Nationalist classes were deeply dissatisfied with the results of the war. They
thought Vittorio Veneto the most brilliant battle gained by any people; and
that they had been cheated by America, Britain and France, of that masteiy
of Fiume, Dalmatia, and the whole Adriatic on which they had fixed their
dreams. The excitable Latin atmosphere was charged with thunder.
D’Annunzio’s descent on Fiume was but one of the lightning flashes of the
general temperament, but it increased the electrical tension on all sides.
Through 1919 and 1920 the issue of the social struggle was still in
doubt Demanding more control in the management of industry and more
wages for less work — like the first Bolshevik phase in Russia — the Italian
proletariat flamed into violence. With repeated strikes attempting to para-
lyse the public services, there were riots, murder, burning and pillage. There
was resistance from the first. It increased until the real state of the more
disturbed cities was sporadic civil war with savage reprisals for Communist
outrage The Socialists, in spite of their divisions, won a big success in
the elections of November, 1919. When Parliament was opened by the King
in December, their party left the Chamber of Deputies, crying, “ Long live
Socialism ” At the end of 1919, a year after the war, their confidence was
at its height. But their sure death-blow was prepared. The counter-revolu-
tion for public safety, patriotism and avowed Imperialism had found its man,
and was ready to strike blow after blow. In the next two years of furious
strife, the power of Bolshevism in Italy was totally destroyed, and by that
example in the sequel the anti-Bolshevik bias of Europe as a whole was
determined.
MUSSOLINI AND LENIN — THE HAMMER OF ANARCHY — CIVIL WAR OF BED AND
BLACKS — TRIUMPH OF FASCISMO
The man was Mussolini, now famous but still incalculable. He began
as a Socialist, just as Napoleon began as a Jacobin, Strafford as a Parliament-
man, and Voltaire as a pupil of the Jesuits. Lenin, the dictator of the
proletariat, was bom a noble ; Benito Mussolini, the dictator of Nationalism,
restorer of order, leader of patriotic enthusiasm and militarism, of capitalism
and aristocracy, was bora a blacksmith’s son. When very young he obtained
the diploma of an elements^ schoolmaster, then settled in Switzerland,
where he became saturated with thoroughly Germanic ideas of organisation
and realism. He preached Marxian doctrine until expelled as a dangerous
extrenaist from Swiss territory. Returning to Italy, he became director of
the chief Socialist newspaper, Avanti. When the world-crisis came he broke
with his party, and threw himself into the patriotic cause. The course of
the ^ruggle transformed his views. He foimded the Popolo d* Italia, gaining
a mighty influence. Its words were battles. Here, in a time of comusion,
138 PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
amidst the weltering helplessness of public authority, was a man who knew
his mind. As writer and speaker, his style had nothing in common with
florid rhetoric or windy declamation. He had a bolt-like force. Above all,
as a man of action, he was decision and resolution incarnate; as an organiser,
he could inspire sacrificial devotion and yet create an iron discipline. Auda-
cious and prompt as Garibaldi, he had far more brain. Filled with scathing
contempt for the prevailing politicians and for all common phrase-making,
he abhorred the spectacle of Bolshevik aggression, social disintegration, and
national weakness. While his ideal was a worship of Italy surpassing the
love of woman, his method was inspired by a belief in “ sacred egotism,”
personal as well as public. He was very capable, with all his elemental
passion, of a strong check on impulse. Whether his brain would not be
overpowered in the end by some volcanic impulse was obviously the question
suggested by all his psychological indications and by his countenance. This
is the man who swiftly became the hammer of anarchy and then aspired to
be the regenerator of his nation.
Mussolini founded the first Fascist companies, or “ fighting bands ” of
social order, in March, 1919. Soon battalions of his black-shirts were formed
all over Italy. Men of all sorts and conditions crowded to his banner —
soldiers, from generals to privates, professors and students, capitalists and
labourers. From the broken ranks of socialism itself masses of adherents
rallied to Mussolini. And above all, it was a movement of belligerent
youth They all obeyed his marching orders. He preached reprisals without
truce or mercy, until the Red terrorists were beaten to the ground by a more
ruthless and competent terror. The Fascist cause in its turn was stained
by bloody excesses. In its dispersed way, this civil war — for it was nothing
less — was as fierce as the old vendetta of Guelphs and Ghibellines In the
end of it, Bolshevism was stamped out from one end of Italy to the other.
The rest must be quickly told. Through 1920 the public disorders raged
with virulence The citizens' movement showed a steadily growing power to
defeat strikes and carry on the public services. The back of Bolshevism was
broken at last by the crises of that autumn. In the middle of September, the
disputes between capital and labour in the iron and steel trades of Lombardy
and Piedmont came to a struggle for life and death. The federated employ-
ers declared a lock-out. But in Milan and Turin and other places, the work-
men seized the factories, defended their possession by Red Guards, and
imagined that the reign of practical Communism as in Russia, had begun.
In a few weeks the attempt proved a fiasco. The workers not only found
that without the former managers and experts, they could not carry on the
higher processes of manufacture, but that without the credit which no one
would give them, they could not even get raw materials. The works, when
taken over again by the employers, were in a vile state of dirt and disorder.
The Government had been almost passive, and even announced measures
for introducing an element of Socialist control into factory management.
Both the attitude of the Government and the disillusionment of the workers
gave an immense impetus to the anti-Bolshevik forces, and to the demand for
a stronger Ministerial regime.
All this played into Mussolini's hands, though in the fight for the factories
he had rese^ed himself with the shrewdest judgment. Immediately after-
wards he seized a better opportunity to move, and then rained destruction
on the Reds. This beginning of the end came at Bologna. That city, in
October, 1920, became a cock-pit of class-war. The anarchists had already
committed several murders when on November 21, Giordani, a disabled
officer, one of the constitutional members of the City Council, was shot in
the Municipal Hall by hired assassins. The hour had struck. Mussolini
J. L. GARVIN
139
was sure of the irresistible support of national opinion. At his signal the
Fascist! threw themselves upon the followers of Lenin in a hundred cities of
Italy, and did their work once for all. Extremist leaders who cared to keep
their lives had to fly for them or to seek more ignommiously the police pro-
tection of bourgeois society. In a few months the Bolshevik movement was
broken down as thoroughly in the country as in the towns. The whole
Socialist movement split to pieces. Throughout 1921, Fascism on a running
tide of triumph became the national movement of the Italian people, and
Bolshevism was annihilated.
But this was only the negative part of the task. Signor Mussolini and
his black-shirts had levelled the ground, as it were, but their next purpose
was structural. Aiming at the reorganisation of Greater Italy on new prin-
ciples of Csesarian authority and vigour, they were the sworn enemies of
the existing parliamentary system. They were resolved to sweep it out
Successive Governments since the war made a general impression of mingled
opportunism and impotence The Fascist! accused them of hopeless adminis-
trative ineptitude, especially in finance, as well as of fateful subserviency to
Socialist demands and Labour exactions.
1922 — THE FASCIST COUP D^^TAT — MUSSOLINI DICTATOR OF ITALY — A NEW
IMPERIALISM — THE CORFU CRISIS AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
In October, 1922, this new phase of the Italian drama came to its climax.
Calling a Congress at Naples, Mussolini, parading 40,000 men in military
formation, summoned the Ministry to resign; and next his manifesto to the
nation proclaimed ** the impending march of the Fascist! on Rome in order
to cut the Gordian knot and hand over to the King and army a renewed
Italy ” The la^t Government of the old discredited type sought to declare
martial law. King Victor refused. He knew that they had no sure public
force of any kind behind them, and that their feeble challenge of civil war
must be instantly annulled. Signor Mussolini was summoned by the Sover-
eign to Rome; and on the night of October 30, the blacksmith ^s son, at the
age of 39, became not merely Prime Minister of Greater Italy but absolute
Dictator like a new Napoleon
Calling the Houses of Parliament together, he addressed the Senate with
respect, but he scourged the more popular Chamber in terms of peremptory
rebuke and menace, unmatched since Cromwell. He told the Deputies, in
effect, that they must entrust him with full powers as Dictator, or disappear.
Preferring not to disappear, they granted full powers as demanded up to
December 31, 1923.
Nothing at present suggests that the period will not be indefinitely ex-
tended. After so many violent declarations. Signor Mussolini showed in
many ways unexpected moderation and sobriety in internal affairs. By
various means he broadened his basis of support He respected religion, but
put the army first. A ruthless public economist, his axe swung right and
left against wasteful abuses. He did not shrink from such reductions in the
over-staffed public services as no ordinary Parliamentary Minister, playing
for votes at elections, would have dared to undertake. A strong foreign
policy, however, had been his chief purpose, as that of his followers, after
the overthrow of Bolshevism. Their dearest wish was to assert — in the
Roman temper of which they conceived themselves the heirs — the increased
status and power of Greater Italy. In this sphere the Dictator for some
time reserved his action while strengthening his means. At the end of
August, 1923, he suddenly startled the world by a first thunderbolt which
140 PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
seems unlikely to be the last. General Tellini and all the other Italian
members of an International Boundary Commission were massacred on the
frontier where Albania marches with northern Greece. Signor Mussolini at
once launched upon Athens an ultimatum of a kind without parallel, with
the sole exception of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which precipitated
the World War. When the Greeks demurred from the harsher terms of
abasement. Signor Mussolini seized the island of Corfu, and an Italian squad-
ron bombarded the town of that name without warning, kilhng 20 innocent
persons. The League of Nations had not ventured to interfere in bigger
matters, involving still more loss of life, but now attempted with hasty
procedure to apply to Italy the excellent moral rules which it had not
ventured to urge as against France or Poland. Mussolini instantly defied
the League and threatened to leave it. He meant what he said, and all
Italy was behind him. Never had his influence over the nation been so
complete. The crisis had to be composed, not by the League but by an
Ambassadors’ Conference of the Powers, as in pre-war days It was arranged
that Corfu would be speedily evacuated after Greece had been compelled to
pay a swinging indemnity, to do obeisance to the Italian flag, and to make
other humble amends.
The Dictator had made it plain once for all that the Italy of Mussolini
would accept no rule not equally applied to any other Great Power, and
in any case would be diflScult to restrain in the Adriatic His next purpose
was to secure that virtually complete Italian control of Fiume, as well as
Trieste, which President Wilson had prevented. He hoped to obtain this
end by negotiation Evidently the Balkan question which precipitated the
World War was by no means settled bv it It was as clear that another
stroke of force like the Corfu coup would be almost certainly fatal to the
peace of eastern Europe. Mussolini, in the spirit of one of his own wisest
utterances, had felt “ the sense of limits ” But the restraint of this powerful
personality, glowing even when compressed, would depend upon circum-
stances. His hostility to the traditional naval power of Britain in the
Mediterranean was somewhat manifest. The cloud on the Mediterranean
horizon was as yet no bigger than a man’s hand, but henceforth it was there.
Although Paris had supported Rome for the moment, owing to simultaneous
complications of the German problem, the real effect of these events in the
autumn of 1923 was to draw France and Britain nearer together. They had
been sorely divided. Britain had pressed for a more moderate policy towards
Germany. Signor Mussolini had made it evident that unless an efficient
Anglo-French partnership could be restored by some good working compro-
mise, no real guarantee for the stability and peace of Europe would remain.
POWER OP FASCIST EXAMPLE — SPAIN FOLLOWS — HtTNQAEY, GERMANY, UtELAim
Everywhere in Europe, however. Fascism had become prevalent where
Bolshevism or any other subversive influence was threatening. Italy for
the time was unquestionably stronger and sounder under Mussolini. In
Germany his movement was copied, and still more generally in Hungary.
In Bavaria, the Fascist crusade was garish and loud under its Tyrolese
con^ander, Adolf Hitler. Greece was governed by a military junta. Bul-
garia, after the murder of the peasant Premier, Stambulis!^, was ruled by
arms alone. The Irish Free State was no less ruled in an essentially Fascist
spirit, and its Government, after fighting down open anarchy, continued for
some time further to keep under lock and key the elected leaders of the
John Redmond, long the leader of the Irish Sir Horace Plunkett, the famous Insh
Home Rule party m the House of Commons. statesman, who writes the chapter on
Ireland m these volumes.
J. L. GARVIN 141
Republican opposition. Other countries were ready to resort to the same
means in case of social danger.
In Spain, where the parliamentary system was the most lethargic and
incapable in Europe, the Italian example seemed irresistibly appropriate.
Accordingly in September, 1923, General Primo de Rivera, an honest soldier
but an amateur statesman, drove out the politicians as by the fiat of the
sword, placed the whole Government and administration of the country under
military control, and proclaimed a regime of imiversal rectitude and obedience.
Devoid of popular preparation, and without the touch of racial genius which
had marked Mussolini^s crusade, the Spanish coup d'etat seemed quite un-
likely to achieve anything like similar success, and rather apt to stimulate
all the revolutionary forces which the great Italian movement had suppressed.
The spirit represented by Mussolini has been unquestionably a steadying
and even a saving influence in Europe as against the spirit represented by
Lenin and Trotsky during the Russian terror and the propaganda of world-
revolution. The counter-revolution, in its turn, will be carried to exaggerated
lengths, and the next few years will see a revulsion. Russia, on the con-
trary, promises to become soundly based like France after 1789, on the
widest system of private property in land. It is no paradox to say that
reformed Bolshevism will be accepted as respectable when corrupted Fascism
is becoming discredited. In any case, this wide and various struggle between
communism and nationalism, anarchy and order, liberty and dictatorship,
has been the most significant event of our generation next to the war itself.
The effect upon the future of political thought and action will go deep
and far.
THE DOMINATING CONFLICT IN EUROPE — FRANCE AND GERMANY — THE REPA-
R.\TIONS CRISIS — THE FINANCIAL CRASH IN GERMANY — ^FRANCE REJECTS
BRITISH MEDIATION — M. POINCARE AND PAYMENT BY FORCE
Through the events of a generation, we have now followed the unfolding
of a drama of the world such as no single generation ever saw before and
perhaps no single century. We come to the last scene and the last record
before we seek to project our thoughts into the future. In 1923 all other
questions were overshadowed by the deepening tragedy of the Franco-German
conflict, when the Reich in effect was conquered and prostrated a second
time by force of arms applied to the most vital region of its life.
After the disastrous fiasco of the Conference of Nations at Genoa, when
M. Poincare’s veto upon the discussion of Reparations in the widest spirit
was vigorously enforced, the sequel developed as foreseen. It was as though
some sinister and resistless fatalism had taken charge of the affairs of men.
At Genoa, Rathenau had climbed wearily up the vine-clad hill endeavouring
to explain once more to the Allied Olympians, in their gleaming villa on
the top, that Germany was now being carried rapidly towards the financial
abyss. Partly, he was not heeded, partly not believed. Refusing to confess
the magnitude of Germany’s own folly in fumbling with her imescapable
problem of payment and allowing inflation to pass beyond control, he was
still possessed by impracticable dreams of solution by means of other peoples'
money, in the shape of an immense international loan. No sign came from the
Allies, none from America ; and his sense of the loneliness of a fallen nation
was iron in his soul. A few weeks later this f^eat lover of his country was
shot in front of his own house by crazy patriotards who only saw in him
the Jew.
At once the crash of the mark came as he had predicted. That unit^i
142 PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
following the Russian ruble, whirled downwards to its doom, and the time
was coming when no man would give or get a dollar for a cartload of paper
notes. T^wo sentences in illustration must suffice. In 1921 Reichsbank notes
in circulation were rather under 114,000,000,000 marks. In 1922 inflation had
swollen the issue more than ten-fold and it reached nearly 1,300,000,000,000
marks. As a result, while 100 marks were still worth about half a dollar
at the outset of 1922, they were not worth much more than a cent at the
end of it; and that was only a beginning by comparison with the further
plunge to extinction. It was the dance of death in currency. The total
Reichsbank issue was inflated more and still more up to figures too astronomi-
cal to quote. While before the war four marks were worth about a dollar,
after the middle of September, 1923, the point was reached where 4,000,000
marks were only worth a cent. Prices accordingly shot up to more and more
fantastic heighte, and while working-class wages could not keep pace, gross
and petty extortion by sellers still came to its own. Annihilation of the
financial means of resistance was as complete as annihilation of the military
means by the Armistice of November, 1918 The inexorable result was a
second capitulation of Germany to France five years after the first. This
general view of the whole process will help us to understand the unparallelled
political struggle which followed the first crash of the mark in the summer
of 1922 after Rathenau^s murder.
Six months before, Germany had begun to rouse French wrath by asking
the Allies for leave to delay her payments. M Poincar6 soon threatened
that France would widen her grip across the Rhine and seize the Ruhr basin,
if there were any further default Nevertheless, in July, 1922, the Germans
pleaded inability, begging for time and some relief In August an Allies'
Conference met. M. Poincare demanded that no moratorium should be
granted to Germany without the seizure of such further assets on her soil
as might either be held in pawn to ensure further redemption, or form in
themselves productive guarantees." The other Allies insisted that M. Poin-
care's method would produce chaos, not cash They made counter-proposals
better designed, as they urged, to secure the cash and avoid the chaos. Their
plan was as unacceptable to the determined French Premier as his to them.
Conscious that he held the iron key of power behind this debate, M. Poincare
went back to Paris resolved in his own inner mind to complete the study of
means for bringing the controversy to an issue by strength of hand.
THE NEO-NAPOLEONIC PROJECT
Alarm was soon excited in Germany and Great Britain alike by the
revelation of the “ Dariac report " — first unearthed by The Manchester
Guardian. This was a secret memorandum drawn up by M. Dariac, Presi-
dent of the Financial Commission of the French Chamber. It recommended
German dismemberment by the virtual separation of the Rhineland from
the Reich, and the more prolonged control of the Rhine itself. M. Dariac,
as we have since learned, was at the same time in favour — see his preface,
dated October, 1922, to the formidable propagandist volume La Ruhr et
UAllemagne — of a further policy on the other side, the right bank of the
Rhine, which would establish French industrial supremacy over the as yet
unoccupied Ruhr basin, with its immense natural resources and manufacturing
power, conveniently crowded into a small area. This must be made in order
to bring about a combination between Westphalian metallurgical coke and
Lorraine iron ore. These incomparable Lorraine deposits are the basis of the
blast furnaces and great steel works controlled by the Comite des Forges.
J. L. GARVIN
143
This project meant the revival towards Germany of the policy of Louis XIV
and Napoleon. By the end of September, 1922, the British Cabinet, as the
result of its infatuated proceedings in the Near East, had come to stand within
a hair's-breadth of war with the flushed Turks after the Greek debacle.
Britain for the time was totally isolated in foreign policy. At that moment,
M. Poincare took his set and fateful decision: in company with Belgium, now
entirely bound to France, to advance on the further side of the Rhine and to
occupy the Ruhr basin.
The intention was not yet avowed. Technical calculations in connection
with the plan had to be worked out with care. Mr. Lloyd George and his
Coalition Government had come to political bankruptcy, and they disappeared.
Mr. Bonar Law, the new British Premier, was anxious for better relations
with France, but it was too late to make any impression on Paris. He and
other British statesmen were to learn more about the implacable fixity of the
Latin mind when fairly set in the mould of a preconceived idea In December
there was another Allies* Conference in London. It failed as completely as
its predecessor in August. M. Poincare, however, now openly declared that
German protests and promises were no longer worth discussing, and that no
progress could be made without some measure like the occupation of the Ruhr.
It was agreed to hold another meeting. The British Government did not yet
understand. When discussions were resumed at the beginning of January,
1923, they represented that Germany was approaching collapse and could
only pay after recovery. Mr. Bonar Law and his colleagues proposed to
grant Germany a moratorium for four years, with exception of certain mini-
mum deliveries in kind; to fix her debt finally at some reduced and payable
figure; while compelling her meanwhile to stop inflation in order to stabilise
both her Budget and the mark. To make these proposals acceptable, Britain
offered to cancel out of hand three-fourths of the French debt, amounting
to about £600,000,000. This was a large concession. French citizens, while
far less taxed, are at least as prosperous, head for head, as British citizens;
and the latter were unflinchingly arranging at this time to pay their own debt
to the United States. It was in vain. The difference between the mentality
of the two nations was a gulf. For nearly two years British Governments
had been urging revision and reduction of the German liability. French
Governments had as uniformly resisted, continuing to demand the impossible
according to the abstract rights conferred by the ill-starred Treaty of Ver-
sailles. They knew the impossible to be so financially, but to keep up the
extreme claim was a means to wield more political and military control. Now,
at Paris, in the first days of 1923, the final British scheme was turned down
without parley. It was not considered. This was the end of another chapter
in post-war history. M. Poincare had cast his die long before. Resolved on
separate action at any risk, he had worked out the method. France had
become, once more, so much the dominant power in Europe that, in fact, as
her Premier knew, there was no risk. From disarmed Germany there was
nothing to fear but passive resistance; from Britain, reluctant to break with
France, nothing but passive disapproval.
FRANCE INVADES THE RUHR — THE CROWNING TRAGEDY OF THE PEACE — THE
LONG GERMAN STRUGGLE — A HOPELESS EFFORT FOR EIGHT MONTHS —
DEATH OF THE MARK — THE SECOND SURRENDER
The French army invaded Westphalia on January 11, 1923, and advanced
on Essen, Dortmund, Bochum, and the rest. It was the beginning of a pas-
sage like nothing yet seen by modem civilisation in time of nominal peace.
144
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
The columns of troops with their steel helmets, artillery, tanks, machine-guns,
appeared amongst a working population trained as part of one of the greatest
fitting nations ever known, but now disarmed, defenceless as helots. They
knew that they had not been disarmed by France alone, but by the combined
power of all the European Allies and America. The inexpressible bitterness
of a new and unique hatred filled their veins. If they could not fight they
would refuse to assist in their own subjugation. They would resist to the
limit of endurance by such means as unweaponed men might use. It was
expected in Paris, however, that success would be almost immediate, that the
occupation of the Ruhr would mean in one fortnight the capitulation of the
Reich. Prolonged refusal of submission seemed impossible. All mechanical
calculations supported this view.
For was not the Ruhr like the neck of the whole German economic organ-
ism and the occupation like a throttle grip? Consider the nature and rela-
tions of this district. Marshal Foch had punned grimly: La Ruhr est une
rue” The whole region with its swarming population of miners and mechan-
ics, artisans and lab^ourers of every calling, is one of the densest centres of
industry in the world. Town is almost joined to town; many of them have
grown with American rapidity. In the agricultural spaces left between, the
fields are intensely cultivated The main impression is that of a landscape
packed with houses, factories, and forges, bristling with tall chimneys, loom-
ing with cylinders, clanging with machinery. The Ruhr area has the closest,
most complex railway network in existence, requiring for eflSciency with
safety, the most exact handling. The neighbouring and dependent Rhine
carries, moreover, in normal times, a larger volume of traffic than any one
main railway track in Europe or the United States. Marching in, the French
soldiers were almost appalled by the latent power which all this enormous
apparatus suggested ; but they were incensed by the evidences of full employ-
ment and confident enterprise, with new buildings going up on every side,
and improvements of an already mar\'^ellous transport system in process of
execution.
After the loss of the Saar and transfer of the industrial part of Upper
Silesia to Poland, Germany's coal production was wholly staked on the Ruhr.
There was no substitute And here were concentrated the interests of the
great industrialists — of Stinnes, of the Thyssens, Krupps, Haniels, Stumms,
Mannesmanns, and the rest — the magnates and millionaires, more powerful
than the German Government, who had maintained in their own interest a
system of fatal finance and weak taxation, without regard to the obligations
towards the Allies and partly with astute disregard. The Allies were mainly
to blame at the beginning for demanding the impossible, France most at this
date insisting upon the impossible and refusing sane revision in spite of the
entreaties of Great Britain and Italy. But the great industrialists control-
ling the Ruhr syndicates had been fiagrantly to blame. This essay, seeking
in good faith to disentangle the truth, so far as yet may be, from all the
difficulties of contemporary interpretation, is history, not polemics. French
action was disastrous from the standpoint of every principle of political wis-
dom accepted by the English-speaking w^orld. French official motives, so far
as they were connected with Neo-Napoleonic projects of breaking up Ger-
many, or with the ambition of the Comite des Forges to rivet a commercial
domination upon the Ruhr and its people, cannot be defended. But to
French national feeling as a whole, the prosperity and impunity of Germany,
suggested by the spectacle of the Ruhr, the facts of inflation, the gross evasions
of adequate taxation seemed a flaunting challenge and must be remembered
as some excuse. In politics, as in Othello, passion and misleading appear-
ances may be the soul of tragedy.
J. L. GARVIN 145
Despite the crushing weight of the French stroke, Germany under Dr.
Cuno’s Government gathered itself together for a desperate fight. It was a
hopeless fight, but they stood it out far longer than anyone outside Germany
had thought possible. The struggle so far from being over in a week, as
M. Poincar6 and his advisers thought they had every reason to reckon, lasted
for eight months and was by far the most remarkable effort of resistance
ever made by a people without arms. The German Government proclaimed
passive resistonce in the Ruhr and forbade all cooperation with the invaders.
The population of the Ruhr, well known for its stubborn temper, was not
only quick to respond but anticipated the order. Even if left to itself, it
would have resorted to every safe means of sullen obstruction and evasion.
The directors and experts of the great syndicates withdrew their books and
their services. Even the Socialist workers made common cause with their
employers. The French were in a situation where they could not retreat,
and the invasion, at first meant to be a parade, had to become an elaborate
and grinding tyranny such as Alsace-Lorraine under the Hohenzollerns or
Venetia under the Habsburgs had never known. Bullet, butt-end, and bayo-
net-point were the only possible instruments of this experiment. There was
necessarily a certain amount of shooting with a considerable number of
deaths and woundmgs, some of them amongst the French. These victims
on both sides were human counters — ordinary persons in uniform and out
of it, who had no responsibility in the great game of things Nearly five
years after the Armistice, Cowper’s little heroine might more than ever won-
der “what they killed each other for.” Meanwhile, the ex-Kaiser himself
was in ease at Amerongen and renewing matrimonial bliss. If deaths and
woundmgs were on the whole reasonably limited in the Ruhr, other punish-
ments were wholesale amongst the foolish population that could not bring itself
at once to kiss the bayonet. There were fines, imprisonments, and expulsions
for high and low. Freedom of speech and of the Press ceased to exist. Under
the French censorship, newspapers disappeared or became colourless cata-
logues of the more inoffensive facts. Hohenzollernism, speaking French like
Frederick the Great, had returned in a kepi instead of a pickelhaube. We
need not prolong this miserable story. The German Government imported
coal. The printing-press poured out more billions of marks to sustain the
Ruhr, though this process could only mean accumulation of paper to the de-
struction of money. All these things as regarded M. Poincare were dew-
drops on adamant. He demanded unconditional surrender, the abandonment
of passive resistance without stipulation. There was a solid France behind
him. By now the Comite des Forges, and other practical persons of business,
were sick of the senseless position they had lightly created. Though the pres-
sure on Germany was excruciating, France was not scathless. Coal deliveries
from the Ruhr were but a fraction of what they had been before the occupa-
tion, and numbers of the blast furnaces in Lorraine had to be blown out.
At last in June, the Cuno Government, which had long been ready for any
terms which would save the stability of the country and keep the R.uhr part
of the Reich, offered to accept the decision of any body of international ex-
perts as to what Germany ought to pay and how. On this, the British Gov-
ernment took up the matter once more with France and urged that the German
offer of absolute submission to impartial enquiry should be taken as a pre-
liminary of peace. This new controversy dragged on for months; once more
the Entente was strained to the utmost short of the breaking-point. M.
Poincare, sure of the nearer issue on which he had staked his whole politi^l
position, refused to accept any mediation on the part of Great Britain. He
was immovable in his resolve that Germany, like Paris aforetime, must stew
in its own juice until unconditional surrender was made.
T. B. Y. — VOL. I — 10
146
PEACE WITHOUT SETTLEMENT
By the end of the summer of 1923, Germany was at her last gasp and the
Ruhr a wilderness by comparison with what it had been. TTie metals of what
had been the busiest railway mesh in the world were like dead bones. The
numberless chimneys had ceased to smoke and the endless machinery to
run. The telephone system was paralysed. The streets were dark at night.
In unoccupied Germany the mass of unemployment threatened for the first
time to rise to a million of the workless and thus to approach British propor-
tions. The situation recalled Swift’s picture of the struggle between ten men
armed and one man in his shirt. Just after the middle of September the
mark had been finally reduced to the worthlessness of the ruble, and its
coming abandonment as legal tender was announced. German finance was
seeking to think out some new instrument of currency. The Ruhr struggle
was coming to an end. The end could only be the unconditional surrender
which M. Poincare had demanded. The French Premier, himself a man of
the frontier steeped in the old wrath after 1871, was an unquenched hater,
nor with all his rare ability and courage did he possess amongst his gifts
either fiexibility or magnanimity.
T
© Keystone Co
The opening in Belfast of the New Parliament for Northern Ireland in 1921 by their Majesties
King George and Queen Mary.
D. Lloyd George
Austen Chamber-
lain
Birkenhead
Winston S.
Churchill
L. Worthington-
Evans
Hamar Green-
wood
Gordon Hewart
trom Um iaU iff of.
thtt iMtriur'nt •htiU M taoiiltud t . .
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. «h« tvlia io » uMoU'vf r..- u
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uowaOM of SOft'lbMni iMlaod, uni if a|>||»ror»d sba^.! ba
x«%in«4 b/ blM latrlclutlon.
© Ufidenvood & Underwood
Arthur Griffith
Michael Collins
Robert Barton
£. J. Duggan
Gavan Duffy
British signatures
are in the left
column; Irish in
the right
The famous treaty for the establishment of the Irish Free
State, signed in London, December 6, 1921. Note the Gaelic
signatures of the Irish delegates.
CHAPTER IV
HISTORY OF OUR OWN TIMES— Continued
By J L. Garvin
Present and Future
FRANCE AND GERMANY — AFTER THE RUHR STRUGGLE — THE FEUD OF A THOU-
SAND YEARS MORE VIRULENT THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM — LORRAINE
IRON AND WESTPHALIAN COKE NAPOLEONIC INDUSTRIALISM AND A SUPER-
SYNDICATE.
When M. Poincare, at the end of September, 1923, had conquered the
Ruhr, twelve months after the irrevocable decision to invade, what would he
do with it? That was the crucial question for the future of Europe and prob-
ably the world. On the answer would depend the relations of France and the
British Empire; the prospects of the League of Nations and all other plans to
substitute judicial processes for the arbitrament of force; the ultimate fate of
peace. The French army was more exempt from any counter-force or check,
military or nawal, than in the time of Napoleon. Equipped with the strongest
air-power existing, able to double its strength by coloured levies from across
the Mediterranean, it was guarded ah sea by increasing flotillas of submarines.
This splendid machine, more supreme in relation to present European circum-
stances than Hohcnzollern might had ever been, held Germany in its grasp.
Would M. Poincare allow a stable regime to be created there? Or would he
take the course — and it was well in his power — which would promote chaos,
the dismemberment of Germany by the virtual separation of the Rhineland,
and the temporary disintegration of the rest of the Reich? No choice more
heavily fraught with alternatives of good or evil ever weighed upon the
responsibility of man.
The first problem of Paris was financial. For the moment, after the Ger-
man surrender, the means employed in the Ruhr had necessarily destroyed
the avowed object. Germany as a whole would have to be granted a mora-
torium, and, as the British had always urged, it would be several years before
cash payments to any considerable amount could be resumed. Yet the agri-
cultural mass of the French people wanted above all to see a palpable result
in coin; they were more interested in that aspect than in Marshal Foch’s
demand for a permanent Rhine frontier, or in the various theories of German
vivisection meditated by the pupils of Richelieu at the Quai d’Orsay. This
might seem, for M. Poincare, an acute dilemma. It was his ambition to make
the elections of May, 1924, in his character of the strongest statesman of the
time, and thereafter to remain Prime Minister for a longer period than any
of his predecessors since the foundation of the Third Republic. Crowned
with laurels, but with empty hands, he could not, with any hope, present
himself to the rural electors. Still less could he venture to propose, before
being returned to power, the more rigorous taxation which the French Budget,
no less than the German, imperatively requires. For escaping the dilemma
there were three suggestions. The first was to dictate, in conjunction with
147
148
PRESENT AND FUTURE
Britain, a settlement with Germany in general, based on participation in the
profits of German concerns and enterprises as well as upon export taxes. The
second was to obtain cash in hand by a loan on the London money market
capitalising Germany's promise to pay. This did not promise well. For one
thing, it would involve some serious effort on the part of France towards
redeeming her war debt to Great Britain. A third course, maintained by its
advocates to be the decisive plan, was regarded by strong influences in Paris
as the sure sequel. The resources of the Ruhr intensively treated would be
operated upon as a substitute for the resources of the Reich. In that region,
the French occupation would become invisible in the military sense, though
Marshal Foch would keep a striking force in the near neighbourhood for
instant use in emergency. French financial occupation would remain as the
real ‘‘productive guarantee." It would be a system not only of vigilant
supervision but of searching control. There would be a coal tax ; not a single
ton would be able to leave the Ruhr without contributing its item to Repara-
tions; and there would be a similar levy on all other exports whether to the
rest of the Reich or abroad. Free coal deliveries to France would be simul-
taneously resumed as Reparations in kind. Subject to these provisions, in-
dustrial enterprise in the Ruhr would be given every facility to return to
active production. This would enable M. Poincare to tell the French electorate
in view of May, 1924, that he had returned to them from the Ruhr ordeal,
bringing his sheaves with him.
No serious thinker could suppose that this plan by itself would succeed.
It would clog and depress the vigorous spint of German enterprise. The
sense of economic serfdom would mean an everlasting obstinacy of under-
effort on the part of the workers. More than ever they would resist reduction
of wages and extension of hours. Their antagonism to capital would be
doubled by hatred of the French. They might be slaves, but they would not
be willing slaves. The employers could have no zest in working the system.
It would be the instinct and the interest of every kind of human nature in
the Ruhr gradually to make the results disappointing to the French in the
hope of terminating their financial as well as their military occupation. For
the same purpose, the obvious course for the rest of Germany would be to buy
as little as possible from the Ruhr. Again, how could the projected French
system be worked at all without either severing the administration of the Ruhr
from that of the Reich, or attempting a dual regime which would be an exe-
crable hybrid? The French in any case would have to be masters in the
Westphalian coal-field as in the Rhineland. The system would mean further
dismemberment and could not mean anything else. After the May elections
of 1924, France would discover that this plan also was more Dead-Sea fruit.
It was therefore as near to certainty as probability can ever reach that
behind the screen of temporary methods, the substantial intention was to
compel the Ruhr syndicates to link up with the Comite des Forges, and thus
to create a coal and iron combination the most powerful in the world for
exporting purposes. The French State would doubtless have a special interest
in the profits. Indirectly the promotion of the prosperity of Lorraine, as of
all the metallurgical interests of the Third Republic, and of its manufacturing
power generally, would in any case be worth more than direct Reparations.
In return for such an arrangement, the Ruhr might presently be returned to
the Reich. Milder terms of final payment might then be granted And will-
ingly accepted by Germany as a whole.
The flaws in this reasoning also are perceptible. A Franco-German super-
syndicate of this magnitude could not be within itself a happy family. There
would be an everlasting incompatibility of temperaments as well as of both
J. L. GARVIN
149
private and patriotic interests. The German side would have to pay the
hipest price for its ore and would get the lowest price for its coal. The
stipulated French predominance would only mean, for the most vital indus-
tries of the Reich, another form of economic subjection. These terms alone
would not be enough to make it a German interest that the super-syndicate
should work well. This issue, in fact, like every other in connection with the
Poincare-Foch policy of “ Reparations and Security,” brings us to the crux
of the Ftanco-German problem. France can never obtain firm German co-
operation, nor change the cumulative hatred she has inspired, until she aban-
dons Marshal Foch’s conception of a military frontier drawn through the
body of the Reich; accepts the German right to national imity as no le^
sacred, inalienable, than her own; retires from the Rhineland as well as from
the Ruhr; and consents to the complete liberation of German soil. But this
would mean permitting the full recovery of the Reich, and there is nothing
that the Third Republic so much dreads. Under M. Poincare it has given
itself reason for dread. The gaping wounds of the war itself might have been
healed by wiser treatment at the Peace Conference; even the historic an-
tagonism between Gaul and Teuton for a thousand years might have been
closed had moderation, and even a certain clemency, been shown to the
German Republic after the Hohenzollem system had been swept away. But
at the end of 1923, the more ominous doubt that shadowed all thought about
the future was whether the invaders of the Ruhr, by trampling Germany
after her disarmament, had not gone too far to be forgiven in this generation
or the next. The slow unresting wheel of change in mortal things gives to
every great virile people, brought low by defeat, its chance again. In vain
at the utmost height of triumph are men heedless of these wheels of God.
FRENCH SECtJBITY AND GERMAN UNITY — THE “ FATHERLAND ” THE TERRI-
TORIAL PROBLEM AS THE CRUX
Thus we are only brought by the first problem to the second. The financial
question is inseparable from the territorial question If any just and manage-
able total for Reparations were finally fixed, Germany would pay like France
after 1871, if offered the same inducement. The German people would pay
for the complete deliverance of German land if that purpose could with cer-
tainty be achieved within such a reasonable period as might energise ordina^
men and women to strive towards an attainable goal. The cause that will
never die out is the recovery of the Rhineland and the Saar, as no less than
the Ruhr itself, flesh of the* flesh and bone of the bone of historic Germany.
This question is what that of Alsace-Lorraine was before the war, but far
bigger. If the German people could be sure of redeeming their provinces in
bondage within five or seven years, or even ten, from now, they would offer
large inducements to Paris. The chances of permanent peace and of the
reintegration of Europe on a normal basis would be incalculably improved.
If Paris, however, continues to insist that the 15 years’ term for the occu-
pation of the Rhine, as sanctioned by the Treaty of Versailles, has not yet
begun to run, and that she will keep the Rhineland and the Saar valley up to
about 1940 at least, even if she evacuates the Ruhr, then France must be pre-
pared for several things. First, no other great nation on earth will help her
in such a purpose, and an increasing number of great nations will condemn
it. Secondly, after a certain number of annual instalments of the great
tribute, however levied, the crisis on Reparations will recur when France is
iiiililfBl y to be as entirely dominant as in 1923; for that particular position
must pass, however stirong and brilliant France may remain as a nation
PRESENT AND FUTURE
150
amongst her peers. Thirdly, the German revolt, the new Befreiungskrieg,
would break out long before 1940. The Richelieu tradition, however, satu-
rates the Quai d’Orsay and most of the French politicians outside it who count
in the leadership of opinion on foreign policy. It is, unfortunately, not cer-
tain that France will consent on any terms to retirement from the Rhine and
complete deliverance of German land within five or seven or ten years. If
BO, the breaking of the French yoke will become, before this post-war gen-
eration is very much older, the cause of causes for which men in Germany,
and women too, will consent to be burnt at the stake. The heart of life is
grim in these matters. If we all have not learned that from the World War,
we have learned little. The general world will not be able to leave this
issue to be settled by France alone in the sense of the prevailing schools
deriving from Richelieu or Napoleon. To leave it at that would be too
dangerous, as we shall next see, for all civilisation.
The one overshadowing question is whether the Fatherland — not a word
of mockery for any lover of music, literature and science, for any lover of
civilisation — is to be vivisected or not. Is German unity, like that of any
other nation, to be recognised and upheld according to the principles that all
the English-speaking peoples fight for? Or is Germany to be broken up, even
temporarily, into three or four different regions, partly free, partly subject?
After the Thirty Years’ War, the final result of Richelieu’s masterly state-
craft, though he was dead, had helped to shatter the country into more than
three hundred pieces, big and little. To-day the fragments, resulting from
a break-up would be larger, but the spirit of disintegration would be the same,
and as immoral as the third partition of Poland. As the power of Britain
and America disarmed this Fatherland — a republic now, and no longer a
military empire — and left it wholly unable to protect herself, it is entitled
to some minimum of impartial protection from the English-speaking nations.
It must, in the nature of things, be long before France herself will be willing
to move in this great matter in accordance with general principles of political
justice and humane wisdom. Success is the tempter, and the Third Republic,
under the mingled influences of triumph and fear, is more tempted now than
was her conquering rival in 1871. Every German step towards full unity was
resisted by France; no student of history can expect the habit to change until
the moral disapproval of the world makes itself p^avely and steadily felt.
After a while, that would be enough. France, which knows so well how to
make herself a favourite nation, does not like to be unpopular; and for various
reasons, increasing in seriousness, despite passing appearances, cannot afford
to be so. The Separatist movement in the Rhineland is a purely artificial
creation, and without French encouragement, sedulously given thou^ not
formally avowed, would not have the shadow of a chance.
FASCISM AND BOLSHEVISM IN GERMANY
The Ruhr surrender left unoccupied Germany in a hazardous and desperate
position, where to save herself was not easy. The subversive elements of
the Left and the Right alike were raising their hands again to threaten the
moderate republic with overthrow. To preserve the economic existence of the
nation at all without the full control of the Ruhr, would be a heavy task.
With unemployment spreading and the winter approaching, the Communist
l^postles of chaos saw in the turmoil of the Reich, the last hope for
Bolshevism in Europe.
None the less, the fortunes of the Reich threatened to pass into the hands
of the Right whether by coup d*Stat or otherwise. One thing was cer-
J. L. GARVIN
151
tain — German imity might suffer passing interruption, but could not be
destroyed. France might as well hope to “ kill the stilUclosing waters ” by
stabbing them. Young men of liberal mind by temperament and heredity, who
would have been active opponents of the Right in ordinary times, were heart
and soul with it on patriotic grounds, believing it to offer the sole hope for
Germany’s unity and greatness. Looking ahead, they anticipated with good
reason the reexplosion of eastern Europe, within the next few years; and they
thou^t, though this sequel mi^t not be seen for a generation, that the
Russian and the German races with the Magyars — over 200,000,000 of people
together — would yet destroy the Treaty of Versailles and redeem all. It
had taken France 50 years to reverse 1870-1871. It would probably not take
Germany so long to reverse the results of 1918-1919. These, after the second
surrender in the autumn of 1923, were not only the calculations of what was
strongest in Germany, but they were the conception of the future to which
most of what was best in Germany had been driven. That no other resort
but this should be left to the German race, after its disarmament by the power
of the United States and Britain as well as France, could not be thought
promising for the prospects of civilisation, nor favourable to the confident
spirit and restful conscience of mankind.
A world’s AFFAra — THE ECONOMIC EFFECT ON ALL NATIONS
The truth issuing from this investigation is that no solution of the Franco-
German struggle can ever be brought about by peaceful means without the
intervention of other nations. It is the world’s affair. It prevents that
general, not one-sided, disarmament which the Allies and their Associate
solemnly declared must be the result of the war. The continuance and new
virulence of this secular feud prevents the return of the world’s quiet. By
far-reaching consequences transmitted from nation to nation, it stimulates all
violent and cynical tendencies. It vitiates more or less the moral and mental
atmosphere everywhere in the twentieth century. Materially, this problem
prevents the full revival of human prosperity by world-production and world-
traffic aided by stabilised currencies and exchanges. Before the war, the two
great consumers of overseas produce — American, Asiatic, African, Australian
— were the dense industrial democracies of Great Britain and Germany.
Germany, enriching by her demand the countries supplying food and raw
materials, made a better market for other manufacturing nations as well as
herself to sell in. Britain gained by it. The United States gained by it.
There is no substitute for it. There is not a farmer in the Middle West,
there is not a coffee-grower in Brazil nor a rancher in the Argentine, there is
not a wool-grower in Australia, but whether he knows it or not, is receiving
lower prices for his products because of present conditions. They hinder that
vigorous interplay of mutually stimulating influences which is the very life
of international commerce. Europe contains over 400,000,000 people. Their
far heavier consuming power in proportion is a characteristic of the white
race by comparison with all the coloured races; but Europe’s enormous con-
suming power will remain far less than what it was, and but half what it
might be, so long as those political perils and those economic disablements
are continued which follow far and wide from the present state of the Franco-
German struggle.
152
PRESENT AND FUTURE
FBENCH SUPREMACY AND BRITISH DEPRESSION — AIR-POWER VERSUS SEA-POWER
— UNEMPLOYMENT AND ARMAMENTS
The case of Britain in this regard is severe. Politically, her position
is irksome and thankless; economically, it is worse. She has sacrificed
her internal agriculture utterly for the sake of manufacturing development.
She is less based upon the home market, more staked upon exports and
imports, than any other society existing or likely to exist. Her people depend
absolutely for livelihood and process upon the prevalence of normal condi-
tions in the world. She has a million and a half of her workers out of em-
ployment, supported by public funds, and with this unexampled depression
of trade she bears a load of taxation which would be an unparallelled burden
even if her commercial prosperity were at its zenith. In an economic sense,
the war was a disaster for Britain, as much as for Germany. Before the war,
British trade with the continent of Europe was so large a part of the whole
that it was indispensable for the full employment of the island-democracy.
These conditions make it imperatively necessary for Cabinets in London to
work for stabilising Europe; to press for the reduction and final fixation of
Germany’s liabilities; to try to moderate French counsels. Nor are the
reasons for this course economic only. The British, though of notable ob-
stinacy in a quarrel, are done with it when it is over, and are ready to make
friends. They lack, even to obtuseness, the vindictive part of historical
memory.. All that impartial experts might determine to be just and prac-
ticable as regards Reparations they want Germany to pay, and even mean to
see that she does. But, they believe that the 'German nation is as much en-
titled to its unity as any other nation. They do not want to break up Ger-
many. The British working-classes have no appetite whatever for holding
down the German working-classes. Britain genuinely thought that France
would be content with Alsace-Lorraine and never dreamed that old Bourbon
and Napoleonic claims to the Rhine as a frontier would be revived. Generally
the difference of mentality in politics and economics alike is so wide, as be-
tween France and Britain, that no two nations existing are more nearly anti-
thetical. The island, taking divergence of opinion and interest as natural
though disagreeable, advocates working compromise; its Latin neighbour, with
tenacious logic, reiterates its own views. The French become quickly exas-
perated; the British slowly alienated. Yet the latter keep more restrained
because they know that an open breach between the two peoples would only
change the situation in Europe from bad to worse and involve new conse-
quences of the gravest order.
After the war, Britain, agreeing to cede her old sea-supremacy and to
accept naval equality with the United States, meant to reduce her armaments
in other respects to the lowest point consistent with safety. Unawares, she
fell below that point. She dismantled her magnificent Air Force. When she
awakened again to post-war realities, and remembered that in the air age
she had ceased for all purposes of defence to be an island, she found France
in possession of an overwhelming air supremacy; and in relation to that fact,
Britain was in a more disadvantageous predicament than at any time in her
history. Naval power alone was no longer the check on military France that
it had been for centuries. The French had vividly realised the truth of this
situation, and it accounted for the decision and confidence with which they
began to repel British views on the German question and to undertake sepa-
rate action. Britain was accordingly in this extreme dilemma — that either,
so far as concerned Europe, she must passively allow the sacrifices of her
people in war to become the suicide of their livelihood, though without them
J. L. GARVIN
153
France would have been annihilated; or^ she must re-arm in order to secure
more attention to her views or necessities and to reassert her due share of
influence in the European question. Though she had taken preliminary steps
to make her Air Force something more than negligible, she was most reluctant
to re-arm thoroughly in that respect. It was what she would have to do if
France refused to modify a policy which could only mean the dismemberment
of Germany, with rising armaments, political dislocation, increasing dangers,
and prolonged economic chaos in Europe as a whole.
FRANCE, BRITAIN, GERMANY AND OTHERS — COOPERATION THE ONLY SOLUTION
— THE FUNDAMENTAL TERMS
As these pages are written, early in the year 1924, it is plain to many
* thoughtful minds that there is only one way to banish this nightmare brooding
over all western Europe after the invasion of the Ruhr and the second Ger-
man surrender. Either things will go worse before they go better, or states-
manship capable of reason and foresight must try to bring about some definite
system of cooperation between France, Britain, and Germany, with Belgium
assisting. Italy’s inclusion in that system would be in every sense desirable;
it would involve definite understandings with regard to Mediterranean policy,
which Signor Mussolini might or might not think it proper to accept. The
British must guarantee for 20 years ahead at least, in terms of definite Al-
liance, the security of France proper including Alsace-Lorraine, and also of
Belgium The British terms in return for this must provide that the Ruhr
shall again become an integral part of the economic system of the Reich;
that every suggestion of permanent dismemberment by the severance of the
Rhineland shall be repudiated once for all; that on the contrary the Rhine-
land shall also remain part of the German system with no intermediary
customs’ line; and that further national hope and inducement to pay shall
be given to the German people, by fixing a definite date for the full and final
liberation of all German land from the armies of occupation. That date
ought to be at furthest 10 years from 1924 — long enough, and practically
the full period of 16 years originally contemplated by the Peace Conference.
Germany would have to accept the Allies’ supervision of her finances during
the 10 years’ term, and would have to satisfy them that her taxation was
equal to the British in scale and as efiiciently enforced, and that all means
were being honestly exerted to stabilise her Budget and her currency. The
total of Reparations and the method of payment would be finally fixed at
such a reduced and perfectly payable figure of about £2,500,0^,000, as
thoughtful British opinion since the Peace Conference has steadily urged.
If there were any culpable default, after the ex-enemy’s resumption of pay-
ments, Britain would join with France as a matter of course in measures of
distraint.
The advantage of this scheme to France and Belgium is that it would give
them security for as far ahead as mortals need look into the incalculable
future ; and would obtain for them more money , and a better assurance of
continued payment than they could get by any other means. Likewise
France could appeal again — as she sorely needs — to the money-markets of
London and New York. The advantage to Britain would be that, while in
any case a vast loser by her war-loans, she would obtain Reparations sufficient
to cov^r part of her American debt which must otherwise depress the standard
of life of her people for half a century to come and put her in the long run
in a worse position than Germany; and also Britain would gain the wider
purpose of promoting the restoration of normal conditions in Europe. The
PRESENT AND FUTURE
154
advantage to Germany would be the guarantee of her stability, of her full
unity, and of the final deliverance of all her soil from foreign occupation
within a decade — a period not too long to take away the zest of hope and
the incentive of work. It will be dif5.cult to gain French consent, especially
tmder the existing Poincar4-Foch regime, to such an essential feature of tiie
scheme as a pledge to relinquish the Rhineland in about 10 years; but yet
the other inducements are so great that Paris might well think twice and
thrice before rejecting a more favourable settlement than in all human likeli-
hood would ever be offered to her again. Germany would protest that the
terms were too hard, but after the war it is a hard world for many, and on
the choice of evils before her this would be the least; for even the German
Bright, when it dreams of another war, must remember the terrible fact that
another war of any kind, with all its destruction, would be fought mainly in
German territory — not French. For all this, the twentieth century is the
age of aircraft, over-riding national boundaries, and it would not be well for
France and Belgium to drive the German scientific intelligence to despair,
and to m^e such a nation’s last necessity the mother of terrible invention.
The plan is not so boldly reconciling as Britain by herself would offer, for she
would rather see all occupied Germany liberated in five years at the most,
rather Uian ten. Any theory of cooperation between France, Britain and
Germany must involve doubts and difficulties. But cooperation between these
nations offers the sole prospect of a safe exit from political and economic
chaos in Europe; that is, so long as the United States stands aloof from its
affairs.
THE WORLD VIEW — 1894-1924 — THIRTY YEARS AFTER — ASIA AND ANARCHY
— AMERICA THEN AND NOW
Looking some decades ahead the broad doubt concerning the future of
white civilisation in the minds of all men accustomed to contemplate past
politics and present history as a whole, is whether there ever can be any real
world settlement without America and whether America can hope to escape,
at least, heavy consequences of unsettlement. Little could the United States
have dreamed of being drawn into a virtually universal war, involving all
continents and oceans by the crime of a few fanatical assassins in Serajevo
and by the war clique in Vienna, wrought up to risk all established things
in a last attempt to maintain by hazard of arms, in the twentieth century,
an empire, which was essentially a survival of the Middle Ages and which
\Fith all its polyglot discords and racial antagonisms, had become inherently
impossible. What was America to the Habsburgs, and what were the Habs-
burgs to America, that she should bleed on account of them and make herself
mighty in arms to cross an ocean? Could any possible fact of the future
be more remote from present conception than was, even 10 years ago, the
sequence of destiny which made America the arbiter of Europe; though un-
happily for Europe, and it may ultimately be for herself, the imprepared
arbiter. Yet it must always be noticeable in a comprehensive view that on
the opposite side from America there is still another continent than Europe,
and that influences in Asia are inseparable from events in what is geograph-
ically only its western projection — a projection where a number of intensively
active white races in relatively small lands created that thing, miraculous in
its genius for invention, power and beauty, appalling in its potentiafities for
evil and destruction, which we call modem civilisation.
Let us endeavour in our minds to grasp the comparison between the pic-
ture of the world to-day and what the picture was some 30 years ago at the
J. L. GARVIN
156
point where this introduction to the study of our time began. The era of
world politics in the fullest sense began, as we saw, in the early nineties —
perhaps precisely in 1894 when William II and Nicholas II began their fatal
intimacy, closely connected with one startling event in Asia, which led by
strange and inexorable processes to the catastrophe of the then existing
order in Europe, and pulled America from afar into the vortex. Just be-
fore, in the humdrum days when Benjamin Harrison of Indiana was Presi-
dent, America was already a Great Power, but in no sense dominant either
in the politics or economics of mankind. Four-fifths of her foreign-bom
population were from the British Islands or from the Germanic and Scandina-
vian races closely akin to the original American stock. The tremendous in^
fiux of immigration from eastern and southern Europe, bringing in widely
different bloods, bad scarcely begun. The racial amalgam was pretty much
what it had been at the time of the Civil War. In 1894 America’s population,
though, for physiological and psychic purposes alike, far more homogeneous
than now, was something over 60,000,000. It was not so much more than the
population of Germany alone. Spain still ruled, in the West and East Indies,
colonies she had held since Columbus. British commercial supremacy in the
world markets was not yet seriously breached either by America or Ger-
many. In Russia, the new Tsar had roughly rejected petitions for a minimum
of constitutional reform, and never dreaming that he would not transmit the
arch-crown of autocracy to his heirs, he had sworn with pious ineptitude to
follow in the footsteps of the sombre, immovable despot, his father. Japan,
at the beginning of this marking year, 1894, was almost universally regarded
as an ingenious imitative race, somewhat more considerable than Siam. In
that summer, 30 years ago, the Japanese blow that brought China to the
ground, as David brought Goliath, began the series of evente that dashed the
old order of the world to pieces. The Russian Tsardom, in its turn, was
thrown back by Japan from the Far East to the Near East only to be fore-
doomed in the latter sphere by the internal results of its downfall in the
former. We have traced the sequence.
What of the world-picture of 1924, a generation after? One,,«ffipire uaa
vanished wholly from the map. The name and being of the Haasburg Mon-
archy are sunk like Atlantis. Two others of the empires that were have cast
their long-descended dynasties; Republican in style, they have been changed
in substance out of recomition by incredible vicissitudes. The state of Europe
as a whole, we have already examined under a searching light. Asia? It,
too, in a different way, is transformed in a manner unimaginable at the outset
of the full era of world-policy. Japan, where men still live who wore chain
armour in their youth, has become one of the five strongest Great Powers, and
her representatives sometimes preside at Geneva over the League of Nations.
What fairy tale ever told surpasses this political wonder of our time? China,
which we can all recollect as the synonym for massive changelessness, became
a republic in 1911, and the Dragon throne fell with the Manchu Dynasty.
Yuan shih-K’ai died in 1916 when on the point of creating a new empire and
since then, the coimtry which embraces at least a sixth of all mankind, prob-
ably a fifth, has fallen into anarchy. Its disjointed provinces are ruled by
military satraps, with their lawless levies; and 10 years of civil strife and
rampart brigandage have caused more mortality and suffering than Russia
ever knew, amidst a patient population — slow to be perturbed even by con-
vulsions — which still goes about its business with stolid diligence so that its
commerce with the world is more progressive, in spite of all, than that of
dislocated Europe. Yet on the economic side, China’s own prosperity and its
contribution to the recovery of the world’s prosperity are small by comparison
PBESENT AND FUTURE
156
witii what they might be. On the political side, what was intraided to be
Celestial Republic cannot emerge from anarchy without external assistanc
The only kind of supervision not likely to lead to another universal destructio
of the world’s peace, from original Far-Eastern causes as before, involves i
least the restoration under the leadership of the United States of somethii
like the former Concert of the Great Powers including Russia and German
as well as Japan.
There is a parallel Asiatic problem equal in magnitude. It is that (
India, another part of what may be called the swarming continent, ai
likewise including a sixth of mankind. There, British rule is grappling wit
the most trying task it has yet encountered. The policy of gradual advani
towards self-government, introduced amidst the idealistic emotions of the wi
after America’s intervention and in the first deceptive stage of the Russia
Revolution, was an unmatched endeavour of its kind, but dependent f<
all its practical virtue upon a firmly literal interpretation of the woi
“ gradual.” The immeasurable problem, however, is like the former state (
the Irish question but infinitely magnified. India, totally unlike Russia <
China, is not a relatively homogeneous portion of the human stock. It is
congeries of different races, languages, sects, and castes, with many millioi
excluded and despised by the castes; with different levels of civilisation, t!
highest equal, amongst a small minority, to the best-educated white intell
gence, the lowest still barbarous. In this enormous medley, brought in
political order and held together in peace by British rule and nothing else -
though full of defects — the latent antagonisms are of anarchio potentialii
such as even Asia has not known hitherto nor the mind of man conceive
Yet there is no content with the gradualness essential to the British schen
as to ail orderly transition. To restrain the imagination of Russian Bo
shevism in the mad summer of 1917 before the ruin and disillusionmcr
would have been easier than to curb to-day the visions of the extremis
among the Indian intelligentsia. British rule and railways have created an i
lusion of imity to which no political reality corresponds. They have instituti
a compulsory, and, as it were, artificial peace resting upon no natural basi
As a searching thinker has said (Charles Pearson in one of the disturbii
books of the last 50 years. National Life and Character), for every wi
the British have waged in India they have prevented twenty. But tl
British raj has been of late like a house built on an incline of grotmd liab
to subsidence; and unless, in addition to the moral vision which has set tl
ultimate goal, it has the even, unflinching nerve to control the process ■
advance, and to check it when the heady sweep of agitation tends to can
all away, the present tenure of Indian suzerainty by a little European islan
will not endure for another generation.
The part played by that island from Elizabeth to now in all the coi
tinents, Europe, America, Asia, Africa, Australia, alike, has been a wonderf
epic, such as would have been beyond fantasy were it not true in fact, b'
Britain, after nearly three centuries of increasing good fortime, has fair
come to her testing-time at last. The probability is rtill that she will survii
it, and that her deliberate and neglectful patience, combined with her ampl
tade of vigour and resource when a crisis is patent, will maintain her positic
in India for longer than is ezpected by the general view of other natioi
to-day. There can be no doubt that if Britain were from any cause i
withdraw from India during the next 30 years — that is to say, during
period no longer than that surveyed by the present study — the resultai
anarchy would be quelled either by Moslem domination or by some forei(
power following an invitation from one or other warring element to interven
Next carrying our thought westward thro;i^ the Islamic sphere whi(
DELEGATES TO THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OP 1923 IN THE GARDEN AT NO. 10 DOWNING ST., LONDON
Top row: Mr. Thompson, Professor Skelton, Sir Maurice Hankey, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mr. Burton, Mr. Graham, Mr. Wilson, Sir Lomer Gouin, Mr. de
W’et, Mr. Davidson, Sir J. B. Masterton-Smith, Sir R. Garran, Mr. Harding, Captain Lane, Mr. Carew.
Lower row: Maharajah of Alwar, Duke of Devonshire, Mr. Massey, Lord Curzon, Mr. Mackenzie Mr. Stanley Baldwin, Mr. Bruce, Lord Salisbury,
General Smuts, Mr. W. R. Warren, Lord Peel, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald.
J. L. GARVIN
167
finks Asia to Europe, and Africa to both, we perceive several changes and
developments not less astonishing in their way than the rise of Japan, the
indescribable adventure essaying to convert the Middle Kingdom into a
Chinese Republic, and the disturbance of India by new movements breaking
up the former mental foundations of the great deep. The Ottoman Empire
of 30 years ago under Abdul Hamid has given place to a racial state more
restricted but more solid: the new Turkw is in effect a Fascist Republic
with Mustapha Kemal as its Mussolini. That it will remain satisfied with
its present curtailed and close boundaries is by no means to be presumed.
Islam, meanwhile, is as disunited as China and nearly as disunited as that
far-spread discordant miscellany which was once called Christendom. The
race of the Prophet is free from Turkish bondage, but as far as ever from
being at one within itself. King Husein rules at Mecca; his sons in Mesopo-
tamia and Trans jordania. But all these regimes are dependent on British
support as against the incohesion of tribes and sects. If the British with-
drew, the Turks would return. The French, holding Syria and Damascus,
are on uneasy terms with Turks and Arabs alike. The British holding Pales-
tine and Jerusalem, less for any serviceable objects of their own than for the
sake of Zionism, are in a case which is no better and might easily become
worse.
Zionism: its romance and rrs dangers — the true hope
This survey throughout has been a record of wonders as well as disasters,
but when we view the attempt to establish Zionism in Palestine under a
British Mandate, we must agree that this is the most fascinating enterprise
of the new age, whatever may be thought of the principle and whatever may
become of it in practice Constructive imagination in politics never under-
took an enterprise so romantic, bold, and delicate. It may remind us of
the labours of a chemist, who, seeking a process to realise a vision of possi-
bility, is not sure whether he will produce a precious substance or an explo-
sion In these compressed pages we can only glance at the experiment in
passing, but we must try to present the essentials. As a result of the devoted
zeal of Jews, who believed that the preservation of the distinctive soul of
their scattered race depended upon their success in propaganda, the British
Government was induced to take up the cause. On November 2, 1917, they
issued the celebrated ‘‘ Balfour Declaration.” It was in favour of the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, subject,
however, to the rights of other races, especially the Arabs, who are and will
remain a large majority. It must be remembered that the Holy Land —
unlike Rome or Mecca — is sacred alike to all three monotheistic faiths,
Moslem, Christian and Hebrew. After the war, one of the ablest amongst
living Jewish statesmen, formerly a Cabinet Minister in the British Govern-
ment, was appointed High Commissioner. With breadth and judgment, Sir
Herbert Samuel has pursued his task of trying to draw conflicting elements
into a working agreement, but it has often seemed as impracticable as the
squaring of the circle. The Arabs, with an increasing vehemence of hostility,
refused to cooperate with the Government. They have benefitted by the sani-
tation and the public works, the general cleansing and improvement, which
accompany British administration in the East wherever it goes, but they
claim as the overwhelming majority — four-fifths of the inhabitants — to be
masters in what they regard as their own land. It is certain that the political
ambition of extreme Zionism to establish by degrees a Jewish domination in
Palestine, or a separate Jewish State of any kind, will have to be abandoned.
PRESENT AND FUTURE
168
The attempt could only end in massacre worse than the old Russian pogroms
from which many of the Hebrew settlers fled. The Arabs will resist anything
like an unlimited influx of immigrants.
But moderate Zionism, while gradually increasing the number of its
adherents by selected immigration, has still every chance to realise the far
greater spiritual dream of making Palestine the cen^ not only of Hebrew
religion, learning and literature, but of thought and idealism with respect to
all the special political and social problems of Jewry throughout the world.
From its pledge to supjrart this part of an appealing adventure, the British
Government is quite unlikely to flinch, though facing a new diflSculty added to
the thousand others that beset it. From the growth of Zionism as a spiritual
and intellectual system, with its university and schools, as well as from those
technical and financial aids to the general development of the country, which
the Jews bring with them, the Arabs have everythmg to gain. The vital
interest of Zionism at this phase is to allay Arab fears of excessive immi-
gration and ultunate domination.
AFRICA — NEWEST WINE AND OLDEST BOTTLE — SPAIN AND MOROCCO — LA
FRANCE NOIRE — AFRICA IN EUROPE
From Asia, in this picture of world-politics 30 years after, we turn to
Africa. In Egypt of the dim dynasties — nearly as much earlier than
Tutankhamen as he was earlier than we — it is a question whether the new
wine of nationalism will not burst the oldest of all political bottles. The
British, going further than in India, have offered independence, subject to
reservations safeguarding the Suez Canal and foreign residents, while pro-
viding against the intrusion in these changed circumstances of any other
foreign Power. Here, as elsewhere, it is difficult to bring extreme nationalism,
when once inflamed by ample concessions, to any kind of compromise; and
impossible to convince them that all political dreams, even after the war,
have hard practical limits. It is certain that if Britain were to leave Egypt
and Palestine the result would not be freedom for either, but that they would
be occupied by the Italians or the French.
At Hie opposite point in North Africa, Spain continues the stru^e which
has drained her of blood and money for years without avail; the result of
the Moroccan campaign undertaken by the new Dictator, General Prime de
Rivera and his military junta, will doubtless do more than anjrthing else
to decide the fate of the Spanish form of Fascism.
By far the greatest thing which has happened in Africa is the rounded
coiqpletion by France of a splendid Colonial Empire, the largest existing
next to the British Empire and far more consolidated. It forms one unin-
terrupted dominion, covering 3,000,000 square miles with a population of
over 30,000,000 inhabitants. Lying on the opposite shores of the Mediter-
ranean, where that sea can be crossed by aeroplanes with ease, and where
shipping tramit is short, this immense possession is far more closely licked
with the ruling Power than are colonies to any other coimtry. This is
" La France Noa-e ” which, by one of the most remarkable developments in
European history, has been mcorporated with the military system of tiie
Third Republic. In spite of the declining birth-rate at home, France relies
confidently upon the reservoir of fighting force in the vast trans-Mediter-
ranean Empire near at hand and magnificently organised. M. Poincare
reminded Germany in one of his resounding speeches that for military pur-
poses she has to deal with a larger population than her own. Ilie dark
160
J. L. GARVIN
iaroops are a normal and indispensable part of French power in Europe, and
they may be reckoned henceforth as forming at least a third of the French
armies.
tmPBECEDBNTED INCBEABE OF ABMIBS IX POST-WAB EtlBOPE — MIUTAXT NEW
NATIONS — THE DEOBEE OF FBENCH BOTBEMACY — BU8SIA AND THE DIS-
ABMED PEOPLES
Amongst all the abnormal developments of oiu* epoch this is the strangest
and the most disturbing, perhaps saddest, to all serious thinkers upon the
problems of post-war civilisation. But it is part, and the most disquieting
part, of that portentous question of increasing armaments to which we must
now direct our view. There is a process in action which of necessity must
prove mortal to ^e world’s peace imless some form of concerted civilised
intervention can arrest it in time. We have seen how, after the German
triumph in 1871 and the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, rival armaments were
built up to a climax. We have seen how in July, 1914, “the machines
began to move of themselves ” ; how mobilisation meant war because every
hour lost or gained might be charged with propitious or adverse fate. The
time factor, minutely reckoned, entered vitally into calculations of mathe-
matical fineness. Superior speed in initial movement was the essence of
advantage. The deadly fear of defeat, if rival and rather slower armaments
were given more time, the desire to make the most of an immediate efficiency
ensured by the labour of years, prevented the delay that woidd have saved
the peace. The growth of competitive armaments must mean war in the
end and never can mean an3rthing else. The moment of clash comes; the
killing instruments are used for their purpose. But in this respect what has
been the sequel of the Peace Conference? Let us see. The defeated four —
Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria — were indeed reduced to
defencelessness. Their Moslem partner, Turkey, escaped that penalty and
by a reinvigorated fighting force fairly reversed the main result of the World
War, so far as she was concerned, and achieved victory at a second remove.
But what of the conquering majority in the rest of Europe — the Allies,
their client states and Russia. They maintained or supplied about 3,000,000
troops on what was called a peace-footing before the war. On what is called
a peace-footing they maintam at least 4,500,000 troops after the war. The
latter number may be more because all figures are not candidly given; for,
as amongst the Italian Fascisti, various auxiliary organisations, ready for
service, supplement the strength of the standing armies. The new states,
big and little, whose creation or expansion were hailed by all believers in
national liberty and racial unity, are military states, one and all. They
have multiplied armies like Customs Houses. Poland, for instance, main-
tains an army on the scale of a Great Power before the war; it is the most
conspicuous and effective thing in her national life, and it is the object of
her idolatry. Including Poland, the emancipated states, like Czechoslovakia
and Finland, and those so enlarged as to be practically new, like Rumania
and Yugoslavia, keep over a million soldiers on a peace-footing. This in
itself is “terrifying” as was remarked by one of the brilliant soldiers of
the war, the late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. But we have not begun
to count the Great Powers. Britain has reduced her army to the limit, just
as she has restricted her fleet by agreement with the United States. Nomi-
nally, the Frmich army as respects numbers — 736,000 men in 1922 — is no
larger than in 1913, but its equipment of machine-guns and aircraft makes
PRESENT AND FUTURE
160
it iDcomparably more formidable in real force than then; and it is undoubtedly
in relation to its neighbours a more irresistible milit^ organisation than
has ever existed since the strongest days of Imperial Rome. The preponder*
ance of Louis XIV or Napoleon was not so absolute. The Soviet State, like
the Tsardom, has to depend on numbers rather than equipment, and it keeps
1^,000 men with the Red colours. This largely accounts for the dis-
proportionate size of the armies maintained by the chain of new states on
the borders of Russia. To understand the present working-system of Europe,
we must remember that Poland and the Little Entente — Czechoslovakia,
Rumania and Yugoslavia — are all closely connected with France by milii
tary arrangements, formal or informal. Russia and Italy are the only
checks upon this system. If Warsaw in conjunction with Paris attacked
Germany, the Soviet State would undoubtedly attack Poland. The Italian
army was reduced after the Armistice, but it has been strengthened again
and more than appears, imder Mussolini. It is a check on the French systems.
All these armaments are defended on the plea of security, like the lesser
aggregate of armaments before the war; and it is a plea to which there is
no present answer. Satire and irony can make what sport they will with
this sequel of the Peace Conference. It is useless to launch rebuke upon
the new crescendo of militarism amongst all the neighbours of the dis-
armed peoples, Germany and Austria, Hungary and Bdgaria. There is in
fact no other security for the new states except their own fighting strength
and that of their protector, France. There is no security in the League of
Nations as it exists. And no security can begin to be effective until for
one thing Soviet Russia is fully readmitted to the political circle of civilisa-
tion, and for another thing either a stronger League of Nations is formed,
or an adequate peace-association of another kind is created.
Otherwise, the monstrous growth we see can only be a bepnning, and
armies must increase and multiply still more, as after 1871, until another
explosion comes at last. There is little need to refer to the intensifying
virulence of the scientific accompaniments. Every wakeful imagination in
the world is aware of them. The poison-laboratories are part of the arse-
nals, and all our apprehensions probably fall short of what chemical research
is achieving in this department. The bombing-powers of aeroplanes to-day
CM turn towns into death-traps. The crashing of houses and the deaths of
civilian inhabitants in the last war would appear a mild and puny perform-
ance of amatemrs by comparison with the destruction of whole streets and
quarters, the indiscriminate massacre of women and children as well as
men, which the advancement of the science of annihilation since the Peace
Conference has made possible even now. Trench wars will not be seen
again. Even massed wars of movement in the field like the closing battles
of 1918 are probably obsolete. But let us not be deceived by a change
of fashion. If the world drifts after 1918-1919 for a few decades even, as it
drifted for nearly half a century after 1870-1871, the ultimate contest will
be between the entire nations of the belligerents. Every man, woman and
chUd capable of using their hands will have to use them for their lives when
cities are the targets. To turn out aeroplanes, bombs, gas shells and poison
shells, tanks and machine-guns for the purpose of the more highly technical
concMtrated coi^cts of tile future, will be the task of whole populations
working by millions, day and night, to destroy each other from a distance.
J. L. GARVIN
161
BEVIBION AND MITIGATION OF THE PABIS TBEATIE5
Inseparable again from the question of armaments is that of providing
some efficient international system for establishing by process of peace some
nearer approach to political justice than the order which has prevailed, in
Europe at least, since the Pans Conference. The hardest thing of all, no
doubt, is to undo, to some equitable extent, what was then misdone. The
mutilation and deprivation of the defeated, though much was properly taken
from them, went too far. The sweeping alteration of Russia’s western
frontiers and economic connections with the Baltic Sea and Central Europe
was a stupendous error for which no defence ever can be offered, if it is
indeed the duty of statesmen to look beyond the day and not to lay up
calamity for the future. There is only one thing stronger than the cause
of unconditional peace and that is the cause of justice which nounshes in
beaten and despoiled men, through their darkest years, an inextinguishable
potency of ultimate revolt against wrong. The renewed menace of com-
petitive armaments and the lessening securities for enduring and confident
peace, are problems which cannot be solved unless some means can be
contrived for revising the peace treaties of 1919, which sowed the Dragon’s
Teeth, already springing up as armed men in myriads. Germany, Austria,
Hungary, Bulgaria, cannot be permanently content with their present
bounds. This is not the place to consider details of rectification, though
it is a momentous study to which closer human thought most urgently needs
to be applied; but all these nations must either be placed by consent in a
more bearable position or, in the long run, they will strike for it. These
nations have not less spirit than the Turks. They are only for the moment
more helpless.
Their total disarmament in the midst of nations more rampantly armed,
as we have described, is no doubt a more effective disability than has
usually been imposed upon conquered peoples. But can it last? Time
passes. All circumstances change. The unexpected happens. Accidents
and internal maladies sometimes overtake successful nations as success-
ful men. Not all the victors and their clients will be equally wise or
equally fortunate. We know that things contrary to right human nature
cannot endure, no matter what extent of artificial advantage they may seem
to possess at a given time. No student of European history can think it
at all probable that the German race can be held down for ever and a day —
or even for a single generation — by a military power imsoundly based like
that of Prance on the attempt to compensate for a deficient birth-rate by
multiplying black levies. The whole of eastern Europe, in the next few
years, is very likely to erupt, and if the accumulation of armaments goes
on, the German race is bound by some means to regain access to arms.
Nor if ordinary weapons are denied, can German intellect be relied on to
remain as defenceless as are German hands to-day. It is possible that
neither rifles, nor bayonets, nor even heavy artillery, will be the decisive
weapons of the future; and as was remarked at another point in these pages,
it may not be finally safe to make dire necessity the mother of terrible
invention in Germany. Russia’s position amongst the nations which cannot
be content with the Paris Treaties is very different and obviously more for-
midable. Perhaps, but slowly, yet very surely, it is bound to become incal-
culably more formidable. Russia is not disarmed. Though the nominal
numbers of the Red Armies are deficient in equipment, that will increase
and improve. Her national spirit has not been extinguished by Bolshevism.
T. B. Y. — VOL I — 11
162 PRESENT AND FUTURE
Apart from racial feeling, the Soviet State is influenced by the same geo-
graphical necessities which impelled the less intelligent Tsardom. Russia
is bound to seek freer access to open water both in the Baltic and the
Mediterranean. She must have such relations with the new small stetes
hurriedly thrust by the Allies between her and the Baltic as will permit of
the same free commercial access to that sea as she had before. Her
economic interest in the question of Constantinople and the Straits, which
no man can suppose to be Anally settled, will continue to be larger than
that of all other countries put together; as the decades pass, it must be-
come relatively larger and larger still. Nor can it be thought for a^ moment
that Poland can permanently stand unless her over-reaching extensions into
the proper sphere of the Russian races are relinquished, and large rectifica-
tions of that frontier are voluntarily conceded. It seems as probable as
anything which a sober measurement of consequence can suggest, that the
Russian question will have a decisive influence upon the German position
and upon that of all the defeated states; and that the exorbitant system of
domination in Europe established by the victors and their clients through
tee Paris Treaties will ultimately be overthrown from the eastern side.
When Communism is as dead in Russia as Jacobinism after a few years was
extinct in France, Russian Nationalism will remain. The whole State of
Europe as it exists five years after the Great Armistice makes for renewed
war, even more certainly, more inevitably, for war, whatever the period of
delay, than the nature of the situation made for war before the late world
conflict. Without the establishment of some powerful and dispassionate
means of revising the actual terms of the Paris Treaties or mitigating their
more equitable and unbearable effects by new arrangements, we cannot ex-
pect that there will be any decrease of danger or any abatement in the new
multiplication of armaments. In the end, these fighting instruments would
be applied to their purposes. There can be no reasoned presumption in
favour of world-peace unless there is established some manner of world-system
to induce no less than to enforce it, by exercising powers of revision in the
interests of practical justice as well as of guarantee for the security of such
landmarks as no neighbour may rightfully remove.
THE SUPREME QUESTION FOR WHITE CIVILISATION — PEACE OR WAR — INADE-
QUACY OP THE EXISTING LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Is the existing League of Nations capable of grappling with these tre-
mendous problems which the present time, so enigmatical and in many ways
so sinister, is bequeathing to the future? If not, can the League, without
America, create a basis so much more broadened, and an authority so
sovereign, as to prohibit war, to suppress it, to diminish its instruments in
eveiy nation, while regulating by judicial process the disputes and diffi-
culties of peace? An analysis of intellect alone must be strictly applied
in these matters; after our experiences in the last ten years we dare not
allow tee noblest emotion to mislead. If an enquiry in this second sense
should still give a negative answer, can we conceive of a wider, simpler,
stronger system for the preservation of world-peace either apart from the
League of Nations in any shape or in connection with it? These, let us be
sure of it, are three questions, searching, crucial, like none that ever before
concerned tee fortunes of white civilisation. For that is the sphere of peril.
Asia and Africa would survive and flourish. They are less advanced, and
though they could dispense with all the European culture they have acquired
— as the people in Erewhon abolished all their machines — they are not yet
J. L. GARVIN
163
exposed to self-destruction by ibe appalling i^rversion of that supreme scien-
tific and technical power to which western civilisation has arrived.
Let us examine the three questions in their order, and consider first the
record and the real capacities of the League of Nations as it exists. Wh^
America withdrew, the apparatus lost its chief motive-power. The mechan-
ism remained as President Wilson and his British collaborators had designed
it, but it could not work with anything approaching the moral and practical
power he had intended. The form remained, but not the function. The
Covenant was there, complete with all its articles, but an authority sufiScient
to apply them did not exist and has never been created. Neither the United
States nor Germany nor Russia are represented in the main work of Geneva,
liie fatal inadequacy is that the League does not represent an effective
majority of the white race either in the Old World or the New, and in these
circumstances, it can neither discharge its duties with sufficient courage and
impartiality as between different nations and Powers, nor can it be regarded
by any one as a safe dependence in the hour of trial. Its work in many
ways has been excellent. It has undertaken many humane offices. It has
settled some minor disputes like a himdred which were peacefully arranged
by diplomatic methods through the generations before 1914. In other re-
spects its record is not more satisfactory than of the old statecraft.
The five test cases are those of Upper Silesia, Vilna, the Saar, the Ruhr,
and Corfu. We may take them in turn. The Paris Treaties transferred
masses of Germans to Polish rule. Political justice and practical equilibrium
in Europe demanded that in other mixed districts Poles should remain under
German rule. Instead, even Upper Silesia was partitioned imder the aus-
pices of the League, and its industrial region, wholly developed by German
enterprise and almost as essential a part of Germany’s economic vitals as
the Ruhr itself, was transferred to Poland. Yet the whole of this province
had been for many centuries an integral and unquestioned part of historic
Germany. On the plebiscite provided by the Treaty the total vote of the
whole province had gone in favour of remaining with the Reich, but by far
the most valuable portion of a region never divided before, was handed over
to the minority of the voters in the plebiscite. There was no historical,
racial, or linguistic argument justifying the return of Alsace to France which
did not weigh on behalf of a German retention of Upper Silesia. This pro-
cedure did not conduce to the permanent interests of peace and reconciliation
in Europe, nor did it show in any way a larger wisdom or a higher morality
than the average practice of the old unregenerate managing diplomacy.
Again, in defiance of the League’s regulations the Poles under General Zeli-
gowski seized Vilna. It was a fiagrant act, but it was carried out with
entire impunity; there were no penalties for lawless violence; Vilna was
awarded to the Poles. In the purely German valley of the Saar, the unfor-
tunate inhabitants, transferred with the coal by the Paris Treaty, complained
and proved that they were oppressed by French administration under colour
of the League’s mandate. Geneva fumbled cautiously in reply to the appeal,
but could only show itself to be little more than a cipher in the question.
The ordinary inhabitants of the Ruhr could not feel that the League gave
any mitigating touch to their humble human lives \mder an alien regime,
or that it was more than a shadow.
Next came the invasion of the Ruhr. Its legality was disputable under
the Treaty of Versailles, and it was indeed pronounced to be illegal by the
jurists advising the British Government. In any case, this sad episode in-
jected more voiom into Franco-German relations than anjrthing since the
worst excesses of the war itself. The unoffending mass of the people in this
convenient district of the Ruhr, became scourged scapegoats for the German
PRESENT AND FUTURE
164
Government and the industrial magnates. The misery dragged on all through
1923. Nothing could have been more destructive to the cause of moral recon-
ciliation in Europe, nor more inimical to the possibilities of a truer peace.
The League did not dare to do anything, and hardly dared to say anything.
Not only was practical intervention not attempted at any risk of rebuff
from Paris, but no ringing accent even of moral appeal and entreaty was
ever heard from Geneva. The reason was plain. In all these cases, nothing
could be ventured against the wishes and interests of France and her intimate
associate, Poland. Had any interference been attempted, Geneva would
have been roughly repudiated by Paris. This cowering quiescence, and the
obviousness of its cause, meant a grave weakening to the repute of the
League in the sight of all serious thinkers, whether believers or unbelievers,
in the original purposes of the Covenant. Finally came the Corfu crisis.
Signor Mussolini, after the atrocious massacre of the Italian mission on the
Grffico-Albanian frontier, launched his ultimatum on Athens, bombarded the
town of Corfu without warning, and occupied the island. It was a particu-
larly spectacular and sensational assertion of might as right. It was not so
glaring in that character as the seizure of Vilna by Zeligowski. It did not
compare in magnitude of forcible action, or in consequent loss of ordinary
lives and widespread suffering, with M Poincare^s seizure of the Ruhr.
None the less, Geneva attempted against Italy what it had never risked on
any issue against Prance, and in effect it summoned Signor Mussolini to
the bar. The Dictator, with all Italy behind him, defied the League, denied
its fitness and impartiality, and threatened to leave it. After that, Geneva
in this affair was the fifth wheel to the coach. No Great Power except Bntain
— to her own detriment as regards her relations with Italy — was behind it,
and Britain alone could do nothing. The case had to be remitted to the
Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, and there it was settled in the style of
the old diplomacy. France, for more support from Italy respecting the Ruhr,
was constrained — though not liking the necessity — to be indulgent to Italy
regarding Corfu. Greece was accordingly mulcted by diplomatic order of
the sum that Signor Mussolini’s ultimatum had required, in order to expedite
evacuation of the island held for a few weeks in pawn.
None but those eager in self-deception could be in the least dubiety about
the meaning of these things. A League which does not even in name represent
more than half Europe; which cannot be sure of commanding an effective ma-
jority of Europe on any larger question concerning peace ; which cannot act in
any case where France is intimately concerned; which cannot act in any other
critical case unless the Governments of France and Britain are in previous
agreement — this is an inadequate Lea^e which cannot serve any main pur-
pose for which it was instituted. This criticism is not a reproach. It is
an analysis. The League had been allowed to do at least one thing which
all men must admire and commend. Austria as diminished and isolated,
with Vienna left as a meaningless metropolis on its hands, was condemned
to death, casually and without intention by the Peace Conference. When
near the point of extinction, financial salvation was provided for it through
the League. But this, like its other fruitful achievements, is an admirable
aside, and does nothing for the fimdamental object of the Covenant which
was intended to substitute a new reign of international law for the former
reign of force. Europe no less than China is ruled by force and by nothing
else, and more crudely by force than in the longer part of the generation
before the war. In the last years of the old peace the war-staffs in Berlin
and Vienna alike were straining to break loose, but up to then the balance
of alliances and armaments had imposed general care and restraint for
decades. None of the members of ^e League accepts its existence as a
J. L. GARVIN
165
safeguard. The vast increase of standing armies in Europe by comparison
with the pre-war maximum in 1913 — despite the disarming of Germany,
Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria — is the only sure index to the realities
of the European situation. Despite the Covenant; despite Council, As-
sembly, and Secretariat; despite the elaborate offices and permanent staffs
at Geneva, maintaining in externals the supposition of an authority which
does not exist, the present inadequate League, which does not represent an
effective majority either of Europe or the two Americas, never can begin to do
the main work for which it was created. Upon its present fragmentary basis
it has doubtless done all that was possible, though from the beginning it
has never shown the full moral courage and spiritual vision. It has enlisted
the service of high abilities, and received a devotion beyond praise. But in
all the chief and vital issues concerning the future of war or peace, the
existing institution at Geneva hardly counts because, though bearing the
inclusive title of the League of Nations, it does not embrace the majority
of the white race. Unless the substance of its living constitution can be
strongly reinforced, to depend upon it in any way for the purposes of induc-
ing or enforcing peace, would be to lean on the broken reed.
THE LEAGUE AS OPERATED WITHOUT GERMANY OR RUSSIA — A “ CLIQUE OF
NATIONS — A MAJORITY OP CERTAIN OTHER CONTINENTS AND RACES BUT
NOT OP EUROPE, NOR OF THE WHITE RACE
We are brought to the second and greater question — whether the League
by broadening its present basis can create an effective peace system for all
purposes outside the two Americas. The inclusion of Germany and Russia
would make a transforming difference by bringing in two of the world's
chief races, numbering between them 200,000,000 souls. Without these, in
relation to the bigger issues, Geneva must always be a mummery or a
c 5 hadow. With these, Geneva, for the first time, would include a positive
majority of white mankind and even represent four-fifths of it. Until that
is secured the League of Nations will remain below its name, and had per-
haps better be called the clique of nations, so that the true facts about the
present close system of control, and one-sided working in main matters, may
be better understood by all men. Again, until Germany is admitted, the League
will not have begun to face the spiritual pu^ose, which was originally meant
to be the very aim and essence of its being — the inclusion, for the first
time after war, of victors, vanquished, and neutrals in one reconciling and
adjusting organisation. This was the only project that could pretend to
serious attempt at meeting the world's need after the great ruin and the
great slaughter. During the war, all the chief advocates of the League in
Europe — certainly in Britain — urged the inclusion of ex-enemies, not
merely as desirable on practical grounds, but as the head and front of the
moral purpose. They were staggered, dismayed, when President Wilson —
at least as regards admitting Republican Germany — did not insist, while
he had the power, on the fulfilment of that purpose. It was the very soul of
all he stood for. For a clique of nations, manipulated by the victors and
their favourite clients, not a finger would have been lifted by persons like
the present writer who throughout the struggle urged the need of a new
world-system. Until the Reich is invited into the circle, the League is
culpable of a standing dereliction of duty, misuses its comprehensive name,
and exposes itself to the satire that scathed the Holy Alliance in its day.
The supineness of Geneva in its spiritual mission was for a long time
accompanied by the alienation of the Germans themselves. German opinion
PRESENT AND FUTURE
166
passed through three distinct phases. After the Armistice, that country
could easily have been brought in, with incalculable advantage to the hope
of a new temper in the world; and at that time men like Erzberger and
Rathenau, both since murdered, would have been as capable as any two alive
of rendering brilliant service to the League organisation. Then came the
moral mockery on which the Swifts and Voltaires of the future will never
cease to exercise their ridicule and parody — the Covenant on the one side,
and the carnivorous orgy of the lions and the jackals on the other. After the
partition of Upper Silesia under the pious auspices of Geneva in continuance
of the spoils system, there was a tremendous revulsion of feeling in Germany.
The League stank in its nostrils. This was natural but foolish. The Ger-
mans in this, as in much else, were victims of the pathetic fallacy and a
prey to self-pity. Persisting in seeing themselves as deserving objects of
the world^s sympathy, they would not perceive that those, no matter what
their griefs, who think only of themselves, are apt to be left to themselves.
Preoccupied with their own harsh sorrows and troubles, they seemed to
forget that they were not the only sufferers; and that as respects inflation,
and scandalously weak or evaded taxation, their follies were almost equal
to their wrongs. Refusing to admit that the Hohenzollem and Habsburg
systems together had forced the catastrophe, the German people for several
years took no real interest in any human cause outside their own grievances.
They were blind to the necessity of settling down to make the best of a bitter
plight; and to the unique chance of employing the League to conciliate the
world^s intelligence. When Germany was stretched on the rack by the Ruhr
ordeal there was a wholesome change. The Reich, if unbroken, would eagerly
join the League on condition of having a permanent scat on the governing
Council, like Britain, France, Italy and Japan. Until this is granted, the
League of Nations will not begin to be changed from what it is to what it
ought to be. If it is suggested that France would object, the answer is that
this issue must be brought into the open, however it may be decided in the
first instance. A formal French veto upon the admission of Germany would
have the drastic effect of showing realities in a garish light. We may well
doubt whether after full debate in the Assembly, Paris would risk the pene-
trating injury to the repute of France resulting from a rigid veto on Germany's
effective admission to the Lea^e and the Council. Fifty-four nations, repre-
senting nominally about five-sixths of the earth's inhabitants, are members of
the League Fully half of these are petty states whose total populations
barely equal that of Germany alone; and, for the most part, they are almost
grotesquely less than equal in civilised significance. That Haiti, Liberia and
Abyssinia; that Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama; that almost
equally exiguous communities like Paraguay and Uruguay — that these are
members of the League, entitled to discourse at Geneva upon the all and
sundry of mankind’s affairs, but that the race of Luther and Leibnitz, Bach
and Beethoven, Kant and Goethe and Bismarck, are at present banned from
a conclave of harmonising civilisation and organ of universal philanthropy,
is one of the most fantastic travesties of human purpose that ever drove an
ironic mind to the re-reading of Candide.
The admission of Russia is another sort of affair; but that also is quin-
tessentially necessary before the League of Nations can begin to be deserving
of its style or capable of its oflices. Whatever were tiie atrocities and
lunacies of Bolshevism in the terrorist delirium now extinct, the discordant
Allies and their late Associate owe an inextinguishable debt to the exorbitant
sacrifices of the Russian people. Without those sacrifices, Hohenzollems,
Habsburgs and Romanovs would still reign together wielding an iron domi-
nation over the earth; not the utmost exertion of the latent power of the
J. L, GARVIN
167
United States could have prevented it. The Russian mind is distinctive
and disturbing, but like the German mind, it is an indispensable stimulus
to the general vitality of white intelligence. We are parochial and timid
while we shun the renewed contact. Without Tolstoi and Dostoievsky,
modem consciousness would no more know itself than without Bach and
Beethoven. How we are misled to narrow and impoverish the former great
intercourse of mankin d — to forfeit the intellectual boldness which was the
birthright of the English-speaking peoples! Do we no longer trust our
strength to mingle in the fullest interplay of international influences, assimi-
lating what we prefer and rejecting as we choose? If we are become so much
less virile as less broad, what would Emerson have thought of it? The
Russians, with all their faults of hair-splitting and their mirage-forming
loquacity, would do more than any other element to stir up the League of
Nations into the kind of mental activity that its purposes require. In spite
of all that has happened from the explosive mixture of perverted ideals and
unbearable circumstances, the Russians, perhaps, more than any people, have
at heart the true instinct of human brotherhood.
The concrete facts are as important. It is very possible that Russian
mortality, resulting directly from the war and its revolutionary sequel, has
been equal to that of all the other belligerent nations put together. Never-
theless, Russia is now on a relatively sober basis, as former pages have
explained. Though an accurate census is lacking, the best estimates place
the population of the Soviet State at not less than 130,000,000. Across
eastern Europe and northern Asia the territory of that state covers nearly
8,000,000 square miles, almost as much as all North America, including
Canada and Mexico as well as the United States. The economic potentiality
of this undeveloped region is immeasurable; the political hardly less We
Westerns are ostriches with om necks in the sand to suppose that we limit
the consequences of these facts by ignoring them. Russian propaganda
amongst the 400,000,000 people of China in chaos — ^no one knows the correct
figure, and though Mr. Rockhill puts it lower, more experts confirm the
figure given — is peraeating to a quite noticeable extent, especially amongst
the Cantonese. It is at least a more real factor in China than the League
of Nations. The more we neglect that particular influence and leave it a free
field, the more it will grow as Russia recovers. For Russia necessarily must
turn where she can; the more her desire to resume full western intercourse
is debarred, the more intensively must she try to work in the Asiatic sphere
— m China and towards India. Without Bolshevik support Mustapha
Kemal never could have rebuilt the fighting force of the Turks, and won the
Peace of Lausanne, abolishing the traditional commercial privileges of
foreigners. Every competent observer of tendencies in world-politics knows
that the force of this particular example has thrilled, like the epoch-making
Japanese triumphs, 1904-1905, from one end of Asia to the other. Young
China talks of abolishing similarly the privileges of foreign trade in the
Treaty Ports. This in time might hit Britain and America hard — far
harder than it could hit Russia or Japan. As we have seen very strange
things, we may see more. Why not? Only purblind statesmanship unable
to look even a few years ahead, can think it enough to disregard these un-
ceasing reciprocal influences between Europe and Asia. If that secular and
continuing process is not grasped, then one of the main factors in universal
history and present politics is missed by nations, America included, refusing
to learn even from the colossal experiences of the last 30 years; and these
pages have been written in vain. We must return to this topic when discuss-
ing more closely America’s own position.
The Russian question has a still stronger bearing on the strictly European
168 PRESENT AND FUTURE
part of the world-question. It is very idle, for instance, to talk of military
disarmament until Russia is brought into a general movement for that
purpose. The Soviet State is not unwilling, but its price unavoidably would
be full recognition and full intercourse. Otherwise, the Red Armies must
be maintained and nourished — at least their select troops — into a gradually
growing efficiency. While that is so, the border states must look to them-
selves, and it is unintelligent or Pharisaical to rebuke them. But if the new
border states next to Russia cannot disarm in ibese circumstances, the rest
of Europe cannot. On the economic side, the high tides of recovery in
international trade and exchange cannot be seen again \mtil the Russo-
Siberian sphere is thrown open to enterprise. This is Germany’s proper
field; and only in this direction can she hope to create such a surplus by
exports and services as would enable her to discharge steadily whatever
liability for Reparations may be finally determined. If general prosperity
is to return, we shall need all tributaries to swell that river: we cannot shut
off as now a large proportion of the whole globe’s resources. On the
political side, the argument is as strong. There can be no settled sense of
confidence and stability in Europe — politically, the earthquake centre of
civilisation — and therefore not in the rest of the world, imtil normal inter-
course between the Soviet State and the west is restored. At present, the
feeling of uncertainty and apprehension when men turn towards the Russian
horizon, is like the Scythian cloud in the same quarter that hung over the
edges of the classic world.
THE GREAT LEAGTJB WITH GERMANY AND RUSSIA — ITS DECISIVE FOSSIBILITIES
— REGIONAL GUARANTEES — ECONOMICS AND DISARMAMENT THE POLISH
CRUX — REPARATIONS AND SECURITY — A SOLUTION OP THE FRANCO-
GERMAN FEUD
The large majority of Europe is now in favour of the admission of
Russia to the League. Neither Britain, Italy, nor Japan would oppose it.
French views have changed so rapidly that to see Paris at no distant date
chaperoning the Soviet regime in foreign policy, would not surprise any
vigilant witness of what is already happening. In an informal way, amicable
negotiations between Paris and Moscow have already made considerable
progress. If France, alertly appreciating that the change in Russia is like
the change from the Terror to the Directory in her own Revolution, should
reverse her attitude sharply, and be the first Great Power to offer full
recognition to the Soviet State, she will derive and deserve considerable profit
from her skill.
French mediation could do more than anything else to solve one of the
worst — perhaps the very worst but one — of all the European problems.
As we have noticed. Imperial Poland has got itself into an impossible
position. Its encroachments have made it hated or disliked by every one
of its nei^bours. Its fiery extremists will rage against any concession to
any neighbour, but there are shrewder brains in Warsaw, and rectifications
on the Russian side must be made if there is to be any solid ground for a
confident existence. Europe is trying to work out a series of regional guar-
antees between groups of states, such as would replace that impossible
Article X of the Covenant, so largely the cause of Mr. Wilson’s dib&cle in
America — which tried to pledge every nation to maintain the technical
integrity of every other. That provision meant supporting all the blunders
md injustices of the Treaty of Versailles. President Wilson ought to have
jettisoned Article X. Not a sin^e nation belonging to the League and
J. L. GARVIN
signatory to the Covenant genuinely accepts that article. None means to
be involved in any distant and doubtful quarrel. Hence the more practical
movement for mutual guarantees between groups of contiguous nations
like the Little Entente. Britain, France and Belgium may come to a similar
defensive arrangement. But a hard-knotted European difficulty, so far,
is Poland. No one wilf guarantee her eastern frontiers, extended far beyond
the proper territories inhabited by majorities of the Polish race. If France
could bring about a peaceful revision between Moscow and Warsaw, more
would be done for secunty and disarmament than any other sin^e success
of statesmanship could achieve. This, like the return of the Rhineland to
a united Germany, is a key-question, just as Alsace-Lorraine before the
war was a key-question. If the Polish difficulty could be dealt with in
this way, there would be a far better chance of steadying all Europe by a
series of regional agreements for mutual defence.
If Germany and Russia were together admitted to the League, its present
moral and practical authority would be more than doubled at a stroke. For
the first time it would be worthy of its great name. Representing 56 States
and nine-tenths of the world’s inhabitants, it would include not only the
many-coloured swarm of minor or infinitesimal communities — Luxemburg
and Liberia, Haiti and Panama, now playing a picturesque rather than an
operative part — but it would likewise marshal all the Great Powers and
races, with a sole exception. The nature and extent of the difference that
would be made by this augmentation of strength may be further illustrated.
You might pick out 20 nations ” from amongst the more minute of the
present members of the League, and they would barely equal one-half the
excluded population of Germany. You might take over two-thirds of the
whole present membership, and they would not come near to equalling in
number the excluded inhabitants of Russia. You might lump together four-
fifths of the various peoples now separately enrolled at Geneva, and yet
come short of the combined weight of the Soviet State and the Reich. So
much for quantity. The higher argument is still stronger. As regards
civilised quality it will hardly be contended that the nominal inclusion of the
Chinese myriads compensates for the absence of Germany, or the myriads
of Hindustan for the absence of that largest and, in some ways, freshest
of white races, the Russian. Apart from those excellent but microscopic
fractions — their intelligentsia — the yellow and brown multitudes are inno-
cent of any consciousness of belonging to the League. We see at once why
in quality even more than in quantity the League of Nations is not yet in
any wise equal to that claim, nor has it approached the pnmary work of put-
ting itself on a strong basis.
To have Russia and Germany in its ranks would change all that. On
the Council, no single Great Power, and no two in tacit collusion, would
be so easily able, as now, to start or stop the machinery of the League just
as diplomatic tactics required; to use it for the ends of the old statecraft
on some occasions, and others either to ignore it altogether, as in the case
of the Ruhr, or to defy it with impunity as in the cases of Vilna and Corfu
— instances where the gravest practical and moral issues for Europe and
the world were in question, the plainest matters of right and wrong at stake.
If Russia and Germany had permanent seats on the Council with Britain,
France, Italy and Japan, there would be a wider distribution of influence
and a far stronger probability that relatively disinterested justice would
be meted out; and that the law and spirit of the Covenant would be more
impartially applied to every Power and to every State. The peaceful pres-
sure in favour of sane settlements could be made incomparably more effec-
PRESENT AND FUTURE
170
tual than now and, indeed, itresistible. With Germany and Russia in, the
inseparable series of economic problems which must be solved together,
before Europe can hope to recover, could be taken in their connection.
Reparations depend on the promotion of general commerce; this depends in
turn upon the restoration of sounder finance and more normal credit; but
yet agam, budgets, currencies and exchanges cannot be stabilised by domestic
measures alone, only by concerted international action. The will and power
to repay war debts in continental Europe cannot exist without these other
measures. In arranging to pay her debt to America, while she has a million
and a half unemployed in her streets, and while there is no prospect that she
will be repaid more than a small fraction, if that, of her own enormous war-
loans to the Allies, Britain has done the right thing. But she has done a
very serious thing for herself; and for her pains, in making her separate
effort to square her accounts, she is widely regarded as a traitor to Europe.
The enlarged League, embracing the whole of Europe, could grapple in ear-
nest with the work of evoking order out of the economic chaos.
The territorial problems could be approached in another way by a series
of conferences, not attempting final solutions but seeking to negotiate working
compromises. Under the auspices of a League, so powerMly reinforced,
states like Finland, Esthonia, Latvia would be persuaded to realise that
self-determination has its duties, as well as its rights; that in the modem
world it cannot be allowed to mean selfish determination; and that special
commercial and railway arrangements must be made giving the Russian
people, once more, free access to the Baltic. In other parts of Europe, bear-
able relations could be established in the same way. Men who want to put
the world right must now school themselves to work gradually “ unhasting
and unresting.” They must try to remove one by one the more acute points
of friction, and above all to bring back after ten years of war and sub-war,
the atmosphere and mentality of peace. Something greater still might happen.
It is very possible that an enlarged League might be the means of solving the
Franco-German conflict itself — the world’s chief cause of wars — by meeting
the demands of France for security as well as Reparations. There is no
reason why Russia should not join with Britain in a perpetual guarantee
of the integrity of France proper including Alsace-Lorraine. That would
make good at last — and nothing else could make it good — the fatal flaw
which has existed in the world-system since the American Senate and people
rejected — inevitably, as we can now see — President Wilson’s proposal to
make the United States a guarantor of France. In place of that, an agreement
to the same purpose between France, Britain and Russia, would be an im-
pregnable compact; one which the German race could never hope to challenge.
But equally, in return for that ironclad satisfaction, France could do her part
by retiring from the Rhine and withdrawing her armies altogether from Ger-
man land. If that were done, not only would France be favoured by such
accumulated pledges of her safety as no other community in the Old World
has ever enjoyed, but there would be a better prospect than has ever existed
before of something like a final reconciliation between the French and German
races. The remaining German grievances would be against the Poles, mak-
ing a tangle of problems hard enough to deal with, yet not hopeless. The loss
of the industrial region of Upper Silesia, the wrenching apart of East and
West Prussia by a Polish wedge, are worse things for Germany than the loss
of Alsace-Lorraine was for France; but in Upper Silesia an economic compro-
mise has already been devised, and though a somewhat crude makeshift in
itself, it works better than anyone had anticipated. With regard to East and
West Prussia and Danzig, many tilings are more unlikely than a close general
171
J. L. QABVIN
understanding, political and conunercial, between Germany and Poland. It
is the only solution; all practical inducements make for it, as well as right
reason. It is with nations as with men. Interest and self-care sometimes
lead to the practical virtue which moralists on higher principles had long
urged in vain.
Nevertheless, the one great thing which must be accomplished in Europe
before all the subsidiary good purposes can come to their own, is a settlement
between France and Britain on the one side, Russia and Germany on the
other. France would have such multiple guarantees for both security and Rep-
arations as might enable her to give back the Rhineland. If that could be
accomplished, there would be a Europe again; every other problem could be
solved, or mitigated, or controlled, by processes of peace under the strength-
ened auspices of Geneva. Political preliminaries like these would bring
under reasonable management even the ominous and overshadowing problem
of the increase of European military armaments to a degree beyond pre-war
example. Without Russia nothing can be done to diminish this rampant
evil. But if in the first instance France, Poland and Russia were to come to
an agreement on relative armaments in the spirit of the Washington Con-
ference, all the other states would be constrained to follow suit. After a some-
what searching investigation, our second question is now answered. What
the present organisation, which, as now manipulated, we have called the clique
of nations, has failed to do and never can hope to do, the Great League in-
cluding Germany and Russia might hope to do, even without America. The
system which we have conceived would be the master-key of European peace
and of the world’s peace.
AMERICA AND THE WORLD — THE TACIT ESTRANGEMENT — IS IT NECESSARY
OR LASTING? — WHAT EVEN THE GREAT LBAGIIB COULD NOT DO WITHOUT
THE UNITED STATES
Europe, then, must first do its own main work. American intervention
within the next few years is no longer expected. The decision of the United
States, to stand apart and keep an absolutely unfettered control of its actions
for an indefinite period, is understood and accepted. In a survey like tiiis,
however, we must still ponder upon the ultimate future of American influence
in the affairs of mankind at large. The subject which was all-absorbing after
the Paris Conference and engrossing up to the Washin^n Conference, pres-
ently became of lessening interest, one indeed with which the larger part of
European thought almost ceased to be concerned. This is an odd paradox.
From Washington to Lincoln, America was regarded by most political thinkers
in the older nations, as well as by the masses of their peoples, as emphatically
the Great Republic where the opportunities of free human development were
widest. After the Civil War, and the abolition of slavery, and Lincoln, the
influence of the United States upon the ideas of nations in general rose to its
height. From the last decade of the nineteenth century there was a certain
check to this attitude. America seemed to stand, like commercial Germany,
rather for the highest material efficiency, for the most powerful types of
economic organisation in the machine age, than for any general human cause.
Then Roosevelt came; though in a manner very different from Lincoln’s, he
lifted once more the mood of those who had come to regard America as but a
larger edition of the ordinary successful nation. He was in every sense a
world’s leader, and his robust stirring creed of courage and exertion had a uni-
versal influence upon the psychology of his time. President Wilson ensued.
His ^ect was temporary and followed by an ebb as dreary as his flood-tide
172
PRESENT AND FUTURE
was triumphing, but while it lasted it was a far more extraordinary power over
mankind at large than any other American had wielded. Verily, in those
times of 1917 and 1918, the part seemed greater than the whole and the United
States more important both for power and guidance than all the rest of the
world The reaction has since run to lowest water. Americans oflScial with-
drawal from Europe has been followed by a sort of instinctive mental
withdrawal of Europe from America. This psychological result was inevitable
in the nature of things, but the change is unprecedented of its kind; it is not
good for either side. No concluding reflections upon the alternatives iti is
bequeathing to the future can evade the duty of examining whether this tacit
estrangement or interruption of familiar intercourse between the United States
and the rest of white civilisation is a permanent necessity.
The Great League, including Germany and Russia, and practically all the
nations but America, could by itself, as we have seen, achieve results on the
largest scale. Grappling with the giant problems of economic restoration,
political adjustment, security and disarmament, it might do very much of
the biggest part of the work required to establish the conditions of reviving
prosperity and the presumption of a long peace. These are obviously huge
difficulties which the Unit^ States may well regard with sympathy for men
good and bad struggling against so vast a mass of adversity. We must look
further ahead. In the old seats of civilisation — those homes of the highest
reaches of human genius and personality whence the many-threaded web of
America’s people derives — the spirit of man is sore beset but not defeated.
The passing years of themselves will bring rallying-power from the war of
exhaustion, but it would not enhance America’s status, nor would it be the
most satisfactory thing for her coming generations to remember that the
greatest and best work in common for a half-ruined earth was done without
her, as well as might be.
European thought meditating on the future of peace or war, yet not look-
ing for America’s entry into the present League of Nations nor for any
binding connection between Washington and the League, reasons upon things
obvious as follows. Some definite participation of the United States — inter-
vention is no longer the word — in the general effort to save the future of
civilisation and mankind, would of itself be infinitely good for the rekindling
of human faith, hope, and energy. For a second thing, America’s voice in
any concert of the Great Powers — such as must be the real directing agency,
if practical idealism is to work by apt instruments — would be more im-
partial and unhesitating in applying any agreed rule to all powers and states
alike. For a third thing, the chief controlling device and regulator of any
peace system could not work properly in the hands of the Great League if the
United States were totally unconcerned with its purposes. The deterrent
to any nation inclined to break saving rules — and the means of restoring
speedy respect for the rules — if an incited violation occurs — is the economic
blockade and especially the sea-blockade. But Britain, which would have
to be the maritime right arm of a Great League without America, no longer
wields an unconditional naval supremacy. Under the Washington Agreement
she divides the sovereignty of the seas with the United States. Britain cannot
act wisely in any matter of blockade unless she is sure of the support of the
United States. America has taken joint responsibility for what Mahan mi^t
well have called the continuing influence of sea-power upon history. Sea-
power is not a local thing. It is as universal, either in direct or indirect effect,
as the seas are one. It acts at a distance. Joint responsibility for the use
or abeyance of sea-power; and non-responsibility for the general fortunes of
civilisation — these represent contradiction in terms.
) Keystone View Co, © Keystone View Co
Pius XI who succeeded Benedict XV ss Sujireme Pontiff in 19SS. Benedict XV, elected Supreme Pontiff in 1914; died January tt,
J. L. GARVIN
173
PBACnCAL F0UCIE8 FOB AMERICA — ELIMINATION OF ABTICLE X — WHAT SYS-
TEM? — (I) A NEW WOBLD-COTJNCIL — OB (II) AN “ASSOCIATE” AOAIN?
— COSpEBATION WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENTS
At least the situation as it existed at the time of Mr. Wilson’s struggle
is practically won, and could be formally won at any moment if a request
is totally altered. The main points of the Republican party in that struggle
in that sense were addressed by Washington to Geneva. Article X, the
centre of the political storm in 1919, declared, it will be remembered, that
“ the members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence
of all members of the League.” But we have already scrutinised the present
truth with regard to this. Who would now guarantee with such unconditional
temerity the non-Polish territories of a Poland weakened by exaggeration?
No one. Who would guarantee any existing frontier in eastern Europe? No
one; except such nations, immediately concerned, like the Little Entente, as
are forming for themselves group-systems of insurance — really military alli-
ances of the old kind, though the Covenant suppresses the word. No one any
longer in Europe takes seriously Article X as a collective obligation. It is
dead. The Canadian amendments already propose that no nation under the
Covenant, without such supplementary, specific agreements as every nation
is free to enter into or not, shall be bound beforehand to engage in any kind
of hostilities without the consent of its legislature. Washington, by lifting its
finger — if it thought the matter worth while, which it does not — could
make this drastic amendment the law of Geneva. America if it wished, which
it does not, could join, forming the Great League indeed, the full World-
Council, while remaining absolutely as free as now from compulsory entangle-
ments of any kind. There is no other proposal for amending the Covenant or
altering the working methods of the League which American statesmen and
jurists could put forward but would be considered at Geneva, with certainty
of amicable agreement if the United States were inclined to complete the circle
of nations in that way. But the devastating controversy between parties has
raged in the United States, and as a result the name and cause of the League
have been deeply bedevilled, despite the entire willingness of Europe to make
vital changes in the Covenant in the sense demanded by republican criticism.
What then? Are we to say there is no other plan? As America’s great
alternative to the Great League, can we frame in our minds the definite con-
ception of another world-system establishing a practical association be-
tween the United States and the rest of mankind for the purposes of peace?
To some such system Mr. Harding’s first Presidential message and the utter-
ances of other Republican leaders seemed to point. To an observer above
the battle, it seemed at that time that American instinct as a whole, in spite
of furious and most intelligible contest upon grave details, like Article X,
was almost at one in desiring some League, if not necessarily this League.
That this instinct still has some part in underlying American feeling there
seems little doubt, and as little that it will more and more correspond with
America’s interests in every respect.
Accordingly, a new peace system — if rejection of the new Geneva cat^
chism, however modified, must remain a condition — might be attempted in
either of two ways: Washington might concentrate on the main business of
peace and on eveiything appertaining thereto, excluding all the admirable
side-work of philanthropy which Geneva undertakes, and mi^t ^k to pro-
mote the one vital cause by a very simplified procedure, the Washington Con-
ference forming the original model of a permanent method, as President
174
PRESENT AND FUTURE
Harding at first seemed to hope. America on this basis could institute
r^lar international conferences. In the end they might even be annual;
not all the smaller States would be included though all their ri^ts would
be considered. The members of such a more compact world-council would
bind themselves not to imdertake hostilities or punitive seizures of terri-
tory without entering into previous consultation with the other members
of the world-council and seelung its unanimous support towards securing re-
dress by pac^c measures. All other states would be warned that hostilities
without previous resort to some manner of mediation or arbitration would
mean economic blockade by the members of the world-council. This would
be an altogether more concentrated system than that of Geneva; it would
sacrifice to simplicity many claims of elaborate logic as well as the suscepti-
bilities of the more microscopic communities — at Geneva the ants and the
elephants go together into the ark. But it would be a peace association capa-
ble of strong, progressive work; and if Washington were resolved to be the life
and soul of it and to make it as useful as possible to all members, it might
be all-powerful. It could be made an efficient instrument for the main pur-
poses — the prevention of war whether by “ outlawry ” or otherwise.
But the second alternative — always remembering that neither is yet
practical politics in the United States — is rai.sed by great existing facts.
The present League of Nations, so far from being likely to dissolve prom-
ises to become broader and stronger in the Old World nor are the Latin.
American States likely to secede. The question must therefore be asked
— whatever the answer — whether it is not possible to establish some regu-
lar working system of free American cooperation with the League. To
achieve that harmony some day would ensure, for any American President
or statesman, a very honourable name in general history. The result
would be of high advantage to the world; could not by any chance be
detrimental to America; and almost certainly would be as advantageous to
America as beneficial to the rest. Cooperation with the League, while not
accepting membership, might be carried out in a very plain and adequate
way. Every year a United States delegation might meet in joint session a
delegation of the League. To hold these joint sessions in Washington and
Geneva by turns could do nothing but good to both sides. The two delegations
would exchange annual reports upon the outlook for world-peace and compare
recommendations for the forwarding of that cause. The United States, re-
serving more freedom thereby, would be an Associate to the peace system of
the League, somewhat as it was an Associate to the Allies in the war. This
method also would mean ample and even superfluous precaution against the
obnoxious entanglements; but it would admit of efficient, continuous partner-
ship in the work of promoting peace and recovery. The Associate, in spite
of that less formal title, was the leading power in the world’s greatest de-
structive crisis; working with the League by the system of joint delegations,
the United States could be as certainly the chief guiding and shaping influence
upon that greatest constructive task in history which confronts the world now.
Tne American delegation could keep at Washington a permanent secretariat
and record office of its own. The expense modest, the thing essential. The
League’s representation, on its side, would be a selected member of the ablest
men — a better body to deal with than either the Council of Ten at Geneva,
as at present constituted, or the large and miscellaneous Assembly. The
joint sittings would ensure a vital contact of minds. Considering every year
in a broad survey the progress or the throwbacks of the cause of peace — the
opportunities, dangers, remedies — this alternative form of world-council, by
facing de^te tasks, and agreeing upon specific action in the temper of the
J. L. GARVIN 175
Washington Conference, could do more than the League without America
can ever accomplish.
If such a scheme were ever brought about the United States could bring
the deterrent force, now practically in abeyance, into sure, impartial play by
not only consenting, but insisting that the economic blockade, backed by the
American navy no less than by the British, must be put into prompt operation
against any Power or State whatever resorting to hostilities, seizures or inva-
sions of territories, violent armed measures of any kind, without first invoking
mediation, or arbitration, or judicial process through the International Court
of Justice. What is needed above all is some supreme tribunal both more
authoritative and dispassionate than any executive council at Geneva can
hope to be until America is added to it. But if the United States decides not
to be closely drawn in on any terms, nor to tie its hands in any way; if Amer-
ica prefers for peace as for war to act as an Associate, then the system of “ co-
operation without entanglement/^ which has been sketched, might be made
capable of saving uses, and well worthy both of America and of the tasks
whereon depend the confident security and resumed progress of civilisation.
This method of regular working between the United States and the enlarged
League by means of joint delegations meeting in annual conference at Geneva
and Washington in turn, might lift this question as high above party contro-
versies in America as its Supreme Court already stands.
WHY AMERICA MUST MOVE — INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS — MODERN CONDI-
TIONS or WORLD PROSPERITY — ECONOMIC INDUCEMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
— DEBTS AND TRADE — LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN RENAISSANCE IN EUROPE
— THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND GENEVA
A number of very different reasons, bound to operate in the future with
converging and cumulative force, make it improbable — in the view of men
looking in a historical temper far beyond the moment — that the present de-
gree of American isolation can continue. Yet when America re-knits connec-
tion she can play no secondary part; certainly no smaller part than that which
would make her the great Associate of the Great League in a joint svstem
permitting cooperation without entanglements ” The factors making silently
for this development may be taken in their order.
The markedly diminished belief of average mankind elsewhere, in the rela-
tive value of American institutions as an element in civilisation at large, is a
fact with which statesmanship, intellect and opinion in the United States are
not likely to remain content; just as they are things not wholesome for the
rest of the world so largely swayed between Bolshevism and Fascism, and
needing more than ever its former faith in the American example of democ-
racy and law.
Next consider the econoinic reasons. They must grow. The com-
mercial interdependence of nations — the requirement of a maximum flow of
exchange for general prosperity buoyant and assured — this is an irrevocable
law. It cannot be changed even by the war: the process had gone too far
before. Europe is normally an immense consuming continent of over 400,'
000,000 inhabitants. It represents more than half the consuming power of
the world. While it remains so deeply impoverished, so dislocated, so con-
vulsed, the reduced European demand must depress prices for American pro-
ducers and restrict the scope for American enterprise. Even Brazil, to take
but one illustration in passing, cannot buy what she might from the United
States until Germany can buy as fully as before from Brazil. The profound
industrial depression of Great Britain means^ in the same way, the disable-
PRESENT AND FUTURE
176
ment of more millions of America's customers, not only in tJiat island, but in
many other countries. While this state of world-economics lasts, America’s
own periods of good trade, in spite of her matchless internal advantages,
must be more fleeting than they used to be and the reactions severe.
Pass to another factor. America desires some more general repayment of
European debts. So far as not repaid, they are a political hold to be used for
salutary purposes. The question of debts cannot be dealt with apart from
the renewed growth of armaments, nor these without the political conditions
which have inevitably produced them. In this sphere the financial and politi-
cal problems are interlocked; nor can America, proportionately to that large
part of her war-loans little likely to be repaid, derive the benefit of economic
restoration without aiding in it and making her timely stipulations.
Part of Europe remains the seismic centre of world-politics, but what of
their perimeter? Still larger issues for the American people are suggested by
tiie facts and presumptions of world-politics. Latin America is the nearest
issue. Secretary Hughes has declared that the United States reserves to itself
the “ definition, interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine.” This
formula leaves the technical position as any Republican administration might
have described it in the same terms before the war. The moral position is
not the same but vividly altered. Seventeen nations of Latin America are
members of the League. Owing to their number — though some half a dozen
of them together represent a population less than that of Ohio or Lancashire
— they play a disproportionate part. They can usually elect in the Assembly
two representatives to the Council of Ten which directs the League. Their
best delegates are excellent members. They have at Geneva a certain sense
of higher status and prestige than they feel in pan-American Assemblies on
their own side of the Atlantic In Europe they meet the statesmen of Ftance
and Italy, Spain and Portugal, and they feel doubly at home. AflSnity of
temperament and mutual comprehension of ideas are reinforced by a new
sense of racial pride. One of the signal results of the war has been a renais-
sance of Latin self-consciousness and self-confidence We may know it to be
true that without the terrible naval and economic machinery set in motion
against the Hohenzollem and Habsburg empires by America and Britain, and
without their direct military aid, the Teutonic race would have crushed as
never before its Latin opponents, and destroyed them. But the really de-
cisive forces of the world-struggle were too largely invisible. Men in the
mass judge by the external drama, by the immediate appearances. To France
the result of the war is mainly a French victory; to Italy, Vittorio Veneto
seems entirely an Italian victory, though gained when the Habsburg
Empire and its armies had been reduced to a state of decomposition by the
cumulative effect of far different forces, such as the exhilarated mass of
Signor Mussolini’s followers, like the large majority of the French people, do
not begin to understand.
'The Latin races, though they much exaggerate in this way, have reason
enough for high pride in Latin achievements. The part played by France
and Italy was glorious and vital to the common victory. In any case,
in our study of facts and influences as they exist, however caused, we
must take these psychological actualities for what they are. On the one hand,
owing to the isolation of the United States and the imprecedented (Usabilities
of Britain, the English-speaking races as a whole play a far less influential
part in the thou^t and action of the world than at any time before the war,
while the wide Latin family is not only more exalteci but, by comparison,
more united. The mental orientation of Latin America never was so steadily
set towards Europe. The reciprocal interest of Spam and Italy — as of France
in a more general way owing to the less close racial connection — never was
J. L. GARVIN 177
so much alive. These processes cannot, within any period which there is need
to consider, bring about concrete results disadvantageous to the Monroe Doc-
trine. But thoughtful opinion in the United States has never held it enough
for the Monroe Doctrine to be an imperative mechanism unsupported by the
encouragement of intimate sympathies. South Americans feel that, at least,
in the sphere of world-politics they are not led but leading; that they are in
advance of the great Northern Republic — in other ways almost their suzerain
— in their attitude towards the common work of civilisation. Accordingly,
in the long run it may become of very real and far-reaching concern for Ihe
United States to participate by some large means in the new relations between
Europe and Latin America rather than allow those relations, quite certain of
becoming stronger as time moves, to develop without her It seems beyond
doubt that the moral and practical leadership of the United States in its own
hemisphere would be sensibly reinforced, as well as elevated, by some ulti-
mate form of definite intercourse with the League wherein the delegates of
South America are conspicuous.
THE CHINESE CHAOS — EUROPE AND ASU — THEIR INSEPARABLE REACTIONS —
CHINA, RUSSIA AND JAPAN — AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN THE PAR EAST UR-
qENT IT MEANS A WIDER WORLD-SYSTEM OF COOPERATION — NECESSARY
SEQUELS TO THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
Nor is this all. A yet more momentous issue is rising on a broader horizon.
These pages opened by showing how events in the Far East, 30 years ago,
mainly contributed by their reactions on Europe to bring about the catas-
trophe of the World "War, the end of a distinctive age of civilisation, the
transformation of the world’s political and economic conditions, the profound
disturbance of all former ideas in the mind of man, white and yellow, brown
and black. No one can guess all the consequences; we only know that we are
but at their beginnings. If America could sever herself always from results
on the other side of the Atlantic, she could not from results on the other side
of the Pacific. Geography, which ought to be the basis of education, is still
of all subjects perhaps the least well taught, despite the illuminating advances
made by its experts during the last few years. One of the popular errors
persisting regards Europe as a separate continent; but it is none such. Even
Russia proper is more broadly connected with Asia as a whole than is, for
example, India, shut off by stupendous mountain-barriers and like a world to
itself. Even western Europe, with the intensely organised and enriching quali-
ties which its vital progress has created — we may say so much for it, despite
its temporary chaos — and with its almost fantastic tangle of sea-bathed pen-
insulas and its memorable islands, is geographically a small, highly specialised
projection of the huge Asiatic land-mass. Physically, Europe-Asia are more
one than North and South America. The United States looks one way to the
Atlantic and another way to the Pacific. Even so Europe-Asia ranges be-
tween both these oceans. Russia starting from near Germany — a little
further away now but still near — stretches right through Asia, and marches
with China until she neighbours Japan. Britain on different terms, but still
fulfilling a function irreplaceable as a safeguard against anarchic dissolution,
is in Asia as in Europe. At last, the United States, continuing to dissociate
itself altogether from the state and fate of this geographical aggregate, would
feel the effect from the Asiatic side. „ , . , .
While amidst our other distractions we have all nearly forgotten what the
Far East means, most competent witnesses think that the Chinese problem
cannot be left alone; and that it cannot be dealt with except by American co-
T. B. T — VOL. I — 12
178
PRESENT AND FUTURE
operation with Europe in conjunction with Japan. We have made some pass*
ing references to the Chinese problem in earlier pages. The fewest further
words upon its nature and magnitude must here suffice. Amongst a popula-
tion as large, or nearly as large, as that of all Europe, there is a condition
of disruption, tumult, military rivalries, political discords, corruption, brig-
andage and ffiaancial chaos, such as the strongest terms we use about dis-
turbances in the rest of the world are unable to describe. It may be said
that these periods of disintegration have been recurrent in the records of the
main yellow race, and that tolerable imity and order always have been re-
stored in the end by the imperturbable endurance and good sense of a people
whose great family-cult make it socially indivisible. This is true. But even
in the past, recovery sometimes required many years, and in the twentieth
century all conditions are changed. The elements of modem education in
these rivalries, their access to modern arms, nourish the antagonisms and
prolong the chaos. The best foreign authorities resident in China believe
that it might be 20 or 30 or 40 years before China could emerge from the
existing anarchy without international action of a wise and limited kind.
Meanwhile, the interior is becoming more unsafe for the lives and interests
of Europeans and Americans alike. We have noticed how the astonishing
success of the Turks under Mustapha Kemal in abolishing the capitulations
inspires in Young China, and especially in the Cantonese, the dream — how
should they necessarily suppose it will not come true? — of eliminating simi-
larly that present privileged status of the Treaty Ports on which the whole
position of foreign commerce and enterprise is founded. The Soviet State
has had some of its cleverest emissaries working in China, especially in the
south. Japan is equally sedulous in the north. Neither Russia nor Japan
are to blame. They are both neighbours to the anarchy; like other Powers,
they must watch their immediate interests and concerns. After the Wash-
ington Conference, Japan kept her word punctually with regard to the Shan-
tung evacuation, but access to the mineral ore and raw products of China
is the basis of her new industrial life Though her policy towards the Chinese
has often been the reverse of sagacious and skilful in method, its objects are
what every other Power in her place would pursue. So in our western dealings
with Russia, we cannot have it both ways We cannot refuse full intercourse
with the relatively stabilised Soviet State of to-day, and at the same time
expect it to refrain from working for such an influence over China as might
ultimately change the balance of the world. This conception of the Russian
mind, like some other large conceptions we are apt to ignore, derives un-
changed from the Tsardom, and is common to Bolshevists and Nationalists
alike.
It would seem that no question outside America is likely to become
more urgently America’s concern than the Chinese problem in its grave
circumstances and graver contingencies. Nothing but the initiative of Wash-
ington can stay the drift of disaster. Britain cannot take the initiative. In
tiiis direction, above all, the work of the Washington Conference ought to
be carried on, but upon an enlaiged basis. To establish a standing foreign
conteol of Chinese administration is not the object. That would mean an
endless entanglement. The object is to help China decisively to reestablish
unity and order under her own administration. For this purpose, in the view
of those whose fully discriminating knowledge of the Far East makes their
opinion most weighty and balanced, two parallel conferences are re-
quired such as the United States and no other Power could secure. One
would be a meeting under truce of representatives of the various Chinese
groups and sections. Money is the essence of their question, just as to re-
store sound Budgets is the key to the economic recovery of Europe. The
J. L. GARVIN
170
Conference of Powers under America’s leadership could provide the induce-
ment to unity by agreeing to raise the Customs* Duties at the ports, and by
this measure of equity to provide a Chinese Government with revenue —
and other aids at need — sufficient to ensure the reestablishment of its
authority throughout the provinces. It is by no means impossible that as
a result of these steps led by Washington, the real unity of China might
be reestablished by consent. The status of the Treaty Ports would be re-
affirmed. The general advantage to foreign trade and enterprise, as well as
to the Chinese people in the mass, needs no emphasis. There is here the
opportunity for one of the best single strokes of stetesmanship that the
present extremity of international complications permits.
Two reflections enforce themselves. In the first place it is quite possible
that before the end of the present century — and perhaps within a period
not much longer than this general survey of our own time has covered — the
pressure may be once more, as in former ages, from Asia upon white civilisa-
tion, reversing the opposite process relatively recent and in its nature tem-
porary; while any long view must obviously suggest that the United States
alone, no matter to what height of development it may arnve, cannot perma-
nently maintain the general interests of white cmlisation even in their just
degree. In the next place, the immediate necessities of the Chinese problem
can only be dealt with by cooperation with Europe as well as with Japan,
and that cooperation for this far-extending question of the future of China
implies some continuous arrangements.
THE HAZARD OF WHITE CIVILISATION — A BROKEN THING — PEACE OB SELF-
DESTRUCTION — AN ANSWER TO PESSIMISM — THE WAR ^CEDES — THE
NEW GENERATION — “ MAN’S UNCONQUERABLE MIND ”
For a long time yet the right guidance of the world and its safety must
depend upon white civilisation, and its restored community of thought and
action. With America as a detached system; with Russia banned after
a terrible revolution brought about by the grossness of Tsarist incom-
petence and abuses, though not so much worse in modem eyes than the
French and Cromwellian revolutions seemed in their time before they,
too, came back to order; with Germany prostrate; with France militant
in her sense of right and in her doubt of the future; with Britain stoop-
ing under burdens and set about in all her ways by more manifold difficulties
than she has ever known; with the rest of Europe swayed hither and thither
by abnormal movements — white civilisation is a broken thing. Even the
relative influence of all the English-speaking peoples upon the mind and
purposes of the world, is notably lessened. They do not pve the desired
leadership. In their post-war relationships, after a brief, immortal comrade-
ship in arms, they reflect the moral disarray of our time. As regards the
main question for all the future, they have no great impulse in common and
no clear aim. They know that if the motives and risks of war are allowed
to grow unchecked for a few decades as between 1871 and 1914, the utmost
development to which intellect, science and mechanism can reach will only
be perverted to that final self-destruction making the legend of Franken-
stein the symbol and epitaph of the white world.
Yet men do not commonly succumb to dangers so generally foreseen.
At the least, we might say to pessimists that these are early days for de-
spair. The lon(| disorders and confusions following the world-struggle may
yet be judged, in the calmness of historic perspe^ive, as a sequel almo^
normal by comparison with the violence of the convulsion. The war recedes.
PRESENT AND FUTURE
180
The generation whose young vitality defies its lessening shadow is coming
nearer every day to its time of prevailing control in human affairs. New
energies are rising in the lands most lacerated and ravaged by the conflict,
as wild flowers in their season cover every battlefield of Eiurope. The forces
working for lasting peace and settlement in the world are wider, deeper
than in any epoch before, if the perils are in many ways as much greater.
As passions blinded by recent conflict and subsequent exasperation £e out,
those forces demanding the reign of law between nations, as between persons,
will become stronger still. The democracies will never again make the massed
sacrifices they gave in the last arbitrament of death. The present League of
Nations is not the sufficient effort, but the general movement against war is
only beginning. It is the movement of the century. That America’s aid by
some path will yet march with this spirit or lead it, we have seen, in this
retiospect and prospect, considered reason to believe.
THE OEBMAN SITUATION AT THE CLOSE OF 1923 — POINCAB^ STILL DETERMINED
TO HOLD THE RUHR — FRUITLESS MONARCHIST COUP d’6tAT IN MUNICH
The European events of the last four months of Germany’s new annee
terrible and of the opening weeks of 1924, deserve to be examined in some
detail. Down to the very beginning of September there was lingering hope
in Berlin, while equally in Paris there was some anxiety below the surface.
Germany’s internal resources were indeed on the point of exhaustion but
the dream of foreign intervention was not quite dead. That spark was now
quenched by a sudden whirl of accidents and consequences outside Germany.
TTie British Government after long reluctance to join serious issue with
M. Poincar6 had taken the decisive step, upon the authority of its law
oflBcers, of declaring the Ruhr occupation to be a breach of the Treaty of
Versailles. Much depended upon securing the adhesion of Italy to this view.
This was in the middle of August. Within a fortnight, as we have seen,
the Italian mission was massacred on the Albanian frontier and Signor
Mussolini instantly launched his ultimatum on Greece. From that moment,
everything played into the French Premier’s hands and in another fort-
night he had completely won the diplomatic game. The British representa-
tive at Geneva, Lord Robert Cecil, proposed the intervention of the League
of Nations against Italy, although no interference with France had been
dared. Liberal but unwise voices in the London press threatened Rome with
an economic boycott. Italy turned with fury against Britain as against the
League. Promptly supporting Italy on the Corfu question, France paralysed
British diplomacy on the Ruhr question. There was an unfounded fear that
the Italian Dictator might attempt other Mediterranean adventures hostile
to British wishes On September 19 the British Premier, Mr. Stanley Bald-
win, met and figuratively embraced M. Raymond Poincare. It was an-
nounced to the world’s astonishment that London and Paris were again in
perfect accord. M. Poincar4 had yielded nothing. It was the end of a
chapter.
A few days after, the German Chancellor called together the Ministers of
the Federal States and local representatives from the Ruhr. There was
nothing for it now but Germany’s surrender, total and unconditional. An
economic Jena had laid her prostrate; and the wits called M. Poincar4
“Napol6on Quatre,” as Kerensky, in his moment of magnificence, had been
call^ Alexander iV. In vain had Herr Stresemann in these last weeks mvil-
tiplied his offers of mortgadng all German property, pubHc and private, for
Reparations if France would relinquish the Ruhr. M. Poincard would dis-
J. L. GARVIN
181
BUBS nothing whatever until capitulation was absolute and humiliation un-
exampled. On September 27 Berlin ordered the end of passive resistance.
The news, though expected, toiled through Germany like a knell. France
overwhelmed M. Poincare with congratulations. The nationalist journals
in Paris wrote that the “ death-rattle of the Reich could be heard at last.”
Through many weeks of chaos and threatened dissolution, they bad some
reason for thinking so.
The nightmare through which Germany now passed was in some ways
the darkest and most bitter episode of her history since the Thirty Years’
War. After five years of illusion, that people felt that they were beaten,
conquered, crushed to the earth — as they had not felt after the Armistice
when their armies, though stripped of all great weapons, marched home with
unbroken ranks, bands playing, colours flying. Grief and despair, patriotic
passions, local antagonisms, class hatreds, raged together. The mi^ty fabric
of political architecture raised and consolidated by Bismarck in 1866 and
1871 shook and swayed; and as its western wing had fallen under the strokes
of the French battering-ram, gaping fissures appeared in the rest. The Reich
on every side seemed about to break up. Germany might disappear like the
Habsburg Empire leaving half a dozen small succession-states behind. France
counted on this; though passive resistance had ceased, still M. Poincar4,
contrary to his repeated declarations beforehand, refused to negotiate.
France would much rather see the Reich break up than pay up. The rest
of Europe held its breath.
Immediately after the surrender, Bavaria, the stronghold of monarchism
and nationalism, revolted against Berlin and appointed a dictator. Von Kahr
— a vigorous, heavy-handed man in Prince Rupprecht’s confidence The
aim of this movement was not separatist Bavaria meant to work later for
the restored unity of the Reich on modified terms, but meant meanwhile to
look after itself against dangers within and without. Without, as Munich
saw it, there was the Socialist peril. Unemployment was spreading right
and left in industrial Germany. The Communists might find their chance in
this turmoil. Neighbouring Saxony and Thuringia were under Red Govern-
ments; but while these regions are industrial, Protestant, and intensely So-
cialist, Bavaria is mainly agrarian, Catholic and Conservative. More than
in Italy, Hungary or anywhere, the German patriotic and anti-revolutionary
bands were resolved to fight Bolshevism to the death and to take their pre-
cautions in time. Bavaria was their citadel, and Ludendorff himself their
man in reserve. Behind him, or rather m front of him, was Adolph Hitler,
the decorative artist from Austria, turned noisy and militant demagogue.
His activities and incitements had created the formidable-looking legions of
the National Socialists. These bands of avowed Fascist! were conspicuous
for violent temper and vivid method In every town and valley of Bavaria
— as in many places in Austria — their orange and red posters were seen.
With the Hakenkreva (or swastika) for their symbol. Hitler’s colunms
paraded with rubber clubs, dividing their execrations between the French,
the Jews and the imagined medley of Republican incompetents and rank
traitors at Berlin who were accused of bringing about all Germany’s dis-
asters. Many Bavarian monarchists, however, wished to raise Prince Rup-
precht to the throne at Munich, and dreamed of a restored German Empire
imder the Catholic Wittelsbach line; while Ludendorff and Hitler were rather
for restoring the Protestant Hohenzollerns under the Crown Prince or his
son. As if these troubles were not enough for the distracted Reich, the
French and Belgians began to let loose the spiirious and for the most part
rufiBanly separatists who had long been secretly encouraged and subsidised in
the Rhineland. Though despised and loathed by nine-tenths of the imfortu-
PRESENT AND FUTURE
182
nate population in the occupied regions, the separatists began by descending
on Dusseldorf, and when the mevitable riot occurred, French troops stood
by while a couple of fallen German policemen as they lay on the street were
brutally beaten to death.
Could anything save Germany? There were still tough and shrewd per-
sonalities at its head — Ibe solid, honest sadler. President Ebert; Stresemann
himself, bold and dexterous; and an enigmatic but competent soldier, Generd
von Seckt, the head of the Reichswehr. He was loyal to the Reich in this
desperate crisis, and the forms of parliamentary Government for the whole
republic survived. An Emergency Powers Bill equipped authority in Berlin
with the full civil and military resoiuces of dictatorship. The successive
strokes which saved German unity in spite of all — outside the occupied
territories — were well planned. The first move was against Saxony where
at the end of October the semi-Communist Government was suppressed, and
replaced in the name of the Reich by a Civil Dictator, after troops had
occupied the Diet-House and all the Ministries. Next in Bavaria, matters
were drawing rapidly to a head. Whether civil war and the general break-
up could be avoided in Germany was still an open question. On Thursday,
November 8, the fifth anniversary of the German Republic, Hitler with a
National Socialist Guard broke into a meeting which the Bavarian Dictator,
Von Kahr, was holding in the Burgerbrdu-Keller; and proclaimed the deposi-
tion of the Bavarian Government. Hitler announced his own leadership of
all Germany, with Ludendorff as Commandcr-in-Chief. That night, soldiers
as well as Hakenkreuzer, marched through Munich with bands playing and
banners flying, while next day the Biirger-Keller was openly Ludendorff’s
G.H.Q. Unbounded enthusiasm and optimism prevailed for a few hours.
But the principals in this insurrection were not up to their parts. Hitler was
dishevelled and overwrought; Ludendorff anxious and unsure. Neither
seemed to know what to do next. Von Kahr outmanoeuvred them both.
He first seemed to accept the revolution, but concerted measures rapidly
with General von Lossow, commander of the Reichswehr in Bavana. Posters
appeared in Munich denouncing Hitler and Ludendorff as traitors, and order-
ing the National Socialist “ storm-troops ” with all other irregular bands to
dissolve forthwith. Unable to believe that the game was lost. Hitler and
Ludendorff tried to march through Munich at the head of 5,000 men. They
were trapped in narrow streets by General Lossow's well-posted Reichswehr
troops who opened fire with rifles and machine-guns. The regenerators, in
this situation, fled in all directions at the first volley, throwing away their
arms. The revolution was utterly crushed in half an hour, "^en Luden-
dorff gave himself up tamely, the reputation of a very great soldier had
suffered an ignominious blow. Hitler, who had escaped in a motor-car, was
captured a couple of days later when only forty miles away. This drama,
however, must not be hastily misunderstood. It saved Germany, indeed,
in her direst hour, from civil war and collapse. So far it was a victory for
the Reich and unity; but not for Berlin. Bavaria under Von, Kahr, again
supreme and with fresh laurels, remained entrenched in its own right, still
demanding drastic modifications of the Weimar Constitution; while Cardinal
Faulhaber, the Pope’s Legate, was a splendid and powerful figure represent-
ing the special support of the Vatican. The Hitlerite bands, temporarily
dispersed, might be used for other purposes under other leadership.
J. L. GARVIN
18 a
BHENISH SEPARATISM POMENTM) Vt TRANCE — THE MtJRDERS AT 6PETEE
On the side of the Rhine, the occupied territories were excluded frmn the
relative pacification, and plunged in disturbances for the rest of the year and
into the beginning of 19^. The French worked hard to galvanise the arti-
ficial separatist movement into real life, first in one part of tiie subjugated
Rhineland then in another. The bribed gangs of adventurers and gaol-birds
failed in city after city though spreading terror for a while. The Belpans
became disgusted with this scandal in their zone, and put down the separatists
in Charlemagne’s town of Aachen. The French were more loath to abandon
a discreditable cause, but its leaders made it still more hopeless by sor^d
and ludicrous quarrels. At last, by one of the sinister repetitions of history,
the disruptionist efforts of the dominant Power were concentrated upon the
small but historic ^strict of the Palatinate. Though belonging to Bavaria,
it lies somewhat apart upon the west bank of the Rhine. Numbering neatly
a million of people, half Catholic, hdf Protestant, it borders Alsace-Lorraine
and as commanding one of the chief Rhine passages — from a strate^c^
point of view — it has been desired by France for centuries. Under ^ms
XIV the ravage of the Palatinate left one of the worst evil-breeding memories
of Franco-German annals. Speyer, Ihe local capital, has the ancient ro-
manesque cathedral, known to many students of mediseval and Reformation
history; and at Speyer the Reformers first took the name of “ Protestants.”
Such facts must be taken into account if we are to realise how modem facts
may shoot from the old roots of things. The separatists were particularly
encouraged by General de Metz to seize the control of Sp^er and the “ Pfalz,”
thou^ the heads of the Protestant and Catholic churches equally protested
that the usupation was against the will of 99 per cent of the inhabitants.
Communication with the other side of the Rhine was interrupted: espionage
and intimidation reigned. At the beginning of January, 1924, Herr Heinz,
the separatist self-styled “ President ” of the Palatinate, was murdered with
two other persons in a caf6 in Speyer. The British Government, which had
strongly protested against all these disruptionist efforts in the Rh in ela iiid after
Germany’s total surrender on the Ruhr question, now insisted on sending one
of its consular officials to carry out an independent enquiry in the Palatinate.
Though this could not be prevented, it was another incident inflaming the
chronic irritation between London and Paris. Summing up in January, 1924,
it is safe to say that the practical imity of the Reich, so far as it is exempt
from direct foreign military control, has been everywhere preserved by the
feeling of the overwhelming majority of the German people. The armed
occupation of the Rhenish lands, including 12,000,000 of Germans, seems
likely to continue for years — as another and many times lai^ Alsace-
Lorraine — but the desired disguise, an apparent consent of the conquered,
cannot be obtained.
KRESENT STATE OP THE REPARATIONS QUESTION — POINCARfi ATTEMPTS TO
FRUSTRATE FINANCIAL STABILISATION OF CffiiRMANY
From this memorable ordeal for the political existence of Germany, we
must turn now to the parallel question — the economic sequel of the Ruhr
surrender and its bearings upon Reparations. As has been noted, through
the recpt weeks of almost mortal criris, the French Premier ignored all the
entieaties of Stresemann and the Reich, insisting instead upon direct nego-
PRESENT AND FUTURE
184
tiation witii the Rhenish iniliistrialists; including Herr Stinnes, the Gennan
plutocrats and profiteers — mostly the least attractive beings of their type in
the world — who had been lai^ely responsible for their country’s misguidance
before the war, during it, and after. But they had turned every successive
phase to gain, and many of them, growing richer and richer in all circiun-
stances, had battened on German miseries like vultures on carrion. They now
declared that the masses must again bear the brunt, that French demands
could only be fulfilled by the abolition of the eight-hour day which the workers
regarded as their chief compensation in all their troubles, and by restoring
a ten-hour day. The resistance of the Socialist parties to these proposals
brought about repeated Cabinet crises in Berlin, but it became clear that to
save the eight-hour day was past hope. To pay Reparations now, the entire
people would have to strain itself to the core, and the balance of social justice
could only be approximately redressed by ending a farcical system of nominal
taxation — the real scandal and folly of German conditions in the inflationist
period — and forcing the capitalists to pay their severe share. A fortni^t
after the collapse of passive resistance the failing mark had out-rubled the
ruble and soon after was down to the idiotic figure of 50,000,000,000 to the
pound steriing. A penny or a cent could buy as many marks as before the
war might have dazzled Croesus in a dream. As a first serious effort towards
stahlising the currency, a new standard, the Rentenmark,” was introduced,
secured by mortgages on agriculture and industry, with elaWate precautions
for maintaining its value for at least a provisional period pending stringent
taxation and the balancing of the Budget after a definite settlement with
France on Reparations.
But this settlement the inexorable M. Poincar5 still refused to expedite.
Instead, in consequence of the Crown Prince’s return from Holland to his
Silesian estates, France in November demanded the resumption of strict
military supervision and control in Germany and threatened more “sanc-
tions ” in case of demur. These further punitive measures were prevented
for the time by British resistance. In the financial problem there was still
no glimmering of daylight. Between France and the Rhenish industrialists,
whose private negotiations — though inevitable — roused the anger of the rest
of Germany, there were repeated hitches. The German Government declared
again and again that it could pay no further subsidies to the Ruhr and the
Rhineland while the French occupation remained. For the ^neral population,
on the other hand, France refused to take any responsibility. At last, on
November 23, the Diisseldorf agreement was reached between the Westphalian
owners and the Franco-Belgian M.I.C.U.M. {Mission Interalliee de Contrdle
des Usines et Mines), popularly known as the “ Micum.” The compact pro-
vided chiefly for the resumption of free deliveries of coal — no less than 18
per cent of net output — - while in future a tax of ten francs was to be levied
on every ton of coal sold; coal-tax arrears since the beginning of the Ruhr
invasion were to be paid; and accumulated stocks were to become the prop-
erty of the invaders. This arrangement was to run up to April, 1924. Ger-
man experts doubt^ whether even with a ten-hour day the agreement could
ever be fulfill^ owing to the dearness of Ruhr products which would result.
And the validity of the Diisseldorf agreement was contested by Britain, ig-
nored in the transaction though adjured to share in the assumed profits.
W^ork in the Ruhr mines, however, was resumed; and Germany formally
withdrew all opposition to the Franco-Bel^an control of ho; raUways left
of the Rhine.
J. L. GARVIN
185
GBSBMANY ** K FRENCH PROVINCE" — UNITED STATES OFFERS ITS ADVICE —
FRENCH OPINION NOT WHOLEHEARTEDLY BEHIND POINCAR^
A German of note said: Germany has become a French province." Herr
Stresemann's Cabinet fell. After several attempts at reconstruction had failed,
President Ebert found in the first week of December a new Chancellor in
the colourless person of Dr. Wilhelm Marx, a lawyer of moderate views and
no distinction, belonging to the Catholic Centre party — that steady pivot of
all the changing combinations. Herr Strescmann as Foreign Minister re-
mained the dominant political personality as before. After more than two
months of the distractions, active submission, as it may be called, following
the official withdrawal of passive resistance, was almost as complete as even
M. Poincare could desire. The way was clear at last for some international
attempt at a provisional settlement between France and Germany of the
financial problem, though no solution of the territorial question could be
expected. Washington’s opinion in favour of the determination of Germany’s
liability by an expert and impartial tribunal had stood on record since the
end of 1922. Britain, Italy and all the former neutrals shared that view.
Towards the middle of October, a couple of weeks after the collapse of
German resistance in the Ruhr, the British Government appealed to the
United States to join in an enquiry. Secretary- Hughes in reply approved
the principle on the main condition, indeed, that indebtedness to the United
States was not mixed up with the discussion of European Reparations, but
in a spirit of sympathy with the position of France and in no desire to relieve
Germany of her just and practicable obligations. These pourparlers seemed
to offer a new hope which was at once threatened wnth shipwreck by M.
Poincare’s unique energy in formulating negatives and limitations. The
French Premier declared at the beginning of November that any enquiry must
be confined to Germany’s present " capacity ; and that there must be no
reduction of the preposterous total indemnity of £6,600,000,000 as fixed in
the far-away and myth-making days of November, 1921. President Coolidge’s
Administration soon signified that any attempt at enquiry under such condi-
tions would be “ useless and futile." But there were warning signs of a dis-
position in the United States to make a large food-loan to Germany where
the hardships of the mass of the population were now lamentable.
Influential opinion in France itself began to dread the consequences of
M. Poincare’s rigidity. With regard to everything but the continued iron
grip on the Rhine frontier, French policy began somewhat to relax its measures
and to soften its tone. General Degoutte was allowed to regroup his troops
80 that French military ascendency became much less visible within the Ruhr
though the district could be controlled again at a moment’s notice. M.
Poincare consented to two Committees of Enquiry under the Reparations
Commission. The first would investigate Germany’s economic position and
capacity ; how to stabilise her finances and balance her Budget. The second
would try to track the flight of German capital into other countries, and to
estimate the total amount of German balances abroad. Confidential assur-
ances were believed to have been given by Paris to Washington that these
proposals would really mean a free and complete enquiry in the sense desired
by Secretary Hughes. No Government would be bound beforehand to accept
any conclusion or recommendation of the investigating bodies. Accordingly,
on December 12 the United States Government sanctioned the wholly un^
official participation of two American financial experts upon the two Com-
mittees. Their proceedings opened on January 14, 1924, when they hoped
PRESENT AND FUTURE
186
that vigorous and unremitting application would enable tiiem to cut through
their tangled task in a few weeks. Formally they cannot enter into the
question whether the tluhr is to be controlled by France or Germany. Really
tiiey must consider that question. It will affect their calculations at every
turn. After more than five years since war, it is difficult to say whether
Germany’s liability will soon be finally fixed at a definite and payable figure
as a result of the laboiirs of two Committees of Enquiry on which the Ameri-
can delegates, though unofficial, must carry exceptional weight. The answer
cannot make any problem worse, and in several respects may well mark a
turning point for the better.
THE EUBOPEAN BALANCE-SHEET IN 1924 — DICTATORSHIP IN GERMANY —
UNJUSTIFIED OPTIMISM OP GERMANY
On January 11, 1924, the anniversary of the Ruhr adventure, the European
press was full of attempts to frame a balance-sheet. Politically, Germany
had been quelled, humbled to the dust, and to some extent inspired by a
wholly new dread and fear of France, though at the cost of implanting a
thirst for future vengeance such as the World War itself did not create.
Economically, France in compelling a real will to pay, had destroyed for a
long time the means to pay, apart from deliveries m kind. M. Poincar6 had
not foreseen this. Twelve months before, he had genuinely believed that a
military seizure of the Ruhr would enable him to dictate terms to all Ger-
many in a week. But the better part of yet another twelve months would
have to elapse before the general production of Westphalia could recover its
normal volume. The efficiency of the intricate railway system would take
long to restore, and for that the French expulsions would have to be revoked,
the German managers and workers brought back. The future of mining pro-
duction, under conditions felt to be like slavery to foreign taskmasters, was
menaced by the certainty, after a deceptive interval, of labour resistance. At
the end of 1923, France was only getting 45 per cent of her coal deliveries
before the Ruhr invasion, and if she got 75 per cent within the first half of
the New Year she would be fortunate. The annee terrible for Germany could
only be regarded as a financial disaster for France.
Thus as between the two nations mainly involved, this ill-starred passage
of human affairs ended with strange revulsions of feeling in contrary senses.
Germany by comparison with past torture was optimistic to her usual point of
exaggeration in every mood. France, tasting the bitterness of Dead-Sea Fruit,
was full of discontent and misgiving, in accordance with that law of the
modem world which subjects the results of all violence to a drastic law of
diminishing returns. The German mood was that of emotional revulsion after
strain. Exceeding anything that solid judgment justified, it was encouraged
by trifles light as air; and soared like a balloon which has thrown out ballast.
To the relief from the fear of civil war and dissolution was added American
participation in the Committees of Enquiry and the prospect of a Labour
Government in Great Britain. At the end of the black year Christmas showed
a glaring contrast between the impoverished majority in Germany and a large
comfortable minority. In effect the country was governed by decree. Gen-
eral von Seeckt was the power behind the scenes. Freedom of speech and
writing was restricted. In this, and some other ways, the Republican post-
war regime was like the Hohenzollem pre-war rigime. Definitely the So-
cialists had failed since the Armistice, and critics originally in their favour
accused them of an unparallelled lack of real ideas and practical capacity.
J. L. GARVIN
187
The elections, to be held at any time between March and June, 1924, were
expected to mark a sbx)ng swing towards the Right. Germany in this mood
of escape from nightmare was inclined for any tolerable scheme of cooperation
with France for a few years, without prejudice to the inward belief in a
further future of revanche, Spiritually, the status of tiie German people for
an indefinite period must be one of subjection unless the world grows wiser
than is anywhere promised. Materially, the opening signs of 1924 indicated
a return to prosperity. The German nation still excelled all others in its
scientific progressiveness, its instinct for combination, and its zest for work.
FKANCE, BEPOSINO ON ITS LAURELS, INCUBS DISPLBASUBB OP SPAIN AND ITALY
— DIVERGENT STANDPOINTS OP POINCAB^ AND MILLEBAND
In France, a perceptible lassitude after triumph was due to several causes.
From the standpoint of national glory and power the Ruhr had been mag-
nificent but it had not paid. La vie chkre was the subject of universal con-
cern. While the cost of living rose, the fall of the exchange value of the
franc was alarming at the beginning of 1924. The devastated districts had
been almost wholly restored with brilliant energy, but at the price of the
piling up of a colossal increase of debt which German contributions could
never liquidate in the end, and even in the next few years would not lighten
as much as had been ardently expected. Heavier taxation — combined perhaps
with a hazardous resort to “ moderate inflation,” so easy to begin mildly, so
hard to restrain — must be faced at last; and dearer living was a problem
almost bound to go worse before it could go better. An armed predominance
temporarily overwhelming in Europe and a ruthless use of force on the soil
of the vanquished, had not purchased the sense of permanent security Mili-
tary loans to the extent of over one hundred million dollars (or £20,(X)0,000
sterling) had been made to Poland and the nations of the Little Entente,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania in the latter months of 1923. The
value was to be taken out by the debtors in the shape of weapons and mili-
tary equipment supplied by the French Armament Factories.
But m far more important respects France was losing support, not gaining
it. The inability to refrain from driving the hardest bargain even in sec-
ondary concerns had resulted in the Tangier Convention. French ascendency
was established in the name of internationalism Spain, included in the
negotiations, and Italy, excluded by the insistence of Paris, were both sharply
alienated. Just before, the British elections had returned a majority over-
whelmingly opposed to the Ruhr adventure and to the whole Poincare spirit.
In London a Labour Government intimately friendly with the German So-
cialists, though earnestly desiring to avert an open breach with France, was
about to come into office. Russia, sure of speedy recognition in London,
Rome and elsewhere, and therefore in Paris, was unquestionably about to
become a factor in general European affairs. The outcome of M. Poincare’s
policy bad made even Belgium profoundly uneasy. Above all, there was the
standing problem with which armaments, however irresistible at an advan-
tageous phase, cannot cope in the long run. There are still too many Germans
— millions too many — and they are too prolific. In these circumstances,
there was an obvious divergence between the two strongest political per-
sonalities in France — President Millerand, temporarily eclipsed by the
Premier, and M. Poincar4 himself. The President markedly described New
Year’s Day, 1924, as “(he dawn of Reconciliation.” M. Millerand’s chief
idea of fraternity would appear to be the Super-Syndicate of capitalists
PRESENT AND FUTURE
188
representing French iron industries and Ruhr coal. The great deal might
indeed mean a prolonged truce profitable to both nations. But President
Millerand no more than M. Poincar6 intends to abandon the Rhine frontier.
This in the end, as through centuries before, will prove unescapably the vital
question between Gaul and Teuton. A compromise postponing for certain
years the reopening of this inveterate antagonism in its fatal acuteness is
doubtless manageable.
Much depends on the result of the French elections in May or before.
The renewal of the Senate at the be^nnmg of 1924 showed no considerable
change in opinion. The conditions influencing the direct popular poll for
the Chamber of Deputies are very different. In Janua^ the Left still ex-
pected to gain heavily at M. Poincare^s expense. The militant bloc National
has not represented in the last few years the average temper of France.
Harsh taxation and dearer living arc likely to aid prudence and reasonable-
ness in international affairs. In view of the elections the rival attitude on
the Ruhr sequel might be most clearly expressed as follows: the governing
Right said with M. Poincare, ‘"We stay until they pay.” The opposition
Left retorted, We stay but we pay.”
BBITISH ELECTIONS OF DECEMBER, 1923 — A. LABOUR GOVERNMENT, WITH
RAMSAY MACDONALD AT THE HEAD — OTHER IMPERIAL CONCERNS
Incidental references already made to remarkable developments in British
affairs must now be briefly explained. In the few months under survey, in
this postscript, the position of Britain in the national sphere was altered by
a complete transformation in her domestic politics. We have seen how, after
the Corfu crisis, the Conservative Premier, Mr. Baldwin, and his Foreign
Secretary, Lord Curzon, abandoned effective opposition to M. Poincar6 and
kept the Entente in bickenng existence while seeking at the same time to
improve relations with Italy. For an interval all these besetting issues were
swept away with the violence of a typhoon by a new controversy. The great
periodical Council of the British Commonwealth, including the Prime Minis-
ters of the self-governing Dominions, representatives of the Irish Free State,
and distinguished native delegates from India, is still called the Imperial
Conference. It met again in London in October. At first it seemed likely
to make its influence felt in foreign affairs, and General Smuts in ringing
speeches demanded a change in the disastrous drift of European relations
towards another great war or anarchy; and the South African statesman
appealed to the conscience of the world. But the strengthening current of
other concerns drew the British Ministry almost involuntarily into a vortex.
The old — and always latent — issue of free imports or Protection was re-
vived in full force. Mr. Baldwin's Government began by extending, to no
very important degree, the system of Imperial Preference by which certain
Dominion products, chiefly fruit, are favoured, as against the foreign com-
petitive products, by relief from revenue duties. Mr. Baldwin was debarred
from going further by the pledge of his predecessor to refrain from inter-
fering with free trade pending another General Election. The Premier and
his Cabinet, after considerable disagreement and misgiving amongst its mem-
bers, decided that they must seek relief from that pledge. Their main argu-
ment was that the vast problem of unemployment in Britain — where nearly
2,000,000 persons registered and unregistered were now without work* —
could only be dealt with, in view of the unparallelled dislocation of world
trade, by protection of the home market. Cto this issue a General Election
J. L. GARVIN
189
was forced in December. Of the three parties, Ck)n8ervative, Labour and
Liberal, the first polled rather less than 40 per cent of the national votes, the
second a little more than 30 per cent, the tnird a little less than 30 per cent.
The results for tbe House of Commons — omnipotent in British affairs — were:
Conservatives, 257 seats; Labour-Socialists, 192; Liberals, 158; Independents,
8. Mr. Baldwin’s former majority was swept away, but for the first time
in the history of the House of Commons no party had anything like a work-
ing majority. Reimited by the return of Mr. Lloyd George’s section on the
anti-Protection issue, the Liberals under Mr. Asquith decided to put the
Socialists in office. In mid-January, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was charged by
the King to form a Labour Government. As regards domestic affairs it will
be a Government in custody and cannot pursue an extreme programme. In
European affairs, its close affinities with the Socialist parties in Europe
may give it a wide moral influence. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald declares that
as a Labour Premier he wilt stand firmly for appeasement and cooperation,
and will begin by the decisive step of granting full recognition to Soviet
Russia. What effect moral influence will exercise, as against European arma-
ments, remains to be seen. In any case the Socialist Cabinet in Great
Britain — though its term can scarcely exceed twelve months and may be
less than six — will be a profoundly interesting experiment for that country
and for the world.
Simultaneously, the whole system of the British Empire was entering upon
a grave testing time. The Swaraj party demanding complete parliamentary
self-government for India had gained so largely in the recent elections as
to threaten the working of the reforms providing for more gradual progress.
Similarly, in the first weeks of 1924, the polls were swept in Egypt by the
apostle of total independence, Zaglul Pasha. Britain’s former regime on the
Nile, that of practical sovereignty, is already renounced in principle, but she
demands agreement ensuring her special standing for the freedom and de-
fence of the Suez Canal. All these are but parts of the widest of world-
problems. Nowhere in the East, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, is
the prospect free from trouble. It seems certain that if the British safe-
guards were withdrawn from either India or Egypt, these countries once more
would be conquered from without.
THE D^ATH OF LENIN — RUSSIA'S “NEW ECONOMIC POLICY" — MUSSOUNfs
OPPOSITION TO FRANCE — RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN SPAIN AND ITALY
A compressed summary must serve for all the rest of the events crowding
the latter months of 1923 and the first of 1924. In Russia, Lenin’s illness and
absence (to be followed by his death on January 21, 1924) were accompanied
by strong dissensions amongst the Communists. The ruling Junta of original
leaders, keeping affairs in their own hands — thou^ not at one amongst
themselves — were denounced as conservative and old-fashioned by a younger
school demanding a share of authority and more liberty to oppose. But
both schools denied that these quarrels threatened ^e stability of the State.
The new economic policy continued to restore individual: enterprise, practical
reconstruction advanced, and large plans for future trade were arranged
with foreign syndicates. Soviet Russia, as these pages are written, seems
assured of full recognition at an early date — giving in return some suffi-
cient acknowledgment of indebtedness — by Itely, France and many of the
smaller countries as well as by Britain. This would be one of the more
significant and promising events in the world’s recent history.
190
PRESENT AND FUTURE
In Italy, Signor Mussolini continued to raise his repute and to consolidate
his power. At home, he pursued his vigorous policy of order, retrenchment
and reform, courageously enforcing more toleration on his own party and
respect for law on his insubordinate supporters in the provinces. The Italian
Parliament renewed his dictatorial powers, and then awaited dismissal. A
new and unique electoral law is designed to give the Fascist rSgime a two-
thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies, to be created by its maker in
his own image before the summer of 1924. At the beginning of that year the
Dictator belied all alarms after the Corfu crisis by a strong stroke of rec-
onciling statesmanship in foreign affairs. By a treaty between Rome and
Belgrade, Italy annexed Fiume — nearly five years after President Wilson’s
protest — but ensured parallel harbour rights and ample facilities for Yugo-
slavia. Not only so. General relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were
settled on a basis of benevolent neutrality almost amounting to an alliance.
Both countries were strengthened by this compact. Resisting French hegem-
ony in other ways, the Dictator had declared frankly for reasonable treat-
ment of Germany. The Mediterranean question, however, was his main
concern. He protested against the exclusion of Rome from the negotiations,
which ended about this time by enhancing French ascendency at Tangier.
Most important of all in , this and larger connections was the visit to Rome
of the King of Spain accompanied by General Primo de Rivera. To the de-
light of the cartoonists, the two Dictators met, as well as the two sovereigns.
This visit had the notable consent of the Vatican, and Alfonso XIII ad-
dressed the Pope in fervent terms of almost mediaeval devotion. The Church
remains an independent influence whose potent 'diplomacy pervades much of
the world, but never forgets that Mussolini restored the Crucifix to the
schools, and insists that the State must shew conspicuous reverence for reli-
pon. Between Rome and Madrid a real entente, probably without definite
commitments, was undoubtedly established. Each country demands that the
Mediterranean shall not become a French lake, and each desires to promote
cordial relations with Latin America, whose numerous votes in the League of
Nations have become a factor in European affairs.
BELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN
By the New Year, however, the future of the Spanish Dictatorship was
still altogether uncertain. Unlike Fascismo, it had no solidly organised
basis of national support. Toiling night and day, issuing countless decrees,
the military Directory had done wonders towards the temporary cleansing
of an Augean stable of inefldciency and corruption. During three months
honesty and economy had been enforced on all hands; numbers of malefactors
had been brought to trial; strikes had ceased — even in Catalonia. The
limited campaign in Morocco was drawing towards success after shameful
mismanagement and disaster under the former parliamentary regime, and
a drain of blood and treasure for years. But inertia was quietly resuming
its sway in many quarters. On the Tangier question the Directory could
obtain from France no satisfaction for national pride. In some glaring cases
suppression of public criticism and critics went much too far. The Spanish
temperament, though backward in active use of liberty, resents and resists
incessant pressure. Above all, while the Italian Dictatorship expressed the
will of the people, the Spanish Directory imposed itself on the people. It
may not endure long unless it can come to some working compromise with
intelligent opinion on the basis of a reformed parliamentary system.
J. L. GARVIN
191
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES — POLAND AND THjE LITTLE ENTENTE —
GREECE — BULGARIA
We have noticed that Poland and the Little Entente during the last weeks
of 1923 were drawn closer to France by military loans. A very close alliance
was concluded between Paris and Czechoslovakia. Poland, in severe finan-
cial straits, was ceasing to be content with these conditions. Yugoslavia
gained more freedom and security by the understanding with Italy. Rumania,
in all these more recent circumstances, must soon establish better relations
with Russia. At Belgrade, in January, 1924, the statesmen of the Little
Entente met in Conference, but the cohesion and influence of that combina-
tion — always rather overestimated by comparison with the internal diflS-
culties, racial and sub-racial, of its members — were more likely to diminish
than increase. They were all afraid of the revival of Hungary, and were
still bent on putting obstacles in the way of the admirable scheme for a
moratorium and loan in favour of the Magyar State on the drastic condition
that it stabilise its finances and balance its Budget in two years and a half.
This plan, under the auspices of the League of Nations, was chiefly pressed
by Britain with Italian support, and in the long run could not be prevented.
The improvement m Austria under the similar scheme mentioned in previous
pages was miraculous.
Greece in these months had seemed on the brink of its fifth revolution
in fifteen years. King George and his Queen by request had quitted Athens
for Bucharest, pending a popular decision upon the growing demand for a
republic. M. Venizelos returned with the New Year and became Prime
Minister to prepare for elections. They will be held, it is asserted, under
such conditions as would make free and decisive the verdict of the people
on the question of republic! or monarchy. At the same time, Greece had lost
more during the long absence of Venizelos than she could ever regain.
Bulgaria, formerly her most hated neighbour, w^as in no better case.
Stamboliisky’s tyranny had been no doubt unbearable to the more civilised
elements of the country for all his powerful common sense. Months after
his overthrow the new regime, supported by the intelligentsia, the ex-officers
and the Macedonian refugees, could only maintain itself by force. There
was no firm security against another revolution. A solid understanding be-
tween Greece and Bulgaria would be to the best interest of both, if M.
Venizelos could take up that question once more and overcome popular
prejudice.
THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST — MUSTAPHA KEMAL IN CONTROL OP
TURKISH DESTINIES
We pass eastward to the nation wrhose unique geographical place in the
world still links tw^o continents. At the end of October, 1923, the New
Turkey severed another historic link with the past. Twelve months before,
the Califate, or spiritual headship of Islam, was separated from temporal
sovereignty over Turkey and ^us reduced to a vague though venerable
shadow. Now, Angora abolished the Sultanate itself and proclaimed a
republic with Mustapha Kemal as first President. The spirit of revolution
could go no further in the Moslem East. Mustapha KemaPs prestige as the
fighting hero of national recovery and triumph is immense, but his regime
depends upon his personality. There is murmuring throughout Islam against
the loss by the Califate of all its legendary splendour, power and substance.
PRESENT AND FUTURE
192
Opposition grows, promoted by the survivors of the old Committee of Union
and Process. The more imperiously the President tries to strike down his
public critics, the more he spreads and strengthens secret antagonism. Fol-
lowing the Turkish ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, the allied troops
have finally evacuated Constantinople. Weakened economically by mortality
and ravage, by the extermination of Armenians, the expulsion of Greeks, and
even by the abolition of the antiquated capitulations, which with all their
faults encouraged western enterprise and investment, the New Turkey is
an incalculable and unpromising problem now that the excitement of war
is over and the dull constructive tasks have to be faced. It is improbable
that the last surprising scene in the long drama of Ottoman fortunes since
1908 has yet been witnessed.
POLITICS IN CHINA — THE JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE — 8INOAPOBB
The introduction to 1924 was as eventful in the Far East as in the Near
East. The anarchy of Chinese politics was not mitigated in October by
tbe election of Marshal Tsao-Kun, after flagrant bribery of a nominal Par-
liament, to be President of the Republic. In Manchuria, Chang-Tso-Lin was
“ pathetically moved by a sense of righteousness ” In the south Sun Yat-
sen — notoriously incited by Turkish success in abolishing the capitula-
tions — threatened to seize the customs’ revenues at Canton. He was
prevented by the naval and commercial unanimity of the foreign Powers,
including the United States. Here none the less are the faint beginnings of
a large question more fully explained elsewhere.
Japan had the sympathy of the whole world in September after the
earthquake which destroyed Yokohama and devastated Tokio. That stoical
nation will restore these cities as Amenca rebuilt San Francisco. In Japanese
politics there was no signal development. Hostile comment was aroused by
the proposed British naval base at Singapore, but that project is certain
to be delayed in any case, and likely to be limited if not abandoned.
AMERICA AND THE OLD WORLD
The relations of the Old World with the two American continents have
already been broadly treated. The outbreak of the Mexican insurrection in
December, 1923, must be mentioned in passing. The faction claiming the
presidential succession for Huerta against General Calles, the nominee of
the present ruler. General Obregon, occupied the oil areas and threatened to
interrupt oil shipments at their chief port, Tampico. The United States gave
its recognition and support to Obregon’s relatively orderly regime. Whether
any system of order with progress can be maintained in the future without
a more permanent adjustment of special relations between Washington and
Mexico is the large question that remains unsolved. More than ever, as we
have seen, regard in this connection has to be paid to Latin-American settie-
ment as a whole. On December 1 the centenary of the Monroe' Doctrine
was celebrated in America, and comment resounded in Europe. This fixed
principle of United States policy has saved South America from becoming one
of fbe chief arenas of world wars. The task in the twentieth century wiD
be to harmonise the security of the Monroe Doctrine with the steady growtii
of the Trans-Atlantic Latin States and their desire for closer intellectual rela-
tions and diplomatic intercourse with tiieir mother-races in Europe.
J. L. GARVIN
103
Lastf but by no means least, President Coolidge’s declarations, with his
habitual precision, at the opening of Congress finally extinguished some
faint expectations still lingering in Europe. The President proclaimed the
refusal of partnership in the present League of Nations by the United States
to be a settled decision and a closed issue. The permanent World Court
of Justice at The Hague was commended as a convenient but not compulsory
resort.
There was at the New Year a general feeling in Europe as a whole that,
with 1923, the worst had passed. The prospect of rapid material improvement
in Central Europe and of normal international intercourse witt Russia,
promised at least a provisional period of stability and recuperation. Germany
and Russia alike might be included before long in the League of Nations,
making it representative at last of the large majority of the white races as
well as of the yellow and the dark. It was widely felt that as 1918 saw the
turning-point of the war, 1924 might see the turning-point for truer peace.
But in a world still full of armaments and contention, the better hopes, though
they seemed fairer than at any time since the Treaty of Versailles, were on
the lap of the gods.
T ». ir — VOL I — 13
CHAPTER V
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR
By Cablton J. H. Hatbs, Ph.D., LL D.
Professor of History, Columbia University. Captain U. S. A.
Militar;^ Intelligence Division, General Staff, 191^1919. Author
of PolUical and Social History of Modem Europe; Brief His-
tory of the Great War; Co- Author of The League of Nations,
Its Principles and Practice.
I. General Causes
The years immediately preceding the World War presented a curious
contrast between thought and action. The predominant thou^t throughout
the world was pacific and optimistic. It was popularly believed that the
human race was making notable progress not only in physical comfort and
well-being but also in intellectual attainments and spiritual breadth and
depth, and that the rapidly growing world commerce in ideas as well as in
commodities was paving the way, in conjunction with international finance
and international labour organisation, for a peaceful evolution toward a new
world-order in which the lion should lie down with the lamb, swords should
be beaten into ploughshares, and war, the primeval curse of hmnanity, should
be exorcised eternally. Never were pacifists more active or more enthusiastic.
Andrew Carnegie and Alfred Nobel consecrated their fortunes to peace propa-
ganda. The Governments of the world participated in peace conferences at
The Hague in 1899 and 1907 and planned for a third in 1915.
It is diflBcult for us, after the event, to imderstand the earlier widespread
optimism. We can now clearly perceive that in the first decade of the
twentieth century certain actions and tendencies were unobtrusively yet
positively predisposing the world not to universal peace but to the greatest
war in human annals.
international anarchy and the vogue op nationalism
First of all, there still flourished in undiminishing vigour a state system
which had had its origin in the lapse of the mediaeval notions of a universal
State and a universal Church. This state system of modem times was based
on the assumption that there were numerous independent and sovereign States,
each being equal to every other and fully competent to do whatever it would
in domestic and foreign affairs without let or hindrance on the part of any
S reme arbiter and with only such practical restrictions as the strength of
er States mi^t impose. At the opening of the twentieth centu]^ there
were some fifty States, in theory absolutely independent, sovereign and
equal. In fact, the fifty were very unequal, and even the strongest among
them was not strong enough to maintain its independence should the others
unite gainst it. Yet each proceeded to act in most cases as though it were
self-sufficient and as thou^ its own self-interest were its sunreme miide.
m
CARLTON J. H. HAYES
105
The fifty States professed to conduct their relations with one another in con-
sonance with the traditional European usages of international law and inter-
national diplomacy, but indirectly, if not directly, force and power were the
final arbitrament among them. And it was no euphemism that every such
State was styled a “ Power,” and that a few States by reason of the thickness
and weight of their armour and the prestige which customarily attended their
show of might were classed as “ Great Powers.” In the circumstances, the
state system was hardly a system at all. It was an assemblage of separate,
selfish and jealous entities, and it enshrined a potent spirit of international
anarchy.
The prevailing anarchy in the state system was becoming more acute
and more dangerous with the ubiquitous rise of nationalism. The idea that
every State should consist of persons who speak the same language and
share the same customs and traditions, is essentially modern. Before the
nineteenth century it found vital expression only m western Europe, in France,
England, Portugal, Spain, Holland and the Scandinavian countries. But
thenceforth it flourished luxuriantly and brought forth fruit in abundance.
It affected the peoples of central and eastern Europe and created the inde-
pendent national states of Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, Serbia, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Norway and Albania. In all civilised countries nationalism was
heightened and intensified, especially after 1880, by the development of
state-directed systems of compulsory, universal, elementary education, by
the spread of cheap chauvinistic journalism, by the constant increase of
armed forces, and by the rising vogue of ultra-patriotic poets, historians,
essayists, and other litterateurs. Under pressure from these powerful
agencies of propaganda, nationalism tended to become strikingly intolerant.
It emphasised what was peculiar to a nation rather than what was common
to mankind. It firmly lodged in every people the conviction that they were
superior to all other peoples. It gave to the masses in each country an
unquestioning faith in their own collective virtue and wisdom and an equally
unquestioning faith in the collective vice and depravity of their neighbours.
Psychologically it paved the way to war.
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES EMBITTERED BY NATIONALISM
In explaining the general causes of the World War, three special results
of the rise of nationalism must be taken into account. One was the willing-
ness and even the zeal with which all members of a national State, regard-
less of religious, social, and economic differences among themselves, were
certain to support their Government in the assertion of national rights,
national interests and national honour. Governments which might other-
wise have been pacifistic were frequently goaded on to militancy by popular
patriotic fervour, while Governments which were habitually truculent knew
that, no matter how secret and selfish their conduct had been, they would
have the unqualified aid of their whole nation if affairs reached a crisis.
In this way twentieth-century Governments grew more combative and the
state system more anarchic.
Secondly, the rise of nationalism embittered certain territorial disputes.
The French conquest of Alsace-Lorraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, though adding a German-speaking population to France, had not
evoked a strong nationalistic reaction in those provinces or in Germany as
a whole; but the German conquest of Alsace-I^rraine in 1870-1871, in an
era of sharpening nationalism, produced quite different results: patriotic
Germans (and all Germans were now patriotic in this matter) insisted on
196
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR
having and holding Alsace-Lorraine because the territory had been " Ger-
man” in the middle ages; patriotic Frenchmen (and all Frenchmen were
now patriotic) longed for a favourable opportunity to regain the '‘lost
provinces ” because their inhabitants had been partially Gallicised prior to
1870 and had protested in 1871 against incorporation in the German Empire.
Alsace-Lorraine was a bone of contention between French nationalism and
German nationalism. In another way the status of Belgium and of Luxem-
burg was a spur to nationalism both in Germany and in France. The little
Duchy of Luxemburg was German in speech and in historical connection,
but it was the first and most obvious step in that expansion of France to
her “ natural boundary ” of the Rhine which, Frenchmen were now patrioti-
cally taught, had been their country’s “ manifest destiny ” since the days of
Julius Caesar. The Kingdom of Belgium was mainly French in language,
but the Germans latterly discovered that a Germanic (Flemish) tongue was
also spoken in Belgium and that all the Netherlands — both Belgium and
Holland — had been part of the German mediaeval Empire. Englishmen,
however, in the patriotic pursuit of their national interests, were minded to
resist any attempt on the part of either France or Germany to control the
small European States which were so close to English shores; and in the
nineteenth century Great Britain prevailed upon both Germany and France
to sign treaties with her, solemnly afiirming the integrity and neutrality of
Bel(num and Luxemburg.
Thirdly, the rise of nationalism actually imperilled certain great European
States which had never been thoroughly homogeneous and which continued
in the twentieth century to resemble in their diversity of subject nationalities
the ancient Roman Empire rather than any national state of modem times.
Such were the Ottoman Empire, the Austrian Empire and the Russian Em-
pire. The Ottoman Empire plainly showed its inability to withstand the
disruptive forces of nationalism. Its subject peoples in Europe had revolted
one after another and established their independence — Greeks, Serbs, Bul-
garians, Rumanians and Albanians. On the eve of the World War the first
three of these Balkan peoples had waged a common struggle against the
Ottoman Empire, had partitioned Macedonia among themselves, and had
confined Turkish rule in Europe to Constantinople, Eastern Thrace, and the
peninsula of Gallipoli. Still, however, the Ottoman Empire remained a
motley aggregation of Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Arabs and Jews; each of
its varied peoples was emphasising its own nationalism; freed Greeks were
mindful of thousands of fellow nationals in Turkish bondage in Asia Minor,
and freed Bulgarians, of fellow nationals under Turkish sway in Thrace;
Bulgaria, Greece and Russia, too, cast covetous eyes upon Constantinople
and waxed eloquent with nationalistic argument for its conquest. Only
Serbia and Rumania, of the states which had long warred on Turkey, were
satiated in that direction. No Rumanians or Serbs were subject to the Otto-
man Empire in 1914.
NATIONALISM AND THE FATE OF AU8TEIA-HUNQABY
The Austrian Empire had been forced in the nineteenth century by the
power of nationalism to relinquish its control of Italy and Germany, and to
consent to the establishment of a united German Empire and a united King-
dom of Italy. Likewise, the Austrian Empire had been compelled to restore
the autonomy of Hungary and to agree to its own transformation into the
Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungry. Then for a time Austria, unlike Tur-
key, had seemed to stay tiie disruptive tendencies of nationalism and to
CARLTON J. H. HAYBB
197
retain her position as a Great Power; in 1878 she had occupied Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serb^speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empue, and in 1908
she formally annexed them. But underneath the seeming might of the Dual
Monarchy lurked serious nationalistic dangers. The Av^ro-Hungarian
dominions were as polyglot as those of the Ottoman Turks. In addition to
the two ruling peoples — Germans in Austria and Magyars in Hungary —
there were Czechs (and their kinsmen, the Slovaks), Poles, Ruthenians,
Rumanians, Yugoslavs of various brands (Serbs and their kinsfolk, the
Croats and Slovenes), and Italians. Gradually these subject peoples came
under the influence of nationalistic agitators and propagandists, until in the
twentieth century the national renaissance was far advanced among all of
them. Italians in Istria and the Trentino were looking forward to incorpora-
tion in the Kingdom of Italy. Czechs in Bohemia were workmg for the
recovery of their independence and for the union of the Slovaks with them.
Poles in Galicia were endeavouring not only to “ polonise ” the neighbouring
Ruthenians but also to concert measures with the Poles of Russia and Ger-
many for the restoration of a free national Poland. Rumanians in Tran-
sylvania were opposing their Ma^ar masters and appealing to the Kingdom
of Rumania for sympathy and aid. Serbs in Bosnia were notoriously sedi-
tious, and Croats and Slovenes were declaring that they were of the same
blood as the Serbs and of almost the same speech and that all the Yugoslavs
should be federated together.
Stimulating the nationalism of the subject peoples in Austria-Hungary,
and rendering the future of the Dual Monarchy a grave international problem,
was the attitude of ultra-patriotic groups in neighbouring states. Despite
the fact that the Governments of Italy and Rumania were in alliance with
that of Austna-Hungary, propagandists were busily arousing popular senti-
ment in those countries in behalf of the completion of national unity; and
the complete national unity of Rumania and Italy could be achieved only at
the expense of the Dual Monarchy. It was similar in the case of ^rbia.
For a time in the nineteenth century Serbia had been allied with Austria,
but in the twentieth century the rise of nationalistic temperature led in
Serbia to the deposition of the pro-Austrian dynasty, the accession of the
anti-Austrian King Peter, and the development of popular agitation in favour
of territorial expansion. The Balkan War of 1912-1913 enlarged Serbia at
the expense of the Ottoman Empire; henceforth it was only the Austrian
Empire which blocked the inclusion of all Yugoslavs in the Kingdom of
Serbia.
RUSSIA AND GERMANY CONCERNED IN FATE OP AUSTRIA
Aiding and abetting Serb and Yugoslav nationalism, and, in a lesser
degree, Czechoslovak nationalism, was Russia. The Russian Empire was
not a national state in the same sense as France or Italy, for it included the
Finns, the Esths, the Letts, the Lithuanians, the bulk of Rullienians (Ukrai-
nians, or Little Russians), the majority of Poles, a considerable number of
Armenians, and many other peoples of varying language and dialect; but,
unlike the Austrian and Ottoman Empires, it comprised a nation (the
Russian) singularly homogeneous and more numerous than all its other
populations put together. The Russian nation was bound by relii^ous and
cultural ties with the Balkan nationalities and by race and Imguistic origins
to all other Slavic peoples; and with the universal rise of nationalism in the
nineteenth century there appeared among Russians a patriotic Pan-Slavist
movemoit, which aimed not only at “russifying” the subject nationalities
198
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR
within the Russian Empire but also at fostering a common Slavic conscious-
ness among Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, Poles and Ruthenians, and accustom-
ing them to lo(£ upon Russia as their guardian and “ big brother.” l^tween
the Russian and Austrian Empires <£iere had long been rivalry over the
advantages which they mi^t respectively gain from the dismemberment of
tiie Ottoman Empire, but in the twentieth century this rivalry was supplanted
by a rivalry far more acute and more dangerous to the peace of all Europe.
It was now a question of the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire itself,
and as the Germans and Magyars within the empire sought to extinguish the
fires of nationalism, so the Russians outside fanned them.
The German Empire had much at stake in the newer rivalry between
Russia and Austria-Himgary. Germany was chiefly a national State of
Germans, but in addition to the French-willed population of Alsace-Lorraine
and some Danes in Schleswig, she held within her Wders, as a subject people,
some three million Poles who shared the yearnings of Russian and Austrian
Poles for national unity and freedom. These Poles were resentful of Pan-
Slavist attempts to “ russify ” them, but they were ready to invoke Pan-
Slavist assistance in their struggle against Teutonic overlordship. The
Germans learned to distrust and fear the Slavs, in part because of the Poles,
and in greater part because Pan-Slavist agitation, developing in Russia, was
directed against the Austrian Empire. Austria was the ally of Germany,
and such patriotic organisations as the Pan-German Lea^e pointed out that
Germans, with Magyars, were and should be the dominant nationality in
the Dual Monarchy and that the fate of Germans in Germany was linked
with the fate of Germans in Austria. The more Russia strove to rouse the
ambitions of Slavic peoples and to disintegrate Austria-Hungary, the more
Germany laboured to bolster up the Dual Monarchy and to incite its govern-
ing groups to curb and crush the activity of hostile neighbours. What had once
been a sincere friendship between the autocracies of Russia and Prussia was
giving way in the twentieth century, before the rising wave of nationalism,
to a vindictive rivalry between Germany and Russia, the stakes of which
were primarily the preservation or destruction of Austria-Hungary, and
secondarily the Teutonic or Slavic domination of south-eastern Europe.
In view of the disquieting effects of nationalism upon Turkey and Austria
and even upon Russia and Germany, it is not surprising that many publicists,
especially on the Continent, should have prophesied prior to 1914 the nation-
alistic undermining and eventual dissolution of the British Empire. Par-
ticularly in Germany it came to be believed that in a general war the Irish,
the Boers, the East Indians and the Egyptians, moved by separatist nation-
alism, would rebel and either paralyse or prevent British participation; and
some Englishmen were obviously troubled by the prospect.
Nationalism was certainly a most disturbing factor in the European
situation. By 1914 it was widespread and intolerant. And toe map of
Europe, drawn in the main at the Congress of Vienna a century earlier when
nationalism was quite disregarded, was at variance in many instances with
the ideals and purposes of determined nationalists. Only a war of huge
dimensions could refashion the European state system on strictly national
bases.
THE NEW IMPBBIAUSM AND ITS BELATION TO NATIONALISM
Nationalism predisposed Europe to war, and nationalism was a senti-
ment. But simultaneously quite a different factor was ptredisposing toe
whole world to war, and this factor was economic. The rapid industrialisa-
CARLTON J. H. HAYES
199
tion of Great Britain, France and Bel^um in the nineteenth cratury and of
Germany, Italy and the United States in the forty years immediately preced-
ing 1914, created intense economic rivalry between certain classes in one
country and corresponding classes in another. Such rivalry displayed itself
in mounting tariffs and consequent “ tariff wars ” and likewise in quarrelsome
scrambles for the exploitation of “ backward areas ” and resulting enlarge-
ment of the arena of international conflict. In both cases the classes who
had the greatest economic interests at stake found that usually, by appealing
to patriotic and national sentiment, thejr could gain the active support of
their Government and of the bulk of their fellow-countrymen. Nationalism
was invoked by manufacturers, traders and investors; the new industry, in
turn, was served by nationalism.
For example, German manufacturers demanded the protection of their
" infant industries ” against foreign competition, especially British, on the
ground that it would make Germany stronger and more self-sufficing, and
protection they obtained. The German farmers and landlords demanded
protection against the importation of cheap Russian and American food-
stuffs, and protection they too obtained. Russia and the United States retali-
ated by according additional tariff protection to their respective “ infant
industries.” British industries were not so infantile, and British fiscal policy
was still in 1914 not protectionist. But tariffs and rumours of tariffs did not
tend in influential circles to promote sympathetic and cordial relations be-
tween Great Britain and Germany or between Germany and Russia. And
it is memorable that relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, already
strained by rising nationalism, were made worse in 1913 by a tariff war
over pigs.
It was over “ backward areas ” that economic competition grew most
intense. Manufacturers and bankers of industrialised European countries
searched abroad for cheap and plentiful supplies of raw material, for numer-
ous and eager buyers of machine-made goods, and also for promising fields
wherein they might invest their savings and surplus capital at a greater
profit than they could obtain at home. Their search was successful; the
whole world was discovered anew by men of business. But the search was
productive of far more serious consequences than had been foreseen. Eu-
ropean traders came into conflict sometimes with the natives and sometimes
with one another; in either case they appealed to their respective Govern-
ments for diplomatic and even military protection; and the Governments,
with popular approval, made haste to defend “national interests” and
“national honour.” In this way the vast continent of Africa was almost
wholly brought under European domination in the incredibly brief space of
thirty years (1880-1910), while against the ancient empires of Asia the
Europeans pressed hard with protectorates and spheres of influence. Great
Britain, first in the field, won for her industrialists the largest share of these
Asiatic and African spoils. France, next in the field, took second place in
tile division of the booty. There were numerous conflicts between ilh'ench
and British traders in Africa and Asia, and therefore repeated crises in the
relations between French and British Governments in Europe, and once, in
1898, Britain and France seemed on the verge of war over conflicting claims
to the Egyptian Sudan. Similarly there was keen rivalry between Russian
emi^ants and British traders throughout central Asia, and consequent ill
feeling between the Russian and British Governments, and in 1904-1905
Great Britain was happy that the Japanese, who had been learning from
Ehirope and imdergoing an industrialisation of their own, made war on
Ruana and set limits to Russian expansion in the Far East.
200
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR
INTBBNATIONAL ANABCHY INTENSIFIED BY IMPEBIAUSM
The world was wide, and so long as capitalistic imperialism was mainly
confined to England and France, the danger of a World War was remote.
With the industrialisation of other national states, however, and the entry
of their men of business and their Governments into the scramble for world-
markets and world-investments, the situation was complicated and fraught
with grave danger. Germany and Italy came comparatively late to the
feast and were not at all content with the meagre scraps which fell from
the richly laden tables of France and England. Italy’s hunger was not so
ravenous as Germany’s, and she eased her worst pangs by waging war on
the Turks (1911-1912) and devouring Tripoli. Italian traders and Italian
patriots, too, looked longingly toward the scenes of Venice’s departed com-
mercial greatness and aspired to economic and political control of the Adnatic
and the eastern Mediterranean. These ambitions of Italy were obviously
running counter to Austria-Hungary’s and likewise to the ambitions of the
Balkan peoples, especially the Serbs and the Greeks.
Germany was in a curious position. Her swift and Ihorough industrialisa-
tion created a numerous and powerful class of manufacturers, shippers and
bankers, who pushed out vigorously for the economic exploitation of the
world. The mass of her fast-augmenting population, peculiarly prone to
follow determined leaders, gave patriotic support to projects of capitalistic
imperialism. Her Government, always responsive to patriotic demands,
found a congenial task in backing with diplomacy and physical might those
Germans who sought to provide the Fatherland with more places “in the
sun.” But by this time there were not enough places left in the sun; the
best had already been preempted by England or France or Russia or Japan.
The louder grew Germany’s alarum, the closer her rivals drew together. It
was German activity in Morocco from 1905 to 1911 which caused France
and England to forget their feuds and to cement their Entente Cordvale.
It was German activity in China which strengthened the alliance between
^gland and Japan. It was German activity in the Near East, particularly
in connection with the Bagdad railway, which caused Russia and England,
age-long rivals for the estate of the Ottoman Turks, to bmy the hatchet and
smoke the pipe of peace. Around the capitalistic imperialism of Germany
in the twentieth century, even more than around German nationalism, was
builded the precarious balance of power which in 1914 haunted the whole
world like a nightmare.
Both the new imperialism and the new nationalism emphasised the char-
acteristic anarchy of the modem state system, and the ultimate arbiter in
any anarchical society is force and violence. The profiting classes in every
country demanded commercial, diplomatic, and finally military support; the
patriotic masses loyally submitted to astounding increases of armament;
and in the twentieth century the Governments of all the Great Powers, and
of some of the lesser Powers, found themselves in a state of military and
naval preparedness hitherto undreamed of. All able-bodied young Germans,
Austro-Hungarians, Frenchmen, Russians, Italians and Japanese were
serving in armies, learning the use of the most up-to-date weapons of de-
strurtion, and glowering at one anotoer across their respective frontiers.
Britishers, Germans, Americans and Japanese were manning huge naval
dmadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts and entering heartily into a forceful
rivalry at sea. The era from 1900 to 1914 was an era of militarism par
excellence; national armaments steadily mounted; and war-scares 'grew in
frequency and magnitude. By the Great Powers armed force was as yet
CARLTON J. H. HAYB8
201
comparatively little used except against weaker peoples; its mere existence
and the mere threat of its use in the relations of the Great Powers to one
another ordinarily sufficed to satisfy sentimental longings of patariots and
to secure economic advantages for men of business. Militarism was a result
of imperialism and nationalism; nationalism and imperialism, in turn, were
intensified by militarism. It was a vicious circle, and the only way to
break the circle seemed to involve the method most terribly anarchic — the
employment of brute force — warl
SECRET DIPLOMACY
For many generations before the World War the delicate relations among
the jealously sovereign states — relations which were aptly called the “ bid"
ance of power” — had been manipulated by a professional class of diplo-
matists with the aid of military and naval attaches and of spies and secret
service. The practices of international diplomacy had been determined in
large part at a time when they conformed nicely to the purposes and ideals
of the divine-right dynasts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when democracy was constantly
preached and increasingly practised, they might have seemed old-fashioned
and anachronistic. To be sure, there were some recent modifications both
in the objects and in the methods of diplomacy: as a result of the industrial
revolution, economic questions connected with trade, tariffs, and overseas
investment, provided a much wider and more attractive opportunity for
tortuous diplomatic negotiation than mere d3mastic problems; and by means
of the telegraph, the telephone, and the trans-oceanic cable the individual
diplomatist was kept in closer touch than formerly with his Government, and
incidentally with the armed forces and the chauvinistic press of his country.
Still, however, the diplomatists were mainly persons of a class, elderly, suave,
insinuating, moving mysteriously their wonders to perform. In certain
countries where modem democratic institutions had not taken root or had
been stunted prematurely, as in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and
Turkey, diplomatists still acted directly at the behest of monarchs or of
small governing cliques, who made no pretence of informing the public of
their transactions or of consulting the wishes of the common people, unless
such a course served their own purpose. Even in freer countries, such as
France, Great Britain and Italy, democratic leaders who had laid violent
hands upon innumerable institutions of despotism and had brought most
matters of domestic concern to the knowledge of a universal electorate, hesi-
tated to assail this last relic of divine-right monarchy or to botst the guidance
of international relations to an enfranchised democracy wUch mi^t by the
slighte^ slip upset the balance of power and plimge the anarchy-infested
world into a grim abyss.
So the diplomatists of the twentieth century continued to manage inter-
national affairs after conventional models. They laboured, usually in secrecy
and stealth, to get from the diplomatists of other Powers what they could
for their fellow-countrymen of economic gain or national prestige. Some-
times they got what they desired by cajolery; more often by veiled threats
of force and armed violence. If they thought they could do most for their
clients by invoking the potential aid of greater armed forces than their own
country possessed, they made special “ deals ” with diplomatists of other
Powers, and presto! an entente, a military “convention,” or a “treaty of
alliance ” defensive or offensive or both.
202
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR
ALUANCES AND THE APPEAL TO FOBCB
Hie game of international diplomacy had become quite involved and
absorbing by 1914, and quite hazardous. Germany, Austria-Hungary and
Italy were members of a “ defensive ” Triple Alliance. France and Russia
were members of a “ defensive ” Dual Alliance. Italy and France were
parties to a special military “ convention.” Great Britain was in an alliance
with Japan and in a friendly entente with both France and Russia. Rumania
adhered to the Triple Alliance, and Turkey was in league with Germany
and Austria-Himgary. Most of these engagements had been made secretly,
and their precise terms were not generally known prior to the World War.
The very existence of some of them, notably the Franco-Italian convention
and the Turkish alliance with Austria and Germany, was known in 1914
only to the Governments directly concerned. On the eve of the World War
German bankers made secret arrangements with bankers of France and
England, in both cases with official endorsement of governmental agents,
for a settlement of conflicting claims in connection with the Bagdad railway
and for a virtual partition of Asiatic Turkey into economic “ spheres of
influence” to be controlled severally by Germany, Russia, Great Britain
and France. At the same time diplomatists of Germany and Great Britain
were secretly negotiating the apportionment of “ spheres of influence ” for
their respective industrialists in the old colonial empire of Portugal.
II. Immediate Causes
The diplomatic representatives of the Powers, especially of the Great
Powers, were in theory the preservers of the world’s peace. In practice,
however, the anarchical condition of the European state system rendered
their function chiefly that of lumon officer between economic interests and
armed forces. For in the last analysis the diplomatists of the twentieth cen-
tmry served economic interests and also the prestige of their monarch or
their Government by invoking the armed strength of their nations. But by
invoking militarism, they were playing a very risky game. Militarism was
based as much upon nationalism as upon capitalistic imperialism; it was
extolled by patriots regardless of economic or dynastic interests; and it
possessed the faculty of producing militarists — men whose vocation was
preparedness for war and whose avocation was a search for national injuries
or national wrongs. If weakness or negligence were discoverable on the
part of a diplomatist or other governmental agent in pressing his country’s
d^ands on foreigners, professional militarists experienced little difficulty in
stirring the wrath of patriots and heaping it upon the head of the hapless
official. Militarists in 1914 were rapidly becoming dictators of international
politics. Diplomatists, beginning as servants of dynasts and men of business,
were ending as slaves of militarism.
Nationalism, imperialism, militarism — these three stalked the world in
1913 and 1914. Yet even so, the vast masses of mankind desired peace,
and thousands of publicists declared that there should be and could be no
war. Great forces, it is true, were silently impelling Europe, and the whole
world, toward a cataclysm; yet human will and heroic leadership are greater
than even those great forces. That the cataclysm came in 1914 is at-
tributable d^ctly to a failure of courageous and honest leadership. A few
exalted officials, some through cowardly bun gling and others through down-
ri^t crime, opened the flood-gates; and war engulfed tiie world.
CABLTON J. H. HAYES
ao3
BEBAJEVO AND THE CHIME OF AN AT7STBIAN MINISTER
On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the aged
Emperor Francis Joseph and heir to the throne of the Dual Monarchy, was
assassinated at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, by Yugoslav youths. The
assassination elicited expressions of regret throughout the world and a
tremendous outburst of popular indignation in Austria-Hungary and Ger-
many. The murderers, who belonged to one of the subject peoples of the
Austrian Empire, had committed the crime under the influence of patriotic
societies and nationalistic propaganda which aimed at disrupting the Dual
Monarchy and incorporating its Yugoslav provinces in the independent
Kingdom of Serbia. The victim, on the other hand, had been the great hope
of all persons who wished to maintain and strengthen German and Magyar
supremacy in Central Europe; he was a vigorous champion of the territorial
integrity of his own country, a loyal friend to the German Emperor, and an
unyielding prop for Teutonic ambitions, economic, national and military.
It was a calamity that the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Dual
Monarchy at this critical juncture was Count Berchtold, a narrow, head-
strong and sinister character. Ever since his accession to power in 1912,
he had stubbornly refused to grant any concession to subject nationalities
in the Austrian realm and had insistently pursued a most malevolent policy
toward Serbia. In 1913, when Serbia was enlarging her territories at the
expense of Turkey and Bulgaria, he had endeavoured to persuade Italy to
join him in an armed attack upon her. Italy’s refusal was galling to Berchtold
and likewise to Conrad von Hotzendorff, the bellicose chief of the Austrian
General Staff, who complained bitterly that he had twice prepared the armies
of the Dual Monarchy for battle and that they could not for ever be dis-
appointed. Now, in 1914, Berchtold instantly perceived in the murder of
Francis Ferdinand the opportunity for the final reckoning with Serbia for
which he had been waiting; and Conrad was gleeful. Tisza, the Hungarian
Premier at the time, objected to Berchtold’s policy and warned the Emperor
Francis Joseph on July 1 that the crime had been committed on Austrian
soil by Austrian subjects, that there was no evidence of Serbia’s complicity,
and that Austria would universally be regarded as the disturber of world-
peace if she utilised the occasion to attack Serbia. Berchtold, however, had
the ear and the sympathy of the senile Emperor; he drew up a letter ad-
^essed to the German Emperor, and had Francis Joseph sign it and secretly
despatch it to William II on July 4. “ The crime against my nephew,” the
Austrian Emperor was guided to say, “ is the direct consequence of the agita-
tion carried on by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is to
weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire. Though it may be im-
possible to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government, there can be
no doubt that its policy, intent on uniting all Yugoslavs under the Serbian
fiag, must encourage such crimes and endanger my house and countries if it
is not stopped. My efforts must be directed to isolating Serbia and reducing
her size. After the recent terrible ev^t I am certain that you also are
convinced that agreement between Serbia and us is out of the question, and
that the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened so long as this
centre of criminal agitation remains unpunished in Belgrade.”
204
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME
William II needed no convincing. Impressionable and pufifed with feel-
ings of his own importance, he was a nationalist of nationalists, an imperial-
ist of imperialists, and a militarist of militarists; he was least minded to
put a brake on the Austrian juggernaut. Bethmann-Hollweg, the weak-
kneed German Chancellor, was a bit nervous about the situation, but he was
William’s creature and quite overawed by such determined gentlemen as
the High Command of the German army and the German navy. Conse-
quently, when the German Emperor received the autographed secret missive
from the Austrian Emperor on July 5, and conferred at Potsdam with
Bethmann-Hollweg and certain military and naval potentates, William II’s
own opinion was confirmed by the latter and encountered no objection from
the former. William II promptly and confidentially replied to Francis
Joseph that Austria might in this case, as in all others, rely on Germany’s
full support, that Russia’s attitude would no doubt be hostile, though for a
Russo-German War he was prepared and Russia was not, that Russia would
think twice before appealing to arms, and that he would deeply regret if
Austria did not seize the present moment, which was all in her favour, for
making war on Serbia. Having thus given Berchtold a blank cheque to do
as he would and to draw to the full on the armed forces of Germany,
William II started on July 6 for his annual visit to Scandinavia, leaving
matters in the hands of diplomatists and general staffs.
On July 7 Berchtold convened the Austro-Hungarian Ministry and
ixrged his colleagues, now that they were assured of unqualified German sup-
port, to make such demands on Serbia in connection with the archduke’s
murder as Serbia would refuse to grant and then to utilise the refusal as an
excuse for war. Tisza alone objected, declaring that an Austrian attack
upon Serbia would precipitate a World War and might lead to the destruc-
tion of the Dual Monarchy. All the other Ministers approved, and Berch-
told proceeded to draft an ultimatum. At a subsequent meeting, on July 19,
the terms of the ultimatum were unanimously approved, Conrad von
Hotzendorff lightly assuring the Ministry that the armed forces of the Dual
Monarchy were ready, and Berchtold securing the consent of Tisza by a
hypocritical promise that Austria would disclaim annexations of territory.
In the meantime Berchtold had received from a confidential agent, whom
he had entrusted with the investigation of the archduke’s assassination, a
report to the effect that the outrage had really been committed by Austrian
subjects and that there was nothing to prove or even to cause suspicion of
the Serbian Government’s cognisance of the steps leading to the crime.”
This report Berchtold hid away from the public and even from Tisza,
Francis Joseph, and the German authorities at Berlin. He was criminally
resolved not to allay popular feeling in Austria and Germany against Serbia.
AtrSTRU’s ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA AND RUSSIA’S EXCITEMENT
The day selected for the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia
was nicely calculated. It was July 23, when a labour strike at Petrograd
was concerning the Russian Government, when the French President and the
French Premier and Foreign Minister were ending a State visit to Russia
and were on the waters of the Baltic on their way to Scandinavia, and
when the British Ministers were viewing with alarm the probable breakdown
CARLTON J. H. HAYES
206
of an Anglo-Irish conforence in London and the beginning of open hostilities
in Ireland. On this day the Serbian Government received at Belgrade the
Austrian ultimatum. It was couched in the most peremptory language and
breathed a spirit of exasperation and determination. It alleged that, by
failmg to suppress anti-Austrian conspiracies, Serbia had violated her
promise, made in 1909, to “ live on good nei^bourly terms ” with Austria-
Hungary and had compelled the Government of the Dual Monarchy to
abandon its attitude of benevolent and patient forbearance, to put an end
“ to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the
monarchy,” and to demand effective guarantees from the Serbian Govern-
ment. As such guarantees, Serbia was called upon to suppress anti-Austrian
publications and societies, to discharge any official whom the Austrian Gov-
ernment should accuse of anti-Austrian propaganda, to discard anti-Austrian
text-books from the Serbian schools, “ to accept the collaboration in Serbia
of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression
of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
monarchy,” and to signify unconditional acceptance of the whole ultimatum
within forty-ei^t hours.
On July 25 the Serbian Government replied to Austria, promising to
comply with such demands as would not impair the coimtry’s independence
and sovereignty, and offering to refer all disputed points to the international
tribunal at The Hague or to a conference of the Great Powers. At the same
time Serbia mobilised her armed forces. The Austro-Hungarian Government
immediately pronounced the reply evasive and unsatisfactory, broke off
diplomatic relations and ordered military mobilisation. War was clearly im-
pending between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
But a much vaster and more terrible war was also impending. Berchtold
was determined at any cost to have ^e reckoning with Serbia of which he
had been baulked m 1913, and which the German and Magyar peoples
regarded as essentially defensive. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister,
and his colleagues at Petrograd were not less resolved to defend Serbia
against Austrian aggression. The Russian Government was convinced that
an Austro-Hvmgarian military success would consolidate Teutonic power in
the Balkans and Turkey and would thwart Russia’s ambition to possess
Constantinople and deprive her of all influence in south-eastern Europe.
They knew that if they resisted Austria they would have the enthusiastic
support of all Russian patriots. And just as the hot-headed chief of the
Austrian General Staff was abetting the warlike diplomacy of Berchtold, so
Sazonov and his nominal master, the weak-willed Tsar Nicholas II, were
besought by Russian militarists, notably by Sukhomlinov, the War Minister,
and by Yanushkevich, the Chief of Staff, to let them unleash their armed
forces and avenge the honour of Russia and the cause of Pan-Slavism.
PACIFIC EFFORTS OF SIR EDWARD GREY
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minii^r, appreciating the serious
character of the crisis which was developing in Russo-Austrian relations,
proposed on July 26 that a conference of diplomatic representatives of Great
Britain, France, Italy and Germany should “ meet in confidence immediately
for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications,”
and that “ all active military operations should be suspended pending results
of conference.” The French and Italian Governments speedily accepted the
proposal, but the German Government, insistent that the quarrel concerned
Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone, declined to participate in any inter-
206
THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR
national conference without Austria’s express approval. On July 28, Austria-
Hungary formally declared war against Serbia.
Thenceforth events marched fast. Amidst the frantic endeavours of Sir
Edward Grey to find some basis for international action which would pre-
serve peace among the Great Powers, military preparations went feverishly
forward. Control was passing from faltering diplomatists to determined
general staffs, from mysterious negotiation to open and inflamed nationalism.
Already, on July 26, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, on his
own responsibility had given orders that the British fleet, which had assembled
at Portland for manoeuvres, should not disperse but should hold itself in
readiness for war. Now, on July 29, when news reached Petrograd of
Austria’s declaration of war against Serbia, the Tsar, on the advice of Suk-
homlinov, ordered the mobilisation of the Russian army. That evening, at
a German Crovim Coimcil at Potsdam, whither William II had returned from
his Scandinavian trip. General Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, argued that
general war was inevitable and that German mobilisation should be begun
at once.
For a few hours hope of peace revived. The German officials who had
rashly ^ven Berchtold early in July a blank cheque were now suddenly
alarmed by the staggering magnitude of what their coimtry might be expected
to pay in honouring the cheque. They had interested themselves in the
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia; its drastic terms surprised them. They had
imagined they could isolate an Austro-Serbian conflict; the warlike attitude
of Russia astounded them Very late they realised what they had done, and
beginning on July 29 they seriously sought a way out. William II despatched
a friendly telegram to Nicholas II. Bethmann-Hollweg urged Austria to
resume negotiations with Russia and wired the German Ambassador at
Vienna: “ As an ally we must refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration
because Austria does not respect our advice. Tell Berchtold with all
emphasis and great seriousness.” At the same time the German Government
adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward Sir Edward Grey’s proposals.
The change of front at Berlin produced some results. The Tsar promptly
countermanded the orders for general mobilisation, which had not yet been
published, and directed that Russian mobilisation should take place only
along the Austrian frontier and as a precautionary measure. Almost as
promptly Berchtold receded from his eidreme position and resumed direct
diplomatic negotiations at Petrograd. Sir Edward Grey took heart.
Russia’s mobilisation and its direct results
What began auspiciously though tardily, ended speedily and direfully.
Sukhomlinov and Yanushkevich, the military masters of Russia, were re-
solved not to brook any delay in armed preparation: they disobeyed their
orders and allowed the general mobilisation to continue, while concealing it
from the Tsar and denying it to the German military attache; on the night
of July 30 they so alarmed the Tsar with their account of the Austrian bom-
bardment of Belgrade that he finally consented to sign new orders for general
Russian mobilisation, thereby legalising what Sukhomlinov had done. It
is doubtful whether the Tsar fully grasped the significance of his own action,
for he proceeded to telegraph William II and King George V that his action
was not to be interpreted as belligerent. Nevertheless, Sukhomlinov, and
Sazonov too, knew that general war would follow and with criminal levity
they now welcomed it. In the secret military convention between Russia
CARLTON J. H. HAYES 207
and France it had been stipulated that general mobilisation by either Power
should be interpreted as a declaration of war.
Russian mobilisation gave the militarists at Berlin the upper hand.
General von Moltke had no trouble now in convincing William II and
Bethmann-Hollweg that the Russians meant business and that an hour’s
delay in German mobilisation would be perilous to the fatherland. On
July 31 Germany presented a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia, demanding
immediate demobilisation. Russia did not comply. Germany declared war.
The Germans knew that war with Russia was almost certain to involve
France. They knew that France was the sworn ally of Russia. They ap-
preciated the popular conviction in France that common cause must be made
with Russia in order to secure her own position as a Great Power and recover
Alsace-Lorraine. Accordingly, on the very day of delivering their ultimatum
to Russia, the German Government demanded a statement from Paris within
eighteen hours whether France would remain neutral. The German Ambas-
sador was instructed, if perchance the answer should be affirmative to
demand as a special guarantee the surrender to Germany, for the duration
of the war, of the French border fortresses of Toul and Verdun. On the
same day the French Government ordered general mobilisation, and on
August 1 replied to the German ultimatum that “ France would consult her
interests.” Two days later Germany declared war against France.
HESITATION OF SOME GREAT POWERS; PROMPT ACTION BY CXEAT BRITAIN
Thus, within a week of the declaration of hostilities by Austria-Hungary
against Serbia, four Great Powers were in a state of war — Germany and
Austria-Hungary opposed to Russia and France. Italy and Rumania, with
feet in both camps, promptly proclaimed their neutrality, on the ground
that the war was not defensive on the part of Austria-Hunga^ and Germany,
but offensive, and that therefore they were not bound to give assistance to
their allies. Thereby the Italian Government kept their secret military con-
vention with France; and it was not long before they, and the Rumanian
Government likewise, were pressing Austria-Hungary for “ compensations ”
in accordance with provisions of the Triple Alliance. The Turkish Govern-
ment also proclaimed the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire, but in this case
the proclamation was thoroughly hypocritical ; it was intended to gain time
BO as to enable the Turks to perfect their military plans and fulfil at a more
favourable moment their treaty obligations to Germany and Austria-Himgary.
Great Britain, on the other hand, almost immediately entered the war.
The British people, on the whole, had marked sympathy for France and
little love for Germany, and Sir Edward Grey had already informed the
German Government that he could not bind Great Britain to observe neutral-
ity. On August 2 he went further and announced that, “ if the German fleet
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to imdertake hostile opera-
tions against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the
protection in its power.” And on the morning of Av^st 4 when news
reached London that German troops were actually invading Belgium on
tiieir way to France, the British Government with popular support in Parlia-
ment and throughout the country, decided finally to join France and Russia.
Sir Edward Grey at once despatched an ultimatum to Berlin, requiring as-
surances by midnight that Germany would respect Bel^an neutrality. Ger-
many refused, on the ground of military necessity, and Bethmann-Hollweg,
with evidence of anger and disappointment, rebuked Great Britain for making
208 THE CAITSES OF THE WORLD WAR
war “juBt for a word — ‘neutrality’ — just for a scrap of paper.” On
August 5 Great Britain formally declared war against Germany.
WAS THE WAB INEVITABLB?
The World War had come as in the twinkling of an eye. It filled thou-
sands with enthusiasm and millions with consternation. It immediately gave
rise to all manner of explanations and justifications, for every people, no
matter how ignorant they were of the real causes or how surprised by the
suddenness of the event, willed to believe that their particular Government
had acted wisely and honourably and that the conduct of their foes was
diabolical.
The World War was directly precipitated by certain officials of the Rus-
sian General Staff. But their conduct was a natural outcome of the criminal
activity of an Austrian Foreign Minister, and this in turn was- aided and
abetted by criminal negligence at Berlin. The egotistical William II and the
addle-pated Bethmann-Hollweg gave fatal carte blanche to the evil Berch-
told; and the decision speedily passed from diplomatists to general staffs.
Yet we must not take too seriously a few actors who strutted on the
stage of European politics m July, 1914, and who by cowardice or cunning
precipitated armed conflict. They would have been quite unable to precipi-
tate any international war, much less a World War, had they not been,
equally with millions of common people, the more or less willing agents of
immense forces which for a generation had been predisposing the world to
mortal combat. The whole world was parcelled out among states whose
mutual distrusts and jealousies were quickened by rival nationalisms and
rival imperialisms; and the existence among these states of a group of Great
Powers, divided in the twentieth century into two huge armed camps, pro-
vided a mighty impetus to rival militarisms. The rapid rise of nationalism
in the Balkans gave a most disquieting aspect to Austro-Russian Imperial
rivalry in south-eastern Europe. The stimulation of national consciousness
among the subject peoples of the Austrian Empire indirectly imperilled all
non-national states and directly embittered the relations between Germany
and Russia. The attempts of Germany to obtain a commanding position in
world-trade and in overseas dominion excited not only German nationalism
but the nationalism of France and of England too, and incidentally brought
into lurid light the future fate of the rich and populous basin of the historic
river Rhine. It was, indeed, characteristic of the new age that men of
business were pushing their several Governments into intense rivalry with
one another, while patriots were pulling and applauding, and that armies and
navies were standing ready to enforce economic interests and national
honour. The world-stage was set for a gigantic war, and the stage hands
comprised not alone a few scheming diplomatists but groups of professional
militarists and crowds of unwitting business men and patriots.
Governments in 1914 might have postponed or altogether prevented the
World War if they had possessed extraordinary foresight and self-control
and if, above all, they had not been victimised by a state system which they
had inherited and which was utterly anarchical. That they did nothing in
the years preening 1914 to abate international anarchy remains the funda-
mental accusation against them.
© Internatwnal ^seusrrd
The Peace Treaty with signatures of American and British delegates affixed. The names read: Woodrow Wilson, Robert Lansing, Henry White, £. M.
House, Tasker H. Bliss, D. Lloyd George, A. Bonar Law, Milner, Arthur James Balfour, George H. Barnes.
CHAPTER VI
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
By CBABIiES &BYMOUB, LiTT J>., LL.D
ProfesBor of History Yale University Member of the Amencan
Peace Conference Pans, 1919. Author of the Dij/lomaiw Back-
ground of the Tror; Woodrow Wilson and the World War.
Editor with Colonel E M. House, What Really Happened at
Paris. Contnbutor to the Encyclopaedia BrUanraca.
In time of war diplomacy assumes a double function. It becomes an
adjunct of the military arm of government, negotiating with neutral or allied
states so as to secure military and economic assistance or, to better in some
other way the conditions under which the war is waged; it also must look
ahead to the time when peace shall be made, in order that the victory^ if it
be secured, may be exploited to its full extent.
This double function appears clearly in the history of the World War.
During the earlier stages the diplomats of the belligerent powers bent their
energies chiefly in the direction of winning new allies or solidifying the diplo-
matic engagements already made. As the war progressed, the negotiations
tended more and more towards a crystallisation of war aims. At times the
two functions merged, since a new ally could be secured or an old ally held
fast only by a guarantee that its war aims were to be fully satisfied.
When the war broke out, in August, 1914, Great Britain, France and
Russia were bound by a diplomatic understanding, and formed what was
commonly called the Triple Entente. This rested upon various special con-
ventions, notably upon that of 1904, between France and Great Britain, and
that of 1907, between Great Britain and Russia. France and Russia were
united in a definite offensive and defensive alliance The Entente had
assumed something of the character of an informal alliance by reason of
the military and naval conversations which representatives of the Powers
had engaged in, but it offered no guarantee that the three states would con-
tinue to make war or peace in common. In order to furnish the mutual con-
fidence necessary to vigorous waging of war, on September 5, 1914, Sir Edward
Grey, Paul Gambon, and Count Benckendorff, for Great Britain, France and
Russia respectively, signed a declaration in which they engaged not to
conclude peace separately. In this declaration, known as the Pact of London,
the three Governments agreed that when terms of peace came to be dis-
cussed, no one of the Allies would demand terms without the previous agree-
ment of each of the others. This was the diplomatic basis of the anti-
German alliance.
Six weeks later it was strengthened by the adhesion 'of Japan. That
Power had been bound to Great Britain by an alliance which had been in
force since 1902. In August, 1914, the British asked for Japanese interven-
tion on the ground that German cruisers in the Far East were a menace to
the commerce and peace of the Orient, and that the interests of the Jananese
as well as the British made the alliance operative. How anxious the British
really were for Japanese intervention may be questioned, (te August 15 a
T. a. T. — VOL. I — 14 209
210 SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
note was sent from Tokio to Berlin containing the “ friendly advice ” of
Japan that the German fleet be withdrawn from the Far East and that
Kiaochow be surrendered to Japan in order to be handed back to China.
There was a touch of irony in the verbiage employed, for in 1895, aftOT the
Treaty of @himonos6ki, Germany had joined with Russia to give “ friendly
advice” to Japan, thus compelling the latter Power to surrender South
Manchuria.
The Japanese note was unheeded by Berlin, and on August 23, the date
previous to which an imconditional acceptance of the advice had been asked,
Japan declared war on Germany. Baron Kato explained his policy to Parlia-
ment: “ Japan has no desire or inclination to become involved in the present
conflict. But she believes she owes it to herself to be faithful to the alliance
with Great Britain and to strengthen its foundation by insuring permanent
peace in the East and protecting the special interests of the two allied
Powers.” On October 19, 1914, Japan signed the Pact of London.
While the Entente was thus solidified and extended, the Teutonic diplo-
matic group experienced difiiculties which were none the less serious because
they had been to some degree anticipated. Germany and Austria had been
boimd to each other since 1879 by a special treaty of defensive and offensive
alliance. Three years later, in 1882, the two Powers, without abrogating their
dual arrangement, which continued to be the basis upon which their diplo-
matic relations were founded, entered into the Triple Alliance with Italy,
which was of a defensive character and which had been renewed as recently
as 1912. Rumania, urged by resentment against Russia, had in 1883 si^ed
a treaty alliance with Austria to which Germany had acceded, promising
that she would enter no alliance or engagement directed against her allies.
Germany knew that she could count unreservedly upon neither Italy nor
Rumania. The former had utilised the Triple Alliance to protect herself
against possible a^ession on the part of France and to maintain the statxts
quo in the Adriatic. But since 1900 she had begun to reestablish friendly
relations with France, and as the Anglo-German quarrel developed she had
tended towards the Triple Entente, since friendship with Great Britain was
an axiom of Italian policy. In 1902 Italy exchanged notes with France
declaring that “ in case France shall be the object of a direct or indirect
aggression on the part of one or more Powers, Italy will maintain a strict
neutrality.” Ten years later, in 1912, the Italian General Staff informed the
Germans and Austrians that the Italian Third Army could not serve on the
Rhine as the left wing of the German armies. Italian feeling against Austria
developed rapidly after the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and public opinion
in Italy began again to regard Austria as the national enemy.
Rumania, also, had slipped from the influence of her Teutonic allies. In
1913 she had joined with Serbia, Austria’s enemy, to attack Bulgaria, which
at the moment was the protege of the Central Powers. Her statesmen
appeared to be upon close terms with Russian diplomats. Like Italy,
Rumania was affected by irredentist dreams; if she had a grudge against
Russia for the seizure of Bessarabia, she also hoped some day to build a
Greater Rumania by the inclusion of Transylvania and Bukowina, which
could only be seemed through a successful war against Austria-Hungary.
Austrian diplomacy in the crisis of 1914 was sufficiently gauche to ensure
the alienation of both Italy and Rumania. When, on August 2, Germany
appealed for Rumanian assistance, the Rumanian Council listened coldly to
the argtments of the Hohenzollem King Carol; on August 3 it decided with
only a single dissenting vote against brining the treaty obligation into effect,
on the ground tiiat the causa foederis did not exist, since Rumania had not
been consulted upon nor informed of the Austrian dimarche regarding Serbia.
CHABLES SEYMOUR 211
The vote was doubtless affected by the attitude of Italy, since word had come
that on August 3 the latter Power had declared her neutrality.
Italy’s decision was based ostensibly on Article VII of the Treaty of Triple
Alliance, which called for an exchange of information between the Powers
previous to any modification of the atat-ua quo in the Balkans, and an a^ee-
ment based upon reciprocal compensation; Italy further insisted that since
the war with Serbia was not defensive the catiaa foederia was not operative.
THE TEEATY OF LONDON
On October 15 the Marquis di San GiiUiano, Italian Foreign Secretary and
a firm adherent of the Triple Alliance, died in office. He was succeeded by
Baron Sidney Sonnino. On December 9, the latter formulated Italy’s claim
to compensation for the alteration of the statua quo in the Balkans, follow-
ing Austria’s attack upon Serbia. The negotiations continued until May 23,
1915, Austria at first protesting, but gradually yielding under German influ-
ence and Italy’s threats of a formal termination of the Triple Alliance. In
March, 1915, Austria consented to discuss the possible cession of Austrian
territory inhabited by Italians; but the demands of the latter proved to be
on an ascending scale. In April Sonmno decided definitely in favor of join-
ing the Entente Alliance, and on May 3 Italy formally denounced the Triple
Alliance. On May 23 war was declared against Austria, although peace
was technically preserved with Germany for more than a year longer.
Italy’s rupture of the Triple Alliance was in part motivated by popular
feeling, which had turned against the Central Powers and which became
intense after the sinking of the “ Lusitania.” It also resulted in part from
the attractive offers made by the Entente Powers, who were in a position
always to outbid Austria; the offers of the latter must be made out of her
own pocket, while the Entente could offer territories which belonged to their
enemies. Conversations between Ilialy and the Entente extended through
the spring of 1915 and developed slowly, chiefly because of Russian anxiety
to protect the interests of the Slavs of the Adriatic coast.
The demands of Italy were high, but were finally met in large degree. If
Italy would enter the war actively on the side of the Entente, she was
promised the Trentino and Tyrol as far north as the Brenner, Trieste, the
peninsula of Istria, and northern Dalmatia, with the islands. The city of
Fiume was to be left to the Croatians. The southern Dalmatian coast was
to be neutralised. Italy was to receive Valona and the right of conducting
the foreign relations of Albania, was to obtain in full possession the islands
of the Dodecanese then occupied by her, and in case of a partition of Turkey
would share with the other Entente Powers. If France and Great Britain
should extend their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany,
they promised to admit Italy’s right to compensations.
The Treaty of London, which embodied the above provisions, was signed
on April 26, 1915, while Italy was still negotiating with Austria. It promised
to Italy not merely strategic protection on her northern and eastern frontiers,
but what amounted to the control of the Adriatic. With Pola, the island,
and Valona in her possession, southern Dalmatia neutralised, and northern
Dalmatia Italian territo^, the Adriatic would become an Italian lake, and
Italy would acquire a grip upon the Balkans. She would control trade from
Ibe north by possession of Trieste, unless Fiume, which was to be left to
the Slavs, should be able to compete successfully.
The Treaty of London was not based upon the principle of nationalities.
In the Tyrol over three hundred thousand German Austrians would be placed
212
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
under Italian sovereignty, and in Istria and on the coast more than a million
Slavs would be transferred from Austrian to Italian rule. But Italy was
impelled by what her Premier Salandra called sacred egoism,” and the
Entente Powers were willing to bid high for the military assistance which
in the spring of 1915 appeared to be invaluable.
Italy’s defection from the Triple Alliance was a severe blow to the Central
Powers, but it had already been in some degree compensated for by German
diplomatic success in winning the military assistance of Turkey. When the
war broke out the Turks realised that they had little to hope from an alliance
with the Entente Powers except a guarantee of territorial integrity. Ger-
many and Austria, on the other hand, could hold out prospects of a renais-
sance of Turkish power under Teutonic protection, provided Russia and Great
Britain were defeated. Feeling in Turkey was strong against the Entente
because of their support of Serbia and their negotiations with Greece, the
states which in 1913 had proved to be the chief depredators.
During the spring of 1914, Turkey, in fear of Russia, had discussed the
possibility of an alliance with Germany, and on August 2, 1914, a treaty
was actually signed. It was not at once ratified, since Turkey was ill-
prepared for war, but it led to a definite accord with Germany; the Turks
decided to proclaim their neutrality, secretly commencing war preparations.
The situation was complicated by the fact that the British had seized two
warships which their yards had nearly completed for the Turkish navy, and
Turkish opinion regarded this detention as a concrete and substantial griev-
ance against Great Britain, as distinguished from other Powers. On the other
hand two German warships, the Goeben ” and “ Breslau,” chased through
Mediterranean waters by British cruisers, had taken refuge at Constantinople.
There a fictitious sale took place, which ostensibly made them over to Turkey.
Actually, however, the German crews remained manning the ships, some-
what to the embarrassment of the neutralist members of the Turkish Govern-
ment, but a ready instrument for the Turkish leaders who expected to throw
in their fortunes with Germany at a propitious moment.
The Entente representatives at Constantinople soon discovered that their
influence was on the wane, and in October the Turks evidently decided upon
immediate participation in the war. On October 27 the Goeben ” and the
Turkish fleet left for the Black Sea, and two days later bombarded Odessa
and other Russian ports. The fleet was under the command of the German
Admiral Souchon, but the coup was concerted with the pro-German Enver
Pasha and probably with the fore-knowledge of Talaat Bey. On November 6
the British Government declared war on Turkey, and by an Order-in-Council
annexed Cyprus.
Germany was equally successful in winning Bulgaria to her side. That
power had been disappointed with and disgusted by the results of the Balkan
League, formed largely imder Russian auspices, and the defeat by Serbia and
Greece in 1913 had thrown her back under the influence of Austria. The
Tsar of Bulgaria, Ferdinand of Coburg, furthermore, had remained consist-
ently Germanophile. In July, 1914, Radoslavov, Premier of Bulgaria, ex-
pressed his readiness to consider joining the Triple Alliance, and on August 2
a draft treaty was submitted. The Entente Powers, on the other hand,
realised the importance of meeting German offers, and during the autumn of
1914 and the spring of the following year carried on active but unsuccessful
negotiations. Compliance with Bulgarian demands would necessitate conces-
sions on the part of Rumania and Greece, whom the Entente Powers at the
moment were hoping to persuade to enter the war and who looked for acces-
sions and not deprivation of territory; Serbia, likewise, was unwilling to make
the sacrifices asked by Bulgaria. The Central Powers, of course, could
promise territory freely because most of it belonged to their enemies.
CHARLES SEYMOUR
213
In Decembw, 1914, the German Government sent Von der Goltz to pay
a Hemonstrative visit to Tsar Ferdinand and to promise that Serbia and
Greece would be made to yield tlieir recent acquisitions; a month later a
large advance was made by German banks, which was followed by further
sums between February and June. Bulgarian hesitations were determined
by the victories of the Central Powers in Galicia and Poland and by the
Entente failure at Gallipoli. On July 22, 1915, a preliminary agreement
was si^ed with the Central Powers, and on September 5 a formal treaty.
Bulgaria was promised Serbian Maradonia and Salonika, Greek Epirus,
Thrace to the Enos-Midia line, and, in certain eventualities, large portions
of the Dobrudja. On September 21 the Bulgarian Government issued orders
for a general mobilisation, and on October 11 Bulgarian troops crossed the
Serbian frontier. The Entente Powers at once declared war.
German diplomatic success with Turkey and Bulgaria may have been due
in part to tactical errors on the part of Entente agents. But the basic
reason was that in each case the Central Powers had more to offer. In the
case of Greece, the Entente Powers possessed the advantage. Through their
control of the sea they could overrun the penin^la if Greece joined the
enemy, and they could also promise vast acquisitions of territory at the
expense of Turkey if Greece would enter the war on their side. In Eleutherios
Venizelos, Premier of Greece, the Entente possessed a firm friend, who con-
sistently advocated active military cooperation. But King Constantine,
brother-in-law of the Kaiser, was equally consistent in his advocacy of a
neutralist policy The first believed in an ultimate Entente victory and saw
a prospect of creating a Greater Greece, dominating the Aegean and con-
trolling western Asia Minor. The King was impressed by the military
strength of Germany and expected a German victory. In the conflict between
the two, the Entente Powers failed at first to adopt a clear-cut policy. It
was not until 1917 and as a result of direct coercion on the part of France
and Great Britain that the triumph of Venizelos was secured.
VENIZELOS versus CONSTANTINE
During the first fourteen months of the war Venizelos remained in power,
except for a brief interval in the spring of 1916. The proposals of the
Entente, however, were not sufficient to break Constantine’s neutralist deter-
mination; it was the period when the Entente Powers hoped to secure the
assistance of Bulgaria, which could only be won through the surrender of
Kavalla by Greece. Venizelos was anxious to cooperate with the Entente in
the attack on Gallipoli, but the King was obdurate and the Greek General
Staff disapproved the plan. In March, 1916, Venizelos resigned, but follow-
ing a general election in June he was reinstated. On October 4 he declared
that since Serbia had been attacked by Bulgaria, Greece must go to her
assistance in deference to her treaty of alliance. This declaration of his
determination to enter the war on the side of the Entente led to his immediate
dismissal and the dissolution of Parliament by King Constantine.
A new election was held, from which the Venizelists abstained, on the
ground that the dismissal and dissolution were unconstitutional. The new
Chamber was thus anti-Venizelist and strongly neutralist. TTie Entente
Powers increased their pressure. They had sent an army to Salonika under
General Sarrail to bring assistance to the Serbs, and this proceeded to estab-
lish itself on Greek territory. In January, 1916, Entente troops seized Corfu
as a base for the recuperation of the defeated Serb army, and when the
Bulgars in May, 1916, crossed the Greek frontier, the Entente Powers claimed
full freedom of action on Greek soil. They proclaimed an intermittent block-
214
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
ade and finally on June 21, 1916, demanded complete demobilisation of the
Greek army. During the twelve months that followed, the pressme of the En-
tente became more exacting. In September, 1916, Venizelos raised the flag
of revolt, and passed to Salonika where he established a government of
national defense. The British offered him rather wavering support, promising
to recognise him as de facto ruler where he was actually accepted.
In the meantime the Entente had seized the posts and telegraphs, taken
Greek ships, and called for the surrender of war material to offset that taken
by the Bulgars on the northern frontiers. To enforce their demands the
French landed marines at the Piraeus and entered Athens. After street fight**
ing the Entente virtually assumed political control of Greece, the Govern-
ment, under threat of blockade, reducing the number of troops to that neces-
sary merely for police protection. In June, 1917, the abdication of Constan-
tine was demanded, based upon the opinion of the protecting Powers that
the King had violated the constitution. Under the threat of seizure of the
Isthmus of Corinth, the invasion of Thessaly by Sarrail, and the landing of
more troops at the Piraeus, the demand was accepted and Constantine left
the country. On June 21 Venizelos reappeared in Athens and on June 27
had reorganised the Government with Constantine’s son, Alexander, as King.
The declaration of war which Venizelos had issued at Salonika became
generally effective, and Greece thus formally entered the war.
The case of Rumania is not exactly parallel to that of either Greece or
Italy. Unlike Greece she could not be coerced, for the Entente possessed no
means of direct pressure; and while, as in the case of Italy, she looked across
the moimtains to the unredeemed Rumanians under Habsburg rule, she was
also affected by the hope of freeing her kinsmen in Russian Bessarabia.
We have noted that at the moment of the breaking out of war, the former
influence of the Central Powers at Bucharest had been eclipsed and a strict
neutrality was determined upon by the Rumanian Government. Relations
were close with Italy, and an agreement providing for action in common
was signed in September, 1914. In view of conflicting factors the only wise
policy seemed to be a waiting upon events. Rumania could not afford to be
upon the losing side.
Early in the war Russia opened negotiations, offering, in return for a
promise of neutrality, to oppose all attempts against Rumanian integrity and
recognising Rumanian claims to Austro-Hungarian territory inhabited by a
majority of her nationals. Germany, on the other hand, seems to have
offered to Rumania part of Bessarabia and the Rumanian districts in the
Timok valley. The Russian successes of 1914 impressed the Rumanian
Government so far that in the spring of 1915 it intimated its readiness to
enter the war on the side of the Entente, in return for the acquisition of
Transylvania, Bukowina, and the Transylvanian forelands as far west as
the Theiss, including the Banat. But agreement was difBicult because of
Serbian claims to the western Banat, which Russia supported; with the
Russian defeats of the spring, negotiations lapsed. Rumania, in fact, began
to lean towards the other side, and after the intervention of Bulgaria and
the overrunning of Serbia in 1915, she concluded commercial agreements with
Austria-Hungary and Germany which were decidedly advantageous to the
Central Powers. According to Count Czemin, if Hungary had been willing
to make territorial concessions, the active military cooperation of Rumania
might then have been secured by the Central group.
Popular sentiment in Rumania, however, continued to favour the Entente,
and the Premier, Bratianu, believing in an ultimate Entente victory, was
inclined to enter the war against Austria as soon as a fit opportunity offered.
This seemed to come in the early summer of 1916. German defeats at
CHARLES SEYMOUR
215
Vo'dun and Russian and Italian victories appeared to foreshadow the failure
of the Central Powers. Negotiations with Russia were resumed, and that
Power ^owed herself ready to make concessions, in particular to concede
Rumanian claims to the western Banat. Great Britain and France offered
to undertake a military offensive from Salonika, and Russia promised the
most vigorous support. On August 18, 1916, the secret IVeaty of Bucharest
was signed by the Entente Powers and Rumania, promising full satisfaction
for the claims of the latter in the Banat, Transylvania, the Transylvanian
forelands, and Bukowina. On August 27 Rumania declared war, Kii^ Fer-
dinand emphasising the force of public opinion which compelled this step.
The promises made formally by the Entente Powers to Italy and Rumania,
and somewhat less formally to Greece, in order to secure the military assist-
ance of those states, obviously compelled a certain crystallisation of war
aims. As the war progressed, the statesmen of Great Britain, France and
Russia felt the need of defining exactly the advantages which they themselves
would draw from the anticipated victory. They looked upon the war as
having been undertaken at first as one of self-defense. But whatever the
factors which had precipitated the struggle, it was natural that th^ should
look forward to certain political compensations for the tr^endous sacrifices
they were making. A definition of such compensations might lead to greater
solidarity and intensity of effort. From the spring of 1915 on. Entente diplo-
mats were engaged in negotiations, some resulting in formal treaties.
THE SECRET TREATmS OF THE ENTENTE
The constancy of the Russian Government was always under suspicion.
Because of this and also because of the vital necessity of Russian military
aid, the Western Powers took under special consideration the territorial aspira-
tions of Petrograd, of which the most important was political control of
Constantinople and the Straits. In March, 1915, the matter was formally
broached by Russia and benevolently considered by the French and British.
It had been imder discussion since the entrance of Turkey, on the side of
Germany, in the previous autumn. On March 20, the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs acknowledged gratefully the assent of the Entente Powers.
The agreement provided for Russian annexation of Constantinople and the
region of the Straits, including a strip of eighty miles along the Black Sea;
Constantinople itself was to be a free port. As regards Persia, Great Britain
was to include the neutral zone in its sphere of influence, but Russia was to
have full liberty in the northern zone. The special rights of Great Britain
and France in Asiatic Turkey were recognised by Russia; the Holy Places
should remain under Moslem rule.
Two years elapsed before the special war aims of France were recognised
by treaty, and even then the agreement was not of a nature calculated to
affect the final settlement. The French demand for the restoration of Alsace-
Lorraine was tacitly approved by the British Government, and in private
discussions as well as in public speeches it was consistently laid down as a
condition of peace with Germany. French aspirations, however, soared hi^er.
In the event of a victory they hoped to secure the Saar valley, with its
invaluable coal, part of which had been taken from France after the battle
of Waterloo. They also hoped to detach from a defeated Germany the dis-
tricts on the left bank of the Rhine, in order that the Rhine might in future
form a perfect strategic frontier against a German invasion. The British
Government at no time officially expressed approval of the latter plan, and
on December 19, 1917, Mr. Balfour declared that “never did we encourage
216
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
the idea that a bit of Germany should be cut off from the permit State and
mected into some kind of . . . independent Government on the left bank
of the Rhine.” Ten months earlier, however, the Imperial Russian Govern-
ment, on February 14, 1917, formally approved the French plan, in return
for which France recognised Russia’s complete liberty in establishing her
western frontiers. This agreement, which might have become of the first
importance, lost its significance after the Russian Revolution and the with-
drawal of Russia from the war.
The chief war aims of Japan included the control of the Shantung peninsula
and the annexation of the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator.
The diplomatic position of Japan was strong because of her occupation of
these regions and her treaty alliance with Great Britain. In July, 1916,
she strengthened that position by treaties with Russia, the secret clauses of
which, amounting to an offensive and defensive alliance, bound the two
Powers to act in common, in order to prevent the political domination of
China by any third Power entertaining hostile designs towards Russia or
Japan. Japanese influence in China, which had already been fortified by
the latter’s acceptance of her twenty-one demands in May, 1916, seemed
supreme. It was not materially weakened by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement
of October, 1917, which, while it forbade special rights and privileges incom-
patible with the integrity and independence of China, nevertheless recognised
that Japan had special interests in China because of her geographical position.
In the meantime, Japan secured from the Entente Powers the promise of
support for her demands for Shantung and the German islands north of the
equator. Russia and Great Britain gave their promise in February, 1917;
France on March 1. On March 28 an oral assurance was given by Italy to
the effect that she “ had no objection regarding the matter.” The Govern-
ment of the United States does not seem to have been informed of these
promises.
The most complicated series of negotiations that took place between the
Entente Allies concerned the Near East and the partition of Turkey. The
agreement of March, 1915, and the Treaty of London, April 26, 1916,
provided, as we have seen, for the most vital Russian demands and, more
generally, for Italy’s claims in the Near East. Further negotiations proved
necessary. In October, 1915, the British began the organisation of an Arab
revolt against Turkish rule, which was desired as a protection to Egypt and
a direct blow against Turkey. They promised that in the event of success
they would recognise the independence of the Arabs south of latitude 37°
except in the provinces of Basra and Bagdad and in the regions where Great
Britain was “ not free to act without detriment to the interests of France.”
A less formal promise also seems to have been made, looking towards the
creation of four Arab states, each to be ruled by a son of the Cherif of
Mecca: the Hedjaz, Syria, Mesopotamia and Kurdistan.
In such a partition of Asiatic Turkey both Russia and France were vitally
interested, and in May of the following year special agreements defining the
aspirations of each Power seemed necessary. By the so-called Pal4oIogue-
Sazonov Agreement of May 16, 1916, Russia was promised the four Vilayets
of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, comprising most of Turkish Armenia;
Palestine was to be internationalised. The interests of the British and French
in Mesopotamia and Syria respectively were recognised, and were defined
by a second agreement (the Sykes-Picot Treaty) of the same date. Tliis
agreement coming to the knowledge of the Italians, they naturally asked for
a more exact definition of their interests in Asiatic Turkey. To this France
and Great Britain must perforce ag^ and in April, 1917, they signed the
St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement which gave to Italy ri^ts in south-western
© Keystone View Co
M. SazQnov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs at
the outbreak of and during the World War.
THEtEB MINISTERS WHO HAD A DIRECTING INFLUENCE ON EVENTS LEADING
TO THE WORLD WAR
CHARLES SEYMOUR 217
Asia Minor (region of Adalia, Smyrna, Aidin), similar to those acquired by
Great Britain and France in Mesopotamia and Syria.
The agreements concerning the partition of Turkey were not entirely
clear, and in some respects were apparently contradictory. The promises
made to Greece conflicted with those made to Italy at St. Jean de Maurienne.
The Sykes-Picot Treaty did not fit in with the promises made to the Cberif
of Mecca, and in June, 1917, Sir Mark Sykes, on behalf of the British,
made further promises to representative Syrians which did not accord with
the agreement with France. Finally the binding character of the St. Jean
de Maurienne Agreement was questioned later by the French and British,
since the approval of Russia was never received. None the less a general
scheme of partition was drafted by the summer of 1917 which the Peace
Conference attempted to follow closely.
The scope of German diplomacy in the war was restricted largely to the
attempts to win and hold her allies and to avoid trouble with neutrals because
of submarine methods. The single important exception is to be found in
the series of diplomatic manoeuvres which ended with the Treaties of Brest-
Litovsk and Bucharest, by which in the early spring of 1918 both Russia
and Rumania withdrew from the war. German war aims in the west depended
entirely upon military events; a sweeping victory would doubtless have
resulted in the annexation of Belgium and such important rectifications of
the French frontier as would have given to Germany the iron districts of
Briey, perhaps Belfort, and possibly north-eastern France to the motith of
the Somme. Responsible German opinion, however, did not count upon more
than the inclusion of Belgium in the German customs union and slight rectifi-
cations in the German-French frontier.
In the east the German Government hoped for greater advantages. Ter-
ritorially these advantages would consist of the creation of an independent
Poland and a ring of Baltic states, emancipated from Russia and brought
directly under German economic, and indirectly under German political
control. Long negotiations with Germany’s ally, Austria-Hungary, took
place regarding the extent of the Polish kingdom that was planned and the
degree to which the Habsburgs might share in its control. The questions of
the ruler and of the inclusion of the Austrian province of Galicia were never
definitely determined.
As the war progressed and the dependence of Austria-Hungary upon her
ally became more marked, the negotiations between Germany and Austria
indicated that in case of victory the former would obtain an economic over-
lordship over the Danubian monarchy which would lead to a German
“Central Europe,” which by its influence over Bulgaria and Turkey would
extend its power into the Middle East. Bulgaria would be brought into
territorial contact with Austria-Hungary, Serbia was to be partitioned, Ru-
mania made dependent by weakening her defenses on the north. Apart from
the difficulties experienced by German statesmen in preserving the morale
of the Habsburg Monarchy, the suspicions of the Magyars and the jealousy
of Bulgars and Turks rendered problematical the success of this programme.
The war aims of both the Entente Allies and of the Central Powers, as
well as the entire course of military affairs, were vitally affected by two
events: ^ the entrance of the United States into the war and the Russian
Revolution. At the very beginning of the European struggle. President Wilson
made plain his desire to adhere to a policy of neutrality ; he evidently regarded
the war as a terrible but remote catastrophe. It was not long before the inter-
est of the United States in its issues and outcome became obvious; President
Wilson himself, in the spring of 1916, stated: “ We are participants whether
we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are
218
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
our own also.” But in the face of the greatest provocation the President
was determined to keep the United States neutral, partly because he judged
this to be his duty to his coimtry, partly because of his conviction Ibat
America could better serve the world as mediator than as belligerent.
With Great Britain serious differences developed as a result of the British
application of maritime reflations which interfered with American trade.
The seiziu'e of American mail and cargoes, and the placing of various Ameri-
can commercial firms upon a black-list by the British, evoked sharp notes of
protest from Washington. The difference might have proved more serious,
had it not been eclipsed by the diplomatic dispute between Germany and
the United States, over Germany’s use of the submarine. This dispute began
with the sinking of the “ Lusitania,” May 7, 1915, and the drowning of more
than 100 Americans. The protests which Mr. Wilson raised against this
attack upon the lives and rights of American citizens and in behalf of human-
ity, resulted in most unsatisfactory replies from Germany; during the sum-
mer and autumn of 1915 Germany’s illegal use of the submarine continued.
Little by little, however, it seemed that modification of the submarine
warfare was being seemed, although the demand of the United States for the
formal disavowal of the attack upon the “ Lusitania ” remained unsatisfied.
But on March 24, 1916, the passenger steamship “ Sussex ” was sunk by a
submarine without warning, in defiance of German promises. Wilson threat-
ened that unless Germany should agree to abandon its submarine methods,
the United States would sever diplomatic relations. Germany yielded, and
during the following ten months relations with the United States improved.
It was likely, however, that unless the war could be ended the demand
for ruthless submarine warfare in Germany would be compelling, and the
United States would be brought in. In December, 1916, the German Govern-
ment and Mr. Wilson independently published notes suggesting the possibility
of peace, the former expressing its willingness for a conference, the latter
calling upon both groups of belligerents to state their terms.
AMERICA INTERVENES
In answer to Wilson's demand the Entente Powers, bound by their secret
treaties, replied frankly with terms which would be acceptable only to a
defeated Germany. The German reply was brief and evasive; it gave no
terms and merely reiterated Germany’s willingness to enter a conference.
The German Government was, in truth, divided: the moderate element,
represented in the United States by Ambassador von Bernstorff, negotiated
actively for Wilson’s mediation; the extremists, however, were determined
upon a resumption of ruthless submarine warfare, which would bring the
United States in upon the Entente side. In the middle of January, Von
Bernstorff was informed of the decision to resume the submarine blockade,
and on January 31 he gave formal notification of this decision to the United
States Government. President Wilson, disappointed and disgusted, at once
broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. He hoped that war might yet
be avoided, but the sinking of American ships and the practical blockade
of American ports that followed, left no loop-hole. On April 2 the President
went before Congress to demand the declaration that a state of war existed,
and on April 6 the declaration was voted.
The entrance of the United States into the war necessarily had an impor-
tant effect upon Entente war aims. President Wilson had already sketched
the principles of a settlement, which later were to be accepted by both groups
of belligerents as the basis of peace, although it was not until January, 1918,
Wiat his proposals were crystallised in the Fourteen Points. This programme
CHARLES SEYMOUR
219
iras by no means in accord with the provisions of the secret Entente Treaties.
The influence of the United States in the determination of war aims was
t)Ound to be great, for during the year 1917 it became clear that without active
American assistance the Entente Powers could not hope to win the war.
Financially, in particular, the Entente was dependent ujMn America.
This influence was enhanced by the defection of Russia. In March, 1917,
the Tsar was overthrown and a Provisional Government, bour^ois in char-
acter, established. Broadly speaking, the cause of the revolution was war-
sreariness developing from the economic chaos of Russia and the failure of
the Tsar’s Government to secure a victorious peace. The hopes of the Entente
that Russia would reaffirm her will to victory under the new Government
were soon seen to be without basis. The demand of Russia was for peace,
and this the Provisional Government, whether under bourgeois guidance or
later under the social democrat, Kerensky, could not secure.
In November the Bolshevists, led by Lenin and Trotsky, secured control
and immediately opened up negotiations with the Central Powers. They
called for a peace without annexations or indemnities and invited the other
Entente Powers to join with them. The latter refused even to reconsider and
publish their war aims. The Bolshevists thereupon agreed to an armistice
with the Central Powers, and at Brest-Litoysk, from December 22, 1917, to
March 3, 1918, carried on peace negotiations. Taking advantage of the
complete military disorganisation of Russia, the Germans laid down terms
which practically provided for the disintegration of the Russian Empire.
When in February the Bolshevists refused to accept these conditions, Ger-
man armies were pushed eastwards to occupy Poland, Lithuania and the
Baltic states. On February 24, 1918, Germany made a new and more drastic
offer of terms, which the Bolshevists finally accepted: “Their knees are on
our chest, and our position is hopeless,” said Lenin. The Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk was signed March 3, 1918, and practically reduced Russia to the
mediseval Grand Duchy of Muscovy. Commercial stipulations put her at
the mercy of German industry. Rumania, whose armies had been defeated
and which was now isolated, signed a humiliating peace at Bucharest on
March 7. German plans for the political control of the Baltic states, the
economic exploitation of Russia, and the creation of a Mittel-Europa seemed
close to success.
The separate peace made by Russia was preceded and followed by other
efforts to arrange a general peace, some of which were public and others
secret. The chances of success were in all cases slim. The Entente, despite
significant symptoms of war-weariness, were heartened in 1917 by the en-
trance of the United States. In Germany, control had fallen to Ludendorff
and the General Staff, who would not consider the concessions necessary to
peace. Hence the proposal that was made by the Pope on August 1, 1917,
which suggested in effect a stalemate, had no practical results except that it
gave to President Wilson an opportunity to underline Uie fact that the world
could not trust the German Imperial Government and that peace could not
be made until the German people gave conclusive evidence of their desire for
a just settlement. In January, 1918, during the course of the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations, an opening seemed to be created by a conciliatory speech of
Count Csernin, in which he accepted in a general fashion Wilson’s conditions.
But the German Chancellor, Hertling, controlled by Ludendorff, adopt^ a
polemic tone, and an ill-considered statement of the Supreme War Council
at Versailles, on February 4, 1918, closed the door.
In the meantime, secret negotiations had been in progress. Shortly after
his accession the new Emperor of Austria-Hungary, Karl, through the m p dimn
of his brother-in-law, I^ince Sixtus of Bourbon, suggested to France the
oBviuii IXUIAIUUS AM> OFiSN COVENANTS
poBsibility of peace, based upon the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Con-
versations continued throughout the spring of 1917, and were seriously taken
by both the French and British. The Emperor suggested that if Germany
would not agree, he might make a separate peace. The negotiations broke
down, however, partly because a separate peace with Austria, based upon the
integrity of the Empire, implied the failure of Italian war aims and was
inconsistent with Entente promises to Rumania; partly because Austria feared
to make a definite break with Germany. Similar secret discussions followed,
carried on for France by a Major Armand, for Austria by Count Revertera;
they continued imtil the spring of 1918, but never approached success.
From November, 1917, on, Clemenceau, Premier of France, repressed the
rising tide of defeatism and stimulated the will to victory. Other attempts
at secret negotiations, such as those through the King of Spain or the con-
versations of General Smuts and Count Mensdorff, met the same fate.
The year 1918 witnessed, however, an alteration in Entente war aims.
The plans for the partition of the Turkish Empire were modified as a result
of the Russian Revolution, for the Bolshevists renounced all claim to Constan-
tinople. Regard for liberal and labour opinion led Lloyd George, on January
6, 1918, to formulate a programme based upon the principle of self-determina-
tion and the demand for some international organisation to limit the burden
of armaments and diminish the probability of war. His declaration that the
Entente was not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary was nullified by the
need of assistance from the revolting nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy.
In the spring of 1918 the Supreme War Council approved the creation of
a united Polish state and expressed sympathy with the national aspirations
of tile Czechs and Yugoslavs. During the summer, formal recognition of an
independent Czechoslovakia was accorded by the Allied and Associated
Powers. The aspirations of the Yugoslavs for union and independence, as
expressed in the Pact of Corfu, in July, 1917, had naturally been opposed by
Italy. But in April, 1918, during the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities
at Rome, the Italian Government unoflScially approved Yugoslav aims, and
by the Torre-Trumbic agreement informally expressed its willingness to settle
the Adriatic problem upon the national principle. The Entente thus stood
committed to self-determination and the partition of Austria-Hungary.
WIIiSONUK WAR AIMS
Of chief importance was the programme of President Wilson, formulated
in his Fourteen Points. These were drafted in his speech of January 8, 1918,
and developed in later addresses, notably of February 11, April 6, July 4
and September 27, 1918. Six of the Fourteen Points were general in character
and of these the most important was the last, which called for “ a general
association of nations . . . formed under specific covenants for the purpose
of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial
integrity to great and small states alike.” The other general points demanded
open diplomacy; the freedom of the seas; the removal, so far as possible, of
all economic barriers; a reduction of armaments; the impartial adjustment
of all colonial claims.
Eight special points indicated the main lines of a desirable territorial
srttlement according to the Wilsonian programme. They followed the prin-
ciple of self-determination, insisting upon freedom of decision for nationalities
whetiier in Poland, the Balkans, Turkey, or on the Italian frontier; conquered
territories must be evacuated and restored; the sovereignty of Belgium must
be unlimited; the “ wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter
of Alsace-Lorraine should be righted.” The Wilsonian programme did not
@ InCernaitonal Newsreel
Five makers of post-war Europe. A photograph taken in London in December, 1918. Left to right:
Marshal Foch, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino.
CHARLES SEYMOUR
221
differ in its main lines vay greatly from that outlined by Lloyd George.
So far as the territorial settlement in Europe was concerned, comparatively
slight changes in the Entente war aims would bring them into consonance with
Wilson’s plan. In the Near and Far East, however, the secret treaties clearly
infringed the Wilsonian programme, which was in sum permeated by a liberal
spirit wholly lacking in the schemes drafted by the Entente in their various
treaties. Would the Entente Allies accept the war aims as drafted by Presi-
dent Wilson, implying certain sacrifices of their national interests? The
answer is to be found in the conditions under which the armistice with
Germany was concluded.
On October 6, 1918, the German Government sent a note to President
Wilson requesting that he take in hand the restoration of peace and invite
the belligerent states to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening
negotiations. The note accepted the programme of the Fourteen Points.
This request followed two and a half months of almost uninterrupted reverses
for German arms on the western front, the complete defeat of Turkey, and
the defection of Bulgaria, which on September 30 had signed an armistice.
The German General Staff, apparently in a panic, had warned the Govern-
ment that it was doubtful how long the lines in France and Belgium could
be held. Behind the lines the morale of the German people had approached
the breaking-point.
Wilson, in his reply, was careful to make sure that the request for an
armistice was not designed merely to provide a breathing space for defeated
German armies; he asked, on October 8, whether immediate evacuation of
invaded territory was contemplated, whether the acceptance of his principles
was absolute, the purpose of discussion being merely the application of details,
and whether the German Chancellor was merely speaking for the authorities
who had so far conducted the war for Germany. To the first two questions
an affirmative reply was given; to the third the Chancellor answered that
he spoke in the name of the German people. The President, on October 12,
made further provision against a cessation of arms which might not lead to
a definite and satisfactory peace: the process of evacuation and the condi-
tions of armistice must be left to the military, and must provide safeguards
and guarantees of the existing military supremacy of the Allied and Associated
Powers; the illegal and inhuman practices of the German forces must cease;
the arbitrary power hitherto controlling the German nation must be destroyed.
It was a demand for absolute surrender, modified only by the stipulation
that the Wilsonian programme should form the basis of peace. On October 20
the Germans accepted, and three days later President Wilson agreed to trans-
mit the request to the Allies.
In the meantime, the Austrian Government had made a similar request
for an armistice based upon the Fourteen Points; Wilson replied that because
of the recognition of the Czechs and the sympathy expressed with the nation-
alistic aims of the Yugoslavs, the provision of “ autonomy ” for those peoples
no longer held good; they and not he must be the judges of what action on
the part of Austria-Hungary would satisfy their aspirations. This reply
virtually loosed the bonds that held the Habsburg Empire. On October 27
the Austrian Government hastened to accept all conditions. But in the mean-
time, revolutionary forces in the empire were at work, so that within a few
weeks it was dissolved into its component national elements.
The enemy thus sued for peace, but on the basis of the Wilsonian pro-
granune. Would the Entente Allies accept that programme? The que^ion
was to be decided at the meetings of the Supreme War Council held at Ver-
sailles from October 31 to November 5; and these were attended by Colonel
House as the representative of. President Wilson. Hie conditions of the
222
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
armistice were determined largely by the militarjr and naval advisers,
althou^ the heads of governments made the final decision. With few excep-
tions all were in favor of granting an armistice. Field-Marshal Haig advo-
cated most liberal terms, so highly impressed was he by the strenrth of the
German military resistance. Marshal Foch, on the other hand, drafted
stringent conditions which would strip the Germans of any power to recom-
mence fighting, and his terms were finally approved. The British naval
e^^rts laid down the demand for the absolute smrender of the German fieet;
this was opposed by Foch as likely to lead Germany to refuse the armistice.
Lloyd George therefore agreed to modify the demand, so as to provide merely
for the internment of the major portion of the fleet. Thus it happened that
the Germans, left in control of their interned ships, were able later to sink
them at Scapa Flow and prevent them from falling into the hands of the
Allies.
The vital importance of these discussions, however, lay in the fact that
they determined the basis upon which the ultimate peace should be made.
Mr. Balfour pointed out that if the Allied Powers agreed without reserva-
tion to the German request for an armistice, they would implicitly accept
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. To this Colonel House naturally agreed.
At once Clemenceau and the Italian representatives insisted upon a dis-
cussion of the Fourteen Points, which they feared might hamper their free-
dom of action in arranging the final settlement. Now that the enemy was
clearly defeated it was easy to forget the promises of a just peace, made in
the hour of extremity, and to remember the stipulations of the secret treaties.
Long discussion followed, in which French, British, and Italians protested
against those of the Wilsonian principles that affected their own claims.
The programme of the President was ably upheld by Colonel House, who
used persuasion and threats in turn; if the Allied Powers would not
accept the Fourteen Points it might be necessary for Wilson to go before
Congress, state that Germany accepted the American terms but that the
Allies refused, and ask whether the United States should continue the war
for the special war aims of the Entente. The French, British, and Italians
yielded, asking for two reservations only. The first of these stated that the
term “ freedom of the seas ” was open to various interpretations, some of
which might not be acceptable; it provided for later discussion, which as a
matter of fact was never held. The second reservation defined the Presi-
dent’s reference to restoration of invaded territories as meaning that “ com-
pensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian
population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany
by land, by sea, and from the air.” The reservations were accepted by
President Wilson and included in his final note of November 5 to Germany,
in which he stated that Marshal Foch would communicate the conditions of
an armistice.
This so-called pre-armistice agreement formed the basis of the peace, as
was acknowledged by both the Allied Powers and Germany. The former
stated on June 16, 1919, “ The Allied and Associated Powers are in com-
plete accord with the German Delegation in their insistence that the basis for
the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace is to be foimd in the correspondence
which immediately preceded the signing of the Armistice on November 11,
1918. It was there agreed that the Treaty of Peace should be based upon
the Fourteen Points of President Wilson’s address of January 8, 1918, as
they were modified by the Allied Memorandum included in the President’s
Note of November 5, 1918, and upon the principles of settlement entmeiated
by President Wilson in his later addresses, and particularly in his address
of Septmber 27, 1918.”
CHARLES SEYMOUR
223
Germany thus surrendered, not upon the terms of tiie Amaietice itself,
but on conditions which the Allied Powers were bound, like Genmny, to
observe in the making of peace. Before the war was ended both sides had
pledged themselves to certain principles, and criticism of the final settle-
ment must be based upon the degree to which these principles were later
applied or disregarded.
It would certainly have been far better for all concerned if a preliminary
peace had been arran^ immediately after the signing of the Armistice of
November 11. The military and naval clauses might have been based upon
the Armistice itself, and the essential pwlitical clauses upon the details of the
pre-Armistice discussions. Such a preliminary peace would have enabled the
Governments to meet the rising tide of social and economic disorder, while
the final treaties could have been completed at leisure. But various delays
intervened. President Wilson was determined to be present at the Peace
Conference and could not leave the United States until December 4; the
chiefs of government in France, Italy, and Great Britain found their attention
taken by domestic politics.
OBOANISATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE
Thus the Conference did not formally convene until January 18, 1919.
By that time much of the spirit of solidarity created by the war among the
Allied Powers had evaporated, and selfish national aspirations had been given
an opportunity to develop. Economic distress and social discontent had
increased to a point where these problems seemed of greater importance than
the treaties. The settlement was thus to be consummated under highly un-
favourable conditions. The Peace Conference itself was not well organised
for the settlement of such diverse and complex questions, nor did the domi-
nating statesmen possess the executive qualities necessary for the crisis
Clemenceau and Lloyd George had won the war through their inspiration;
Wilson had blazoned the path of peace. No one of them was an organiser.
The Conference worked inevitably on a committee system, and, in view
of the difSculties of the situation, expeditiously It convened in plenary
session on only five occasions. Authority was taken by the Supreme Council,
which met for a time as a Council of Ten (two delegates each for the five
principal Powers — Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Japan),
and then as a Council of Four, an informal committee composed of Clemen-
ceau, Lloyd George, Wilson and Orlando. The Council of Four delegated
certain functions to a council of the five Forei^ Ministers of the principal
Powers, but retained all important decisions for itself. With the exception of
certain vital and contentious points reserved for the chiefs of government,
the treaties were drafted by expert technical committees, of which a large
number were created. Their recommendations as to frontiers and the political
and economic stipulations which they laid down were generally accepted with-
out change by the Supreme Council; they were translated into “treaty
language ” by a committee, and became the actual material of tiie treaties.
The Peace Conference was marked, naturally, by frequent differences of
opinion which were probably no greater nor less than had been anticipated.
Unanimity must be secured among a large number of states which, although
boimd together in the war by hostility to the Central Powers, possessed, never-
theless, divergent basic interests, l^e claims of the newly liberated nation-
alities were excessive and conflicting; and at bottom ^ere was always the
cleavage between the aspirations of the Europran Fore^ Offices, charactor-
ised by traditional national selfishness, and the liberal spirit voiced by Wilson,
who called for sacrifice in order to reach a peace of reconciliation.
SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
224
The most important item in the Wilsonian programme was the immediate
creation of a League of Nations; this it was, he believed, which would make
this peace different from and better than earlier settlements. While all had
accepted with greater or less enthusiasm the principle of a League, the
European statesmen were inclined to emphasise first the territorial and finan-
cial settlement which should mark their victory. President Wilson succeeded
in having the League put at the head of subjects for discussion, and on
January 25, at the second Plenary Session, its principle was approved without
a dissentient voice. During the following three weeks a special committee,
including the President, Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts,
Venizelos, Leon Bourgeois, elaborated the charter or Covenant of the League,
which on February 14 was accepted by the Plenary Conference. Wilson left
for America, doubtless feeling that the major purpose of his mission to Europe
had been achieved.
Thereafter the attention of the Conference was directed to the territorial
and economic claims of the victorious Allies. The most important and diffi-
cult question was the amoimt of indemnity or reparations that Germany
should pay. The French and most of the other European statesmen argued
that Germany was obligated to pay the entire costs of the war — reparations
for indirect as well as direct damage This contention they attempted to
base upon the Armistice, in which there appeared a protective phrase reserving
future claims of the Allied Powers. The Americans argued that the Allies
and Germany were bound by the pre-armistice agreement, in which Germany
was obligated for ‘‘ all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies
and their property by the aggression of Germany. . . This, they argued,
implied merely direct damage and could not be stretched to include indirect
war costs. The dispute was finally settled so as to exclude indirect war costs
but to include pensions. Even so, the amount that might be demanded from
Germany seemed to exceed her capacity for payment and no agreement could
be reached between the Americans, British, and French as to the sum of
reparations which should be inserted in the treaty. Both Lloyd George and
Clemenceau feared the political effects of inserting a sum far below the ex-
pectations vrhich they themselves had aroused among their constituents. After
long discussion, it was decided not to specify a definite sum to be paid by
Germany, but simply to list the categories of damages for which Germany
was responsible. A Reparations Commission was to be created, which by
May 1, 1921, should determine the extent of Germany’s capacity to pay.
Germany was required to acknowledge full liability in the treaty.
French territorial demands created another problem of almost equal diffi-
culty. The claim of France for the re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was
fully recognised. But Clemenceau also asked for the Saar valley and for
the separation of the left bank of the Rhine from Germany. These claims
had been accepted by the Russian Imperial Government at the beginning
of 1917, but had never been recognised by the British. The demand for the
Saar was based partly upon the fact that much of this district had been
taken from France in 1815 and also upon the close economic connection
between the iron districts of Lorraine and the coal regions of the Saar. Presi-
dent Wilson stoutly opposed any idea of annexation. It was finally decided
that the coal mines should be given to France, but the region itself should
be governed by a commission under the League for 15 years, at the end of
which time a plebiscite should decide ultimate sovereignty. If the plebiscite
decided in favor of Germany, that state should have the right to buy back
the coal mines which were regarded as reparations for the damage done to
the French mines in the region of Lens and Valenciennes. The demand of
France for the separation of the left bank of the Rhine was based upon the
CHABLES SEYMOUR
225
need of giving adequate strategic protection to France. It was strongly urged
by Marshal Foch. To this demand both British and Americans offered vigor-
ous opposition. The decision finally taken was that there should be Allied
occupation for a period of 15 years, and that Great Britain, the United States,
and France would sign an agreement by which tiie two first-named would
come to the assistance of the third in case of an improvoked aggression by
Germany. This would give a chance to discover the intentions of Germany
and to determine the capacity of the league to protect France.
At the moment when these decisions were taking form, in April, the
Italians vigorously advanced their claims, based upon the Treaty of London,
and they even went beyond that Treaty in demanding the town of Fiume
which they had agreed should go to the Slavs. President Wilson raised no
serious objections to their acquisition of the southern Tyrol as far north as
the Brenner Pass, but he stoutly opposed the annexation of Fiume and the
northern districts of Dalmatia which had been promised Italy in the Treaty
of London. Had the Italians rested upon the Treaty and surrendered their
claim to Fiume the President’s position would have been difficult, for the
French and British felt compelled to honour the promises they had made in
1915. But they joined Wilson in opposing the Italian demand for Fiume,
although they left it to the President to carry the burden of the dispute.
The Italians threatened that if their claims were not granted they would be
compelled to leave the Conference. Wilson replied by publishing a manifesto,
on April 23, in which he set forth the American position and appealed directly
to the Italian people to join with the United States in the application of
liberal principles even at the sacrifice of their own immediate interests.
Orlando and Sonnino thereupon left for Rome, where they were enthusi-
astically received and encouraged to persist in their territorial demands.
But at Pans the Conference decided to go on with the German Treaty regard-
less; on May 5 the Italian delegates left Rome and returned in time to take
part in the final discussion of the Treaty with Germany. Negotiations over
Italian claims in the Adriatic continued between Italy and the other Powers.
In the autumn of 1920 a separate treaty was signed by the Yugoslavs and
Italians at Rapallo, which left Fiume independent, gave Dalmatia (except
Zara) to Yugoslavia, and the rest of the contested area to Italy. This solu-
tion proved satisfactory to none of the interested parties.
During the crisis caused by Italian claims the Japanese put forward their
demand for the reversion of German rights in Shantung and for the German
colonies north of the equator. Their position was strong, for they had the
promises of British and French support. Wilson, who was inclined to oppose
their demand, feared that if the Japanese left Paris as the Italians had done
and as they threatened, the Conference would break up. He therefore yielded
perforce, exacting from the Japanese, however, the promise that they would
later enter into negotiations with China for the return of Shantung, a promise
which three years later was to be fulfilled.
THE PEACE TBEATTES
On May 7, 1919, the Treaty being completed, the German delegates ap-
peared at Versailles to receive it. Nearly eight weeks of uncertainty followed,
taken up with the study of German protests and the insertion of certain
minor alterations, of which the most important was the decision that a plebis-
cite should be hdd to determine the sovereignty over Upper Silesia. Early
in June the British demanded extensive concessions to the Germans, in order
T. a. T. — VMi. I — 15
226 SECRET TREATIES AND OPEN COVENANTS
Uiat the acquiescence of the enemy might be secured. Wilson joined with the
French in opposing eleventh-hoiu* changes on tiiis score, and on June 20 the
German acceptance of the peace terms was announced. Eight days later, on
the fifth anniversary of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,
the Treaty was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.
The Treaty of Versailles with Germany had as its first article the Covenant
of the League of Nations. Apart from the stipulations mentioned
above, Germany agreed to surrender to Belgium small districts about Eupen
and Malm4dy, and to Denmark the region in Schleswig where a plebiscite
might indicate the desire of the inhabitants to return to Danish sovereignty.
The Polish districts in West Prussia and Posen were given to the newly
created Poland, which thus secured a corridor to the sea; the German city
of Danzig was to be a free port imder the League. East Prussia was thus
cut off from Germany territorially, but plebiscites in Allenstein and Marien-
werder, which resulted in favor of the Germans, left its area undiminished.
Germany surrendered her overseas possessions which were partitioned between
Great Britain, the British Dominions, France and Japan. In most cases
the Powers received the German colonies not in absolute ownership but as
mandatories of the League, to which they were responsible for their
administration.
The bulk of the German mercantile fleet was surrendered as part of her
reparations account, and her fleet was reduced to six battleships, six light
cruisers, and twelve torpedo boats. No submarines were allowed. The Ger-
man army was to be reduced to 100,000 men, including officers, and universal
military service and training was to be abolished. The accumulation of arms,
munitions and equipment beyond the needs of this small army was forbidden,
and the manufacture of war material of any kind except as specified in the
Treaty was prohibited. All fortifications 50 kilometres east of the Rhine
were to be razed. Finally the Treaty states that “ the armed forces of Ger-
many must not include any military or naval air forces.”
The settlement in south-eastern Europe and in the Near East was deter-
mined by the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly and Sevres, which
were signed with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey respectively. The
dissolution of the Habsburg Empire had been practically accomplished by the
time the Peace Conference convened. The separate nationalities had already
begun their independent organisation, and the Conference did little more
than confirm the division of territory and settle the details of frontiers.
Poland received Galicia. Bohemia, Moravia, part of Silesia, and the
Slovak districts of northern Hungary were formed into Czechoslovakia.
Rumania secured Bessarabia, Transylvania, Bukowina, and a large part of
the Banat and Transylvanian forelands, although less than had been promised
by the secret Treaty of Bucharest. Serbia joined with the south Slav regions
of southern Hungary (the western Banat, Baranya, Backa) , Croatia-Slavonia,
the Austrian provinces of Dalmatia, Camiola, and southern Styria, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Montenegro, to form the Kingdom of the Serte, Croats
and Slovenes. This kingdom, known as Yugoslavia, acquired also stategic
points from Bulgaria. By the Treaty of Rapallo (Novmber 12, 19^) it
surrendered to Italy its claims in Istria and to certain islands in the Adriatic,
but arranged that Fiume should become a free state. The settlement in the
Danubian and Balkan regions was roughly according to national lines,
although inevitably in certain details, especially in Albania and on tiie new
Italian frontier, nationalistic principles were disregarded. Austria and Hun-
gary, reduced each to rather less than the national core, became independ^t
republics.
The secret treaties affected the European settlments less than has some-
CHARLES SEYMOUR
227
times been asserted: neither Italy nor Rumania received as much as had
been promised them. In the attempted partition of the Turkish Empire,
however, the plans of 1916 and 1917 were closely followed. The Treaty of
Sfevres, signed with Turkey on August 10, 1920, reduced Turkey in Europe
approximately to the Tchatalja lines, and in Asia deprived Turkey of the
territory partitioned by the French and British in the Sykes-Picot Agreement,
including Syria and Mesopotamia. There was to be an independent Armenia,
the zone of the Straits was to be internationalised, and Smyrna with a hinter-
land was to be administered by Greece, although final renunciation of Turkish
sovereignty was not demanded. The independence of Syria and Mesopotamia
was recognised, but they were placed temporarily under French and British
mandates respectively. Palestine, designated as a national home for the
Jews, was put under a British mandate. The Hedjaz was made independent,
freedom to the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina being guaranteed to all
Moslems.
By a Tripartite Agreement signed on the same date as the Treaty of
Sevres, Great Britain, France and Italy arranged for zones of special interests
for the two latter, with boundaries closely approximating to the spheres de-
limited in the Sykes-Picot and St. Jean de Maurienne Agreements except for
the area around Smyrna and a small region further to the north which was
included in the zone of the Straits.
These dispositions, arrived at with the greatest diflBculty, were destined to
speedy and extensive alterations as a result of the Turkish nationalist move-
ment led by Mustapha Kemal Pasha.
CHAPTER VII
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
From the Outbreak op the War to the Battle op Verdun
By Major-Gesnebal Sk Frederick Maurice, K.C.M.G., CB.
Commander of the Legion of Honour Croix de Guerre. First-
class Order of St. Stenislas of Russia Director of Military
Operations, Imperial General Staff, 1915-1918. Author of Forty
Days in 1914; The Last Four Months.
The strategy of the World War was in its main lines simple. The
principles of strategy are simple; the diflSculty lies in applying them correctly
when information is incomplete and when an almost infinite number of
complications affect the result of battles, the winning of which in the
most decisive fashion possible is the object of strategy. In August, 1914,
and throughout the war Germany and Austria occupied a central position in
relation to their enemies. They were in fact generally called the Central
Powers. Inferior even at the outset in numbers, their object was to crush
their opponents in succession by massing troops for a heavy blow against
some portion of the opposing fronts while holding the remaining portions
defensively with comparatively weak forces. Germany entered the war with
a military organisation and equipment superior to those of any other Power,
and this together with a very complete network of railways and their central
position gave the Central Powers facilities for concentrating force quickly
greater than their opponents possessed. On the other side the Entente, or
Allied, Powers, thanks mainly to the naval sujwriority of Great Britain, had
control of the seas, a control threatened at times, but never destroyed by
the German submarines. This gave them liberty to develop their greater
resources and to place those resovirces where they would, a liberty curtailed
only by the fact that the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of the
Central Powers interrupted direct communications by sea between the
Entente Powers of the West and Russia. The problem before the Central
Powers was then to choose when and where to break outwards throui^ the
circle of their enemies, while defending on the remainder of the circle such
territory as they could not afford to lose, and the problem before the
Entente Powers was to choose when and where to break inwards while pro-
tecting those places vital to their existence.
WHY THE GERMANS INVADED BELGIUM
Long before the war came Germany had made her plans to meet the
eventuality of war against France and Russia. France, her most serious
enemy, she knew would be ready before the slow-moving masses of the
Russian army, hampered by inferior railway communications, could
228
® IrUerntUtoneil Newsreel
Hight: H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, only surviying son of Queen Victoria and formerly Governor-
General of Canada; left: Lord Allenby, the deliyerer of Jerusalem and one of the most picturesque
figures of the World War.
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
brous^t into the field. She had therefore decided to concentrate the largest
possible number of troops against the French in the first instance, while hold-
up off the Russians with the help of Austria with a minimum of force. For
this plan to succeed it was necessary to crush the French army quickly,
before the Russians could march across East Prussia towards Berlin. The
line of fortresses, which from Verdun to Belfort protected the eastern frontier
of France, might well prevent a swift and decisive movement into the heart
of the country. Germany therefore decided to march round this line of
fortresses through Belgium, with the right wing of her armies of the west,
and come down on Paris from the north-east. This movement was to be
combined, if opportimity offered, with an attack by the armies of the left wing
through Lorraine, and if both attacks succeeded it was hoped that a modem
Cannae on a vast scale would be the result. From a purely military point
of view the German plan was as good as could be devised. It was very
nearly completely successful, and even its failure left Germany for years in
a dominating position on the western front; but in framing this plan, and in
framing many other plans throughout the war, the German strategists left
moral considerations out of accoimt. The invasion of Belgium, the neutrality
of which had been guaranteed by Germany amongst other Powers, was a
crime, which at once brought Great Britain into the war against her and
produced throughout the world a feelmg of repulsion against German methods,
the military importance of which the experts, examining the problem from
the narrow purview of the office of the Great General Staff in Berlin, had
entirely overlooked. This neglect of the moral factor, or in other words
of the value of a good cause, eventually united against Germany more enemies
than have ever before confronted a Great Power, and on this ground the Ger-
man plan must even from the purely military standpoint be condenmed.
NUMEBICAI. StmERIOBITY OF THE ALLIES
None the less, the plan at first produced great results. In measuring the
strength of the opposing forces at the be^nning of the war it is convenient
to take the division as a unit of comparison, the variations in strength of
divisions in the different armies not being considerable. France had available
47 regular and 27 reserve divisions and 10 cavaliy divisions. Russia 70
regular divisions, 36 reserve divisions, and 24 divisions of cavalry; Be^um
had six divisions and one cavalry division; Great Britain had ready an
Expeditionary Force of six divisions and one cavalry division; and Serbia
12 divisions and a cavalry division — making a total for the Entente Powers
of 141 regular, 61 reserve, and 37 cavalry divisions. Against these Germany
had 50 regular divisions, 32^ reserve divisions, and 11 cavalry divisions; and
Austria-Hungary 32 regular, 16 reserve, and 11 cavaliy divisions, or for
the Central Powers together 82 regular, 48^ reserve divisions, and 22 cavalry
divisions.
Thus from the first the Entente Powers had an enormous superiority of
force, but their armies were widely scattered. The Russian stren^h could be
brought but slowly to the frontiers of Germany and Austria, the small Belgian
and ^rbian armies were isolated, and no plans for concerted action with them
had been made. The little British army had to be brought across the
Channel to France, and three of the French regular divisions had -to come
from North Africa. Taking these factors into consideration, the German
leaders believed that they would be able to overwhelm the French army
before their opponents could work together, and with that object they con-
centrated almost the whole of their forces on the western front, bringing 73^
230 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
divisions and 10 cavalry divisions against France and Belpum, and leaving
only nine divisions and one cavalry division on the eastern front to oppose
the northern Russian armies, while Austria was left to face the southern
Russian armies and Serbia.
GERMAN STTPEBIORTTY AT THE DECISIVE POINT
Of the 73i German divisions no less than 52, divided into five armies,
were allotted for a great wheel through Belgium, and of these 52 divisions
32, comprising the armies of Von Kluck, Von Bulow, and Von Hausen, formed
the right German wing and were to sweep aside the little Belgian army and
fall upon the 15 divisions of the British Expeditionary Force and of the
1st French army which made up the left wing of Joffre’s command. So
despite the general numerical inferiority of the Central Powers the Germans
achieved the feat of having in that portion of the vast theatre of war, in
which they had elected to make their decisive effort, a superiority of more
than two to one. Thus arose the idea which long endured that the Germans
had at the outset an immense superiority in numbers.
But if this superiority did not in fact exist, how came it about that the
Germans were able to overrun Belgium, approach the gates of Paris, and
establish themselves so firmly in north-eastern France that it required four
years of effort on the part of the Entente Powers, and the reinforcement of
a new ally, the American army, to drive them out?
FRENCH MISCALCULATION
The answer is that the original French plan of campaign was based upon
a grave miscalculation. The French reserve divisions were in efficiency and
equipment far below their regular divisions, and it was assumed in France
that few if any of the German reserve divisions would be able to take their
places at the beginning of the war in line with their regular comrades. In
fact, almost all the German reserve divisions took their places in the front
line. Thus the German strength on the western front was far larger than
the French had supposed it would be. Further, for some years before the war
the French military leaders had devoted themselves to the encouragement of
the spirit of attack in the army. This had been carried to an excess, and in
particular the value of entrenchments in modem war had not been appre-
ciated, while the provision of heavy artillery had been neglected as being
likely to hamper mobility and diminish the elan of the attack, and the use of
machine-guns had not been as carefully considered as it had been in the
German army.
The French plan of campaign provided for an immediate offensive on
either side of the fortress of Metz directed eastward by the whole of the
^nch forces. The French infantry, dashing forward with great gallantry
in attacks which had been insufficiently prepared by artillery, was mowed
down by the German machine-guns, and to some extent demoralised by the
imexpected effect of the high-explosive shell of the German howitzers. The
result of the first battles of the war on the western front may then be ascribed
to the facts: firstly that the French plan was prepared on wrong data and
the Germans were foimd to be strong where they were expected to be weak,
and secondly that the tactical training, equipment and methods of the French
troops were not as good as those of Sie Germans.
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
231
THE GERMAN TROOPS MOVE — LUDENDORFP’s FIRST SUCCESS
On July 31^ 1914, both Russia and Austria ordered a general mobilisation
of their forces. The next day Germany followed suit and declared war on
Russia. France and Belgium immediately ordered mobilisation. The World
War had begun. On August 2 German troops invaded Luxemburg and seized
the railways, a long-prepared preliminary to the concentration of their armies
in the west. The same day Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium demand-
ing free passage for her troops through that country, a demand which Belgium
at once proudly rejected. On August 4, German troops crossed the Belgian
frontier and began an attack on the Belgian fortress of Liege, and Great
Britain declared war on Germany. On the night of August 5-6, German
troops in five columns under the command of General von Emmich attempted
to carry Liege by a coup-de-main. Four of the five attacking columns were
repulsed, but the fifth, largely owing to the skill and courage of Major-General
Ludendorff, succeeded in entering the town The forts still held out and
could not be reduced until the Germans had brought up heavy howitzers,
the effect of which was decisive. The last fort fell on the morning of August
16, the Belgian commander, General Leman, being found unconscious among
the ruins. His gallant stand had gained four invaluable days for Belgium's
Allies, for the roads through Liege were indispensable to the German plan,
and till they were clear the great wheel through Belgium could not be begun.
Meanwhile the little Belgian army had taken its stand behind the river
Gette, about midway between Liege and Antwerp, and had repulsed the
attacks of the German advanced troops, but with the road through Liege open
the German avalanche began to pour through Belgium carrying terror with
it, and on August 18 the Belgian army fell back on the fortress of Antwerp.
THE FRENCH ATTEMPT AN UNSUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE
On the other flank of the long line the French offensive began on August
6 with an abortive incursion into Alsace Mulhausen was reached, but the
French troops had then to withdraw before superior forces. On August 18
the 1st and 2nd French armies invaded Alsace-Lorraine in force. By then
it was known at French headquarters that the Germans were moving in
strength through Belgium, but it was not realised that very large forces had
crossed the Meuse. The French plans were still vitiated by the false estimates
which had been made of the German strength. A German movement through
Belgium had long been anticipated in France, but it was assumed that if the
Germans were strong on their right in Belgium, and sufficiently powerful
on their left in Alsace-Lorraine to resist the strong attack of the 1st and 2nd
French armies, they must be weak in their centre. The French Commander-
in-Chief, General Joffre, therefore still adhered to his plan of a general offen-
sive. He moved his 5th army under General Lanrezac up into Belgium, in
the angle between the Meuse and the Sambre, where it, with the British anny
on its left, was to be ready to oppose the Germans coming down from Liege,
directed his 1st and 2nd armies to press their attacks in Alsace and Lorraine,
and ordered forward his 3rd and 4th armies for a drive through the Ardennes
against the German centre, through which he hoped to break. The French
were soon enlightened as to the real strength of the Germans. On August 20
the 2nd French army under de Castelnau came up against the Germans under
Prince Rupprecht in strong defensive positions, and in the battles of Sarre-
bourg and Morbange met with a serious reverse. Its retreat carried back
232 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
wilii it to tile French frontier the Ist French army under Dubail. The same
the Germans occupied Brussels and began to bombard tiie Belipan fortress
of Namur.
On August 21 the 2nd German army under Von Biilow opened an attack on
tile 6th French army on the Sambre, and on the 22nd the British army of
four divisions and one cavalry division reached the neighbourhood of Mons,
where its commander, Sir John French, agreed to fight on the information
given him by the French that he was not likely to be opposed by more than
four German divisions and one or two cavalry divisions. August 23 saw
the climax of the “ Battles of the Frontiers,” for on that day the 3rd and
4th French armies under Generals Ruffy and de Langle de Cary, advancing
into the Ardennes, came up against the German 5th and 4th armies under
the German Crown Prince and the Duke of Wurtemburg. These armies of
the German centre so far from being weak were slightly superior in ^rength
to the two French armies, and what Joffre had intended to be his chief coup
failed.
But on the French left worse was to come, for Von Billow with the 2nd
German army defeated Lanrezac’s 5th army in the battle of Charleroi, and
while that battle was raging Lanrczac found that the Germans had entered
Namur and that his right flank and rear were threatened by the advance
to the Meuse, above Namur, of the 3rd German army under Von Hausen,
while late on the 23rd Sir John French learned, after his troops had been
beating off the German attacks with a great measure of success, at Mons,
that he had in front of him not three or four German divisions but the whole
of Von Kluck’s 1st German army, of which six divisions had engaged his
troops, while four more divisions and three cavalry divisions were coming
up. The Germans had therefore succeeded in enveloping the Allied left wing
with greatly superior force, and an immediate retreat to escape from the net
was the only possible course.
Immediately on the collapse of the initial French plan Joffre proceeded
to create a new one. His right, the 1st and 2nd armies, was directed to hold
positions covering Belfort and Nancy on the frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine.
His centre and left were, pivoting on the fortress of Verdun, swung back so
as to free his left from the German envelopment, and to help to that end he
created on his extreme left a new army, the 6th, under Maunoury, by with-
drawmg troops from other parts of his front. He intended on the first
opportunity to begin a new offensive with the three armies on his left, the
6th, the British, and 6th, and hoped to be able to do so from the line of the
Somme. The German pursuit was however too rapid. On August 26 Von
Kluck caught up the 2nd British Corps and it was forced to stand and fight
at Le Cateau, whence it made good its retreat, after materially delaying
Von Kluck’s pursuit.
None the less the Germans reached the Somme before the new 6th army
was ready, and the retreat had to be continued. In default of the general
offensive which he had hoped to deliver, Joffre directed his 6th army to
turn about and attack in order to relieve the hard-pressed British, who
being on the extreme left were in the position of the greatest danger. Tliis
it did on August 29 in the battle of Guise, where it severely handled the 2nd
German army. Nor was this the only check to the triumphant progress of
the Germans, for on August 26 Dubail’s 1st armv obtained, at the Gap of
Cbarmes, a success over the Germans issuing from Lorraine. Still, the
general feeling in the German army was one of exultation; it was believed
tiiat the decisive battle had been won, and that it remained only to exploit
the victory — a complete misreading of the situation, which proved to the
undoing of Germany.
Sm FREDERICK MAURICE
233
VOK MOIjTKE a FAILUBE — BUSBIAN AID
The Gennan Chief of the General Staff, Von Moltke, the bearer of a great
name, but a man of no outstanding ability, and in weak health, lost control
of the situation. In order to assist their hard-pressed Allies on the west the
Russians had sent forward two armies into East Prussia before their con-
centration was completed. On August 20 at Grubmnen, and on the 23rd
at Frankenau, the comparatively small force of Germans was pressed back
and alarm spread through eastern Germany. Refugees from East Prussia
flocked into Berlin, and the capital was seriously perturbed. Great pressure
was brought to bear on German Headquarters to relieve the situation on the
eastern front, and in a moment of weakness Von Moltke yielded to that
pressure. He sent off General Ludendorff, who was serving on Von Billow's
staff, to Von Hindenburg, who was given the command in the east, and so
started the famous combination which was to last almost till the end of the
war, and he took two army corps (four divisions) from his right wing, which
was his chief means of gaining a decisive victory in the west, and sent them
with a cavalry division to East Prussia.
Ere these arrived Von Hindenburg had in the battle of Tannenberg, on
August 29, all but annihilated the 2nd Russian army, and all danger in East
Prussia was, for the time, over. Had these four divisions been present at the
battle of the Marne the history of the war might have taken a very different
course. Von Moltke whose headquarters were in Luxemburg, far removed
from his vital right wing, was rarely in touch with his armies. His orders were
late in arriving, and when they did arrive events had usually moved beyond
them. So Von Kluck and Von Biilow, the commanders of the German armies
on the right, took to devising their own plans.
VON kluck’s wheel to the left
On August 30 in response to an appeal from Von Billow, Von Kluck be-
gan to wheel inwards from the neighbourhood of Amiens against the left
flank of the French 6th army, hoping to cut it off from the Marne. In
making this movement he neglected the British army, which he believed he
had defeated decisively, and Maunoury’s 6th army, the strength of which
was continuously growing as the reinforcements sent by Joffre arrived. On
August 30, too, Von Moltke still under the impression that it remained only
to reap the fruits of victory in the west, directed Prince Rupprecht in
Lorraine to attack de Castelnau, and break through to Nancy, hoping that
he would thus envelope the right of the French line, as he had done the
left. On August 31 began the battle of the Grand Couronnfi in front of
Nancy, which ended on September 6 in a heavy repulse for the Germans.
On the other flank Von Kluck’s cavalry patrols penetrated to within a few
miles of the gates of Paris, the defences of which had been reached by
Maunoury's 6th army, and the French Government was transferred to Bor-
deaux; but Von Kluck’s main bodies leaving Paris on the right, were march-
ing towards ChAteau-Thierry on the Marne, seeking the flank of the French
6th army. On September 1 Von Kluck’s progress was delayed by tiie rear-
guards of the British army, which since the battle of Le Gateau he had
neglected; on the 2nd he made a clumsy attempt to bring that army again
to battle, an attempt easily evaded. But that day Joffre, finding that the
retreat of his 6th army was seriously menaced owing to the stand wUch it
had made at Guise, decided to swing back his left as far as the Seine, south
234
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
of Paris, in order to disengage that army, and was prepared even to abandon
temporarily the French capital, rather than diminish the wei^t of the
counter-offensive which he had planned. On September 3 Gallieni, the Gov-
ernor of Paris, discovered that Von Kluck was marching past the Paris de-
faces and had exposed his right flank to Maunoury’s 6tb army, which had
come under Galli^ni’s direction.
BATTLE OF THE MABNE
Galli^i at once proposed that the 6th army in combination with the
B^sh army should attack Von Kluck’s flank. Joffre looking to an attack
on a greater scale was not prepared to agree until he knew that his 5th army
would be free to take its part. Late on September 4 the French Commander-
in-Chief, finding that the 5th army was sufficiently disengaged and that Von
Kluck had crossed the Marne with all his army except one reserve corps,
and was deeply committed, issued orders for a general offensive to begin on
the 6th. By then Von Kluck had awoken to his danger, and had discovered
that Maunoury’s army, of the strength and movements of which the Germans
were strangely ignorant, was a serious danger to his flank and rear. He at
once proceeded to counter-march his infantry from in front of the British
back across the Marne, and to attack Maunoury as it arrived, leaving a
force composed mainly of cavalry to fill the gap. September 8 was the
critical day of the battle of the Marne. On the Ourcq Maunoury’s men,
fighting like tigers, had forced Von Kluck to bring more and more troops
back across the Marne, thus widening the gap between his army and that of
Von Billow. But Maunoury, as Von Kluck’s strength against him increased,
was very hard pressed, and his northern flank in grave danger of envelop-
ment, when help began to arrive ; for on the evening of the 8th the British
army, after forcing back the troops left to delay them, were within a short
distance of the Marne bridges, west of Chateau-Thierry, while on their
right the French 5th army, now commanded by Franchet d’Esperey, had at
Montmirail inflicted a severe defeat on Von Billow’s nght.
Still further to the right of the French line, about the marshes of St.
Gond and F^re Champenoise, a new 9th French army, which had been created
by Joffre a few days before mainly from the left wing of his 4th army, and
placed under the command of General Foch, had been fighting desperately
against the determined effort of the left of Von Billow’s army, and of the
3rd German army under Von Hausen, to break the French centre. Here the
resolute determination of Foch to refuse to admit defeat kept the centre
together, while the gap between Von Kluck and Von Billow was forced
furtoer west. Already it had become obvious to Von Moltke at Luxemburg
that the great envelopment of the French armies, for which a few days before
he had hoped, was out of the question. Prince Rupprecht’s attempt to break
through at Nancy had failed, and he was out of touch with the armies on
his right, which appeared to be in danger. In these circumstances he sent
one of his staff, Lt.-Col. Hentsch, to his right with powers to coordinate the
rrtieat of the German armies, there, if retreat should be necessary. Hentsch
reached Von Billow early on the 9th, at the moment when the news arrived
t^t the British army was crossing the Marne in the gap between the 1st
and 2nd German armies. This news caused Von Billow to decide that he
must retreat to save his flank, and Hentsch went off to direct Von Kluck to
fall back also, the retreat of these two armies carrying back the whole German
line as far as Verdun.
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
235
WHY THE ALLIES WON AT THE MARNE
Thus the long-planned scheme of German conquest in the west collapsed.
It collapsed, partly because the Germans had overrated the extent of theii
early victories and had not realised that the Allied retreat was a manceuvre
deliberately planned and directed by Jofifre, and not a flight from stricken
fields; partly because, under the impression that everything in the west was
going better than had been anticipated, Von Moltke had withdrawn troops
from his vital right wing to stem the Russian advance; partly because the
Germans had not believed that the British army could be so quickly placed
in the field in France (both Von Moltke and Von Kluck were in complete
ignorance of its presence at Mons until battle there was joined, and that
army just turned the balance), but chiefly because Von Moltke was not up
to his task, was badly served with information, and was unable to direct
effectively the movements of his armies. He allowed himself to be tied to
his distant headquarters at Luxemburg, in marked contrast to the activity of
Joffre who was constantly visiting his armies, encouraging the despondent,
dismissing the incompetent, and with rare foresight and courage building up
and forcing through in circumstances of almost imparallelled dfficulty a new
plan when the initial French scheme of operations had broken down.
SEVERE AUSTRIAN DEFEATS
The first weeks of September, 1914, brought new hope to the Allies aftei
the gloom of August. An Austrian army invading Serbia had on August li
been decisively defeated by the Serbians in the battle of the Jadar, and the
Austrians had been driven back out of the country. Austrian arms wen
faring badly, for after an initial success on Au^st 25 at Krasnik in Polanc
the Austrians had, on September 2, been heavily defeated in the battle oi
Lemberg and that important fortress had fallen to the Russians. On Sep-
tember 12 the Austrians were again defeated in the battle of Grodek, anc
on September 15 a second invasion of Serbia was crushed, in the battle oi
the Drina, while the Russians captured Czernovitz in the Bukovina on thi
same day. From the Vistula to the Pruth the Austrian armies were every-
where pressed back. Men began to talk of ‘‘the Russian steam-roller.'
Japan, joining the Alliance, landed troops in Shantung and attacked the Ger-
man fortress of Tsingtau, and optimists were looking to peace at Christmas
These hopes were soon shattered. The German retreat from the Marne wac
not of long duration. On September 13 the Germans were found to be stand-
ing along the Aisne. The British army and the French troops on either sid(
of them managed to establish themselves across the river, but could noi
drive the Germans from the heights beyond, reinforcements arriving for then
in the nick of time from the siege of Maubeuge, which fell on September 7
After bitter fighting along the Aisne the front of battle settled down into the
deadlock of trench warfare, the trench lines rimning just north of Soissons
north of Reims through the Argonne to the heights north of Verdun, whence
the line bent southwards east of Nancy, Epinal and Belfort to the Swisj
frontier, a front not substantially altered during the next four years.
THE RACE TO THE SEA
Then ensued what has been called “ the race to the sea.” As the trend
lines were established, it became possible for both sides to reduce the numbei
236 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
of troops on the entrenched front from the density which had been the result
of open battle, and each side endeavoured to use the troops thus released to
get round the still open flank of the other. These efforts produced a series
of battles, first about Noyon and Peronne which were held by the Germans,
then in front of Albert which was held by the French, while at the end of
^ptember and the beginning of October a fierce struggle took place for the
possession of Arras. Joffre had appointed Foch to direct generally the opera-
tions on his left, and it was largely due to Foch’s energy and courage that
Arras remained in French hands though the trench line reached to the very
outskirts of the town.
The Belgian army had, it will be remembered, retreated into Antwerp,
and had kept a considerable force of German troops in observation of the
fortress. Further, it had by a series of sorties prevented the Germans from
detaching troops against the Channel ports, the occupation of which would
have severed the most direct communication between England and France,
and given Germany convenient bases for raids upon British sea-borne com-
merce. Thus the Belgian army rendered a second invaluable service to the
Allies. The Germans, as a preliminary to another great effort to get round the
Allied left and secure the Channel ports, determined to reduce Antwerp, and
on September 27 began to bombard its forts with heavy howitzers. Simul-
taneously the Allied commanders agreed on another effort to get roimd the
German right and reach out a hand to Antwerp. The British army relieved
by the French on the Aisne moved northwards into Flanders, and was ac-
companied by French troops directed by Foch. After his failure on the
Marne, Von Moltke was removed from his position of Chief of the German
General Staff and his place taken by Von Falkenhayn, who planned and
supervised the new German effort. The siege of Antwerp was vigorously
pressed, the forts being smashed one after the other by the fire of 42
c.m. howitzers, and preparations for a drive towards Calais were pushed for-
ward. The British Government, alarmed at the reports from the Belgian
front, made an effort to aid the defence of Antwerp, which Mr. Winston
Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, endeavoured by his presence
to encourage, while British troops, for the most part newly raised levies but
partially trained, were sent into the place to hearten the Belgians. A more
imjwrtant succour took the form of a regular British division and a cavalry
division, which were landed at Zeebrugge under General Rawlinson on October
6 and 7. But ere these troops could make their pressure felt, Antwerp had, on
October 10, fallen, the Belgian army accompanied by the gallant King of
the Belgians escaping along the coast towards Dunkirk, to meet the British
and French troops moving northwards, the Belgian Government being es-
tablished at Havre.
While these dire events were passing in Belgium the British army had
reached Flanders, and its right extending the French left north of La Bass4e
Canal, advanced towards Lille, where it was just anticipated by the Germans,
who occupied the great industrial centre of north-eastern France on October
13. This was the prelude to a fierce battle which raged from the La Bass4e
Canal through Armentfores, Messines, Ypres and Dixmude to the North Sea
coast near Nieuport. On October 16 the Germans, in the battle of the Yser,
attacked Dixmude, which was heroically defended by French marines, and
did not fall to the Germans till November 10. Aided by their French Allies
the Belgian army established itself north of Dixmude as far as the dunes of the
coast, and, letting in the sea to flood the land, stalled off the German attach.
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
237
THE GERMANS FAIL TO CAFTUBE THE CHANNEL FORTS
Meanwhile the British left, under Sir Douglas Haig, had reached Ypres,
and passing through that town had joined forces beyond it with Rawlinson’s
troops from Zeebrugge. A grim struggle followed, for the Germans were
making strenuous efforts to compensate for the failure on the Marne by
breaking through to the Channel ports. Not only were the besiegers of
Antwerp with their heavy artillery brought up to the attack, but four new
army corps (eight divisions) created since the outbreak of war — a remark-
able feat of organisation — arrived to take part in the battle. On October 31
a supreme German effort nearly succeeded in breaking the British front, but
was just forestalled, and thereafter the arrival of reinforcements for a time
eased the situation of the Allies; but on November 11 a final great effort
to reach Ypres was made by the German Guard, and was repulsed only by
the heroic gallantry of the all but exhausted troops. This attack by the
Mite of the German army closed in a dramatic climax the campaigns of 1914
on the western front, where, when they ended, the trench barrier was estab-
lished from the North Sea to the Swiss frontier. The effort of the German
Guards was the last which the Germans could for the present afford to
make in the west, for events in the east were urgently claiming their attention.
THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT
After Tannenberg, Hindenburg, promoted Field-Marshal by a grateful
Kaiser, had cleared the Russians out of East Prussia, crossed the frontier and
advanced into Poland to the Niemen. Rennenkampf, the Russian commander
in this area, had fallen back to stand behind that river, and Hindenburg,
not yet strong enough to act decisively against the Russian masses, somewhat
rashly attempting to force him out of his position, failed and was obliged to
fall back. The Russians following him gained a success over him in the battle
of Augustovo (October 1-4) . Then leaving his troops in East Prussia in de-
fensive positions in the tangle of the Marsurian lakes, which the Russians
were unable to break, he moved southwards to the help of his hard-pressed
Austrian ally. The Russians were engaged in besieging Przemysl, had reached
the Carpathians, were threatening to force the passes into the plains of
Hungary, and had begun a great movement up the valley of the Vistula
towards Cracow.
Hindenburg proposed to outflank this movement by striking at the middle
Vistula below Warsaw, while Mackensen with his left centre made an attempt
on Warsaw. The battles which resulted are usually called the First Battle
for Warsaw. They lasted from October 16-17. Hindenburg achieved part of
his object in that the Russians were obliged to give up the siege of Przemysl,
but his main effort to cross the Vistula and reach Warsaw was defeated by
the prudent manoeuvres of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke
Nicholas, and the Germans were compelled to retreat. It was this defeat
which convinced Von Falkenhayn that a term must be put to the assaults on
the western front and reinforcements sent from that front to Hindenburg.
So the last effort of Ypres was made on November 11, and thereafter the
Germans adopted a defensive policy in the west; and all troops beyond those
required to hold the western trenches securely were sent eastwards.
238
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
MOBS AtTSTSUN FAILTJBES
Thus early the Germans had discovered that the Austrians could not long
be left to themselves. In December the Austrians had begun a third invasion
of Serbia, and had occupied Belgrade, but m the battle of the ^dges (Decem-
ber 3-6) their army was completely routed by the Serbians under the com-
mand of their Crown Prince, and barely half of it escaped back to Austrian
territory. On November 11 the Russians began a second time to besiege
Przemysl, and their centre advancing up the Vistula reached the forts of Cra-
cow, the most westerly point attained by their armies. But before Cracow
could be seriously besieged, Hindenburg, assured of reinforcements from the
west, where a second time the Russians had relieved the strain, struck his
counter-blow. The second battle of Warsaw began on November 18 and
continued until Christmas; indeed Hindenburg had hoped to give the Polish
capital to the Kaiser as a Christmas present. He defeated the Russians in
the battle of Lodz, November ^December 6, and compelled them to abandon
the advance on Cracow ; but his progress was stopped by the Russian defences
35 miles west of Warsaw, and the siege of Przemysl continued. With the
close of the year winter put a stop to active campai^ing, and the Germans
remained with their lines estahlished well within Polish territory.
THE ALLIES COMMAND THE SEA
Before closing the story of 1914 we must look at what has been happen-
ing in the world outside the main theatre of war. The command of the sea
which the Allies possessed prevented Germany from sending any help to her
colonies, and most of these fell easily. By August 26 small British and French
expeditions had occupied the German colony of Togoland. On September 27
an Anglo-French force under General Dobell captured Duala, 'the chief port
of the Cameroons, and a campaign chiefly conducted by native troops was
begun for the conquest of the interior. On September 19 forces from South
Africa occupied Liideritzbucht in German South-West Africa. In the Pacific
an expedition from New Zealand had seized Samoa on August 29, and by
September 17 German New Guinea and the surrounding German islands had
surrendered to a force dispatched from Australia. By October 7 the Japanese
had occupied Yap and the northern German Pacific islands, and on Novem-
ber 7 Tsingtau capitulated to the Japanese who had been joined by a small
British force from North China. So, before the end of the year, of all Ger-
many’s colonies, only German East Africa remained in her undisputed pos-
session. Against that colony an expedition had been sent from India in
November, and had attacked the port of Tanga, but the expedition was not
well planned and the attempt failed.
TUBKEY JOmS THE CENTBAL FOWEBB
But Germany obtained some compensation for the loss of most of her
colonies, and power to create complications for the Allies, by the accession
of Turkey to her side. A secret agreement between Turkey and Germany
had been concluded in the early days of the war, and two powerful German
cruisers, “ Goeben ” and “ Breslau,” which at the beginning of August were in
the Adriatic, had escaped to Constantinople and passed nominally under the
© Ktyslone View Co.
A lonely British outpost on a canal bank in Flanders. The landscape is typical of this region of
Belgium.
THE WAR IN THE WEST
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
239
Turkish flag, but it was not until November 1 that war with Turkey was
actually begun. This at once greatly mcreased the strain on the Allies. As
has been explained, it cut off all hope of easy communication by sea between
the western Allies and Russia. For Russia it involved an extension of the
war into the Caucasus, while it made it necessary for Great Britain to take
measures to protect Egypt and the Suez Canal, and to forestall enterprises
against India. In order to secure the Persian Gulf and the supplies of oil
from the Persian oil-fields, an expedition was sent from India, which landed
on November 6 at the head of the Gulf and occupied the mouths of the Tigris
and Euphrates.
Thus at the end of 1914 the war was already world-wide, and there were
indefinite possibilities of its extension. Despite the failure of her plan of con-
quest in France, Germany had occupied the whole of Belgium; established
herself in the west within a short distance of the Channel forts, the direct^
doors between England and France; and at Noyon she was within 60 miles
of the French capital. On the eastern front she had driven the Russians
from her territory, and the feebleness which Austria had displayed seemed
to be the one weak spot in her armour. In the first months of the war she
had secured a dominating position, and the task of driving her from it was
indeed formidable.
NEW MILITARY PROBLEMS
The trench barrier in the west presented to the military world an en-
tirely new set of problems. It made free manoeuvre, the chief resource of
generalship in the past, impossible, and it increased enormously the importance
of material, mobility having become a consideration second to power. The
demand for heavy guns, high-explosive shells, machine-guns, and new weapons
suitable for trench warfare, was unending, while the development of fighting
in the air and the dropping of bombs as a means of attack was rapid and
the numbers of aeroplanes employed increased quickly All this meant that
the industries of the combatants were severely taxed to supply the armies in
the field, and the mobilisation of manufacture became as important as the
mobilisation of man-power. In this Germany, who had from the first given
more thought to the development of heavy artillery and to the application of
her industries to the purposes of war, had a considerable start.
But the ultimate resources of the Allies were far greater than those of the
Central Powers, and with them the question was how quickly could those
resources be developed and how should they be employed when ready. Lord
Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, had alone of the states-
men of Europe at once seen that the war would last for years, and made prep-
aration accordingly. He planned an immense expansion of the British army,
and whereas at Mons the British had put four divisions and one cavalry divi-
sion into battle, he provided for 70 divisions and five cavalry divisions, while
each of the British Dominions was preparing large contingents, and every
colony promised its quota of men. It was clear that very large British re-
inforcements would be ready in 1915, while the French army would also be
expanded, though of course that army having been much the larger at the
outbreak of the war could not be increased to the same extent as the British.
THE EASTERN AND WESTERN SCHOOLS
The question arose as to how these reinforcements could best be em-
ployed. There were those who held that attacks upon the western trench
240 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
barrier were a useless waste of life, and certainly the first attempts had
produced little but loss. They argued that the right course was to attack
the Central Powers at their weakest and not at their strongest point. Some
desired to send troops to reinforce the Serbian army, the effect of which it
was hoped would be to bring Greece and Rumania in on the side ol the
Allies, to cut Germany off from Turkey, and enable a deadly blow to be dealt
at Austria, the weak member of the opposing combination. Others advocated
an attack upon Turkey, which would open a road through the Straits to the
Black Sea and Russia. There was much to be said for this last plan. Russia
had masses of men but needed mimitions to arm them, and could not
manufacture them herself. She had, m return, grain and oil to place at the
disposal of the western Allies. Further, an attack upon the Dardanelles
would enable the sea and land power of the Allies to be used in combination.
On the other side it was held that the western front could not be considered
secure as long as the Germans were as near as they were to Paris and the
Channel ports; that the central position of Germany would allow her to
strike while the Allies were preparing distant enterprises; that at any time
she might elect to act defensively on her eastern front and bring back troops
for a great enterprise in the west; and that though reinforcements of men
might be ready, reinforcements of munitions were not, the troops on the
western front being woefully short of shell and all appliances required to
make life in the trenches endurable.
THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN
These briefly were the views of the opposing eastern and western schools
of thought, which remained in conflict throughout the war. The result of
the dispute was a compromise. It was agreed to send the greater part of
the British reinforcements to France, and also to make an attack upon the
Dardanelles, which it was hoped the British navy would be able to force.
The reasons for making this attempt were strengthened by a Turkish attack
begun on February 2, 1915, on the Suez Canal. The attack was beaten
off without much diflSculty, but it was felt that a blow at Constantinople
would be the best defence of Egypt and make it unnecessary to keep a large
number of troops for the defence of that country. The attack on the Darda-
nelles was begun on February 19, by a combined British and French fleet,
and the first forts were destroyed; but it was finally repulsed on March
18, one French and two British battleships being sunk. It was then decided
that it was too late to draw back, and a military attack upon the Gallipoli
Peninsula was ordered. This began on April 25, the British after severe
fighting effecting a landing at Cape Helles, the French landing at first on
the Asiatic side of the Straits and later being transferred to the Peninsula.
The troops for this enterprise were in part sent out from England, in part
drawn from Egypt, whence came the Australian and New Zealand con-
tingents, and were reinforced by two French divisions, the whole being
imder the command of Sir Ian Hamilton.
A series of battles with the Turks for the heights of Krithia followed,
but by the middle of June the Allied forces merely held a fringe of land on
the edge of the Peninsula, and it had become clear that it was not possible
to drive the Turks from it by direct attack. The preliminary naval attack,
which had not produced the results expected of it, had given the Turks
ample warning, and their defence was ably conducted by the German general,
Liman von Sanders. A combined naval and military attack carried through
SIR FREDERIC3K MAURICE
241
by experienced troops would probably have been successful in the first
instance, but Great Britain bad not in February, when the naval attack
was made, suflScient experienced troops available, and her stocks of munitions
were in the making. The result was that owing to initial mistakes Great
Britain was led into undertaking two great campaigns, while she was in
process of raising a national army, and bad not the resources ready for the
proper conduct of one.
THE WESTERN FRONT
On the western front Joffre had planned, for the spring of 1916, a great
attack in Artois, in the neighbourhood of Arras. He held the view, in which
Sir John French concurred, that it was essential to drive the Germans back
at the earliest possible moment from the numerous points vital to the Allies
which their position in the west threatened. Further loyalty to Russia who
had twice helped her friends in the west when they were hard pressed, de-
manded that every effort should be made to force the Germans to send back
troops to France The French operations were to be conducted by General
Foch, and the British army was to cooperate with him on his left. As a pre-
liminary to the greater attack, Sir John French made on March 10 an attack
with his 1st army on the German positions about Neuve Chapelle. The village
was carried; but the attack was soon held up beyond it by the German
machine-gunners. This battle, though small compared with those that fol-
lowed it, had a great influence on the course of war in the west.
The view at that time held by the Allied commanders was that the war
had taken the form of a vast siege of the Central Powers. At Neuve Chapelle
was tried for the first time the experiment of preparing the attack of the
infantry by an intense artillery bombardment by guns of all calibres. The
results though meagre were held to be suflSciently promising to warrant a
development of the method, particularly as the Allied munition factories
were beginning to produce guns and high explosive shell in quantities, which
in the future would be vastly increased. It was held that if a breach suffi-
ciently wide could be blown in the German defences, it would only remain
to pour the infantry through that breach, and the enemy would be forced
out of his trenches into open country. This conception, which as will be
seen was erroneous, dominated for the next two years the plans of battle
on the western front, and the demand was ever for more and more^heavy
guns, more and more shell. Foch’s attack was to begin early in May, but
the Germans were not disposed to watch passively the preparations for
the battle.
USE OF POISON GAS
On April 22 they discharged volumes of poison gas from cylinders against
the Anglo-French positions surrounding Ypres. Foch had withdrawn the best
of his troops from this area in preparation for his battle in Artois, and those
that remained, totally unprepared for this form of attack, at first fled in
panic. On the French right, however, the 1st Canadian division made a
splendid stand, and the Germans, somewhat uncertain of what the effect of
the new weapon would be — a number of their own troops were in fact
poisoned by their gas — were unprepared for the extent of their success.
This allowed the Allies time to send up reinforcements, and a new front
was patched up around- Ypres; but the German attacks in this second battle
of Ypres continued until May 24 and bad the effect of reducing very materi-
T. B. Y — VOL. I — 16
242
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
ally the help the British were able to give Poch, whose attack opened up on
May 9 in the battle of Souchet. This battle, which lasted until July 13,
began with a feature common to such battles in the west, initial gains by
the infantry as the result of the artillery bombardment. These gains were
followed by fierce fighting in the tangle of German trenches, in which every
point of vantage had to be won against the stubborn resistance of the Ger-
man machine-gunners, and in the end the gains which brought the French
up to the slopes of the Vimy Ridge, the crest of which remained in German
hands, were, compared with the whole extent of front, insignificant, and had
been won only at enormous cost. The British attacks on Foch’s left at
Fromelles and Festubert met with still less success, for the British army had
uot yet suflScient heavy artillery and high-explosive shell to cut the German
barbed wire and overcome the German machine-guns. Still, the idea that
the right form of attack was an immense bombardment followed by an assault
persisted, and when Foch’s attacks came to an end Joffre set himself to
accumulate munitions for a still greater attack by this method in the autumn.
GERMAN SUCCESSES IN THE EAST
The Germans had been devoting the winter and spring to preparing a
supreme effort against Russia. During the early part of the year there had
been some desultory fighting on the eastern front In Poland Prasnysz had
in February been captured by the Germans, and retaken by the Russians,
and on March 22 Przemysl after a gallant defence had capitulated to the
Russians. But this was to be the last Russian success for many a day. At
the end of April an Austro-German army under the command of Von Mack-
ensen, supplied with an immense stock of heavy artillery and a vast accumu-
lation of shell, in the preparation of which the munition factories of Austria
and Germany had been toiling throughout the winter, began a great attack
through the northern hills of the Carpathians directed on Przemysl and
Lemberg. On May 2 Mackensen broke through the Russian front at Gorlice,
and the Russians, woefully short of artillery and shell, and lacking even
rifles and rifle ammunition, fought gallantly but vainly, suffering colossal
losses, to stem the tide. Przemysl was retaken on June 2, Lemterg three
weeks later, and by the middle of July the Russians had been driven out of
Galicia and back to their frontier. The last hopes formed of the “ steam-
roller ” had vanished. But worse was to follow.
Mackensen’s advance through Galicia had left the Russians round War-
saw in a pronounced salient, and this salient Hindenburg proceeded to crush
in by a general offensive along the whole eastern front from the Baltic to
the Carpathians. On August 6 the Germans entered the Polish capital, and
the Russians were involved in an immense retreat on a front of 500 miles.
By the end of September Courland and the greater part of Poland was in
the hands of the Germans, and the Russian front ran in a general north
and south line from Riga on the Baltic through the Prinsk marshes to the
northern slopes of the Carpathians. But the Russians, though they had
suffered dire defeats, were not done with. Throughout their great retreat
they had kept their line intact, and now that it had been straightened out
they turned to counter-attack as opportunity offered. Notably at the end
of September, Brussilov on the Carpathian front defeated the Austrians, left
for a time to themselves by their German allies, and recaptured Tarnapol.
The Austro-German offensive petered out from exhaustion, and the eastern
front settled down to face the Russian winter.
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
243
ITALY ENTERS THE WAR
To turn again to the west. In May, high hopes had been aroused amonpt
the Allies by the entry of Italy into the war on their side. It was generally
felt that Austria, whose weakness was clear, would be unable to stand long
against the new foe. But these hopes did not long endure. The conforma-
tion of the Italian frontier made an attack on Austria peculiarly diflScult.
The frontier being mountainous in character was highly defensible, and the
one opportunity of striking an effective blow was across the extreme north-
eastern end of the frontier, where the mountains dwindled into hills in the
direction of Laibach or of Trieste. But the communications of an Italian
army moving in this direction ran through the plains of Venetia at the foot
of the Austrian Alps. This meant that General Cadoma, the Italian Com-
mander-in-Chicf, had to guard the exits from those Alps zealously, and while
fighting eastwards had to keep one eye on his northern flank.
Italy declared war on Austria on May 23, and after some initial successes
on the frontier began on July 2 the First battle of the Isonzo, a river which
runs just east of the old Italian frontier from the Julian Alps to the Gulf
of Trieste. In the difficult country the Italian attacks could make little
progress through the Austrian trenches, and a deadlock of trench warfare
similar to that in France supervened.
Meanwhile the British had decided to make a last effort to open the
road to Constantinople, and large reinforcements were sent to the Gallipoli
Peninsula. The Russians were pressing the Turks hard in the Caucasus,
and had occupied Van in Armenia, arriving too late however to forestall a
wholesale massacre and deportation of the Armenians by the Turks. The
British expedition to Mesopotamia was winning success, and it was believed
that Turkey was nearly exhausted. On August 6 a fresh landing was made
on the Gallipoli Peninsula, at Suvla Bay, but the troops, new levies without
experience of war, were asked to undertake the most difficult of military
operations, namely a landing in presence of an enemy. They failed in the
enterprise, and were stopped by the Turks on the hills beyond the shore.
Hardly had the battle of Suvla Bay ended when a new development in the
Near East condemned the ill-starred Gallipoli campaign to complete failure.
BULGARIA TOO JOINS THE CENTRAL POWERS
Bulgaria had long been flirting with the Central Powers, and in September,
impressed by the result of Hindenburg’s campaign against Russia, she ordered
mobilisation and prepared to invade Serbia on the understanding that a
large Austro-German army would also enter that country. Attacked from
across the Save and the Danube by the Austro-German forces, and taken
in flank by the Bulgars, the Serbians had no chance of holding their own.
In less than two months their army was swept out of their country, and
retreating through Albania found refuge in Corfu, when^je it was eventually
landed in Salonika, which had been in the interval occupied by an Anglo-
French force. On hearing of the impending attack on Serbia the French
and British Governments had decided to send troops from France to Salo-
nika to her aid, and a British division was moved there from the Dardanelles.
But these troops only arrived in time to entrench positions around the har-
bour of Salonika, where they were watched but not attacked by the forces of
the Central Powers, which had secured possession of the whole of Serbia.
344 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
The immediate result of this campaign was to open up direct rail com-
mtmication between Germany and Constantinople, and amid great rejoicinj^
the first through Eastern express left the Friedrichstrasse station of Berlin.
It was clear that it would not be long before heavy German artillery could
be in action on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and there was pave danger that
the Allied troops there would be blown from their precarious positions into
the sea. So after much debate it was mournfully decided that the Peninsula
must be evacuated, and on December 20 the troops were reembarked from
the Suvla and Anzac positions, the latter being the name given to the lin^
held by the Australian and New Zealand Corps. To the general amazement
the withdrawal, which had appeared to be a desperate undertaking, was
carried through without loss, and the amazement was still greater when the
Turks, despite the warning of the earlier withdrawal, allowed the troops at
Helles to escape also without loss. The greater part of the expedition was
sent to Egypt to recuperate, and so ended an undertaking which cost Great
Britain 117,000 battle casualties, while tlic sick numbered close on 100,000.
THE ALLIED CAUSE AT LOW EBB
About the time when the situation in Gallipoli was seen to be hopeless,
the British expedition in Mesopotamia had established itself far up the
Euphrates and the Tigris. A British force under General Townshend had
reached Kut el Amara on the latter river, and overcome the Turks there
without much difficulty. It appeared that the occupation of Bagdad would
go far to neutralise in the East the effect of the failure at the Dardanelles, so
Townshend was authorised to advance to Bagdad. At Ctesiphon, not far from
the city of the Caliphs, he met and again defeated the Turks on November 22 ;
but the arrival on the field of Turkish reinforcements sent from Europe com-
pelled him to retreat, and his force was caught up and besieged in Kut el
Amara. Reinforcements were hurried to Mesopotamia, but the long and
difficult line of river communications had not been sufficiently prepared to
enable large forces to be maintained on the front, and the Turks were able to
hold off the relieving force until Townshend was, on April 29, 1916, forced
by starvation to surrender. Thus in the Near and Far East the fortunes of
the Allies were at a low ebb.
THE ALLIES FAIL TO BREAK THROUGH
Nor did any relief come from the West. Joffre’s great offensive, of which
the highest hopes had been formed, and for which vast preparations were
made, began on September 25. It took the form of a double battle, of which
the main effort by the French armies was made in Champagne, while a second
attack was made on the German lines on either side of Lens. Here the French
under Foch were to storm the Vimy Ridge and advance south of Lens, while
a British army under Sir Douglas Haig took Loos, and advanced north of
the mining town. The general scheme of attack in both battles was the
same, namely the crushing of the German trenches by an immense bombard-
ment, to be followed by a great infantry assault. The French army had
grown both in power and in numbers, and the British army, though still far
from its full development, had been greatly increased by the arrival of
ffitchener’s levies.
In September, 1915, the fighting strength of the British and French armies
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
24 {
on the western front reached 3,250,000 men, while that of the Germans ot
the same front was imder 2,000,000. It was believed that this superiority?
would prove crushing, and Mackensen’s achievement at Gorlice, in breakin|
the Russian front, was held to confirm the correctness of the method oi
bombardment and assault. The result was a grave disillusionment. In Cham-
pagne the first and second lines of the German trenches were carried, and
a large number of prisoners were taken, but the German reserves arrived in
time to prevent a breach being made, while in the northern battle the results
were even less satisfactory. Foch’s attack on the Vimy Ridge failed com-
pletely, and though the British, using gas for the first time, stormed Loos,
they were stopped a short distance beyond that town. The Allies had not
discovered how to break the barrier in the west.
Tbe analogy of the siege was, in fact, misleading. In a siege, when the
defences are breached and the place entered successfully, victory is won.
But on the western front tilie creation of a breach and the passage of the
infantry through it were only the preliminary steps It was then necessary
to meet and overcome the opposing reserves. The huge bombardments of
the west certainly flattened out the trenches, but they also destroyed the
surface of the ground, making rapid movement forward difficult, and this,
added to the confusion inevitable in battle, prevented an orderly and co-
ordinated advance of the attacking infantry. Further, the lengthy process
of assembling a mass of heavy artillery and bringing up mountains of shell
could not be easily concealed from an enemy well provided with aeroplanes.
Thus the defender had usually some warning and time to bring his reserves
to the point of attack. These reserves arrived fresh and in good order in
areas not destroyed by shell-fire and were able sooner or later to hold up
the attack.
The conditions on the western front were essentially different from those
on the eastern front. There the Russians deficient in guns, shells and
machine-guns, had not the means of replying to attack which the opponents
in the west possessed, and their lack of aeroplanes prevented them from dis-
covering what was afoot. But the essential difference between the two fronts
was that the distances were far greater, and the railway communications,
particularly on the Russian side, far less developed. So the rapid move-
ment of reserves, the essential feature of defence in the west, was not pos-
sible in the east, and Mackensen’s methods, successful on the one front were
not applicable to the other.
The winter of 1915 saw a reorganisation of the Allied command in the
east. Joffre, till then nominally Chief of the French General Staff, became
Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, with de Castelnau as his Chief
of Staff, while Sir John French was succeeded in the command of the British
army in France by Sir Douglas B[aig, Sir William Robertson becoming Chief
of the British General Staff.
VERDUN: “ THEY SHALL NOT PASS ”
The Germans, though their tactical methods were at this time, particularly
as regards the use of heavy artillery and machine-guns, ahead of those of
the Allies, and the results which they obtained were, therefore, greater, were
still far from having solved the problem of the barrier in the west. Von
Falkenhayn, anxious to anticipate an Allied offensive in France, planned, for
the beginning of 1916, a great attack upon Verdun, one of the pivots of
|he Allied defensive system, by the army of the Crown Prince. His avowed
intention was less to break through the French defences than to bleed white
246 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
tile French army, which had home till then the brunt of the war in the west.
During December and January the Germans made a number of local
attacks designed partly to distract attention and partly to test various
methods of bombardment in view of the greater effort which they were
p lanning . There had been indications that this effort would be made in the
Verdim sector, and General de Castelnau was sent thither by Joffre to exam*
ine the defences. He ordered certain improvements, but time was lacking
to carry these out.
The Allied defences at this period of the war were very inferior to those
of the Germans, for the British and the French had spent the greater part
of 1915 either in carrying out the vast preparations necessary for an attack
in trench warfare or in attacking, and had little energy or labour left for
more digging . The Germans who had been on the defensive throughout the
year were able to use forced labour from Belgium and the occupied provinces
of France, besides the large number of prisoners they had captured on the
Russian front, while the Allies could only find labour at the expense of their
armies or of their munition factories. It was the superior strength of their
defences which allowed the Germans, while in inferior numbers on the whole
front, to run the risk of withdrawing troops from parts of that front in
order to obtain sufficient force for the attack on Verdun That attack opened
on the banks of the Meuse opposite Verdun on February 21. The Germans
at once gained a startling success, penetrating the French lines, and on the
fourth day of the battle capturing Fort Douaumont, one of the chief of the
outlying works of the fortress of Verdun. This success was greater than any
yet gained by the Allies in attack, though their relative superiority in men
on the battle fronts had been far greater than that of the Germans at the
bejpnning of the battle of Verdun.
The British and French Commanders-in-Chief were agreed that the
principles on which the plans of battle in 1915 had been drawn up required
modification. It was seen that the analogy of the siege did not hold, and
tiiat until the German reserves were exhausted no decisive success could be
expected. So long as the Germans attacked at Verdun they would have to
^aw upon their reserves, and it would therefore be to the advantage of the
French to endure these attacks provided always that the enemy gained no
advantage which he could exploit to the detriment of the strategical position
of the Allies on the whole front, and provided that the exhaustion of the French
reserves was not excessive. Joffre therefore decided to fight defensively at
Verdun as long as possible, but to be ready to strike back as soon as the
situation appeared to him too dangerous, or as soon as the French army was
reaching the limits of endurance. He therefore asked Haig to extend his
front and release French troops for the Verdun battle and also to prepare to
attack north of the Somme. These tasks the steady increase of the British
army enabled Haig to undertake.
Tlie battle of Verdun continued throughout March and April, the Ger-
mans in their attacks gaining ground slowly at great cost. In May General
P6tain who had made a great reputation by his defence of the fortress was
appointed to command the group of French armies of which the Verdun
troops formed a part. General Nivelle taking his place in command of the
army on the battle front. Towards the end of May P4tain became alarmed
at we progress of the Germans and pressed for an early bepnning of the
counter-offensive on the Somme, but Joffre was anxious to give Haig as much
time as possible for his preparation and bade P5tain endure yet longer.
In tile first days of June occurred two events which were turning-points
in Great Britain’s administration of the war. On the 5th H. M. S. “ Hamp-
shire ” struck a mine off the coast of Scotland and sank with Lord Kitc h ene r,
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
247
who was on his way to Russia to concert plans with the Russian Government,
on board. A few days before he sailed Kitchener had reviewed the last of
his new divisions before it left for France. His work was in great measure
accomplished, and three days after his death compulsory service became
British law.
On June 7 the Germans captured Fort Vaux, and on June 24 stormed the
village of Fleury. This was the furthest point reached by them in their ad-
vance on Verdun, and it was also the culminating point of the military
achievement of the Central Powers. Except for a mile along tJie Austrian
frontier where it marched with those of Hungary and Italy, they had driven
the enemy everywhere from their territory, and on both western and eastern
fronts they had established themselves deep in the country of their enemies.
Belgium and Serbia were wholly in their hands. Their Turkish ally had
gained remarkable success both at the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia.
Only at sea did the Allies remain supreme, and on the oceans the German
submarines were taking a heavy toll. There was to be many a crisis before
the war ended, and the tide of success was to ebb and flow, but with the last
assault upon Verdun there began an appreciable decline of the military
strength of the Central Powers. The story of that decline may be left to
the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
HOW THE WAE WAS FOUGHT AND WON
Continued
From the Battle op Verdun to the Armistice
By Major-Gbnebal Sir Frederick Mattricb, K.C.M.G., C3.
Commander of the Legion of Honour. Croix de Guerre. First-
class Order of St. Stanislas of Russia Director of Military
Operations, Imperial General Staff, 1915-1918 Author of Forty
Days in 1914; The Last Four Months.
The bombardment which began the battle of the Somme was opened by
the British artillery on June 24, 1916, the very day on which the Germans
captured Fleury. Petain’s resources were nearly exhausted, and it was time
for the British army to come more definitely to his help than it could do
by extending its front and setting free French troops. That army had grown
under Kitchener’s direction from a small body of regular troops into a great
national force. At the end of June the four divisions and one cavalry divi-
sion which had appeared at Mons had become 56 divisions and five cavalry
divisions, which represented the flower of the manhood of the British Empire.
The Canadians had long been on the western front and they were now joined
by Australians and New Zealanders rested and reequipped in Egypt from the
exhaustion of the Dardanelles enterprise. The British army was ready to
relieve the French of the brunt of the land war which they had so long borne.
The battle of the Somme was fought out in three stages, the first being the
struggle up the western slopes of the Somme plateau, the second the fight for
the possession of the plateau, and the third the advance down the northern
and eastern slopes towards the valleys of the Upper Ancre and the Canal du
Nord. The first phase was completed by July 17 when the British who had
won their way through the second German defensive system, had established
themselves on the western edge of the plateau. This second stage began on
July 23 with a series of fierce counter-attacks by the Germans designed to
drive the Allies off the plateau. These being repulsed, the line fought its
way forward yard by yard, wresting trench after trench from the enemy,
who continually brought up reinforcements. Throughout August the grim
struggle continued, and it was not until September 9 that the British were
in possession of Ginchy and were able to look down the slopes towards the
Canal du Nord with the greater part of the plateau in their hands.
HINDENBURG AND LUDENDORPP TAKE COMMAND
The battle was fought, it will be remembered, for two objects — the
relief of Verdun and the exhaustion of the German reserves. The Germans,
forced to transfer troops to the Somme, had to relax their pressure on Verdun.
The French through July slowly regained part of the ground which had been
won from them, and on August 17 drove the enemy out of Fleury. Verdun
248
Marshal Petain, who fought the Germans General Nivelle, who was relieved of com-
to a standstill at Verdun; Commander-m- mand of the French Armies after the com-
Chief of the French Aimies from May, parative failure of the ambitious attack
1917. launched April 16, 1917.
® Keystone View Co.
Marshal Joffre, who threw back the Germans at the Marne
in September, 1914.
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
240
was no longer in danger. The second object of the battle of tbe Somme was
being obtained slowly but surely. In the two months since July 1, 64 divi-
sions had been engaged by the Germans. In the six months of Verdun th^
bad employed 43 divisions m battle, so that their defence on the Somme
was exhausting their troops far more than their attacks on Verdun. At the
end of August the failure of Falkenhayn’s plans was publicly admitted ^
bis supersession by Hindenburg, with Ludendorff as Chief of the Staff. The
situation of the Allies was very different from that of Jime, when men were
wondermg how long it would be before the Germans entered Verdun. Not
only had Verdun been saved and the Germans forced to fight desperately on
the defensive, but the Italians had driven back the attacking Austrians in
the Alps, had then passed themselves to attack on the Isonzo, and on August
9 had captured Gorizia. On the Russian front Brussilov had won great
victories in the Bukovina, and on August 27 Rumania had entered the war,
and yet another enemy confronted the Central Powers. The Serbian army
had been reconstituted and moved from Corfu to Salonika, where it had
taken its place in the Allied line Sarrail, now in command of all the Allied
forces in Macedonia, had been able to swing his left forward from the cramp-
ing lines covering the harbour of Salonika, and the Entente Powers were at
last in a position to speak plainlv to Greece. In the Near and Far East and
in Africa the situation of the Allies had improved remarkably. Egypt was
not only in no danger but was able to spare many divisions refitted after
the Dardanelles campaign for employment in France.
In Mesopotamia the British force had been reorganised and strengthened
and was preparing to attack the Turks. In West Africa the conquest of
the Cameroons had been completed. In German East Africa local levies
under the leadership of an able German general. Von Lettow, had long been
giving trouble and had been making raids into the British territory of Uganda.
In order to meet this danger, it had been decided to organise an expedition
into German East Africa, largely made up from troops drawn from the
Union of South Africa, and the command was given to General Smuts.
Smuts began his campaign in May, 1916, and by manoeuvring round the
fianks of Von Lettow’s forces drove them back, first from the frontiers of
Uganda and then into the interior of the German colony. On July 7, Smuts
occupied Tanga, where the first British enterprise in that part of Africa had
failed, and on September 4 the capital of the German colony, Dar-es-Salaam,
fell to him; so though it was evident that the complete conquest of German
East Africa would be a long business, owing to the nature of the country
and its vast extent, all anxiety as to the outcome was by then at an end.
The whole machinery of the Alliance was for the first time simultaneously
at work, and Joffre's strategy appeared to be triumphant.
FIBST APPEABANCE OF TANKS
It was in these encoura^ng circumstances that the third phase of the
battle of the Somme began on September 15. The attack of that day was
made famous by the appearance in battle for the fir^ time of tanks, as yet
few in number, imperfect in construction, but a British invention destined
later to have decisive influence on the problem of breaking through the trench
barrier. By ^ptember 26 the third German system of defence was pene-
trated, and it seemed as if the fruits of victory were to be gained, when the
weather broke and mud and wet proved to be potent auxiliaries of the enemy's
defence. The days were growing shorter and the weather became worse,
while tihe Germans, drawing troops from all parts of the front to prevent
260 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
tiieir line breaking, fought with fine courage. By November 17, when the
battle ended, they had engaged no less than 127 divisions. Their reserves
had indeed been worn down; in the valley of the Andre they had been
pressed into an awkward salient, but it was too late to reap the harvest on
the battle front. The first fruits of the Somme were gathered elsewhere.
On October 24 Nivelle began an attack on the right bank of the Meuse
and on the following day recaptured Fort Douaumont. This conspicuous
success was followed by the recapture of Fort Vaux on November 2. The
battle ended in complete victory for the French, six French divisions over-
coming seven German divisions at surprisingly little cost. Nivelle and Man-
gin, who commanded fhe Army Corps engaged, became the heroes of France.
The victory was largely due to the skilful handling of massed artillery, and
the Nivelle method became famous. Its fame was increased when, on Decem-
ber 14, a second attack won an even more brilliant success, which neutralised
all, or nearly all, the advantage won by the Germans in four montiis of
tremendous battle.
When the statesmen of Paris and London compared the results of these
two battles at Verdim, which resulted not only in important gains of groimd
but in the capture in a few days fighting of more than 17,000 prisoners, with
the slow bludgeon work of the Somme in which the British army in four and
a half months had captured 38,000 Germans at a tremendous price, they
began to think that they had at last discovered the man for whom they were
looking so anxiously, the man who would give them victory without the
appalling sacrifices which the Somme had cost.
THE BUMANIAN COLLAPSE
On the eastern front, where General Allenby had taken the place of the
Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russians began a great attack under the leader-
ship of Brussilov in July, in Galicia and the Bukovina. The Austrian
armies in those parts suffered severe reverses, and the Russians on July 28
a second time captured Brody. Rumania had for a long time been hesitating
as to whether she should take the plunge of joining the Allies, and these
successes of the Russians on her northern borders were used to induce her
to throw off that hesitation. This she finally did on August 27. The Ger-
mans by great efforts had by then succeeded in rallying the Austnans and
in checking the progress of the Russians, but even so there is little doubt but
that a prompt advance by the Rumanians into Transylvania would have
placed the Austro-German forces in a grave position. Instead however of
advancing promptly they moved slowly, waiting for the Russians to come
through the Carpathians, a slowness which was increased when Mackensen,
whose name as the result of his achievement at Gorlitz and in Serbia struck
terror, collecting a body of Bul^rian militia, te which he added a small
force of Germans and some Turkish troops, invaded the Rumanian Dobrudja
and advanced down the right bank of the Danube. The slowness of the
Rumanians gave the Germans just the breathing-space they needed for their
preparations against the new enemy. A small German army under tJie com-
mand of Yon Falkenhajm, acting with great energy, attacked and defeated
the Riunanian left wing in the Carpathians, while their centre and right were
creeping forward into Transylvania. On September 20 Von Falkenhayn
captured the Vulcan pass and opened the road to Bucharest, thus menacing
the communications of the northern Romanian armies, wnich were com-
pelled to retreat to cover their capital. Their new front of battle was formed
by the end of October, by which time Mackensen had occupied Constanza in
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE 251
tile Dobmdja. Then crossing the Danube near Sistova, Mackensen again
turned the Rumanian left and occupied Bucharest on December 6.
The overrunning of another small Ally had a most depressing effect on
the peoples of the Allied countries. The number of German troops employed
against Rumania was not unnaturally exaggerated, and it was believed that
despite the bitter fighting of Verdun and the Somme the Germans had been
able to send many divisions to the eastern front. The Somme was held to
have been a costly failure, and the view prevailed that it was time to make
drastic changes in the arrangements for the conduct of the war. So on
December 7 Mr. Asquith’s Government fell, and he was succeeded as British
Prime Minister by Mr. Lloyd George, while in France a complete reorganisa-
tion of the higher command took place.
ALLIED PLANS FOB 1917
Early in December, 1916, Joffre had held at his headquarters a second
conference of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and Chiefs of the Staff, to
review the military situation and to decide on the plans of campaign for the
coming year.
Great Britain had still a number of divisions to send to France, where
the fighting strength of the army had grown to about 1,200,000 men, but
it would not be possible for her to create any more divisions and her
strength would reach its maximum in the middle of 1917.
The strength of the French army had, at the beginning of 1917, been
increased to about 2,600,000 combatants, and the fitting strength of the
Allies on the western front was then about 3,820,000 men against 2,200,000
Germans. Joffre declared that the French army would maintain its strength
for one more great battle, but that thereafter that strength would diminish
steadily as France would not have the men to replace losses. He therefore
warned Sir Douglas Haig that during the coming year the burden must fall
more and more upon the British army. As to Germany the Allied Com-
manders believed that the battles of Verdun and the Somme had materially
exhausted her military resources, a view the correctness of which has since
been amply confirmed by Ludendorff, who speaks of the progressive falling
off of the German power at this time. The occupation of Riunania had put
a fresh strain on Germany, and the Russian armies were at last well supplied
with munitions and had been very successful in the autiunn campaign of
1916 in the Bukovina and Galicia, so that it did not appear probable that
Germany would be able to transfer many troops from Russia to France.
This made it appear that the relative superiority of the Allies on the western
front would be greater in the spring of 1917 than at any time that could be
foreseen with certainty. For all these reasons it was decided to follow up as
quickly as possible the advantage won in the battle of the Somme and to
continue to exhaust the enemy’s reserves as preparation for a decisive effort.
All the armies were to be ready to attack in the first fortnight of February,
and the British in the meantime were to continue to press the Germans on
the Somme battlefield.
NIVELLE COMMANDEH-m-CHlEF — NEW PLANS
Joffre’s plans did not however meet with favour in Prance. A number of
oflBcers of the General Staff regarded the proposal to give more and more of
the task of consummating victory to the British army as a slur upon tiieir
2S2 how the WA« was FOUGHT AND WON
country and their army. They found support in Paris, where there were
many politicians who had lost confidence in Joffre. The result was the
Bi irifjBti change in the French higher command, which has been mentioned.
Foch, whose costly attacks upon the Vimy Ridge had not been forgotten,
was placed on half-pay, while Joffre was made a Marshal of France and
given an honorific position in Pans, Nivelle, one of the heroes of Verdim,
becoming Commander-in-Chief.
The new Commander-in-Chief at once made a drastic change in Joffre's
policy and plans. He wished to increase the size and power of the French
attack arranged by his predecessor, and in order that he might obtain the
French troops necessary he proposed that the British should relieve the troops
of two French armies and extend their front southwards across the Somme.
As this would take time and make a heavy call upon the British army he
proposed that Haig should limit the pressure to be maintained on the Ger-
mans on the Somme battlefield during the winter to a corresponding extent,
and that the date of the opening of the combined campaign should be post-
poned until March 15. This meant not only a delay of six weeks in launch-
ing the attacks planned by Joffre, but that the enemy would have leisure to
recover from the effects of the Somme. It soon became clear, as Nivelle’s
plans developed, that there was to be an even more complete change of plan
than this. He proposed to apply on a great scale the methods he had em-
ployed with such success at Verdun and to return to the policy which had
been discarded after the failure in Champagne in 1915. He intended bv
skilful employment of a great mass of artillery to overcome the enemy^s
resistance in his front lines, and then to attack with a great reserve which
should burst completely through the trench barrier and restore by one swift
blow a war of movement on the western front.
On the British side Mr. Lloyd George had never looked with much favour
upon the policy of attacking the trench barrier in the west. He had been
horrified by the slaughter of the battle of the Somme, but he was quite
ready to welcome a Commander-in-Chief who offered so attractive an alterna-
tive to the slow bludgeon work of the Somme, as a short and decisive battle.
So it was agreed by the French and British Governments at a conference
held at Calais at the end of February that the British army should be
placed under the orders of Nivelle, a first and imperfect attempt to achieve
unity of command; imperfect because it is not possible for a commander
occupied with the affairs of his own front to direct those of another.
THB GERMANS RETIRE TO THE NEW HINDENBXTRO LINE
The results of this mistake were soon evident. Before the Calais con-
ference ended news arrived that the Germans were withdrawing on the British
front in the valley of the Ancre, and early in March there were indications
that the Germans were preparing to retire from the whole of the Somme
battlefield into a great new system of defensive works covering Douai, Cam-
Wi and St. Quentin, the system which became known to the Allies as the
Hindenburg line. But Nivelle did not believe in a German retreat, and issued
to Haig orders which were not compatible with the changed situation. He
was soon undeceived, for before the end of the month it had become apparent
that the Germans were in retreat from Arras to the Aisne. Relieved from
pressure on their front during the winter, they had prepared for their retreat
systematically. The whole coimtry which had been in their occupation west
of the Hindenburg line was devastated, villages were burnt, roads and rail-
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE 253
ways desixoyed, fruit trees cut down, and mines which exploded at a touch
were prepared with devilish ingenuity.
In these circumstances a rapid pursuit became impossible, and the Allied
troops were not m touch with the Hindenburg system till the first week in
April, the German withdrawal extending at its greatest depth to about 30
miles. This retreat, planned and successfully carried through by Ludendorff,
effected a great change in the situation, to the benefit of the Germans. Not
only did it materially shorten their front and thereby enable them to increase
their reserves, but their troops exchanged the battered defences of the Somme
battlefield for the strongest lines that had yet been built on the western
front. The Germans had withdrawn from a considerable part of the front
which Nivelle had intended to attack, and as he still adhered to the main
features of his plan, this made a further postponement necessary while troops,
guns, and munitions were brought forward. In the altered circumstances
grave doubts arose in the minds of some of the senior French generals, and
these coming to the ears of the French War Minister, M. Painlev6, he
assembled a council of war on April 6, the very eve of the offensive, at
which criticisms of the plan were presented by certain of the commanders
who were to take a leading part in its execution.
•Despite this unfortunate prelude the campaign began auspiciously. The
British opened it on April 9, with an attack by Allenby’s 3rd army on the
German front east of Arras, combined with an attack by the Canadian
Corps and British troops under General Byng on the Vimy Ridge. Allenby’s
men, advancing on either side of the Arras-Cambrai road, won their way
through the strongest and most intricate defences yet attacked by British
troops, while Byng’s captured the Vimy Ridge, which had for so long resisted
Foch’s assaults, and pressed down its northern slopes into the plain beyond.
At the end of the first stage of the battle on April 15 more than 13,000
prisoners and 200 guns had been captured.
FAILURE OP NIVELLE — P^TAIN IN COMMAND
What was to have been the second battle of Nivelle’s campaign was
fought by the group of armies of the French Centre under Franchet d’Esperey
aerainst the German front in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin, but Franchet
d’Esperev was there in contact with a part of the main Hindenburg line and
had not had the time to prepare for an attack on these formidable defences.
This attack of April 14 was consequently little more than a demonstration,
and had none of the results which Nivelle had hoped to obtain from it. The
main French effort, which took place on the front between Reims and
Anizy, began on April 16. Nivelle’s scheme was based on the supposition
that the French infantry would on the first day of battle break through the
first three German lines; but the Left attack failed almost completely, and
though the others broke through the first German line, little progress was
made beyond it. The dream of a rapid rupture of the enemy’s front had
to be abandoned, and a fresh plan of battle had to be formed. Nivelle re-
quested Haig to press his attacks beyond the Vimy Ridge so as to keep the
largest possible number of Germans occupied in that quarter, and he altered
his plan of a rapid assault into one of slow progress up the Chemin des
Dames Ridge, of which he captured the eastern portion. But early in May
it was quite evident that Nivelle’s campaign had failed, and on the 15^
the French replaced him by General P#tain, while General Foch became Chief
of the Staff in Paris. P4tain’s first task was to wind up the operations (m
the Aisne front, and the battle ended definitely on May 20.
264 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
The events of the spring had proved woefully disappointing to the Allies
because of the high hopes which Nivelle had injudiciously aroused, but they
were far from unimportant. The German retreat in March, which was a
direct consequence of the battle of the Somme, had at last removed a stand-
ing menace to one of the most vital parts of the Allied front, that which
covered directly the roads to Amiens and Paris. Had the Germans in March,
1918, started from the positions which they held in February, 1917, and had
their attacks progressed at the same rate, they would have entered Amiens
on the second day of the battle, which would have ended with the German
gims bombarding Abbeville and communications between the French and
British armies severed. The retreat which was forced upon the Ger-
mans by the battle of the Somme saved the Allies in the following year^
but the whole course of the war in the west miglit have been changed if
the Germans had been pressed on the Somme battlefield during the winter,
and if they had been attacked early in February before their plans for retreat
had been completed, as Joffre and Haig had desired instead of being allowed
to fall back at their leisure. As it was, the failure of Nivelle to realise the
anticipations which he had encouraged caused profound dejection in the
French army and nation. A series of mutinies occurred in the French armies
which so affected the morale of the French troops that Petain found it
necessary to appeal to Haig to keep the enemy engaged while he restored
the confidence of his men.
RUSSIA DROPS OUT. AMERICA COMES IN
In the meantime two events which profoundly affected the conduct of the
war had occurred. In March a revolution had broken out in Russia, and
on March 15 the Tsar had abdicated. On April 6 the United States of
America declared war on Germany. It was obvious that the Russian Revo-
lution would have its repercussion in the ranks for the Russian army, but
the condition of that army was not hopeless yet. On May 19 the new
Government of Russia had issued a declaration repudiating a separate peace,
while in June Brussilov had succeeded Alexeyev as Commander-in-Chief, and
was preparing an offensive in Galicia, an offensive which began on July 1
and at first had some success. It therefore seemed possible that if the
German army in the west was kept fully occupied the Russian army might
yet recover, and it was certain that inactivity of the Allies in the west would
precipitate the threatened collapse.
The entry of the United States of America into the war on April 6 had
brought the Allies immediate and valuable aid in shipping and finance, but
the first contingent of American troops did not reach France until June
26, and it was calculated that it would be a year at least before any large
American force could be ready to take part in battle on the western front.
In the meantime it was urgent that the Germans should make no great attack
upon the French army until Petain had had time to restore its morale.
BRITISH ATTACKS IN THE SUMMER OP 1917
It was in these circumstances that Haig began his campaign in Flanders.
Its object was to gain possession of the Passchendaele Ridge so as to be
able to sweep with gun-fire the plains beyond it towards Zeebrugge and
Ostepd. This achieved, a combined naval and military attack, secretly
^LACK SEA
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
255
prepared in England, was to be made on the Belgian coast, which it was
hoped would lead to the capture of the ports which served as bases for the
German submarines. The campaign opened with a brilliantly successful
attack made on Jime 7 by the ^d British army xmder General Plumer on
tbe Messines Ridge, the whole of which was captured together with 7,200
prisoners and 67 guns at comparatively small cost. Thus the Ypres salient
which had been a name of dread to the British army since the winter of
1914, was obliterated, and the way prepared for the main advance to Pass-
chendaele, which began on July 31.
The plan of battle was to deliver a series of blows, each with an objective
limited by the support which the artillery could give without changing
position. It was believed that the experience of Messines and of the French
at Verdun had shown that this would allow the infantry to reach their
objective without heavy loss. But the rain of an abnormally wet August
upset all calculations. The difficulty of getting ^ns and ammunition for-
ward through the slough of mud prevented the delivery of a rapid succession
of blows, and a more terrible strain was imposed upon the troops than in
any other battle of the war. It was not until September 20 that the German
third line was pierced, and not until the middle of October that the British
troops attained the mam ridge. By then one of the chief objects of the
battle had been gained. The Germans, forced to send more and more troops
into Flanders, were compelled to leave the French alone, and Petain had
time to restore the confidence of his army. Part of his method was the
delivery of very carefully prepared attacks on a comparatively small front
supported by a great mass of artillery which should leave the infantry little
more to do than to occupy the ground won. The first of these attacks was
made on the Verdun front on August 20, and by September 9 the JVench
had regained all the ground which the Germans had won in six months’
fighting in 1916. This was followed by a more important attack delivered
on October 23, which gave the French the whole of the Chemin des Dames
Ridge, and resulted in the capture of 11,000 prisoners and 200 guns. Then
Petain was able to tell Haig that the French army was able to look after
itself.
BATTLE OF CAMBHAI
The British troops, struggling in the mud of Flanders, could not be given
the reasons which had called for a supreme effort from them, and the terrible
struggle through the mud, unrelieved by any conspicuous success, told
heavily upon them. The continued bad weather and the slowness of the
progress made had caused the abandonment of the project of landing on the
Belgian coast, and all hope of driving the Germans from the Belgian ports
had gone; but there still appeared to be an opportunity of profiting from
the exhaustion of the German reserves by striking a blow in a new direction
before the winter gave the Germans time to recuperate. On November 20
Byng’s 3rd British army attacked the Germans in front of Cambrai. This
battle opened a new area in trench warfare. One of the outstanding diffi-
culties which the trench barrier had created was that the accumulation of
the huge stores of material of war required for a great bombardment made
surprise impossible. But at Cambrai these difficulties were overcome by
using a great number of tanks, brought up secretly to take the place of the
bomibarmnent in breaking the enemy’s defences. The attack was made on
one of the strongest parts of the Hindenburg system, but the t-mlfa success-
fully broke through and the surprise was complete; 10,000 prisoners and
142 guns were taken. Unfortunately on the eve of the battle of Cambrai
256 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
six French and five British divisions had been transferred to Italy to help
the Italian army to stem the disaster of Caporetto, so that Haig had not
the troops to complete and extend the successes won at Cambrai. This is a
striking example of the advantage which their central position conferred
upon the Germans, for the British divisions which would have been invalu-
able at Cambrai, had not reached the Italian front at the time when the
Austro-Gennans were checked on the Piave and the battle of Caporetto
came to an end. On November 30 the Germans attacked both flanks of
the salient which Byng’s advance had created, and regained a great part
of the ground which had been won. Thus the battle of Cambrai ended on
December 7 in one more disappointment for the Allies.
ITALUN DISASTER AT CAPORETTO
After the capture of Gorizia in August, 1916, the Italian srmv had not
found it possible to make any material progress in the very difficult moun-
tainous country in which it was involved. Throughout the early part of
1917 the Italian front was in a state of stagnation, varied only by local
enterprises which produced no change in the general situation. From this
stagnation it was awakened by yet another great Italian attack on the
Isonzo in August and September. Though the extent of ground won by the
Italian army was not great, the exhaustion of the Austrian army which
resulted from the battle alarmed German Headquarters and it was determined
to send to the Italian front a German army of eight divisions under General
von Below, coming mainly from the Russian front. A weak spot was dis-
covered in the Italian line near Caporetto, and here the Germans attacked
and broke through on October 24. The Italian line in the mountains was
turned, and the greater part of their army was forced to retreat with very
heavy losses. The situation in Italy caused great alarm in London and
Paris, and reinforcements were hurried from France through the Alps. Ere
they arrived, however, the Italian army had rallied and checked the German-
Austrian pursuit on the Piave.
ALLIED SUCCESSES IN THE EAST
In the Far East General Maude in Mesopotamia had begun in Decem-
ber, 1916, an offensive campaign against the Turks around Kut el Amara.
Gradually wearing down their resistance, he had by the middle of February
^iven the Turks from the right bank of the Tigris, then crossing the river
in their rear had routed their main army, and after a brilliant pursuit he
entered Bagdad on March 11, 1917. Early in 1916 the Grand Duke
Nicholas, who on handing over the command of the Russian armies to
General AJexeyey, had assumed the control in the Caucasus, had defeated the
Turks md occupied first the fortress of Erzerum and then the port of Trebi-
this in the late summer and autumn by driving the Turks
iroin Bitlis and Minsk in Turkish Armenia and sending troops to the Persian
frontier of Mesopotamia. Thus when Maude entered Bagdad there appeared
• • u ^ prospect that the Russian and British forces would be able to
^in hands and erect an effective barrier in the East. This hope was de-
stroyed by the Russian Revolution, which soon brought about the collapse
of the Russian forces in Turkey. So Maude in Mesopotamia had to fend
for himself, which he was doing successfully when on November 18 he suc-
cumbed to cholera.
On the Egyptian front a first attempt by the British to force the Turkish
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
257
lines on the southern frontier of Palestine failed in two attempts on Gaza
on March 27 and April 19. But as it appeared important in view of the
Russian collapse to prevent the Turks from sending an army to recapture
Bagdad, General Allenby, who had been sent from France to command in this
theatre, was reinforced. On October 31 he attacked and turned the left flank
of the Turkish position on the southern frontier of Palestine, and captured
Beersheba. Then rolling up the Turkish lines from east to west he captured
Gaza on November 7, and following up this victory with an energetic and
cunningly planned pursuit, he occupied Ascalon on the 9th and Jaffa on the
16th of November. Turning eastwards into the hills of Judea he again
defeated the harassed enemy, received the surrender of Jerusalem on
December 9, and entered the sacred city on foot the following day. These
successes in the East revived the controversy between those who advocated
an offensive policy in the East and a defensive policy in the West, at least
until the Americans could take the field in strength. This discussion was
raging when the year closed.
T. B. Y. — VOL. I — 17
258
HOW THE WAK WASS i<UUUtll. AJNU WUIN
CBEATION OF AN ALLIED SOPBEME WAB COUNCIL
A sequel to the Italian defeat at Caporetto was a definite step forward
toward the coordination of Allied effort. At Rapallo on November 9 it
was decided at a conference of the Allies to create a Supreme War Coimcil
of the chief Allied Ministers, with Headquarters at Versailles. Permanent
military representatives to assist and advise this Council were appointed:
General Weygand, Foch’s right-hand man, being the French representative;
Sir Henry Wilson, the British representative; while General Cadoma, who
had been succeeded in the command of the Italian army by General Diaz,
represented Italy; and General Bliss the United States. These military
representatives had no executive power. This Supreme War Council met at
the end of January, 1918, to consider the Allied plans for the ensuing year.
The situation was very serious.
The exhaustion of the German army in 1917 had been more than offset
by the collapse of the Russian army. Peace negotiations between Germany
and Russia had been opened at Brest-Litovsk on December 22, and for some
time past a steady stream of German divisions from the eastern front had
been arriving in France and Belgium. France had no longer the men to
replace her losses, and Petain had been compelled first to reduce the strength
of his divisions, and then to cut down the number of those divisions. Five
British and six French divisions had gone from France to Italy. In the
British army the losses caused by the fighting at Passchendaele and Cambrai
had not been made good, and early in 1918 Haig was compelled to follow
the example of the French and to reduce the strength of his divisions. In
the summer of 1917 there had been 178 Allied divisions on the western front,
opposed to 108 German divisions. At the beginning of 1918 the number of
Allied divisions had fallen to 163, the German divisions had increased to
175. The reduction in the strength of the British and French divisions had
been offset, to some extent, by a corresponding reduction in the size of the
German divisions, but there were still large reinforcements ready to be
transferred to France from the Russian front. The Allies could only obtain
additional divisions for the western front by withdrawing them from Pales-
tine, Salonika and Italy; but the British statesmen desired an offensive in
Palestine, the French statesmen were opposed to any further weakening of
the Macedonia front, and the Italian statesmen would not hear of any
diminution of the Allied contingents in Italy.
DIVIDED COUNCILS
In these circumstances the Supreme War Council, recognising the need
for a supreme military authority, formed a military executive eommittee
composed of its military representatives with General Foch as President,
the functions of this committee being to create a general reserve for the
western front, to determine the location of that reserve, and to issue orders
for its employment. Thus executive military command was placed in the
hands of a committee, which is always objectionable, for a committee is
very rarely able to act with the promptness and decision which is the essen-
tial feature of effective command, and instead of unifying the command on
the western front it complicated matters by leaving the British and French
Commanders-in-Chief in control of the greater part of their armies, while
taking a part of their troops away from them and placing that part tmder an
independent authority. This decision was a compromise, for toe Allipd
Copt/rirjht ret>(rre(l for artist and owner by Walter Judd, Ltd Portrait by Sir William Orpen, R A.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, O.M., K.T., Commander-in-Chief of the Bntish Expeditionary Forces in
France and Flanders, 1915 to 1919.
® Keystone View Co © Keystone View Co
Major-General Sir Charles Townshend,
who in spite of lack of supplies held Kut el
Amara for 143 days before surrendering to
the Turks.
Sir John French, later Field-Marshal the
Earl of Tpres, O.M., K.P., who was
Commander-in-Chief of the original British
Expeditionary Force in France.
THREE FAMOUS BRITISH SOLDIERS
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
259
statesmen, remembering the unfortvmate results of Nivelle’s campai^, were
not yet ready to agree upon a generalissimo. The effects of this unsatisfactory
compromise at once appeared. Sir William Robertson was unable to agree to
the principles involved in the creation of the Executive Military Committee
and was removed from the position of British Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, bein^ succeeded by Sir Henry Wilson, whose place at Versailles was
taken by Sir Henry Rawlinson. Nor did the difficulties end there. Towards
the end of 1917 M. Clemenceau, who had become Premier of France on
November 18, had brought great pressure to bear on the British Government
to induce it to order the British army to extend its front in France. M.
Clemenceau was so insistent that Haig, despite his protests, was directed to
extend his right by relieving the French as far south as the Oise. This ex-
tension was carried out by Gough’s 5th British army. In consequence of
the additional burden thus thrown on the British army, and of the continual
arrival of German divisions on his front, Haig represented that he could not
supply the British contingent to the general reserve, and at a further meet-
ing of the Supreme War Council in London on March 14 and 15, the forma-
tion of the general reserve was postponed. A week later the Germans made
their great attack.
GERMANY S GREAT OFFENSIVE
On March 21, after a short but very heavy bombardment, 64 German
divisions attacked Byng’s 3rd army and Gout’s 5th army between Arras
and the Oise on a front of over 50 miles, 40 of these divisions falling upon
Gough’s 14 divisions. Ludendorff had planned with skill, for he had placed
his reserves so that they would be directed against the northern part of the
British front or against the French front in the neighbourhood of Reims,
as readily as they could be launched against the British armies which he
actually attacked The attack on those armies did not come as a surprise.
Haig’s Intelligence Department had predicted the actual day of the attack,
but it was by no means certain that this would be the main German effort.
The security of the Channel ports was vital to fhe British, and a successful
advance by the Germans in Flanders might have had fatal consequences.
Haig therefore felt himself compelled to keep his reserves north of the
Somme; south of that river he could better afford to lose ground, and his
troops in that quarter could be more speedily reinforced by the French. It
was for these reasons that Gough’s front was weakly held when the battle
began. Under the pressure of overwhelming numbers Gough fell back be-
hind the Somme.
Meanwhile the German attacks north of the Somme were being relent-
lessly pressed, and it had been agreed between Haig and Petain that, in the
e^ent of the Germans attacking in force in that quarter, the French should
take over the line south of that river. As early as March 22 the first
French troops arrived to support Gough’s right, but this reinforcement was
insufficient to check the progress of the Germans. On March 24 the latter
captured Peronne and the next day forced their way across the Somme near
that town, having already got across both the Upper Somme and the St.
Crosat Canal. It was in t&se conditions that General Fayolle arrived to
take command of the battlefield south of the Somme, but, though two French
armies, Humbert’s 3rd and Debeney’s 1st army, had been ordered up by
P5tain, Fayolle had as yet no adequate assistance to bring to Gou^. On
Fayolle’s arrival Haig had placed that portion of Gough’s army which was
north of the Somme under Byng. On March 25 the Germans drove in Byng’s
260
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
new right, and compelled it to retire behind the Ancre, thus exposing Gougih’s
flank and forcing him to withdraw to the outskirts of Villers-Brettonneux, on
the main road to Amiens and less than ten miles from that town. The posi-
tion was then highly cntical. Haig, in view of the danger to his line north of
the Somme, could send no reinforcements to Gough, and it appeared highly
probable that, unless P6tain could support the 5th army at once, the Germans
would get into Amiens and sever communication between the French and
British armies. P6tain, in view of the rapid progress the enemy was making
in the direction of Montdidier, felt it to be above all things necessary to
bar the roads to Paris, and could not see his way to help Gough on the
Amiens front. In these circumstances, on Haig’s initiative, a conference was
held at Doullens on March 28, at which it was agreed that Foch should be
appointed to “ coordinate the action of the Allied armies on the western front.”
And so unity of command, though in a somewhat tentative form, became
a fact.
Foch’s first obiect was to maintain connection betw^n the French and
British armies. Ludendorff’s plan aimed at thrusting in a wedge between
those armies. He had intended that his main effort should have been made
north of the Somme, so that after driving back the British he might use that
river, where it bends westwards from Peronne through a wide marshy valley,
to hold off the French until the destruction of the British army was com-
pleted. But owing to the British resistance in the neighbourhood of Arras,
the right of his great attack had become exhausted at an early stage of the
great battle. Thus finding that his left was being unexpectedly successful,
he changed his scheme and made his main effort south of the Somme in the
direction of Amiens. But as Haig had foreseen, this part of the battle front
was more easily strengthened by the French and to it Foch hastened troops
by all and any means. On March 28 Ludendorff made a final effort to gain
more room north of the Somme in a great attack on the right of Byng’s
3rd army, and Home’s 1st army near Arras, but this attack failed with heavy
loss to the Germans, and with this failure the attempt to separate the Allied
armies was doomed. The German advance on Amiens south of the Somme
was petering out from exhaustion, and the remnant of Gough’s army, fighting
with superb gallantry, was able to hold the lines of Villers-Brettonneux,
while further south the Germans, after capturing Montdidier, were held up
by the constant stream of French reinforcements which poured in from the
south. The ^eat battle ended with a final and unsuccessful effort of the
Germans against the Franco-British front south of the Somme on April 4
and 5.
Four days later, on April 9, the Germans began a fresh effort in Flanders
under the direction of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. The first German
attack was made near Neuve Chapelle on a part of the line held by Portu-
guese troops, of which two divisions had since the summer of 1917 joined the
British army. The Portuguese gave way, and the 1st and tod British
armies in Flanders had been weakened in order to supply reinforcements for
the 3rd and 5th armies on the Somme, so that at first the Germans made
startlingly rapid progress. On April 11 they captured the Messines-Wyts-
chaete Ridge, which Plumer had taken in the previous June, entered Armen-
ti^es and Merville and on April 15 occupied Bailleul. Plumer was then
compelled to shorten his front in the Ypres salient, and to abandon all the
ground which had been won at such cost in the third battle of Ypres.
The British army then stood, to use Haig’s phrase, “ with its back to the
wall ” of the Channel coast But the British soldier never fights more stul>
bomly than when he is in a tight place. A gallant defence on the right of
the battle front saved Bethune and prevented the Germans from ftvti>TniiTi pr
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
261
their attack southwards. British reinforcements arriving in the nick of time
stayed the enemy’s advance in front of the important railway jimction of
Hazebrouck, while the French troops sent up by Foch were able to reinforce
Plumer, who checked the enemy to the south of Ypres. There then ensued
a short pause in the north, but on the Somme battlefield the Germans made
on the 23rd another effort to capture Villers-Brettonneux, and were for a
short time in possession of the village. Rawlinson, who had left the Supreme
War Council and reconstituted the 4th army on the Amiens front, after the
remnants of the 5th army had been withdrawn, saved the situation by a
brilliant night attack in which troops of the 4th and 5th Australian divisions
took a leading part. Villers-Brettonneux was recaptured and the road to
Amiens was again closed. The Germans then resumed the battle in
Flanders, and on April 25 captured Kemmel Hill, held at the time by French
troops. This hill dominates the country between Ypres and Armentiferes,
and had the Germans been able to extend their success by gaining the last
of the Flanders ridges, which lie west of Kemmel, the British position would
have become precarious. This they attempted to do on April 29, but the
attack failed everywhere On April 30 the French recaptured Locre, and
the battle of Flanders came to an end
In these two great battles the offensive power of the British army was
for a time broken. That army had in six weeks suffered 350,000 casualties
and had lost 1,000 guns and a vast quantity of war material. But the
mimition factories of Great Britain were fully developed, and the loss in
material was made good with astonishing rapidity. It took longer to replace
the men, but large drafts were hurried across the Channel from England, and
troops were ordered to France from Palestine, Salonika and Italy, while in
April a further military service Act extending the liability to serve was
passed through Parliament. These measures might and should have been
taken before the German attack was delivered, but that attack at least taught
the lesson that no enterprise in distant theatres of war would sufSce to
protect the vitals of the Allies. That les.son once learned was applied with
commendable promptitude, and the British army recovered from its reverses
with the greater ease because Ludendorff left its lines undisturbed and
turned his attention further south.
FOCH COMMAHDER-IN-CHIEF — THE GERMANS AGAIN REACH THE MARNE
The Allies in general and Foch in particular had expected that the Ger-
mans would make another attempt to reach Amiens, or would try to complete
the exhaustion of the British army. But the German troops both on the
Somme and in Flanders were wearied with their efforts, and some of them
during the recent battles had shown no great desire to fight. Ludendorff
therefore decided to attack on a new front, and on May 27 the Germans
assaulted the famous Chemins des Dames Ridge between Reims and Soissons.
Here the Germans under the Crown Prince William effected a surprise, and
advancing with 42 divisions against the 12 divisions of the 6th French army,
overran the Chemin des Dames, forced their way across the Aisne, captured
Soissons on Mav 29, and on the 31st reached the Marne between Dormans
and Ch&teau-Thierry. But Foch, who on April 14 had been definitely
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the west, had, as well
as the British Government, been taking measures to strengthen the western
front. General Pershing had at once placed at his disposal all the American
troops available, which at the time consisted of two divisions. These
divisions had gone into the front line near Montdidier, whence they were
262 HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
transferred to a new battlefield, where they arrived in the nick of time to
stop the Germans from crossing the Marne near ChfiteaU'Thierry. Foch
had also ordered back four French divisions from Italy, and had persuaded
the Belgians, whose army had been reorganised and considerably strength-
ened, to extend their front as far as Ypres, thus relieving the British troops
and enabling him to withdraw the French reserves which he had placed
north of the Somme. With these reinforcements the third great German
attack of the year was brought to a standstill.
The Germans had now created two great salients on the western front:
one the result of the March battles, with its head at Montdidier; the other,
the outcome of the attack on May 27, with its head at Chateau-Thierry.
On the map the Allied position appears highly critical, for in the north the
enemy was almost at the gates of Ypres and no great distance from the rail-
way junction at Hasebrouck; from his lines near Villers-Brettonneux he
could bring the still more important railway junction of Amiens under effec-
tive artillery fire, while at Chfiteau-Thierry he was within 40 miles of Paris
where tiie ^avest anxiety prevailed. But the danger period was passing,
for tile British army was Rowing in strength as reinforcements reached it
from the distant theatres of war, and American troops were coming across
the Atlantic, at first at the rate of 120,000 a month, increased in July to
200,000 a month, a result made possible by the amount of British shipping
placed at the service of the American army, shipping set free because the
British people cheerfully agreed to drastic reductions in the import of sup-
plies. So when the Germans made their fourth attempt of the year, designed
to join up the salients of Chateau-Thierry and Montdidier by the capture
of Compifegne, Foch was ready for them. The battle of Lassigny began on
Jime 9 and ended on June 13, with the Germans well to the north of Com-
pile, having gained little in return for the heavy losses they had sustained.
TSBaTY or BBE&T-LrrovSK
While the great struggle was being fought out on the western front, com-
parative calm had prevailed elsewhere. On March 3 peace between Russia
and the Central Powers was signed at Brest-Litovsk, and on the next day
peace was also concluded with Rumania; so that the Germans were free to
withdraw from the eastern front all troops fit to go into the line in France
and Belgium. Early in April a small German force landed in Finland, where
Finnish forces under General Mannerheim were opposing the Bolshevist
elements, while in Siberia anti-Bolshevist Russian troops had been joined
by a division of Czechoslovak troops composed from prisoners found in
Russia. To give support to these various elements a British e}q)edition was
landed at Murmansk on the coast of the White Sea in May.
In the following month more serious events occurred in the Italian
theatre of war. The Austrian army had been in a great measure recon-
stituted by the arrival of many hundred thousand prisoners of war released
from Russia, and on June 15 it began a great attack on the Italian army,
which extended from the mountain front in the Alps and along the Piave
River almost to its mouth. The attack gained some initial successes and
tile Austrians got across the Piave in some places, but they were soon
checked, and had to retreat over the river with very heavy loss. This defeat
had a very depressing effect both in Austria and in Hungary, where the
people had long b^n weary of the war. The Bulgarians were no less weary,
and in Germany itself signs of discontent were multiplying, but Ludendorff
was not aware of the temper of his weapon, and had plauneH a final great
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
263
attack, grandiloquently called the Friedensturm — the asrault that brings
peace. It took the form of an attack east of Reims combined with another
west of that town on the southern front of the Chi,teau-Thierry salient.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MABNE
This second battle of the Marne started on July 15. The attack to the
east of Reims failed completely before the skillful defence of General
Gouraud, that in the Chateau-Thierry salient at first made some progress,
but on July 18 a counter-blow which Foch had prepared against the German
flank between Chfiteau-Thierry and Soissons, a blow delivered by the army
of General Mangin, under whom fought two American divisions, took the
Germans by surprise. Mangin succeeded in cutting the railway commu ni -
cations south of Soissons, upon which the supply of the German troops in the
Chateau-Thierry salient largely depended, and they were compelled to fall
back across the Marne. A series of combined attacks, delivered against the
southern front of the salient by six American divisions; against the western
front by Mangin strengthened by two British divisions sent down by Haig;
and against its eastern front by Berthelot, also strengthened by two British
divisions, and with the aid of two Italian divisions, which had arrived in
France some time before, drove the Germans out of the salient and across
the Vesle; the battle ending on August 4, with Paris relieved of all danger.
Foch then proceeded to put into execution plans that he had for some
time had in mind. He was aware that the Germans, though growing weaker,
still had strong reserves, and until those reserves were fisher weakened he
had no intention of engaging upon a great attack designed to break through
the enemy’s line. Indeed at this time the general view among the Allies was
that it would be prudent to await until 1919 when the American army would
be in great stren^h, before attempting a decisive effort against the Germans.
Foch’s intention was rather to continue the process of exhausting German
power by a series of limited attacks, planned so as to free from the enemy’s
grasp some of the more important railway ccxnmunications.
foch’s policy of limited attacks succeeds
This series of attacks was begun by the British army on the Amiens
front on August 8. That army was now in possession of a new t3rpe of
tank which was a vast improvement on the early models. Of these tanka
400 cleared the way for the infantry advance, and demoralised the German
defence. The attack was delivered astride the Somme by the 4th British
army under Sir Henry Rawlinson, while Debeney’s 1st French army extended
the battle to the right. In the centre the Australians and Canadians over-
whelmed the German divisions opposed to them, and on August 12 Rawlin-
son’s front was established before Chaulnes, and he had captured 22,000
prisoners and 400 guns. Foch, delighted with this success, urged Haig to
press forward through Chaulnes on Peronne. But Haig finding the German
resistance in front of Chaulnes to be growing stronger, and suspecting that
Ludendorff was endeavouring to repeat his manoeuvre of 1917 and to retreat
into the Hindenburg line, persuaded Foch to extend the front of battle farther
northwards. This decision, in the event, made possible victory in 1918,
for Haig throwing in his 3rd army on the left of the 4th in ten days drove
the Germans across the old Somme battlefield with the loss of 34,000 prison-
ere and 270 guns. Then on September 2 with his 1st army he attacked
on the Arras front and broke through the northern extension of the Hinden-
burg line, taking 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns, while between September
12 and 19 the 3rd and 4th armies drove the Germans back into the shelter
of the Hindenburg system, taking 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns.
THE AMEBICANS CAPTURE THE ST. MIHIEL SALIEHT
Ere this was achieved the American army had brought to a conclusion
one more of the limited attacks which Foch had planned. For attacking
the salient of St. Mihiel on September 12, they had by the evening of the
13th completely obliterated the salient, and taken from the enemy 16,000
prisoners and 443 guns. The effect of Foch’s policy of limited attacks, and
of Haig’s bold extension of that policy after the battle of Amiens, had been
to change completely the balance of power on the western front. The Ger-
mans had lost enormously in men and in material, both in the failure of
their great attack in July, and in the many defeats they had suffered since,
and Ludendorff had been obliged to break up no less than 20 of his divisions
to keep the remainder up to strength. The German reserves of 66 divisions
in May had fallen to 19 in September, and the successes of the Allied tanks
had had a great effect upon the German infantry.
While the Germans were weakening both in numbers and in morale the
Allied troops were flushed with victory, and their numbers were mounting
up; for in March Pershing had only been able to offer Foch two divisions,
but now he had 24, each double the strength of a German division, ready to
go into battle; and the British army had made good the losses in men and
in material which it had suffered in the spring.
Foch had already planned that the first series of attacks which ended
with Pershing’s capture of the St. Mihiel salient should be continued by an
attack by Gouraud’s army and the American army, on either side of the
Argonne Forest, and that this should be followed by an offensive by the
Belgian army and by Plumer with the 2nd British army on the Ypres front.
The question was whether these two attacks should be limited efforts, designed
to continue the process of exhausting the enemy’s reserves, or whether they
ishould bo a part of the great general offensive on the western front. For the
latter it was necessary that the British army should assault the Hindenburg
system. A failure to break through that vast system of defences would
certainly have been very costly and might have broken the high spirit of the
British army. But the British Commander-in-Chief was confident that the
moral superiority which his men had established over the enemy would be
decisive, provided he struck at once. He was in no mind to give Ludendorff
the chance recovery which had been allowed him after the battle of the
Somme. He therefore decided to follow the attacks of Gouraud and tbe
Americans immediately by an attack towards Cambrai and St. Quentin.
CONTINUED ALLIED SUCCESSES
The great battle began on September 26 with the attacks of Pershing’s
Americans and Gouraud’s Frenchmen on either side of the Argonne. Both
attacks gained a considerable initial success, but were then checked for a
time by the stout resistance of the Germans. On September 27 the 1st and
3rd British armies began the second battle of Cambrai by attacking the
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
265
Greman front north and south of that town. While these armies were forcing
their way through the Hindenburg defences, the battle of Flanders began on
September 28. In that battle the Belgian army, reinforced by ibe French
6th army, which Foch had withdrawn from the centre and sent northwards,
and the ^d British army, attacked the front between Dixmude and Mes-
sines, which the enemy had weakened in order to meet Haig’s attack upon
Cambrai, and in 48 hours had won back the whole of the Flanders ridges,
which in 1917 it had taken three months of fierce and bloody fighting to gain.
Then on September 29 Haig in the battle of St. Quentin struck bis decisive
blow with Rawlinson’s 4th army, in which the 2nd American Corps bad been
incorporated, while Debeney’s 1st French army cooperated on his right
against the town of St. Quentin. Rawlinson’s men after a stupendous bom-
bardment in which more than 1,000,000 shells were fired at the enemy’s
lines, broke across the Canal du Nord, which formed the core of the German
defences. In the nine days of tremendous battle the let, 3rd and 4th British
armies broke clean through the Hindenburg system, while the 1st French
army, advancing triumphantly on their right, entered St. Quentin.
The effect of this gigantic battle was immediate. On September 29
Hindenburg pressed the German Government to open at once negotiations for
an armistice. Owing to political difiBculties there was delay, but events in
other theatres of war soon helped to convince the statesmen in Berlin that
Hindenburg’s advice should be followed.
COLLAPSE OF BULGARIA AND TURKEY
During the summer of 1918 information reached the Allies that the
m<yrale of the Bulgarian troops had very notably declined. It appeared prob-
able that Bulgaria would not fight stoutly to support a falling Germany, so
it was decided to make a general attack on the Macedonian front. This
attack was begun on Aug;ust 15 by the Allied forces under General Guil-
laumat, who had succeeded Sarrail in command. The Serbian army, attacking
with great gallantry, broke through the Bulgarian centre and, following this
success with a relentless pursuit, entered Ishtip and Veles on September 25.
The Bulgarian Government then asked for an armistice, which was concluded
on the 29th, hostilities between Bulgaria and the Allied Powers ceasing at 12
noon on the 30th. The collapse of Turkey was as rapid. During the summer
the British troops withdrawn from Allenby had been replaced in Palestine by
Indian troops, and, the reorganisation of his command completed, Allenby pre-
pared to attack the Turkish lines north of Jerusalem. On September 19
Allenby broke through the Turkish lines so successfully that on the first
day of the battle he was able to pass his fine force of cavalry along the coast
round the enemy’s fiank. On the 20th the cavalry entered Nazareth, and
swept round the enemy’s rear, while the infantry drove forward through the
hills of Samaria. The Turkish retreat became a rout; on the 30th the pur-
suing cavalry captured Damascus, and the Turkish army in Syria ceased to
exist as a fighting force. Simultaneously Sir William Marshall, who had
succeeded to the command in Mesopotamia on the death of Maude, advanced
in that theatre of war. On October 25 he defeated the Turks at Kirkut, on
the 30th the Turkish army on the Tigris surrendered to him and on November
3 the British troops were able to enter Mosul without opposition. Ere that
had happened the Turks had sent in their plenipotentiaries to negotiate an
armistice which was signed at Mudros on October 30.
266
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
CONTINUOUS AliLIBD ATTACKS ON THE WHOUB WESTERN FRONT
To return to the western front, Foch’s attacks had compelled the Ger-
mans in the intervals between the fronts of battle to withdraw. On October
13 the French entered Laon, and on the 17th the British occupied Lille with-
out firing a shot. The time had come to press the Germans everywhere and
with all available means. Already on October 10 Foch had issued instruc-
tions directing the Belgian army to advance to Bruges, i^e British armies
upon Maubeuge and Mons, and Gouraud and the American armies upon
Mezieres and Sedan, the purpose of this advance being to cut the enemy’s
iTiftin lateral line of communication, the railway connecting Brussels, Mau-
beuge, Meziferes, and Sedan, and to drive the Germans into the Ardennes
forest. In pursuance of this plan the British 1st, 3rd and 4th armies began
on October 13 the battle of the Selle, in which, though the enemy was
strongly posted ^hind a river in fiood, his resistance was again broken, and
by October 25 the British had forced the enemy well back from the river,
and had reached the outskirts of Valenciennes and Le Quesnoy and the
southern edge of the Mormal forest. Simultaneously King Albert on the
right had pressed forward into Belgium, and driving the Germans back be-
hind the Scheldt, entered Bruges on October 19, and by the next day cleared
the whole of the Belgian coast.
On the southern front of battle there was no question of a German retreat,
and the Americans had to fight very hard to clear the difficult country in
which they were operating and to push the Germans back into the Kriem-
hilde lines, the southern extension of the Hindenburg system. On their left
Gouraud had also to overcome a stubborn resistance, and it was not until the
middle of October that he was ready to attempt the passage of the Aisne,
which he did on October 16, when he stormed the heights of Vouziers and
captured GrandprA On the 16th, 17th and 18th the Americans in a series
of fierce attacks broke through the Eriemhilde lines. The last German de-
fensive systems were then pierced. Then while continuing his great drive to
the north-east in order to force the Germans back behind the Meuse, Foch
prepared for an attack by part of the American army and the French armies
of his right, eastwards on either side of Metz, which should turn the line of
that river. But before the latter attack had more than begun, the end
came. The news that the Americans had broken through the Kriemhilde
lines, that the French had forced their way across the Aisne, and that the
British had driven the enemy back from the Selle, decided the Government
in Berlin to hasten negotiations for surrender. On October 26 Ludendorff
tendered his resignation, which was accepted.
AUSTRU COIiLAFSBS
Of Germany’s allies there remained only Austria. The position of the
[talian front had undergone little change since the defeat of the Austrian
attack on the Piave, and it was on that river that the battle which com-
plied the downfall of Austria began on October 21. In that battle the
British troops imder Lord Cavan had the honour of leading the way across
die river, and the Austrian resistance was broken decisively by General Diaz,
as was that of the Turks by Allenby. On October 27 the Austrian Govern-
ment sued for an annistice, and on November 1 revolution broke out in
ITienna. The armistice between Austria-Hungary and the Allies was «»i gn«d
ya November 3.
SIR FREDERICK MAURICE
267
FINAL ALLIED ADVANCES
While ihe German Government was preparing to send emissaries to Foch,
the latter was ordering his armies forward on their last advance. Behind
the Germans now lay the forests and mountains of the Belgian and Luxem*
burg Ardennes, traversed by a few roads and washed by the Meuse with
comparatively few crossing places. If the British armies could cross the
Meuse between Namur and Dinant, there was good prospect that the retreat
of the Germans through Northern Belgium would be cut off, and that they
would be forced back against the Dutch frontier. If the German centre had
not made good its retreat before Gouraud and the Americans captured
Mezi^res and Sedan, it was in danger of being cut off. This was the posi-
tion of which Foch proposed to take advantage by continuing his main ad-
vance. So on October 31 King Albert resumed his advance in the north, and
in four days reached the outskirts of Ghent. On November 1 the British
attacked in the battle of the Sambre, when their 4th army on the right broke
across the Sambre Canal and seized Landrecies. Their 3rd army, attacking
simultaneouslv, occupied the old fortress of Le Quesnoy, and on November
3 the left of the 3rd army and the right of the 1st encircled Valenciennes and
captured that place. Debeney’s 1st French army on the right of the Bntish
also forced its way across the Somme in the neighbourhood of Guise, and
keeping pace with the British entered Avesnes. On November 1, too, Gou-
raud and the Americans started on their final effort and made a great spring
forward beyond the Kriemhilde lines. On the 6th Gouraud captured Rethel
with his left, and on the same day the Americans, following up the retreating
Germans with extraordinary vigour, entered Sedan, the objective allotted
to them by Foch. On the evening of November 10 Gouraud’s right had
reached Meziferes, and the German centre, in order to escape, had to aban-
don masses of guns and military stores. But ere this the German pleni-
potentiaries had crossed the Allied lines and were in conference with Foch.
By a curious stroke of fortune the war ended with the British army on the
very ground where it had first encountered the Germans in August, 1914,
for on November 11, a few hours before the Armistice became effective, the
Canadian Corps of the 1st British army entered Mons, the scene of the first
Anglo-German battle of the war.
WAS THE ABMISTICE FBEMATUBE?
The question has often been asked: was the Armistice premature? The
view commonly held, that it was imposed upon the soldiers by statesmen
anxious to end the war, has no foundation in fact. The Armistice was con-
cluded upon the advice of Foch who had consulted the Allied Commanders.
Their armies had on November 11, 1918, reached the limit beyond which
immediate advance was not possible, the destruction of the roads and rail-
ways, scientifically carried out by the Germans in their retreat, being so
complete as to make it impossible to bring forward supplies for the Allied
armies if they continued to advance. A halt approximately on the line
reached on November 11 would have been necessary until the communica-
tions had been to some extent restored; such a halt might have given the
German troops time to recover to some extent and to establish themselves
either behind the Meuse or behind the Rhine, in which event there would have
been further fierce fitting with heavy loss of life. Foch, it is true, had
prepared for a possible German stand behind the Meuse and had planned
HOW THE WAR WAS FOUGHT AND WON
an advance into Lorraine on either side of the fortress of Metz. This ad-
vance, which was to be carried out mainly by American troops, had actually
begun when the Armistice came. But this advance too would probably have
involved heavy fighting and much destruction of property which is to-day
intact in the hands of the French. In these circumstances, Foch reasoned that
if he could impose such terms upon the Germans as would leave them mili-
tarily helpless, he had no right to risk the loss of another life. The terms
of armistice accepted by Germany required the surrender of almost the whole
of her fleet, of 5,000 guns, 25,000 machine-guns, 3,000 bomb-throwers, 1,700
aeroplanes, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway waggons and 5,000 motor
lorries. Since the beginning of July, 1918, the Germans had lost in battle
close on 7,000 gims and vast quantities of war material of all kinds, so that the
surrenders required of them by the Armistice terms were sufficiently large to
make further resistance impossible. That the Allied Commanders were not
wrong in their judgment has been proved by the event,, for despite periodical
alarms as to Germany’s secret armies and secret stores of munitions, she
has never even attempted to resist by force any demand that has been made
on her. The logical conclusion is that she has never felt able to do so. The
difficulties which have arisen in Europe since the war cannot be fairly ascribed
to a premature cessation of hostilities, though it is possible that some of
them might have been obviated by a more extensive occupation of Ger-
many in the first instance This, on the other hand, would have delayed
demobilisation, and the men who had fought and survived were natu-
rally clamouring to return to their homes that they might resume the oc-
cupations of peace- I am not here concerned with the conditions of the
Versailles Treaty of Peace, which may or may not be a contributory cause
to the distresses of Europe; but it is indubitably the case that the sacrifices
which the World War required were so colossal that no rapid recovery from
them would in any circumstances have been possible. The fourteen nations
which took an active part in the World War together suffered 42,000,000
casualties, and the number of their dead amounted to 8,246,471. The ex-
penditure of treasure almost defies calculation, and the destruction of prop-
erty was on a scale never before approached in war. During the great
battle at the end of September, 1918, the British army, fighting upon about
a third of the whole battle front, fired in one week £10, 000, WO worth of shells.
These tremendous losses, human and material, can only be made good by
years of patient effort. The main purpose for which the war was fought by
the Allies, the crushing of the military power of Germany, has been achieved,
but at a price which has left the victors only less crippled than the van-
quished.
CHAPTER IX
GEEMANY NEVER DEFEATED!
By Major-General Erich Ludendorff
Chief Quarter-Master-General. Author of Ludendorffs Own Booh,
In the speech from the Throne, with which the Emperor William I opened
5 first German Reichstag, on March 21, 1871, he greeted the newly con-
stituted German Empire as being a trustworthy guarantee of the peace of
Europe.
Thirty years later Prince Bismarck writes in his Reflections and Remi-
niscences:
Germany is the only Great Power in Europe which pursues no aims
save those attainable by the way of peace, whilst Germany’s neighbours are
pursuing, either openly or in secret, aims which can only be realised by
means of war.”
Bismarck’s aim was the consolidation of the newly formed empire and
the maintenance of peace, and the means which he used were his wonderful
policy of alliance and its inevitable corollary — the development of the
German army.
The natural increase of the trading and industrial population was accom-
panied necessarily by the increase of the landless population. Both of these
reacted upon one another, since the overflow of the population found itself
without fixed abode, and emigration had almost ceased. This growth of the
population forced Germans to seek an outlet beyond the confines of their
own country. They sought and found markets and colonies ; and they needed,
for the maintenance of their evcr-mcreasmg population, strength at sea — i.e,,
a fleet as well as an army, in order to protect their trade and foreign posses-
sions as well as to keep the seas open in case of war. Aims of world-policy
were in no way involved in this. The people desired only to live in peaceful
competition with other nations; the maintenance of peace was still their non-
political aim, and this was also the policy of the German Government. At
the same time they never suspected that their thoroughness, their industry
and their capabilities would be regarded by other nations as an inconvenient
source of rivalry in the markets of the world, and of which they must make
every effort to rid themselves. The German nation remained also under a
delusion as to the real intentions of its immediate neighbours, and did not
perceive that it would ultimately be compelled to fight for its bare existence.
It failed therefore to draw the right conclusion, namely, that the development
of its own strength was the only real security for its existence.
GERMANY FAILS TO PREPARE
Large masses of the German people believed, on the contrary, that the
maintenance of peace required not so much the development of strength as
the pursuit of extensive non-political aims and a lofty moral mission. The
269
270
GERMANY NEVER DEFEATED
lack of both of these was engendered by the absence of a ferting of nationality,
and by the material and entirely economic tone of the Gcfvemment’s policy.
This gave room for international tendencies — nothing short of treasonable,
which, intentionally or not, furthered the propaganda of enemies who were
intent on destroying Germany and had foimd many points at which th^
could weaken their adversary internally; and these tendencies brought dis-
sension among the people.
Under Bismarck’s successors the development of military strength was
left far behind the growth of the population and the increase of material
prosperity. Universal military service was no longer enforced. Thus it came
to pass that in 1912 Germany enrolled only 54 per cent of her fit young men,
whilst France, in spite of a considerably lower standard of fitness, enrolled
per cent. And so in the year 1912, 150,000 to 200,000 fit men in Germany
were not enrolled. Even thou^ the recruits enrolled in former years had
been weaker, there occurred a falling-off in this year of considerably more
than 1,000,000 trained men, i.e., 70 divisions or more. In the financial sphere
conditions were ve^ similar. The imited effort for national strength remained
far below its possible point of attainment. Thus the German Government
had abandoned what had been the foundation of the policy of the Emperor
William I and Bismarck, and had also withdrawn their support from a far-
reaching policy of alliance, which was voluntarily ^ven up by the Chancellor
Caprivi through the non-renewal of the defensive alliance with Russia.
The alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy was entirely a political one.
The latter did not prove a trustworthy Ally ; Austria-Hungary and Germany
stood by each other for better or worse. The military strength of Austria-
Hungary was likewise far below its possible point of attainment, both in
numbers and material. Unfortunately, the German statesmen regarded this
as a matter merely affecting Austria-Himgary, instead of seeing clearly that
the existence of the German people was also vitally dependent upon it.
COALITION AGAINST OEBMANY
It followed, as a natural consequence, that the falling off in the armaments
of both countries and the instability of the alliance with Italy excited a
desire for war on the part of Germany’s enemies. The same effect was also
produced by (among other thin^) the growth in Germany of social democracy
and the fi^t against “militarism”; and in Austria-Hungary, of differences
among the various nationalities. Fear of the German sword vanished. Enemy
propaganda became busy. The peril of war increased in Europe. In spite
of conflicting interests, both political and military, France, Russia and
England united together in the one great desire to annihilate Germany and
Ai^ria-Hungary. Belgium and Serbia joined them. Italy and Rumania,
while biding their time, inclined towards the Entente. This last became a
definite military alliance. The German Government was powerless against
it, and continued to vacillate between seeking support from Russia and from
mgland — falling at last between two stools. And what was worst of all,
it (Knitted even at the last moment to use all means in its power in order to
bring the military strength of Germany and Austria-Hungary to its utmost
point of development, which was the only possible reply to its enemies’ schemes
for annihila tion. Again, it also neglected to institute a propaganda which
should show the deluded world where “ militarism ” was to be found, and
who alone would be guilty if the tiireatened war were to break out.
The General Staff had much cause for anxiety. In my position as head
of tiiat departanrait on the General Staff which was responsible for mobilisa-
ERICH LUDENDORPF
271
tlon and the preparation for campaigns {Aujtmrsch-md-MobOmachvngaah~
1 a^mpted, in the autumn of 1912, after overcoming many diffi-
culties, to raise ffie strength of the nation to its highest possible point; also,
among otiier things, to bring about the enforcement of universal military
service and the formation of three additional Army Corps.
The last organic army law in Germany, which was passed on June 30,
1913, in spite of opposition on the part of the Social Democrats, proved a
useless encumbrance to the General Staff; who felt more and more acutely
that it was faced with the task of making good on the field of battle the
negligence of the Government’s policy in every department. The enemy saw
clearly the position of Germany and Austria-Hungary, though this was not
known to the world at large. The latter only saw what enemy propaganda
tau^t it to see (there being no German propaganda) ; it saw one thing more,
however, namely, the incomparable Geman army and the German navy,
eager to prove themselves. These institutions, under the auspices of the
Supreme Military Command, had become schools for moral training as well
as for warfare, where the highest degree of human perfection was attained;
and (thanks to the rejection — so disastrous for Germany — of universal
military service), these schools were not attended by all the fit young men
of the country.
At the end of July, 1914, when war broke loose through the action of
Germany’s enemies, Germany found herself without a definite war aim, with
no clear idea of the difficulties ahead, insufficiently armed, but with a first-
rate army and navy. Contrary to enemy expectations, the nation went to
war with determination and enthusiasm. It now became a serious question
for Germany whether the German army, with its superior qualities, supported
by the German navy and the military strength of Austria-Hungary, would,
fighting on interior lines, be able alone to meet and destroy enemy forces
(both east and west), which were far superior in numbers. The numerical
superiority of the enemy was indeed considerable. The proportion on land
was two to three or two to three and a half; at sea it was even more un-
favourable.
A swift and shattering blow was only possible by mustering the strongest
available forces against ^ance, and then only by causing the right wing of
the army to march through Belgium, with its centre of gravity north of the
line Li4ge-Namur; so as to circumvent in this manner the French eastern
front with its fortifications, and give battle to the French army in the open,
and this presumably under conditions favourable to ourselves, i.e., with our
own strong right wing encompassing the weak left wing of the enemy.
Numerous manoeuvres by the General Staff had repeatedly testified to the
soundness of these views; and they had been laid down, in the event of a
campaign, by Count von Schlieffen, who had always held by the theory of
annihilation in warfare.
THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEOTBALITT
The violation of Bel^an neutrality was a stem necessity — a tra^pc ex-
pedient due to the force of circumstances; though as a matter of fact there
was no doubt whatever in military circles as to the hostile attitude of Belgium
and England.
These considerations formed the basis of the campaign of 1914 between
Aix-la-Chapelle and Strassburg. Of the German divisions available, 70 in-
fantry and 10 cavalry divisions advanced in the west, one cavalry and nine
infantry divisions advanced in East Prussia, and six newly-formra infantry
272
GERMANY NEVER DEFEATED
divisions were held in reserve for the west. As far as the west was concerned
a greater concentration of force seemed inconceivable, yet this was not
sufficient to secure for Germany a numerical superiority on the western front,
especially since Italy (through her inaction, which was indeed expected) did
not necessitate the diversion of any French troops.
It followed of necessity that the numerical proportion on the eastern front
was most extraordinarily unfavourable. The Russian forces were more than
twice as strong as those of the Central Powers. Conditions here were all the
more imfortunate as Austria had sent a considerable number of her forces
against Serbia, in order to effect a coup in that quarter. The union of the
Central Powers for a joint campaign in the east had certain weak features.
A strategic offensive by the Austro-Hungarian army in eastern Galicia, as it
was actually planned, formed part of the general scheme for a joint action.
The only course to take in these circumstances was similar to the one actually
taken later by the 8th German army in East Prussia — namely to strike bold
determined blows, taking advantage of the enemy’s weak points. Our plan
was thus to hold the common front until, having gained a decisive victory in
the west, we might attempt the same against Russia.
THE PLANS OP THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
As part of the scheme for this campaign on land it was intended that
the German navy should take action in order to prevent the transport of
British troops to France, and at the same time to weaken the British navy
to such an extent as to render it incapable of carrying out an extensive
blockade of Germany from the north of Scotland. Notwithstanding its in-
feriority in numbers the German navy would have been equal to the task.
These plans were abandoned owing to a lack of agreement with the General
Staff, and to mistaken views as to strategy, and above all owing to the policy
of the Chancellor, who still doubted the sincerity of England’s desire to fight,
and feared that a battle at sea would provoke her unduly. The Austro-
Hungarian navy was not strong enough to be entrusted with undertakings of
strategic importance.
In spite of their weak features, the plans laid down by the General Staff
for the war as a whole were on a gigantic scale, such as had never been known
before in the history of the world; and were, moreover, the only possible
means of saving the life of Germany and Austria-Hungary. It was hoped
that in spite of inferiority in numbers, German leadership and the German
army would be able quickly to accomplish their object in the west. This
was also of importance owing to the fact that economic preparations had been
entirely inadequate. No general scheme had yet been agreed upon as to these
preparations, although the General Staff had urged the country seriously to
consider what should be done in this respect. A long war was considered
impossible by the economic departments of the Government.
On the side of the Entente it was assumed that Germany would make an
attack on France through Belgium. The French army, with the English on
its left wing, was to effect a counter-attack on the German army by way
of Lorraine and Belgium, south of the line Li6ge-Namur. An offensive by
the great mass of the Russian army was of course expected. Its main forces
were to engage the Austro-Hungarian army in eastern Galicia ; and were to
be reinforced from the direction of East Prussia by two powerful armies
coming from the Niemen and Narev; and Germany and Austria-Hungary
were, on land, to be literally smashed to pieces.
The British fleet was to protect the transport of British troops to France,
ERICH LUDENDORFF
273
also to carry out an extensive blockade. Instead of attacking the German
fleet it was to blockade closely the German coasts in the North Sea and the
Baltic, preventing any approach to Germany by sea. The French fleet was
to secure the transport of troops from Africa to the south of France, and
the Russian fleet was to control the Baltic.
THE ADVANCE THROUGH BELGIUM
Operations in the west began by the coup at Liege, which secured a free
passage for the advance of the German army through Belgium. The German
advance through Belgium north of Metz, with 54 divisions of infantry and
seven of cavalry, took the form of a broad encircling movement to the left,
with its pivot somewhere near that fortress (Metz). The Belgian army
retreated towards Antwerp; the English and French armies advanced from
the opposite side, attacking in various places, but were surrounded on the
extreme left wing, thrown back and forced to retreat. The German troops
then between Metz and Strassburg, i,e., 16 infantry and three cavalry divi-
sions, which were intended to cover the left flank of this movement, were
reinforced by six divisions from the army reserve and dealt a blow at the
attacking French forces which were far superior in numbers. At no place,
however, did the German troops obtain a crushing success; a decisive battle
had yet to be fought, and it was necessary to concentrate troops for that
purpose. Troops which had been fighting in Lorraine were to be brought
by tram as far as the extreme left wing of the army, and then to advance
on foot through Metz, and to reinforce the left wing of the fluctuating
front line. In this way the German army west of the Meuse was to serve
as an extension of the main forces, the centre of their objective being to
the west of Pans. This might have been accomplished without diflSculty.
However, the High Command allowed the troops in Lorraine to follow up
the enemy they had defeated, and muster before the line of fortresses of the
Moselle and the Meuse. The High Command had even weakened the right
wing which was seeking a decisive battle by withdrawing two army corps
from Namur in order to send them to East Prussia where the Russians
seemed to be making victorious advances. Thus the German army advancing
in France was deprived of its weight on the right wing, and was unable to
reach Pans.
BATTLE OF THE MARNE
The French army seized the opportunity of surrounding the German right
wing, which was marching unconcernedly by, to the east of Paris; and at
the same time the armies along the front as far as the Meuse opened a
fresh attack. The battle of the Marne was lost, notwithstanding decidedly
successful tactics, because the German High Command itself was not in
control, and the General Staff of the Second army did not shew sufficient
firmness. Up to this time the brave German army had made up for all
inefficiencies on the part of the leaders and had shown itself worthy of its
great tradition. Now, however, its right wing was obliged to retire far back.
German operations in the west were wrecked, and with them the plan for
the whole war. The hope of gaining a victory with this magnificent army
— trained in peace time — had not been realised. The German Hi^
Command was guilty of mistakes from which no one can exonerate it. But
the weaker one is, the more fateful the mistakes. It has been truly said
T. B. Y. — VOL. 1—18
274
GERMANY NEVER DEFEATED
that God is with strong battalions; and strong battalions were not given to
High Command, owing to the fact that military strength had not been
^veloped to its full edacity in the days before the war.
ON THE EASTERN FRONT
In tile east, initial failures had been the cause of the fatal weakening of
the German right wing in France. However, after the appointment of Field-
Marshal von Hindenburg as Commander-in-Chief, the 8th army which was
engaged in East Prussia held its position there through heavy fighting. The
army was obliged, by moving from place to place, to do the work of several.
In October its bold operations gave to the brave Austro-Hungarian army,
after the latter’s defeat in eastern Galicia, fresh power of resistance in sou&
Poland, and in November it made an attack along the Vistula toward north
Poland against the right wing of the Russian army, which was sweeping down
from Warsaw to the Carpathians; this brought the Russian advance to a
standstill.
The opportunity of following up this last action so as to bring about a
defeat of the whole Russian army which would decide the war, was allowed
to go by, because the German High Command, now imder General von
Falkenhayn, failed to supply reinforcements from the west. The army
reserve, nine divisions which had been formed and made ready at home,
was ordered by the High Command to the west — to Ypres. In France,
after the battle of the Marne, each side wished to secure the northern fiank.
Action at the front became weaker. The blow at Ypres was intended to
carry the operations as far as the river, according to the original plan; but
it proved a failure. In the east there were not enough forces for a decisive
campaign. All the same, the strength of the first Russian onslaught had been
broken; and by this failure the Entente saw its plan of operation shattered,
in the same way as the war scheme of the Dual Alliance had already failed.
A LONG WAR
Thus, for both sides the duration of the war seemed incalculable; it was
destined to penetrate ever deeper into the life of the nations and to make
ever-increasing demands upon individuals. The conduct of the war depended
more and more vitally on the numbers of men available, material resources,
and the spirit of the belligerent nations. The enemy possessed more men
and material. The particular menace to the Central Powers lay in the eco-
nomic blockade which England was carrying on contrary to international
law, the effects of which became more acute as time went on. It was now
a question whether the spirit of the peoples in the Central Empires would
still rise superior, and whether Germany in particular would retain the
entiiusiasm with which she had entered the war, or whether those forces
would assert themselves which had been known to give trouble even before
the war.
As far as Germany was concerned. General von Falkenhayn and the
Imperial Government were considering after the battle of the Marne whether
it would not be more advisable to wind up the war as quickly as possible;
but they were obliged to abandon this idea, as there was no alternative open
to them in the face of the determination of the Entente to fight to a finish.
ERICH LUDENDORfF
275
A WAB 07 LIMITED OBJECnVBB
Now that war was to continue, General von Falkenha]m saw clearly that
it was essential for the Centaral Powera not to succumb to military or eco-
nomic exhaustion sooner than their opponents, and that they should make
every effort to avoid any premature laying down of arms. This led him
more and more to aim at limited objectives, the taking and holding of wUch
would be possible without extreme effort or a drain on reserves. He pur-
posely renounced the idea of inflicting a crushing defeat on the enemy, and
only aimed at successes whereby he could “ hammer ” at hie opponents, forc-
ing them to pay the price of our superiority, however little they might be
able to afford this — successes best calculated to injure them more than our-
selves. These limited objectives were to be taken at the first attack, not
after a prolonged defence. General von Falkenhayn hoped that by this
means the enemy would gradually be exhausted and brought to such a state
of internal wealmess that he would be willing to come to an imderstanding.
The fleet was likewise to assume a waiting attitude; which decision de-
prived Germany of an essential part of her resources for waging war. This
situation was, moreover, not changed by the battle of Jutland.
At the same time people in Germany had no true conception of the char-
acter of the war, so that the measures taken in the country itself for the
continuance of it were by no means adequate in view of the serious situation.
For one thing, no attempt was made, even at this point, to enlighten the
nation and call on it to sacrifice everything for its own salvation. Also,
no use was made of propaganda as a means of waging moral warfare against
the hostile nations, and thus an important weapon was neglected.
THE ENEMY DESIRES TO ANNIHILATE US
In all the measures which he took, the enemy was dominated by the
desire to annihilate. The British fleet, merely by its presence, maintained
the hunger-blockade against Germany. In addition to this the enemy people
at home were goaded into hatred of their opponents, a systematic propaganda
was carried on against the spirit of the nations of Central Europe, who were
physically weakening; and on land, both in the east and the west, attacl^
were continued in the hope of a decisive victory. In the winter of 1915
Russia was still of primary importance in the enemy plans. She intended
to conquer East Prussia; and to force back the weakened Austrian army
from the Carpathians into Hungary. Anxiety about the Austrian army hin-
dered the German High Command still more in the formation of its plans,
though, knowing as it did the real nature of the war, it even now found
it hard enough to make any definite decision. At the moment, German forces
were able to hold the front in the Carpathians, and Field-Marshal von
Hindenburg with reserves sent by the High Command succeeded after a
fierce battle in checking the Russian advance in East Prussia. Conditions
on the Austro-Hungarian front were, however, gradually becoming so diffi-
cult that the German High Command decided of necessity to undertake the
famous break-through between Gorlice and Tamow. This offensive gradually
assumed broader proportions — for the most part contrary to the wishes of
the German High Command — and ended in the repulse of tlie Russian army
along a wide front, with heavy losses on our own side.
276
GERMANY NEVER DEFEATED
THIS OEBMAN HIGH COMMAND VS. HINDENBUBQ AND MACKENSEN
Unfortunately the German High Command could not agree with the plans
of the Field-Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen who wished to
develop this offensive into an action which should crush the enemy — the
latter (Von Mackensen) pressing forward over the Bug, and the former (Von
Hindenburg) over the line of the Niemen between Grodno and Kovno. At
the time when this became possible, i.e., in September, 1915, it was too late
to gain thereby any important object. The Russians were heavily beaten but
by no means fatally. The grounds on which General von Falkenhayn had
hoped in these circumstances to make the Russians willing to sue for peace
are explicable only by himself.
In view of the conditions on the eastern front, and the critical state of
affairs in the west, where the French and English after unsuccessful attacks
in May were now preparing for a fresh advance; in view, too, of the conditions
in the Balkans, operations in the east were forcibly suspended. Here also,
after partial successes in active fighting, trench warfare had again assumed
supreme importance.
Already in September, 1914, Turkey had joined the Dual Alliance.
Although this was more of a hindrance than otherwise from a military point
of view, the advantage of Turkey’s action lay in the fact that it cut off
communication between the Entente and Russia and Rumania. Turkey was
hard pressed on the Gallipoli peninsula. After the taking of Warsaw, Bulgaria
made up her mind to join the Triple Alliance which now became the Quad-
ruple Alliance, and took care to secure herself against danger from Serbia,
by an attack on that country This attack also seemed imperative, in view
of the position of Austria-Hungary. The brilliant campaign which was
thereupon conducted in the Balkans, in the autumn of 1915, failed to attain
its crowning object, ie., the taking of Salonika. In Macedonia too, by the
end of 1915, the struggle for position had reached a point equally favourable
to both sides. Nevertheless, at the close of the year 1915 things seemed to
stand favourably for the Quadruple Alliance in the various theatres of war.
Taken as a whole, the plans of the Entente had failed, although the arrival
of Kitchener’s army in France, and the entry of Italy on the side of the
Entente had made the numerical balance of forces still more unfavourable
to the Quadruple Alliance: and that in spite of the victory over Serbia, the
assistance of Bulgaria, and the improved use which was now made of the
military strength of Turkey.
THE BATTLE OF VEBDTJN — A MOBAL FAILDBE
All through 1916 the German High Command renounced the idea of
continuing the interrupted Russian campaign; which should have been con-
tinued by an offensive via Rumania into the Ukraine, directed more or less
towards Kiev. This would presumably have so weakened Russia as to
arouse in her the desire for peace, and would also have put an end to the
economic distress of the Quadruple Alliance. A joint offensive against Italy
from the direction of south Tirol and the Isonzo, as was suggested by General
von Konrad, was also considered by the High Command as too great an
imdertaking. There would have been, it is true, great difQculty in obtaining
sufficient forces for such a campaign without a dangerous weakening of the
fronts, both east and west. The German High Command decided therefore
A German field telephone in France.
SCEITES BEHUTD THE GERMAN UNES
ERICH LUDBNDORPF
277
upon the attack on Verdun; whilst Austria-Himgary, exhausted as she was
after her effort against Russia, set out from south Tirol with insufficient
means, to make an attack on the Italian army, from the direction of
south Tirol.
The attack on Verdun was not undertaken with the object of destroying
this most powerful fortress of France. We hoped, rather, that we should
be able, while using only a small amount of our own forces and material,
to inflict a deep wound on the French army, from which it would slowly
bleed to death. Our calculations were wrong. The fighting, which lasted
for months, wore out not only the French army, but also the German. This
attack must be recorded as a moral failure. Conditions proved more favour-
able to the French. They held their position and were now able to take
part in the Somme offensive, though perhaps not to the extent they had
originally wished.
Even in 1916 the Entente had not given up its idea of annihilating us.
By March, Russia was attacking the German front from Vilna to the Gulf
of Riga, aiming at widespread objectives ; she was, however, heavily repulsed.
On the other hand, considerable successes were gained by the so-called
Brussilov offensive, directed against the Austrian front, this last being greatly
weakened as the result of the offensive against Italy. Austria-Hungary was
obliged to bring this unfortunate campaiim in Italy to a close. German
troops were being sent to the east. The offensive on the Somme, which was
opened shortly afterwards by the English and French with an amount of
material such as they had never had before, caused severe pressure on the Ger-
man front in the west. Attacks by the Bulgarians in Macedonia were not suc-
cessful. The Quadruple Alliance, fighting as it was on interior lines and
with limited objectives, which is a contradiction in terms, was forced on all
fronts to assume a defensive attitude, and was obliged to renounce all initia-
tive. Its forces and efforts were crippled in all directions. The enemy
seemed to be triumphing on all fronts, thanks to his superiority in numbers,
also to his flourishing war industries. At this period of severe tension Ru-
mania entered the war on the side of the Entente; her plan being to press
through Transylvania to the south of Hungary, thus surrounding our eastern
front and ultimately causing its collapse. She hoped thus to separate Bulgaria
and Turkey from the two great Central Powers, and by this means to secure
victory for the Entente.
HINDENBUBO AND LUDENDOBFF TAKE COMMAND
At the end of August, 1916, during this period of serious anxiety, the
Emperor summoned Field-Marshal von Hindenbui^ and myself to the High
Command. We were both aware of the extraordinary difficulty of the task
which lay before us, and we saw only too clearly the negligence of which
Germany had been guilty both before and during the World War, and the
enemy’s determination to destroy us. The fact that it was no longer possible
to procure cereals and oil from Rumania caused a severe crisis with regard
to provisioning. We could now only hope for success by putting all our
energy into the conduct of the war; and that meant developing to the utmost
our national and economic resources, and throwing them all into the scale.
In order to counteract the pacifist, defeatist and revolutionary tendencies
which had been ppceptibly coming to the fore, it was essential to make the
whole nation realise the gravity of the situation and to inspire it with a
determination to fight imtil victory was gained. It was necessary also to
bring all national and economic resources to the service of the war; at the
278 GERMANY NEVER DEFEATED
KATno time to organise measures for the reinforcement of the army and the
improvement of tactics at the front, in order that the latter might be adequate
against the overwhelming massed action of the enemy. In particular it
seemed important, with a view to sparing human life, to let machines take
the place of men, as far as possible, t^erever the High Command was
responsible only to itself, all its plans were carried out, but when the
Chancellor (Bethmann-HoUweg) had to be consulted, a great deal that was
essential was left undone. The Chancellor completely failed to carry out
his most important tasks, those calculated to raise the spirit of the people.
On the contrary, he allowed the unmolested development of forces which
already existed in the country and were endangering victory, and which were
furthered by the effects of the blockade and of hostile propaganda. Above
all, he neglected to institute propaganda against the morale of the enemy
countries.
As far as strategy was concerned, the newly-appointed High Command
found itself incapable, in view of the almost hopeless military situation, of
converting into effective action its theory of fighting to a finish. The way
for such action was only opened by slow degrees, owing to the furious attaclra
of the enemy on all fronts. It was first made possible by the hasty offensive
conducted with emergency troops against our new enemy, Rumania. The
latter was defeated up to the winter of 1916-1917, indeed only saved by
tile winter from total destruction. The supply of cereals and oil was again
secured for the Central Powers, in spite of the systematic destruction of the
oil wells. But the necessity of leaving a number of competent divisions on
the Rumanian front proved a burden to the High Command, since it involved
a corresponding depletion of reserves both east and west.
In view of the increased armaments of the enemy on all sides, there
remained at the beginning of 1917 (as far as the theatres of war on land
were concerned) no choice for the High Command except to allow the enemy
to take the initiative, and to endeavour during his attacks to retreat to the
Siegfried (or Hindenburg) line. Thus on land the war had ^come entirely
a defensive one.
ADOPTION OF SOBMABINE WABFASE
At sea, on the contrary, it was possible by means of unlimited submarine
warfare to take the offensive, and thereby to influence the whole situation of
the war in a decisive manner. This put an end to the unnatural position by
which the power of our navy was nearly lost owing to its passive attitude.
At last Germany was able, despite weakness in numbers, to throw her whole
strength into her fight for ©dstence. The submarine warfare was intended
not only to bring relief, so sorely needed, to our own troops, by hindering
the transport of war material to the enemy fronts; but also to undermine
the entire economic life of the enemy countries, and their war industries.
It was hoped in particular that this would seriously affect England’s food
supply (just as her blockade had affected ours), and that we should thus
make her suffer to such an extent that she would desist from the further
pursuit of her desire to annihilate us, and would be ready to make peace on
terms honourable to both sides.
The fact that this submarine warfare would afford President Wilson a
welcome excuse for entering the war on the side of the Entente was a dis-
advantage which had to be taken into account, for the High Command had
no doubt whatever but that the President would declare war as soon as the
chances of victory seemed to favour tiie Central Powers. These last were
therefore compelled to go to war with America in order to save their lives.
ERICH LUDENDORFF
279
In deciding to carry on unlimited submarine warfare the High Command
was taking a course by no means simple, since it meant the provocation of
a neutral State; at the same time it was the only means, belated it is true
but presumably not yet too late, of making full use of a particular weapon
while there was still some hope for the Central Powers to hold their own in
this struggle for life.
The danger arising from the entry of the United States into the war,
namely tiie bringing of fresh troops from America over to France, was not
viewed by the Admiralty in so serious a li^t as it was by the High Com-
mand; for the former hoped that the submarine warfare would soon have
a decisive effect upon England. The High Command did not, however, look
on the U-boat campaigns as the factor which would ultimately turn the
scale; but rather as one of the means towards victory, though of supreme
importance for a certain period. The submarine warfare opened on February
1, 1917. According to Admiral Scheer, if it had started at the beginning of
1916 it might have proved a deciding factor in the war. It was now hampered
by restrictions that prevented the intimidation of neutral shipping, and seeing
the way it was carried on, neutral countries did not believe that it was in
earnest. Moreover, the enemy’s means of defence had become so extensive
and so effective that the activity of the U-boats was greatly hindered.
Nevertheless, it caused serious trouble to the Entente.
At the end of March, 1917, Admiral Jellicoe was obliged to confess to
Admiral Sims that England could only continue the war until November.
At the same time the Revolution had broken out in Russia. The Tsar was
deprived of his throne, because he had shown himself willing to make peace
in order to save his country from revolution. The Revolution was supported
by the Entente for that very reason. A German victory seemed possible.
AMEBICA ENTERS THE WAR
At that moment the United States declared war, as the German Hi^
Command had expected. A year had to go by, however, before any strong
newly-formed American divisions could take the field in France. The Ger-
man High Command decided to continue the submarine warfare with the
utmost energy; and also made up its mind, in the summer of 1917, to attempt
as soon as adequate forces were available to gain a decisive victory on land
against Russia, weakened as she was by the Revolution. Yet it was feared,
at any rate by the Chancellor, that a German offensive on the eastern front
would destroy the desire for peace, which was revealing itself in Russia.
Besides, the High Command had to devote its attention to repelling the
attacks of the Entente, who were trying to force a decision in the west.
The Entente, as in the previous years, had originally planned attacks both
on the eastern and western fronts. Russia fell out, however, owing to the
Revolution, and the Entente attacked only in the west, at Arras and on
both sides of Reims, in an attempt to break through the German front.
The attacks failed, causing very heavy losses to the French army and dis-
organising it internally. The German High Command was now able to
draw off forces for the offensive against Russia. The military situation
had become more favourable. The measures organised by the High Com-
mand were being carried out, its tactics had proved to be sound, and the
Powers of the Quadruple Alliance were able to hope for a victory which tiie
world should recognise as a victory of Germany and her ruling House.
280
GERMANY NEVER DEFEATED
WHY PRESIDENT WILSON DECLARES WAR
In order to prevent such a victory, President Wilson had declared war;
and now other forces were only too obviously arraying against Germany
those hidden forces which fashion the world’s history. By the Balfour
Declaration of November 2, 1917, with its far-reachmg promises, England
imdertook to protect the Jewish nation, and thus bound up the'interests of
that nation with her own destiny.
Peace was being preached at Stockholm by international, socialist and
democratic elements, and Germany was thereby induced to make her peace
resolution of July 19, 1917. This move spread the belief in those quarters
tiiat the way was always open for a peace based on understanding, and that
this was hindered only by the High Command and the German desire for
victory.
This defeatist policy was also furthered in Vienna, though perhaps for
different reasons, by Count Czemin and his following, whose opinion was
most clearly expressed in his well-known statement of April 12, 1917, in
which he declared that Austria-Hungary’s power of resistance was coming
to an end. Closely coordinate with this tendency was the attempt by the
House of Parma (to which the Empress of Austria belonged) to induce
Austna-Hungary to break with Germany and conclude a separate peace
between the Dual Monarchy and the Entente, thus dealing an even greater
blow at Germany.
Resolutions, for the most part in favour of a rapid conclusion of peace,
were voiced in many quarters, their most serious manifestations taking the
form of mutinies in the home fleet. In proportion as those forces increased
which were working for Germany’s downfall by endeavouring to undermine
her fighting spirit, the Government of the country should have acted with
greater firmness and wisdom. The Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, was
by no means equal to the ta.sk,' he proved no assistance to the High Command
in its effort for victory. He resigned his post. Under his successors. Dr.
Michaelis (who was turned out of oflSce by the Reichstag for not being suflS-
ciently accommodating) and Count von Hertling, the internal conditions
of Germany did not change. The High Command remained, and worked
as well as it could without support.
THE COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA
After July we set ourselves to deal with the Russian front inflicting
crushing blows at isolated points, since our forces were not sufficient for
larger operations. We succeeded in bringing about the enemy’s collapse,
thanks partly to the increasing Bolshevist tendency of the Revolution. The
rulers of Russia opened negotiations for an armistice with Germany, in
which Rumania also joined. The High Command had gained an important
object. It gained another through a successful action against the Italian
army, in which its plans for destroying that army were carried out to the
full. The military situation had thereby changed to such an extent that
it was possible in the autumn of 1917 to consider attempting a decisive attack
on France. It was there, indeed, and not on the Italian front that a decision
would have to be soufffit. As the submarine warfare had had no permanent
effect, the German High Command considered that a victory on land was
the only possible way to end this terrible war, more especially as the enemy
desired a fight to a finish.
ERICH LUDENDORFF
281
THE WAB AIMS OF GERMANY
Although fully aware of this desire on the part of the enemy, the German
High Command had ever been most willing to consider any suggestions for
peace p>ut forward by the Chancellor, even when these were purely of an
academic character, as for instance the peace offer of December 12, 1016.
The way to peace seemed actually to be accessible in the spring of 1917
owing to the Revolution in Russia, but this hope was frustrated. A second
possibility appeared in September, 1917. It seemed then as if development
at the front had inclined the Entente towards peace. But this tendency
appears to have been checked rapidly by internal events in Germany.
Nevertheless, the High Command had the opportunity at that time of
stating clearly its views as to our aims in the war. It pointed out the
primary necessity of securing a direct ^arantee for the economic centres
of Germany situated near the frontiers, in particular the industrial district
of Rhenish-Westphalia; and insisted therefore that Belgium must not, in
the event of a future war, be allowed to serve as a base for our enemies.
In order to achieve this object we should have to conclude closely-binding
economic agreements with Belgium, if her sovereignty were to be main-
tained; also to obtain certain military guarantees. In the east we hoped to
acquire territory especially in Courland, for the overflow of the German
population; also to secure various guarantees against the newly-arisen State
of Poland. New markets were to be won in Africa by the enlargement of
our colonial possessions. By gaining these objects it seemed as if we should
have secured for Germany the means of healthy development which she so
sorely needed, and which had been denied to her increasing population before
the war.
THE PEACE TREATIES OP BBEST-LITOVSK AND BUCHAREST
The Peace Treaties concluded with Russia at Brest-Litovsk and with
Rumania at Bucharest in the winter of 1917-1918, did not wind up military
operations in the east. It would not have suited German policy to do so.
Negotiations with Russia had indeed to be assisted in February, 1918, by a
sharp attack against the Russian front. The front between ourselves and
Great Russia required a garrison, even though a small one, to prevent raids
by Russian hordes into the occupied territory. It was necessary, moreover,
to leave four weak divisions as a garrison in Rumania, as the Rumanian
army still remained in the eastern part of the country, demobilised but
fully equipped for war. It was particularly inconvenient for the High Com-
mand to be obliged to spare 20 divisions in order to occupy the Ukraine
and later also Georgia, even though the oldest recruits could be used for
this pu^ose. As regards supplies, the Central Powers were now obliged
to obtain necessities of life from the Ukraine, as the Rumanian harvest had
entirely failed. Oil had to be procured through Georgia, for the oil produc-
tion of Rumania was not sufficient to supply the amount of oil now required
for the offensive in the west. The reason why Finland was included in
the German military area, and a few battalions left there, was that these
might serve as a menace to Petrograd and prevent Soviet Russia from
taking up arms once more against Germany at the instigation of the Entente.
The uncertainty of the position in the east necessitated more forces remain-
ing there than the German High Command had originally estimated. It
was impossible now for it to alter any plans with regard to the attack in
283 GERMANY NEVER DEFEATED
France. The assistance of Austro-Hungarian troops in the west ceased to
be efficacious after the abdication of the Emperor Charles. Consequently
ibe Gennan High Command was compelled to deql with an offensive in Italy
which naturally occurred.
The German High Command had exerted its powers to the utmost in
planning the offensive in the west. The German troops employed were as
strong as those of the enemy. The High Command had anticipated that it
would probably fail to carry through its operations at the first attack, and
that several attacks would therefore be necessary. It would have preferred
to conduct the offensive in Flanders; but the presence there of ^rong enemy
reserves did not favour this scheme. Moreover, an attack through Flanders
would have to be conducted in part over the plain of the Lys, and would
have been impeded by the muddy condition of the ground there, which
usually made fighting impossible before the middle of April. It would not
have been wise to put off operations until so late, in view of the possible
arrival of American troops to reinforce the armies in France. The German
High Command decided, therefore, to make an attack on the English rif^t
wing and the French left wing between Arras and Lahere.
THE FINAL OFFENSIVE ON THE WESTEBN FBONT
The taking of such a large objective under unfavourable conditions and
with considerable inferiority in numbers, would have required a determined,
well-planned campaign lasting 18 months, with strong leadership and un-
tiring effort in all departments.
The planning of this attack must be reco^ised by the world as one of
the greatest achievements in the annals of military history. The subsequent
heroic struggle of an army whose strength was sapped above all by revolu-
tionary movements at home, showed, however, only too plainly that a Ger-
man victory was not compatible with the views of any party or world-
policy — in fact, that a German victory must be prevented in order that
the proletariat might live.
The attack on March 21, 1918, was successful. The German soldier
proved himself superior to the enemy; yet these troops, carefully trained in
long years of peace, lacked the driving force necessary to take Amiens. A
determined attack both sides of Lille also obtained considerable local suc-
cess. Unluckily, the forces were not available to follow this up with a
fresh attack. The Entente realised that it was indeed being hard pressed,
and compelled neutral states to provide shipping for the hasty transport to
France of American troops, which now began to arrive in rapid succession.
THE AMEBICAN8 ABBIVE
The third German attack via the Chemin dee Dames was also successful,
and might have been more so but for the appreciable difference caused by
the arrival of American troops on the field of battle. Nevertheless, German
enoeesses were so marked that in England as well as in the United States a
de^ for pmce again became apparent.
In the middle of July the final German attack on both sides of Heims —
whi<ffi should have been followed up by an offensive in Flanders, was doomed
to failure. The enemy had been warned of it throu^ treachery and careless-
ages. A counter-attack which was opened immediately between the Aisne
ERICH LUDENDORFF
283
ad the Marne robbed the German army of what it had gained by the
attack of May 27. After this the enemy lost any desire for peace that he
had had. It is said, in criticism, that after the result of the battles in
March and April tiie German Hi(^ Command should have renounced any
further attacks. It should not be forgotten, however, that even in May Ibe
German soldier was still showing his superiority over the enemy; also that
in view of the developments of home policy both in Austria>HungaTy and
Bulgaria, the Quadruple Alliance was held together only by the prospect of
a German victory. The aspect of things at that time from the enemies’
point of view should also be remembered.
HOPE or VICTORY VANISHES
After the events at the end of July all hope of victory had vanished.
Our efforts had been in vain. The serious manifestations of internal disrup-
tion which became apparent in the German army at the battle of Amiens
on August 8, confirmed the melancholy conviction that its fighting strength
had become greatly impaired — of which, revolutionary agitation was not
the least cause!
Germany’s plan for the conduct of the war had become purely defensive,
whilst the enemy attacks increased, having been reinforced since August 8
by the newly arrived American troops. The only alternative which remained
for Germany was either to retreat slowly before these attacks and by heroic
fighting to put up a courageous resistance until such time as diplomacy should
have succeeded in its almost impossible task of bringing about a tolerable
peace without annexations or indemnities (according to President Wilson’s
programme) ; or, and this seemed the most probable, summoning up the
final strength of a nation driven to desperation and wide-awake at last, to
continue the war and, if need be, to perish with honour. The German High
Command and the army in the field were entirely prepared to take t.hia
last course.
The retreat took the form of a well-planned operation, and was carried
out splendidly. All attempts by the enemy to break through the German
front and subdue the German army were frustrated. The strength of the
army lasted several months longer, even though its Allies had collaps^.
Then came the betrayal of the fatherland — brou^t about by the disinte-
grating influence of enemy propaganda, by revolutionary agitation, and
finally by the outbreak of the Revolution itself ; and all this made it impos-
sible for the nation to put forth its full stren^h and therewith to support
the army. This betrayal forced the army at length to conclude an ignomini-
ous armistice. After an honourable retreat to its own country this army was
disarmed by the revolutionary authorities in Germany, at the same time
that the fleet was surrendered. These were acting in accordance with that
damnable precept of German social democracy, which runs as follows —
“ It is our firm intention that Germany shall lower her banner once for all,
without even bringing it home victorious for the last time.”
Thus they brought the German nation to its present pass. If before the
war it had not enough land for its needs, now the words of Clemenceau,
that “there are twenty million too many Germans in the world,” would
seem to be near the truth — but for the German will to live.
CHAPTER X
THE VICTORIOUS ARMIES OF FRANCE
By General Charles Marie Emmanuel Mangin
Member of the Supenor War Council Captor of Fort Douau-
mont, October, 1916 Commander of the French 10th Army;
Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour
All the Allied and Associated Powers entered into the World War with
all their heart and all their strength. The soldiers of every country gave
proof of the same tenacity and the same courage; and the leaders of the
same self-sacrifice in the common interest. The citizens of each of the war-
ring nations bore the same privations and the same sorrows with equal
courage. In this long struggle, without precedent in history, all had their
share in the common victory.
But the special action of each nation was determined by the moment
at which it entered the war, by its geographical position, by the degree of
its military preparation, by its means and its economic possibilities. The
efforts of each nation were dissimilar, and consequently the results of their
efforts were not the same. In a long and bloody battle, all regiments, arms
and even services of the victorious army are all equally deserving of the
motherland; there are, however, certain corps which, owing to their position
in the line, did more than others, and units in which losses were heavier
or whose rdle was more effective.
France was the first to be attacked; thus she took part in the conflict
from its opening day. Her frontier was the chief theatre of the struggle,
from the North Sea to Switzerland. Invaded, she endured devastations with-
out parallel. Having learned from experience, she had prepared herself for
a struggle that she foresaw long before. She had not been able to devote as
large sums to her military preparations as had her adversary; but all her
sons underwent compulsory military service. The length of service having
been reduced from five years to three and then in 1904 to two, was in 1913
again raised to three years. As a result of the extreme tension of the political
state of Europe, France, in proportion to her population, bore the heaviest
military burdens; and it is owing to this military service — equal for all —
that her citizens were able from the first day of the war to transform them-
selves into soldiers. And because of the intense work of her officers, and staff
officers, France's army was able to form increasingly numerous units and to
place them under competent officers through all the changes that increased and
differing material imposed on strategy and on tactics. These heavy sacri-
fices, to which the nation consented, enabled the French armies to beat off
the enemy in spite of his superiority of numbers and equipment, and gave
the Allies time to organise, to arm and to become trained before taking
their place in the firing line.
THE OPERATIONS AND CONDUCT OP THE WAR
On the western front, the warfare from the outset took on a character
of extreme violence. The German plan counted on a great victory over the
284
Marshal Foch, appointed Generalissimo of the Allied Forces on the Western Front in 1918*
© Keystone View Co © Keystone View Co
General Mangin, Captor of Fort Douau- General Gallidni, Military Governor of
mont, who contributes the chapter **The Pans at the outbreak of ^e World War.
Victorious Armies of France.**
GENERAL MANGIN
285
French armies. Since the smallness of her population forced France to throw
immediately all her combatants into the first line, the first defeats would,
they thought, be decisive. The German staff declared that the French people
were decadent and that they would never rise after a preliminary defeat.
Germany would thus be able to transfer almost the whole of her victorious
armies in France to the Russian front, where the mobilisation and concen-
tration of the Russian armies would be vepr slow.
Hostilities broke out on the extreme right with a rapid incursion of the
French into Alsace (Mulhouse taken and lost, August 8 to 10), while at
extreme left the Germans invaded Belgium (battle and siege of Liege, August
3 to 17; battle of Dinant; occupation of Brussels). The Belgian troops stand
north of the Sambre and Meuse; all the rest of the front is held by French
troops.
During the battle of the Frontiers, the First army of Dubail begins the
battle of Sarrebourg, the Second army of Castelnau fights at Morhange.
Retreat is necessary; it is halted by the stand of the French right, which
checkmates the invaders by defending the opening at Charmes, August 26.
In the centre, the Third army of Ruffey and the Fourth of Langle, which have
entered Belgium, are forced back as a result of the battle of Neufchateau-
Virton. On the right bank of the Meuse, the Fifth army of Lanrezac is
beaten at Charleroi, white more to the left, the British array under General
French is thrown back at Mons. During these battles of the Frontiers there
were engaged in the fight 2,689,000 French, 120,(X)0 Belgians and 70,000
English.
The general retreat ordered by General Joffre takes place in an orderly
manner, being protected by vigorous blows delivered at (3uise (Fifth army),
at Cateau (British army with some French divisions) , and at Signy-PAbbaye
(Third army). The struggle continues towards the east with the First army
of Dubail on the Mortagne and the Second array of Castelnau on the Grand
Couronne at Nancy. The German command is holding divisions there which,
according to the original plan, as we now know, were to have moved west-
ward to support the great enveloping movement Yielding to the request
of the German Crown Prince Rupprccht of Bavaria, it vainly attempts to trap
the armies of France in the arms of a gigantic pincers. The Russian attack
in East Prussia is of unexpected vehemence, and draws two German corps
from the western front to the eastern. This removal of troops diminishes the
strength of the German right, still further weakened by the siege corps
withdrawn to Antwerp and Maubeuge.
General Joffre has formed on the left of the British army the Sixth
army of Maunoury, which falls back on Pans under the orders of General
Galli6ni, the Governor of the capital. In place of following up the envelop-
ment of the French left by a large movement reaching to the west of Paris,
the first German army of Von Kluck bends in an oblique direction east of
Paris and in its rapid march, exposes its flank to an attack from Paris.
BATTLE OF THE MARNE
General Galli^ni obtains permission to profit by this and attacks towards
the Ourcq on September 5. Acting in concert with General French, whose
support he has obtained. General Joffre then advances the date of the gen-
eral attack which he has foreseen and been preparing for. All the Allied
armies halt, make a half-turn and advance against the enemy. A general
battle follows on all fronts. But at the German right, the First army of
Von Kluck, pressed by the Sixth army of Maunoury from September 5, orders
286 THE VICTORIOUS ARMIES OF FRANCE
to its right on the evening of the 6th the two left army corps, the departure
of which breaks the line. The left of the Fifth army of d’Esperey at once
takes advantage of this opening, the British army accompanies the movement,
and the Second German army of Von Billow threatened by a turning move-
ment, begins to retreat, forcing the whole German front to fall back as far as
the Aisne, where reinforcements taken from the left enable it to stand.
THE RACE TO THE SEA
From the middle of September the two adversaries attempt to outSank
each other on their west wing The British army, which fought on the Chemin
des Dames with remarkable bravery, is transported to the nortli in order
get nearer its base. It begins the long and terrible battle of Ypres (October
15 to November 13), whilst the struggle is continued with equal fury on
both its right and left. The Allied armies fight side by side and even inter-
mix, and the fraternity of the battlefield diminishes the hardships which
the dualism of command inevitably entails. Presently the shortage of muni-
tions and the absence of the necessary means for destroying the fortifications
which are being constructed from the North Sea to Switzerland lead to a
long pause, interrupted only by violent local fights.
THE WAR FOR POSITION
The two adversaries are buried in trenches along two or three lines, de-
fended by barbed wire net-work. Behind this first position, a second and
often a third are established. The woods, the villages and certain important
points are centres for independent resistance. The figlit continues under
enemy fire and often through the night and is everywhere formidable. The
armies seek means of breaking these new defences and improvise new methods
of warfare, new materials of attack and defence; clipping-shears, armoured
wheel-barrows, hand-grenades, shells with live fuses for destroying barbed
wire defences, etc. The problem is how to break the front This is the object
of frequent and costly experiments, particularly to the French
The effort in men and material is proportionate to the length of the front.
The front was divided thus:
Belgians
English
French
Amencans
Italians
Total
Kilometres
Kilometres
Kilometres
Kilometres
Kilometres
Kiometru
[ January
18
40
715
773
1915
[July
27
63
695
785
[ October
27
116
640
783
; January
27
96
646
769
1916
April
26
138
598
762
(
[ October
24
127
612
765
1917
April
27
138
574
739
(
[ February
90
20D
520
750
1918 <
(June (end)
40
165
646
10
911
1
(Nov. 11
50
90
300
120
10
570
The effectives of the British armv in France increased far more rapidly
than the length of the front held by the British troops, who became more and
more dense (6,800 to the kilometre in January, 1915; 11,600 in January,
1916; 13,000 in 1917), while on the French front there were only 3,500 to
4,000 combatants to the kilometre, a number which corresponds to the density
GENERAL MANGIN
287
of the German front opposite. These figures, which comprise not only the
troops in sectors, but also the divisions in reserve, were not known in France
until the end of 1916, for General Joffre, questioned on this point by the Gov-
ernment, refused to reveal information that the British command had commu-
nicated to him in strictest confidence. The French command fully understood
that the British troops were almost all recently enlisted, that they did not in
the beginning possess the same fighting capacity as the French troops and
that they therefore required a progressive training, a greater density on the
front, more frequent relief, and longer periods of instruction behind the lines.
But these considerations were overlooked by the parliamentary commis-
sions in France. The Army Commission in the Chamber, in particular,
reproached the French Command for having demanded from its Allies an
extension of front only at the moment of preparation for attacks. It also re-
proached the French Ministry for not having intervened with the British
Government in order to ask — to insist on an equitable division of fatigue
and dangers in order to relieve the French troops.
During this long war for position, attempts to break through were made
sometimes by combined actions, such as the battles of Arras in May to
June and September 25, 1915, the battle of the Somme in July to October,
1916, the battle of the Aisne in April to May, 1917, the battle of Flanders in
August to September, 1917, and sometimes by actions in which only one army
was engaged, as at the battles of Champagne in December, 1914, and Sep-
tember 25, 1915. The only really serious attempt at breaking through on
the part of the German army took place at Verdun, and this great battle
which lasted during nearly tlie whole of 1916 was fought entirely by French
troops. Under a bombardment such as was never known before, the French
troops yielded several kilometres of territory in February and March, some
hundreds of metres in April and May. The German advance, although con-
tinuously slowing down, progressed mechanically and irresistibly, after a
bombardment which demolished the trenches together with their defenders.
But at the end of June, the French made a counter-attack and overwhelmed
the enemy. The struggle diminishes in intensity in August and September,
at which time the battle of the Somme is at white heat. It terminates in
victory by the retaking of Douaumont on October 24, and of Louvemont-
Bezonvaux on December 15.
THE BATTLE OP PRANCE IN 1918
The check to submarine warfare forces Germany to seek on land a solu-
tion for the war. She can now transport to the western front those troops
that are available because of the surrender by the Soviets. But the entry
of America necessitates a prompt decision before American forces are suffi-
ciently numerous to reestablish the balance of strength on the principal front.
On March 21, the British right is attacked; all the French reserves rush
to the battle which begins with a disastrous reverse for the Entente, A
soldering is made before the irreparable separation between the two armies
takes place. From April 9 to 29 the attack recommences on the British
centre, which at first gives way. The salient of Ypres is menaced. A newly
formed French army immediately arrives, and the German advance is halM
after severe fighting.
On May 27, the French line is bent on the Chemin des Dames and pushed
back as far as the Marne. On June 9, a new attack near Compi&gne carries
with it the threat of connecting the salient of Montdidier (a result of Ae
attack of March 21) with that of Chateau-Thierry, which dates from May
THE VKJTORIOtJS ARMIES OF FRANCE
27; but a counter-attack of five French divisions on the flank of tiie Grermaa
advance halts it on June 11 This is tbe first time since the beginning of
this inauspicious year that any such result has been obtained. It marks the
end of the German successes.
On July 15, a new German attack opens in Champagne and meets with
an elastic defence which it cannot overcome. On July 18, the French offen-
sive makes a surprise attack without any preparatory cannon firing and falls
on the west flank of the Chfiteau-Thierry pocket, between the Aisne and the
Marne. After the first day, more than 10 kilometres of advance is made and
the total captures are 20,000 prisoners and 200 cannon. The success is con-
tinued as far as the Aisne and the Yesle; it is the second victory of tiie
Marne. On August 8, the British armies and the First French army are vic-
torious in Santerre; on August 20, an advance begins again on the Aisne
and carries the French to the Ailette. Then the Americans wipe out the
salient of Saint-Mihiel; the battle for Flanders has begun, to be continued
indefinitely, for Marshal Foch, after having dealt successive blows along
the whole front, orders a general action, which is terminated by the premature
Armistice of November 11, at the moment when the last effort would have
carried the Lorraine front to the Saar, cut the German commuzdcations and
forced the armies of the Kaiser to throw down their arms.
THE COMMAND
If we seek to establish the role of the French command in the World War,
it may be stated that the first battle of the Marne was won by Marshal
Joffre, who was in command of the French armies. The success of the Ger-
man attack of March, 1918, was needed in order to convince the Allies of
the necessity of a single command, which had been foreseen m 1917. The
great offensive battle, which began on July 18, 1918, and which finished the
war on November 11, was led by Marshal Foch. In the east, it was under
the command of the French General d’Esperey that on September 15, 1918,
the Allied armies won the victory of Macedonia which pierced the Bulgarian
front, and led them to the Danube.
When we thus examine the conduct of the war in its bare outlines we
see that to the French command and staffs fell the task of the constant or-
ganisation of all the new methods of warfare caused by the use of new mate-
rials and of masses of men whose numbers had until then been unheard of.
First, there was the war of movement, in which over-brutal operations had
to be adapted to the use of the machine-gun and the heavy cannon; then
followed the war of position, and here all had to be improvised for attack as
well as for defence. The results were the costly experiments of 1915, termi-
nated by the offensives of Artois and of Champagne, and the brilliant defence
of Verdun (the only offensive in the grand style that the Germans imdertook
druing the three years of this period) which was terminated by the victories
of October 24 and December 15, 1916; the check of the fourth German offen-
sive July 15, 1918, in Champagne; the second victory of the Marne, begim
only three days afterwards, on July 18. Let us remember that to the credit
of the French staffs belong the reorganisation of the Serbian and Rumanian
armies and the instruction of the American armies in which 2,000 French
officers served — 500 in the training camps in America, and IJKK) in France
in fighting units. There is no doubt that the American troops would have
been able to teach themselves by experience; but after April, 1918, there was
no time to be lost and they were thrown into the fighting line as rapidly as
possible. Hence the use of Allied instructors. In one American division
GENERAL MANGIN
alone, out of ten French oflScers, seven fell on the battlefield. (See Lt.-CoL
Requin’s La Course de VAmerique a la Victoire (America’s March to Vic-
tory) , with a letter of appreciation from Mr. Baker, Minister of War, pages
81 to 87, 112, 140 and 165.)
SFFECTIVB FORCES AND LOSSES
The French peace army, which comprised 817,000 Frenchmen, was raised
to 3,704,000 between August 1 and 15 by the mobilisation of the reservists
and territorials. During the next ten months it incorporated 2,740,000 addi-
tional men through the enlistment of the young recruiting classes and the
old territorial classes. It replaced its losses continually, first by the incor-
poration of the following classes eighteen months ahead of time: that is to
say, of the young men of the average age of eighteen and a half years; second,
by increasingly rigid revisions of exempted men and of malingerers (the
young classes were examined four and even six times) ; third, by the combing
out of all services and the use behind the firing line of none but medically
disqualified men; fourth, by the use of its over-seas contingents.
The military strength of the incorporated men was 7,842,000 Frenchmen,
260.000 natives of North Africa, 275,000 natives of the tropics, 38,000 natives
of the old colonies (Antilles, Reunion, etc.) — a total of 8,415,000 men. From
1917 the railways, navigation, mines, war factories, and agriculture employed
approximately 1,300,000 Frenchmen and 300,000 colonials; nevertheless, owing
to the rigid methods of recruiting, the strength of the armies on the north-
east front and in the east was always maintained between 2,700,000 and
3,000,000 fighting men.
Taking into consideration only Continental territory, all Frenchmen medi-
cally fit and between 18 and 45 years of age were mobilised for more than
four years. One-fifth of the total population remained under arms during
the whole of the war.
The French armies having from the first to the last day supported' the
heaviest burden of the war, also suffered the heaviest losses. They bou^t
victory at the price of 1,357,800 men dead (36,000 ojfficers, 1,245,000 French;
71.000 colonial natives, 4,600 soldiers of the Foreign Legion). The total
losses amongst officers were 18 5 per cent, and of combatant officers 22 per
cent; amongst French soldiers the losses were 15.8 per cent, and 15.2 per cent
in the ranks of their coloured comrades, who arrived later at the firing line.
These losses bore most heavily on two classes of the nation: first, the in-
tellectuals, since they furnished the largest number of officers (93,000 at the
time of mobilisation, 104,000 appointed during the course of the war) ; and
next, the agriculturists, because all men engaged in transportation, miners,
and workingmen in general, were withdrawn from the front in order to
serve with the non-combatant army and above all in war factories. It is
for this reason that England, for example, did not have the same proportion
of losses as France; English workmen had to remain in the mines to dig
coal, in war factories and in naval shipyards in order to repair the losses
caused by the German submarines, and her sailors had to remain with the
fleets which transported the foods for the Entente armies, etc. Every class
of every nation, and every nation in the Entente did its duty. Nevertheless,
in speaking of losses it must be stated in what proportion they affected the
different nations. France lost one killed for every 27 inhabitants — men,
women, and children; England lost one killed for every 57 inhabitants of the
British Isles, and one killed for every 75, if the total white population of the
British Empire be counted; Italy lost one killed for every 79; Belgium, who
T. a. Y. — VOL. I — 19
290
THE VICTORIOUS ARMIES OF FRANCE
could not recruit on her invaded territory, lost one killed for every two
hundred; Russia, one for approximately every 107; the United States, which
entered late into the war, one for every 2,000 inhabitants.
To the 1,281,000 dead Frenchmen must be added 740,000 mutilated. These
losses fell chiefly on the younger classes, because the older classes were placed
in less exposed positions. More than one half of the young men between 19
and 34 were struck. In addition, civilian mortality was noticeably increased
by the sufferings and privations of war; the birth-rate went down owing to
the absence of married soldiers, and it will remain diminished for many gen-
erations on account of the disappearance of 1,300,000 young men of whom
the greater number would have founded a family. Never before has any
nation suffered such a loss of human capitel.
WAR MATERIAL
It has been said that the World War was a war of material. One might
have said that it was a war of fighting effectives, for it was terminated by the
wearing down of German divisions with losses which could not be replaced.
Again, it might be called a war of command, for this wearing down was the
result of the clever combinations and the tenacity of Marshal Foch — that is
to say, it was an absolutely personal work. And again, the war could not
have been won without the imperturbable energy of Marshal Joffre; and yet
again it was a war of soldiers, for in no other war have the combatants in the
ranks ever had to display, and for so long a time and to such a high degree,
qualities of courage, endurance and tenacity in the face of ever-increasing
hardships. It was, too, a war of nations, for never before have nations en-
tered in so great a degree into a struggle with all their resources Intensive
recruiting, privations due to the maritime warfare, and the labour of all,
including women, who replaced farm-hands, workmen and employees fighting
at the front, were all a part of the universal effort
War of nations, war of soldiers, war of commands and staffs, war of fight-
ing effectives, war of material, the World War was the sum of all these wars
in which each factor played an immense role, indispensable to victory.
The equipment of the French army corresponded to the idea that all
European staffs had formed in regard to a future struggle — a short and
violent war, full of movement. In 1886, the French army had adopted a
repeating rifle of reduced calibre and more accurate trajectory, a result of the
use of a new smokeless and greaseless powder, the invention of a French
military engineer. For a long time this rifle remained the best, but was later
followed by other similar weapons. To-day, in 1924, it still remains in use.
But there were not enough of them, and 2,265,000 of these weapons had to be
made and almost as many had to be repaired. The role of the machine-gun
had not been estimated at its true value in the French army; 71,000 of them
had to be manufactured. Besides the machine-gun, were automatic rifles to
tile number of 290,000, used after 1917. To feed this infantry weapon, it was
necewary to manufacture five thousand million cartridges of 18 millimetres.
The infantry used 102 million hand grenades and 40 million rifle grenades.
The field artillery at the beginning of the war was composed only of the
75 millimetre cannon, adopted in 1897, the perfection of which remains un-
equalled in 1924, thanks to its hydro-pneumatic brakes; these automatically
replace tiie gun in firing position without disturbing its aim, and afford an
exceptional rapidity and accuracy of firing. The number of tiiese guns in
use in August, 1914, was 2,500; in July, 1915, 2,950; and in September, 1918,
6,600. It was necessary to replace worn out and damaged cannon and in part
GENERAL MANGIN
291
to furnish other Allied armies with them. In brief, war manufactures com-
prised 13,000 gun-barrels, 12,000 brakes, 6,000 gun-carriages, and repairs were
scarcely inferior in number. The number of cartridges manufactured for tiie
75 cannon was 180 millions, although at the beginning of the war the number
on hand hardly reached 4 millions. Both French and Germans were short of
mimitions in September, 1914, after the battle of the Marne, for the calcula-
tions made fell far short of the real demand. This shortage prevented the
battle from being a decisive one, and thereafter both sides engaged in inten-
sive manufacture. The construction of these cannon cost 240 million francs,
the repairs 36 millions, the munitions twelve and a half thousand millions,
and the shell cost an average of 70 francs (25 francs before the war, 80 francs
in 1916 and about 60 francs in 1918) .
But the 75 cannon, contrary to an opinion too generally formed, could not
do everything. It had to be reinforced by heavy cannon of medium calibre,
and higher trajectory, which could seek out enemy battenes and shelters
behind the defilements of ridges, and which could thus counterbalance the
material and moral effect of the German heavy artillery. In July, 1916, the
piece known as the ’105 short made its appearance, and m October, 1918, was
used with 1,575 Schneider equipment and 260 St-Chamond equipment. Of
the ’105 cannon, which produced the same effects as the ’75, but with added
power, 155 were to be found at the front in 1916 and 730 at the end of
hostilities.
At this time, heavy and powerful artillery- was represented by 600 pieces
of ’155 long, 260 pieces of ’220 short, 95 pieces of ’270, 80 pieces of ’280. The
old pieces of the Bauge system, ’80, ’90, ’96 of field artillery, did good service
during the first part of the campaign, but their day was over. In 1918, there
were still in use 24,000 pieces of the ’120 and ’155 long and short of this
system, and mortars of about ’220.
Besides these few brief facts on artillery material, mention must be made
of aviation (3,600 French aeroplanes at the moment of the Armistice) ; of
2,600 tanks; of toxic gases and methods of protection from the same; of means
of communication and in particular the development of the telephonic wire;
of motor trucks, the use of which increased throughout the war; of railways
and their utilisation in the side movements behind the lines ; of the provision-
ing of the armies — a matter of the greatest importance; of sanitation and all
the progress which led up to it; and of clothing and equipment for more than
8 million men. This simple enumeration gives but a feeble idea of the in-
dustrial effort of France during the war in spite of the occupation by the
enemy of those regions which contained the greatest part of her industry.
It must be added that the British fleet assured the Entente of the mastery
of the Atlantic Ocean, while the French navy held the Mediterranean. Raw
materials and coal and provisions arrived, thanks to these circumstances.
Let it also be added that France contributed to the armament and equipment
of the Allied armies in fairly large measure, namely to an amount repre-
sented by a sum of more than 10 thousand million francs, which was deducted
from the French debts In this total the share of the United States figures at
three and a half thousand millions, for the American army received 137,000
horses, 1,871 French ’75s, 762 ’156 short Schneiders, 224 cannons of ’155 of
great power, 240 tanks, 2,676 equipped aeroplanes, thousands of machine-
guns, mitrailleuse rifles, trench engines, and material of every kind. The
American divisions, as was right and fair, received their share in ’155 shorts
before the French divisions. The American field artillery, equipped solely
with French cannon, used during the whole of the campaign nothing but
French projectiles.
The monetary cost of the war. expressed in every country by an increase
292 THE VICTORIOUS ARMIES OF FRANCE
of the public debt from 1914 to 1921 (during the period of hostility and of
immediate liquidation ) , was far higher in France than in the other Allied or
associated countries. As a result, France has borne by far the heaviest burden
of the war. The Memorandum on Public Finances, published in 1922 by ttie
League of Nations, evaluated the cost of war as follows: (See in the Revue
de France of November 1, 1923, a remarkable article by M. Georges Hersent
Qtn a itayi la guerre ) .
In Millions of Francs at Par
Internal Debt
(Increase)
External Debt
(Increase)
Total
France ....
... 197350
77306
274,650
Great Britain . .
. . . 143,875
34,000
177375
Italy
. . . 72,970
20,000
92,970
Belgium
. . . . 26,000
1380
27380
United States .. ..
. . 113,900
—
113,900
DEVASTATION OF FBENCH TEBRITORY
France served as a battlefield for more than four years in a war which
took place in her richest departments; these produced 80 per cent of her tex-
tiles, 90 per cent of her minerals, 81 per cent of her cast-iron, 55 per cent of
her coal; 26,000 factories and 590,000 houses were destroyed, of which 450,()00
were razed to the ^ound, and wide spaces had to be cleared of barbed wire
and frequently of live shells, levelled and brought back to order.
It was not merely the necessities of a war of aggression which caused these
ills; it was the desire to strike France in a vital spot and to assure for a longer
time the triumph of German industry. Throughout the whole of the French
occupied zone, new machines were dismantled and taken to Germany, others
were broken and factories dynamited. In order to ruin agriculture, the fruit
trees were razed to the ground. Coal-mines were systematically destroyed,
timber was removed, wells were inundated. Railways, roads, works of art
were the object of the same deliberate destruction. The advantages of science
were placed at the service of barbarism in a way hitherto unheard of in the
annals of humanity. The losses caused by all this went far beyond the total
of those inflicted on all the rest of the Allies put together. According to The
Official Report of the Commission on Reparations from 1920 to 1922, war
damages were valued as follows in millions of francs at par:
Damage to Property
Damage to Persons
Total
France
136380
81,940
218320
Great Bntain . .
27,672
43,575
71,147
Italy
24,134
50,079
74313
Belgium ... .
. . . . 29358
6,772
36,630
Umted States .
948
4,000
4348
(Approximate valuations)
(Pensions)
By tte Treaty of Versailles Germany agreed to pay reparations for the
war which she was responsible for and which she carried on with an unex-
ampled savagery; but the Allies have permitted her to organise a fraudulent
bankruptcy, and France has been forced to raise herself from her ruins by her
own means. She has courageously undertaken this, and this colossal work
has started well; but in the matter of reparations the account against Ger-
many, which declares herself insolvent, is a French debt which has risen to
one hundred thousand millions of francs.
To sum up, in this long struggle in which the liberty of the world was in-
volved, all the Allies have done their duty ; their self-sacrifice for the common
GENERAL MANGIN
293
nterests and their indestructible union assured a victory for Right. But
he geographical situation of France, directly attacked, placed her in the first
ine; forty years of reflection, of silent work, of sacrifices and study gave her
m army which for a long time and almost alone bore the burden of battle,
vhich never ceased to take, in that battle, a preponderant part. After the
irst reverses, this army gathered renewed strength and at the Marne de-
itroyed the German plans. At the end of the long war, in which all fought
vith equal courage, it was the French command which assured the triumph
if the Allied armies.
CHAPTER XI
AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR
By Frank H. Simonds
Chevalier of the Legion of Honour Military Editor of the
Review of Reviews. Associate Editor of the New York Tribune.
Author of History of the World War; They Shall Not Pass —
Verdun, 1916.
I. Introduction
In any accurate appraisal of the American military contribution to the
Allied victory in the World War there are two clearly defined aspects to be
considered. In the first place since the United States was but one of many
nations fighting in a common cause, and her military forces necessarily
played a restricted role, we have first to examine the relation of this role
to the war itself. What was the American contribution to that achievement
which was disclosed in the Armistice terms of November 11, 1918?
In the second place American participation must be viewed as an inde-
pendent military performance of its own. Acting in the closest cooperation
with the Allies, the United States nevertheless engaged in battles in which
the troops of Pershing fought as divisions, corps and finally as armies, first
under the orders of French general oflScers and then of American. These
battles, Cantigny, Belleau Woods, Aisne-Mame, St. Mihiel and finally the
Meuse-Argonne, deserve to be studied for themselves, since they constitute
a part — and in magnitude the most impressive part — of American military
history.
Here, then, is the double question which the writer seeks to answer. (1)
What did Pershing’s army contribute to the common victory? (2) What was
the character of this contribution, itself? What did the United States bring?
and What did she do?
II. What the United States Brought
To consider the value of the American military contribution to the Allied
victory on the military side, it is essential first of all to appreciate the con-
dition of the Allied cause at the moment when the United States declared
war, April, 1917, and in June of the same year, when the first American
division reached European shores.
In April, 1917, the dominating circumstance was plainly the decline and
rapidly approaching fall of Russia. The campaign of 1916 had brought the
Central Powers to the edge of ultimate disaster. The terrible failure before
Verdun, the deadly grinding attrition of the Somme, the amazing victories of
Brussilov in Galicia and Volhynia, the ever-increasing pressure of Italy along
the Isonzo — all combined to put an intolerable strain upon German re-
sources and German resolution. At the close of the year Germany seemed
294
© Anfsfon* ('if
General Pershing, Comniander-in<-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France.
© Keystone View Co © Keystone View Co,
Major-General Leonard Wood, originator The Hon. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of
of the Plattsburg training camp and later War in President Wilson’s Cabinet from
GoTomor-General of the Philippines. 191S to 19S1.
FRANK H. SIMONDS 295
not only condemn^ to the defensive, but to a defensive without issue. She
was bleeding to death from many wounds and Ludendorff, in his own narra-
tive, testifies to the peril of the hour.
An Allied resumption of the concentric attack, of the strategy of Grant,
which brought the South to its knees by maintaining pressure all round
the mighty perimeter of the Confederacy, this was not only indicated by
conditions, but foreshadowed by preparations. All that was needed for vic-
tory, it seemed, it still seems, was that Russia should deliver one more blow;
that, to use the American Civil War parallel again, Sherman should march
to the sea, while Grant continued to hold Lee before Richmond.
But brusquely all changed. Russia staggered and then collapsed. The
opening British success before Arras on April 9 had no decisive aftermatii.
The French army was beaten at the Aisne and the character and complete-
ness of its defeat affected its morale. In a word, while there were abrupt
changes alike in the French High Command and in the French political
world, the French army ceased to be available as an offensive force for the
balance of the year.
Relieved thus on the Russian side and on the French, the Germans were
able to concentrate against the British in Flanders and beat down Haig’s
supreme effort in the bloody shambles of Passchendaele. Before the year
had ended the capacity and the strength, the moral and the physical re-
sources of the Allies to crush Germany by a renewed attack, had disappeared.
More than that, despite the warnings of certain military leaders, the politi-
cians had overborne the soldiers and the Allies had settled down to a passive
defensive, leaving to Ludendorff the opportunity to attack when and as he
chose. For the first time since the terrible days before Ypres in October,
1914, the initiative had passed to the Germans on the western front.
In accepting the defensive in January, 1918, the Allied leaders were domi-
nated by a single calculation. The defensive of itself could decide nothing.
It was not a means to victory but a postponement of the event. It was
purely and simply a calculation based upon the expectation of the ultimate
arrival of America in such strength as to permit the Allies to pass from the
defensive to the offensive and achieve victory.
In a word, the strategy of Haig and P^tain in 1918 was that of Wellington
at Waterloo. From March to July the whole mighty battle of France would
repeat the comparatively insignificant, but forever memorable, struggle which
terminated the career of the great Emperor. Like Napoleon, Ludendorff
would strive with all his might to crush his enemies actually before him —
the French and the British — to pound them to pieces before help could
come. Could Pershing arrive in strength in advance of the collapse of Haig
and P4tain as did BlQcher before Napoleon had destroyed Wellin^n’s army?
This was the whole problem of the Allied campaign of 1918, only dimly
perceived in advance but disclosed with almost ghastly clarity after the initial
disasters of March and April.
Now Pershing did arrive in 1918 as did Blflcher in 1815. In both cases
the arrival did not come until the defensive had been strained to the utmost.
Like Napoleon at Waterloo, Ludendorff at least twice saw victory slip through
his fingers. Moreover, just as in the case of Napoleon, when the moment
came for the supreme effort and the employment of the Guard, the battle
was already lost, so, when Ludendorff staked all on the July offensive — the
^gantic “ Peace Storm ” — his battle was also doomed.
The history of the whole war on the western front, from the moment the
war of positions succeeded that of movement, is comprehended in the question
of reserves. Until September, 1918, no offensive could lead to decision, be-
cause neither side possessed that decisive advantage in numbers and machin-
296
AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR
ery, which enabled it to follow up a local success or avoid being halted by
the arrival of the reserves of the enemy. To succeed it was necessary first
to suck in all of the enemy’s available reserves, while retaining a striking
force for the final thrust
In June, 1918, the Allies were in a situation in which, could Ludendorff
have attacked again, victory was his beyond question, for there was left to
Foch no sufiicient reserve to meet a new attack. The March and May at-
tacks before Amiens and on the Chemin des Dames had exhausted Allied
reserves. But Ludendorff was in the same situation. He, too, must wait and
reorganise, and while he waited, America arrived; when he resumed, it was
Foch who possessed the superior reserves and could pass to the offensive
after defeating the last German offensive. But this superiority was due
largely to the arrival of American divisions, alike on the battle front and
in the quiet sectors, where they released Allied combat units.
On November 11, when the end came, Ludendorff had a single division
in reserve, Foch upwards of a hundred, but of the hundred, reckoning in
bayonet strength, more than half were American. Moreover, for November
14 Foch had planned a new attack between the Moselle and the Saar, on
either side of Metz, and since the Germans had no reserves to send to this
sector, that attack could have proceeded without limit. Once it had pierced
the thin lines defending the German trenches, its road to the Rhine was free,
and already the Germans had be^n the evacuation of Metz In that new
offensive, too, many American divisions were marked to participate, and this
participation would not diminish the pressure the American First army was
exerting with fatal effect in the Meuse--Argonne.
Without American intervention, then. Allied victory in 1918 would have
been impossible Conceivably, had American troops not arrived when they
did and as they did, contributing alike time and numbers, Ludendorff would
have won. That was his calculation, and if he lost, it was not without more
than one vision of triumph. The United States brought the victory. With-
out her the war could have been for the Allies at best a stalemate.
III. What the United States Did
Of the various engagements in which American troops participated, at
least five — namely Cantigny, Belleau Woods, the Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel
and the Meuse-Argonne — may fairly be described as battles, although the
first two were, reckoned in the scale of world-war conflicts, no more than
local affairs, while the third, the Aisne-Marne, presents a confused and con-
fusing aspect, since it was fought under French High Command and Ameri-
can troops were used in various phases and without connected relation. Only
St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne are battles in the contemporary sense, and,
since they were fought by American armies under American command, fur-
nish a satisfying picture of the American Expeditionary Army actually at
work. To these five must be added the battle of the Hindenburg line, in
which two American divisions, fighting under British command, played a
considerable and useful part. For the rest, although American divisions also
fought imder Gouraud in Champagne and with the Belgians and French in
Flanders in the closing phase, their service, while useful, is indistinguishable.
(a) CANTIGNY
While the 26th Division had endured a severe, if local, German attack
in the trenches about Seicheprey in the Woevre a month earlier, it is the
FRANK H. SIMONDS
297
taking of Cantigny by the Ist Division which really opens the active military
operations of the American Expeditionary Army. On March 21 Ludendorff
had launched his gigantic “ Kaiser’s Battle,” which brought the Allied cause
to the edge of defeat. On the morrow of this attack Pershing in memorable
words had placed his whole force at the service of Foch, newly come to
supreme command.
But in March and even in April, the American resources were slender;
actually there were not more than the 1st and 2nd Divisions available.
Moreover, it is not until April 25, nearly eleven months after its arrival,
that the 1st Division actually goes into line. The German drive for Amiens
has ended, the new front has stabilised. Ludendorff has won the most tre-
mendous victory of the war, since the First Marne; but he has failed of a
decision and must collect his resources for a new effort.
The position taken over by the 1st Division is of utmost importance, since
it is north of Montdidier and covering the Paris-Amiens railway, along the
new front where the German attack of March was finally pinned down. This
new front is not yet consolidated, the trenches are mere traces hastily thrown
up in the day of supreme peril. The word now is to hold; the time to
counter-attack has not yet arrived.
Nevertheless, after a four weeks’ stay, the 1st Division, after long and
careful preparation, suddenly rises from its trenches, advances along its whole
front, takes the village of Cantigny and its surrounding defenses, consolidates
its new gains and holds them. A brilliant opening exploit, costing little in
the attack but involving material losses when the Germans begin to retaliate
with their heavv artillery. Prisoners and guns are taken and an advance of
more than a mile is made on a division front. The affair had begun on May
26 and the news of it is given to the world at the precise moment when
Ludendorff makes his second bid for decision — that on the Chemin des
Dames. This news, too, will serve as the single solace for the Allied world
in the terrible days which follow, solace because it is the first authentic sign
that America is arriving. Cantigny is exclusively a 1st Division affair and
the 1st Division is a regular division, made up of troops drawn from the
standing army.
(b) BELLEAU WOODS
America’s second battle follows closely on the first. On May 27, when
Ludendorff rushes across the Chemin des Dames, across the Aisne and the
Vesle and takes up the road for the Marne, the 2nd Division is resting in
billets north of Paris. It is under orders to take over portions of the Amiens
front near the 1st Division But on Decoration Day its orders are changed
and it is hurried eastward of Meaux along the Paris-Metz road.
At this moment the German drive is just reaching its limit. The Ger-
mans have taken Chateau-Thierry and lined the Marne eastward to Dormans.
They have failed to get Reims and have been stopped outside of Soissons.
They are enclosed in a deep and awkwardly narrow pocket or salient, and
further substantial progress is prohibited to them until they reorganise their
communications. They have advanced until they are out of breath and have
outrun their supplies.
Already a machine-gun detachment south of the Marne facing Chateau-
Thierry, a detachment belonging to the American 3rd Division, has aided
in keeping the Germans north of the river. Now the 2nd Division, the Marine
Brigade and two regiments of regular infantry go into action astride the Paris-
Metz road, four miles west of Chateau-Thierry. The ground they occupy is
memorable in this war because here there opened that fatal gap between
29S
AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR
Billow and Kluck, which forced the German retreat from the First Marne
and the loss of the best chance Germany ever had for victory.
On Jime 1 the 2nd Division is coming into line. Degoutte’s French troops
retire through the American lines on the following days. The front stabilises
itsdf. Facing the marines north of the Paris-Metz road is a thick tangle of
forest land covering a rugged hillside, a typical New England country-side.
In this wood the Germans have established themselves, and are organising
cover with their customary thoroughness. It will serve, they think, as an
admirable point of departure for the next attack, for the final march upon
Paris.
The marines, however, Harbord commanding the marines, Bundy the
division, think differently, and, French units cooperating, on June 6 they at-
tack. Their objective is the whole woods before them, Belleau Woods then,
the woods of the Marine Brigade for all future time. This attack does not
get far. Nor will other attacks make much progress. Not imtil Jime 25
will the marines emerge on the German side of the forest, with the task
accomplished.
In the stru^le they lose 48 oflScers and 1,176 men killed, 17 officers and
1,528 men missing, 196 officers and 4,879 men wounded. The total casualty
account is, then, 285 officers and 7,585 men, 7,870 in all — killed, wounded
and missing, nearly 30 per cent of the organised strength of the division.
In the battle the division took 24 guns and 1,654 prisoners. It also used up
several German divisions, rushed up to hold an unexpected thrust.
Cantigny was a promise to the Allies, Belleau Woods was a threat to
the enemy. German experts still disparaged the tactical training of Ameri-
can troops, but they now agreed in asserting that American troops would
fight, could fight, and had the value of shock troops. For Ludendorff, Belleau
Woods was a foretaste of what the Meuse-Argonne would be.
(c) AISNE-MABNE
On July 15 Ludendorff launched his final offensive, which culminated in
the second battle of the Marne. His main attack was between Reims and
the Argonne on the field of the great battle of Champagne of September,
1915. A secondary and concomitant attack was to be made along the Marne
from Chateau-Thierry eastward. The main purpose was to crush the French
armies on this double front, but the immediate strategic purpose was to
aboUsh the Reims salient, drive all the Allied forces south of the Marne from
Chalons to Chateau-Thierry, separating the armies about Verdun from Paris
and threatening the rear and communications of all the other French armies
from the Meuse to Switzerland.
Almost immediately, however, the German attack between Reims and the
Argonne was checked An answer had been found to the Hutier tactics which
had brought victory at Caporetto in 1917, in March, 1918, before Amiens,
in April about Ypres, and finally, in May about the Chemin des Dames.
By the next day Ludendorff was obliged to abandon his main attack, but
the secondary operation along the Marne had met with moderate success,
the river had been crossed on a wide front and German armies moving east
toward Epemay were approaching that city and threatening all the communi-
cations of Reims. Accordingly Ludendorff decided to continue.
We are now at the supreme crisis of the war. A vast German force has
engulfed itself in the narrow Chfiteau-Thierry salient. Its lines of communi-
cation are parallel to the sides of tbe pocket and perilously near to the firing-
line. If the Allies can thrust west out of the ^ims salient and east from
the forest of Villers-Cotterets, a short advance in botii cases will at the least
© KeyHone V *cu> Co.
More than 2,000,000 American troops were transported to France during the World War. Above,
the transport Piattsburg/’ her decks crowded with U. S. soldiers.
FRANK H. SIMONDS
299
BO menace German communicatione as to compel the troops fighting on the
Marne to retire; it might, with luck, close tiie pocket in their rear and achieve
a gigantic Sedan.
Against such an attack, Foch has made preparations, hasty and incomplete,
for all depends upon the success of Gouraud and the French Fourth Army
in Champagne. But if it holds then there will be a general attack, the main
thrust coming just south of Soissons and directed eastward across the German
communications. But, while the main thrust will come south of Soissons,
there will be a general attack all round the salient.
For the decisive operation three divisions are marked, the 1st and 2nd
American Divisions will attack on either side of the French Moroccans.
Southward between the Aisne and the Marne along the Ourcq the 4th Ameri-
can Division will fight. Southward again and facing out from Belleau Woods,
which it has taken over from the marines, is the 26th, the Yankee Divi-
sion. South of the Marne are the 3rd and the 28th, with Gouraud is the 42nd,
which will later be moved westward. During the German attack, the first
phase of the battle, the holding stage, the 42nd east of Reims and the 3rd
south of Chateau-Thierry will render brilliant service, particularly the 38th
Regiment of the latter division.
On the morning of July 18, however, it is the 1st and 2nd which go into
action. The moment has come to pass from the defensive to the offensive.
Moreover, the Germans along the side of the Chateau-Thierry salient are
asleep. Suddenly out of the mists and fog and through the standing wheat
come the Americans and the Moroccans, following a sudden sharp artillery
preparation. With them come innumerable tanks.
Along miles of front the German resistance collapses, prisoners and guns
are captured in vast numbers, the main lines of communication are ap-
proached, commanded and even at points crossed. By night there is no longer
any question of a continuation of the German offensive out of the Chateau-
Thierry salient. What is to be decided is whether Ludendorff can save the
huge force he has adventured into this abyss.
Meantime all along the line the attack is pressed, the 4th, the 26th, the
3rd, the 28th pass to the attack. On July 19 the German line everywhere
wavers. By this time Ludendorff has had enough. Henceforth his effort
will be to escape. But, thanks to the pressure of the pursuit, in which the
32nd and 42nd participate and even the 77th joins, he will exhaust all his
reserves in the undertaking and be condemned henceforth to the defensive.
In the attack and the pursuit eight American divisions participate, and four
are National Guard units, a significant detail. French, British and Italian
troops are also in line. But the decisive circumstance is the attack of the Ist
American Corps, the 1st and 2nd Divisions in the daylight hours of July 18.
The measure of their service is disclosed in their casualties, 7,870 for the
1st, 3,792 for the 2nd. But the 1st took 3,500 prisoners and 63 gims, the 2nd
3,000 prisoners and 75 guns In the battle and pursuit Americans engaged
eight divisions — nominally a quarter of a million men and actually nearly
200,000; their loss was above 45,000 killed, wounded and missing; their cap-
tures 9,000 men and 138 guns.
The performance of various National Guard divisions in the pursuit was
beyond praise. Still but partially trained they crossed bayonets with Prus-
sian Guard units and prevailed. But for the presence of American regular
divisions the counter-offensive could not have been risked; but for the pres-
ence of other American National Guard divisions the pursuit could not have
been.pressed. In the battle and the jiursuit more American troops participated
than in any previous battle in American history.
300
AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR
(d) ST. MIHIEL
The Second Marne and the Aisne-Mame phase of it is the turning-point
of the campaign and of the war. By comparison the next American battle
is relatively unimportant. In reality the significance! of St. Mihiel lies in
the fact that, strictly speaking, it is the first American battle, the opening
operation of the American Expeditionary Army fighting as a imit and fight-
ing under American High Command. Cantigny, Belleau Woods, the Aisne-
Marne — these were the tests which enabled Pershing to make good his
demand that American soldiers fight as an army, rather than as scattered
fragments, in the several Allied armies.
St. Mihiel was a wholly simple operation, quite like that of the Aisne-
Mame, since it consisted in the reduction of a pocket or salient. This salient
the Germans had driven into the French barrier lines along the heights of
the Meuse in the days of the First Marne in 1914. It extended westward
from the Woevre plain, over the heights of the Meuse and included a bridge-
head west of the Meuse. Thus it partially isolated Verdun and at the same
time enabled the Germans to close the main Paris-Nancy railway.
In the winter of 1914-1915 Joffre had striven desperately to break down
the western side of the salient about Les Eparges and had failed almost
tragically. A second attempt in the summer of 1915 west of the Moselle in
the Bois le Pretre had been even more costly and futile After that the war
had gone northward, and the St. Mihiel salient remained a thorn in the French
flank, but no longer an active sector.
The business of Pershing was now to reduce the salient, both because it
offered an admirable field for an opening operation of a new army, and
further because such a reduction was an essential preliminary to any attack
north and west of Verdun in the Meuse-Argonne region, such as was now
being devised.
As planned, the attack would consist of a main thrust upward between the
Moselle and the Meuse and a minor thmst outward from the heights of the
Meuse north of St Mihiel. The conception was that these two attacking
forces should meet behind the nose of the salient, which was at St. Mihiel,
surrounding the Germans inside the loop and capturing them.
The German positions were fortified with extreme skill, were almost im-
pregnable on the north and very strong between the Meuse and the Moselle
Nevertheless, feeling the pressure for reserves Ludendorff was already begin-
ning to draw out of the salient when the blow fell. It caught him unawares
and in his own narrative he reproaches himself bitterly for the disaster.
September 12, Pershing's birthday, in the daylight hours the attack was
delivered. Between the Moselle and the Meuse the Americans had six divi-
sions in line and two in reserve: on the heights of the Meuse two more, act-
ing in cooperation with a French imit. Between these two groups around the
nose of the salient were French troops, whose mission was to gather the fruits
when the victory had been won.
From start to finish the operation was a success. Within twenty-four
hours the two attacking forces had joined hands behind the salient." The
German resistance had collapsed: The wreck of the Germans had retired
to the new line drawn across the base of the salient. Prisoners taken num-
bered 16,000, guns 443^ the total American loss being 7,000. As an initial
performipce it was bnlliant in the extreme, and for the Germans terribly
expensive now that their reserves were beginning to melt with such alarming
rapidity. For all the Allied armies it was a new stimulus; it was the final
evidence that Americans had arrived in fact and in force. All told it was
for the Allies one of the most profitable twenty-four hours of the war up to
FRANK H. SIMONDS 301
that time, measured by prisoners and guns taken, by ground gained and by
the smallness of the cost in casualties.
(e) MEUSI>-AROONNE
With the closing days of September we enter the final phase of the cam-
paign of 1918. The German has everywhere been driven back into his organ-
ised positions from which he emerged in March. In the pursuit he has lost
enormously in men and in materials, his reserves are disappearing; his confi-
dence is abolished. All his effort now will be concentrated on holding the
lines he occupies until winter closes fighting and opens the chances for attain-
ing peace by negotiation. Meantime he is actually preparing to start nego-
tiations
Foehns strategy will be comprehended in a never-ending pressure, in a
series of rhythmic attacks, now here, now there, designed, in sum, to turn
the German out of his defences, exhaust his remaining reserves, reduce him
to that condition where there can arrive what Napoleon called the “ event,”
namely the collection by the assailant of a striking force and the delivery
of a final blow, against which the enemy no longer has any remaining
resource
In this programme the British will attack from Ypres to St. Quentin, the
French from the Oise to the Argonne, the Americans from the Argonne to
the Moselle, but chiefly between the Argonne and the Meuse. Presently the
Belgians will also attack north of Ypres and Italian troops will appear on
the Chemin des Dames At bottom Foch’s strategy is that of Grant in 1864.
As the American general used Meade, Sherman and Thomas in coordinated
attacks calculated m the end to use up Confederate resources, so Foch will
employ Haig, Petain, Pershing The policy is again attrition, and Foch not
only has the men but the machinery to make the German expense vastly
higher than his own.
In this colossal operation the American part will be to advance north,
between the Meuse and the Argonne, west of Verdun, carry the various Ger-
man defence systems, reach open country and press down on either bank of
the Meuse toward Sedan and Montmedy. Twenty odd miles north of them
runs the main German line of communications, the Metz-Lille railway. It
is the life-line of all the German armies in France and of most of those in
Belgium If it is cut before the Germans get out, untold thousands of them
will be caught like rats in a trap with only the narrow aperture between
Sedan and the Dutch frontier as an avenue of retreat and only one railway
line to move all their accumulated material of four years of war.
Between the Americans and Sedan lies an intricate region of deep forests,
high hills, marshy valleys, most difficult on the west in the famous Argonne
Forest, where the attack of the Prussians in the Valmy campaign of 1792
came to grief. The German lines have not only been carefully prepared, but
before them is the tremendous glacis of chaos resulting from the great Verdun
battle. To pass this, to bridge it when it is passed, this will be a tremendous
problem, so great in fact that the Allied authorities, French and British
alike, warn Pershing against the attempt and would use his forces elsewhere.
But Pershing insists, has his way and does attack on the morning of Sep-
tember 26, his attack backed by 3,000 guns and aided by a great air concen-
tration, both details largely supplied by the French. His force is organised
in three corps, three divisions to each, operating on a twenty-five-mile front.
The attack is frontal and straight ahead. The immediate objective the
series of German defences as far north as Montfaucon, the hill town which
dominates the country. Having “ mopped up ” all of these, the attack will be
302 AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR
resumed at once and, overrunning the remaining German defences, reach the
vital railway.
Successful as it is beyond all reasonable expectation, this opening Ameri-
can attack just misses reaching all of its objectives. Its centre is checked
in front of Montfaucon, and before this vital position can be taken the Ger-
mans have had time to collect their reserves and pour them into the threat-
ened sector. So, like all similar attacks, the American offensive dies down,
the front stabilises again. It will be necessary to bring up new reserves,
above all to create communications across the desert. Here is the main
problem.
Pershing has advanced six miles, and even seven at points; he has taken
10,000 prisoners and 100 guns. On October 4 he will resume, but this time
he is almost instantly checked; the Germans are ready, they still have re-
serves. Henceforth progress will be slow. An intricate, indescribable battle,
reminiscent on a huge scale of the Wilderness in the American Civil War, is
joined and continued for more than three weeks, while slowly, resistlessly
but at terrible cost in men and in effort, the American army presses on and
finally reaches the last German line.
The battle is the battle of soldiers. There is little strategy, hardly more
regard for tactics; a young giant and an old veteran grapple, youth against
experience and preparation, and the question is always whether youth can
endure the agony until age begins to tell. There is nothing in the war more
inspiring than the achievement of the young soldiers in the Meuse-Argonne.
Finally, on November 1 age does tell, the German defence collapses along
the whole front, now extended east of the Meuse. The American advance
becomes a mad scamper, the German is not retiring, he is disappearing, the
Mets-Lille railway is first brought under indirect fire and then disclosed along
the Meuse to the astonished gaze of the American soldiers facing Sedan.
But now, we are on the eve of the Armistice.
In the Meuse-Argonne Pershing engaged 22 divisions, with replacements
amounting to 700,000 men. He took 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon and 3,000
machine-guns and he suffered 117,000 casualties. Against him the Germans
used and used up 47 divisions, more than a quarter of their whole strength.
In the battle the American army advanced more than twenty miles, reached
and crossed the main objective, which was the Metz-Lille railway and had
before it at the Armistice no German force capable of checking its further
advance. The road to the Rhine was open. In the two months from St.
Mihiel to the Armistice, during which American troops fought under Ameri-
can command, they took 42,000 prisoners, 1,290 guns and an accumulation of
war material beyond calculation. They also occupied and exhausted more
than 60 German divisions, above a third of Ludendorff’s entire army.
In the Meuse-Argonne as at St. Mihiel, the American armies were enor-
mously aided by French guns and aircraft, while French ammunition was
alone available. Neither operation could have been made without this aid.
Moreover, in both cases the strain of organising communications for the
moment surpassed American experience and preparation. These things de-
serve emphasis, not because they were unusual or different from the experi-
ences of other armies in the same stage of development, but because it is
always important to make clear the handicaps imposed upon the soldiers by
the state of unpreparedness which existed when the United States entered the
war and to destroy the evil legend that in a few months, and out of no thing ,
a country can improvise a perfect military machine.
FRANK H. SIMONDS
303
CONCLUSION
When the Armistice came, America had troops fighting on the Scheldt, the
Upper Sambre and on the peculiarly American front between the Meuse and
the Moselle, while there were other divisions ready to join in the proposed
attack between the Moselle and the Saar. She had engaged 29 divisions and
had 13 more available. She had two armies organised under Generals Liggett
and Bullard. She held more line than the British and nearly as much as the
French; and alone of the commanders of national armies, Pershing reported
his forces as ready to continue during the historic session which framed the
terms for the German surrender.
In sum, America came to the battle of France as Bliicher came to that of
Waterloo, bringing the reserves of victory, engaging the enemy before he could
achieve a decision, drawing off his reserves at the critical moment and finally
supplying the Allies with a reservoir of man-power which enabled them to
seize the offensive, break the power of resistance of an enemy already ex-
hausted by his supreme effort, and join in the pursuit which had no visible
terminus at the moment when the Armistice ended the fighting.
It was the existence of American divisions available for action which en-
abled Foch to risk the counter-offensive of July 18; it was the actual fighting
of these divisions which permitted the victory and insured the exploitation of
it, which was so fatal to the Germans. These first divisions, then, enabled the
great French Marshal to regain the initiative, while St. Mihiel and the Meuse-
Argonne sucked in so many more German divisions, otherwise available
against the French and the British, that on Armistice morning Ludendorff
was destitute of all further resources. He was powerless before a blow which
was already impending.
CHAPTER XII
THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY ON AND
UNDER THE SEAS
By OswAU) T. Tuck
Instructor-Commander in the Britiidi Navy. Head of the
Admiralty Historical Section.
Whatever may have been the causes which overwhelmed the world with
war in August, 1914, it was not welcomed by the German Naval Authorities.
The fleet they were building would not be completed till 1920. Their ally,
Austria, was not expected to be of any assistance; they realised that they
would have to bear the whole brunt of the naval operations alone From
every standpoint it was clear that their position was bad. Their ships were
greatly outnumbered by the British. Between them and the open ocean lay
file British Isles, shutting them off from sea communication with their colonies
and with the few cruisers they had been unable to recall The only plan,
since war had been determined upon, was to abandon these to fend for them-
selves and concentrate on reducing the margin of British superiority suffi-
ciently to permit their main force, the so-called High Sea Fleet, to come into
action. Till then it was to be kept intact behind the barrier of forts and
sandbanks which guard the German coast.
TRIPLE AIM OF THE BRITISH FLEET
This suited well the British war plan. It was based on the principle
that the Germans must be prevented from attacking in force the shores
of the British Isles or the shipping on which the life of the nation de-
pended. It had, moreover, to recognise that the British army might cross
the Channel and operate with the French. During the army’s passage its
protection would be the third of the main tasks of the British navy. All
these objects would be attained if the German fleet could be destroyed in
battle; but in view of its inferiority it was hardly likely to seek action.
There remained only to blockade it. Since in the face of submarines a
close blockade of the German Bight was no longer practicable, for the main
or Grand Fleet of Great Britain a base was chosen at Scapa Flow, in the
Orkneys, beyond what was considered the effective range of submarines. The
battle squadrons were not to remain in harbour; they were continuously to
sweep the waters between Scotland and Germany ready to engage the High
Sea Fleet should it put to sea. However, German light forces might raid the
transports continually passing between England and France. To stop these
raids the older warships were disposed on either side of the transport route,
while half the best destroyers and all the latest submarines, based on Harwich,
were to sweep the southern part of the North Sea and obtain early information
of enemy movements.
304
The daring attack on the German submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Belgian
coast in 1918 with the object of blockmg both harbours. No fewer ninm y. c.’s were
awarded for extreme gallantry in this bold and hazardous enterprise.
OSWALD T. TUCK
305
The events of the first six months of the war followed naturally from tiiese
3lans. The German fleet did not seek action. The Harwich Force made sev-
eral raids on the outposts in Heligoland Bight, provoking the Germans to
•eply. Their answer took the form of combined mining and bombarding raids,
/he towns chosen being generally those undefended. On two occasions the
•aiding force returned scot-free; but on the third they fell into the hands of
he British battle-cruiser force under Sir David Beatty and narrowly escaped
lestruction. The incident deepened the Kaiser's anxiety not to risk his
leavy ships; and the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von In^nohl, was
•elieved by Admiral von Pohl with orders that unsupported raids were to
;ease.
FAILURE OF FIRST GERMAN WAR PLAN
Apart from these raids, which had no further object than to annoy the
idversary, the war was being carried on for the Germans by the submarine
ind mine-layer, employed in the policy of attrition. They were meeting
vith little success. Such losses as they were able to inflict were more than
nade good by newly built ships Moreover, the German plan of laying
nine-fields secretly in unannounced positions enabled the British to declare
be North Sea a dangerous area and to restrict neutral shipping to certain
lefinite routes where it was easy to exercise control. The number of con-
/raband-runners that escaped the British fleet must have been very few.
But, indeed, there was little need of contraband-running. Great Britain in
ler respect for International Law and the rights of neutrals as yet saw no
ivay of preventing a vastly increased import by the nations bordering Ger-
many, although there was little doubt that most of the goods imported found
their way across the German border. Nevertheless, the watch for contraband
[lad to be continued, even though it was felt in the fleet to be a farce.
Abroad, German naval power and the movements of German shipping
hiad come to an end. In the Mediterranean quiet had reigned for many
months. At the outbreak of war a formidable ship, the “ Goeben," the latest
of the German battle-cruisers, was at large and a menace to the transporta-
tion of the French troops from Morocco to France. The chief task of the
British squadron in the Mediterranean was to help the French, who by a
convention signed on August 6 were given supreme command in that sea.
The whole French battle-fleet massed in those waters afforded direct escort
bo the transports, and the services of the British squadron were not required;
but communication between the French and British was incomplete and
through a lack of concerted effort the ‘‘ Goeben " escaped to Constantinople.
At first it was thought she was interned; but this was soon seen to be a
mistake. The Turkish Government announced that they had bought her in
place of two dreadnoughts preempted by the British ; she hoisted the Turkish
flag, and through her Germany exercised strong pressure on Turkey. At the
beginning of November a British ultimatum that she and her crew must be
interned received no response, and the Allies commenced hostilities by a
bombardment of the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. As they did
not proceed to occupy them, the demonstration merely hardened Turkish
obstinacy, especially as months elapsed before anything more was done.
Outside the Mediterranean, squadrons of British cruisers, reinforced in
some cases by French warships, occupied the important confluences of trade.
The trade routes were not patrolled nor, indeed, did British ships follow
their normal tracks. In the open sea they were instructed to scatter singly
so as to present as little target to a raider as possible, and a State Insurance
Scheme indemnified ship owners in case of loss. But before the war was a
T. B. Y — VOL. I — 20
306 THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY ON AND XJNDER THE SEAS
fortnight old the whole system of trade defence had been weakened by the
necessity of escorting home the garrisons from abroad in order to swell the
force in France. From so far as China the cruiser system had to bear
the unexpected bmden of escorting troops; and in the Indian Ocean the whole
British squadron was occupied in escort. It was here that the German cruiser
“Emden” made a brief and boldly executed raid. The “Karlsruhe’s”
equally successful career in Uie Atlantic was cut short by an internal explo-
sion. The other German cruisers made little impression.
nESTEUcnoN OF VON spee’s squadron
Apart from the isolated German ships the only squadron was that of five
vessels under Count von Spec, stationed in the Pacific. That ocean became
untenable when Japan declared war on Germany on August 23. The German
colonies, one by one, were occupied by the Allies; and as, moreover, the
German system of supply from neutral ports broke down under the vigilance
of the British cruisers and the rigid neutrality of the countries not yet at
war. Von Spee as a forlorn hope decided to make for Germany. Off the coast
of Chile he met and defeated a weak British squadron under Sir Christopher
Cradock, who was lost with his fiagship; but the German Admiral met his
fate near the Falkland Islands where his squadron was destroyed on Decem-
ber 8 by Sir Doveton Sturdee, specially sent out with two battle-cruisers by
Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. One Gorman ship, the
“ Dresden,” escaped, to be destroyed a few months later.
Altogether the first six months of war had given Britain a stronger naval
position than she had hoped to win. Her imports flowed in unchecked; her
army and its reinforcements had landed in France without the loss of a man
or a pound of baggage; her coasts, except for a few futile bombardments,
were inviolate. She seemed to have secured all the results of naval victory.
SUBMARINE WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING
But Germany was contemplating a new and untried form of warfare.
Having failed to make any appreciable mark on the British fleet she now
decided to give Great Britain the mortal wound by bnnging her imports to
a standstill. This is a recognised object of warfare, and had been successfully
achieved by the British so far as consideration for neutral Powers would
pernut. Germany, with her surface ships immobilised, could carry out her
decision only with the submarine, a craft which by its nature was unsuitable,
since though it could destroy ships it could not in itself bring them in for
adju^cation nor even provide for the safety of the crews, as had been the
practice. Nevertheless, on February 18, 1915, there was brought into force
an announcement that Germany would attack all shipping in the neighbour-
hood of the British Isles, and it was soon clear that the submarine was the
instrument she was employing. Large merchant ships were given a defensive
armament, the patrol craft were increased, and the Straits of Dover and other
channels were netted; but no really effective reply to this new weapon had as
yet been devised, and in the first six months nearly 200 British merchant ships
were destroyed, only a few submarines being lost in the process.
Widi World Photos
H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth ** is a post-Dreadnought ship, carrying eight 15-inch guns, with
which in 1915 she attempted to force the passage of the Narrows at the Dardanelles.
WuU U arid Photos
The submarine M-3 at a Naval Review at Spithead. During the War the effectiveness of sub-
marines was enormously developed, some twelve different types being in use in naval operations.
Wide World Photos
H,M.S. ** Hood ” at a Review of the Fleet at Spithead. This warship is the latest type of post
Jutland battle-cruiser, has a speed of 32 knots, and mounts eight 15-inch guns.
OSWALD T. TUCK
307
SINKING OF THE “ LUSITANU ”
Nevertheless, the inherent objections to the use of submarines were oper-
ating. Their frailty, and the fact that certain liners carried a couple of guns
astern, gave Germany an excuse for torpedoing large vessels without warning;
and many neutral ships were destroyed. On May 7, 1915, the “ Lusitania,”
one of the largest British passenger liners, was sunk without warning, and
oyer a thousand men, women and children were drowned. Among them were
citizens of the United States. That country refused to accept the German
plea of military necessity, and in September Germany restricted her submarine
campaign to waters where American vessels were not found; for more than a
year the Mediterranean became the main theatre of the terrible struggle.
There great events were in progress Lord Fisher had been devoting his
energies to building a large fleet of craft which he intended for a landing
on the Baltic shores of Germany. The scheme, however, w'as deemed im-
practicable ; and, instead, the British Government decided to make an attempt
to capture Constantinople by a combined military and naval attack on the
Dardanelles. The various parts of the operation were not well coordinated;
and when after some delay the troops landed, they found that in spite of
heroic efforts they could not make appreciable progress. The submarines
took toll of the supporting forces and supply ships, and the prospect of success
receded till, in January, 1916, the attempt was abandoned and the Gallipoli
peninsula evacuated The general failure of the Dardanelles Expedition had
been redeemed by the intrepid action of British submarines, which penetrat-
ing the mine-fields and nets of the Narrows had cut the sea communication
with the peninsula. One of these, commanded by Capt. M. E. Nasmith, sank
89 Turkish vessels and put out of action several others — the most impressive
submarine feat of the war, far outweighing anything the Germans did.
Most of the troops which had been on the Gallipoli peninsula were trans-
ferred, first by the French and later by the British, to the port of Salonika
in Greece where they remained for years awaiting orders to advance. The
move did not lighten the naval task of protecting their communications; and
the absorption of naval effort in this duty left little to spare for direct
attack on submarines These used as bases the Austrian ports in the Adriatic
and passed out to their cruises by the Straits of Otranto. When Italy joined
the Allies in May, 1915, it became possible to attempt to bar these straits;
and a fleet of British fishing vessels endeavoured to keep the raiders in by
a barrage of nets They were several times attacked by Austrian cruisers;
but the barrage was steadily maintained, as yet with little success, for most
of the losses of merchant ships at this period of the war occurred in the
Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the campaign in home waters had been lim-
ited to the North Sea and Channel. German ingenuity evolved a new type
of mine to be discharged from a torpedo tube, and boats fitted for this had
been laying these ugly eggs in clutches of half a dozen all along the coast.
The losses from these mines were considerable; but the mine-sweeping service,
now a vast organisation, redoubled its efforts to keep the channels clear, and
frequently mines were swept up within a few hours of being laid. The Ger-
man naval authorities made repeated attempts to obtain the Kaiser’s assent
to imrestricted warfare, that is, torpedoing at sight; but they were defeated
by the action of one of their own submarines in siting a passenger ship, the
“ Sussex,” and ixiwning a number of American citizens. The United States
once more protested with such force that the Kaiser ordered all submarine
08 THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY ON AND UNDER THE SEAS
irarfare in future to conform with the Prize Law, which insisted on visit and
earch before action and on reasonable precautions for the safety of pas-
engers and crew.
BATTLE OF JUTLAND
The order reached the High Sea Fleet at sea out on another bombarding
aid; it was now under Scheer, an ofl5cer of great energy. For submarines
3 work by the Prize Law, in view of the activity of the defence, seemed to
im to mean annihilation of the frail craft and he ordered his boats home,
'here were a number of smaller submarines operating from Zeebrugge ; these
Iso went home and for several months attacks on merchant ships in home
waters came to an end
Scheer now planned to use his submarines in a fleet operation; his idea
^as to station them off the harbourh m which the British lay waiting and then
y a sortie of his battleships, to attract out some part of Jcllicoe’s fleet. When
ae plan was put into effect the British fleet put to sea as expected, but its!
apid evolutions baffled the watching submarines, and on May 31 off Jutland
/ suddenly appeared in full force out of the mist in front of Scheer. He
ad no intention of engaging more than a detachment; and by a well-executed
olte jace he was able to hide himself in the mist before the British fleet
ould turn and follow him. When night fell, Scheer dodged round behind
is adversary and brought his fleet in safety home. Though the waiting sub-
larines again failed to hit any ships when the British fleet returned to har-
our, in the few minutes of firing while the mam fleets were in contact both
ides suffered some losses. Still, the action left the relative positions much
s they had been; the British battle-fleet remained too superior for Scheer
3 risk a decisive action. He made one repetition of his plan, without any
pecial result; but a third attempt became impossible, when in October his
iibmannes were ordered to resume the war on commerce.
The Bntish navy fought the submarine by every mechanical device that
enius could invent and every stratagem that courage might suggest. Even
dth the most rapid construction of destroyers and the nearly complete ab-
orption of the fishing fleets in the anti-submarine service, there were too
2 w vessels for more than a continuous patrol of certain avenues of approach,
n these areas any submarine which betrayed its presence was hunted. If
n the surface it was fired on; when it dived, the patrol boats clustered
ound and dropped bombs on it The submarines were dnven further and
iirther from the British Isles till they could find leisure to work only in
lid-ocean. Here they found their prey.
THE NEW Q-SHIPS
But sometimes the bait concealed a hook. A submarine carried only a
mited number of torpedoes and preferred to sink her quarry by gunfire,
'his suggested to a fertile brain the idea of heavily arming a harmless-look-
ig tramp steamer, concealing her guns under deck-houses, and then waiting
or a submarine to approach. At first there were successes with these so
ailed Q-ships, but some submarines which escaped after attack gave warning,
nd thenceforward they were very wary. It fell to the lot of the Q-ship
rews to be shelled for hours, to be torpedoed, to have their ship set on fire,
11 the while hoping that before she sank they might entrap the cunning
aemy into presenting a reasonably hopeful target. Nothing that would
OSWALD T. TUCK
309
frighten him was allowed to appear; indeed, several times men sank with their
ship rather than give away her real character. The stories of the Q^ships
stir the deepest emotions.
By all these means the submarines were hampered in their work of
destruction. In fact, the shortage of shipping from which the Allies were
beginning to suffer was not so much due to the losses at sea as to the enor-
mous amoxmt of tonnage demanded for the supply services of the armies and
navies, not only of the British but of the French and Italians. Consequently,
only two-thirds of the vessels afloat were available for the work of import;
and the people of Great Britain especially were dependent upon foreign
meat and grain for the next meal.
If the Allies were suffering severely it was equally true that the situation
of Germany was almost desperate. Success on the military front seemed
further off than ever; and the British blockade was at last effective, for, by
withholding coal from companies known to be trading with Germany, Great
Britain was able to restrict almost completely the supplies of her enemy.
Gradually Germany was forced into the position of a beleaguered and
starving town.
But surrender was still far off. Experts assured the Kaiser, that if the
submarines were freed from all restnctions, they could in a few months
eliminate England from the war and secure for Germany a victorious peace;
even if the United States declared war the American army, when raised, would
never reach the scene of action. At length convinced by these arguments the
Kaiser agreed ; but to avoid further bloodshed he delayed the executive order
till he had made an offer of peace.
APPARENT SUCCESS OF UNRESTRICTED WARFARE
Unfortunately, the offer was couched in such terms as a victor uses to
the vanquished. The Allies were far from that position and they rejected it
without discussion. Then to a listening world Germany announced on Janu-
ary 9, 1917, her intention of resorting to unrestricted submarine warfare.
At first the expected success seemed attainable. The number of ships sunk
leaped rapidly upward till in April, 1917, it reached the total of 6o. In
that month more than a thousand British seamen, non-combatants, were
killed; one ship in every four that left the British Isles never returned. In
face of so appalling an attack it might be thought there would be difficulty in
obtaining crews; but men twice and thrice torpedoed sought a fresh ship
as a matter of course, and the courage of the British merchant seamen shines
bright in the record of those dreadful times.
THE CONVOY SYSTEM
Even before unrestricted warfare Germany had made a determined effort to
stop neutral shipping; in October, 1916, Norway and Sweden lost 86 vessels
and, finally, Scandinavian ships refused to sail without escort. Various
methods of protection were tried and found useless, till the only means left
was to collect the ships into convoys and give each convoy an escort strong
and numerous enough to keep the enemy at bay. It may seem strange that
so obvious an expedient had been so long delayed. But, in truth, the idea
had received a great deal of attention. It had objections: from the mercantile
side in the inevitable slowing down and restriction of voyages, from the
310 the struggle JfGK SUriUijMAGr UJM ATSiJ UJlNtfliiv xyia
masters of ships in the diflBculty of manoeuvring in squadrons, and from the
naval authorities in the lack of sufficient craft to supply the escorts; for,
so long as the German High Sea Fleet remained in being, the British Grand
Fleet must be kept equipped to meet it. In spite of these very real objections
the first convoy left the Humber for Norway on April 29 and arrived un-
harmed. It soon became clear that the difficulties had been over-estimated,
and it seemed that the antidote to the submarine had at last been found. A
special department came into being to organise a world-wide system; the
neutral Powers agreed to obey its orders; and soon shipping in all the
threatened areas was collected* in convoys. In proportion as the system
became universal, losses began to diminish.
A convoy at sea was a sight not to be forgotten. An ingenious method of
dazzle-painting had been introduced, and in the periscope of a waiting sub-
marine would appear out of the mist a shapeless mass of stripes and blurs,
continually changing as the vessels zigzagged, and presenting no definite
target on which to set the torpedo. Destroyers and patrol craft kept off the
enemy, which after dogging the lumbering mass for days might have had
not a single chance of successful attack. The zigzags, the painting, the
escort, all combined to baffle the submarines, which now in addition to finding
their prey becoming inaccessible were obliged to run into danger in order to
seek it. There were cases where a submarine, eagerly w^atching a convoy
through her periscope for a chance to fire, was pounced on from behind and
bombed to death.
Further, the bases to which the submarines had to return and the routes
bjr which they approached them were increasingly blocked by mines. The
mine had been regarded by Great Britain in peace time as the weapon of the
inferior power and not suitable to a navy which intended to use the sea as
its highway. It had received little more than perfunctory attention, with the
result that the British mine in the first years of war proved hopelessly in-
efficient. Only after study of the German mines was an effective type evolved,
and even then supplies were not ready in sufficient quantities till September,
1917. From that time onwards Heligoland Bight was so thickly mined and
the German mine-sweepers so often raided that the keeping of clear channels
for the passage of submarines as far out as 150 miles became the principal
work of the whole High Sea Fleet.
THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR
In declaring unrestricted submarine warfare the German Staff had reckoned
that it would achieve its object before the inevitable entry of the United States
into the war could affect the issue. It seemed at first that they were not
wrong, for it was not till April, 1917, that the United States declared war
Her first contribution, six destroyers, reached Queenstown on May 2, 1917,
passing the very spot where two years before a hundred Americans had been
done to death in the “ Lusitania.” By the end of the year, 37 American de-
stroyers had arrived and were assisting with the convoys, for whom the escorts
were still all too few.
But, from a naval point of view the principal effect of the entry of the
United States into the war was the increased stringency of the blocl^de.
The actual stoppage of German supplies ceased to be a naval operation; it
was performed in American custom-houses, and the import of the neutral
coimtries bordering on Germany became so restricted that they could no l^n gar
spare anything to send across the frontier.
© Keyittone Vtew Co © Keystone View Co.
Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord from November, The Marquis of Milford Haven, formerly
1914 to May, 1916, when he resigned owing Prince Loms of Battenberg, First Sea Lord
to his opposition to the Dardanelles expedi- in 1914. He is given much of the credit for
tion. the mobilization of the Fleet.
© Keystone View Co
Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, First Lord of
the Admiralty from 1911 to 1916, where he displayed
great vigour, industry, and imagination.
311
OSWALD T. TUCK
With an eflBcient mine at their disposal the British again attacked the
problem of closing the Straits of Dover. A strange form of barrage was
created. The mines were laid deep and the area above them was intensively
patrolled by vessels carrying flares and powerful lights, the effect of which
was to make the Straits as bright as day. For a submarine to attempt to
pass on the surface meant certain destruction by the patrols; to proceed
submerged was to meet an even more horrible end on the thickly laid mines.
By the middle of 1918 the Straits were at last impassable, and though the
Germans made two destroyer raids on the patrols, they could not succeed in
opening the barrage.
ZEEBRUGQE HARBOUR CLOSED
The command at Dover was now in the hands of Sir Roger Keyes, whose
active temperament was not content with a watching role. Zeebrugge and
Ostend on the Belgian coast were the outlets for the numerous smaller sub-
marines which operated on the east coast of England, and though the ap-
proaches had been many times mined, the Germans swept the channels and
continued to come out But on April 22, 1918, a strangely assorted squadron
set out from Dover In it were ancient cruisers, Liverpool ferry-boats, sub-
marines, destroyers, motor-boats, trawlers — all bent on fulfilling their part
in a carefully rehearsed performance. The drama was played at Zeebrugge;
the trawlers swept a way through the mines ; the motor-boats sent up a smoke
screen, under cover of which the ferry-boats landed parties of men on the
heavily defended Mole; the submarines blew themselves up under the piers;
the men on the Mole fought their way to the guns commanding the entrance;
and the old cruisers steamed in to block with their carcasses the canal which
was the main exit for the Flanders submarines. The operation, carried out
with extraordinary skill and gallantry, was almost entirely successful; and
though Ostend remained open, Zeebrugge, that thorn in the side of England,
lost most of its power to torment.
THE NORTH-SEA BARRAGE
Heligoland Bight was now so thick with mines that submarines were
making their way out to the Atlantic by the Cattegat, a route which lengthened
their voyage but made it incomparably safer. A mine-field laid in the Cattegat
proved ineffectual; and the grandiose scheme of making a complete barrage
across the North Sea between Scotland and Norway was devised. It received
enthusiastic support from the Americans. They arranged to lay the middle
and eastern portions of this immense barrier; and soon after it was begun
a United States mining squadron arrived. This huge undertaking absorbed
most of the American naval effort in European waters during the remainder
of the war. As it progressed it narrowed the opportunities for submarines
to reach the open sea where they could best hope to work.
The submarine was gradually being mastered; no longer was it possible
for her to use her gun, except on small sailing vessels which by their nature
were imconvoyed. The mine-sweeping service had so far countered the mmes
that in four months only one ship was lost on them. The submariners sole
chance of achieving her object was to let fly a torpedo into the thick of a
convoy or at a ship which had dropped astern. Never did she dare to reveal
her presence, and all the steamers lost were now torpedoed without warning.
The numbers fell month by month while the toll of lost submarines increased.
312 THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY ON AND UNDER THE SEAS
American troops poured into France. The submarine campaign had failed.
Mutiny broke out in the High Sea Fleet, and despair began to settle on the
councils in Berlin.
The German army was in no better case than the navy. A tremendous
effort to break the Allied line had, like the submarine campaign, ended in
failure; and in September Germany began to retreat. The final blow came
from the south where, years before, the British had knocked at the gate of
Constantinople. At the failure of the Dardanelles Expedition in 1915, Bul-
)^a, anxious to share in the spoils of war. changed her attitude of friend-
liness to the Allies into an active union with Germany. She was left un-
touched at first; but now at last the Allies made a serious advance from
Salonika and Bulgaria succumbed at once. Peace was declared with her on
September 30. Four days later Germany and Austria proposed an armistice
to discuss terms of peace.
THE QBEATEST NAVAL SUBRENPER IN ALL HISTORY
Though unconditional surrender might have been demanded, it was not
pressed by the Allied army commanders; the Allied Admiralties, however,
secured the delivery of the whole effective part of the German fleet into their
custody. In the dusk of a grey November day Sir David Beatty, now Com-
mander-in-Chief, received the Great Surrender, the greatest in the history
of the world, as the German High Sea Fleet filed past his flagship. It was
berthed in Scapa Flow while the plenipotentiaries settled its final disposal
A long line of submarines was piloted into Harwich, affording the British
destroyers the unaccustomed spectacle of a German submarine on the surface.
When at last the Peace Treaty was drafted it left Germany a mere skeleton
of a fleet, nothing more than a group of antiquated vessels. But the German
navy was not to disappear without a dramatic gesture As soon as it was
clear that the Treaty must be siened, secret orders came from Berlin to Scapa;
and one day the High Sea Fleet was seen to be sinking at its moorings. Soon
the German navy had disappeared German historians claim that because
their fleet was surrendered without a battle it had never been defeated; but
if to-day they seek it, it is to Scapa they must go ; there, the High Sea Fleet
lies still in its lonely grave.
CHAPTER XIII
THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE WORLD WAR
By Grand-Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
Father of the German Navy. From 1897 to 1916 Secretary of
State for the Impenal Navy. Author of Naval Bills of 1898,
1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912.
FOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS THE GERMAN FLEET BUILT?
If I were addressing an American reader, I could be very brief in discuss-
ing the reasons for the naval legislation of 1900, which determined the
construction of the German fleet, since the United States has on its own part
entered on a period of successful rivalry with the most powerful fleet in the
world. The only drawback to a perfect analogy is the fact that the Ger-
man fleet, which the law in question was intended to call into being, and
which was to be completed by the year 1920, never soared so high in its
aspirations as does the American creation Proof for this statement, which
no propaganda however skilful can put aside, is furnished by a tabulation
of the naval budgets of the countries in question in the period before the war:
In the year 1913 the following sums were expended for the respective
navies:
Totals Per Capita of the Population
England 236 Million Dollars 5 13 Dollars
United States 148 “ 1.53 “
Russia 124 “ ** 0 79 "
Germany 117 “ ‘‘ 1 73
France 103 2 59 “
In the ten years preceding the outbreak of the World War, the three
largest maritime powers expended on their navies the following sums:
England 1,920 Million Dollars
United States 1.280 “
Germany 870 “ “
Ten years later the scene-shiftings have resulted in a fundamentally different
picture. The instability of exchange renders every attempt at absolute ac-
curacy impossible, but according to the most reliable figures accessible to me^
the naval budgets for the year 1923 provide for the following:
Totals Per Capita of the Population
England 296 Million Dollars 627 Dollars
Umted States 308 “ “ 2.79
Germany 6.5 ‘‘ “ 0.11 “
These figures are taken from the NauUcua of 1923, page 342 and following, where they
are given m gold marks. For purpose of comparison, they are here expressed in dollaiB
(1 dollar 4 marks).
The elimination of the German fleet has not only not diminished the size
of the naval budgets of the world; it has swollen their volume. The tidy
amount which Germany paid before the war is now added to the American
313
314 THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE WORLD WAR
account. The United States has, as it were, assumed Germany's burden,
inasmuch as the English fleet, feeling itself no longer held fast in the North
Sea, has developed into an Atlantic and a Pacific fleet. The table given
shows that before the war not only England and the United States, but our
Continental neighbours as well, exceeded us in the volume of their naval ex-
penses — Russia absolutely, and France at least in proportion to her popu-
lation. It therefore appears singular that England was always inquiring of
us, why we were engaged in fleet construction, since all the world was doing
it. The thought is a natural one, that the purpose of creating power is to
inspire others with a dread of attacking it. In June, 1923, the British Prime
Minister, Mr. Baldwin, gave as the reason for building an English airfleet,
that it would protect Great Britain against attack from the strongest air-
power that could reach the English shore. If we substitute sea-power for
air-power, this statement coincides, practically word for word, with the ex-
planations which accompanied the construction of our fleet. The German
fleet was built as a so-called risk-fleet, that is to say, it was to be so strong
that an attack on it, even on the part of our strongest opponent, would be
accompanied with very considerable risk. If now English propagandists, as
for example Winston Churchill in his rather journalistically written book on
the World War, take occasion to jeer at me and at this plan of a risk-fleet,
they as victors have an easy task, however lacking they may be in tact. As
a matter of fact, Churchill's ex post facto laboured construction is incorrect,
and has been controverted since the war by the Recollections of Lord Jellicoe.
Germany's position demands a strong fleet
Our geographical position made it absolutely imperative for us to provide
strong bulwarks of safety against attacks from without Americans, fearing
neither territorial assaults nor any insidious attempt to undermine the unity
and integrity of their commonwealth, find it hard to realise the situation of
a nation like Germany, hemmed in for centuries between the most powerful
and warlike states in the whole world, inhabiting a contracted domain pro-
tected by no natural boundaries, a country which, century by century, had
been devastated, depopulated, and reduced to scarcely conceivable conditions
of poverty.
For the past thousand years, and in countless offensive wars, France has
never deviated from her settled purpose of wresting the German Rhine from
us. Notwithstanding England's many quarrels with France, that nation has
continuously and as a matter of course acted in unison with France, whenever
it was a question of preventing the unification of Germany. Prussia had
hardly begun to attract notice, when England promptly and faithlessly de-
serted her ally, Frederick the Great, as has been graphically described by
Admiral Mahan. When, after the overthrow of Napoleon, Germany was
ambitious of achieving a condition of greater unity as a State, the same
England, this time Germany's hard and fast ally, united with her hitherto
sworn and deadly foe, France, to frustrate Germany's desire. This consistent
policy on the part of Great Britain, against the natural union of the branches
of the German stock, was repeated in 1848, 1864, and even in 1870. I need
only mention the black realities of the present moment (1924), which depict
us shorn by the same pair, France and England, in union if not in amity;
and this time robbed of our purely German lands on the Rhine and the Saar,
of Alsace, Geman Austria, Upper Silesia, Danzig, Memel, etc. These things
furnish the final proof of the dire necessity we were under, of fashioning for
ourselves weapons of defence.
ALFRED VON TIRPITZ
316
ENGLAND THE ENEMY OF GERMAN TRADE
Since the year 1895, considerably before the existence of any German fleet
worth mentioning, England had been the avowed enemy of our industrial
trade development. We had grown to he commercial rivals. As the English
Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, in his speech at Manchester, November 2,
1923, bluntly put it: Towards the end of the last century, our commercial
predominance became imperilled, especially by two rivals, Germany and the
United States. This rivalry it was necessary to forestall, and by the time it
had reached its climax came the World War.^' What the Prime Minister
meant by his last words, he is at liberty to declare, but we are also at liberty
to conclude. Even if England had been willing to concede, for instance,
German predominance in such a speciality as the manufacture and handling
of chemical products, the further fact that our steel products were forging
ahead of the English was felt as a deadly thrust into the very centre of
English commercial pride. Old accustomed feelings of superiority were further
wounded by the increase in German shipping and oversea trade. Just before
the second war with Holland (1663), while a discussion was going on as to
how a declaration of war could be justified, the English Admiral Monk called
out to the waverers: What wc want is a slice more of the trade the Dutch
have gotten in their hands.”
It had been my habit, since the ’nineties of the last century, to have all
the leading English newspapers and journals laid before me, so that, beginning
with the notorious ‘‘ Germania delenda ” article in the Saturday Review, their
hate-envenomed floods of print came very frequently under my eyes.
The feeble German counter-propaganda sounded like the naive prattlings
of children. But while the Germans themselves were scarcely aware of the
arguments made in their defence, to the English propagandists they were a
highly welcomed material, and were carefully selected, arranged and hawked
about. In the European crises betvreen 1905 and 1911, England was from
first to last the inciter to hostilities We on our part were well aware that
England was the secret manipulator of that process of isolating Germany,
which led first to the outbreak of the World War, and then by virtue of the
enormous predominance of power on the side of the Anglo-Saxon, Slavic^^
and Romance Entente nations, not to mention the further whipped-in con-
course of smaller peoples, led to Germany’s crushing defeat. During the
thirty years preceding the war, Germany and England were separated by a
fundamental difference of policy which can be stated in a single phrase: on
Germany’s side the effort to overcome or to moderate the tension between
the European Powers, while England always, from the time of Lord Salisbury,
sought to maintain this tension, in order to have a free hand in Asia and
Africa for compensatory bargaining.
Any willingness on our part to give up or to slacken our fleet-building
would have protected us in no way from England’s commercial jealousy knd
its consequences. For proof of this one need only point to the conditions
at the present moment (January, 1924). Only the other day Lord Birken-
head, in a public speech in Vancouver, declared that any policy of compel-
ling Germany to assume the burden of reparation payments would threaten
the national life of Great Britain, inasmuch as Germany’s competition for
the world’s trade would cause the break up of the British Empire. Is there
any American living who believes that England would have tamely suffered
a Germany with no sea-power at its command to outstrip her commercial
rival, England having all the while the power to impose on us a prohibitive
tax, large enough to paralyse our industries? Such simple-mindedness might
316 THE GERMAN NAVY IN -THE WORLD WAR
strike root here and there in the brain of a politician; at the Central Office
of the Imperial ^a Service we could not afford to entertain such notions.
We believed l^at the English mind still adhered to the confession which
Goldsmith’s Deserted ViUage sounded in a clarion note:
"That trade’s proud empire hastes to swift decay,
As ocean sweeps the labour’d mole away:
While self dependent power can time defy.
As rocks resist the billow and the sky ’’
The only real protection to Germany’s world’s commerce and the sole
remain in g possibility of feeding an increasing population, those “ 20 millions
de trap,” lay in the construction of a fleet; not a fleet which should inspire
us with wild thought of attacking England, for peace alone could bring us
any profit or advance; but on the other hand a fleet powerful enough — were
we attacked — to so cripple England that it should forfeit its monopoly on
the seas. We were bent on creating a guarantee of peace, an instrument
which would cause England to respect the vital interests of Germany, how-
ever irksome Ihis might be to England’s commerce, and to negotiate with us
on equal terms, whenever differences of opinion might arise. If the English
statement characterised our fleet as an expensive luxury, this convenient desig-
nation on their part was powerless to produce any impression upon us; far
more justly might the possession of a fleet by any other nation have been
stigmatised as a luxury, rather than by Germany. England knew full well that
in case of war Germany, without a fleet at its command, would starve unless in-
deed general maritime disarmament on the part of all nations became u reality.
It is necessary to add that the creation of a fleet entailed the further obliga-
tion of developing a corresponding governmental policy, which the German
Foreign Office did not uniformly succeed in doing.
HOW THE GERMAN FLIETWAS BUHiT
The German fleet legislation of 1900 was introduced and carried through
with the fullest publicity and with clearly stated explanations of its aims.
The sole modification (for what was new in 1906 was in reality a part of
the legislation proposed in 1900) occurred in the year 1911-1912, at which
time our general plan of defence rendered a change in the organisation
necessary to the extent of authorising the construction of two additional
ships. Our naval service had nothing at its disposal corresponding to the
long-service men in England, and this rendered additional preparedness all
along the line necessary, after England had concentrated its entire fleet in
the North Sea.
Battleships, not cruisers — since we lacked naval bases — constituted the
nucleus of our fleet, according to the teachings of the great American expert,
Mahan. Submarines, which since the days of Fulton had not ceased to en-
gage the attention of naval constructors, were not yet technically fit for
ocean service, while ships for coast defence were of no use to us. Not until
1910 were submarines capable of high-sea service. At the beginning of the
war we had at our command a larger number of high-sea service submarines
than all the navies of the world combined, but this state of tilings did not
warrant plans for a general blockade of England, aside from the fact that
we had formed no plan whatever for attacking that country.
ALFRED VON TIRHTZ
317
THE GERMAN FLEET DURING THE WAB
Our geographic situation prescribed boundaries for the possible scope of
action of our fleet and determined its necessary plans of action.' The English
fleet, in its quality of “ fleet in being,” fulfilled the twofold function of pro-
tecting England and blockading our coast. This explains the skilful manoeu-
vre of the militarists in preventing the ratification of the London Declara-
tion of maritime law, notwithstanding its acceptance in 1911 by the House
of Commons. No sooner had war been declared than England proceeded
promptly to disregard each and every provision of the naval code, not only
towards us but towards neutrals, with the purpose of adapting its blockade
to the peculiar German-English situation. On November 2, 1914, England
declared the North Sea, in its entire extent, included in the region of hos-
tilities. Lawful protests on the part of neutral powers were ignored. America
too often forgot that it was England, which on November 2, 1914 — first of
all the Great Powers — issued a war-zone declaration devoid of any basis
in maritime law, and that England, by and through this declaration, com-
pelled Germany to issue a similar declaration on February 4, 1915.
The aims of the German fleet could be no other than to break up the
English blockade The sole method of accomplishing that end was by op-
posing fleet to fleet in a general engagement. We were, to start with, in an
unfavourable situation for accomplishing this result, for we had not ex-
pected war and had up to July, 1914, made no preparations whatever for
such an event, while the English were not only from the outset in a high
condition of preparedness, due to the possession of the long-service men,
but also owing to the fact that the whole mobilised Grand Fleet of Great
Britain was lying at anchor at Spithead Roads in July, 1914. This was one
of the reasons why our Admiralty staff did not in the first weeks of the war
risk a general engagement. In accordance with our system of defence, fully
half our fleet could not be declared ready for service until several weeks of
preparation had passed.
Notwithstanding all this, I considered a decisive general action to be our
first duty, and documentary evidence now at hand proves that up to the
middle of July, 1915, it was still possible to force the English fleet to a
general engagement. We could not count on the possibility of fighting this
battle-royal in proximity to our own coast. It was necessary to strike out
into the Channel. As soon as our offensives extended their range, England
would be compelled, from considerations of prestige alone, to accept the gage
of battle. It appears however — from documents since published on bowi
sides — that a number of possibilities existed of bringing about an engage-
ment in the middle of the North Sea. According to my own opinion, shared
by all the best ofiicers, the prospects for the German fleet were not unfavour-
able. While the numerical superiority of the English was of course undeni-
able, we could at least, by assuming the initiative, bring relatively stronger
force to bear on a given point. There was the further thought that in a
battle at sea, superior forces cannot be made use of so promptly as would be
the case with heavier battalions in a land engagement, because at sea, ship is
pitted against ship. It is also fact of history that smaller fleets have often
triumphed over heavier flotillas.
318
THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE WORLD WAR
GEBMAN FLEET AND MEN SUPERIOR TO ENGLISH
We were also of the belief that the material of our ships and the training
of our oflScers and men had reached a higher state of efficiency than was the
case in the English fleet. The engagements of Coronel and Jutland ^ have
settled that point. The admiral in command of the American forces in
British waters conflrmed this as a fact when he remarked to the commander
of the Bayern which ship was at the moment undergoing inspection at
Scapa Flow: “ You did not know, of course, what sort of weapon against
England you had in your hands. If you had known that fact and used it
for what it was worth, the result would have been different. No English
vessel can come near comparison with your ships and especially not with
the * Bayern (See L. V. Reuter, Scapa Flow, Leipzig, page 16.) But even
if one assumes, as one is entitled to do, that unequal numbers would have
rendered an out and out victory on our part impossible, there can be no
doubt that the English fleet would have been so crippled, that the English
monopoly of world supremacy at sea would from that moment have ceased
to exist. This event, had it come to pass, would have at once altered the
international situation in our favour. If we, on the contrary, put off the sea
battle until our political, military and economic situation was partially shat-
tered and until the famine, caused by the blockade, had carried off women
and children in such numbers that the morale of our heroic nation as a whole
was still further curbed and humbled, then the effect of a naval action would
necessarily fall far short of what we might expect in the first year of the
war. It was also not to be lost sight of that the English fleet was constantly
being added to and that its preponderant strength would tell in the long run.
TRAGIC ERRORS OP THE GERMAN CIVIL AUTHORITIES
Our history abounds in tragic errors, but among these the action of the
political authorities of the German Empire in preventing the fleet from being
put to the supreme test in the first year of the war, is one of the most tragic.
While there were no strong personalities among those in whose hands the
guidance of the fleet in the first years of the war had been placed, those
leaders still, theoretically speaking, had it in their power to force a general
engagement; but in so doing they would have been compelled to exceed the
instructions which overshadowing political influence had imposed upon them.
If we ask what political considerations could induce the leaders in Ger-
many's battle for existence to enter on a course, now so inconceivable, as
that of frustrating the ardent and gallant desire for action on the part of
the fleet, certain points of view must be refined and over-refined. The illu-
sion was strongly entertained that England, as the relatively most reasonable
of our opponents, would in a short time be ready to conclude a peace arrived
at by negotiations, and consequently ought not to be ** irritated.” On the
other hand the fleet had to remain ‘‘ intact,” perhaps with the intention of
offering it to the English in the approaching ” Peace Treaty, as induce-
ment and compensation. The Imperial Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg,
always baffled my efforts to combat his vague hopes of peace by falling back
upon this false conception of English mentality, as though personal friendly
relations could exercise any influence on the resolutions of statesmen, who
were solely intent on aggrandising the world Empire of Britain, and who
were while engaged in the task — as the Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss
1 Admiral von Tirpitz uses the German name (“ Skagerrak ”) for this battle. For
reasons of uniformity, we have used the name “ Jutland.”
® International Newsreel
A German submarine of the type in use during the World War. The U-boats were from 210 to
225 feet long and could travel 14} to 17 knots on the surface and 8 to 9 knots when submerged.
ALFRED von’ TIRPITZ 319
army put it — “as cold as a dog’s nose.” Just as the Chancellor, up to
the last moment before the declaration of war and even in his painful agita-
tion after that event, stood spellbound before the fact that England was
entering the war against us, just so was he unable to realise that England,
speaking softly and carrying “ a big stick,” was bent upon utilising this op-
portunity, that would never again return, of inflicting fatal injury upon its
commercial rival.
But the Chancellor and his nearest subordinates were not alone in lacking
the most elementary conception of what constitutes power. Large numbers
of Germans were built on the same pattern. They were well-meaning men,
excellent administrators, but poor politicians. To this must be added that
the nature of sea-power had only begun to dawn slowly on continental Ger-
many. Our great historians had no sense for its real meaning; I had Mahan
translated to surmount this difficulty. The fact also remains that the division
into two squadrons, one of which had to watch the Russians in the Baltic,
tended to cripple the fleet’s united action, but it never should have acted as
a deterrent. Fleets have again and again for the last 2,000 years determined
the supremest issues in the world’s history, from the Second Punic War and
the battle of Actium, to Trafalgar and the American Civil War, and finally
to the World War. Here at last a new element appeared to lead that method
of conflict to its climax. In the few years that have elapsed since the con-
ception of aerial warfare, the insular security of England has been nearly
done away with.
MUTINY IN HIGH SEA FLEET
My efforts to stake everything on the issue of a sea battle remained fruit-
less until it was almost too late to hope for a decisive result. The mutiny
in the High Sea Fleet at the moment of the national collapse in November,
1918, has cast a deep shadow upon the history of the navy After a period
of continuously exhausting service, varying from four to seven years, deprived
of every comfort, always at sea in the North Sea, in severest weather, huddled
together in the floating fortresses that moved so seldom against the enemy,
constantly associated with socialist wharf labourers — the nerves of the sailors
on our battleships could no longer stand the strain when the bulk of their
younger oflacers were taken from them, swallowed up by the submarine service.
The mutiny was no isolated fact; it occurred at the very moment when the
last Government of the Emperor, with its socialist leanings, had repeatedly
offered to capitulate to the enemy; had in that way led the soldiers at the
front to expect a speedy return home, and had finally, by this alluring pro-
posal weakened to a very dangerous degree the will of the men to continue
the conflict. The mere prospect of sacrificing themselves on the altar of
Fame did not appeal to the men at the guns.
The first English Admiral to meet, after the truce, one of the leaders of
our fleet, remarked to him: “ You know, the large battleships did not imder-
stand how mutinies arise on such craft, especially when they are not engaged
in active service ; you lacked our long experience in the matter since the time
of Nelson and St. Vincent.” Characteristically true it was, that on our sub-
marines, torpedo-boats and the many other vessels of smaller size, absolute
loyalty reigned up to the last moment, though these branches of the marine
service demand superhuman sacrifices and were subjected to the highest
losses. What the English Admiral failed to realise was that with us it was
not a question of mere mutiny at sea, but rather a political upheaval with
subversive tendencies. England’s boast that the battle of Jutland reduced
the morale of our fleet, was put forward for the purpose of representing that
320 THE GERMAN NAVV IN THE WORLD WAR
engagement as a victory for the English fleet. As a matter of fact, this great
naval battle increased to a remarkable degree in both our officers and men
the feeling that we possessed better materials and better personnel.
What sort of spirit animated the German navy down to the last sailor
during the period when the nation still believed an honourable termination
of the war possible, is shown in the imperishably valorous exploits of single
units in all branches of the service. In the first months of the conflict,
Theodore Roosevelt clearly perceived the difference between the bashfulness
of our naval leaders and the dashing initiative of the commanders and men
of our ships of every description, when he wrote: “ In the present war the
deeds of the ‘ Emden,’ of the German submarines, of Von Spree’s squadron,
have shown not merely efficiency but heroism; and the navies of Great Britain
and Japan have been handled in masterly manner.” (America and the World
War, 1915, page 171.) In truth there was no lack of efficiency and heroism
everywhere in our fleet. The most considerable and striking example was
without doubt the battle of Jutland; from the handling of the single battle-
ships in the engagement, down to that of the torpedo boats, everyone mani-
fested a joyous valour of resolution, a skill in seamanship and in intrepidity
in attack which remain imexcelled.
HEROISM AND LOSSES OF THE NAVY
That was Jutland — but Jutland was not the only and not the last incident.
In what manifold ways the yoimg German navy distinguished itself by deeds
sealed with its blood, a glance at the monumental tablets for the fallen in the
Naval School at Miirwik will show:
Atlantic Ocean
North Sea
German Bay
Hoofdon
White Sea
Flanders
West front
Baltic
Baltic
Bay of Riga
Bay of Finland
Kattegat
Ckiurland
Oesel
Indian Ocean
Mediterranean
Dardanelles
Black Sea
Adriatic
Gallipoli
Asiatic Turkey
Ocean of the Air
English Channel
IriiSi Sea
Bay of Biscay
South Seas
Tsmg-tau
East Africa
The German navy which at the outset of the war numbered 79,000 names
on its rolls, lost 36,000 men in the above-mentioned various scenes of action,
among them 1,500 oflScers or others holding equivalent positions. Young
officers, in fact every able-bodied seaman, viewed witii dismay the prospect
of continued inactivity in the High Sea Fleet. The requests for detached
service on board other units in active service at sea, for responsible duties,
for a chance to meet the enemy at close quarters, became constantly morp
numerous and more urgent. A very large number of these requests had to
granted, so that the ships of the High Sea Fleet were at the beginning of
the year 1918 stripped of their younger active officers and of the most efficient
under-officers and men. All hands had crowded into the submarines, the air-
ships, the aeroplanes, the auxilia^ cruisers and the mine-layers. It was in
these various branches of the service that the personnel of the navy as a whole
was able to give expression to the exploits of which it was capable. What a
record of performance is furnished, for instance, by the Flanders boats of
which it was known that in 1917-1918 out of five submarines, only three on
the average, and often less than three, would ever return! While IW sub-
marines in all went down in conflict with the enemy, there is not an tnatanna
of a man who did not struggle with all his might against relief duty.
© Keyattme View Co
The famous German light cnuser **£mden” whose exploits m 1914 created a sensation. Under
the command of Captam von Muller she ranged the Bay of Bengal, bombarded Madras* raided
Penang, and m all accounted for fifteen ships.
© Keystone Vvew Co
Count Maximihan von Spee, German Admiral,
whose squadron was engaged on December 8, 1914*
off the Falkland Islands by Admiral Sturdee’s
cruiser squadron. Admiral von Spee’s ship the
Schamhorst ” was sunk, he and hia two anna
ALFRED VON TIRHTZ 321
True heroism was required for the airships’ assaults against England,
especially after it had been clearly proved to what deadly peril each hydro^n-
inflated colossus was exposed from aeroplanes discharging incendiary projec-
tiles. The machine-guns on the air craft were capable of delivering in perfect
security several hundred bullets to the minute, and a single one of these, if
it penetrated the gas balloons, mi^t be enough to seal the fate of the airship.
Thirty naval airships, most of them enveloped in flames, were lost in the war.
Our few naval flyers battled unweariedly against most unequal odds, not
only as regards numbers, but also as regards the efficiency of their air craft.
Worthy of all praise also were our long-range cruisers and later our auxiliary
cruisers. After Japan — at England’s behest — had followed the other Powers
in declaring war upon us, almost the only refuge left to our vessels was the
open sea itself. For under England’s compulsion and cowed by the imfriendly
attitude of the United States — manifested from the beginning — the neutral
states kept anxiously in the background. “Aid and comfort,” such as fell
to the lot of the “ Alabama,” had vanished from the earth as far as we were
concerned.
The smaller cruisers — “ Emden,” “ Karlsruhe,” “ Konigsberg ” — kept in
suspense for months large portions of the ocean. Their situation was from
the first well-nigh hopeless. But they could at least sell their lives dearly.
Of enemy’s goods and bottoms they destroyed more than double their own
value. The voyages of the auxiliary cruisers, “ Mowe,” “ Wolf,” “ Meteor,”
and not less of the sailing clippers “ Seeadler ” and others, remind us of the
sea romances of Marryat and Cooper. Lightly armed and capable of no great
speed, they sallied forth, traversed the oceans, only too soon drawing
after them the pack of war dogs in full cry. Their singularly humane
treatment of their captives, providing as they did for most of them freedom
and conveyance in captured vessels, was the very means which kept the trail
fresh for their pursuers. War ships and auxiliary cruisers to the number of
386 went to the bottom of the sea with the flag of the old empire flying. Not
one of them surrendered to the enemy; in addition, 170 auxiliary vessels
were lost.
PRICELESS SERVICES OF THE FLEET
The bitter warfare which our mine-destroying vessels waged for four years
against the wintry sea and the enemy so successfully that the English never
succeeded in bottling up the Heligoland Bight, unfavourably situated though
it was, reads like a drama of night and storm. When Germany shall once
more enjoy a period of quiet and repose, the true spirit which actuated both
the officers and the men in our navy will form one of the sources of inner
exultation for those who come after us. It will also, I firmly believe, receive
its just tribute from the nobler among our former enemies, as soon as the
monstrous lie as to German guilt for the war, which has been poured out like
a propagandic flood, shall have cooled to empty ashes.
In spite of the insufficient use which was made of the strongest arm of
defence in our navy, the High Sea Fleet, its services remained priceless.
Had Germany been without this fleet, the English-Russian naval agreement
would have gone into effect. Russia would have received war material
without end, our Baltic coast towns would have been devastated and the
whole Baltic coast would have been constantly exposed to landings in force.
Our connection and traffic with Sweden would have come to a stop. Under
such conditions our power of resistance would perhaps not have held out for
a single year. On ^e other hand, as we possessed a High Sea Fleet, con-
T. B. Y. — VOL. I — 21
322 THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE WORLD WAR
siderations for the safety of the Baltic furnished no reason for holding the
fleet in reserve; for if it fought, no more unfavourable result was to be ex-
pected than that our battle-fleet and that of the enemy would meet with
relatively equal losses in the conflict.
THE SUBMARINE WAR
As time wore on and the chances grew more remote that the High Sea
Fleet would be put to the supreme test and that as a consequence we should
be delivered of the English blockade, our interest in the other arm of the navy
became more intense ; the submarine seemed placed in our hands by a favour-
able decree of fate for conducting the sea war to a successful conclusion. As
it was probable that the submarine would bring upon us more international
problems than airships, gas-bombs or tanks, our policy was to delay the
beginning of the submarine war until the necessary preparations should be
completed. The coast of Flanders having been in our possession since the
autumn of 1914, we had been able from that time to work with short-ran^
submarines in England's territorial waters; and it was accordingly now in
our power to make regular additions to the fleet of larger submarines and
at the same time to increase rapidly the total number of submarines of
smaller type. The spring of 1915 was thus fixed upon as the natural date
for action. As to entering upon any formal plea in favour of the use of
submarines in war or of the eminently correct and chivalrous use made of
them by the German navy, I consider that beneath my dignity; there is
also no longer any cause, in view of the declared opinion of formallv hostile
experts. (For general justification and for the correct conduct of our sub-
marine war compare (1) Admiral Simses Address before the City Club in Los
Angeles, April 3, 1923; (2) The official publication of the French Ministry
of War, La France militaire”)
ENGLAND THE FIRST TO BREAK INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the submarine constituted a new weapon of attack, I was in favour
of testing it by means of a sharp blockade of the English East Coast, includ-
ing London and the Channel ports. Not only did this he fully in our power,
but it would also be of material assistance to our army on land; it would,
too, strike a blow at England’s commerce, without for the time being blockad-
ing the Anglo-American trade route via Liverpool. Those at the helm of
State determined, however, without taking me into their councils, on a very
grave step: in the form of a juristic reprisal for the English war-zone
declaration of November 2, 1914, all the waters of Great Britain were pro-
nounced to lie within the region of hostilities, the measure to go into effect
February 4, 1915. When thereupon President Wilson issued his condemna-
tion of our course, we could but feel this to be an unfriendly act and a threat
besides, since America had raised only a weak theoretical protest against
England’s blockade, notwithstanding its violation of international law. We
were well aware, too, that in the American Congress the question was seri-
ously considered, whether the gigantic assistance rendered to the Allies by
the United States in the form of arms and munitions of war did not con-
stitute a hostile act against Germany. If those considerations had been
heeded, or if the United States had insisted on the observance, on the part
of England, of the Declaration of London regarding sea law, to which the
United States had given their consent, Germany would have renounced the
use of submarines in the war.
ALFRED VON TIRHTZ
I know well that in the Anglophile propaganda of the time the theory was
advanced that Germany had, by its invasion of Belgium, forfeited its right
to demand impartial consideration of these questions of maritime law on
the part of the most powerful neutral nation. We were given to understand
that the moral feeling of the American public had been so aroused by the
incident in question, that Germany from that moment was debarred from
demanding just treatment. I wish to add a few words on this subject, as
the complicated European relations do not on the whole present themselves
readily to American ways of thought, and yet it was principally out of these
questions of neutrality that the incomprehensible war between Germany and
the United States arose, a conflict catastrophic for Germany, not profitable
for America, and a tragic episode for humanity. To me this reflection is
most painful, since there had never been a moment in the history of the
United States when Germany had not stood firmly on the side of America,
both in feeling and action.
THE INVASION OP BELGIUM JUSTIFIED
The march through Belgium finds its primal justification in the axiom —
which matter-of-fact Americans will be slow to dispute — that a people in
supreme jeopardy, assailed by nations vastly more powerful than itself, which
had moreover most carefully prepared themselves for this very conflict, that
this isolated people must resort to any and every means of defence. If
Americans find it next to impossible to think of themselves as so assailed, I
attribute this to the fact that a life and death assault by land on the United
States is not thinkable. This renders Americans slow to realise the alternatives
presented to us, when we found ourselves confronted by the three or four
largest military powers in the world. In this desperate situation we re-
frained from declaring war on Belgium; we demanded passage for our army,
to which by virtue of the Treaty of 1830 and the occupation of Liege, we
could claim a legal right, since the German Empire was Prussians recognised
heir and successor. This right by law had at that time been instituted by
England, at the time Great Britain was showing hostile tendencies against
France It was quite in accordance with the way of thinking of Bethmann-
Hollweg, the German Chancellor, to refrain from utilising this juristic point
of view, perhaps in the hope that the sublime right of self-defence would
find recognition as such. Instead of taking his stand formally upon legal
ground, he appealed to the sentimentality of our opponents. In addition,
the General Staff had for a considerable time known^ — as the Chief of
Staff informed me when our troops began their march — that military agree-
ments aimed at us existed between Belgium, England and France, and that
Belgium had through this course of action lost its rights of neutrality.
Depots with munition and military supplies for English troops were already
established on Belgian territory. Although Germany, previous to 1870, had
saved Belgium from annexation on the part of France, Belgium had during
the Bismarck era erected its Brialmont fortresses, simply and solely against
Germany, long before the march through Belgium had been considered by
the General Staff. Germany, on the other hand, had left its Rhine frontier
without fortress or redoubt. For what reason did the Entente states, with
Belgium barking the loudest, set up such a hue and cry, when Holland, with-
out any urging on our part, declared its purpose of protecting both Dutch
and Belgian neutrality by fortifying Flushing? This indignation proved,
without a shadow of doubt, that our opponents were counting on Antwerp as
the English military port of entry for breaking into Germany. The Belgian
324
THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE WORLD WAR
Government had moreover — before the war — given free permission to
French Ministers, still' holding office, to deliver inflammatory addresses in
Belgium against Germany. Our almost morbid love of peace and our anxiety
to avoid every occasion on the part of our opponents for taking mnbrage,
were to blame for the unfortunate fact that before 1914 we did not make
the vehement protest which this direct violation of the very essence of neu-
trality called for. To fill to overflowing the measure of these considerations,
I need but point to the now generally acknowledged fact that England did
not enter the war with the purpose of upholding the Belgian neutrality but,
as Sir Edward Grey assured the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, during
the visit of the latter at Balmoral, September 27, 1912, that England was
bound by her agreement wiib France, in case of war with Germany, to come
to the assistance of France, not only with her na'vy but with her aimy, and
further that England would do her utmost to strike Germany’s power a most
telling blow.
ENERGETIC ST7BMABINE WAR WOULD HAVE DESTROYED ENGLAND
When President Wilson entered upon his first bout to knock out Ger-
many’s submarine war, I contended that the submarine war should be prose-
cuted with the utmost energy, regardless of any protest whatever. Had this
been done, England would have been lost, in which opinion I am again sup-
ported by Admiral Sims, for the Admiral asserts that even in 1917, England
was saved from the submarine peril only through means suggested, in large
measure, by him while Commander-in-Chief of the American naval forces in
Europe. His statement is probably true, but in the year 1915 America
also was very far from being in a state of military preparedness, nor do I
believe that America at that time had either the full intention or the military
organisation for effecting England’s rescue. We must again direct our atten-
tion to the policy of the Imperial Government in the years 1915-1916, which,
because of President Wilson’s Notes, crippled the systematically conducted
submarine war, imtil nothing was left save a kind of ineffective cruiser war-
fare. This gave England — assisted by the United States — time to bring
the means of defence to the necessary degree of effectiveness. Meanwhile
our valiant submarine combatants had to stand idly by and submit to such
fearful shocks as when, in the battle on the Somme, in 1916, the army called
vainly, for their aid. This our Chancellor not only prevented them from
rendering, but he also, in order to avoid Mr. Wilson’s frown, prevented them
from blocking the English Channel transports with their enormous supplies.
When I perceived the impossibility of counteracting the weak-kneed resolu-
tion of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, inexcusable alike in its military and
political asi^cts, I sent in my resignation March 17, 1916. The comment
of the English press was: “ Exit the pirate.” My successor found himself
constrained to support the Chancellor’s policy, of paring down the construc-
tion of submarines. The enemy, with his apprehensions of danger from the
sea thus relieved, returned our offer of peace in December, 1916, with a brutal
refusal; and this gave the first intimation of the future mercilessness of the
Powers which already felt themselves victors. Then at length our military
authorities felt themselves obliged to respond, January, 1917, with the defi-
nite inauguration of systematic submarine war. Late thou^ this resolution
was, Germany fortunately seconded it by energetically resuming the con-
struction of submarines in February, 1917, so that a favourable result re-
mained possible if time were still vouchsafed.
ALFRED VON TIRPITZ
325
LOSSES AT SEA
In March, 1916, we had approximately 70 submarines in service, 64 of them
at the front, and 149 submarines in process of construction, to be delivered
in the course of the financial year 1916. In the year 1918 the submarine war
slackened, this being due partly to the lessened activity ip construction fol«
lowing upon my resignation, and partly to the extraordinary improvement
on the part of the enemy in the means of defence. According to our experience
as a whole, an unrestrained submarine war in 1916 would have been certain
to yield us per vessel and per voyage, on an average, 51,000 tons sunk. In
the summer of 1917 the average sank to 14,000 tons and in the autumn of
1917 to 9,000 tons. How much greater the net loss to our enemy and our
corresponding success would have been in the year 1916, is shown by the
American rate of increase in ship construction for mercantile marine. This
increase in enemy cargo space, making good the losses sustained, was chiefly
due to America. England was, it is true, straining every nerve, but her
activity was necessarily confined to construction for out and out naval pur-
poses and she could do little towards replacing lost cargo space. But America
was building on a progressive scale, so that according to newspaper reports,
the increase in American cargo space in the year 1918, in a single month,
equalled the increase in 1916 for the whole year. As to direct means of de-
fence against submarines, which the navy had developed to an extraordinary
degree since the beginning of 1916, it is not my intention to enter here, but
merely to remark that, simply as regards quantity, the United States and
England were able to produce far more means of defence than we were able
to match in the building of new submarines. It only remains to be said that
the Imperial Government, still adhering to its remarkable policy of heeding
every ** neutral ’’ wish even as late as the year 1917-1918 — a policy at once
deeply repugnant to the nation’s feelings and utterly wrong in such a des-
perate crisis — once more hastens to impose certain hard and fast restrictions
on unlimited submarine war. More especially the steady stream of food
supplies from Denmark to England, a measure winked at by us, but hardly
compatible with neutrality, made itself felt to our disadvantage. From the
autumn of 1918 on, a great revival in submarine war was to be expected,
since the increased activity in submarine building, begun in February, 1917,
was making itself felt. But it was too late; the German defence broke down
as a result of under-nutrition caused by the blockade of a whole nation,
situated as it were in a beleaguered fortress, for four and a half years. This
universal and pervasive cause was aggravated by the Marxistic infusion of
plague germs, to which the German workmen had fallen victims.
THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA "
The sinking of the “ Lusitania ” formed, and in a measure still remains,
such an important factor in creating public opinion, especially in the United
States, that I desire to add a few words on this much mooted event.
The “ Lusitania ” was listed in the English navy as an auxiliary cruiser,
and the English regulations for that class prescribed that she should have
on board, even in peace times, the necessary arms and munitions. It has
furthermore been settled by the New York Court of Appeals that the “ Lusi-
tania ” had on board an unlawful cargo, consisting among other things of
5,400 cases of munitions: a fact which President Wilson knew at the time
326 THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE WORLD WAR
he despatched his second “ Lusitania ” Note, but of which he denied knowl-
edge. The sinking of the Lusitania ” constituted, in the opinion of this
high, American court, a legal act in time of war. The commander of the
German submarine which did the sinking was not aware at the moment when
he had to make his decision, that it was the ‘‘ Lusitania ” that loomed up
before him, still less that she had a large numbp of passengers oni board.
He therefore acted simply in accordance with his instructions and despatched
his torpedo. Only when the “ Lusitania ** careened so that he could see her
four funnels, did he realise the identity of the vessel he had struck. He there-
upon refrained from despatching a second torpedo, in order to render possible
the rescue of the passengers. If, in spite of this, the sinking followed so
speedily, that fact cannot be explained by the single torpedo. We are driven
to the probable explanation that the explosion of the torpedo led to a second
explosion of the munitions on board, and that this in turn caused some in-
ternal destruction, such as the bursting of a bulkhead and thus hastened the
final catastrophe. The nature of the unlawful cargo makes it impossible to
suppose that a series of harmless explosions only could have taken place.
Let us now suppose that the commander of the submarine was, at the
moment of forming his resolution, actually aware that he had the “ Lusitania ”
before him; in that case he could not have avoided the bitter reflection that
the unlawful cargo, if not sunk, would cost the lives of 10,000, 20,000 or
perhaps even a greater number of his fellow-countrymen. I cannot believe
that any oflBicer in the American navy, finding himself in such a position,
would have refrained from making use of the only means at his command
for preventing such a holocaust. The American public was expressly warned
through the German embassy, not to take passage on the Lusitania through
the war zone. The warning was received in America with a certain sneering
mockery, which seemed for all the world like a provocation. But even if it
was not so meant, most people, certainly I for one, must continue to regard
the deplorable loss of more than 1,000 human lives as an astonishing proof
of the carelessness of a public, knowingly to embark on a voyage through
war territory, and of the frivolity of an English shipping concern. The skilful
use which English propagandists made of America’s perfectly natural pain
and sorrow over this imfortunate occurrence, induces us quite too easily to
forget the 800,000 women and children, who, after the execution of a duly
signed armistice, after the army had been disbanded, after the delivery of the
fleet, perished miserably through the barbaric and, from the military point of
view, useless continuation of the English blockade. I am silent as to the
other countless hecatombs — the fate of those, now dying in Germany quickly
or by lingering starvation, because America was instrumental in striking us
down, and because it has as yet not taken occasion to redeem the promises
which President Wilson made to us.
CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND:
THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF THE BRITISH ADMIRAL IN
COMMAND "
By Admiral Jellicob
First Viscount of Scapa, O M , O C B., etc Admiral of the Fleet.
In command of the British Fleet at the Battle of Jutland.
Governor-General of New Zealand since 1920.
THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE
The causes leading up to the battle of Jutland may be sinnmarised as
follows:
1. The pressure of the British blockade had by April, 1916, led to insistent
calls in Germany for action on the part of the fleet.
2. Admiral Scheer, who had succeeded to the command of the German
High Sea Fleet in January, 1916, was chafing under his enforced inactivity.
3. The receipt of a strong note from President Wilson on the subject of
the torpedoing of the Sussex,” a passenger ship carrying many United States
citizens, led to the withdrawal of German submarines from war against mer-
chant ships and rendered them available for enterprises of a military character.
4. The announcement in England, that steps were being taken to prevent
such occurrences in the future as the Lowestoft raid on April 25, may have
given Admiral Scheer reason to believe that some division of the Grand Fleet
was intended.
He planned therefore to station submarines off British fleet bases, to
draw a portion of the Grand Fleet to sea over the submarines, and to bring
that poition, or such of it as survived the submarine attacks, to action with
the whole High Sea Fleet.
In accordance with this plan, 16 submarines left the German bases on
May 15, with orders to reconnoitre the central portion of the North Sea and
to be in positions off the British fleet bases in the Humber and at Rosjrth,
Cromarty and Scapa, by May 23. Of these, eight were off the entrance to
Rosyth and its vicinity. Six to eight submarines of the Flanders flotilla were
also to operate to the eastward of the English Channel.
Admiral Scheer’s first plan included the bombardment of Sunderland by
1 The battle of Jutland is still being fought, although years have passed since it
took place. It has excited probably more controven^ than any other single battle of
the World War, both the British and Germans claiming a victory The Editor of
TheBe Eventful Yecars asked each of the two commanding officers to tell the story of the
battle as he fought it. These two personal narratives, with the many diagrams (sup-
plied m each case by the writer) illustrating the exact position of each of the vessels
engaged, will enable the reader to form his own opinion as to who was the real victor
in this historic conflict. For the German account, see the chapter immediately follow-
ing this, wntten by Admiral Scheer, Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet.
327
THE BATTLE OF .JXJTLAND
his battle-cruisers. This bombardment would bring out the British force from
Rosyth, and Admiral Scheer hoped to bring it to action with his fleet.
In order to prevent being cau^t at sea by the Grand Fleet on one of its
periodical southerly sweeps, Admiral Scheer intended to station his airships
to the northward of his fleet to give timely warning of the approach of
British ships. His submarines lying off Scapa and Cromarty were further
relied upon for this purpose.
The weather conditions, however, from May 22 onwards proved unsuitable
for airship reconnaissance, and Admiral Scheer then decided, as time weqt on,
to put his second plan into operation, since his submarines could not be de-
pended upon to remain off the British coast after June 1.
According to this second plan, the German battle-cruisers were to proceed
toward the Skagerrack and the coast of Norway, to attack British light
cruisers operating in that vicinity. This movement, supported by the whole
High Sea Fleet, was again expected to draw a portion of the Grand Fleet
to sea.
In the early part of May the whole Grand Fleet had been off the Jutland
coast supporting a British naval air raid on the Zeppelin sheds at Tondem.
in the hope that this operation would draw the High Sea Fleet to sea; ana
a more extensive operation in the Skagerrack itself, having the same object
in view, had been planned for June 1 ; so that both the British and German
Commanders-in-Chief were workmg for a meeting, the British Commander-
in-Chief hoping to entice the entire High Sea Fleet to sea, and the German
Commander-in-Chief anticipating the possibility of meeting separate divisions
only of the Grand Fleet. (Scheer, page 141.)
PBEUMINABY MOVEMENTS
The British Admiralty became aware, early on May 30, by means of
intercepted wireless signals that some unusual movement was in progress at
Wilhelmshaven, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was warned
by telegram at noon of there being indications that the High Sea Fleet might
be going to sea. He was told also that at least eight German submarines
were known to be in the North Sea. As the result the Grand Fleet proceeded
to sea between 9 and 10 p.m., the battle-fleet to concentrate in Lat. 57® 45' N.
Long. 4° 15' E., and the Rosyth force in Lat 56° 40' N., Long. 5® E., by 2 p.m.
on May 31. Sir David Beatty, in command of the Battle-Cruiser Squadrons
at Rosyth, was directed to steer to meet the battle-fleet if he had sifted
nothing by 2 p.m.
The Battle-Cruiser Fleet was on this occasion, as in other similar cases,
given a rendezvous a considerable distance (69 miles) from the battle-fleet,
which was kept to tiie northward in the hope that if German forces were
encountered, they could be drawn by the battle-cruisers sufiSciently far from
their bases to admit of their being crushed before they could regain safety.
Prior to the Grand Fleet proceeding to sea, several reports were received
from ships on patrol of submarine attacks being made on them, or of sub-
marines being sighted. Attacks on the fleet were therefore anticipated, but
beyond three tmsuccessful attacks on the light craft of the Rosyth force,
nothing occurred.
J
© Keystone View Co,
Earl Beatty whose brilliant handling of the
battle-cruisers in the Battle of Jutland won him
high praise and rapid promotion.
Admiral Reinhard Scheer who commanded
the German naval forces in the Battle of
Jutland. He contributes a chapter on the
battle to These Eventful Years*
© Keystone View Co,
Viscount Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Fleet m the Battle of Jutland, concerning which he con-
tributes a chapter to these volumes.
ADMIRAL JELUCOE
329
STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FLEETS
On departure from its bases the Grand Fleet was composed as follows:
From Scapa
Fleet Flagship “ Iron Duke ” with flag of Admiral Sir John Jelhcoe, Commander-
m-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, Chief of Staff
Ut Battle Squadron. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (2nd in command of Grand
Fleet) in command
Marlborough ” (Flagship)
“ Revenge **
“ Hercules ”
“ Agincourt ”
Colossus ” (Flag of Rear-Admiral E.
F A Gaunt)
“ Collmgwood
“ Neptune ”
“ St Vincent **
4th Battle Squadron. Vice-Admiral Sir F. D. Sturdee in command
“Benbow” (Flagship) “Royal Oak”
“ Belleiophon ” “ Superb ” (Flag of Rear-Admiral A. C.
“ Tcmeraire ” Duff)
“ Vanguard ” “ Canada ”
Srd Battle Cruiser Squadron. Rear-Admiral Horace Hood m command
“ Invincible ” (Flagship) Light Cruisers
“ Inflexilole ” “ Canterbury ”
“ Indomitable ” “ Chester ”
2nd Cruiser Squadron Rear-Admiral H. Heath m command
“ Minotaur ” (Flagship) “ Cochrane ”
“ Hamp^ire ” “ Shannon ”
4th Light Cruiser Squadron. Commodore C E. Le Mesuner in command
“ Calliope ” (Flagship)
“ Constance ” “ Caroline ”
“ Comus ” “ Royalist ”
40 Destroyers with the Light Cruiser “Castor,” Commodore J. R. P. Hawksley in
command
From Cromarty with orders to meet the Commander-in-Chief at sea:
2nd Battle Squadron Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram in command
Ut Division “ Orion ” (Flagship of Rear-Admiral A.
“ King George V ” (Flagship) C Leveson)
“ Ajax ” “ Monarch ”
“ Centurion ” “ Conqueror ”
“Erin” “Thunderer”
1st Cruiser Squadron Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot in command
“Defence” (Flagship)
“Warrior” “Black Prince”
“ Duke of Edinburgh ” 10 Destroyers
From Rosyth: Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty in command in “Lion,” Fleet Flagship
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
“ Princess Royal ” (Flagship of Rear-Admiral 0. de B. Brock)
“Queen Mary”
“Tiger”
330
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
“New Zealand” (Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham)
“ Indefatigable ”
Bth Battle Squadron
“Barham” (Flagship of Rear-Admiral
Hugh Evan Thomas)
“Valiant ”
“ Warspite ”
“ Malaya ”
Destroyer Flotillas
With 27 Destroyers
Seaplane Carrier
“ Engadme ”
1st Light Cruiser Squadron
“ Galatea ” (Flagshio of
Commodore E. S. Alexan-
der Sinclair)
“ Phaeton”
“ Inconstant ”
“Cordelia”
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
“ Southampton ” (Flagship
of Commodore W C
Goodenough)
“ Birmingham ”
“ Nottingham ”
“ Dublm”
3rd Light Cruiser Squadron
“ Falmouth ” (Flagship of
Rear-Admiral T. W.
Napier)
“ Yarmouth ”
“ Birkenhead ”
“ Gloucester ”
On the German side the following vessels left the Jade River at 2 a.m.
(all times mentioned are Greenwich Mean Time), May 31, under the com-
mand of Vice-Admiral Hipper in the Liitzow
Ist Scouting Group
Battle^Cruisers
“Liitzow” (Flagship)
“ Derfflinger ”
“Seydhtz”
“ Moltke ”
‘‘Von der Tann”
33 Destroyers
Second Scouting Group
Light Cruisers
Frankfurt ” (Flagship of Rear-Admiral
Bodicker)
Wiesbaden ”
Pillau ”
Elbing ”
Regensburg” (leader of Flotillas)
At 2^ A M. the remainder of the High Sea Fleet under Vice-Admiral Scheer followed.
The vessels were
Fleet Flagship “Fnednch der Grosse”
1st Battle Squadron
“ Ostfriesland ” (Flag of Vice-Admiral E Schmidt)
“ Thiiringen ”
“ Helgoland ”
“ Oldenburg ”
“Posen” (Flag of Rear-Admiral Engelhardt)
“ Rheinland ”
“ Nassau”
“Westfalen”
2nd Battle Squadron
“Deutschland” (Flag of Rear-Admiral Mauve)
“ Pommem ”
“ Schlesien ”
“ Schleswig-Holst.ein ”
“Hannover” (Flag of Rear-Admiral Lichtenfels)
“Hessen”
Srd Battle Squadron
“Konig” (Flag of Rear-Admiral Behncke)
“ Grosser Kurfurst ”
“ Markgraf ”
“ Kronpnnz ”
“ Kaiser ” (Flag of Rear-Admiral Nordmann)
“ Prinz Regent Luitpold ”
“Kaiserin”
ADMIRAL JELLICOE
331
4th Scouting Group
Light CruAsers
** Stettin ” (Flag of Commodore Reuter)
“ Munchen ”
“ ^auenlob ”
“ Stuttgart ”
** Hamburg **
^'Rostock” (Flag of Commodore Michelsen) and 39 Destroyers
The total forces engaged in the North Sea were:
British
German
Battleahips
28
22 (mcluding 6 pre-dreadnoughts)
Battle-Cruisers
9
5
Armoured Cruisers
8
Nil
Light Cruisers
25
11
Destroyers
77
72
Seaplane Carrier
1
Nil
Air^ips
Nil
10*
Submarines
3
22
* Only five of these airships actually ascended on May 31 for reconnaissance m a
direction north to west of Heligoland between noon and 1 p.m. The remamder ascended
early on June 1.
DISTINGinSHING CHARACTERISTICS
The British and German fleets differed very considerably in their main
characteristics. On the British side the capital ships earned guns of larger
calibre than did contemporary German vessels. On the other hand, German
ships possessed very much greater defensive qualities both as regards armour
and protection against under-water attacks, the latter being rendered possible
by the greater beam of German ships. British vessels were limited in this
respect by the width of existing docks. The resisting power of the German
capital ships is well indicated by the manner in which some of their battle-
cruisers survived the battle of Jutland in spite of receiving a very large
number of hits from projectiles as well as damage by torpedo. German ships
of any particular date were of greater displacement than were British vessels
of the same date.
German ships of all classes carried torpedo armaments considerably su-
perior to corresponding British ships.
POSITION AT 2 P.M. MAY 31
At 2 P.M. on May 31, the British battle-fleet was 18 miles distant from
the rendezvous, having been delayed by the necessary examination by de-
stroyers of the large number of neutral vessels sighted, and the undesirability
of forcing the destroyers to consume fuel by overtaking the fleet at high
speed ; the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was 10 miles short of its rendezvous at 2 p.m.
Neither fact was, however, considered of importance by Sir John Jellicoe,
since he had received a wireless message from the Admiralty during that
forenoon to the effect that directional wireless signals placed the German fleet
flagship still in the Jade River.
Before leaving the Jade, Admiral Scheer had, however, transferred the
wireless call sign of his flagship to a shore station, and the fact of the call sign
being still located in the Jade led the British Admiralty to believe that his
ships had not left their base whereas in reality they had left some hours
earlier.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
THE FLEETS IN CONTACT
Contact took place at 2.20 p.m. between the “Galatea” (eastern flank
ship of the light cruisers screening the Rosyth force) and German destroyers,
part of Admiral Hipper’s force, and as a result the British battle-cruisers,
which shaped course to cut the German vessels off from their base, sighted
the German battle-crmsers at 3.30 p.m., steering a north-westerly course.
Admiral Hipper altered course to S.S.E. and at 3.45 the British ships as they
closed, conformed to this course. It is of interest to note that a seaplane
from the British seaplane carrier “ Engadine ” took part in the preliminary
reconnaissance of the German force.
At 3.47 P.M. the battle-cruisers on each side opened fire.
Both British and Germans over-estimated the range at starting, but the
Germans, aided by a clear western horizon, were the first to obtain it cor-
rectly and commenced hitting both the “ Lion ” and the “ Tiger ” at 3.61 p.m.
at a range of about 13,000 yards. (One sea-mile equ.'ils 2,000 yards.) The
British battle-cruisers were hampered by the smoke of destroyers which were
endeavouring to take station ahead in a position favourable for a torpedo
attack on the German line, and according to German reports, their vessels
did not suffer much in the early part of the action.
The German ships were directed by Admiral Hipper to engage their op-
posite numbers in the line, counting from the “ Lion.” On the British side,
the “ Lion ” and “ Princess Royal ” were directed to concentrate on the
“ Liitzow,” the leading ship. According to the gunnery oflBcer of the “ Derf-
flinger,” that ship (second in the German line) was not fired at by any British
ship imtil some ten minutes after the action commenced This must have
been due to some misinterpretation of the signal made by the “ Lion.”
The 5th Battle Squadron under Admiral Evan Thomas was five miles
from the “ Lion,” Admiral Beatty’s flagship, at 2 30 p.m. The flag signals
of the “ Lion,” ordering the subsequent alterations of course, were not, at
the distance that the two flagships were apart, readily distinguishable on board
the “Barham,” and the dense funnel smoke of the battle-cruisers obscured
their movements from Admiral Evan Thomas, whose information as to the
situation was confined to intercepted wireless messages from the British light
cruisers, which were, during this period, reporting the sighting of German
light cruisers. The ensuing delay in altering course resulted in the 5th Battle
Squadron being 7^ miles from the battle-cruisers when the action commenced
and prevented the squadron from sighting the German battle-cruisers until
about 4.05 p.m., or opening fire until 4.10 p m., and then only at very long
range (19,000 yards). This was a fortunate circumstance for the German
battle-cruisers since it saved them from an overwhelming concentration of
fire. (Diagram I.)
From 3.47 to 4.38 p.m. the action between the battle-cruisers was fought
on southerly courses at ranges which were as short as 13,000 yards, but which
increased between 4.05 and 4.15 to about 20,000 yards. During the fierce
fighting in this southerly run, the British suffered two serious disasters, the
battle-cruisers “ Indefatigable ” and “ Queen Mary ” being sunk at 4.02 and
4.26 P.M. respectively. In both cases the ships were hit by salvoes, the pro-
jectiles from which evidently communicated their explosion to a magazine,
which blew up and destroyed the ship with the loss of practically the entire
ship’s company.
The ships of the 5th Battle Squadron between 4.10 and 4.35 p.m. were
engaging the two rear German battle-cruisers, at ranges between 20,0()0 and
17,0(n yards, and, in spite of very difficult conditions of light, according to
ADMIRAL JELLICX)E
Admiral Scheer, “ with ectraordinary rapidity and accuracy.” (Scheer, page
143.) At about 4.30 f.m. the German battle-cruisers commenced to zigaag
in order to throw out this fire.
German reports mention the inefficiency of the British shell, to which tb^
attribute the relatively small damage sustained by their ships at Jutland in
comparison with the number of hits received. The defect lay in the fact
that the shell when hitting at an angle to the face of an armour plate did not
penetrate before bursting, whereas German shell with their excellent delay-
action fuses burst inside the British ships.
Between 4.15 and 4.30 f.m. both sides attacked with destroyers, a hot
eng ag ement taking place between these vessels midway between the opposing
l$t and tnd
Ughi CrvxMT
Squadront
N
ind ^
German Seauttng^
Group
battle-cruisers. The German destroyers were forced back to their own line,
after discharging 12 torpedoes at the British heavy ships at ranges from
9,000 to 10,000 yards; none of these hit. Two German destroyers were sunk
by their British opponents, one by gunfire and the other by torpedo. The
British destroyers pressed their attack closer home, two (the “ Nestor " and
“ Nicator ”) firing three torpedoes each at the German battle-cruisers at
ranges between 3,500 and 6,000 yards, one of which hit the “ Seydlitz ” ; others
were fired at longer range. Two British destroyers (the “ Nestor ” and
“Nomad”) were disabled by German gunfire and were later suidt by t^e
German battle-fleet as they came up. Both lines turned away to avoid tor-
pedoes, the British some two points, and the Germans at least four points,
to avoid the very gallant attack of the “ Nestor ” and “ Nicator.” TTie
British battle-cruisers owing to their position with reference to the German
destroyers were in less danger of successful torpedo attack than either the
German battle-cruisers or the British 5th Battle Squadron. (Diagram
THE GERMAN BATTLE-FLEET AFFEABS
At 4.33 P.M. Commodore Goodenough, with his 2nd Light Cruiser Squad-
ron, which had been some two miles ahead of the British battle-cruisers,
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
334
sighted first a cruiser, and then battleships, to the S.E., turned towards them,
and five minutes later, having made them out as the whole German battle-
fleet, steenng north, reported the fact by wireless. He then, in the true
cruiser spirit, closed the German battle-fleet to within 13,000 yards to ascer-
tain the exact composition and course of the German fleet before he turned
to his squadron; although under very heavy fire, he avoided damage by skilful
manoeuvring. Admiral Beatty sighted Uie German battleships shortly after-
wards, and at 4.40 turned his battle-cruisers to the northward to fall back
on his Commander-in-Chief. The German battle-cruisers also turned to the
northward at about 4.50 p.m. As the “ Barham ” (which was eight miles
astern of the “ Lion ” when that ship turned) closed the “ Lion ” on opposite
courses, that ship was seen to have a signal flying to the 5th Battle Squad-
ron to turn 16 points in succession to starboard. When the turn was completed
in obedience to this signal, the squadron was some miles astern of the
battle-cruisers, and came under a heavy fire from the van of the German
battle-fleet, which was only sighted from the 5th Battle Squadron during the
turn. This fire caused considerable damage to the British ships, especially
the “ Malaya ” and “ Warspite.”
THE BUN TO THE NORTH
After the turn, and during the run to the northward, the two rear ships of
the 5th Battle Squadron (“ Warspite ” and “ Malaya ”) returned the fire of
the German battleships whilst the “ Barham ” and “ Valiant ” engaged the
battle-cruisers.
The opposing battle-cruisers renewed the engagement at long range for a
short time after the turn to the northward, the Germans having the advantage
in light; as the British ships showed up clearly, whilst the German vessels
were almost indistinguishable. Fire ceased between the battle-cruisers at
5.10, but the leading ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were able to continue
in action during the greater part of the northerly run at ranges between
17,000 and 19,000 yards, their fire according to German reports being very
disconcerting.
At 5.40 P.M. the German battle-cruisers were again sighted from their
British opponents, which had altered course slightly to the eastward to meet
(be British battle-fleet, and the action was renewed at about 14,000 yar^
range.
ADMIRAL JELUCOE
335
THE MOVEMENTS OF THE BBITISH BATTLE-FLEET
When at 2.20 p.m. the “ Galatea’s ” first report of sighting German vessels
was intercepted in the “ Iron Duke,” flagship of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the
battle-fleet was steering S. 50® E. in six divisions of four ships in line ahead.
A cruiser screen was stationed 10 miles ahead, and in advance of this screen
was the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, imder Rear-Admiral Hood. As the
reports indicated the presence of German vessels, speed was increased to 17
knots, zigzagging or frequent alterations of course for the purpose of confusing
hostile submarines if attempting an attack, ceased, a course S.E. by S. for the
Horn Reef was steered, steam raised for full speed, and the ships prepared
for action The cruiser screen was ordered to open to 16 miles ahead.
By 3.15 P.M. the fleet was steaming 19 knots and on receipt of Sir David
Beatty’s report of the presence of German battle-cruisers, speed was increased
to 20 knots, the utmost of which the fleet as a whole was capable. The 3rd
Battle Cruiser Squadron was sent on to reinforce Admiral Beatty, although
the southerly course on which the action was proceeding gave little hope
that it could take part in the engagement unless the German ships were forced
towards the Skagerrack.
The report at 4 38 p m. of the sighting of the German battle-fleet came as
a distinct surprise, in view of the information from the Admiralty that
Admiral Scheer’s flagship was still in the Jade River. Admiral Jellicoe’s gen-
eral signal at 4.47 p m. Enemy’s battle-fleet is coming north ” gave the fleet
welcome news for which it had been waiting nearly two years. A wire-
less message was sent to the Admiralty: Fleet action imminent.” This was
the pre-arranged signal on which available forces should be sent to the scene
of action and provision made on the East Coast for tugs, ete., to be in readi-
ness to assist disabled ships.
It was a matter of the first importance to the British Commander-in-Chief
to ascertain the strength, formation, position, course and speed of the High
Sea Fleet so that the British battle-fleet could steer to meet it, and on meet-
ing be correctly formed, and on a suitable bearing. Admiral Beatty had been
given the position and movements of the Commander-in-Chief at 3.27 p.m.
Information came to Admiral Jellicoe between 438 and 5 p.m. in four
messages, viz.: three reports from the “Southampton” and one from the
“ Princess Royal ” (passed from the “ Lion ”) . These reports owing to posi-
tions by dead reckoning being in error, placed the German Fleet at 5 p.m. in
four different positions, separated rather widely from one another, which fact
discounted their value.
No further news was received until about 5.20 p.m. when the Admiralty
signalled the 4.()9 p.m. position of the German flagship. It was assumed to
have been obtained by directional wireless, and was disregarded in favour
of positions given by ships in contact with the German fleet. At 5.45 p.m.
further reports reached the Commander-in-Chief from the “ Southampton,”
“ Black Prince ” (right wing ship of the battle-fleet cruiser screen) , and again
from the Admiralty.
A mean of the reports up to 5.45 p.m. made it appear that the van of the
German battle-fleet would at 6 p.m. be 26 miles right ahead (i.e., S.E. by S.)
of the “ Iron Duke” (position “A” Diagram III). The later series placed
the van at 6 p.m. either 13% miles north-west of “ A ” (position “ B ”) or 17
miles W.iN. of “ B ” (position “ C ”) . This discrepancy placed the Com-
mander-in-Chief in a state of great uncertainty. Knowledge gained by plot-
ting the courses of both fleets since the issue of German reports, shows that
336 the battle OF JUTLAND
the actual position of the German van at 6 p.m. was at “ D ” (Diagram III)
viz.: 17 miles N. 65° W. of position “ A.”
The only reported information regarding the strength of the German
battle-fleet was contained in a signal at 4.45 p.m. from the “ Princess Royal ”
(passed from the “Lion”), which mentioned 26 to 30 battleships. This
confirmed the latest Admiralty Intelligence reports, crediting the Germans
with 18 completed Dreadnought battleships. Eight pre-Dreadnoughts would
bring the battle-fleet strength up to 26. It was anticipated that at least 88
German destroyers would accompany the fleet when it put to sea. The very
misty conditions prevailing during the subsequent action, and the retiring
manoeuvres adopted by Admiral Scheer, prevented the British Commander-
in-Chief from seemg more than a few (German ships at a time, and from
forming any idea of the strength and formation of the High Sea Fleet.
The complete uncertainty as to the position of the German battle-fleet
became a matter of increasing anxiety to the British Commander-in-Chief
as time passed, and heavy gunfire and distant flashes of guns to the southward
showed him that he was rapidly closing ships in action. A mistaken move
in deployment would place the British battle-fleet in a position of tactical
disadvantage, besides giving to the Germans the advantage of wind and light.
The light was much better looking westward than eastward.
A further consideration was the danger of massed torpedo attack on the
battle-fleet in the act of deplosrment if delayed too long; the thickening mist
produced ideal conditions for such attack. But pending correct information
no action was possible, and the Commander-in-Chief held on at full speed.
Meanwhile, occurrences were taking place to the eastward which had a
material effect upon the movements of the fleets. Admiral Hood, in the
3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, who at 3.15 p m. turned to the eastward to
intercept the vessels reported by the “ Galatea ” had since 3.45 p m. steered
a course which he anticipated would bring him into touch with the British
battle-cruisers. But the fleet having been dependent, since leaving its bases,
upon dead reckoning for its position, there was a discrepancy of 12 miles
between the estimated positions of the “ Iron Duke ” and “ Lion.” This
will not surprise any seaman since all ships had been zigzagging between
daylight and 2 p.m. and the “ Lion ” in addition had been in fierce action.
A^iral Hood, equally with his Commander-in-Chief, was therefore ignorant
of the true position of the British battle-cruisers, and his course took him
too far to the eastward.
At 5.30 P.M , however. Captain Lawson in the light cruiser “ Chester,”
five miles to the westward of the “ Invincible ” (Admiral Hood's flagship),
sighted the German 2nd Scouting Group of light cruisers (stationed about
four miles on the starboard bow of Admiral Hipper’s battle-cruisers) , turned,
md engaged them on a northerly course. The “ Chester ” suffered severely
in the ungual combat, before she came under the protection of Admiral
Hood’s ships which at once steered for and engaged the German vessels;
these turned to the southward at 5.50 to escape, the ships and the destroyers
in company discharging torpedoes and using artificial fog to cover their
retirement; the “Wiesbaden,” however, was partly disabled and the
“ Pillau ” damaged before they were clear. Admiral Hood’s battle-cruisers
avoided the torpedoes by turning away. His four destroyers gallantly led
by the “ Shark ” (Commander Loftus Jones) then attacked the ships of the
2nd Scouting Group, the “ Shark ” being disabled by gunfire after firing a
torpedo at one of the German ships. She was sunk a few minutes later by
German destroyers.
Whilst Admiral Hood was engaging the 2nd Scouting Group, Rear-
Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot in the “ Defence,” flagship of the 1st Cruiser
ADMIRAL JELLICOE
337
Squadron, forming part of the battle-fleet cruiser screen, also sighted these
vessels on his starboard bow, and with the “Warrior” opened fire. The
German ships drew out of range, but the partially disabled “Wiesbaden”
presently came into view and was engaged. (The encounter between the
3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 2nd Scouting Group led to important
results. Admiral Boedicker who commanded the Scouting Group mistook
Admiral Hood’s force for a battle-fleet, and so reported it, thus misleading
Admiral Scheer.)
These attacks on German ships from the eastward and northward, com-
bined with the pressure on the van of the British battle-cruisers and ships
BSmSH BATTLE
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Position of Fleets at
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of the 5th Battle Squadron, and the torpedo attack by the British destroy-
ers, caused Admiral Hipper to turn to Ibe eastward at 6 p.m. and to S.S.W.
at 6.07 p.M. to close his battle-fleet.
The situation at this time is shown in Diagram III which also indicates
the actual position of the van of the German battle-fleet as compared with
the various positions in which the reports to Admiral Jellicoe placed it.
At 6 p.M. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, commanding the let Battle_ Squadron
on the starboard wing of the battle-fleet, reported sitting the British battle-
cruisers bearing S.S.W. (i.e., broad on the starboard bow) and steering east. At
6.01 P.M. (be “ Lion ” being sighted from tbe “ Iron Duke,” Admiral Jellicoe
T. B. T. — VOL 1 — 22
338
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
signalled to Admiral Beatty asking for the position of the German battle-
fleet. At the same time he alter^ course to south, as from the position
of the “ Lion ” and her consorts, it appeared that the German fleet must
be much further to the westward than the reports had indicated. Just
afterwards, however, heavy firing was heard to the south-eastward of the
“Iron Duke,” (probably from the “ Defence ” and “Warrior”), and as it
was evident that the fieets were very much closer than anticipated, it be-
came essential to be prepared for deployment at a moment’s notice; course
was therefore altered to S.E. in order to bring the leaders of divisions approxi-
mately abeam, and the destroyers were ordered to take up positions for
deployment. Meanwhile, no reply having come from the “Lion” to the
Commander-in-Chief’s enquiry at 6.01 p.m., it was repeated. At 6.06 the
“ Lion ” reported the German battle-cruisers bearing S.E. and at last, at
6.14, their battle-fleet bearing S.S.W.
The fleets were now so close that shells were already falling near, and
a moment’s reflection convinced the British Commander-in-Chief that it
was too late to form line of battle on the starboard division, as was his &sC
impulse; such a movement would not only necessitate very large alterations
of course, but would almost certainly lay the fleet open to a concentrated
attack by destroyers during deployment. The situation was critical, and the
simplest deployment manoeuvre imperative.
Line of battle was accordingly formed at 6.15 p.m. (Diagram III) on a
S.E. by E. course on the port wing division commanded by Sir M. Jerram
in the “ King George V,” with the intention of gaining for the British battle-
fleet both the advantage of position across the German van, and the
advant^ of better light. The manoeuvre had hardly commenced when
Sir Cecil Burney’s division, now in rear, came under the fire of the German
van at a range of 13,000 yards; the fire was effectively returned by the
“ Marlborough ” and some ships of her division, as well as by the 5th Battle
Squadron which at this time formed astern of the battle-fleet, but the
dense smoke of the British cruisers then passing along the line some two miles
distant, on their way to take station ahead of the battle-fleet, almost entirely
screened the German battle-fleet from view, and although speed was reduced
to 14 knots for seven minutes to allow the battle-cruisers to draw clear, it was
not until 6.25 p.m. that fire could become general, and even then the British
van and centre were severely hampered by smoke.
Admiral Jellicoe signalled at 6.29 p.m. to alter course by sub-divisions
to S.S.E., to get clear of the smoke and to close the German fleet, but was
obliged to annul the movement because deployment was not yet complete,
ships were bunched owing to the reduction in speed, and it was not certain
that the battle-cruisers had cleared the head of the line. Had this move
been possible, the German battle-fleet would have been caught in a still
more unfavourable position. As it was, the British fleet was across its van,
and Admiral Scheer was forced to alter course to east.
The “ Iron Duke ’* (ninth ship from the van) opened fire on the “ Konig,”
leading German battleship, at 6.30 p.m., punishing her severely. Only a few
ships of the German van division could be seen, but on these vessels the
fire of all shins of the battle-fleet, from which they were visible, was con-
centrated. There was no effective reply, probably owing to the difficulty of
seeing the British ships clearly against the eastern horizon.
ADMIRAL JELLICOE
339
MOVEMENTS OF 3eD BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON AND IST CRUISER SQUADRON
The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, after its engagement with the 2nd
Scouting Group, steered to the westward towards the sound of gunfire until
the ** Lion '' was sighted in action with the German battle-cruisers. These
latter vessels had closed their battle-fleet at 6.14 p.m. and formed ahead of
it, on a northerly course, being then attacked by the destroyers “ Onslow ”
and ‘‘ Acasta ” on the port and starboard bow respectively. Both destroyers
made a fine attack, but their torpedoes failed to hit. Admiral Hood turned his
squadron into line two miles ahead of the ‘‘ Lion ” at 6.20 p.m , and steering
to the south-eastward came into close action at about 9,000 yards’ range
with the German battle-cruisers on a parallel course.
German accounts speak of the fire from Admiral Hood’s ships as very
effective (the “ Lutzow ” being severely damaged and the “ Derfflinger ”
heavily hit) until at 6.32 p.m the battle-cruiser Invincible,” hit by a salvo
from the “ DcrfHinger,” blew up and disappeared, only six survivors being
picked up by the destroyer “ Badger.”
Shortly before this the armoured cruisers “ Defence ” and ‘‘ Warrior ”
having at 6.05 p m. opened fire on the “ Wiesbaden,” closed that ship to finish
her off, and in doing so came under the fire of the German battle-cruisers
and leading battleships at short range. Before Sir Robert Arbuthnot could
extricate his ships, the Defence,” hit by heavy shell, blew up at 6.20 p m.,
and the Warrior ” was partially disabled, but was able to withdraw owing
to the German fire being diverted to the battleship “ Warspite,” which ship
was near her with her helm temporarily jammed. This occurred whilst the
5th Battle Squadron was making a wide turn in order to form astern of the
remainder of the battle-fleet. Both the Warspite ” and the Warrior ” were
forced to leave the line and to make for a home port; the “Warrior,” en-
countering bad weather later, was abandoned in a sinking condition after a
fine attempt by the “ Engadine ” to tow her home.
THE GERMAN FLEET WITHDRAWS
The situation was becoming so serious for the High Sea Fleet with its
van being crushed, that Admiral Scheer at 6.35 p.m. adopted the desperate
remedy of turning all his ships simultaneously to the westward directly
away from the British line. Such a movement under fire with the ships in
a bent line involved considerable risks, but the manoeuvre had been fre-
quently practised in peace and was carried out successfully under cover of
a dense artificial fog produced by the German destroyers. (Diagram IV.)
Admiral Scheer states that artificial fog or smoke prepared by a special
process at the largest dye works, was supplied to all the lighter vessels for
use in covering retiring movements. A similar arrangement seems to have
been supplied to German military forces, but in this case it was used to
conceal offensive movements.
By 6.40 P.M. firing had ceased and the German ships had disappeared
from view. Admiral Jellicoe at 6.44 altered course to S.E. by divisions.
Admiral Scheer’s turn to the westward could not be seen from the bridge of
the “ Iron Duke,” and the assumption was that thickening mist had tem-
porarily obscured the German ships. Admiral Burney, however, in reply
to a signal, having reported that he could not see any German battleships,
a further turn to south was ordered at 6.55.
Just at this time the battleship “ Marlborough ” — flagship of Sir Cecil
840 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
Burney — was hit by a torpedo fired probably by German destroyers then
attacking; several torpedoes had already been avoided by the ships of
Admiral Burney’s squadron, their wakes being observed in time. At 7.05
V.M., there being still no German ships in sight, the British battleships were
turned together to S.W. by S. to search in this direction (Diagram V).
Ignorant of the course of the German fleet, and of its formation, the British
(b) Owing to the mist large alterations of coiuse would give the German
flotillas highly favourable opportunities for attack and the total alter-
ation of eight points was therefore carried out in tiiree movemente.
ADMIRAL JELUCOE
341
Meanwhile at 6.58 p.m. Admiral Scheer had again reversed his line by
a simultaneous turn and steered east with possibly one of two objects in
view, either to attack the rear of the British fleet, or to evade that fleet
by crossing astern. He can hardly be credited with intentionally steering
in line ahead for the centre, since it would expose his van to the same heavy
concentration of Are from which he had only liberated it with great diffi-
culty half an hour earlier. According to German diagrams, be believed the
British fleet to be much further to the south than it was in reality; conse-
quently, instead of striking the rear as eiqiected he presently found himself
opposite to the centre.
Commodore Goodenough, on deployment, had placed his 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron in its action station towards the rear of the British fleet,
and in searching for the German fleet, now sighted ships to the soutWard,
ran down, made out the van of the High Sea Fleet at 7 p.m. steering E.S.E.,
and reported the fact. He came imder fire, but again his ships were not hit.
THE FLEBirS AGAIN IN CONTACT
At 7.09 German destroyers were sighted nearly ahead of the “ Iron Duke,”
and a submarine was reported on the port bow, whereupon Admiral Jellicoe
turned his ships to south, thus steering at the submarine, and forming the
battle-fleet for action. Just afterwards, the rear divisions of the battle-fleet
342
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
re-opened fire on the German van then coming into sight out of the haze.
The range was short, 8,000-11,000 yards, and the German battle-cruisers,
which were ahead of their battle-fleet and the first ships sighted, came under
a most devastating fire.
By 7.14 p.M practically the whole British battle-fleet was in action with
the German battle-cruisers, and with the van of the German battle-fleet
about 3,000 yards further west. They were forced to turn to the southward.
The ranges at which the German ships were engaged by the British
varied between 8,000 and 14,000 yards for their battle-cruisers, and between
11,000 and 17,000 yards for their battleships, according to the division to
which the British ships belonged, the difference in distance being due to
the disposition of the British fleet (Diagram VI).
The return German fire was again ineffective owing to the British, being
to the eastward, having the advantage in light; the Colossus was the
only battleship hit. The conditions of light were curious; British ships firing
at battle-cruisers did not observe the battleships, whilst others firing at
battleships could not see the battle-cruisers, although the latter were nearly
between the battleships and the British fleet. It was seldom that the visi-
bility admitted of ships being seen beyond 12,000 yards.
THE GERMAN FLEET AGAIN WITHDRAWN
In order to close the range for his van and open that for his rear divisions
to lessen the risk from torpedo fire^ (torpedo range as between battleships
was about 15,000 yards), Admiral Jellicoe signalled at 7 16 for line ahead to
be formed on the centre^; at 7.17 Admiral Schecr, who had run into a position
of the greatest danger, and whose ships were being repeatedly hit, launched
a destroyer attack, ordered his crippled battle-cruisers to attack, and under
cover of another artificial fog screen once again turned the ships of his
battle-fleet simultaneously to west, in order to save the van from destruction.
The “ Lion with the British battle-cruisers had been about two miles
slightly on the starboard bow of the leading British battleship, the “ King
George V,” when Admiral Schcer made his first turn away at 6.35 p.m. ; at
6.55 P.M., when the battle-fleet turned to south, she was five miles off and
nearly ahead. At this time when altering course to starboard the ‘‘ Lion,”
owing to failure of her gyro compass, turned a complete circle, followed by
the other battle-cruisers. At 7,10 p.m. they were three miles on the port bow
of the ‘‘King George V,” and thus at much longer range from the German
ships than the battle-fleet. But at 7.15 they sighted the German battle-
cruisers, and the mist clearing for a short time engaged them at a range of
about 18,000 yards.
Under the heavy punishment inflicted the German battle-cruisers turned
sharply away, after their battleships, at 7.21 p.m., and by 7.25 firing at the
heavy ships had ceased.
GERMAN DESTROYER ATTACK
The German destroyers attacked as Admiral Scheer turned away, at
7.17 P.M. They had been sighted as early as 7.08 p.m. and engaged by the
^ To permit the van squadron to form ahead of the centre squadron Admiral Jellicoe
reduced i^ed between 720 and 8 p.m. to 15 knots In spite of this reduction the van
squadron found it necessary, owing to the alterations of course to the westward, to
average 18i knots speed during this period.
ADMIRAL JELLICOE
343
secondary armament of the British battleships as they came within rai^.
The attack was in successive “ waves,” first by boats of the 6th Flotilla
coming from a bearing 40“ before the starboard beam of the “ Iron Duke,”
threatening the van and centre; secondly by boats of the 9th Flotilla threat-
ening the rear (Diagram VI).
German destroyers carried six torpedoes; one flotilla only (11 boats) could
(iierefore discharge as many as 66 torpedoes.
The constant alterations of course to the westward by the battle-fleet
had prevented the British destroyers from reaching a position for counter
attack, and the battleships were dependent on their own gun-fire and on that
of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was ahead of the battle-fleet by
7.22 P.M. and was ordered to attack the destroyers.
The 6th Flotilla was observed to turn at 7.26 p.m. being then about
8,000 yards from the “ Iron Duke ” ; it was concluded they had just fired
their torpedoes, and the British battle-fleet was then turned to port to avoid
them, first two points and later a further two points.
At about 7.% P.M. the 2nd Battle Squadron in the van being clear of
torpedoes altered course to form ahead of the “ Iron Duke ” on a southerly
course; at 7.35 a course S. by W. was signalled, and the battle-fleet directed
to form single line ahead. One of Admiral Schcer’s diagrams shows that 21
torpedoes were fired at this time; far fewer than was expected in view of
the armament carried. Many torpedo tracks were seen to cross the British
line, but the torpedoes, being near the end of their run, were avoided.
Attacks by the German 3rd and 6th Flotillas followed those made by
the 6th and 9th; these were driven off by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron,
only one boat firing torpedoes.
The Germans lost one destroyer sunk, and two badly damaged by the
gun-fire of the battleships and Light Cruisers, scored no hits, but effectually
concealed Admiral Scheer’s movements by means of the artificial fog screen
^veloped simultaneously with the attack.
344
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
FCRTHEB MOVEMENTS OF THE BBITISH FLEET
In a wireless message timed 7.30 and received at about 7.45 f.m., Admiral
Beatty, ahead of the fog screen and smoke, reported the “ Lion ” steering
S.W. and German ships bearing N.W. by W. from her; he did not give their
course; the battle-fleet therefore altered to the “ Lion’s ” course, S.W., form-
ing single line ahead at the same time.
But at 7.45 f.m. Commodore Goodenough in rear of the fog screen, re-
ported a number of German ships as detached at 7.15 f.m. and steering
N.W. ; this made the situation again doubtful, but at 7.59 f.m. a searchlight
signal received from Admiral Beatty, reported the leading German battle-
ship bearing N.W. by W. and steering S.W.^ Admiral Jellicoe then altered
course to west to close the German Fleet.
MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FLEET
Admiral Scheer continued approximately on his westerly course until
well out of sight behind his fog screen, and by 8 f.m. had hauled round to
south. He now knew from his destroyers that the whole British Grand
Fleet was opposed to him, and in his despatch remarks that his only safety
lay in reaching the Horn Reef before the British. To facilitate this he
gave directions that all hisi destroyers were to be used for night attacks.*
His movements indicated an intention of passing round the van of the British
fleet.
At 8.15 F.M. he was steering south with the 2nd and 4th Scouting Groups
leading, followed by the 2nd Squadron, 1st Scouting Group, and the 1st
and 3rd Squadrons. His course converged sharply with that (west) of the
British fleet.
THE FLEETS AGAIN IN CONTACT
At 8.15 F.M. the British battle-fleet was steering west at 17 knots m
divisions; the battle-cruisers were between six and seven miles S.W. of the
“ King George V,” steering W.S.W. with the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron on
the starboard bow steering west searching for the German fleet and the
armoured cruisers on the port quarter; the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with
the lUb Destroyer Flotilla, was between the battle-fleet and battle-cruisers,
and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron steering west to the northward of the
battle-fleet. (Diagram VII.)
Admiral Jerram had been directed by the Commander-in-Chief at about
8.10 F.M. to follow Admiral Beatty’s battle-cruisers, but reported that they
were not in sight. At 8.18, hearing gunfire on the port bow, he turned his
sqimdron to WB.W. The firing was the result of contact between the
British 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and the German 4th Scouting Group.
After an action between these ships lasting for ten minutes the Germans
turned away and were lost to sight in the dusk.
Admiral Beatty altered course to west on hearing the firing, sighted the
1 The '* Lion ” was over 17 miles from the German van at this time and therefore
obviouabr not in sight of it; the report was probably a repetition of that received at
7.46 F.M.
2 This signal was mtercepted by the Admiralty and Admiral Jellicoe informed at
10 F.M.
'■ifr
@ Kadel A Herbert
Admiral Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Fleet in the Firth of Forth ?rith the Famous Railway Bridge ii
the background.
ADMIRAL JELLICOE
345
German battle-cruisers and turning to W.S.W. opened fire at about 821.
The German ships, being in no condition for further fighting, turned sharply
away, passing in rear of their 2nd (pre-Dreadnou^t) Battle Squadron,
which the British battle-cruisers then engaged. This squadron held on until
the 1st Scouting Group was out of range, and then turned away. The battle-
cruiser “ Derfflinger " and three ships in the 2nd Squadron were hit, and their
return fire, owing to the bad light to the eastward, was ineffective except for
one hit on the battle-cruiser “ Princess Royal.”
At 8.14 p.M. Commodore Hawksley, commanding the destroyer flotillas
in the “Castor” light cruiser, attacked some German destroyers sighted
ahead of the battle-fleet. A portion of the 11th Flotilla and the 1st Division
of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron supported him. The German destroyers
fired torpedoes (two of which were seen to pass through the battle-fleet line)
and retired, being chased by the British vessels, from which the leading
battleships of the German 1st Squadron were suddenly sifted at 826 p.m.,
about four miles off. These vessels opened fire and the light cruisers fell back
toward the “ King Geoi^ V,” the “ Calliope ” receiving three hits, after fixiiqc
a torpedo.
Between 8.21 and 8.30 the British battle-fleet steered in the direction of the
gun-fire heard between bearings W.S.W. and S.W. from the “ Iron Duke,” but
did not si^t the German fleet in the rapidly failing li^t, each of its squad-
346
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
rons having turned to the westward or north-westward by 8.30 p.m. The
position at 8.4S is shown in Diagram VIII.
DISPOSITIONS FOB THE NIGHT
With the advent of darkness fresh dispositions were necessary. The idea
of a night action between the heavy ships was at once rejected by Admiral
Jellicoe, the reasons amongst others which influenced him being:
(1) As is well known such an action possesses a strong element of pure
chance; the value of the Grand Fleet to the Allied cause was far too
great to be made the sport of chance.
Diaguam VIII.
Position of Fleets
at 8:45 P.M. (Dusk).
1st
German
Scouting
HIGH
3rd Squadron
ind m
Light Cruiser ^
Squadron f
/sth M
Battle CrutserW
Squadron
/ea.
Divmon
Sth Divtatot^
ttk Dtvmon^
Srd Dxinstumjf
Fleet Flagship
(lat Squadron
aHHiles - ,
tnd uivmonM
Iron Duke
BRITISH
SEA
// y Group
Squadron
Snd
'German Scouting
I
FLEET
Royalist
Constance,
If-
jf
CalliopeAjf
Dtvtsvm
J/ BATTLE
FLEET
German
Seouting
Group
Minotaur^^mumrvd
j^Srd ^ Cruisers
tT Light Cruiser Cruisers
Squadron rlAotk
let A /
Light Cruiser f Scale of Sea Miles
Squadron ^ o i 2 s 4
(2) It is extremely diflBcult to distinguish friend from foe, and there is great
danger of ships on the same side engaging each other.
(3) A night action would discount the value of the preponderating artillery
fire possessed by the British fleet.
(4) It would give the German fleet the opportunity to take advantage of
the superior torpedo armament known to be possessed by both ships
and destroyers, as well as of their more perfect defensive arrangements.
TT* T^a ^ would ensure contact with the
High Sea Fleet on June 1 before it could reach its bases. It was inferred
that the German fleet was on a bearing approximately WS.W. from the
“ Inm Duke ” and according to a report from the “ Falmouth ” at 8.46 p.m.
steering W.S.W.; reports indicated that its squadrons were scattered; Admiral
Scheer mif^t be expected to stand well to the westward or south-westward
before seeking to regain his base. According to British information he had
ADMIRAL JELLICOE
347
four routes to safety: (1) by the Skagerrack, (2) by the Horn Reef, (3)
along the Friesian coast, and (4) by a swept channel to the north-westward
of Heligoland. Of the four the second seemed to Admiral Jellicoe the least
probable, as he expected Admiral Scheer to be aware of the fact that British
submarines had been of late watching the Horn Reef exit. These facts led
Admiral Jellicoe to decide to steer south to a position commanding both
the Heligoland and Friesian coast routes. He intended to close the Horn
Reef at daylight unless events during the night altered his views. In order
to make the passage via the Horn Reef dangerous, should that route be
taken, the Commander-in-Chief at 10.16 p.m. directed the Abdiel ” to lay
a line of mines in a position to the southward of the three British submarines,
already stationed off the Horn Reef.
In furtherance of his plan the Commander-in-Chief altered course to south
at 9 P.M., formed the British battle-fleet in three squadrons in line ahead one
mile apart, and stationed the destroyers five miles astern for the double
purpose of attacking the High Sea Fleet should it follow to the southward,
and of protecting the British fleet from destroyer attacks. At 9.05 p.m. the
“ Lion ” reported the 8.40 p.m position of the German battle-cruisers; at the
same time Admiral Jerram reported the “ Lion in sight. The two reports
combined placed the Germans at 9.05 about 15 miles N.W. of the battle-fleet,
which position differed from that given in earlier reports The discrepancy
was due to the ships taken m the dusk by Admiral Jerram for British being
in reality German; they were unsuccessfully attacked with torpedoes by the
“ Caroline ” and Royalist.^^
Admiral Beatty turned his battle-cruisers to a course south at 9.30 p.m.,
stationing his two Light Cruiser Squadrons to the westward. His position
then and throughout the night was about 13 miles W.S.W. of the ** Iron
Duke.”
THE NIGHT ACTIONS
As mentioned earlier. Admiral Scheer had decided to make for the Horn
Reef; he states in liis despatch that he intended to take the shortest route
and to press on regardless of night attacks. To this bold decision his escape
was due. In making it he was probably influenced by his knowledge of
the excellence of the night defence arrangements of his ships. At about
9.30 p.m. he shaped course S.S.E. 3 E. at 16 knots with the 2nd and 4th Scout-
ing Groups leading, and his destroyers advancing on a sector from E.N.E.
to S.S.W. His course soon brought him into contact with the British fleet.
At 10.05 p M Commodore Haw’ksley in the “ Castor ” with the 11th
Flotilla sighted the 2nd Scouting Group on his starboard bow. He took
them for British ships as they made the correct British challenge,^ but they
then switched on searchlights and opened fire; this was returned, the
Castor ” receiving several hits. The “ Castor ” and two destroyers fired
torpedoes, but without result; fire was not opened from the remaining
destroyers because it was thought that the ships in sight were British.
At 10.20 P.M. a fierce engagement lasting for 15 minutes took place be-
tween the British 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and the German 4th Scouting
Group, which sighted each other at a distance of 800 yards. On the British
side the “ Southampton ” and “ Dublin ” received many hits and sustained
severe casualties, whilst the Germans lost the “ Frauenlob,” sunk by a tor-
^ On board the ** Lion ” the Challenge and Reply for the day had been lost and at
932 P.M. the “ Lion ” asked the “ Princess Royal ” for it by flashing signal. The reply
may have been read by a German ship.
THE BATTLE UK JUTLAiNU
SiS
pedo from the “ Southampton,” very heavy casualties being sustained in the
other ships of the German Scouting Group. The opposing squadrons turned
ADMIRAL JELLICOE 349
Goodenough from reporting the action to the Commander-in-Chief until
11.30 p.M.
Between 10.30 and 11.30 f.m. information bearing on the situation reached
Admiral Jellicoe. Two reports came from the Admiralty, the result it was
presiuned of directional wireless bearings or intercepted signals. The first,
received at 10.40 pm., reported the rear ship of the German battle-fleet to
be in a position which put her eight miles to the southward of the “King
George V ” at 9 p m., steering south. This information was disregarded as
obviously incorrect. The second report, received shortly before 11.30 p.m.
but despatched at 10.41 p.m., stated that the German fleet was believed to
be returning to its base as its course was S.S.E.fE., speed 16 knots.
But just afterwards, Commodore Goodenough (at 11.38 pm.) reported
his 10.20 engagement v#ith German light cruisers, and the “ Birmingham
of his squadron at 11.30 p.m. reported that battle-cruisers “ probably hostile
were then (11.30) in sight, on a course south; the position given was 30
miles to the northward, i.e., slightly on the starboard quarter of the “ Iron
Duke.”
Of these reports, that from a ship actually in sight of German vessels
was taken as the most reliable; it indicated to the Commander-in-Chief that
the High Sea Fleet was following him 30 miles astern and on the same
course, le., south not S.S.E.JE It was considered probable that even if
the Admiralty report timed 10.41 p.m. had been correct when despatched,
the Germans had altered course subsequently and the signal ordering the
new course had not been intercepted by British stations.
On the German side Admiral Scheer had been informed at 10.30 p.m.
by the German wireless station at Neumiinster of Admiral Jellicoe’s signal
ordering the British flotillas to take station five miles astern of the battle-
fleet, which had been intercepted and decoded. This information was of
priceless value to him as once the British flotillas were located, he knew the
position and course of the battle-fleet, even if the signal ordering the course
south had not also been intercepted, as to which there is doubt.
The British 4th Flotilla came into contact with the German van at
11.10 P.M. For some minutes Captain Wintour, commanding the flotilla,
had been unable to make out whether the ships dimly seen on his starboard
side were friend or foe. He finally challenged, and a devastating fire was
at once opened on the “ Tipperary ” and her consorts. Several destroyers
fired torpedoes, including the “ Tipperary,” which was disabled, but some
withheld their fire for a time, still uncertain of the identity of the ships
seen. In the confusion caused by this attack, the “ Elbing ” of the German
2nd Scouting Group was rammed by a German battleship and sank later
on; the German battleships turned to the westward for a time away from
the attack. The “ Broke,” which took the place of the disabled “ Tipperary ”
as flotilla leader, sighted, and attacked at 11.30 p.m. a vessel believed to be
a battleship. This vessel opened fire and disabled the “ Broke’s ” steering
gear, causing her to ram the destroyer “ Sparrowhawk ” ; the “Contest,”
another destroyer, in the blinding glare of searchlights and gun-fire, also
rammed the “ Sparrowhawk ” just afterwards In this encounter the German
light cruiser “ Rostock ” was torpedoed and she sank during the night. A
portion of the 4th Flotilla now led by the “ Achates ” came once more in
contact with strange ships at midnight. Doubt as to her identity again led
to some of the destroyers not firing, but several torpedoes were fired, and it
was thought at the time that one from the “ Ardent ” had taken effect.
In these three gallant attacks by the 4th Flotilla the British lost the
“ Tipperary ” and three destroyers sunk, and others disabled, and the
Germans lost two light cruisers.
350 the battle OF JUTLAND
The searchlights, star shell and gun flashes during the actions recorded
above were seen in the “ Iron Duke,” and taken for the expected destroyer
attacks made by either British or German vessels and supported possibly
by light cruisers. Notations made on board the various British battle-ships
during the nightfall refer also to the fighting as being of this character.
The order of the British flotillas from west to east at 9.30 p.m. was 11th,
4th, 13th (9 boats) , 9th (5 boats) , 12th. The “ Marlborough ” (unknown to
the Commander-in-Chief) dropped astern from inability to maintain a speed
of 17 knots, and a gap gradually opened between the 4th Flotilla and those
to the eastward which were keeping station on the Marlborough.” This
gap was widened between 11.30 p.m. and midnight under the following con-
ditions.
German shell (fired at the 4th Flotilla) were falling amongst the van
vessels of the 13th Flotilla, and the leader, thinking that the fire was directed
at his destroyers, and that the presence of the 4th Flotilla between himself
and the Germans prevented him from attacking, turned to the eastward ; this
caused both the flotillas on his port side to turn also to the eastward (Dia-
gram IX), leaving a clear route for the High Sea Fleet.
However, the 12th Flotilla, commanded by Captain Stirling in the
“ Faulknor,” resumed a southerly course at 12.15 a m. and came in sight of
the German battle-fleet steering about S.E. at 1 45 a.m., June 1. The Ger-
man ships sighted the destroyers and turned away; the 12th Flotilla keeping
out of sight got ahead of them, altered course to N.W. at 2 a.m. and carried
out a gallant and successful attack. Twelve torpedoes were fired resulting
in the German battleship Pommem ” being hit and blown up with all
hands. It was thought at the time that a second battleship had been de-
stroyed in a second attack by the Maenad.”
Captain Stirling sent two wireless reports to his Commander-in-Chief,
the first giving the position, and the second the course of the German battle-
fleet, but owing probably to German wireless interference, neither report was
received by any British ship except the destroyer “ Markman,” then close
to the ‘‘ Faulknor.” Had the reports been received, however, it is improbable
that they would have resulted in the High Sea Fleet being intercepted, for
the first signal gave the Faulknor’s ” position as 10 miles astern north
of the 1st Battle Squadron ; the second reported the German course as S.S.W.
The Faulknor^s ” actual position was 19 miles N.E. of the “ Marlborouj^,”
which ship herself was approximately N.N.E. 12 miles from the “ Iron
Duke ” instead of one mile east of her as the Commander-in-Chief imagined.
The report would have indicated to him that the German fleet was 10 miles
directly astern, whereas it was in reality 30 miles N.E. by N. of the “ Iron
Duke,” and if he had turned north to the position given him, he would have
passed some 15 miles off the German ships, and could not have seen them,
the visibility being only three miles.
The final work of the destroyer flotillas was an attack by the “ Moresby ”
on four German battleships at 2.35 a.m. It was thought at the time that the
torpedo she fired had hit a battleship, but in reality the victim was the
German destroyer V4, which was sunk.
THE SEARCH FOR THE HIGH SEA FLEET
Admiral Jellicoe altered course to North at 2.40 a.m. A wireless report
despatched from the Admiralty at 1.48 a.m. and received by him at about
the time of the turn to North placed the damaged ** Liitzow ” at midnight in
ADMIRAL JELUCOE
351
Lat. 56.26. N., Long. 5.41 E., the identical position in which the Birming-
ham ” reported battle-cruisers at 11.30 p.m. This confirmatory evidence
strengthened his expectations of meeting the High Sea Fleet to the north-
ward. The fighting that had taken place during the night, even if confined
to the respective light forces, was expected to force the German fleet to
the westward or northward. Concentration of the British fleet being
necessary, all squadrons and flotillas were directed at 2.22 a.m. to close the
battle-fleet. The “ Colossus ” then reported the absence of the Marl-
borough’s ” division from the battle-fleet, which having with it only the
4th Light Cruiser Squadron — lacked “ eyes ” ; there were no destroyers in
sight, and as the Admiralty 1 48 a.m. message had also informed the Com-
mander-in-Chief that all German submarines were coming out from their
ports, a destroyer screen was needed. In view, however, of the low visibility,
the possibility of early contact with the German fleet necessitated the battle-
fleet being formed in single line, in disregard of the submarine danger.
At 3 40 A.M. course was altered towards the sound of gunfire heard on
the port bcam„ but the hope thus raised that the German fleet had been
sighted by the battle-cruisers was dispelled by the 3rd Light Cruised Squad-
ron reporting by wireless that the firing was at a German airship; the north-
erly course was then resumed. Soon afterwards Admiral Beatty asked
permission to sweep S.W. to locate the German fleet. He had last seen
it steering that course and had evidently formed the natural impression that
Admiral Scheer would try to regain his base by passing to the westward of
the British fleet.
In view of the information received during the night. Admiral Jellicoe
felt that the German fleet could hardly be to the westward of his battle-
cruisers, so he held on to the north to meet it, endeavouring at the same
time to regain touch with his light craft.' At about 4 00 a m. a signal from
the Admiralty (despatched at 3 29 a.m.) reached him stating that at 2.30
A M. the German mam fleet was in Lat. 55 33' N. Long. 6° 50' E., i.e., 16
miles to the westw'ard of the Horn Reef Lightship, steering S.E. by S.
Allowing the widest margin for error it was obviously impossible for the
Grand Fleet to intercept Admiral Scheer, who would by 4 a.m. be in the
swept channel through the mine-fields, and it became apparent to Admiral
Jellicoe that his opponent had escaped him. Thenceforth his movements
were directed to endeavouring to locate and cut off injured German vessels,
but these had as a matter of fact all sunk, and at 11 a m. this being clear,
he shaped course for his base
The weather was apparently thicker in the vicinity of the Horn Reef
than further west, for Admiral Scheer stated in his despatch that he could
barely see the length of one squadron (2J miles) , He waited off the Horn
Reef for a short time, for the battle-cruiser “ Seydlitz,” received a report
from his airship “ L.ll ” of the presence of the British fleet to the west-
ward, decided that his ships were in no condition for further fighting, and
proceeded towards his base. On the way the battleship ‘‘ Ostfriesland ”
struck one of the mines laid by the " Abdiel ” on May 5, but managed to
reach harbour, while it became necessary to beach the “ Seydlitz,” severely
damaged during the fighting, at the mouth of the Jade River, to save her
from sinking.
^ Owing largely to the difficulty of maintaining accurate dead reckoning, particularly
in the destroyers, under the conditions of night action, the concentration of the fleet
was not effected for several hours. The battle cruisers were m sight at 5 a m. with their
Light Cruiser Squadrons; the cruisers were in touch at 530 a.m., all ^ese vessels being
sent eastward to search for German ships; the destroyers were met at 845 a.m. and
Admiral Burney’s division of the battle-fleet at 7.30 pm.
352
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
LOSSES IN THE BATTLE
The losses sustained by the opposing forces in the battle of Jutland were
as follows:
On the British side: Three battle-cruisers, two armoured-cruisers, and
eight destroyers were sunk in or shortly after action, and one armoured-
cruiser sank on her way across the North Sea towards her base; 6,097 officers
and men were killed and 510 wounded. These losses except the sinking of one
battle-cruiser, one armoured-cruiser^ and five destroyers occurred before the
British battle-fleet came into action.
On the German side: One battleship, one battle-cruiser, four light cruisers
and five destroyers were sunk; 2,545 officers and men were killed and 494
wounded.
The greater loss of life on the British side was the result of five ships
being blown up with practically all hands, their destruction being due not so
much to the number of hits they received as to the excellence of the German
shell and delay-action fuses which, combined with the comparatively light
protective armour in the British ships, enabled the explosion of the shell
to reach the magazines.
The Germans were fortunate in being able to take off the survivors from
the “Liitzow” (1,250 men), “Elbing^' and “Rostock” before these vessels
sank during the night,* and in the greatly damaged “ Seydlitz ” •* reaching
shallow water before it became necessary to beach her. Her bows were flush
with the water when she was beached.
THE RESULTS
As is usually the case when a naval battle does not result in the capture
or destruction of a large portion of one of the two fleets, both sides claimed
the victory, the Germans basing their claim on having inflicted greater
material losses than they received, together with a mistaken impression (the
result of an incorrect report from airship L 24) that the capital ships of the
Grand Fleet on the morning of June 1 were split up into three detachments,
and were therefore avoiding action.^ The foregoing narrative will show how
incorrect was this assumption.
The British claim to victory rested on surer foundations; —
(1) In the fact that the High Sea Fleet, from the moment that the British
battle-fleet appeared, consistently refused action and manoeuvred with the
sole object of returning safely to its base.
^ The " Black Prince ” This ship apparently lost touch with the Bntish fleet after
reporting German battle-cruisers in sight at 540 pm (see page 334). At 8.51 p.m. she
reported a submarine in sight She evidently steered south at about 9 r m , and at mid-
night came under the fire of the German battleships “ Ostfnesland ” and “ Thiirmgen,”
was heavily hit and blew up.
2 The “ Lutzow ” was hit by about 40 projectiles and by at least one torpedo She
had 7.000 tons of water in her, and was finally sunk by a German torpedo at 2 a m
* The “ Seydlitz was hit by at least 30 projectiles and one torpedo, and the “ Derf-
flinger,” according to her gunnery officer, received 25 hits from the largest calibre shell
and as many more from those of lesser calibre In both ships the hits were mostly on
the port side. These two dups were not ready for service again imtil November and
September, 1916, respectively. The greatest number of hits on any cyiital ship on the
Bntish side was 13 (in the case of me “Warspite”), and all injured British ships were
repaired by August 2.
* This message from airship L 24 at 3 a m on June 1 reported ** 12 ships in Jammer
Bay ” (90 miles north of the Horn Reef) . Needless to say, these ships did not belong to
the Grand Fleet.
ADMIRAL JELLICOE
353
(2) That on June 1 the movements of the Grand Fleet were directed
towards a renewal of the action as soon as the High Sea Fleet coidd be
located. On the other hand, Admiral Scheer himself states that owing to
the condition of many units of his fleet, he did not consider it desirable to
seek an offensive against even the 12 British ships reported by airship L.11
to the westward of the Horn Reef on the morning of June 1 (Scheer, page 166).
(3) That the German fleet only once left the vicinity of the Heligoland
Bight after the battle of Jutland, viz , on August 19, 1916, and on that occa-
sion Admiral Scheer, warned by his numerous airships stationed to the north-
ward, that the British battle-fleet was at sea and steering to meet him, retired
to his base long before the fleets were in contact. The next trip of the Hi^
Sea Fleet towards the British coast was for the purpose of surrendenng.
Captain Persius, the well-known German writer on naval matters, prob-
ably summed up tho situation, as seen in Germany, when he stated in the
Berliner TagebUitt on November 18, 1918: “ Our fleet losses were severe, and
on June 1, 1916, it was clear to every thinking person that this battle {i.e.,
the battle of Jutland) must and would be the last one. Authoritative quai^rs
said so openly.”
». a. T.— VOL. 1—23
CHAPTER XV
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF THE GERMAN ADMIRAL IN
COMMAND.'
By Admiral Kbinhabd Schecr
Commander-m-Chief of the German High Sea Fleet, from Janu-
ary, 1916, to the end of the World War. In command at the
battle of Jutland Author of Denschland's Hochsecflotte tm
Weltkneg
WHY WE FOUGHT THE BATTLE
England's participation in the World War of 1914-1918, showed the
decisive importance of sea-power, for as the war drew towards its end
the German armies on all fronts were still on enemy soil.
It is remarkable that between the two capital fleets only one battle was
fought, and this after the war had already raged for two years. Never
again in the following two and a half years did the British even try to bring
on a decisive action.
It was expected on the German side that the British fleet would challenge
the German fleet to a fight soon after the outbreak of the war, a fight which
certainly could have been forced by an operation against the German coast,
and that the Bntish navy, relying on its ability and superiority, would
undertake it in order to weaken German sea-power to such an extent that
Germany's fleet would be of no further influence in the war. This expecta-
tion was wrong. England had no intention of forcing a battle with the
German fleet. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, said
clearly in a speech in the Guildhall, November 9, 1914, that “economic
stringency,” enforced by blockade, would be the means of bringing Germany
to her knees.
This blockade was supported by the unimpaired existence of the British
fleet, “the fleet in being.” The respect it commanded made it possible to
disregard the objections of the neutral Powers, who were damaged by the
blockade and whose rights were infringed. It was therefore one of the
capital objects of the Germans to weaken this fleet and with it British
prestige.
DiflBcult as this object might be for a weaker fleet, such difficulty ought
not to be allowed to dampen the fighting spirit. If a weaker force lacks the
1 The battle of Jutland is still being fought, although years have passed since it
took place It has excited probably more controve^ than any other single battle of
the World War, both the British and Germans claiming a victory. The Editor of These
Eventful Years asked each of the two commanding oflicers to tell the story of the
battle as he fought it. These two personal narratives, with the many diagrams (sup-
plied in each case by the writer) illustrating the exact position of each of the vessels
engaged, will enable the reader to form his own opinion as to who was the real victor
in this historic conflict. For the Bntish account, see the chapter immediately preceding
this, written by Admiral Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet.
354
® Kcutel di; Herbert
A German mme-laying flotiUa returning from a cruise along the Finnish coast.
REINHARD SCHEER
355
courage of enterprise, it is better for it to capitulate at once. Acts of daring
do not mean that every precaution should not be taken to create favourable
conditions so as to attain ultimate success. These were the ideas by which
our actions were controlled at the time I received the order to take command
of the German High Sea Fleet, in January, 1916.
An attack by the German fleet upon the northern part of the British
Isles, or against the base of the British fleet in the Orkneys, would have
been playing directly into the hands of our enemy. He would have bad the
choice of time and place to begin the battle. The attacking force could not
so far away from its base be sure of help from all its auxiliary forces,
especially of torpedo boats, to aid the battle-fleet in a day-battle or in
the attack during the following night. The scouting of our air-ships, so
valuable because o^ our deficiency in light cruisers, would not have been
available at such a distance. The long return to our base would have
enabled the enemy to choose the time for attack and, in case of a battle,
our heavily damaged ships would have found it difficult to regain their
home ports.
The se(*ondary tasks which impose themselves on a fleet in war time
diverted the attention of the German fleet from its main object during the
first two vears of the war, and did not bring us any nearer to bringing about
a favourable issue of the war itself.
The fact that we held command in the Baltic, that Swedish shores re-
mained at our disposal, that the operations of our army were not interfered
with by the landing of enemy troops on our otherwise undefended coasts —
these were all due to the presence of our fleet. Certainly our victories in
France and Russia were not to be undervalued, for they kept the enemy away
from German territory. But the British power of resistance was in no way
impaired by them, while the German people as well as those countries which
supplied our fighting forces with necessary material, suffered heavily by
being shut off from the world^s trade.
If relief were to be found, if- British trade were to suffer, if the back-
bone of British strength, the fleet, were to be weakened, it could only come
from success at sea
Strategical considerations cannot alone decide how a war is to be fought.
The moral propensities of a people, which develop under the pressure of
war — perseverance, the willingness to sacrifice, fortitude, the ability to
lead — all these expressions of the will-power of a people have to be directed
in the right wav. These qualities are imponderable, but they are of decisive
influence. If they were the same amongst mankind, numerical and material
strength alone would decide everywhere, and no hope would be left to
those who, while weak, were morally in the right and were straining every
nerve to resist successfully the brutal might of the stronger.
To-day no serious man, even among our enemies, believes that the German
Empire, which was prospering in all respects, intentionally and solely with
the object of extending its power, embarked in a fight with Powers so
superior as our opponents in the World War.
It was for what they felt to be the right that the whole German nation,
notwithstanding many differences in home politics, stood together like one
man in the conviction of duty, and the will to defend their country with
all their energy.
In this fight with superior powers, the fleet, as the arm created to pro-
tect the seafaring interests necessary to the life of German trade, was
eager to justify the confidence the nation had put in it and wished in no
way to fall behind the army in sacrifice. To fail to make use of such moral
reserves would have been to sin against the necessity of the moment when
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
356
all means had to be strained for a successful issue. 'Hie belief in the navy's
ability was based on the knowledge of its training in peace-time. But proof
had to be given in the serious time of war. To avoid such proof was
absolutely against the wish of both officers and men of the fleet. Of this
1 was flrmly convinced. The British fleet had avoided a flgbt; the German
fleet had heretofore not sought a fight because minor and momentary con-
siderations had been given too much weight. This could not go on. That
is why we fought the battle.
CHEBMAN FLAN OF ACTION
_ Since the beginning of this century, the composition of the navies of the
chief sea-powers has shown a great similarity as to the different types of
ships. The strongly armoured battleship, with about ten guns of heaviest
REINHARD SCHEER
357
calibre, forms together with other ships of its kind, the line of battle and
the nucleus of the fleet. The decision in fight lay with the artillery, which
was able to throw shells filled with explosives, and having at the same time
high armour-piercing quality, a distance of 20,000 metres. At this range a
target, 200 metres in len^h, nine metres in height, and 30 metres in breadlii,
could be hit with certainty. The speed of these ships of the line was
20 miles an hour. To them battle-cruisers were added in the proportion
of one to four battleships. The battle-cruisers surpassed the speed of the
ships of the line by some six knots, had the same calibre of guns, but less
armour and fewer guns in proportion to their displacement. The measure-
ment of both these classes of ships was about 25,000 tons.
The first ship of this type was the British Dreadnought, built in 1905, of
about 19,000 tons. With the passing years this kind of ship had been
made more efficient but had remained in principle the same, whether battle-
ship of the line or battle-cruiser. The other kinds of vessels, such as light
cruisers, torpedo-boat destroyers and torpedo-boats, were of a more varied
type in the different navies, but their differences were not strong enough to
influence the outcome of a battle. One of the chief necessities for a fleet
was timely and correct information, so as to have knowledge of the strength
and position of the enemy’s main fleet. This information was obtained by
light cruisers. According to their report the initial and most favourable
position for the battle had to be chosen. Besides this scouting, another duty
of the light cruisers was to veil the movements of the fleet, and for this a
number of light cruisers was necessary. In this respect the British fleet was
absolutely superior to ours. The Zeppelins on our side were able to perform
most valuable scouting, but they were too dependent on the weather to be
counted on securely for service with the fleet. They were, too, most vulner-
able, were not able to defend themselves, and had to retreat before any armed
ship. The U-boats, which rose to be a most important arm in this war,
were unable to cooperate tactically with the fleet because of their lack of
speed. These boats received orders which they were able to execute only
according to their abilities.
The object of the German fleet was to draw the enemy away from his
remote base to a place where the German fleet, notwithstanding the difference
in numbers, need not shrink from accepting battle. For this purpose two
sudden attacks were undertaken in the spring of 1916 against the south-east
coast of England. Although on the second occasion even the fortified ports
of Yarmouth and Lowestoft were bombarded, the British fleet did not appear
in time either to prevent this or to cut off the retreat of the German force and
thus to compel them to battle. The disappointment in England was con-
siderable. The First Lord of the Admiralty tried to calm the feeling of
his countrymen by declaring that he had taken the necessary precautions
so that the German fleet should be punished severely if it tried such attacks
another time. This opportunity we were most willing to give by a sudden
attack to be delivered on the central British east coast in the direction of
Simderland, north of the mouth of the Humber. This enterprise seemed
risky without the scouting of the Zeppelins, as we had no wish to fi^t a
battle in a position unfavourable for our artillery. The omission of any
precautions, which might have led to disaster, would have been pimishable.
We still lacked experience as to the value of the British fleet in action, but
we had no reason to doubt the ability with which it would be handled.
As the German ships had finished their repairs and overhaulings soon
after the middle of May, 1916 — the “Seydlitz” had been damaged by a
mine in April during the last enterprise — the new plan was now to be
executed. Some of the U-boats had been withdrawn from their attack on
368 the battle OF JUTLAND
British trade, and 16 of them were now despatched to lie in waiting before the
different harbours of the British coast between the Humber and the Orkneys.
They were ordered to attack vessels leaving port, with the hope that by
damaging some of them the difference of numbers, which was sure to be
against us, might be somewhat reduced. They were to remain in these posi-
tions till the first of June. By that time I hoped to execute our plan. But
the weather was continually unfavourable for the use of the Zeppelins. To
profit from the U-boats already sent out, the plan was altered, and the
cooperation of the airships given up. The new plan was directed against
the trade in the Skagerrack, where the peninsula of Jutland gave us a
certain shelter against surprise from the east. The very last possible date,
May 30, vras chosen for the undertaking. The forces under the command
of the Admiral of the Fleet were: one squadron of five battle-cruisers led
by Vice-Admiral Hipper; two groups of eleven light cruisers, of which one
group of six was attached to Admiral Hipper, the five others serving as a
screen for the main force of the battle-fleet. This main force, commanded
personally by the Chief of the Fleet, Vice-Admiral Scheer, was composed
of three squadrons comprising altogether 16 modem ships of the line and six
somewhat obsolete battleships, carrying only four 28 cm. guns each. In
addition there were seven flotillas of torpedo-boats. Three of them were
attached to Admiral Hipper, four were kept with the main fleet; in all there
were about 70 vessels. On May 30, the fleet was assembled on the Jade, the
bight near Wilhelmshaven. The cruisers led by Admiral Hipper left at
two o’clock in the morning of May 31. The fleet followed half an hour later
to give the cruisers with their superior speed the chance of being well ahead,
so that on meeting the enemy the presence of the main fleet might not be
discovered at once, though it might still be near enough to be able to render
assistance in case of emergency. The order of the line was: First, the Third
Squadron, the ships of the ‘^Kaiser” and “Konig” class, each with ten
30 cm. armament.* Then came the First Squadron, eight ships of the line of
Dreadnought type, but less modem than those of the Konig ” class. Lastly
came the Second Squadron with six ships of the pre-Dreadnought or
Deutschland ” class.
REINHARD SCHEER
359
In view of the possibility of encountering mines in the German bight,
which had been well swept beforehand, the ships steamed in single file. From
the Third Squadron one ship, the ‘‘ King Albert,” was missing on account
of damage to its engines, the repair of which we could not wait for. In its
place the flagship of the fleet was ranged as the closing vessel of the Third
Squadron. This place was chosen in order to afford a better view of the
line, for the fleet steamed with 500 metres distance from ship to ship,
and 1,000 metres between the squadrons, so that the whole length of the
line was 11 kilometres. The position at the head of the line was abandoned
for one could not know whether the manoeuvres of the enemy encountered
might not lead us to reverse the line, m which case the flagship of the fleet
would have become the last ship in the rear. The weather on our steaming
out was very clear, a light breeze blowing from the north-west, the water
smooth. The forenoon, also the first hours of the afternoon, passed without
sighting any ship of the enemy. A general disappointment seemed to arise,
as no trace of the enemy was to be found, but soon after 3.30 p m. a wireless
signal was received by the “ Friedrich der Grosse ” saying that our advance
guard had sighted several light cruisers of the enemy, and that these had
turned away to the north (Diagram II). Soon afterwards the Admiral in
charge of the cruisers sighted in the west two columns of large ships steering
east. He advanced to attack them. The ships of the line now closed their
ranks to a distance of 500 metres from ship to ship and ran with highest
speed and in a northerly course to join our cruisers These were, at 3.30,
a distance of about 50 miles from us
THE BATTLE OPENS
At 4 45 the Admiral in charge of the cruisers reported that he was en-
gaged in a fight with six battle-cruisers of the enemy on a south-easterly
course. These battle-cruisers were: ‘‘Lion,” “Princess Royal,” “Queen
Mary,” “ Tiger,” “ New Zealand ” and “ Indefatigable,” under the command
of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty. It was he who had, perhaps with the
intention of barring the way southward to our cruisers, developed the fight
on a south-easterly course; in this way the distance between the fighting
cruisers and the approaching German main fleet quickly diminished. This
course w^as the more fortunate for our side, as we had the advantage of the
wind, which carried smoke and fumes to the east and gave our artillery a
free outlook toward the enemy. At 5 13 the last ship of the line of the
British battle-cruisers, the “ Indefatigable,” having been hit by a salvo
from our battle-cruiser “Von der Tann,” sank with a terrific explosion.
The German main fleet had in the meanwhile taken a westerly course so
as to enclose the enemy’s battle-cruisers between itself and Hipper’s ships.
But at 5.20 a new squadron of four or five large ships of the enemy had
appeared on the scene and had joined the fight. I held it necessary in
view of the superiority on the British side to hasten by the shortest way
to the assistance of our own cruisers (Diagram III) .
At 5.30 the British battle-cruiser “Queen Mary” was sunk by the
artillery of our cruisers. During this fight of the cruisers the German torpedo-
boats dashed forward to the attack, and British destroyers were thrown
against them. A fight between these ensued at distances between 1,000 and
1,500 metres. Two German boats were sunk as well as two of the British.
TVo other British boats, “ Nestor ” and “ Nomad,” were put out of action
and lay between the lines without motion. They were afterwards destroyed
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
360
by the approaching ships of our line. The first phase of the fi^t between
the cruisers had been most advantageous for us. The fact that the four
British battleships under the command of Admiral Evan Thomas reinforced
Beatty’s ships made no change, as the fire of their 38 cm. guns had bera
delivered at so great a distance, tbat when the German main fleet came in
sight of the fighting lines, both at highest speed, no damage had yet been
done.
The British commander now broke off the engagement and tum^ north-
ward with his remaining four battle-cruisers and the four battleships. They
came within reach of the artillery of our foremost ships of the line and
were pursued at once. If we stuck to them it was certain that they would
make use of their superior speed to draw us towards their main fleet. This
was what in fact happened. It was a considerable advantage to the British,
that in this way their main fleet received full information as to our strength,
formation, cotirse, and position. As a result their Commander-in-Chief could
at once prepare for the meeting and develop his squadrons in time and so
advantageously as to employ his full artillery power.
THE QEBMAN FLEET IN FUHSUIT
The German admiral on the contrary knew nothing of the approach of
the British main force in full strength. If he kept on pursuing these cruisers
the latter were bound to succeed in leading him into the prepared embrace
of the full British fleet. On the other hand there was no reason for us to
stand off from the pursuit as long as there was a chance of laming one of
the Britirii ships. In Justice to the latter it should be stated that they
fulfilled their duty splendidly in drawing us towards their fleet. Slowly
they had tum6d in a north-easterly course so that the wind, which had veered
RMNHARD SCHEER
361
to the soutii-west in the meantime, left the smoke of their funnels hanging
ov^ their line and ^us obscured them. The visibility had in the mean*
whUe somewhat diminished. Owing to the difficulty of locating the exact
positions of the British cruisers and their battle-fleet the British commander
had not yet deployed his squadrons for the battle, and they were still
formed in columns of six rows next to each other when the German main force
met the advance guard of the British battle-fleet.
The engagement in pursuit (Diagram IV) was fought from 5.55 to 6.40,
from the moment Beatty had made out the German battleships up to the
time the latter were in sight of the British main fleet. The artillery fire was
slow during this period, partly on account of the long distances, which
Beatty maintained, partly on account of the decreasing visibility. For
some time the artillery fire was silent altogether. Besides Beatty’s battle-
cruisers, eight armoured cruisers of the “ Minotaur ” type and three battle-
cruisers of the “ Invincible ” type belonged to the British advance force.
Admiral Hood on board the “ Invincible ” did not quite seem to grasp the
situation when he sighted the light German cruisers, which stood near Hipper’s
ships. He opened fire on them at 6 55. At this time the light cruisers and
torpedo-boats on both sides advanced to attack. It was here at 7.20 that
our light cruiser, the “Wiesbaden,” was put out of action and unable to
move. Of these engagements, between Hood’s battle-cruisers and our light
cruisers nothing could be seen from the flarahip “Friedrich der Grosse”
between 6155 and 7.10. To help the “ Wiesbaden ” the whole of the German
fleet was now swung round two points. At this time two reports reached me
pretty much at the same time — one from a torpedo-boat, the oth'er from a
li^t cruiser — saying that they had sighted over 20 battleships of the enemy
steering south-easterly courses, the ship heading the line bearing due east.
It was now clear we had encountered the whole British fleet.
362 the battle OF JUTLAND
Let us here take a short retrospective view of how thin^ had gone up to
this moment. The German fleet meets during an expedition in the North
Sea, iC British squadron of six battle-cruisers and some seven light cruisers.
The German battle-cruisers soon come into action with them. Four of the
most powerful of the British battleships of the line join the flght. The
German cruisers steer a course which quickly leads them (the English battle-
ships) towards the German battleships. On the British side two of the
new battle-cruisers are sunk, only a very few of the crews being saved. In
face of the approaching German battleship squadrons (16 modem ships of
the line and six battleships of pre-Dreadnought type), the British force
gives way to the north but keeps in touch at a distance rather beyond the
range of the artillery. Soon they lead the pursuing German ships in an
easterly course. After following these cruisers for about an hour and three
quarters the German admiral considers whether or not it is now time to
sever coimection with the enemy and to prepare for the torpedo attacks of
the coming night. At that very moment a new group of enemy ships seems
to join the fight (Hood’s battle-cruisers), and the “ Wiesbaden ” is disabled.
The intention to sever connections with the enemy is for this reason deferred.
The next reports make it likely that a large part of the enemy’s main fleet
must be m close proximity. There is not the slightest thought of avoiding a
meeting with it and the fleet therefore remains running with highest speed on
a north-easterly course. A few minutes later, at 7.10, in a large circle on
the horizon between north and east the salvos of the British ships are
visible. We find ourselves within their reach.
BBmSH MAIN FLEET IN ACTION
In judging from what is seen from the German flagship it is impossible to
say whether a joint line is formed by the enemy or if what is seemin^y
a line consists of different groups of ships, working separately. In fact the
head of tiie German line is surrounded by the enemy’s fleet, so that the fiftii
and sixth British battleship squadrons as well as Hood’s and Beatty’s cruiser
squadrons join their broadsides against the leading ships of the German line.
At the same time, five further British divisions of battleships are occupied
REINHARD SCHEER 363
in iuming to the north-east so as to change the parallel columns in which
they had steamed into the line of battle formed behind their left wing
column. While the British main force is thus occupied in manoeuvring, the
armoured cruisers, led by Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot, press home an attack
against ihe German light cruisers (Diagram V), some of his ships crossing
the bows of Beatty’s battle-cruisers. They thus find themselves between
the fire of the German main force and the British fifth and sixth battleships.
The “ Defence,” Arbuthnot’s flagship, is sunk by the fire of the “ Friedrich
der Grosse,” and the “ Black Prince ” receives heavy damage. This happens
to the “ Warrior ” also, which ship is left by its crew m a sinking condition.
At this time Beatty presses hard on the leading German ships. At 7.10 he
sees the approach of the battle-cruisers commanded by Admiral Hood (tiiree
“ Invincibles ”) steering north-west. He orders them to join his line forming
themselves on a south-easterly course before his flagship, the “ Lion.” At
7.25 Hood closes with the German battle-cruisers within a distance of 8,000
yards; at 7.34 his flagship, “ Invincible,” is sunk.
It was in this short time that two British admirals, Hood and Arbuthnot,
met their death by the destruction of their flagships. During this fight the
“Warspite” of the British Fifth Battleship Squadron (Evan Thomas) was
severely damaged and had to leave the line. The leading squadron of the
German line had, as soon as it found itself under a concentrate fire covering
eight German ships in this part of the battle, turned to starboard so as to
bring the whole of its artillery to bear. I could myself see from the bridge
the explosions of the enemy’s shells on the hulls of the foremost ships. I
had left the conning tower to be able to see more of what wae going on.
•nie “ Friedrich der Grosse ” was within the enemy’s range, but receive no
direct hit.
A further turning of the German line, which was led by Vice-Admiral
Behnke, the leader of the foremost squadron, would have brou^t us, at the
moment the enemy was passing our turning point, into a luff position most
disadvantageous for the artillery The light of day was declining, the fumes
364 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
of tiie explosions and smoke from our funnels went driving towards the
enemy and impeded the accuracy of our artillery, while the enemy was less
hindered as he could see the silhouettes of our ships against the light western
horison. A ^sadvantageous issue of the battle seemed to be certain for us
by going on in this way. So I decided to extricate the fleet from this position
(Diagram VI).
The British main fleet had flnished its deployment at 7.38 (Diagram VII).
Our diips lay in a line strongly curved towards the south. A simultaneous
turning of all battleships in this position was a difficult manoeuvre, which
would call for the best skill of the captains of the fleet, especially considering
the difficulty of getting through the necessary signals and the possibility of
some ship being hampered in their manoeuvres by damage. The turning
itself was, however, performed by the fleet with the same accmacy as in
peace, and gave me an absolute certainty of its reliability in coming
eventualities.
The British fleet was, after this turning to the east, out of touch with
us, and the artillery fire ffied away. As a result of the earlier turning away
of the head of our line, our battle-cruisers were out of sight of my flagship.
They were supposed to be standing between our line and the enemy’s under
heavy pressure. There was as yet no report that their flghting powers had
been diminished.
BEINHARD SCHEER
806
THE OEBMAN FLEET ATTACKS AGAIN
jyter the separation of the two main fighting forces, our cruisers steamed
in sight of the fiagship with a southerly course. Tlie manoeuvre of the fieet
had extricated them from their difficult position. Tiffien our fieet had again
straightened its line on a westerly course the question was what was now to
be done. It was still too soon to break off the day’s battle. It was, therefore,
resolved to thwart the possible intentions of the enemy by another tiirust
and to begin the battle anew. At 7.55 the three battleship squadrons were
again simultaneously thrown on an easterly course by a turn to starboard
(Diagram VIII). The cruisers and torpedo-boats received the order to close
in on the enemy and they threw themselves, backed by the ships of the line,
with highest speed in the direction where the enemy had passed out of si^t.
This thrust must have been unexpected by Admiral Jellicoe.
Although the artillery fire was soon resumed with the utmost vehemence,
the British did not venture to overcome the attack by artillery, but in the
apprehension of possible torpedo hits turned away to the east. As the enemy’s
fleet was by this thrust shaken off again, and it was now 8.17 p.m., the
German fleet turned for the third time so as to get out of touch with the
enemy and to prepare for the further fights which were to be expected during
the night and on the following day.
Regarding an attack against our battleships during the day by British
torpedo-boats, so far nothing had come under my observation; on the other
hand, our torpedo-boats had advanced to the attack both with the cruisers
and with the battleships during the last thrust.
How successful these attaclra were could not be ascertained. But later we
learned that the battleship “ Marlborough ” had been hit and had arrived
in England in a damaged condition. If one were inclined to thinlf lightly of
the efficiency of the torpedo craft, it must be taken into consideration that it
was their attack which induced the enemy to break off the en ga geme nt and
to give up his position so favomable for his artillery. Jellicoe had not found
the time, by means of his 36 light cruisers and his torpedo-boats (as numerous
as ours), to parry the thrust of our boats.
Up to now, battle luck had been on the German side. In the initial fight-
WD
initi nAllLtJb^ UJt JUlliAJNU
ing of the cruisers from 3.30 to 5.55 p.m. two powerful battle-cruisers had
been sunk on the British side; on our side none. In the pursuit between
5.55 and 7.00 no loss was suffered on either side. When the British advance
guard of the main fleet was met and shots were exchanged with the deploying
British main fleet itself, one British battle-cruiser and ^ree armoured cruisers
were lost. Two battleships, ‘‘ Warspite ” and Marlborough,^' were put out
of action. When the German fleet performed its second thrust against the
British line, which was in the meantime developed into a broad front, the
enemy gave way to the pressure and lost both the tactical cohesion amongst
its groups and touch with the enemy. On our side only the light cruiser
“Wiesbaden” had been put out of action; the “ Liitzow,” the flagship of
the battle-cruisers, had been heavily damaged although still able to keep up
its speed of 15 knots. Notwithstanding the gathering darkness I could, by
my own sight, ascertain that all battleships and cruisers retained their places
in the line and obeyed my signals. The satisfaction I felt at this moment at
the enemy's inability to score was considerable, as one may imagine. The
British, although superior in strength, well informed in all particulars regard-
ing us, able to choose the most advantageous tactical position according to
their cruisers' reports, had not been successful.
PLANS FOR THE NIGHT
What had to be thought of now was to guard against the enemy's
torpedo craft during the night, to arrange the fleet for the best resistance
against such attacks, to send our own torpedo-boats in search of the enemy,
who had disappeared to the east, and to gain a position in which the con-
tinuance of the fight on the next day might be most favourable to us.
After the last turning the Second Squadron — six pre-Dreadnoughts —
was in the lead. They were now sent to the rear of the line as were also
those battle-cruisers which had suffered the most during the fight of several
hours. The battleships of the line were all ready for immediate action,
notwithstanding that the foremost ships had received numerous hits. The
stores of ammunition were everywhere sufiicient. The light cruisers which
had stood between our own line and the enemy, who had disappeared in the
east, were withdrawn to the starboard side during the night, in order not
only to avoid mistakes in making out ships during that time, but also because
the enemy's torpedo craft were expected from that side. It may be pointed
out that of our ten light cruisers, although they had stood between the
lines, none had been severely damaged; only tlie “Wiesbaden” had been
lost. Of torpedo-boats we had lost five, two of them during the fight of
the battle-cruisers, three in the course of the further fighting. Some of the
torpedo-boats had fired nearly all their torpedoes so that they were of no
use during the night. They followed the fleet. The others were to find and
attack the British squadrons. Unfortunately they did not succeed in this.
The reason was that the different groups searched the sectors between north-
east and south, while Jellicoe's fleet had crossed the course of the German
ships ten to fifteen miles ahead, and were by this time to the west of us.
We were on a westerly course during the end of the battle; had arranged the
fleet for the night to pursue a southerly course and had then changed to
south south-east in order to gain Horn Reef light-ship (Sketch Map, p. 356) .
This place I held to be favourable to us for the continuance of the battle.
It would enable us to profit tactically by the mobility of our units, by the
diflSculty in navigating among the shoals, and by the mine-fields near by.
A splendid opportunity for attack was offered to the British torpedo-boats
REINHARD SCHEER
367
when their main fleet crossed our course, they being then in a protected
position behind the columns of their battle-fleet; and again when we by chance
steamed into their midst, ^me fighting took place between British and
German light cruisers during the night before our cruisers had attained their
positions west of us. The British torpedo craft were successfully warded
off by our battleships. The light cruiser “ Rostock,” in one of these attacks,
was toipedoed and sank. The crew was saved by our torpedo-boats. Another
of our light cruisers, the “ Elbing,” was rammed by the battleship “ Posen,”
while trying to get out of its way. It also sank after the crew had been taken
off. The light cruiser “ Frauenlob ” was torpedoed and sank with nearly
all hands aboard. The British armoured cruiser “ Black Prince ” approached
our line of ships at one o’clock at night. It came under a concentrated
fire of three battleships and sank in a few minutes with a terrific explosion.
At 4 A.M. when the British torpedo-boat attacks had ceased for some time,
a renewed attack on the end of our line was successful. The pre-Dreadnou(dit
“ Pommem ” was hit by a torpedo and sank after an explosion, 'file
battle-cruiser “ Liitzow ” had not been able to master the masses of water
which were filling its hull. It had to remain behind and was at last unable
to move at all. The crew was therefore taken off and the ship was sunk
by our own torpedoes. The news of this disaster only reached me after I
had attained Horn Reef and had turned round to steam to her relief. Of
the enemy fleet nothing was seen in broad daylight. ^ To search for it seemed
fruitless as it was foggy and the visibility was limited to 2,000 metres. Sto
a return to Wilhelmshaven was decided on. Admiral Jellicoe states in his
report that he witnessed the night attacks of his torpedo-boats and saw our
starshells. It was therefore absolutely in his power to keep so well in touch
with us as to be able to resume the battle, if he chose, the next morning
at daylight. He decided not to take this course. His desire for attack
cannot have been considerable.
368
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
THE RESULT OF THE BATTLE
Jellicoe did not win tactical successes in the battle of the day before,
althou^ conditions were decidedly more favourable to him than to us. The
losses of ships and of men were, according to the reckoning of C. C. Gill,
Commander, U. S. Navy, in his book Wkat Happened at Jutland, on the
British side: 111,980 ship-tons, 6,447 men dead or missing, 564 wounded; on
ihe German side: 60,189 ship-tons, 2,400 men dead or missing, 400 wounded.
Comparing the number of capital ships which joined the fi^t on both
sides, we find that 45 British ships stood against 27 German. The expecta-
tion of the British people, that its fleet would be able to beat easily and
thoroughly any weaker adversary that ventured to fight it on the open sea,
was sorely disappointed. On the other side, the German people were right
in rejoicing over the success of their young fleet. The certainty that the
German fleet was able to meet an enemy so famous for his former victories
on sea and even superior in some respects, strengthened the self-reliance
of officers and men in our navy. They felt that they possessed in their ships
a force which could answer to any demands modem warfare on the water
mi^t raise. This was shown by the German fleet again proceeding to an
offensive after repairs were finished on Au^t 19, and the adopting of the
idea of an expedition against Simderland, which had been given up on May 31.
Airships and U-boats joined this expedition. The Germans approached
within 40 miles of the British coast but then turned south, because of a
report from an airship, with the hope of drawing a British force into battle.
That hope was not realised. Nor did the British fleet ever undertake an
offensive of their own diming the rest of the war, nor did it operate against
the German coast, not even when a large part of the German fleet had been
detached in the autumn of 1917 for the conquest of the Baltic islands so
far east.
The strategic results of the victory of Jutland were: for the German
fleet freedom of movement in the southern part of the North Sea; the fleet
was able to protect up to the end of the war the U-boats when they left and
returned to their base in the North Sea, and it was able to superintend the
clearance of our waters from British mines; it prohibited these mines from
being carried so close to the German ports as to bar the U-boats from
troubling British trade. A victory on the British side at Skagerrack would
not have left Germany the sea-power to hinder tiie Allies from: helpmg
Russia by sea, a fact which contributed largely to the breakdown of Russia
itself. No assistance was given by the fleet in the protection of British
trade against U-boats, of ffie necessity of which the English people were
so firmly convinced. The fleet of Great Britain never seriously attempted to
beat the Germans on the water with the intention of breaking the backbone
of the U-boat raids. In some future time the enemies of England will take
advantage of such deficiencies.
By the battle of Jutland, the prestige of the British navy suffered
damage beyond repair, for it showed to the world that the daring and
offensive spirit of former centuries bad not been kept up.
CHAPTER XVI
MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE
AMERICAN NAVY
By WiLUAM S Sims
Rear-Admiral, U 8 Navy Admiral m Command of American
Naval Operations in European Waters, April, 1917, to end of the
World War Formerly President of the Naval War College.
The intensive campaign against the German submarines in 1917-1918 was
tile “ Crisis of the Naval War,” and necessarily also the crisis of the World
War, because neither troops nor supplies could have been transported in suffi-
cient quantity to turn the scale unless the submarine problem had first been
solved.
In telling the story of how the United States navy assisted in defeating
the German submarine, mistakes will be related as well as triumphs, because
the lessons learned from the former are vitally necessary to avoid similar
mistakes in the future.
The proposition of the Imperial German Government, made on January
31, 1917, was one that no self-respecting nation could accept. It proposed
that the United States surrender its right to free travel by sea: only such
ships as were prescribed could sail, and they only when and where and how
they were allowed by Germany. The United States was asked to accept
so ignominious and undignified a surrender of rights and duties as to
amount to giving up honour and self-respect. Like Belgium, the United
States was asked to tear up international agreements. On March 16 and
17, 1917, violence was used; three American ships, homeward boimd, were
sunk. The President asked Congress to declare war, and the proclamation
went forth on April 6, 1917.
THE SX7BMABINE IN THE WOBU) WAR
It was the use Germany made of the submarine that directly forced
America into the war; and ample warning had been given that this type
of ship would have to be fought. In fact, the account of American naval
participation in the war is almost entirely the history of the fi^t against
this new weapon. Yet the Government took not a single step to prepare
for the type of war that must be waged, and for months after entering into
the conflict the Government failed to recognise its true character or to com-
bat intelligently the very menace which drove the United States into ^e
war and which constituted its vital aspect.
The submarine campaign, after the American entry into the war, may
be divided into three phases:
First, the period from February 1, 1917, to the end of July, 1917, when
American aid was inconsiderable and when shipping was not being con-
voyed. Average losses, 640,000 tons per month.
T. a. T. — VOL. I — 24 309
370 MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN NAVY
Secondly, the period from August 1, 1917, to February 1, 1918, when
there was a partial employment of the convoy system and moderate assist-
ance from America. Losses, 390,000 tons per month.
Thirdly, the period from February 1, 1918, to the Armistice, when full
cooperation was given by America, and consequently full use could be made
of the convoy system. Losses, 250,000 tons per month.
The first period was the crisis of the submarine war. It was also the
crisis of the land campaign.
As General Pershing clearly shows on page seven of his report to the
Secretary of War, the primary consideration limiting the number of Ameri-
can troops that could be sent to France was that of tonnage. The tonnage
losses of 1917 made it impossible at the time to transport any considerable
American army and, at the same time, continue the absolutely essential
military supplies and food for the civil populations of the Allied countries.
It therefore became necessary to limit the number of American troops that
could be sent abroad during the first year to an average of approximately
25,000 men per month. If the additional million and a half tons sunk
unnecessarily in 1917 had been saved by prompt cooperation of the navy,
the number of American soldiers sent to France could have been doubled
or trebled. If the tonnage had been available, and the additional American
troops had been sent to France, and the new drafts called more promptly,
America could have had a million men m France by March, 1918, instead
of 300,000.
Of the land situation General Pershing stated: “It can not be said
that German hopes of final victory were extravagant ’’ Russia was in the
throes of a revolution and about to drop out of the war The Allied coun-
tries were not self-supporting. They depended upon overseas imports for
their very food. Reserves were sufficient for a month at the outside. Mr.
Hoover said in his statement before the Senate investigating committee,
“ The situation was dangerous almost beyond description. ... I cannot
overemphasise the critical character of that position and the dangers in which
the whole Allied cause rested. ... It is obvious that the war would have
come to an end almost in a moment if the supplies had been cut off.” And
the supplies were rapidly being cut off, as the following table shows:
Tonnage available to Allies, 1914 (American tonnage not included) 31,500,000
Total imports of Europe, 1914 (not including imports of Russia and
Central Powers) (aQnually) in tons 170,000,000
Tonnage required for these imports. , . 25,000,000
TONNAGE LOSSES
Allied net losses, August 1, 1914, to January 1, 1917 . . 400,000
Net losses, first quarter, 1917. 1,300,000
Net losses, Apnl, 1917 800,000
Minimum imports required by Europe (annually) in tons. . . 100,000,000
Tonnage required for these imports 18,000,000
Tonnage required for military and naval use (m addition to tonnage
required for imports) 8,500,000
Absolute minimum of tonnage necessary to Allied cause . . 26,500,000
Tonnage available to Allies, January 1, 1917 31,100,000
Net losses January 1 to May 1, 1917 2,100,000
Tonnage not available because of damage or repairs. . . 2,000,000
Net tonnage available to Allies May 1, 1917 27,000,000
(I) Average monthly tonnage losses February 1, 1917, to August 1,
1917 640,000
(II) Average monthly losses Au^st 1, 1917, to February 1, 1918. . . 390,000
(in) Average monthly losses February 1, 1918, to November 11, 1918 250,000
WILLIAM S. SIMS
371
From the above figures it is clear that the absolute minimum of tonnage
necessary to victory, 26,500,000, was barely covered by the amount avail-
able on May 1, 1917. There was a margin of but 500,000 tons, and the
average monthly losses were 640,000 tons! It appeared as though the
Grerman estimate — which the British Intelligence Department had reliably
learned — of the certain defeat of the Allies within two months, was a
reasonable, not to say moderate, one. Such, then, was the desperate nature
of the situation when America entered the war.
It may be well here to digress to point out the nature of the process where-
by trained military men decide what is to be done when they are confronted
by such a problem. The first step is to gather all available reliable informa-
tion about the enemy and natural obstacles, and also about one’s own forces
and resources. The next step is to determine what is the object to be
gained. Then all possible means are compared in the light of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each. The plan offering the most advantages
and the fewest disadvantages in reaching the objective is then adopted.
Such a systematic analysis promises, if not the best possible, at least a
reasonably sound solution, and, at all events, the best attainable one under
bhe existing conditions.
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AND THE SUBMARINE PERIL
This process was systematically employed by the staff of the American
Naval Headquarters in London. The results proved so correct that it is
possible to use extracts from the first cable to the Navy Department, April,
1917, to describe the situation and also the steps that were eventually taken
after distressing and perilous delays. Of the situation this cable stated
(see pages 30-34, Hearings of the Senate Naval Investigation) :
** Supplies and communications of forces on all fronts, including the Russian, are
threatened, and control of the sea actually imperilled
** German submarines arc constantly extending their operations further into the
Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling Russian situation critical.
Baltic fleet mutiny; 85 admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in some armies
there is insubordination”
Of the enemy’s and Allied forces it said*
** On account of the immense theatres and length and number of kinds of com-
munication and the material deterioration resulting from three years’ continuous operation
in distant fields with inadequate base facilities, the strength of the naval forces is dan-
gerously strained. This applies to all of the sea farces outside the Grand Fleet. The
enemy has 6 large and 64 small submarine mine-layers; the latter carry 18 mines; the
former 34, also torpedoes and guns All classes submarines for actual commission com-
pleted at a rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of sub-
marine campaign immediate active cooperation absolutely necessary ”
The last sentence represents America’s prime object, or, as military
men call it, America’s ** mission,”
The plan proposed was outlined as follows:
The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of communica-
tion in the eastern Atlantic; therefore I very urgently recommend the following immediate
naval cooperation:
“ Maximum number of destroyers to be sent accompanied by small anti-submarine
craft, former to patrol designated high-sea area westward of Ireland based on Queenstown
with an advance base at Bantry Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol force Destroyers,
small craft, should be of light draft with as high speed as possible, but low speed also
useful. Also repair ships and staff for base
372 MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN NAVY
“ The chief other and urgent practical cooperation is merchant tonnage and a con-
tmuous augmentation of anti-eubmanne craft to reinforce our advanced forces. Th^
IS a serious shortage of the latter craft For towing the present large amount of sailing
tonnage [m] dangerous areas sea-going tugs would be of great use. . .
The cable included also this accurate forecast of the enemy’s probable
intentions:
“ It 18 very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our coast or
m the Canbbean to divert attention and keep our forces from uie critical area in tiie
eastern Atlantic through effect upon pubhc opmion.”
This cablegram was a mere skeleton outline of the letter sent the next
day. In the latter will be found recommended the means whereby the
submarine could be defeated. There were no brilliant inventions listed,
such as the Navy Department counted upon for spectacular results. There
was no time to be wasted waiting for such devices. The Germans were
rapidly winning the war. Fine schemes would be of no use after defeat.
The only possible motto was “Let’s get on with the war”; and whatever
weapons lay at hand were used in a cooperation with the Allied navies so
cordial and wholehearted on both sides as to be practically without prec-
edent in the history of warfare. In order to render the maximum assist-
ance, the relatively small American naval forces, instead of being operated
as a national unit, were employed as reserves when and where, after dis-
cussion in the Allied Naval Council, it was decided they could render the
most effective service to the common cause.
Some amateur strategists, eminent statesmen among them, wanted to
know why we did not “ dig the rats out of their holes ” or “ go after the
hornet’s nest.” TTiis advice was of course thoroughly sound in principle,
but wholly impossible of execution.
The question was thoroughly discussed before the Allied Naval Council,
and Admiral Mayo, who was on a visit to Europe at the time, reported to
tlie Navy Department: “ Consider full examination of difficulties will show
impossibility of success.”
DEFENSIVE MEASUBES AGAINST THE FEBIL
Immediate, energetic, and practical steps were imperatively demanded.
To build more merchant ships than the Germans could destroy was an
obvious, but slow and costly programme. Purely protective measures, such
as dazsle-painting, made it difficult for a submarine commander to dis-
tinguish the type, course, and speed of a vessel, hence making marksman-
ship with torpedoes inaccurate. Arming merchant ships forced the sub-
marine to rely upon her torpedoes, of which only a few could be carried,
tiiereby reducing the length of time they could operate at sea. Zigzagging
at hi^ speed was another protective device, of great value for speedy
war-vessels and liners, but of less value for slow merchant ships.
The mine-barrage across the North Sea was at first impracticable be-
cause the right type of mine to make it effective in time was not available
until November, 1917. Previous to that time 750,000 mines of any type
then available would have been necessary to create the barrage 280 miles
long, and the combined available resources of the Allies could not have
constructed and planted them in less than two years, even if they could have
spared the tonnage for the large number of mine-layers and other vessels
that would have been required for such a colossal undertaking.
WILLIAM S. SIMS
373
The invention in America of the antenna mine alone made it possible
to construct a barrage in time to be of any benefit, because it required
only about 100,000 of these mines. As a result of this invention, the work
of constructing the mines and fitting out the necessary mine-layers was
undertaken with all possible energy. Bases were established in Scotland,
and the mines were sent over and planted, with the assistance of the BritUb,
with imprecedented rapidity. It was a stupendous tmdertaking, and would
“ BT PDIMISSION OF THU V. 8. NAVT."
doubtless have been of great value if the necessaiy mine had been invented
in time to complete the barrier about a year earlier. However, thou^ the
submarine campaign was well in hand before the barrage was completed,
the destruction of shipping having by that time been reduced by the convoy
system below the rapidly increasing rate of construction, still the barrage
proved of considerable value. It is believed that it accounted for at least
six submarines, and doubtless exercised a considerable influence upon the
morale of the German submarine crews from the time the mines began to
be planted.
These defensive measures, therfefore, were only of auxiliary value. It
was necessary to attack and defeat the enemy that was rapidly cutting
conummications and winning the war. Hence anti-submarine craft armed
with guns and depth-charges were imperatively required. But these, even
if ^e United States had had them, could not have sunk submarines unlesa
374 MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN NAVY
they could have caught them. Here was where the offensive value of the
apparently defensive convoy system came in. We could not successfully
“ chase hornets all over the farm,” and we could not “ destroy their nests.”
But we could lie in wait for them where they were forced to go. In order
to win the war the submarines had to sink a sufficient number of merchant
ships. Sailing all ships in convoys escorted by destroyers would force
submarines to expose themselves to the attack of the latter in order to
get within striking distance of the former. Such was the plan. It appeared
to the American Naval Headquarters in London to be the only possible
immediate solution whereby the German attack on Allied lines of communi-
cation could be frustrated in time. All other practical measures were also
to be used, no matter what was the opinion of their relative value, because
everything that might contribute to the defeat of the submarine had to
do its share. But the convoy system promised the greatest immediate
results. It eventually reduced the losses to one-half of one per cent of the
vessels thus escorted. The anti-submarine craft, too small or too slow to
operate with convoys, were to be based near where trade routes converged
and where, therefore, submarines would find the best hunting-grounds for
unprotected merchant ships. The following extracts are from the first letter
of April, 1917, from London Headquarters to the Navy Department referring
to this vitally important matter.
“ The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions such as raids on
our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the war’s decision will be made is m
the eastern Atlantic at the focus of all lines of communications. . . The main submarine
effort must continue to be concentrated in the above critical area . . They are forced
to cover all the possible trade routes of approach between the north of Scotland and
Ushant. . . It is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main submanne
campaign into other quarters of the globe without diminishing results in this and all
areas to a de^ee which would mean failure to accomplish the mission of the submarine
campaign, which can be nothing else than a final decision of the war. . . .
One of the pnncipal demands is for convoys of merchant shipping and more
definite and real protection within the war zone. . . . The answer, which mamfestly is
not publicly known, is simply that the necessaiy vessels are not available, and fur^er
that those which arc available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous
service. . .
ATTITUDE OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT REGARDING CONVOY SYSTEM
And yet, although advised on April 17 of the advantages of the convoy,
although informed on April 30 that the Admiralty was studying the method,
although urged to adopt it on May 1, and although informed on May 21
that the Admiralty had adopted it and needed American assistance to put
it in operation, still on June 20 the Navy Department replied in a cable
ending in these words: '‘In regard to convoy, I consider that American
vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.” '
The American Naval Headquarters in London never found any reason
to change in any essential the views or plans set forth above. From first
to last they urgently requested the adoption of the convoy, and the immedi-
ate sending of the necessary vessels to carry it out. But, as stated in the
official letter of the writer, January 7, 1920, to the Secretary of the Navy,
on the subject of naval lessons of the Great War (pages 1 to 10 Naval
Investigation Hearings ) :
" In spite of the numerous messages sent in April, the only information received up
to April 27, 1017, was that six destroyers only would be sent. The situation was then
so very critical that London Headquarters appealed to the American Ambassador in
London, who sent a most urgent message to the President, and on May 3, 1017, the fir^
defimte information was received of the department’s intention to send more than six
destroyers — that ultimately 36 and two repair ships would be sent.”
( 8 ) Underwood A Underwood
On board the U. S. battleship ** New York ” on the occasion of the surrender of the German
fleet — the greatest naval surrender in all history. Left to right: Admiral Sir David Beatty,
Admiral Rodman, H. M. the King, H. R. H. the Prince of Wales, and Admiral Sims.
WILLIAM S. SIMS
375
Such, at the very crisis of the war, after the most energetic — even
extraordinary — appeals, was the pitifully inadequate response of a mi^ty
Power when the fate of the world hung in the balance! This attitude in
no sense represented the will of the American people, but the absolute
negation of that will which was to throw the nation’s whole strength into
the war. It was the result of a wholly mistaken and wholly unpardonable
conception of strategy on the part of the United States Navy Department.
For those who dictated its policy Mahan had written in vain. Here is an
abstract from a cable received from the Secretary of the Navy as late as
Jvly 24, 1917:
"The department recognises . . . the necessity of sending ail anti-submarine craft
which can he spared from the home waters^ mto active European waters, and when
such craft become available will send them. In making the local assignments abroad
of such forces, the department requests and will be guided by your advice, which should
be given after consultation with the various Admiralties concerned as a pnority of
requirements.
"The department is strongly of the opinion — based on recent experiences — that
the question of supplying adequate guns and trained gun crows to merchant ships is one
which can in no wise be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid system of in-
spection, this method is believed to constitute one of the most effective defensive sub-
marine measures.”
This policy made paramount a passive defence in home waters where no
attack had been made, or could be made without ample warning, and
offensive action at the decisive point a secondary matter! Later, after the
United States had abandoned this policy, Germany made desperate efforts
to induce her to resume it by making submarine raids on her coast in the
hope that she would withdraw some of her anti-submarine forces from the
vital area where alone Germany could be defeated.
DESPERATE SITUATION FULLY EXPLAINED
Again on June 25, 1917, the American Naval Headquarters in London
wrote to Mr Page explaining the desperate nature of the situation. The
following are extracts from that letter:
“Queenstown, June 25, 1917
"My dear Ambassador. I consider it my duty to send you herewith for your in-
formation copies of a letter and certain messages which are typical of what I have been
sendin" to the Navy Department
" You will see from the department's only reply, dated June 20, that I am not having
any success in getting more vessels sent over into the critical area here.
“ All of the material assistance being organised by our Government will be futile
if we do not take immediate steps to insure safe passage of such essential supplies through
the submarine zone — that is, through the enemy’s lines . .
" It remains a fact that at present the enemy is succeeding and we are failing. Ships
are being sunk faster than they can be replaced by the building facilities of the world.
This simply means that the enemy is winning the war There is no mystery about that.
The submarines are rapidly cutting the Allies’ Imes of communication When they are
cut, or sufficiently interfered with, we must accept the enemy’s terms
" It 18 a poor plan, indeed, that does not involve attackmg the enemy’s war craft or
forcing them to attack ours.
"The fact must be thoroughly realised that the war is being, and must continue to
be, fought exclusively on this side of the Atlantic, and that it will be won by us, or lost,
within the next few months
" It can not be won by any accumulation of naval forces on our coast lines or in any
other areas except those in which the war is being fought, and must continue to be fought.
" It must be lost, or very unsatisfactorily terminated, if there is not an immediate
and sufficient accumulation of anti-submarme forces here in the critical areas. This for
the simple reason that, if the shippmg losses continue at the present rate, the Allies
can not win. Sims.”
1 Italics here and elsewhere are by the Author.
376 MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN NAVY
Mr. Page, who was a man of common sense — and the conduct of war
consists largely in the exercise of just that quality — concurred entirely as
his forceful letter to President Wilson shows:
“ Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the future or in any
theatre of the war, our help is now more seriously needed m this submarine area for
the sake of all the Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else. After
talking over this critical situation with the Pnmo Minister and other meml^rs of the
Government, I can not refrain from most strongly recommending the immediate sending
over of every destroyer and ail other craft that can be of anti-submarme use. This seems
to me the sharpest crisis of the war and the most dangerous situation for the Allies that
has arisen or could arise If enough submannes can be destroyed in the next two or
three months, the war will be won, and t/ we can contribute effective help immediately
it will be won directly by our aid I can not exaggerate the pressing and increasing
danger of this situation. Thirty or more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us
immediately would very likely be decisive There is no time to be lost. Paob.”
Whether or not this letter was decisive, it certainly marked the begin-
ning of a new attitude on the part of the Navy Department toward the
naval war. But it was only a beginning.
DuGEtAM IlLUSTRATINQ GRAPHICALLY THU CrIBIB OP THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN
It shows how the curve of the total of German submarines available begins to lose
its upward tendency after the entry of the United States into the war.
Note the increased upward curve in the line indicating the num^r of submarines
sunk, and the increased monthly average of submannes sunk, after the convoy system
was adopted and Amencan aid became whole-hearted and effective.
For the first time the Navy Department, on July 10, 1917, actually
defined its policy with respect to the conduct of the war. But it defined it
in these words which indicate that its emphasis on a passive defence in
home waters, which were not and had not been threatened, was still para-
mount:
"Prom Secretary of Navy. To Vice Admiral Sims, U.SS. Melville. Received*
July 10, 1917.
" The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is quoted for
your information and guidance as an index of the policy of the department m relation
to codperation of our naval forces with those of our Allies: ‘ After careful consideration
of the present naval situation, taken in connection with possible future situations w^ch
mmht anse, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy, in so far as it
relates tojhe Allies* First, Ihe most hearty cooperation with the Allies to nieet the
present submanne situation in European or other waters compatible with an adequate
defence of our own home waters. Second, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies
to meet any future situation arising during the present war. Third, the realisation that
WILLIAM 8. SIMS
377
while a sucoeasful termination of the present war must always be the first Allied aim and
will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future posttum of
the Umted States must %n no way he jeopardised by any dxsifUegraiwn of our main
fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main mihtary r61e of the United
States naval force lies m its safeguarding the line of commumcations of the Allies’.’’
The first point means that, notwithstanding that the ability of the
armies in France to continue the war depended upon the Allied navies'
maintaining the safe transport of troops, ammunition and other supplies,
including their very food, as the fourth point clearly recognises, the declared
policy of our Government was to retain on the coast of the United States
a considerable number of destroyers and other anti-submarine craft for
defence in case the Germans should attempt to create a diversion on the
western side of the Atlantic.
CONVOY SYSTEM AT LAST APPROVED BY NAVY DEPARTMENT
After a seemingly interminable and almost fatal delay, the convoy
system was finally approved by the Navy Department and more officers,
men, destroyers and patrol craft were sent over into the area of actual war
operations.
The advantages of the convoy principle as a protection against sub-
marine attack were of course recognised from the beginning of the war,
and it was continuously used to safeguard troop transports There
were two obstacles in the way of its adoption for merchant shipping, one
insurmountable at the time, the other due to a mistaken opinion. The
former was the lack, until after 1917, of sufficient destroyers and other
vessels for escorting convoys, and the latter was the opinion of merchant
skippers that they could not manoeuvre a miscellaneous collection of mer-
chant vessels in the close formation that was necessary to enable escorting
destroyers to ward off submarine attacks. This lack of confidence was
due to an entire lack of experience in handling vessels in compact groups,
but it was proved by the first trial to be wholly unjustified. London
Headquarters believed in the practicability of the plan and always advo-
cated the adoption of the convoy as soon as the necessary vessels should
become available.
After a little experience the merchant marine officers handled safely
their ships, even when there were as many as 30 in a convoy, in close
formation, at 500-yard intervals, at night, without lights, zigzagging simul-
taneously like a school of fish. Their skill cannot be too highly appreciated.
For their courageous and skilful performance of a nerve-racking duty the
world owes them a debt that can never be paid. Some were torpedoed
repeatedly, only to come back each time to take another — perhaps a last —
chance. Accepting all the risks and having none of the rewards of a naval
officer, they made possible the convoy system which made certain the defeat
of the submarine.
When these methods began to be effective the Germans commenced to
send a few submarines into American waters in an effort to induce the
United States to withdraw some of the anti-submarine forces to our coast,
exactly as London Headquarters had foreseen. But so successful were the
Allies’ methods of keeping track of the submarines — how this was done
affords an unparallelled story of ingenious secret-service work — that Lon-
don Headquarters was able to warn Washington whenever German sub-
marines were started on their way, and if necessary could have sent de-
378 MISTAKES AND ACfflEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN NAVY
stroyers from European waters to cross the Atlantic and be waiting to deal
with them upon their arrival. But by that time the Government was not so
ready to play the German game and disperse the American forces; and the
German effort to accomplish that result merely resulted in a dispersion
of German submarines which was to the Allied advantage. The American
public was calm and made no attempt to influence strategy.
The record of the convoy work and the work of the anti-submarine craft
is the story of the naval war to the end, except for the part played by the
mine barrage, the naval air forces operating against the submarines from
their sea-coast stations, and the division of battleships that reinforced the
Grand Fleet. And, although they did not operate directly against the enemy
submarines, mention should be made of the admirable services of the naval
14-inch guns on railway carriages in bombarding German positions on the
western front, and the gallant and always efficient marines who added to
their laurels at Belleau Wood and Chateau-Thicrry.
THE MORALE OF THE AMERICAN NAVY
One of the greatest forces making for success in war is the morale of
those actually engaged in the fighting. This depends chiefly upon their con-
fidence in their leadership — their belief in the soundness of the measures
taken to support them and to defeat the enemy. It would be difficult for the
layman to imagine the depressing effect upon the naval personnel at the front
when it became known, soon after the entry of the United States into the
war, that the Government was retaining on its own coast the destroyers,
battleships and personnel so urgently requested by the Allies and so urgently
needed in the war zone and, more depressing still, that it was resisting the
adoption of the convoy! That under such conditions the American naval
forces maintained throughout their morale and devotedly performed their
arduous duties is a record of which the United States may well be proud.
Only a miracle of energj^, patriotism, and sacrifice enabled the naval per-
sonnel in contact with the enemy to do their full share in getting by the
crisis; and once the convoy was in operation they materially assisted in
doing what the Germans declared could not be done — in escorting to France,
with very small loss, 2,000,000 men and the merchant vessels carrying their
essential supplies and the food required for the Allied countries.
It would be a pleasure specifically to record the services of the naval
forces operating from the American bases established in Europe, and in the
various areas, and the names of the many oflScers responsible for their effi-
ciency, both those w^ho directed important forces from shore bases and those
who carried out the operations at sea. The writer has recorded these else-
where in his Victory at Sea, but as space does not permit a repetition of them
here, let it suffice to say that all honour is due both officers and men for the
admirable energy, nautical skill and unfailing courage they maintained during
the long and discouraging uphill fight while gradually diminishing the effec-
tiveness of an able and elusive enemy whose tactics was to avoid combat with
naval vessels and win victory by destroying the shipping carrying essential
supplies. By the end of the war there were 373 vessels of various classes, and
5,000 officers and 75,000 men in the U. S. naval forces operating in European
waters.
Needless to say, the necessary expansion of our naval personnel to ten
times its peace strength resulted in a navy largely composed of untrained
men; but, regardless of this lack of training, these fine young men displayed
an energy, enthusiasm, adaptability, and resourcefulness beyond all praise.
WILLIAM S. SIMS
370
Substituting zeal for experience, common sense for technical knowledge, and
initiative for training, they accepted the hardships, dangers, and drudgery
of the campaign with the sporting spirit of the American youth — the spirit
of the young sailor who asked “ Where do we go from here, bullies? ” upon
finding himself in the sea after his ship was torpedoed.
COMPLETE COOPERATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT
By February 1, 1918, the cooperation of the Navy Department was
whole-hearted and complete. Merchant ships were being built to replace
the lost tonnage. New destroyers for convoy work, eagle-boats and sub-
marine-chasers were being delivered and put into operation. The toimage
sunk by submarines steadily decreased in volume until the end of the war. .
What the public does not imderstand is that the United States Navy
Department was organised for administration in time of peace. Had it been
organised for the conduct of war, and had the chief advisers of the Secretary
been selected from those trained by the study of warfare, all possible plans
and preparations would automatically have been made long before the war
— preparations in material, personnel, morale, training, discipline and leader-
ship Instead, the department had no plans or preparation corresponding to
the kind of war that, as should have been apparent, had to be fought. The
department began with unsound principles of organisation, command, and
strategy The very fact that after months of opposition the department
finally adopted the policies and methods that brought success showed that
the initial attitude was indefensible
In justice to many splendid ofiicers, it should be emphatically stated that
they understood the nature of the war and the principles that should have
governed its conduct, but unfortunately their advice was not accepted. Some
even had been trying for many years to bnng about a sound military organi-
sation of the department.
While the American people should always be profoundly grateful that the
United States was able finally to render vital assistance to the cause of the
Allies, still it should never be forgotten that had those who controlled the
naval effort of the United States been trained in the requirements of modem
war, and had they acted upon correct military principles from the first, as
they did later, there can be no doubt that the war would have ended much
sooner with all that that implies.
CHAPTER XVII
GOVERNMENT BY PROPAGANDA
By Bertr.\nd A W. Russell
Late Fellow and late Lecturer, Trinity College. Cambridge.
Author of Problems of Phdloaophy; Principles of Social Recon^
structzon; Prospects of fndustnal Civilisation.
Government propaganda is no new thing. Herodotus was in the pay
of the Athenian State, which accounts for the fact that Athens comes out
of his history with so much glory. In the wars of the Guelphs and Ghibel-
lines, the victory of the former was due to the fact that the Pope, through
the medium of the friars, outdid the Emperor in the organisation of official
propaganda. At the time of the Spanish Armada, both Philip II and Eliza-
beth organised their propaganda in quite a modem way. Philip II’s activi-
ties in this line are exemplified by Cardinal Allen’s Admonition to the
Nobility and People of England arid Ireland^ accusing Queen Elizabeth of
every imaginable vice (quoted in Frederick Chamberlin’s Private Character
of Queen Elizabeth). The British popular horror of the Spanish Inquisition
no doubt is derived from English Government propaganda during Elizabeth’s
reign. Historians and literary men have always taken part in this work;
Henry VIII is propaganda for Elizabeth, and Macbeth for James I, who
appears as a descendant of Banquo wearing a triple crown.
But it is only in recent years that Governments, and even single depart-
ments, have instituted regularly organised propaganda bureaus, for the pur-
pose of giving publicity to their own virtues and to the vices of their
opponents. Before the World War, there was still a certain subtlety in the
methods employed. For example, after the Anglo-Russian Agreement of
1907, most English newspapers ceased to mention instances of Tsarist oppres-
sion, London was afforded an opportunity of growing enthusiastic over the
Russian ballet, and translations of Russian literature had no difficulty in
finding publishers. At the same time the Kaiser was posing as almost a
Mahommedan in Turkey and throughout the Near East. But with the out-
break of the World War the methods practised became more direct. The
Germans, in this as in other matters, were better prepared; they began at
once to publish accounts and professed photographs of Russian atrocities in
East Prussia. The German official reply to the Bryce report subsequently
complained that these photographs (with the titles changed) had been
plagiarised and published by the Allies, as illustrating German atrocities in
Belgium. Whether there was any truth in this charge we do not know. In
any case. Allied propaganda, through British control of the cables, secured
wider publicity than that of Germany, and achieved a notable success in
winning the sympathy, and ultimately the cooperation of the United States.
In neutral countries both groups of belligerents subsidised newspapers to
present their case under the guise of impartiality, but outside Europe the
Central Empires had much more difficulty than the Entente in carrying
through this policy.
380
© Keystone View Co
This picture painted by the German naval artist Klamroth shortly after Bulgaria entered the wai
m 1915 was designed to arouse the indignation by showing British warships bombarding the narrow
strip of coast on the Aegean Sea which Bulgaria then held.
Cmirtesu of the Century Co
Raemaker’s famous cartoon called “ Les Assassins.’* According to Mr. Bertrand
Russell, author of the chapter on Propaganda, cartoons of this diaracter were
exploited by various Governments to keep up the morale of the civil population.
BERTRAND A. W. RUSSELL
381
The methods adopted by the different Governments were closely analo-
gous, but the British Government, perhaps through its long experience of
democracy, was, on the whole, more successful than the Continental belliger-
ents in bringing doubters to its side and increasing the enthusiasm of the
converted.
Sir Gilbert Parker, who took a prominent part in propaganda in America
while that country was still neutral, explained his methods in Harper^s
Magazine (March, 1917):
“ We supplied three hundred and sixty newspapers in the smaller states
of the United States with an English newspaper which gave a weekly review
and comment on the affairs of the war. We established connection with the
man in the street through cinema pictures of the army and navy, as well
as through interviews, articles, pamphlets, etc., and by letters in reply to
individual American critics, which were printed in the chief newspaper in
the State in which they lived, and were copied in newspapers of tiie other
and neighbouring States. We advised and stimulated many people to write
articles; we utilised the friendly services and assistance of confidential
friends; we had reports from important Americans constantly, and estab-
lished association by personal correspondence with influential and eminent
people of every profession in the United States, beginning with university
and college professors, and scientific men, and running through all the ranges
of the population. We asked our friends and correspondents to arrange for
speeches, debates, and lectures by American citizens, but we did not encourage
Britishers to go to America and preach the doctrine of entrance into the
war.”
After America’s entry into the war, British propaganda, imder the
direction of Lord Northcliffe, was able to adopt more direct and ambitious
methods. In all other countries, also, propaganda suited to their conditions
was organised. Numbers of able men and women, of all shades of opinion,
were employed to present the British case to different nations and to differ-
ent sections. Any fact which had a propaganda value was seized upon, not
always with a strict regard for truth. For example, world-wide publicity
was given to the statement that the Germans boiled down human corpses
in order to extract from them gelatine and other useful substances. This
story was widely used in China when that country’s participation was desired,
because it was hoped that it would shock the well-known Chinese reverence
for the bodies of the dead. The story was derived from the fact that the
Germans had a Kadaververwertungsanstalt, i,e,, establishment for the
utilisation of carcases/^ The story was set going cynically, by one of the
employees in the British propaganda department, a man with a good knowl-
edge of German, perfectly aware that “ Kadaver ” means “ carcase,” not
‘‘ corpse,” but aware also that, with the Allied command of the means of
publicity, the misrepresentation could be made to “ go down.”
Meanwhile the same kind of thing was being done in Germany, to stimu-
late the hatred of the Allies. The present writer possesses a pamphlet by a
well-known German pacifist. Dr. Gumbel, called Vier Jahre Luge (Four years
of lying). In this pamphlet German war-propaganda is exposed. It ap-
S ars that the German people did not know till 1918 that the battle of the
ame was a victory for the Allies. In the matter of Russian atrocities, the
Press was ofl5cially warned not to throw doubt upon any that were men-
tioned as genuine in the German White Book on the subject. For example,
on February 9, 1917, the Press were cautioned against mentioning that a
certain working woman, who had asserted that her pregnancy was we result
of rape by a Russian soldier, had subsequently stated on oath that her child
had a different origin. The German (lovemment completely deceived the
382
GOVERNMENT BY PROPAGANDA
German nation as to the effectiveness of the U-boats, and denied that the
Americans were succeeding in landing their troops in France. Under these
circumstances it was impossible for Germans who had no access to secret
information to form any idea of the true state of affairs.
With the end of the war, a new propaganda contest began — the propa-
ganda of the Bolsheviks on the one hand and the rest of the world on the
other. Although actual fighting played a not inconsiderable part in the
conflict, propaganda was the most important weapon on both sides, and was
developed to a greater extent even than during the war. The result was that
Russia and the rest of the world became completely ignorant of the true
facts about each other, which were replaced in their imaginations by fantastic
and melodramatic illusions. One small personal experience will illustrate
this. The present writer was in Russia in 1920, in company with a Labour
Delegation, who were received as other Governments receive princes, and
were everywhere feted. On returning from Russia, we found it universally
believed, even by British Consuls in capitals near Russia, that we had all
been put in prison. In Russia, meanwhile, the rank and file of the Communist
party — though not of course the leaders — believed that the Social Revo-
lution was imminent throughout Europe, and would, when it came, immedi-
ately improve the economic condition of Russia.
The Bolsheviks, having achieved power solely by means of propaganda,
developed this method with extraordinary skill They sent propaganda
trains ” along the railways into the country districts to educate the peasants.
They used the army as a training-ground for Communists. They induced
parents in towns — through the difficulty of obtaining milk and other neces-
saries — to send their children to Government institutions, where, by the
age of six, they were proficient in the Communist creed. The French fleet in
the Black Sea and the British soldiers in Archangel and Murmansk were so
much influenced by Bolshevik propaganda that the former mutinied and the
latter could not be relied upon to fight. To the whole of Central Asia the
Bolsheviks proclaimed the doctrine of self-determination; by this means
(together with other factors) they robbed the British of the fruits of victory,
in whole or part, in the vast region from Afghanistan to Constantinople,
caused uneasiness to the Government of India, and stole a march on the
Japanese in Mongolia. The influence of Bolshevik propaganda on Asiatic
intellectuals is exemplified in a curious book called The Futurism of Young
Asia, by Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Professor, National Council of Education,
Bengal ; Berlin, 1922. This book is in English, though published in Germany.
The cessation of Bolshevik propaganda has always been the principal de-
mand of the British Government in negotiations concerning trade relations
Meanwhile the British and all other western Governments have retorted
by anti-Bolshevik propaganda at least as effective and mendacious as that
of the Soviet Government. The story of the nationalisation of women in
Russia is probably still believed by most well-to-do people in the west,
although every well-informed person knows it to be baseless. The British
Government once distributed in Russia and neighbouring ports, by the help
of the Admiralty, an issue of Pravda (the Russian official organ), which
turned out to have been forged by the White Russians. This issue, by an
oversight, bore a London imprint, which Scotland Yard cut off from
most copies, but a few slipped throu^ unmutilated. When the present
writer returned from Russia, he found his friends, almost without exception,
unwilling to believe his statements as to matters which he had personally
observed. Those who accepted British Government propaganda would not
believe that the streets of Moscow were orderly, and more free from ordinary
crime than any western capital. Those who sympathised with the Bolsheviks
BERTRAND A. W. RUSSELL
383
would not believe that the population lived under a police reign of terror,
or that espionage and delation were carried to lengths previously unknown.
This attitude was a reaction against propaganda: those who had realised
that the Soviet Government was not as black as it was painted assumed
that it was wholly virtuous, forgetting that that is not the nature of Govern-
ments or indeed of hmnan bemgs. A reaction of this kind was inevitable in
view of the known anxiety of the western Governments to prevent accurate
knowledge about Russia. For example, Professor Goode, a disinterested
inquirer, went to Russia expecting to think ill of the Bolsheviks, but came
to think well of them. For this crime he was arrested by the British on
his arrival in Reval; his papers were confiscated, and after he had been
nominally set free he was kidnapped by the British naval authorities in
Reval and detained on board British warships in the Baltic for a considerable
period.
The telegraph agencies are largely conducted in the interests of one or
more Governments. Every politically well-informed traveller who has been
in the Far East has been able to see for himself that a certain very well
known agency is strongly pro- Japanese. Instances of this have been men-
tioned repeatedly in the Japan Chronicle, When the Japanese Crown Prince
was in England, he gave Japanese decorations to a very small number of
men ; among them was the British head of this agency. The Russians have
telegraph agencies in the Far East to present facts from their point of view;
the Chinese have none, so that the world outside China has always the view
of Chinese occurrences which suits the enemies of China.
Broadcasting is a powerful method, not yet fully developed. During the
County Council Elections in London in November, 1922, the oflBcial wire-
less advised people to vote for the Government party. It was subsequently
said that this was a mistake; but it was not rectified by a corresponding
mistake on the other side.
Undoubtedly the cinema, or ** movies,'^ will be, until some newer invention
supersedes it, the most potent of all means of propaganda, because it is
frequented by people who are too frivolous to read politics in newspapers,
and because it lends itself to insidious methods. It was largely used in the
United States to prepare American participation in the war, for example by
suggesting a Mexican invasion organised and financed by Germany. (Such
a suggestion had to be confined to a thoughtless public.) It was used during
the war to concoct atrocity-films, which did much to stimulate the universal
mutual hatred. The topical gazette which, in most picture-theatres, gives
representations of certain recent events, is of course admirable for propa-
ganda. Grave writers on political theory seldom mention the cinema, be-
cause there is nothing about it in Aristotle or Montesquieu; but it is one of
the most powerful political forces of our day, and its influence is on the
increase.
Propaganda is not confined to international matters. Recently Sir
Laming Worthington-Evans, the British Postmaster-General, was made the
subject of laudatory notices in the Press, which were supplied by a propa-
ganda oflScial in the Post Office. Being new to the office. Sir Laming had
not known that he was liable to this sort of treatment, and took steps to
cause it to cease. Other Ministers, however, have been less squeamish. The
present writer is not in a position to judge as to the extent of this evil else-
where. The New York Freeman (Au^st 22, 1923) states, d propos of this
incident: “We believe — though Englishmen may think this an extravagant
claim — that the United States suffered more from this sort of prostitution
even than the England of Northclifife and Lloyd George.” This statement,
however, seems scarcelv credible.
3g4
GOVERNMENT BY PROPAGANDA
It is not only through the Press that Government propaganda is carried
on, but also through the schools. In all coxmtries, it is regarded as part of
the business of education to instil patriotism. This is done by dwelling on
the sins of other nations and the virtues of one’s own, thus producing an
atmosphere of national self-righteousness. French elementary school-
children at the present day are carefully taught to hate the Germans. The
present writer has munbered among his friends an Italian and a Greek, both
men of learning and high academic distinction, who severally informed him
that, while the case for every other belligerent in the World War was
obviously unsound, the case for their own country was absolutely unanswer-
able. In each case they were carried away by propaganda, the effectiveness
of which was mainly attributable to the influence of early education.
Government propaganda is also employed in labour disputes, to popularise
the case for the employers. This is done in all industrial countries.
The technique of Government propaganda, as applied to adults, is derived
from the practice of advertisers. Commercial competition has provided
data as to the kind of advertisements that are successful; in America, the
psychology of advertising has been carefully studied by eminent psycholo-
gists. Advertising is the art of producing belief by reiterated and striking
assertions, wholly divorced from all appeal to reason. Experience shows
that the average man, if he is told a hundred times a day that A’s soap is
the best, and fifty times a day that B’s is the best, will buy A’s, although
he knows that A is making the assertion for the sake of his own pocket,
not from a disinterested love of truth. This fact is now utilised by Govern-
ments, especially through the Press and the cinema, to cause subject popu-
lations to believe whatever suits the Governments. Although, in democratic
countries, the population is allowed to vote, it is not allowed to form its
own opinion on the issues, but is hypnotised into the opinion which is officially
considered desirable. A dramatic event, such as defeat in war, causes the
whole edifice of hypnotically-induced belief to break down, and leads to a
revolution, which puts the apparatus of spell-binding into new hands. But
in ordinary times the method works well, and enables the holders of power
to secure stability in the Government. The whole method is as yet in its
infancy, but it is likely to become developed and perfected with great rapidity,
imtil nothing but defeat in war will suffice to produce any change not desired
by those who control publicity. This will make for the preservation of order
and the domination of the more solid ” elements in the community.
In spite of these advantages, however, there are certain dangers in the
method. There is the danger of revolution, through the sudden overturning
of a whole system of beliefs not based on fact. Whenever a fact becomes
too patent to be denied, it destroys the credit of propagandists who have
been endeavouring to conceal it, with the result that there is a sudden and
often dangerous revulsion. If the facts had come to be toown gradually,
a gradual adaptation to them would have been more possible. All Europe
east of the Rhine, in 1917 and 1918, illustrated this danger.
There is also the danger that men become accustomed to potent and
irrational stimuli to belief, instead of the milder but more reliable stimulus
of reasonable evidence. An irrational stimulus most readily produces belief
when it appeals to some primitive instinct, and the continual stirring up
of such instincts constitutes a danger to civilised life.
Finally there is the danger that, in the absence of an international Govern-
ment, the rival systems of propaganda instilled by different Governments
produce conflicting passions, which greatly increase the likelihood of war.
Nationalism is the principal aim of Government propaganda. That is to
say, when we consider all the nations and not one only, the effect of Govern-
BERTRAND A. W. RUSSELL
385
ment propaganda is to make A and B believe that it is their sacred duty
to kill each other. The world is divided by national barriers into ^oups
with absolutely opposite beliefs, each set of beliefs seeming fantastic and
impossible (as indeed it should be) to all who are outside the nation con-
cerned. In these days of disarmament conferences, it is strange that the
disarming of national propaganda has never been suggested. ' So long as
Governments devote themselves to stirring up national rivalry, it is inevitable
that the passions generated should demand an outlet. If Government propa-
ganda were in the hands of an international authority, the beliefs propagated
might still be false, and the methods of producing conviction mi^t still be
irrational, but at any rate what was taught would not be a source of strife
and mutual destruction, as at present. Since, however, such a hope is utterly
Utopian, it will be necessary to wait until the evils wrought by Government
propaganda have produced (through survival of the fitter) a general scep-
ticism as to all frequently reiterated statements, and an immunity from
incitements to collective hysteria. This will not happen, however, until the
population of the civilised world has been very considerably diminished by
the existing methods of propaganda.
T. B. T. — VOL. 1 — 25
CHAPTER XVra
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: WHAT IT HAS
ACCOMPLISHED
By L^n Boitrobois
President of the Chamber of Deputies, 1902-1903. President of
the Senate, 1921. At various times Minister of Public Instruo*
tion, of Justice, of Labour and of Foreign Affairs. Premier Dele-
gate of !^nce at the Hague Conferences Member of the
Council of the League of Nations, in which capacity he was
chiefly responsible for the drafting of the Covenant of tiie
League. Author of Pour la SocteU des Nations; Le Pacte 1919
et la Societe des Nations; Le Trait6 de Versailles
I. Its Origin
The conference held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 paved the way for
the Peace Treaty of 1919, which constitutes the charter of the League of
Nations. These conferences had studied the problems of disarmament,
codification of the rules of war, and organisation of a system of arbitration
with a view to the peaceful regulation of international conflicts.
As far as the question of disarmament is concerned, these conferences,
because of inability to effect concrete results, were forced to limit them-
selves to the declaration: “that the limitation of armaments, which wei^
so heavily on the world, is eminently desirable for the material and moral
welfare of humanity.”
The rules of war on both land and sea had been settled by unanimous
consent at The Ha^e, but in the course of the World War Germany carried
out none of the obligations which had been imposed on her when she adopted
these conventions. Indeed, Germany, supported by those States which were
later in the World War to become her Allies — Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria
and Turkey — opposed the idea of compulsory arbitration in cases where the
vital interests of a nation were not involved.
The Peace Treaty of 1919 was possible because the Allied and Associated
Powers had been overwhelmingly affected by the disasters caused by the
World War, and had foreseen its painful and far-off repercussions. The
growing interdependence of all phenomena in the life of men, and the inevi-
table solidarity which, in an ever-increasing degree, binds their destinies to-
gether, were cruelly demonstrated in the war. A conflict, at the outset
limited in its original causes and apparently equally limits in its conse-
quences, having divided two nations, one of which was a small state of
eastern Europe, spread almost immediately over nearly the whole of Europe,
and from tiiere to several of the states of Asia and America, no matter how
strong the desire of these states to remain neutral. Since the Armistice, each
of these rtates has been quick to perceive that, as it had foreseen, the dis-
organisation produced by tiie war in all the phenomena of production, of
exchange and of transport, was far from having exhausted all its evil effects.
© F, H, Julhen, Geneva
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN SESSION
An official photograph taken at the opening of the Second Assembly of the League at Geneva in 1921. M. L4on Bourgeois sums up the future of the
League in his article for These Eventful Years in three words: ** Justice, Life, Peace.**
I^N BOURGEOIS 387
A profound unrest yet subsisted, manifested by the demoralisation of ex-
change, which in turn was a sign of the deepest demoralisation of human
activity. An insupportably hi^ cost of living, and deadly break-downs
in all the richest countries, demonstrated the universal danger.
Since war thenceforth was destined to effect an economic transformation
of the world, and would no longer be limited to merely local confla^ations —
evils striking only those directly responsible for them — but might even
spread over the entire globe, was it not the duty and to the vital interest
of all to seek a method, to create an institution, the object of which would
be to foresee and prevent the causes of war or at the least to limit its dis-
astrous extension?
Each of the authors of the Peace Treaty was agreed on this essential
idea: the necessity of creating between nations, capable of a common con-
science of right and wrong, a solemn agreement with the view of ensuring
human order by means of a durable peace.
By the terms of the preamble of the Peace Treaty, equity as between
nations was defined as “ international prescriptions recognised as effective
rules of conduct between governments ” ; as treaties stipulating certain
obligations in the mutual relations of the organised peoples,^' or, finally, by
the application of international relations founded on justice and honour.”
II. Its Constitution
It was not desirable in 1919 to create a sort of super-state imder the name
of League of Nations. This, indeed, would have been impossible, for the
World War — a war of liberation for many oppressed races — served only
to make national sentiment more imperious, more ready to take offence.
All nations are equally desirous to maintain jealously their independence and
to reserve intact the free exercise of their full sovereignty. On the con-
traiy, what was desired was to constitute an association between those nations
which were free and which voluntarily stood for peace — nations, great or
small, all sovereign states, but equally willing to enter into a contract for
the mutual assurance of peace. This assurance was to have a twofold
object: first, a general guarantee of one and all against all risk of war at
any violation of justice; second, to procure for one and all the benefits of
a real mutuality — that is to say, an ensemble of practical agreements which
would substitute for a condition of competition and rivalry, in which the
germs of conflict develop unceasingly, a state of solidarity profitable to all
concerned.
It is thus not a question of a super-national organisation whose actions
would be sometimes disturbing and sometimes ineffectual, but simply of a
mechanism which — the principle of unanimity being admitted for the
validity of every important decision — will carry with it no danger to any
state. Useful in its early stages, then indispensable owing to the complexity
of modem life, the League will be worth exactly what the states which com-
pose it are worth.
Its three essential organs are the Assembly, the Coimcil and the perma-
nent Secretariat.
Article 3 of the Peace Pact declares that ^^the Assembly is composed
of the representatives of all states which are members of the League.” These
states at the opening of the Assembly numbered 41; at the beginning of
1984, 52.
Each state, each member of the League, is allowed a maximum of three
representatives in the Assembly, but no state possesses more tiian a single
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
388
vote; the vote is taken by a roU-call of all the states, and it is the first
delegate of each state who votes in the name of his country.
The Council (Article 4) is formed in part by the representatives of
the five Great Powers (the United States, not having ratified the Treaty, has
no place on the Council, consequently reducing to four the number of the
representatives of the Great Powers who are entitled to rank as permanent
members) and in part by six representatives of six other states, submitted
annually to reflection. Bel^um, Brazil, Spain, Greece, China, Sweden and
Uruguay have been, or are still, represented on the Council.
THE DUTIES OF THE LEAGUE
The Council is entrusted in a more or less permanent fashion with the
working of the League. According to Article 4, it “takes cognisance of
all questions entering the sphere of the League’s activity or affecting the
peace of the world.” Now, Article 3, which deals with the organisation
of the Assembly, provides in the same terms that “the Assembly takes
cognisance of all questions entering the sphere of the League’s activity or
affecting the peace of the world.” Here, then, are two organisations, one
•of which assembles with great frequency and the other only once a year, that
are charged in precisely the same terms with precisely the same powers.
Some of the articles of the Peace Pact intentionally assign to both the Council
anJ the Assembly certain special tasks, while others are limited to referring
to “The League of Nations” without any particular designation of either
the Council or the Assembly.
Nevertheless, in practice normal relations have been established between
the Assembly and the Council; and until precise definitions are made, the
following rules determine these relations: — The Council is not a governing
body responsible to the Assembly; both Council and Assembly have the same
origin and their relationship in no sense resembles that of a House of Lords
and a House of Commons. The Council presents a report each year to the
Assembly, dealing with the work accomplished. The Assembly considers the
results of the deliberations undertaken by the various commissions; these
are accepted by this Body before being sent to the Council for special study
and for a report that is presented at the next meeting of the Assembly.
'The Council considers the resolutions of the Assembly as possessing the
highest moral importance, but does not consider itself definitely bound by
them.
The Council and the Assembly, except on matters of procedure, of elec-
tions, or in certain cases designated in the Treaties, can pve only tmanimous
decisions. But this unanimity is not considered as being destroyed by simple
abstention. All states, great or small, which are members of the League are
equal before the law; all have as the safeguard of their sovereignty, an
equal right to declare their will.
Finally, the Secretariat is composed, on the lines of the Assembly, of a
personnel drawn from all states; this personnel, owing to its system of inter-
national cooperation, is engaged in the preparation of the work of the Council
and Assembly.
A FEBMAKENT COUBT OF JUSTICE
Article 14 of the Treaty imposes on the Council the heavy task of prepar-
ing a project for a permanent Court of International Justice and of submitiing
LEON BOTIRQEOIS
it to the members of the League. It was in September, 1921, that the
Assembly imd the Council came to an agreement concerning the choice of
the eleven titular judges and four assistant judges, who constitute the supreme
tribunal of the civilised nations. These assembled for the first time at The
Hague, February 15, 1922, and have already rendered many opinions.
Recently, in the “Wimbledon” affair, for the first time they delivered a
sentence.
In establishing among nations a non-political and purely judiciary
oi^anisation — a tribunal composed not of representatives of this or that
state, but of well-known and highly-respected jurisconsults drawn from all
over the world and charged solely to mete out justice in the differences and
conflicts which surge between nations — the League of Nations has consti-
tuted an organisation which is destined to become the corner-stone of a new
international order.
At The Hague a permanent Court of Arbitration had been constituted, but
strictly speaking, there was nothing permanent about it but a list of arbitra-
tors who placed themselves — and still do — at the disposition of various
parties and who may be called upon by them to form a tribunal; further, the
members inscribed on the list of arbitrators were nominated by their Govern-
ments. Whatever their personal authority, they were considered as repre-
senting their respective countries, and appeared more in the role of national
representatives.
The members of this Hague Court of Arbitration are responsible for the
lists of persons eligible for the permanent Court of International Justice.
Voting as nations, they have the right to designate four names, of which two
must not be those of fellow-countrymen. From these lists the titular and
assistant judges are chosen for presentation to the League of Nations. Those
nominated must receive an absolute majority in both the Council and the
Assembly. The United States of America has participated in establishing
the statutes of the Court through Mr. Elihu Root; and an American jurist,
Mr. John Bassett Moore, is among the judges.
The scope of the jurisdiction of the Court is inscribed in Article 14 of
the Treaty. It takes cognisance of all disputes that may be submitted to
it, but it is particularly those enumerated in Article 13 — disputes concerning
the interpretation of treaties, all points of international law, and ruptures
in international contracts, which are the special province of the Court of
Justice. This jurisdiction is not obligatory, but those states which wish to
make it so as between themselves, are authorised to sign a supplementary
protocol to that effect.
THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEES
Article 23 of the Treaty entitles the League to take all necessary measures
to guarantee and maintain liberty of communication and transport and to
ensure an equitable treatment of commerce, and for the prevention and cure
of contagious diseases and of social evils such as the trade in women and
children, the trafSc in opium and noxious drugs, etc.
For the execution of this article, the Council has established a certain
number of technical organisations, such as the Committee of Economics and
Finance, the consultative Committee of Communications and Transport, ^e
Committee of Hygiene, etc.
These committees, formed of experts of the highest repute, are purely con-
sultative ceatres of study placed under the imme^te control of the Council.
390 the league OF NATIONS
They have no powers of initiative, but they make a study, from their special
points of view, of the questions submitted to them by the Council and pre-
pare the agenda of the international conferences that either the Council or
the Assembly has decided to convoke.
Finally, the whole problem of labour was, in Part 13 of the Treaty of
Versailles, handed over to the International Labour Organisation. This body
was organised at Washington before the League was bom. It has obtained
a wide automony, and by special provisions masters, men and governments
are represented. The expenses of this organisation are charged to the budget
of the League of Nations.
III. Its Work and Its Future
The chief object of the League of Nations is the maintenance of peace
by the substitution of a reign of justice for the reign of force.
Those states which are members of the League of Nations pledged them-
selves, when siting the Peace Treaty, in two particulars: first, that of Article
10, which provides for the respect and maintenance of the territorial integrity
and political independence of those nations which are members of the League;
second, that of Article 12, which declares that, in the event of disputes with
any other state, recourse will not be taken to war before an attempt is made
to bring about a peaceful settlement.
By Article 11, as soon as danger of war becomes apparent, whether or
not directly affecting any one of the members of the League, or whenever
it is feared that peace may be endangered, the Council of the League of
Nations, either at the request of any one of the members, or automatically
through the intervention of the Secretariat, must at once assemble for de-
liberation.
Articles 12, 13 and 15 offer to each state which is a member of the League
a choice of the most varied procedures for permitting them to regulate any
differences which may arise between them or with any state which is not a
member of the Lea^e.
There is first — if the solution of a question of justice is involved — the
Court of Justice; or — should the states concerned prefer it — there is the
method of arbitration, either by the intermediary or the Permanent Hague
Court of 1907, which is still in existence, or by a direct choice of the parties
concerned.
There is also — if the trouble consists of one of those frequent political
difficulties where it would be extremely hard to deliver, judicially and abso-
lutely, a verdict for or against either of the disputants, and where only
conciliation and compromise are possible — the Council iteelf, which places
itself at the disposal of the disputants in an attempt to find, in agreement
with them, a basis of understwding and to reestablish friendly relations
between them.
the successes of the league
By such a method the Council has already solved the grave questions of
the Aland Islands, appeased the dispute between Serbia and Albania, and
stayed, at least, hostilities and maintained peace between Poland and Lith-
uania. In these three cases it was the interested Powers themselves which
demanded the services of the Council. In the question of Upper Silesia, as
in the financial reconstitution of Austria, it was the Supreme Coimcil which
301
LfiON BOTJBOEOIS
submitted to the League of Nations a question for which it could find no
solution itself. The question of Upper Silesia, in which was involved the
whole peace of Emope, was not a confiict between Germany and Poland, but
a failure on the part of France and England to arrive at an tmderstanding
regarding a ruling that Germany and Poland were obliged to accept. In
particular, the partition of what is known as “ the industrial triangle ” was
considered to be an impossibility on account of the vastness of the interests
— mineral and metallur^cal — involved in the contested territory.
By means of a profound and strictly impartial study which lasted more
than six weeks, and which adhered scrupulously to the prescriptions of the
Treaty of Versailles, the Council, seeking to conciliate these with the various
economic interests involved, succeeded in establishing a partition under con-
ditions which for two years have given satisfaction to all, even to those
directly concerned.
Austria, in the throes of a complete financial break-down at the beginning
of winter of 1922, implored the assistance of Europe. A special Committee,
directed by the Council to seek a remedy for her desperate situation,
succeeded in seven weeks in making an arrangement by which the sover-
eignty of Austria was solemnly proclaimed, the interests of the lenders
guaranteed and the control of Austrian finances assured. In a few months,
even in a few weeks, this arrangement stayed the deb&de, stabilised Aus-
trian money and for the first time created among Austrians a confidence in
the future of their country.
If, in such exceptionally dangerous cases, the League of Nations has
succeeded where the Powers failed, the credit deserved must be given to its
spirit of justice and independence and to its system of work, which is pru-
dently objective and disinterested. Part of the great strength of the League
of Nations lies in the fact of its permanence and consequently in its capacity
for continuous action. Not only, in giving its decisions, does it speak in the
name of the fifty nations and more which compose it and under the influence
of universal public opinion, but it can also, with public opinion supporting
it, execute ite own decisions. The Council is represented in Upper Silesia
by an arbitrator, and in Austria by a Commissioner, who see that the de-
cisions of the Council are carried out in the same spirit in which they were
inspired.
ITS PERMANENT CHARACTER
The permanent character of the League of Nations also carries with it
results of a political nature. It is not merely disputes between sovereign
states which menace the peace and order of the world. Within these states
themselves it is ^ssible that conflicts may arise, of which the repercussions
beyond the frontiers may have grievous consequences. The opposition of a
resolute minority can bring about the formation of rival groups whose chiefs
may seek wpport outside their own country.
The Allied Powers, at the time of the signing of the Peace Treaties, fore-
saw this danger, and in several of these treaties clauses were introduced
with the intention of ensuring, by the most precise regulations, the pro-
tection of minorities.
ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS
But to whom can the guardianship of these regulations be confided, and
of udicnn can punishment for their violation be demanded? Who can enforce
392 the league OF NATIONS
the application of these regulations to other states? These things can only
be done by an organisation at once independent of states and permanent in
character — that is, the League of Nations.
In the same way, the former German colonies and certain territories
detached from the Turkish Empire, according to the terms of the Treaties,
have been awarded to tiie victorious Powers as mandatories only of the
League of Nations. Again, the League of Nations has been entrusted with
power of control over, the protection and even the administration of,
territories which, for reasons of justice or political or moral necessity, have
not been definitely awarded or left — either permanently or temporarily — in
the hands of any particular state. The Saar Government and the High
Commission of Danzig, which were established by the League of Nations,
have exercised their powers without in any way disturbing the peace of
these two territories in both of which the risks of conflict were great.
Here, then, is a form of international action capable of considerable
development in the future. The League of Nations has succeeded in obtain-
ing these results without use of an executive force. How would it secure the
enforcement of its decisions m cases of breaches of the Treaty?
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS
Article 8 establishes in principle the necessity of a reduction of arma-
ments and the theoretical conditions for this reduction. And the same
article, in its last paragraph, creates a moral obligation between states to
inform one another concerning the state of their armaments. Article 9
creates a permanent military commission entrusted solely with the power of
advising the Council. The author of this chapter tried, at the Peace Con-
ference, to introduce into the Treaty two important regulations, one dealing
with the question of the mutual verification of the declarations made by the
states concerning their military forces, and the other dealing with the prepa-
ration of any military measures which might eventually appear to be neces-
sary. These problems are still being considered by the technical commis-
sions of the League.
There is, it is true, Article 16, which provides for those measures which
are to be taken in the case of violation of the Peace Pact regulations and
notably that of Article 12. According to Article 16, the guarantees provided
for are partly diplomatic and economic and partly military. But the dis-
cussion on Article 16 brought to light the fact that, so far as the majority
of states in the League is concerned, each considers itself to possess the right
of declaring what it believes to be a violation of engagements and, conse-
quently, of applying the blockade. As for military sanctions, tiie provisions
are contained in the following: In this case, it is the duty of the Council
to advise the various Governments concerned of the armed forces which the
members of the League will contribute respectively to that armed force
destined to enforce the decisions of the League.”
To the Council thus falls the duty of addressing its recommendations to
the members of the League, each state remaining free either to follow them
or to take no action. This is a positive source of weakness, but it bears on
the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of states, a matter in which
experience alone will demonstrate those limitations that are both possible
and harmless.
In the meanwhile, it is not easy to see how a compulsory limitation of
armaments can be imposed on states which are not certain of being efiica-
ciously protected by the League in the event of aggression. Furthermore,
LfiON BOURGEOIS 303
the idea of guarantees was considered by the consultative commission
appointed by the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of study-
ing the question of the limitation of armaments. Article 21 of the Peace
Treaty also authorises any kind of regional entente and all defensive imder-
standings having as their end the maintenance of peace.
Although lacking a material force to execute its decisions, the League
of Nations represents an extremely powerful moral force; it constitutes an
ensemble of means of action and methods of procedure which have already
made it in some of the gravest circumstances, and with the growing adhesion
of Governments and the still more effectual support of universal opinion, an
eflBlcacious instrument — and the only one — existing for the maintenance
of peace.
The Lea^e of Nations has been careful to strengthen its political action
by the judicial action of the International Court of Justice and further by
an organic action, the object of which is to accustom all states, in so far
as their sphere of interests is concerned, to associate themselves with, and
to live together for, aims higher than immediate selfish advantages; in a
word, to create an organisation which cannot be attacked on any particular
point without inflicting a grave hurt on the whole.
If it is possible to coordinate special national interests by means of mutual
equitable concessions and with special exchange of services, and thus to
attain solidarity in a balanced and mutually satisfactory whole, the associ-
ated interests will themselves resist any attempt at rupture that may be
made by a warlike or ambitious Government. Such a rupture would have
disturbing effects on the financial and economic equilibrium established
between states associated within this common organisation and would inflict
a wound on all states at once. This would lead to a tightening of the entente
between them and of the union for defence against all attacks. In such an
organisation of mutual interests the real strength of international bonds
would be found. This is the firm foundation of international life.
PROBLEMS ALREADY DEALT WITH
The League seeks to organise the protection of health and life. The
International Bureau of Hygiene has been incorporated with it. In Poland
the war against typhus has been brought to a victorious conclusion. The
International Labour Organisation brings masters, men and Governments
together for the discussion of hours of work, strikes and all other problems
connected with production. Questions of transit, of navigable routes, of
ports and railways were discussed at the Barcelona Conference in 1921.
Tariffs will be on the agenda of a conference which is shortly to meet. The
economic and financial situation of the world was studied in detail at the
Brussels Conference in 1920. I have already alluded to the successful finan-
cial reconstruction of Austria which the League of Nations took in hand
in 1922. The League also organised the reparation of war prisoners who
were then in Russia, and of Russian emigrants, and also instituted measures
of relief protection for those Greeks and Armenians who had fled from
Asia Minor.
ITS IDEALISTIC ASPECTS
Finally, in the domain of intellectual work, just as in political matters
and in all departments of material activity, the League aims at the creation
of a mutual association for the safeguard of each state, which is asked to
394
THE LEAGUE OF NATTONB
conform to the prescriptions of justice and equity. The League of Nations
has created a conunission for intellectual cooperation. The object of tiiis
commission is not in any way to interfere mth the oripnolity of national
mentality, the diversity of which is a condition essential to the progress of
ideas. On the contrary, it seeks to allow national genius to develop with all
the more strength and vitality by drawing from the general treasury of the
knowledge, methods and discoveries of all. From uie souls of all these
nations, is it impossible to bring forih one which will be common to all, and
will unite, without absorbing the aspirations of any one of them, in ai^our
for justice?
The work and the future of the League of Nations may be summed up
in three words: Justice, Life, Peace. With the object of establishing a lasting
peace it will work to organise, in conformity with justice, those instinctive
movements of material and spiritual solidarity which now animate national
life.
CHAPTER XIX
REPAKATIONS
THE LARGEST BILL EVER PRESENTED
By John Fobteb Ddubs
Counsel to the American Mission to Negotiate Peace, 191S-1919.
Member of the Reparations Commission and of the Supreme
Economic Council, 1919. Chevaher of the Legion of Honour.
PRE-ABMISTICE NEQOTUTIONS
The first authoritative declaration of the reparation demands of the
Allied and Associated Powers was contained in Mr. Lloyd George’s “war
aims ’’ speech of January 5, 1918. He then stated the Allied demand to
be “ the complete restoration ... of the independence of Belgium and such
reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces.
This is no demand for war indemnity such as was imposed on France by
Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of war-like operations
from one belligerent to another which may or may not be defensible. . . .
Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro and the occupied part of
France, Italy and Rumania. . . . Finally, there must be reparation for
injuries done in violation of international law."
This declaration was endorsed by Mr. Clemenceau the following
day, and three days later President Wilson, in his address of January 8
to Congress, stated in substantially similar language, as certain of his
Fourteen Points: “ Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated
and restored. ... All French territoty should be freed and the invaded
portions restored. . . . Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacu-
ated; occupied territory restored.”
These two statements stood as the official declaration of the Allied
objective as to reparations when in October, 1918, the German Government
sought an armistice. On October 6 that Government, in a note to the United
States, declared that it accepted “ as a basis for the peace negotiations, the
programme laid down by the President of the United States in nis message to
Confess of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements.”
President Wilson, apprehensive of the vagueness of the phrase “ as a
for peace negotiations,” demanded that the German Government accept the
terms laid down by him on January 8, and in subsequent addresses, as ^e
“ terms of peace,” so that discussion would be limited to reaching an agree-
ment “ upon the practical details of their application.” To tiiis the Ger-
man Government replied on October 14, that it “ accepted the terms ” and
would expect discussion only as to the practical details of their application.
Thereupon President Wilson advised the German Government that, in view
of such explicit acceptance of the terms of peace, he would take up with the
AUied Powers the question of an armistice. The President then transmitted
to the Allies bis correspondence with Germany and sought their assurance
REPARATIONS
396
that they too accepted the terms of peace to which Germany ha3 agreed. 1%e
Allied Governments in reply stated that “ subject to the qualifications which
follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government
of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President’s address to
Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in
his subsequent addresses.” Then followed two qualifications, one relating
to the freedom of the seas and the other relating to reparation. As to this
the Allied Governments stated “the President declared that invaded terri-
tories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed The Allied Govern-
ments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this pro-
vision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made
by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies
and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and
from the air.”
This interpretation was accepted by President Wilson and by the Ger-
man Government; and thereupon, it appearing that all of the parties were
in agreement as to the “terms of peace,” the military armistice was nego-
tiated and .concluded.
Article 19 of the Armistice provided: “ reserving all subsequent demands
and claims on the part of the Allies and of the United States, reparation of
damage.” This language in the Armistice was suggested by the then French
Minister of Finance, and was incorporated without discussion in the Armis-
tice as signed on November 11, 1918, on behalf of the Allies by Marshal
Foch and Admiral Wemyss.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
When the Peace Conference assembled at Paris in December, 1918, fol-
lowing the conclusion of the Armistice, the subject of reparation was per-
haps uppermost in the minds of the various Allied delegates. General
elections had just been held in Great Britain and in France and the
Governments had been returned to power on platforms which pledged them
to recover from Germany the full costs of the war. With the other Allied
Powers, financial and economic considerations played a commanding rdle.
Virtually all looked to Germany as an inexhaustible source of wealth from
which their shaken finances mi^t be reestablished.
The Conference organised itself into commissions, one of which was
the Commission on Reparation. This Commission was given the duty “ to
examine and report on the question of the amount for reparation which
the enemy countries should pay and are capable of paying, as well as the
form in which payment should be made and to recommend measures to
guarantee payment.”
The procedure of this Commission was, in the first instance, to seek from
the various Powers a written statement of the general principles which, in
their opinion, should govern the formulation of the reparation terms. As
a result of the memoranda which were thus submitted it quicldy developed
that there was a difference of opinion upon three fundamental principles,
namely:
(1) Could the Allies require from Germany payment of the entire
costs of the war or were they limited to reparation in respect of actual
damage done by the German military forces?
(2) If, in general, war costs could not be recovered, was Belgium in
an exceptional position smee, being neutralised by treaty, the war of Ger^
JOHN FOSTER DULLES 397
many against Belgium was, from its inception, illegal and imposed upon
Germany the duty of making integral reparation?
(3) If the Allied Powers were, in general, limited to seeking reimburse-
ments from Germany to the amount of damage done to the civilian popula-
tion and its property, as stated in the pre-Aimistice declaration, what was
the proper cons^ction of this declaration? In particular, could pensions
and like governmental charges be deemed to be “ damage to the civilian
population and its property?”
Of these three questions ^e first was basic, and assmned prime importance.
It was the subject of formal debate before the Reparation Commission of
the Peace Conference throughout several weeks. This discussion merely
accentuated, however, the divergence of views. The American delegates were
alone in their contention that the Allied Powers were so limited by the pre-
Armistice agreement that war costs could not be demanded of Germany, but
only compensation for actual damage done to civilians and their properly
by the German military forces on land, by sea and from the air. In view
of this fundamental difference of opinion the reparation delegates decided to
refer the question back to the heads of the four principal powers, namely,
France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States. With this reference tbe
Reparation Commission of the Peace Conference virtually ceased to function.
Thereafter the heads of these four states — the “ Supreme Council ” or “ Big
Four ” as they were popularly called — themselves dealt with the reparation
question and themselves, with the advice of their personal technical advisers,
determined the reparation provisions of the Treaty.
When the question of war costs was first referred to the Supreme Council,
President Wilson was en route to the United States on the George Washington.
The matter was, however, fully submitted to him by wireless, and it was
finally settled in accordance with his views as expressed in the following
wireless message to the American Mission:
“ I feel that we are bound in honour to decline to agree to the inclusion
of war costs in the reparation demands. The time to think of this was before
the conditions of peace were communicated to the enemy originally. We
should dissent, and dissent publicly if necessaiy, not on the ground of the
intrinsic injustice of it but on the ground that it is clearly inconsistent with
what we deliberately led the enemy to expect and cannot now honourably
alter simply because we have the power.
(Signed) Woodbow Wilson."
Once, however, it had been agreed that the reparation demands of the
Allies would exclude war costs and be limited to damage as specified in the
pre- Armistice statement, the further question immediately arose as to whether
pensions and payments made by the Allied Govenments to the families of
absent soldiers (separation allowances) should fall into the category of war
costs, and thus be excluded, or whether these items could be treated as
“ damage to the civilian population." Mr Lloyd George was particularly
insistent upon the inclusion of these items, as otherwise Great Britain would
have been largely excluded from participation in reparation; and the British
Dominions, which had suffered no material damage, would have been wholly
excluded. The views of Mr. Lloyd George in this matter were finally accepted,
largely due to the persuasion of a memorandmn of General Smuts, who ar^ed
that Government payments to families whose bread-winners were mobilised
in the armies really represented damage to the civilian population, and that
pensions also represented damage to civilians, since in most cases the wounded
soldiers continued to suffer loss after reverting to a civilian status. The
REPARATIONS
398
United States, however, at that time, disclaimed any intention of itself
seeking reparation on this score.
The third question of principle, namely, the status of Belgium, was not
dealt with until the very eve of the handing to Germany of tiie Conditions
of Peace. This was due to the fact that Belgium, which was the nation pri-
marily interested, had no representative upon the Supreme Co\mcil, which
was then dealing with these questions. Furthermore the principal Allies,
having themselves agreed to renounce war costs, were somewhat fearful of
^e political consequences incident to giving Belgium an exceptional position
in this respect, even though Germany had herself admitted the duty of mak-
ing integral reparation in the case of Belgium. This question was, however,
finally settled in a sense favourable to Belgium after Kmg Albert had made
a dramatic appearance before the Supreme Council, fiying from Brussels to
Paris for this purpose. Not only was this preferential position as regards
war coste accorded to Belgium, but Belgium was at the same time accorded
the right to receive, on account of her claims, 2,000,000,000 gold marks in
priority out of Germany’s first reparation payments.
When the questions of principle had been settled as above indicated, a
considerable task still remained in formulating the Allied demands in pre-
cise treaty terms. The American delegation strongly believed that the Treaty
should fix definitely the amount of Germany’s liability, even though it was
admitted that such a fixation could not be scientific either from the point of
view of Germany’s capacity or from the point of view of expressing the
precise amount of damage done. The British delegation inclined toward this
same view, and serious efforts were made to arrive at a definite figure which
could be inserted in the Treaty. Eventually, however, the differences of
viewpoint proved too great to be reconciled, and it was finally determined
not to express in the liVeaty the precise amount which Germany should pay.
The procedure adopted was to schedule the various categories of damage for
which Germany should be held liable, and to leave to a commission to be con-
stituted imder the Treaty, and known as the Reparation Commission, the duty
of evaluating the precise amount of this liability and fixing the rate of pay-
ment. It was, however, recognised by all that there should at least be some
preliminary demands of a precise nature. Accordingly the Treaty obligated
Germany to pay on account by May 1, 1921, 20,000,000,000 gold marks, which
was to include the costs of the armies of occupation, and from which was to
be deducted the cost of certain essential food imports of Germany within this
period. Furthermore, the Treaty provided for certain deliveries in kind, nota-
bly coal, ships, live-stock, reconstruction material and dye-stuffs, the value
of which would be credited against the cash sums due. In the case of coal
and reconstruction materials the Reparation Commission was given authority
to fix the precise amounts within certain maximum limits and the Commission
was instructed, in so doing, to take into account the internal economic situa-
tion of Gemany. The fi^e of 20,000,000,000 gold marks, above referred
to, was arrived at by valuing certain credit allowances and specific German
assets, such as ships, cables, dye-stuffs, etc., which would be taken pursuant
to the Treaty ter^.
The Treaty did not attempt to fix the respective interests of the Allied
creditors in Germany’s reparation pasrments. Efforts to apportion
amounts then proved unsuccessful, and this question also was left for subse-
quent settlement.
The foregoing represented the basic lines of the Conditions of Peace as
submitted to the German peace delegates. The submission was in writing,
and the Germans were allotted a brief period within which to express their
views in writing. No verbal discussion or negotiation was permitted. The
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Germans in their reply and comment on the draft Treaty recognised and
accepted the obligation to make good material damage done in ^ance and
Belgium and the duty to make integral reparation in the case of Belgium,
including payment of her war costs. The Germans rejected, however, the
items of pensions and separation allowances as being not fairly within the
terms of iwace which had been offered them and which they had accepted
before laying down their arms. The Germans further sou^t an immediate
and definite fixation of their liability and offered, subject to the modification
of certain economic terms, to make periodic payments to a total of 100, 000*
000,000 gold marks. This was not a capital sum, bearing interest, but a
total of annuities which were to be begun in the year 1927. The actual capi-
tal value, in 1919, of the German offer was not subject to defimte computa-
tion because the amount of the periodic payments was to be in certain re-
spects dependent on the condition of the German budget. It was roughly
estimated, however, that the amount offered had a then capital value of
about 40,000,000,000 gold marks.
The German observations upon the conditions of peace were considered by
the Allied Powers, but did not result in any material changes. Thus the
reparation terms as above outlined were finally incorporated in the Treaty
of Peace as signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.
THE TREATY IN OPERATION
Immediately upon the signature of the Treaty, the Reparation Commis-
sion was informally organised Formal organisation was completed when
the Treaty legally came into force through the deposit of ratifications on
January 10, 1920 France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States were
entitled to permanent representation upon the Commission. Belgium was
entitled to permanent representation except when shipping questions were
to be decided, when Japan took Belgium’s place. The United States, as a
non-ratifying power, did not, however, assume its place on the Commission
and was not represented except through the presence of an observer.
This Commission, under the Treaty, was constituted the central and exclu-
sive agency of all of the creditor nations with respect to the handling of the
reparation question subject only to control on certain specified major ques-
tions by the interested Governments. The seat of the Commission was Paris,
and its chairman, the French member, was entitled to two votes in the
event of a tie.
Since the Treaty did not require any cash to be paid by Germany imtit
May 1, 1921, the Commission at first devoted itself primarily to the applica-
tion of those provisions of the Treaty calling for the deliveries in kind. In
so far as concerned most of th^e, such as deliveries of ships, dye-stuffs and
live-stock, the Commission secured substantially satisfactory execution by
Germany. As regards reconstruction material there proved to be little de-
mand, since the industries of France and Belgium desired themselves to
supply such reconstruction material and were able to rally patriotic im-
pulses in favour of the use of domestic rather than German goods. This same
spirit rendered it impracticable to work out any arrangement for the actual
emplo 3 rment of German labour for reconstruction punioses. Several offers to
this end were made by Germany and carefully considered by the Reparation
Commission. But objection to the presence of Germans in France and the
opposition of French labour unions ultimately prevented the consummation
of these plans.
REPARATIONS
400
With regard to coal, however, the requirements were very great and diffi-
culties constantly arose. The Reparation Commission called for monthly
coal deliveries of 2,000,000 tons, and Germany was usually about 10 per
cent in arrears in meeting this monthly schedule. She claimed that this
schedule could not be fully met without disastrous effects upon her own indus-
trial life, and pointed to the fact that the coal deliveries which she did make
so depleted her supplies as to require her to make large imports from Great
Britain which were uneconomical and a great financial drain. These diffi-
culties were accentuated when the Silesian coal-fields were in large part
awarded to Poland.
FIXING THE DEBT AND THE PESCENTAOE3
While the Reparation Commission was thus struggling with the various
problems involved in deliveries in kind, the various Allied Governments,
directly or through their members on the Reparation Commission, were work-
ing on the major problems of the fixation of the total German debt and the
fixation of percentage of interest of the various creditor nations. There
occurred a series of conferences (San Remo, Hythe, Boulogne, Spa, Brussels,
etc.) attended by the Allied Premiers. Little of permanent importance was
accomplished at these conferences, except that at the Spa Conference of
July, 1920, the Allied Powers agreed upon their respective interests in Ger-
many’s reparation payments. The following were the percentages then
determined upon:
France 52%
Great Britain . 22%
Italy . 10%
Belgium 8%
Other Allies 8%
At these conferences various proposals were made both by the Allies and
by Germany for an arbitrary fixation of the total reparation liability. None
of these proposals secured unanimous acceptance, however, and the matter
was finally left for determination by the Reparation Commission in ac-
cordance with the Treaty procedure. This involved an actual valuation by
the Commission of the damage covered by the several categories (material
damage, pensions, etc.) which were specified by the Peace Treaty. This
damage the Reparation Commission evaluated, in the aggregate, at the capi-
tal sum of 132,000,000,000 gold marks, plus the amount of Belgium’s war debt
of about 4,000,000,000 gold marks.
No official statement has been made as to the amount of the several items
going to make up the total, but it appears that approximately 45,000,000,000
gold marks is ascribable to material damage and about 87,000,()iw,0()0 gold
marks to pensions and separation allowances.
'The Reparation Commission not only thus fixed the total of Germany’s
liability, but also established what it termed a “ schedule of payments ” to
provide for the discharge of this amount. This schedule of payments pro-
vided in substance that tiie total amount was to be evidenced by bonds, '
whereof 12,000,000,000 gold marks were denominated Series A and
38,000J)00,0()0 gold marks denominated Series B. These two series of
bonds were to bear interest at five per c^t and to be amortised as to principal
at the rate of one per cent per annum. A further series of bonds, denominated
C Bonds, was provided for in the amount of 82,000,000,000 gold mur ks
These bonds were to bear interest and to have a due date only when the
© Wtde World Photoi. © Wide World Photos
General Charles G. Dawes, American repre- Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the German
sentative in the mvestigation of the fiscal con- Reichsbahk, and prominent in the discussion
dition in Germany, 1924. of reparations.
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
401
Reparation Commission might consider that the payment of principal and
interest on this additional amount was within the capacity of Germany.
In order to provide for the payment of interest and amortisation of the
principal of the bonds of Series A and Series Germany was to pay annually
2,000,000,000 gold marks and a further sum equivalent to 26 per cent of
Germany’s annual exports.
These findings of the Reparation Commission as to Germany’s total lia-
bility and as to the rate of its discharge were communicated to Germany
by the Allied Powers on May 5, 1921, and Germany’s acceptance demanded
under threat of military coercion.
This ultimatum was accepted by Germany, and thereupon Germany
began to make cash payments in addition to deliveries in kind which had
been virtually the sole mode of payment up to May, 1921. These payments
prior to May 1, 1921, had fallen far below the 20,000,000,000 gold marks
contemplated by the Treaty. This was due largely to the fact that the then
current trade depression had resulted in values for German property sur-
rendered which were much lower than the values contemplated when this
figure of 20,000,000,000 gold marks was inserted in the Treaty.
GERMANY UNABLE TO MEET PAYMENTS
It quickly became apparent that Germany would be unable to make
cash payments to the amount required by the May, 1921, Schedule of Pay-
ments. The mark continued to decline rapidly, partly in consequence of
such cash payments as were made and perhaps even more on account of sales
of the mark by persons who sought to anticipate that future fall which was
then felt to be the inevitable consequence of the reparation demands There
set in a flight of capital from Germany, everyone seeking to exchange marks
for foreign currencies. The resulting fluctuations and rapid declines of the
mark created a further economic need for established businesses to carry
their working capital in foreign currencies of stable value.
This rapid decline in the value of the mark created Government fiscal
problems of enormous difficulty. Tax receipts fell to an insignificant value.
For while tax rates were, on paper, very high, yet the resulting income to
the Government was small because, by the time taxes were due and paid,
the currency m which payment was made had but a fraction of the value
which prevailed when the tax was levied. Thus budget deficits resulted, and
the German Government, feeling unable to cope with the problem, adopts
the easy way of printing an ever-increasing quantity of marks to meet its
budget requirements This inflationist policy in turn resulted in still further
depreciation of the mark.
The result of all these factors quickly demonstrated to the Reparation
Commission that Germany must be granted some relief in cash payments,
and Allied conferences were held at brief intervals at each of which the
amounts currently payable by Germany were reduced. At the Cannes Con-
ference (January, 1922) the cash payable by Germany was reduced to
31,000,000 gold marks every ten days. Subsequently (May, 1922) the total
cash amount for the year 1922 was reduced to 720,000,000 gold marks.
Finally, on August 31, 1922, cash payments were entirely suspended for the
remainder of the year and the balance due for 1922 was accepted in six
months’ Treasury bills, which were paid when they fell due in 1923. This
moratorium, however, was to expire on January 1, 1923, and Germany in
November, 1922, informed the Reparation Commission that she would there-
after for an indefinite period be unable to make any cash payments.
T. B Y — VOL. 1 — 26
402
REPARATIONS
AMOUNTS ACTUALLY PAID BY QEBMANY
As to the actual value of what Germany had paid up to 1923, there is
great dispute due to the fact that the greater part of these payments were
made in property and not in cash. The accounts of the Reparation Com-
mission show total payments of slightly over 8,000,000,000 gold marks,
whereof about 1^00,000,000 are payments in cash and the balance payments
in property. These accounts do not reflect the final valuation of all items,
and they embrace only what is technically known as “ reparation ” imder
the treaty as distinct from “ restitution ” of identical objects, payment of
pre-war debts under the “ clearing-house ” system, etc. There is also great
dispute as to the valuation placed by the Commission on property which had
been delivered. The German Government claims that the total values trans-
ferred by her under the Treaty amount to over 45,000,000,000 gold marks.
This estimate is undoubtedly excessive. Valuations made by independent
economists of high standing place the fair value of what Germany has deliv-
ered under the Treaty at from 20,000,000,000 to 25,000,000,000 gold marks.*
OCCUPATION OP THE BUHB BY PEANCE AND BELGIUM
The Allied Premiers met in Paris on January 3, 1923, to deal with the
situation resulting from Germany’s announced intention to discontinue cash
payments. At this conference each of the Governments of France, Great
Britain and Italy submitted a plan for dealing comprehensively with the
question of reparations and the question of inter-Allied debts, which latter
subject was regarded by all of these nations as having a direct relationship
to the question of reparation. Germany also had proposals in readiness
which, however, were not received.
The British proposal provided for a reduction of Germany’s reparation
liability to the nominal capital sum of 50,000,000,000 gold marks. This sum
was however subject to a further reduction to perhaps 35,000,000,000
gold marks in consequence of discount provisions which were offered
to encourage Germany to make prompt payments. The British proposal
further provided for a moratorium period of four years and for an Allied
supervision of Germany’s finances. Coupled with this proposal as to Ger-
many, Great Britain put forward proposals as to the treatment of Allied
debt. These involved a virtual cancellation by Great Britain of the debts
of France, Italy and Belgium in consideration of Great Britain receiving some
part of the German reparation bonds which would be attributable to these
Powers.
The French proposal involved retention of the basic features of the May,
1921, Schedule of Payments, suggesting however that the 82,000,000,000 gold
mar^ of C Bonds thereby provided for should be used in discharge of inter-
Allied indebtedness. France stated that if these C Bonds woidd first be
accepted at par by her creditors in discharge of France’s indebtedness,
then France would be prepared to join with these creditors in cancelling or
scaling down the “ C ” Bonds, including those which France would still
* The amount of die indemnity paid by France to Germany after the war of 1870-
1871 was the equivalent of 4,000,000,000 gold marics. In comparing, however, the relative
burden of the two payments, allowance must be made for changed conditions. For
instance, the purchasing power of gold was much less in 1922 than in 1871 and the German
populatimi is larger than was the French population which paid m 1871. On the other
hand, the war of 1871 was much leas exhauking, economically, than the war of 1014-1918.
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
403
own. Thus the French plan admitted the possibility of Germany’s debt
being reduced to 50,000,000,000 gold marks contingently upon France’s
Allied debts being cancelled. The French plan further provided, however,
for the actual seizure by the Allies of certain sources of income within Ger-
many, such as railroads, coal, timber, export taxes, etc., and the direct ex-
ploitation of these for reparation account.
The Italian proposal occupied a position midway between the British
and FVench.
The difference of views between Great Britain and France with respect
to this seizure of “ guarantees ” was in itself an insuperable obstacle to any
agreement, and the conference broke up on Janua^ 10 after the Allied
Premiers had concluded that there was no possibility of their agreeing.
France thereupon assumed an independent initiative. Her first step was
to proceed herself to seize the guarantees which had been proposed by her
plan of January 1. To create a legal basis for this, the Reparation Com-
mission by the votes of BVance, Belgium and Italy had first declared Ger-
many in voluntary default as to wood deliveries and then as to coal de-
liveries, there being a discrepancy of some ten per cent between the deliveries
made by Germany and those which had been required by the schedules of
the Reparation Commission. The declaration of such default brou^t into
play the provisions of Paragraphs 17 and 18 of Annex II of the Reparation
Clause of the Treaty These provided that in the event that the Reparation
Commission should find Germany to be in voluntary default, it might recom-
mend to the interested Powers the action to be taken and that:
“ The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the
right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Ger-
many agrees not to regard as acts of war, may include economic and financial
prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respec-
tive Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances.”
It was the view of the French Government that the authorisation of
“other measures” warranted the military occupation of German territory,
additional to that west of the Rhine which was already held pursuant to
Treaty authority as security for Germany’s obligations, and the seizure in
such other parts of Germany of what France regarded as productive sources
of revenue This construction of ttie Treaty was not shared by the British
Government, which construed the words “ other measures ” as referring
merely to measures of the same general character as those which were con-
templated by the phrase “ economic and financial.”
On January 11, 1923, French and Belgian forces proceeded to extend
their occupation of Germany beyond the left bank of the Rhine, and to
occupy the rich industrial section of the Ruhr. Here was concentrated Ger-
many’s principal coal and iron deposits, her greatest industrial establish-
ments and a population of some seven million persons.
The German Government and people, having been disarmed pursuant to
the military clauses of the Treaty, were unable to oppose forcibly the armies
of occupation. They accordingly resorted to “ passive ” resistance. This
consisted of a refusal on the pait of the inhabitants of the occupied region
to conduct any activity from which the French might gain advantage. The
output of coal was immediately stopped, as was the manufacture of coke
upon which the French metallurgical industry was particularly dependent.
'Hie great iron and steel factories ceased operations. The French in reply
threw a military cordon about the occupied area completely cutting it off
from the balance of Germany and preventing any income or outgo of persons
or goods, other than certain essential supplies of food. Within the area they
established a regime of strict martial law; and mail, telephone and telegraph
REPARATIONS
404
commvinication was totally interrupted. In consequence of the measures
taken by one or the other side, all industrial activity was halted and the rail-
roads ceased to function. With this and the French requisition of automo-
biles, horses, etc., transportation in the occupied region became almost im-
possible and complete stagnation set in.
The maintenance of passive resistance, while costly to the French, im-
posed far heavier burdens upon the German Government. Food must be
supplied to the occupied region so that the population, no longer working,
tiiould not starve. In addition, the German Government was faced with
the task of maintaining the economic life of the balance of Germany which
was now cut off from its accustomed supplies of coal, iron and steel. This
involved large imports from Great Britain, Sweden and other foreign coim-
taries. This financial burden greatly accelerated the decline of the mark
with consequent economic disturbances and loss.
FAILURE OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE
Germany early realised th.it she would be first to succumb in this contest
which was virtually a renewal of war, and she sought to secure terms
through new reparation offers to the Allies. On May 2, 1923, the German
Government proposed to the Allied Governments that her reparation lia-
bility be fixed at 30,000,000,000 gold marks, and as security for such pay-
ment, Germany undertook to create mortgages upon private property in
Germany, including urban and rural property and industrial enterprises, and
also to pledge the Government-owned railroads and special sources of
revenue, such as custom receipts, spirit monopolies, tobacco taxes, etc. This
offer failed, however, to meet with a favourable reception and subsequently
on June 7, 1923, the German Government, by a supplemental note, modified
the foregoing proposal by agreeing to assume and give guarantees for the
payment of any sum which might be determined by an impartial commis-
sion to be within her capacity. This proposal corresponded to a suggestion
made by the American ^cretary of State, Mr. Hughes, in December, 1922,
to the effect that some such impartial determination afforded the best solu-
tion of the reparation problem. That this idea was thus taken up by the
German Government was largely due to British initiative. Great Britain
was anxiously seeking for a solution of the Ruhr conflict which was disrupting
trade conditions throughout Europe and, at least in Britain’s opinion, pre-
venting British commercial recovery and contributing to the great unemploy-
ment which prevailed.
When Germany had made this proposal of June 7, 1923, the British
Government expressed the view that at least it deserved consideration by
tile Allied Powers. France, on the other hand, took the position that she
would not enter into any negotiations with Germany until Germany should
have first unconditionally abandoned passive resistance and have begun co-
operation with the French in their exploitation of the industrial wealth of
the Ruhr. This difference of views between Great Britain and France was
openly and sharply expressed in notes which were exchanged during the
summer of 1923. This diplomatic correspondence, while otherwise fruitless,
did serve to clarify the position of the French and Belgian Governments.
It developed that France insisted on receiving 26,000,000,000 gold marks and
Belgium 5,000,000,000 gold marks, plus any amounts which they were obli-
gated to pay on account of their war indebtedness to their former Allies.
The amount of 26,000,000,000 gold marks, representing the mininfinm French
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
405
demand, provided her external war debts were cancelled, was an amoimt
calculated to represent the actual material damage done in PVance, exclusive
of the item of pensions and separation allowances.
The German note of June 7, 1923, represented the last effort of the Ger-
man Government to seek by negotiation a solution of the Ruhr conflict. The
resources of the Government were rapidly waning. The Gold Reserve of the
Reichsbank had fallen from about 2,250,000,000 gold marks, at tiie time of
the Armistice, to approximately 400,000,000 gold marks and the value of the
paper mark had depreciated so that millions were required to buy a dollar.
It was apparent that passive resistance could no longer be financed, and in
September, 1923, the German Government formally announced her abandon-
ment of resistance and the withdrawal of all legal enactments forbidding
either cooperation with the French occupying forces or the payment of taxes
to the French authorities. After this surrender the German Government im-
mediately sought to secure from the French Government a modification of
the character of the military occupation so that it should be reduced to
“ Invisible ” proportions and the way opened for the resumption of normal
economic life in the Ruhr. The French Government declined, however, to
have any dealings with the German Government and adopted the policy of
conducting separate negotiations, with groups of Ruhr industrialists, for the
resumption of deliveries in kind.
At this point, the British Government revived its former suggestion that
Germany’s reparation liability should be determined on the basis of an im-
partial investigation of Germany’s capacity to pay. It accordingly invited
the Allies, including the United States, to name experts upon such a com-
mission of inquiry The American Government expressed its willingness to
act, provided this procedure met with the approval of the other Allied
Powers The Belgium and Italian Governments indicated their acceptance
of the plan The French Government, however, was fearful lest such an
inquiry into Germany’s capacity to pay might lead to a reduction of Ger-
many’s liability without a corresponding cancellation of the French debt to
England and the United States. It accordingly attached conditions so
limiting the scope of the inquiry that the Amencan Government concluded
that the purpose of the proposal was nullified and the project was then
dropped.
With the failure of this effort it appeared to the German Government
that the last hope had disappeared for an early comprehensive settlement of
reparation which would recognise the authority and respect the territorial
integrity of the German State. The German Government, imable to exercise
any functions in the Rhineland and Ruhr, and unable even to negotiate re-
garding the fate of these provinces, acquiesced in their de facto passage under
the control of France and freed the inhabitants to develop directly, and as
best they could, some working arrangement with the French authorities.
CHAPTER XX
INTER-ALLIED DEBTS
By Bernard M Baruch
Chairman of the War Industries Board Member of the Su^eme
Economic Council Economic Adviser for the American Peace
Commission American Delegate on Economic and Reparation
Clauses. Author of Making of the Econormc cmd Rej^ratione
Sections of the Peace Treaty
"Wars are fought on the land, on the water, in the air, and behind the
front where the civilian forces labour. It is not enough to mobilise a nation's
military strength; there must be a mobilisation of its full economic re-
sources, industrial, agricultural, and financial. These must be organised, co-
ordinated, and directed with the same strategy that governs the operations
of the purely military arms of the service. The World War involved not
only all of the man-power, but the material resources of the participating
nations. So it was soon found necessary for the stronger financial nations
on each side to support the weaker nations with financial resources, goods
and services — as well as with man-power. The natural theory was that
each nation should finance, as in times of peace, its own necessities; but
it soon became evident that requirements from outside sources could not be
obtained in the usual manner (te., offering bonds or like securities on the
domestic and foreign markets) because of the deranged condition of ex-
changes; and so fimds for Governments had to be obtained through loans
of one Government to another. Thus arose the inter-Allied debts.
AMOUNTS ADVANCED
England and France were called upon early in the war to supply money
for the less wealthy Allies. Most of this money was spent in the creditor
countries. When America entered the war, it was found necessary to relieve
the already overstrained credit, not alone of the participants who had already
borrowed money from England and France, but of England and France them-
selves. So loans from America were negotiated to the amount of $9,842,468,-
566.82. Later there were added obligations for sales of surplus war materials,
for relief, and for flour, bringing the total to $10,578,509,342, which together
with interest made a total at the end of 1923 of $11,800,010,245. There
was no thought when made that these loans would be treated differently from
any other loans.
As a rule the lending nations ai^ed their Allies in two different ways.
For the articles which were purchased by their Allies within the creditor
countries' boundaries, they loaned money; for the thin^ the lending nations
purchased in the debtor countries, they had to pay cash. Most of the credi-
tor countries also sent their soldiers to the debtor territory, and not only
supported thepi while there with munitions and food from home, but paid
for such munitions, food and transportation, necessary for their troops, as
406
«• o B
BERNARD M BARUCH
407
were obtainable in the debtor countries. Thus, the United States not only
loaned England and France money, but in addition spent hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in those countries for material, equipment and transportation.
The other countries, when making purchases in the United States, used
money they had borrowed from the United States. The United States paid
cash.
Because of inability or unwillingness, the only understanding reached on
inter-Allied debts has been an agreement to fund the British debt to the
United States. It was the general understanding that Belgium’s indebted-
ness to the Allies and to America was to be paid from the German reparation.
DOES PAYMENT DEPEND ON REPABATION8?
This whole subject of the inter-Allied debts, other than those between
Great Britain and the United States, was in January, 1924, held up pending
the settlement of the reparation problem. France, followed by Italy, practi-
cally said to the other nations that unless Germany pays certain sums of
money, it cannot, or will not, pay its indebtedness to other nations. M. Poin-
care, in his note to Lord Curzon of August, 1923, said that until France
should receive 26 billions of gold marks from Germany, and m addition the
cancellation of its indebtedness to England and America, or the acceptance
by its creditor nations of the German “ C ” Bonds (generally considered
of doubtful value), the reparation matter could not be settled. Whereas it
is perfectly true that the more Germany pays to the Allies, the more they
will have out of which to pay their debts, this self-evident truth has no rela-
tion to the inherent ability of the Allies to pay their outstanding obligations.
The Franco-Italian position, ignoring this economic truth, seems simply
equivalent to saying that until their chief debtor pays them, they (the French
and Italians) will not (not cannot) pay their creditors. See Poincare note to
Curzon, as ifollows: While recognising our debt, while not even thinking
of leaving it unpaid, we are forced to say that we can only pay after having
received what Germany owes us. We shall demand from the latter, in
addition to our 26 milliards of A ” and ‘‘ B ” Bonds, what is demanded
from ourselves.”
The point is often raised that if Germany’s debt is scaled, why should
not the debt of the Allies one to another be scaled. There would be some
force in that argument if one urges that Germany be let off for less than she
is able to pay, or that the recipients of the reparations be more lenient to
Germany than the facts warrant. If Germany’s ability to pay out of her
own resources is fixed at, roughly, a capital sum of ten thousand million
dollars, the taxpayers of America will want to know why France out of her
resources cannot pay what she owes America.
If the quid pro quo for the cancellation of inter-Allied debts should be
the cancellation of that portion of the German reparation liability which
cannot be paid and is therefore worthless, then those creditor nations which
cancel their debts are in effect paying German reparations. That would be
a bad precedent to set — to make some of the victorious nations pay to
some of their associates an indemnity for the nation they had conquered.
THE POSITION op THE UNITED STATES
Some contend that the debts were incurred in a common cause, and
therefore should be cancelled. Those who advance this argument must agree,
however, that payment should not be cancelled where the money was used
INTER-ALLIED DEBTS
408
for the purpose of increasing the borrowing nation's permanent shipping, its
industrial resources, its railway equipment, or for the purpose of buying
food that was resold to its own people. Nor could it be expected that, where
the money was borrowed for the purchase of materials which went into the
export trade of the debtor country, or to pay for material purchased in other
parts of the world (usually represented by advances to support their foreign
exchanges) or to purchase things which were bought after the war, any of
these could be called a contribution to a common cause and therefore be
cancelled. Further, if a debtor country claimed cancellation for things which
were used for military purposes, it should repay to the creditor coimtry the
cash sums of money which were spent for purely military purposes in the
debtor country. The United States has refused to consider the cancellation of
any debts, feeling that if she should — other reasons outside — the major cost
of this and all future wars would fall upon her and thus put her in a position
of subsidising all wars, having subsidised one. It is true that before the
United States entered the war, the Allies held an economic conference at which
they declared for economic and military solidarity and the boycotting of
Germany, but it is also true that at the Paris Peace Conference all of the
Allies agreed, in the Economic Drafting Committee (a committee coinposed
of representatives of the five great nations which decided what economic and
financial questions should be taken up at the Peace Conference and what
should not be) to recede from such position of economic solidarity and boy-
cott of their enemies after the war. At the Paris Conference they refused to
discuss cancellation or elimination of the debts, leaving that for each country
to settle for itself
THE PREREQUISITE OF PAYMENT
Undoubtedly debts incurred in the World War, based on the prices then
prevailing, cannot be paid on the basis of the present prices or volume of
trade; it can only be done on a far greater volume of business than has
ever before been known, with the entire industrial machinery of the world
operating at its fullest capacitv or upon a basis of much higher prices.
Consequently, there has arisen the question of the necessity of the cancella-
tion or scaling down of these debts Some leading financial authorities
have claimed that the United States would be ruined by accepting pay-
ment of the money owed to it because that would involve a glut of gold
or materials or both in the American market But it is very difficult to
imderstand why any man or nation would be ruined by receiving what is
due The general attitude of a debtor nation toward a creditor nation should
be that of an individual debtor toward an individual creditor. Debts can
be paid only by services or bv commodities, and it is very unlikefy that the
world would be worse off if the nations set to work to produce more com-
modities, thereby creating greater wealth in order to pay one another. This
would inean that the individuals within the nation would enjoy the use of
more things than they had ever enjoyed before.
Cancellation of debts would lay an axe to the root of international finance.
Many bankers in convention in America have urged the cancellation of war
loans between Governments, yet they continue to offer for sale peace-time
bonds of those Governments whose war debts they urge should be cancelled.
They would reserve from cancellation the bonds which they, as bankers, have
sold, on the argument that these are for post-war purposes. And they would
be aghast at a proposal to cancel the United States bonds which were issued
to obtain the money on which the foreign bonds are based and which they
BERNARD M. BARUCH
409
and their clients hold. There can be no payment on the basis of the present
gold standard of the debts between nations unless, through world-wide peace
and order, mankind gets to work and commences to save and labour as it has
never done before.
The United States has appointed a World War Foreign Debt Commission,
composed of the Secretary of the Treasury as chairman; Charles E. Hughes,
Secretary of State; Herbert C. Hoover, Secretary of Commerce; Reed Smoot,
United States Senator; and Theodore E. Burton, member of the House of
Representatives, to handle the matter of the Allied debts due the United
States. So far England alone has settled, the other nations postponing liqui-
dation until a more favourable time or until the German reparation question
has been disposed of. It will be very severe upon the Germans to have to
pay what they justly should. It will be very diflScult for the debtor to pay
the creditor nations; but the taxes and burdens upon the citizens of the
creditor nations are just as severe and burdensome The German reparation
will have to be settled upon its merits, and so with the Allied debts.
HOW DEBTS CAN BE PAID
The payment of the debt of one country to another need not be directly
by gold or exports, but it can be indirectly by exports For instance, the
United States might be paid by Great Britain or France or Italy with the
things which they make; or by tea and hides from China, jute from India,
tin from tlie Straits Settlements, or other colonial products; or by the im-
portation into the United States of coffee from Brazil, or bananas from
Honduras, the debtor nation in turn supplying to the exporting nations the
things which they need ; or by the export of capital to build railways, develop
industries, etc , abroad, which would increase the productive and consump-
tive power of tlie world
When an individual owes money, he works and saves and pays. The only
way an individual can pay is through money or services. His services might
displace somebody else’s services, but the community in which he lives is
better off because of his working and saving and paying, and increases with
him in prosperity and contentment So the nations of the world must work
and save and pay one another. Unless the nations work and save, they
cannot pay; and unless there is peace and order in the world, the nations
cannot work and save.
While there is a divergence as to the loan statistics of the borrowing and
lending countries, the following table of the loans is approximately correct.
The table does not include loans made by Germany during the war to her
allies:
Certain disparities between the figures in the following table and those in calcula-
tions from other sources will be noted in several instances. This is partly due to the fact
that in some calculations all or part interest is computed, and in others it is not In
the following table accrued interest to the United States is computed, while in the case
of Great Britain’s loans it is only partly figured in But, in general, the table presents
as nearly accurate a schedule of the debts as it is possible to obtain. The table, however,
^ould be considered as representing the situation to December 15, 1923, when the above
article was wntten and the table prepared. The table is taken by permission from
advance sheets of the volume Inier-AWhed Debts, by Harvey E. Fisk, Bankers IVust
Company, N. Y., 1924.
INTER-NATION INDEBTEDNESS IN 1923 DUE TO THE WORLD WAR. IN DOLLARS AT EXCHANGE PARITIES. 000 OMITTED
ED DEBTS
3aipnpni
■^namajoAOo paiilY
ox
CHAPTER XXI
THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION
By J Laurence Laughlin, Ph D.
For twenty-four years Professor and Head of the Department of
Political Economy at the University of Chicago. Editor of the
Journal of Political Economy. Author of History of Bimetal-
lism; Principles of Money; Credit of the Nations, Money and
Prices
I. Conditions from 1900 to 1914
In the monetary history of the world since 1900 we start out with a
basis of stability in standards and credit. This had been acquired during a
considerable period of peace, and of development in methods of production,
of sound finance, and credit, and in the general adjustment of prices to a
gold standard by the largest commercial countries. The great fall in the
value of silver since 1872 and the consequent agitation for free silver and
bimetallism had spent its force by 1900. France and the Latin Union, Ger-
many, Austria-Hungary, Japan and the United States had joined Great Brit-
ain's long-held preference for gold. In the first decades of the twentieth
century there was no lack of gold and silver with which to provide a secure
basis for exchanging the world's goods. Indeed, the prodigious yield of
$913,000,000 of gold from 1896 to 1920 had been the greatest ever known.
In 1900, gold prices of all commodities in the United States, for example,
stood at about the same level as in 1890, and to 1914 they had moved gradu-
ally upwards from about 65 to 80. Industry had had no serious problem of
depression to deal with, and no upheaval of prices, due to fluctuations in the
value of the world's monetary s^ndard. The steady rise of general prices
in this period had acted as a gentle stimulant to production.
In the field of banking and credit normal conditions prevailed, disturbed
on occasions by fear from wars in the Balkans. The Bank of England and
the discount houses of London formed an organisation well adapted for
carrying on the credit operations by which English exports and imports were
paid for. Acceptances drawn on institutions on the Continent and in London
to a very large sum were effectively handled with a minimum use of gold.
Moreover, by the use of cheques drawn on bank-deposits the British public
had little need of the paper money supplied by the Issue Department of the
Bank of England. On the contrary, France and Germany depended on bank-
notes for their circulation and very little on a deposit-currency. To the
French public and the Government when loans were granted, payment was
made in the form of bills of exchange or of notes of the Banque de France.
An expansion of business credit in England showed itself in an enlarged dis-
count- and deposit-account, while in France it was in an enlarged bank-note
issue. The same was true of Germany and the Reichsbank. These differences
were only too evident later in the World War.
During the years before the World War the quotations for foreign ex-
change fluctuated according to the exports and imports of goods and to the
411
412
THE 1VL4DNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION
items of “ invisible exchange within the limits set by the shipping points
of gold, because foreign bills were liquidated in currencies on a gold basis.
The United States was destined to stand out in dramatic contrast to
Europe in monetary and credit operations. During the first decade of the
new century that country suffered from a collapse of credit (1907) which,
together with earlier experiences, led to the creation of the Federal Reserve
System in 1913, which was not only ^ reconstruction of bank-note issues,
but also a reorganisation of credit with a centralisation of gold-reserves.
This act was the most important in its nature and effects ever entered on
American statute books. It played a momentous part in the tasks laid
upon credit and money in the difficult days of war and reconstruction. Its
provisions, however, are too well known to be given here.
As regards public debts and the budgetary equilibrium between national
income and outgo, there was a world-tendency since 1900 to spend more tlian
the income; but the chief offender in this respect was France which by 1914
had incurred the largest debt of any country in the world.
II. The World War the Cause of the Monetary Problems
It goes without saying that the most serious monetary problems of the
first quarter of the twentieth century were born of the World War of 1914-
1918. Problems, fiscal and monetary, appeared on a scale never before
dreamed of, and in these days of reconstruction the nature and history of
these problems are necessary to an understanding of the means by which they
are to be solved. The principles of money and credit received an illustra-
tion such as the world never had before. The field, of course, is too large to
be treated in detail, and we are too close to the events to obtain a wholly
correct historical point of view, but it is quite possible from documents now
accessible to skebch out the main outlines of the processes by which the
world was penalised, and thereby to learn better how to deal with the dis-
asters and suffering of to-day due to monetary errors.
Great as were the necessities which faced the belligerents, when obliged
to pay appalling and hitherto inconceivable costs of war, perhaps the great-
est surprise to the hi.^^torian is the want of understanding by those guiding
governmental finance in Europe, that fiscal methods of raising funds should
be decisively separated from the monetary functions of the Treasury. The
sad experience of the United States in 1862-1879 (to say nothing of other
and earlier disastrous errors in Europe) was either forgotten or consciously
disregarded in a time of emergency. Finance Ministers, even if trained, were
probably too often overwhelmed by the untrained legislative majorities who
in times of peril settled the policies of the State by political makeshifts
rather than by monetary skill. It was obvious, of course, that the enormous
costs of war could not be paid for in money, and that they could be met
only by forms of credit, such as short, unfunded or long-term funded, loans,
by which payment could first be postponed and then thrown forward on
future generations. That has been true in the financing of all wars. But
it is amazing how general was the belief that immediate needs for funds
could be met by issuing demand obligations of the State in the form of paper
money. Of course, such paper was a debt which could be presented at a
time and manner that might be ruinous to the issuer. Consequently it was
made inconvertible from the start. Such an attempt to borrow, which de-
stroyed all the existing monetary mechanism, through the confusion of the
fiscal with the monetary functions of the State, produced a situation so ruin-
ous, nay even ghastly, that the world has never before seen its like. In the
J LAURENCE LAUGHLIN
413
violation of so obvious a monetary principle we find the clue to many of the
worst evils from which Europe is suffering to-day. The avoidance of such
a destructive policy by the United States, on the other hand, is the out-
standing reason for the dramatic contrast between the condition of prosperity
in this country and that of Europe.
Ill The Issue of Paper Money
To the uninitiated it might seem almost incredible that so slight a matter
as the resort to inconvertible paper money could prove so widely destructive.
It is our duty, therefore, to analyse carefully the effect of monetary opera-
tions during the war upon the economic processes not only of exchange but
of production, consumption and distribution, thus extending out into the
social and political fields.
Some of us who for many decades have been studying the principles of
money may have been led to think that, after all, the functions of money
were secondary to the primary economic functions of production and dis-
tribution of goods The actual existence of goods that satisfied our wants
seemed of primary importance, and the means of their exchange after being
produced seemed to be secondary It seemed that so long as production was
proceeding, we could get on, although with serious inconvenience, even if
money failed us. If this was the conclusion, under our complex industrial
and monetary organisation of society, it is now clear that it must be dif-
ferently expressed Certain of the world^s monetary problems take on, if
not new form, at least a new emphasis. Economic production remains funda-
mental, but monetary errors may have results on the primary processes
hitherto not fully realised.
In the earliest attempts to exchange goods by some medium of exchange
used as money, the very first requisite demanded was that it should have a
well-recognised and definite value. As the outcome of centuries of experi-
ence that commodity (gold) has been chosen, by a process of elimination,
as the monetary unit, which is believed to be the least subject to changes in
value due to causes affecting itself. A seller always hesitates to part with
valuable goods for something that may shrink in value while in his posses-
sion This general truth holds good of all peoples at all times. It is a
powerful agent in the reactions of to-day throughout Europe. Anything
which changes the value of the monetary unit in which all goods are priced
and all securities and contracts are drawn, will cause economic ruin com-
parable, in the physical field, only with an earthquake in Japan.
IV The Results of Inconvertible Paper
When European countries, like Germany, Austria-Hungary, France,
Belgium, Italy, Russia and Poland in the early days of the World War began
by making their paper issues inconvertible into gold, the first costly step
was taken. The error lay in the violation of the rule that no fiscal needs
should be met by issuing demand obligations in the form of money. As
nothing of value was given in payment by inconvertible paper the debt re-
mained unpaid. Then at once the value of the money began to depreciate,
so that the monetary unit entered upon a career of uncertainty. In excuse,
the weak explanation was given that such action could not have been avoided
in emergencies where large sums were immediately needed. If these sums
414
THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION
were needed for loans, they could have been better obtained by other credit
devices than paper money. If for the needs of trade, the answer to this is
that the productive soiu'ces of a country could turn out little more of the
great mass of goods in war time than in normal times of peace: there was
little, if any, more capital in industry and fewer workers. The metallic
money and bank reserves of the world had not been destroyed. If the credit
organisation had not been deranged by bad management, the mechanism of
exchange would have sufficed to exchange as many goods in 1914-1918 as in
the years before. That is, if not interfered with the monetary functions of
the State could have worked as effectively in war as in peace.
An illustration of this truth was given by the experience of the United
States after entering the war in 1917. In all she expended about $34,000,-
000,000 — nearly as much as any one of the belligerents — and yet she
maintained the gold standard, made no issues of inconvertible paper, kept
her credit organisation intact through the Federal Reserve System, and did
not confuse her fiscal with her monetary functions. As a result she did not
suffer disaster from the ruin of her mechanism of exchange; and at the end
of the war she was able to devote herself wholly to the readjustment of
industry to the demands of peace, without having first to recover from ex-
hausting wounds in her swollen debts, abnormal prices and enfeebled credit.
The quick recovery of the United States, as the creditor nation of the world,
was lai^ely due (aside from her great natural resources and managerial
power) to her escape from inconvertible paper and a disorganised mechanism
of exchange. On the other hand, the departure of European countries from
the straight and narrow path of monetary wisdom is recorded in plain but
p>ainful suffering. It is the duty of history to point out for coming genera-
tions just how monetary errors could have produced such amazing damage
as we now see in Europe.
(1) THE RISE OF PRICES
The first effect of inconvertible and depreciating paper was a rise of prices.
As the paper fell in value, gold disappeared from circulation under a law
as old as Thebes and Babylon. That is, a new and changeable standard of
prices and contracts was introduced. The central banks of Europe held on
to their old metallic reserves; but the leash that held the bank-issues to
redemption was cut and they wandered off unrestrained on the easy descent
to Avemus and lost values. The gold and even the small silver in the hands
of the public were hoarded. Goods, therefore, priced in paper, obviously
rose in prices as the standard depreciated. It is to be noted, however, that
causes affecting the expenses of producing goods (such as higher wages,
materials and taxes) had an influence on prices as well as causes directly
affecting the standard. So that while countries holding more or less closely
to the gold standard (such as the United States, Japan, Canada and fbe
United Kin^om) suffered from rising prices due to increasing costs, those
countries with a depreciated paper standard (such, for mcample, as France,
Italy and Germany) suffered not only from increasing costs but vastly more
from the necessity of expressing the prices of goods in a falling standard.
The consequences are shown in the following brief table of prices for the
ten years 1913-1922:
J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN
415
WHOLESALE PRICES
[From Federal Reserve Bulletin]
Year
United
States
Japan
United
Kingdom
Canada
France
Italy
Grermany
1913
100
100
100
100
100
100
1914
98
96
101
101
96
100
1915
101
97
126
110
187
188
1916
124
117
169
186
187
202
1917
174
147
177
262
299
1918
197
192
226
206
889
418
1919
212
286
242
217
867
864
HiKh
238
288
276
240
423
455
Low
197
206
217
205
325
320
1920
248
296
246
610
624
1966
High
272
321
313
263
588
662
Low
189
206
243
214
434
504
1921
168
188
182
846
678
2180
High
177
219
232
208
407
642
Low
148
190
157
168
325
509
1922
149
196
166
166
827
662
32,716
High
156
206
160
169
362
601
166,495
Low
138
183
150
162
306
524
4,217
1923
164
High 1
159
212
157
169
424
588
16,170
Low
150
184
147
163
387
563
millions
It IS thus seen that in France the depreciated bank-notes allowed prices to
rise nearly six times (to 588 in 1920) as high as in 1913, in Italy to more than
SIX times (to 662 in 1921), and in Germany to the fantastic level of more
than thirty thousand times (in 1923) and even far beyond that. Other
countries, Russia, Poland, Austria-Hungary, for example, suffered likewise
from the breakdown of a fixed standard. Such, then, being the facts as to
the rise of prices, it is not difScult to trace the baleful residts which spread
ruin all over Europe.
(2) WAGES AND INCOME SUFFEE
The next effect was to cut down the purchasing power of all wages and
incomes. The direct cause of distress is the fact that the forces affecting the
issue of paper money and its depreciation are wholly different from those
fixing the rates of wages and incomes. Hence the two will not move alike.
Wages may be paid by the week or month ; but prices in paper fluctuate by
the day or hour. A German shopkeeper closed his doors at noon in order
to keep goods which he could sell at three times the price the next day.
Meanwhile wages and incomes were not raised pro tanto. In Austria, while
a loaf of bread went up to thousands of depreciated paper crowns, the
labourer’s wages not only did not rise in proportion, but he was too often
thrown out of employment. The resulting misery and starvation, which an
excessive issue of paper money brought in its train, beggars description. It
was worst east of the Rhine and the Alps. The tillers of tiie soil, who pro-
duced their own food, got on best of all the working classes, because they
416
THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION
gpt some products without being caught in the dizzy whirhvind of changing
prices. But the workers in the factories and mines caught the full force of
the storm. Hence they were the natural converts to communism. Thus the
ill effects of bad money spread even to a disintegration of morals and forms
of government.
(3) DESTBtrcnON OF THE INTELLECTUAL CLASSES
Of still greater loss to the well-being of the world was the practical
destruction in many countries of the middle and intellectual classes. They
suffered more because they fell from a higher level. The receivers of salaries,
such as telephone and telegraph operators, clerks in stores, banks and offices,
teachers in the schools, the clergy, professors in the universities, holders of
scientific posts, and Government officials were paid in the depreciating money
without any corresponding increase in salaries In countries like Russia
(where assassination for holding non-Bolshcvistic views added its force),
Poland, Austria, Hungary and Germany, the fall in value of paper so re-
duced the purchasing power of these classes that they have lost not only the
decencies of life but lapsed into abject misery and even starvation. They
have been glad to get any kind of common labour, and without the physique
have been merged with the working classes whose physique is hereditary.
In addition, where the Governments have become bankrupt, no salaries are
paid to old incumbents, or the paper has become worthless In Germany
where the workers on the Government railways have had their money wages
raised, their wages could not possibly keep up with the descent of the paper
to practical worthlessness.
(4) THE FATE OF THE MASK
While the nominal value of the German mark at the end of the war in
1918 was about 7 cents (par 23.8), very great additions were made to the
issues in 1919-1920, followed after the middle of 1922 by incredible sums,
until finally in a single week the issue ran into the quintillions. Conse-
quently the value of the mark has gone down to practically nothing One
cent in American money would buy upwards of a hundred million marks
In the summer of 1923, for $7 Congressman A P. Andrew in Germany
received 4,000,000,000 marks. In a restaurant the bill for a meal for two
amounted to 1,500,000,000, and the tip to 400,000,000 (in all about $3).
The depreciation smee then makes these figures very small. By November 30,
1923, the issue ran up to 400^ quintillions. Such being the incredible changes
in the value of the standard, one can easily grasp the difficulties of doing
business. Goods were marked with basic figures, multiplied by a coefficient
varying with the daily or hourly fluctuation in the value of the mark. A
producer, therefore, would find manufacturing very difficult if he imported
materials and hired labour at one time, and at another sold his goods
in paper marks. The coefficient might be marked up to cover risks of change
in the money, and in the beginning industry might have become feverishly
active, but in the end it became a mere gamble. The holders of marks lost,
general purchasing power became attenuated, industry was checked, and em-
ployment fell off. The losses fell most heavily on the people of small means.
J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN
417
( 5 ) FICTITIOUS PB08PBBITY ONLY
The manner in which industrialists could save themselves and throw the
losses on others was perfectly clear. Unable, or unwilling, to produce goods
for export, the industrial magnates in the Ruhr and elsewhere kept workmen
employed in vast new construction-projects. Corporations greatly expanded
their buildings with new structures, new mills, new foundries. Everywhere
were built new docks, great ships, stores, apartment houses, office biuldings,
and blocks of dwelling houses Labour was kept employed in an amazing
building boom in making additions to fixed capital at home. To finance such
an enormous expenditure the industrialists, with the authority of the Gov-
ernment, themselves printed unlimited sums of inconvertible paper money
with which they paid the workmen. What was the outcome? The indus-
trialists now possess a vast increase in plant and equipment, for which they
paid out paper money which cost them little or nothing The paper became
worthless in the hands of workmen or shopkeepers, while the new structures
stood ready for a revival of active competition when international trade
should become possible Besides all this, the national government has ex-
pended large sums on canals, railways and public works. Likewise local
governments have erected schools and public buildings. Unemployment was
thus prevented The expenditure was met, however, in currency issued by
their employers, national or municipal, which later became worthless. The
so-called prosperity was fictitious. Thus a depreciating and uncertain
standard was used as a means of redistributing wealth, the poor and nuddle
classes being crushed, while the industrialists emerged with more capital in
the form of fixed construction.
(6) BOND-HOLDERS LOSE, STOCK-HOLDERS GAIN
The destructive effects of a fluctuating standard appeared also in wiping
out the classes who depended for an income on savings or inheritances invested
in homes, bonds or mortgages Communists may enjoy this, but they cannot
long enjoy the destruction of credit, private and public, which must inevi-
tably follow Billions of dollars were subscribed by loyal citizens to
national and municipal loans Just in proportion as they turned their wealth
over in return for bonds were they sacrificed. Being redeemable, principal
and interest, in paper, the value of all these securities has become practically
as worthless as the paper. Corporations have been able to pay off heavy
indebtedness for a song. If the question of German reparations is ever
settled, Germany can then return to international competition with practi-
cally no internal debt. The amounts of these debts have been sponged off
the slate by a process of confiscation at the cost of every holder of these
securities One can realise the despair and ruin thus caused by imagining
what would happen if the billions of Government bonds bought during the
war by patriotic people in the United States, and if in addition all State,
municipal, local, and corporation bonds, were to become worthless and the
holders thereof to be deprived of their income. No words could picture the
universal ruin. For it should be remembered that the vast deposits of the
working and thrifty classes in the savings banks could pay no interest imless
invested in bonds and mortgages, and so these would also be lost. By such
a process as has been thus briefly described, bond-holders lost, but stock-
holders gained. Actual property in fixed forms was not destroyed, but their
T. E. y.— -VOL. 1 — 27
418 THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION
ownership was transferred to others by an odious and unjust method. Ger-
man banks, moreover, have raised the rate of interest on loans even to
1,800 per cent a year, but pay only 18 per cent on deposits. It would seem
as if the phenomenal and almost incredible destruction following upon the
incertitude caused by depreciation of paper issues has been burned so deep
into the consciousness of the world that never again would it be permitted;
but so short is memory, and so limited the proper training in monetary prin-
ciples, that such errors are sure to recur in the future problems of the world.
Nevertheless, it is best to put on record in this brief statement the fateful
consequences of monetary inflation, lest we forget.”
V. The Use of Paper Money not Inevitable
It has been pointed out that the resort to dangerous issues of paper was
due to the inability to distinguish between the monetary and the fiscal func-
tions of the State in times of great need. But it is a disruption of fiscal
methods, consequent on the staggering expenses of the World War, which
forges to the front in every country. The balancing of the budget is at once
a hope and a despair. Indeed, it has been thought by some that because of
the great need inflation was inevitable. That depends Of course it may be
said that a man's mental distress may be so great that suicide is justifiable;
but that is not a convincing doctrine to most men What the man needed
was a recfimen that would restore his physique It is likewise not certain
that the fiscal need could ever be so great as to warrant fiscal suicide.
In the fir«!t place, is there no alternative to the issue of one particular
form of credit (t e , a demand obligation to be used as money) in a time of
emergency? On the one hand is the serious responsibility of the State to
see that the steadiness of the standard is maintained and the various media
of exchange are kept unhampered, to the end that, in a crisis of affairs, the
productive output of the country may continue as large as possible. Such
an output is the main support for fiscal measures Tlien why undermine
that basis by a ruinous monetary issue which would lessen production and
also destroy the credit of the Government for getting other means of pay-
ment? For paper money is not the only resource available By keeping the
metallic standard intact, expenditures are not stated in swollen figures, and
the power to borrow in normal ways is retained. Credit not being weakened
by inconvertible paper (the last resort of a bankrupt Government), the
income from taxes (which are slow in coming in) can be anticipated by short-
time borrowings at home and abroad, while the large residue must be met
by long-term bonds. These normal fiscal measures are the alternatives to
inconvertible paper. To resort to the latter is the very way to make a resort
to the former impossible. It is not a choice of comparable policies: one is
temporising in the face of ruin and insolvency, the other is a way out (of
course requiring courage and skill) on solid ground leading to eventual im-
provement of credit and solvency. Paper money is a credit device, but it
is not the only one. What is wanted is not an enormous quantity of new
money, but a means of payment provided by banking and credit based on
sound fiscal measures. By these means a medium of exchange, expanding
with the monetary work to be done, can be certainly assured, without depart-
ing from a fixed standard and so without the distinctive upheaval in prices
and contracts which paralyses production and trade. The madness of paper-
money inflation, as we have shown, is the very means by which an economic
situation can be produced which will make the balancing of the budget im-
J. LAURENCE LAUGHUN 419
possible. The first condition of a balanced budget is the return to a stable
standard.
Yet it has been urged in extenuation of paper-money inflation that once
entered upon it is impossible to stop; as one issue resulte in a rise of prices,
more paper is needed to do business on the higher scale, and so on. As well
say that once a man begins drinking, he can never stop. The essential fallacy
of this theory is that it assumes that goods can be exchanged only by forms
of money passed from hand to hand. On the European continent, where
cheques are little used, that may be more true than in Anglo-Saxon countries;
but even there bills of exchange and transfers save the use of money. How-
ever this may be, the practical answer to this point of view is that issues
of paper have, in fact, been stopped even after serious depreciation has
resulted. In France, in spite of the failure to receive reparations from Ger-
many enough to cover the restoration of devastated areas, in spite of an enor-
mous debt-charge, in spite of an unbalanced budget, not only has the Gov-
ernment set its face against an increase of note-issues, but as the State repays
advances from the Banque de France the quantity ofl bank-notes is being
slowly reduced. She is trying to keep to the law requiring an annual reduc-
tion of 2,000,000,000 francs. And she resorted to fiscal means (short-time
bons de defense) to meet her deficits until Germany would come to terms.
Thus the fall in the value of the franc has been held around 4.50 cents or a
little less. But, of course, the possibility of decreasing the note-issues de-
pends on the chance of getting reparations from Germany. Likewise, Czecho-
slovakia, after being overwhelmed by the monetary debauch of Central
Europe, has determined on a definite value of her crown (which stays around
2.90 cents). She does not pay by issuing more paper. Saved from ruinous
fluctuations in prices, her production is recovering, and by fiscal measures
she is obtaining income for the State at the same time that her credit abroad
has so much improved that she has floated loans even in so distant a country
as the United States. On the other hand, Germany, which has stupidly per-
sisted in multiplying her paper marks to fantastic sums in order to create
only false means of payment, has wiped out her middle classes, paralysed
industry, lost her metallic reserves, destroyed her credit so that she cannot
borrow at home or abroad, and has made a grotesque joke of taxation and
her budget. She mixed monetaiy with fiscal measures in a deadly brew which
has poisoned her whole economic system.
VI. Demoralisation op Foreign Exchanges
Following on the departure from the gold standard and directly influences
by the fluctuations of the depreciated paper (which drove out the metallic
money), the derived monetary problem which has caused exceptional trouble
throughout the whole world is that which is concerned with the foreign ex-
changes. In them the difficulties affecting internal and domestic transac-
tions (which we have thus far been treating) have been extended to all trade
with forei^ countries.
In foreign trade, no matter what the variety of metallic monies, or the
use of paper money, within the respective countries, gold is the only stand-
ard, the one to which all means of international payment are adjusted. The
device for saving the risk of actual transfer across land and water in inter-
national trade (comparable to cheques in domestic trade) is the bill of ex-
change. A, who exports $10,000 worth of wheat to C in England or France,
has a claim to that sum in gold in the respective coimtry. He sells his claim
420
THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION
in New York to any one, such as B, an importer of rugs, who wishes to pay
a like sum abroad. The bill is simply an order by A on C to transfer the
claim on $10,000 to some one, D, indicated by B as the one from whom he
bought the rugs. Thus one bill embodying the gold value of wheat is offset
against another embodying the gold value of rugs, and no gold is shipped.
In actual practice, bills criss-cross according to trade with many countries,
but always require settlement in terms of gold. Redemption of this inter-
national means of payment in gold is provided by a system of “ shipping
points.” As the mass of items in the export account from the United States
may vary widely from those of imports, an excess may be due to that coun-
try for vice versa). Thus the supply of bills on abroad exceeds the demand,
and their price falls; but they cannot fall beyond the “ shipping point/* that
is the point where it is cheaper to import gold than to sell bills (or
vice versa).
It is this mechanism, thus briefly described, which has been disrupted by
the departure of European countries from the gold standard. That is, the
international means of payment is no longer redeemed in gold. There are no
longer '' shipping points.** Hence, a bill drawn by us on a shipment of cotton
to Germany or Austria, is no longer affected in price alone by the relative
excess of exports and imports, but goes directly to that level (always fluctu-
ating) at which a country's internal paper money is valued in gold. For
instance, a bill on France is worth no more than the paper francs in which
it is payable. A claim for $10,000, when the franc was at par in gold (19.3
cents), would be settled by about 50,000 francs. When the franc is worth
about four and one-half cents, 50,000 francs would equal only about $2,250.
To pay the American bill in gold would therefore require nearly 220,000 paper
francs. The same situation holds, mutatis mutandis, for British, German,
Italian and other foreign exchange.
As a consequence, European buyers are penalised in buying foreign goods
in proportion to the fall in their foreign exchange, unless each buyer at home
has given him as much more paper money as would equal the depreciation.
Not only does this not follow, but the domestic value of the paper does not
keep pace with that in the foreign exchange market. Moreover, the uncer-
tain value of the paper standard causes serious speculation in exchange,
based upon events which may affect the credit of the Government (such as
payment of reparations, or a split in the Entente), but which have no rela-
tion to the movement of exports or imports of goods and securities.
The problem of the foreign exchanges comes home more practically to
all countries than any other arising from a fluctuating standard, because it
affects neutrals and those who were not close to the conflict. It is often re-
garded as one that can be solved by reaching an equilibrium between exports
and imports of goods and invisible items Of course, a restriction on unneces-
sary imports may help out the internal situation, because it increases saving
and reduces waste But even if an equilibrium were brought about, while
the standard was yet depreciated, the rates of exchange would still fluctuate
with the standard. In the interesting. case of British exchange, the return to
par ($4.86 2-3) is not merely a matter of equalising the items of her
foreign trade, but the redemption of her bills and acceptances and her cur-
rency notes in gold. Althou^ no such sinner as other European belligerents
in issuing inconvertible paper. Great Britain did put out unnecessary Gov-
ernment paper, the currency notes of August 6, 1914. Some $1,400,000,000
were still outstanding in January, 1924. This was the one great monetary
blunder of the British. Sterling cannot go to par until these notes are freely
redeemable in gold and until London is a free gold market. Until then the
British must continue to pay a heavy tax on their imports equal to the de-
preciation of sterling.
B-aro
O Wide World Photos
9tmMa post-wir currency. The mlSion mark note came to be worth litlle more the paper
waa printed on. The coina Aown here are rentenmarka, i^ch were first put Into drcolafioii
J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN
421
VII. Repudiation Inevitable
Of cour^, the war deranged production and markets, but the most of
the diflScuIties in which Europe is entangled have arisen since the Armistice.
The continuance of heavy military expenditures, the bitterness of national
antipathies, political complications, the excessive administrative and taxa-
tion burdens, have been made an excuse especially since 1918 for using mone-
tary forms to meet fiscal needs. Socialistic Governments have shown a
peculiar tendency to mismanagement of money and finance. Public debts
of Europe because of the depreciation of standards, are now drawn in figures
of such fantastic hugeness that they can in most instances never be paid off
at par. Repudiation in some part is inevitable, probably by so-called
stabilisation,’* that is, by accepting the depreciation as it stands, and thus
scaling down all debts at the expense of all creditors.
The injury to production and the disruption of trade at home by mone-
tary evils extended, as we have seen, to foreign relations. The depreciated
paper could not be used in foreign payments. Germany, it is true, bought
foreign currencies with paper marks, but only by cheating loyal supporters
abroad into taking what turned out to be worthless. In international deal-
ings, as we have seen, payments can be made only in the equivalent of gold.
But the country swamped with depreciated paper is placed at a great disad-
vantage There are only three ways of meeting international obligations: by
(1) money, (2) credit, or (3) goods In payment of imports or debts incurred
by the war, such a country cannot use her depreciated money at par, and
gold has been driven out. The effect of her monetary policy has indicated
possible repudiation, and practically destroyed her credit. The only alterna-
tive is a return to the production of exportable goods. But to produce goods,
some slight credit to buy imported materials is necessary. Hence good
intentions, a fixed determination to stop printing money for fiscal uses, are
absolutely essential to even a moderate start m production and the restora-
tion of international credit. Austria went down to the uttermost depths,
but by following this policy she is slowly recovering with the help of the
League of Nations. Germany, after passing from one stupid blunder to
another, is now drinking the cup of monetary and financial misery to the
very dregs.
VIII. England, France and Germany
Inasmuch as the central banks in Europe are the institutions that supply
the circulation and dominate the credit conditions in their respective coun-
tries, they have been directly and seriously influenced by the wild fluctua-
tions of the paper standard in which their dealings and accounts are neces-
sarily expressed. Moreover, through them, as the agents of the Govern-
ments, has the inflation of paper money taken place.
In the case of the Bank of England, however, there was no expansion of
bank-notes. Throughout the war their amount ran about or under
$400,000,000. They would have fully supplied all British monetary needs
without a departure from the gold-standard. It was the blimder in issuing
Government ‘‘currency notes” for fiscal purposes to about $1,700,000,000
that caused the depreciation of the standard at times by 34 per cent. The
bank itself bore the burden of the collapse of acceptances in 1914 and sup-
ported the joint-stock banks in that emergency. The British need for media
of exchange (the monetary functions) was provided through the bank’s items
THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEX lJNJ«JLiAiiun
422
of discounts and private deposits on which cheques were drawn. Thq Issue
Department functioned normally and remained intact.
The Banque de France worked in a commimity which did not use cheques,
but which depended largely on bank-notes as a medium of exchange. No
great addition to the normal circulation of about $1,200,000,000 woidd have
been required for monetary purposes in the exchange of goods. Unfortu-
nately, already having the heaviest public debt in Europe, the Government
got advances from the bank in the form of notes until the amount of bank
money issued for fiscal purposes rose to 39,645 million francs (at par
$7,929,000,000) November 3, 1920. This is the centre of France’s diffi-
culty with her standard, which has been (since 1914) inconvertible paper,
and has depreciated as low as 3.06 cents per franc (19.3 cents being par).
She has, however, preserved her gold reserves, about $1,100 million in
January, 1924, as a hope of future redemption when the Government has
repaid its advances. But the public finances, partly because of Germany’s
default on reparations, are not in a state to warrant measures for materially
reducing the issue of notes for a long time to come. Meanwhile the value of
the franc remains the sport of speculation. And the bills discounted for
commercial operations rose to sums far beyond the inflated note-issues be-
cause of the larger figures in which the prices of goods were counted.
The German Reichsbank provides an example of an over-praised system
done to death by stupidity and misdirected nationalism. Like the Banque
de France, it supplied the circulation for a country not using cheques in
large quantities. 'The item of notes rose pari passu with discounts. When the
Government brought to it Treasury certificates as a security for loans, bank-
notes were returned. Therefore, when the Government wanted funds for
fiscal purposes, the invasion of the monetary functions was shamelessly
extended. The vast increase of inconvertible Reichsbank notes was, conse-
quently, largely due to the demands of the Government and mainly since
tne Armistice. As if this outcome were not sufliciently fantastic, enormous
quantities of loan-bureau notes {Darlehnskassemcheine) were issued. Even
corporations and local bodies, as we have seen, printed paper marks. Noth-
ing worse could have happened to the banking and credit system. Not only
was the value of the mark reduced to practically nothing, but public and
private credit was ruined. In 1923, banks charged as much as 35 per cent
a day. Yet, even after the “ renten-mark,” based on the dubious security of
enforced mortgages, was introduced, the worthless paper marks remained
a legal tender for all debts. Moreover, farmers refused to part with food for
money of practically no value; hence the criminal monetary policy was
responsible for whatever there was of starvation in the cities. It is reported
that a widow in Saxony sold her calf for 1,000,000 marks and deposits the
sum in a savings bank. When she drew it out six months later, it sufficed to
buy only one herring.
The fall in the value of the mark jcould not be attributed to the pressure
of France and the Allies for reparations, because the reparations have not
yet been paid. The wretched financial, industrial and social conditions of
Germany are to be traced directly to issues of paper money wrongly used
for fiscal purposes but entirely under the control of her own officials.
IX. The Wat Out — Austbu
What has been stated of typical countries thus far is also generaljy true,
under their respective systems, of Belgium, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania. The case of Russia stands by
J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN 423
itself. Belgium, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Austria have stopped the print-
ing of paper money. Their monetary units remain more or less stabilised
about a figure now far below gold. In the end, the way out of the disasters
brought on by an erroneous monetary policy can be best presented by the
methods applied to Austria through the League of Nations.
The fundamental error of Austria, of course, was the issue of paper money
for fiscal purposes. The crown fell to 1-15()00 of its old value. Conse-
quently, as in other countries, old debts were paid off for a trifle, and holders
of securities lost their incomes. The State, municipalities and corporations
had a clean debit sheet, because of the redistribution of wealth. The credit
of the State was gone, and the expenditure far greater than the income.
Railways had large deficits. Roads and buildings had been neglected for
ten years. Under paper inflation there had been waste and moral delin-
quency. Grants had been lavishly made and officials multiplied. How was
this invalid Austria treated? The Committees of the League, through Dr.
Zimmermann, as a condition of granting aid, first of all stopped the issue of
notes to cover fiscal expenditure. The willingness of the Government and
the public to submit to the drastic measures of reform proposed immediately
gave hope of obtaining a loan to cover deficits until the budget could be
balanced From September, 1922, the crown ceased to fall A new Bank of
Issue independent of the Government was established Provided Austria
would reduce expenditure and levy taxes under the supervision of the League
an international loan was promised. Ministries were reduced, 100,000
oflScials were to be dismissed, State enterprises turned over to private manage-
ment, and taxes for new revenues enacted. A loan of $126,000,000 based
on customs and the tobacco monopoly and guaranteed by Great Britain,
France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Czechoslovakia
was successfully floated. Reparations and claims were waived. Austria
is carefully fulfilling her promises, taxes are increasing, deposits in savings
banks are growing rapidly, foreign currencies are again appearing, capital
is returning. The Bank of Issue is building up a respectable cash reserve,
deficits are falling, the separation of monetary from fiscal functions has been
thoroughly established, and conditions are thus provided for the crowning
work of reestablishing economic production which underlies all permanent
prosperity. The interdependence of industries and communities will aid
neighbouring countries and they in return will react favourably to Austria.
Such is the road which stiff-necked Germany must eventually tread.
X. A Contrast — The United States
In dramatic contrast to the misery of Europe stands the prosperity of the
United States. She illustrates not primarily the way by which Europe may
work out from its disasters, as in the case of Austria, but the way by which,
in spite of vast war expenditures, those disasters might have been avoided by
fortunately not confusing the monetary with the fiscal fimctions of the
State. Although in the Civil War the United States sinned by issuing incon-
vertible greenbacks (1862-1879) and suffered accordingly, in the World
War the use of paper money for fiscal purposes was never discussed and by
general acquiescence the gold standard was never departed from. The United
States deserves no great credit for consciously avoiding possible disasters,
but the fact remains that they were avoided. As always, the preservation
of a gold standard in the midst of depreciated currencies brought to Ajmerica
the gold driven out of other countries and swelled American bank reserves
424
THE MADNESS OF PAPER MONEY INFLATION
to an unprecedented level. The saving grace of the new Federal Reserve
System strengthened and unified credit. The stable standard encouraged
enormous savings, and the vast field of investments was protected from
the extreme fiuctuations common to European countries. The United States
was thus able to lend to others, and the American dollar has become a
symbol of solidity in the foreign exchanges. Prices have changed according
to changes in costs, but not because of changes in the standard. The in-
evitable readjustments of industry from war to peace were not complicated
by a social redistribution of wealth and the wiping out of all debts. Hence,
after the financial readjustment of 1921, the essential factors of production
were unshackled and ready for a prosperous future. The war taxes sufficed
to cover normal annual expenditure soon after the Armistice The budget
has been balanced. The huge floating debt has been skilfully refimded by
Secretary Mellon. Thus since 1917 the enormous expenditures of the United
States amounting to about $34,000,000,000 have been met by legitimate fis(‘ai
measures (short or long-time loans) without the chaos due to paper inflation
which was inflicted on European nations. The experience of the United
States, therefore, as opposed to that of Europe presents a practical lesson
in sound monetary policy far more impressive than any that could be gamed
from argument. For decades to come it will remain the outstanding mone-
tary lesson from the World War.
V
CHAPTER XXII
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
By Edwin R A Seligman, Ph D. LL D
McVickar Professor of Political Economy and Finance, Columbia
University Chairman of the Mayor’s Tax Commission, City of
New York, 1914-1916 Expert Adviser to the Joint Legislative
Tax Committee, 1919 Formerly President of the American Eco-
nomic Association and of the National Tax Association Author
of Essays tn Taxation, Shifting and Incidence of Taxation, The
Income Tax, Progressive Taxation, Economic Interpretation of
History; etc. Editor of Political Science Quarterly.
L The Developments to the World War
From the beginning of the century to the outbreak of the war, the progress
in the democratic movement resulted almost everywhere not only in a great
increase, but also in a notable change, of taxation. Among these changes
were the introduction or expansion of the inheritance and the income tax,
the adoption of differentiation and graduation, the imposition of land-value
or unearned-increment taxes, and the emphasis on direct taxes on wealth,
contrasted with indirect taxes on commodities or transactions.
the united kingdom
In 1900 out of a total revenue of about £130 million, the tax revenue was
almost £110 million, of which the excise contributed about 38, the customs
24, the income tax 27 and the death duties 18 millions. Adding about
£52 million of local taxation (from public rates, tolls and duties) would
bring the total tax burden in 1900 to about £162 million and in 1907 to
about £175 million
As a result of the Boer War the general tax revenues (exclusive of local
rates) in 1902 were increased to about £132 million. These figures changed
but little for the rest of the decade. Then came the contest over the Budget
of 1909 and the agitation for augmented revenue, due partly to the addition
to the naval estimates, partly to the new legislation for old-age pensions
and national insurance. The result was that by 1913-1914, the last full year
before the war, taxation yielded about £163 million. Inasmuch as the local
rates now amounted to £82i million and the other local duties to £l0i million,
the total tax burden may be put approximately at £266 million in 1913-1914.
The salient facts in the character of taxation during this period deserve
mention. Great Britain had for some time observed the policy of trying to
keep a fair balance between direct and indirect taxes. From the budget
reform of Harcourt in 1895 up to 1909, the increased revenues came almost
equally from these two classes. When Lloyd George found that he needed
about 14 millions more to carry out his programme, he decided that a little
over one-half should come from indirect taxes. He accordingly provided for
425
426 TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
an increase in customs duties, liquor and tobacco excises and in the motor-
car tax as well as for additional stamp duties and a new tax on petrol or
gasolene.
The chief interest of the new budget lay, however, in the direct taxes.
A beginning had already been made in 1907, when the principle of differen-
tiation was introduced into the income tax. That is to say, a distinction
was now made whereby “ unearned ” was taxed at a higher rate than
" earned ” income. In the same year a considerably steeper scale of gradua-
tion was applied to the estate duty.
In the Finance Act of 1900-1910, not only do we find an extension of
differentiation, but the graduated principle was now applied to the income
tax, through the device of the so-called supertax. Moreover, on the smaller
incomes, in addition to the abatements then in force a reduction was intro-
duced for each child under sixteen. Thus at both ends of the scale modifica-
tions of the income tax were provided which were designed to realise a greater
approximation to the principle of ability to pay.
Another change was tlie steeper graduation now introduced in the estate
duty, with the result that the inheritance tax, or combination of death duties,
now presented a progressive scale running up to twenty-five per cent The
most significant feature of the budget — and the true cause of the re-
sistance by the House of Lords, which led to the epoch-making constitutional
changes of the following year — was the introduction of the new land taxes
— the undeveloped land duty, the increment-value duty, the reversion duty,
and the mineral-rights duty These taxes, however, met with a most obstinate
resistance, so that the annual expenses of valuation exceeded the insignifi-
cant returns. As a consequence, all attempts to enforce the law were
discontinued in 1920.
FRANCS
The French tax system in 1900 was composed of both direct and indirect
revenues. The four major direct taxes were the so-called “ real ” taxes
(impdts riels) or taxes on things, rather than on persons — on real estate,
on busmess (patentes), on doors and windows, and the so-called contributwn
personnelle et mobiliere or combination of a rentals with a head tax To
these must be added the so-called assimilated taxes (on carriages, horses,
clubs, and including a variety of fees) with a minor yield. The indirect
revenues included registration and stamp taxes, customs duties, taxes on
drinks, salt, vinegar, candles and playing-cards, as well as taxes on securities
and successions which in other countries would be classed among the direct
taxes. Finally the monopolies included those on matches, powder and
tobacco, the last being of considerable fiscal importance. In 1900 out of a
total revenue of 3,815 million francs the tax revenues were over 3,100, of
which the so-called direct revenues supplied over 524 millions. The local
t^es (departmental and communal) were derived from the so-called addi-
tions (centimes additionneU) to the four direct state taxes and from the
local customs (octrois). These amounted in 1900 to about seven hundred
millions, bringing the total tax burden to about 3,900 millions of francs.
The situation in France during the period up to the World War suffered
but little change. The growing democratic movement, indeed, caused an
increasing interest in the endeavour to abolish the taxes on produce, or
red taxes, and to replace them by an income tax. In 1899 under the
Ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau, M. Joseph Caillatix introduced a bill for
an income tax designed to replace the door and window tax as well as the
personal-movables tax. Under the succeeding Ministries, especially those of
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN 427
Rouvier and Poincare, more extensive methods of reform were proposed.
In 1907 Caillaux again became Minister in the Clemenceau Cabinet and
within a few years forced through the Chamber of Deputies a compre-
hensive income-tax bill. From now on the agitation grew to have the project
accepted by the Senate. It was not, however, until 1914 that the income-
tax law was enacted by the Parliament. But the outbreak of the World
War caused its postponement until 1916. Under the new law the income tax
was to be composed of a series of schedule taxes (impots cedulaires) on each
constituent source of income, and a general or supplementary graded tax
upon the entire income. The income tax was to replace the four direct
taxes, the assessment of which by the State was, however, to be continued
temporarily for departmental and communal pmposes.
The other changes of importance during this period affected the inherit-
ance and the land tax. The scale of the inheritance tax was increased in
1901 and 1902 and again in 1910, the direct talx now rising to six and
one-half per cent, and the collateral tax to twenty-nine per cent. Finally,
the law of 1914 converted the tax on unimproved real estate from an appor-
tioned to a percentage tax, at the rate of four per cent on rental value; and
increased the tax on improved property to the same figure.
From 1901 to 1913 the total revenues grew from 3,576 to 5,092 million
francs While the revenue from direct taxes increased only moderately,
namely from 532 to 634 millions, the revenue from the indirect sources
increased from 1,964 to 2,890 millions, and the revenue from monopolies
from 746 to 1,035 millions. The greater part of the augmented revenues
were thus being derived, in contradistinction to the British system, from
indirect sources. It was this consideration among others which played a
role in the growing demand for an income tax.
If we attempt to estimate the total tax burden, we must include the
local revenues. The total local receipts, departmental and communal, grew
from 1,128 in 1901 to 1,684 million francs in 1913. The tax revenues, com-
posed of centimes additionnels (or supplements to the four direct state taxes)
and octrois or municipal customs duties, grew from 707 to 943 million francs.
As a result, the total tax burdens — state, departmental and communal —
increased from about four thousand million francs to slightly over five
thousand million francs.
GERMANY
In Germany, as in the United States, we have to deal with both Federal
and State Governments. In 1900 direct taxation was still reserved for the
states, the Federal Government depending on custom duties and internal
indirect taxes, chiefly on spirits, tobacco and sugar and including stamp
taxes. To make up the deficiency in the revenues, recourse was still taken
to contributions from the states (Matrikidarbeitrdge) partly covered, how-
ever, by allotments (Uebcrweisungen) or ^ants from the Federal to the
State treasuries In 1900 the State contributions of 528 millions were almost
balanced by Federal allotments of 508 millions. Out of a total Federal
revenue of 1,998 million marks, the tax revenues amounted to about 887
million marks. Inasmuch as the State tax revenues aggregated about 650
millions and the communal taxes to about 800 millions, the total tax burden
in Germany in 1900 was about 2,200 millions of marks.
The system^ of Federal grants to the states began to introduce considera-
ble confusion into the state budgets, as the states could never tell exactly
how much was coming to them. Accordingly, in 1904, the system was
428
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
abolished so far as concerns surpluses from customs and the tobacco tax,
leaving only some of the stamp taxes and the spirits tax subject to the old
arrangement. In 1906 the increasing needs of the Federal Government led
to a number of new taxes, so that the Federal tax system henceforth com-
prised customs duties, taxes on tobacco, spirituous and malt liquors, sugar,
salt, playing-cards, stamp taxes on securities, sales, lotteries, and railroad
transportation. A new feature, moreover, was the Federal collateral inheri-
tance tax, ranging from 4% to 25%. This, however, was to be levied by the
separate states, who were now to abandon their own recently adopted in-
heritance taxes, and to turn over two-thirds of the yield of the new tax to
the empire. The law also provided for a postponement (Stundung) in the
payment by the states of their contributions, whenever the excess of con-
tributions over Federal grants should amount to more than 40 pfennigs per
head.
This change, however, did not suffice, and the growing needs of the Fed-
eral Government were sought to be met by the laws of 1909. These pro-
vided for increased taxes, the settlement of the fiscal relations between the
empire and the states and the adoption of a Federal unearned-increment tax.
All the old taxes were increased and new taxes were imposed on dividends
and interest (Talonsteiter) , transfers of real estate, electric lamps, and bank
deposits. Moreover, three-quarters, instead of two-thirds, of the inheritance
tax was henceforth reserved for the empire. So far as the relations of
state and Federal finance were concerned, the imperial grants were limited
to the net yield of the tax on spirits, and the “ uncovered ” contributions
were increased from 40 to 80 pfennigs per head The unearned-increment or
land-value tax which had begun as a local impost in Frankfort in 1904,
had spread rapidly throughout Germany. The law of 1911 provided for
a Federal tax to replace the state and municipal taxes. To this extent the
empire now started on a policy of direct taxes. As a result of all these
changes, the Federal tax revenues in 1913-1914 grew to 1,960 millions
So far as concerns state and local revenues, the movement initiated in
Prussia in 1893, which tended to replace the taxes on produce by an income
tax, now spread so that by the end of the period the reform had been almost
everywhere accomplished. The state tax revenues increased to 1,140 millions
in 1913, and the communal taxes to 1,378 millions. The result is that
the total tax revenue of Germany increased during the period from a little
over two thousand millions to about four and a half thousand millions of
marks, of which a little over two thousand millions came from direct taxes
UNITED STATES
The relative increase in taxation here was less marked than in the other
•countries, the real significance of the period being found in the change in
character rather than in amount of taxation.
After the Spanish War the American Federal revenue system reverted to
its customary form of customs and internal excises. The movement, how-
ever, to defray a part, at least, of the expenditures out of direct taxes, which
had been checked by the Supreme Court decision in 1895, declaring the in-
come tax unconstitutional, now acquired increasing momentum. The agita-
tion in Congress assumed the form of a demand for a Federal inheritance
tax and so much of an income tax as might be possible under the Court
decision. The movement culminated in 1909, in the enactment of a tax on
corporate incomes, called an excise or indirect tax in order to come within
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN
429
the constitutional inhibition. The agitation for a constitutional amendment,
however, grew until the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in 1911. This
was followed by the enactment in 1913 of a Federal income tax, levied on
individuals and corporations alike. With this change a new chapter in
American fiscal history begins.
In the state and local revenue systems there was also a change going
on. While the general property tax remained the chief source of revenue,
we have to note a multiplication of the inheritance taxes, both direct and
collateral, with a considerable rise in the scale of graduation. Increasing
reliance was also now put by a number of the more progressive states upon
corporation taxes. Finally, the movement m favour ot imposing income taxes
culminated in the year 1911, when Wisconsin introduced both a personal
and corporate income tax to be levied by the State rather than the local
authorities.
The Federal tax revenues amounted in 1901 to 546 million dollars (exclusive
of the Post Office) , and in 1913 to 724 millions (plus 267 from the Post OfiBce) .
The state and local tax revenues are given by the decennial census as 895
million dollars in 1903, so that it would be safe to put them at about
850 millions m 1901. This would make a total tax revenue — Federal, state,
and local — of about 1,400 millions. From 1903 to the World War the burden
of state and local taxation increased at a faster rate than the Federal burden,
the former growing from 886 to 1,459 millions, the latter from 505 to 661
millions; with the result that the total tax revenue — Federal, state, and
local — increased to 2350 millions. This progression is not so rapid as in
some of the other countries. The explanation is to be found in the fact that
the burdens of military preparation were not growing to the same extent as
in Europe.
II The Period of the World War, 1914-1918
The war broke out in August, 1914, and ceased in November, 1918. The
war years are therefore taken as the five years, 1914-1918; and inasmuch
as the fiscal years of Great Britain and Germany end on March 31 and that
of the United States on June 30, the fiscal year 1918-1919 is counted in the
war years of those countries.
The stupendous expenditures of the war were met only in small part by
taxation. In France the occupation of some of the richest provinces by the
enemy as well as the political conditions rendered it impossible to defray
any of the war expenses from taxation. The newly imposed taxes were
scarcely suflScient to compensate for the deficit in revenues caused by the
occupation. In Germany the expectation of speedy victory and of the im-
position of tributes upon the conquered peoples prevented for some time any
increase of taxation; it was only in the closing years of the war that sub-
stantial additions were made to the Federal tax burden. In the separate
states and communities, however, there was a great increase of the tax
burden from the beginning. In England and the United States, considerably
larger sums were derived from taxation, although here also the overwhelm-
ing proportion of the war expenses was met by loans. The proportion of net
war expenditures defrayed from war taxes for the entire period of the
war was in fact only about 17% in Great Britain and 21% in the United
States. But so stupendous were the actual sums required that the burden
of taxation in both Great Britain and the United States was enormously
increased.
430
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
OBEikT BBITAIN
The British revenues, exclusive of loans, rose from £198 million in 1914
to £889 million in 1919, and the tax revenue jumped from £163 million in
1914 to £7^ million in 1919. To these figures should be added, in order
to obtain the total tax burden, the local rates and duties. These, however,
increased only slightly, namely from £92.6 to £113.1 million. The total tax
revenues of Great Britain, therefore, grew during the war period from £256
to about iXQ7 million.
In 1914 the customs were increased on tea, and both the customs and the
excise on beer. In 1915 came an increase of customs on coffee, chicory, cocoa,
sugar, molasses, glucose, saccharin, ^ed fruits, tobacco and motor spirits and
a further increase on tea; the excise duties were raised on coffee, chicory,
motor spirits and medicines; new customs duties were imposed on motor-cars,
musical instruments, clocks and cinematograph films; and new excises were
levied on sugar, molasses, glucose and saccharin. In 1916 both customs and
excises were further increased on coffee, chicory, cocoa, sugar, molasses, glu-
cose, saccharin, mechanical lighters and matches; new customs duties were
imposed on table waters and cider; new excises were levied on matches, table
waters, cider, perry and motor spirits licenses, and a tax on entertainments
was introduced. In 1917 the entertainment duty was increased, as was also
the customs and excise on tobacco. Finally in 1918 there came an increase
of the customs on spirits; of both customs and excise on immature spirits,
tobacco, beer, sugar, molasses, saccharin and matches; as well as an increase
in some of the stamp duties.
The chief reliance, however, for meeting the war expenditures was placed
on the excess-profits tax and an augmented income tax. The rate of the
war-profits tax, beginning at 50% in 1915, was increased to 60% in 1916
and to 80% in 1917. The income tax was increased in 1914 to a normal
rate of Is. 3d. plus a supertax running up to Is. 4d., or a total of 2s. 7d.
(12 11-12%). In 1915 the exemption was reduced from £160 to £130, and in
1916 the rates were increased to 3s. 6d. normal and 5s. supertax, or a total of
8s. 6d. (42i%). Finally, in 1918, the rates were increased to 4s. 6d. normal
and 68. supertax, or a total of 10s. 6d. (52^%). Moreover, the estate duty
which since 1909 had been assessed at a rate of from 1-15% (on estates over
one million pounds) was now increased to a maximum of 20%. The result
was that by the end of the war from a quarter to a third of very moderate
incomes and over a half of the larger incomes were taken by the State; and
in the last year of the war over three-quarters of the tax revenue was derived
from direct taxes on wealth. The burden had now become a crushing one.
FBANCE
In France, largely for the reasons adverted to above, the increase in
taxation was much slighter. It was not until 1916 that the general income
tax was put into operation, the war-profits tax introduced (at the rate of
50%), and the alcohol tax augmented. At the end of the year certain of
the taxes assimilees were doubled; the taxes on securities, sugar, tobacco and
bevera^s were increased; while new taxes were imposed on pharmaceutical
socialities, mineral waters, amusements and coffee, cocoa and chicory.
Finally, the income tax had its rate increased to 10% and the miniTnnm of
exemption decreased to 3,(X)0 francs. The war-profits tax was increased to
EDWIN R. A. SEUGMAN 431
80% and an exceptional war tax ” of 12 fr. plus 25% of the general in-
come tax was introduced. In 1917 the “ 8ched{ded ” income taxes were in-
troduced, with rates of from 3f%-6%, while the rate of the general income
tax (impot global) was raised to 12 J%. Abatements were granted on in-
comes from 3,000 to 150,000 frs., at which figure the full rate began; and
reductions were introduced, running up to 50% for six children or other de-
pendents. The same year witnessed an increase in the taxes on land, matches
and successions — the latter being raised to a minimum of 36% on distant
relatives. The war-profits tax was increased to 80%, and a new tax on pay-
ments was introduced. Finally, in 1918, the income tax was raised to 20%
and substantial increases were made in the taxes on tobacco, sugar, drinks,
chicory, vinegar and transportation. An increase was also made in some of
the assimilated revenues, a new tax was imposed on life insurance, and a
luxury tax was introduced, running up to 20%.
As a matter of fact, however, for the first two years of the war the yield
of both the direct and the indirect taxes was actually less than before the
war. In the subsequent years the chief increases came from the customs
duties, the income tax and the war-profits tax. But even then the total in-
crease of taxes was comparatively slight, growing from 2,921 million francs
in 1914 to 3,311 millions in 1916 and to 5,308 millions in 1918. Owing to
the war, moreover, the local revenues from taxation remained about the
same (899 millions in 1914 and 911 millions in 1918), while the proceeds
from octrois actually decreased, owing largely to the occupied districts.
The total tax burden m France at the end of the war period may there-
fore be put approximately at six and a quarter thousand (6,259) million
francs as compared with somewhat over three and three-quarter thousand
millions in 1914; and with over five thousand millions in the year preceding
the war.
GERMANY
The first two years of the war witnessed a diminution of the tax revenues.
Federal tax revenues falling from 2,417 million marks in 1914 to 1,577 millions
in 1916; and the state tax revenues increasing only from 1,113 millions to
1,310 millions, thus making a total decrease from 3,530 to 2,887 millions.
In 1916, however, came a recognition of the inevitable and the decision to
augment taxes, especially as the customs revenues had shrunk enormously
owing to the war. In 1916 the postal, telegraph and telephone charges were
increased, the tax on tobacco was augmented and a sales tax imposed. In
1918 heavy taxes were imposed on coal and railway traflSc, and the duties
on tea and coffee were raised, new taxes were imposed on wines, mineral
and artificial waters, an increase was effected in the beer tax as well as in
the stamp taxes, especially bills of exchange, the postal telegraph and tele-
phone charges were again raised, the turnover tax was increased to a half of
1%, with 10% on luxuries, and the brandy monopoly was introduced.
In the meantime direct taxes had been levied. TTie Federal Government
had enacted in 1913 a non-recurring defence contribution {Wehrheitrag)
imposed at a comparatively low rate, on both property and income. In the
same year provision was made for the Besitzsteuer, or tax on the increment
in the value of property, to be levied in 1917 and thereafter. Now in 1915
an annual war tax was levied on the Reichsbank and in 1916 an Imperial
war-profits tax was imposed, consisting of a levy on the increment of prop-
erty in cases not subject to the Besitzsteuer and rising to a rate of 50% on
the highest increments. In 1917 this tax was increased 25%. Finally, in
1918, a non-recurring extraordinary war tax was imposed on both property
432
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
and income, the property tax rising to 5%, the excess income tax to 50%.
The state and local taxes on income and property were also considerably
increased.
As a result of these measures the Federal taxes yielded almost three
times as much in 1917 as in 1914, increasing from 2,417 to 7,274 millions.
Inasmuch as the state taxes also rose in 1917 to 1,534 millions the Federal
and state tax revenues amounted in 1917 to 8,808 millions, and in 1918 to
8,139 millions. In order to ascertain the total tax burden at the close of the
war it would be necessary to add to the Federal and state taxes, the local
taxes. Unfortunately, exact figures for this are not yet available. A fair
estimate, however, based on the figures of 1913 and on the assumption that
local taxes increased in a little larger proportion than the state taxes, would
put the local tax burden in 1914 at about one and three-quarter thousand
millions and in 1919 at about three thousand millions. This; would bring
the entire tax burden — Federal, state, and local — from about five and
three-quarter thousand million marks in 1914 to about eleven and a quarter
thousand millions in 1918 — a very much greater increase than in France.
UNITED STATES
Although the United States did not enter the war until 1917, the financial
disorders in Europe so seriously affected current revenues that an addition
was imperatively needed. The emergency revenue law of 1914 accordingly
increased the taxes on beer and tobacco, and imposed a variety of stamp
taxes. In 1916 the scale of progression in the income tax was made sharper
with a 2% normal tax and a surtax rising to 13%. Furthermore, provision
was made for an estate tax, running up to 10^., a munitions manufacturers’
tax, an excise tax on corporations, and a series of special taxes. In 1917
an excess-profits tax of 8% was imposed, and the scale of the inheritance
tax increased to a maximum of 15%. After the entrance of America into
the war in 1917 new taxes were imposed on excess profits, transportation,
sales, stamps and admissions, together with a great increase in the taxes on
income, tobacco and liquors. Finally, in 1918, the existing taxes were in
many cases more than doubled, and a multiplicity of excise and miscellaneous
taxes were imposed. The income tax was increased in 1917, to a normal tax
of 4% and a surtax of 65%; in 1918, the normal tax was further raised to
12% thus making a total maximum tax of 77%, the highest yet reached by
any country in the world.
As a result, by the end of the war, although the customs revenues de-
clined from 210 million dollars in 1915 to 183 millions in 1919, the internal
revenue had multiplied more than ninefold, increasing from 416 to 3,840
millions. The total Federal tax revenues grew from 627 millions in 1915
to 4,089 millions in 1919.
In order to ascertain the total tax burden, it would be necessary to add
to the Federal statistics those for the states and the localities. Complete
figures are, unfortunately, lacking. All that we possess are the statistics of
the revenues of states and of cities over thirty thousand, in 1919. These
revenues amounted to 1,403 millions. We possess, however, the census fig-
ures of all state and local tax revenues for 19^. If we assume that local taxes
grew in the war period at a similar ratio to the growth of state taxes, the
combined state and local taxes would have increased -in 1919 to about 2,617
millions. Adding to this the Federal taxes as above would bring the total
tax burden in 1919 to about sue and three quarter (6,706) thousand millirwiH
n
© Hams <fc Ewing
B. M. Baruch.
Inter-Allied Debts
© Hama ac Ewing
Julius Klein.
World Commerce.
O. P. Austin.
Wealth of Nations.
Portrait by J C Laughhn
J. L. Laughhn.
Money Inflation.
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN
433
III. The Post-Bellum Period
Many of the war expenses did not cease with the Armistice. It took
some time for the armies to be demobilised and for conditions to return to
a fairly normal state. Moreover, the stupendous war debts called for gigantic
sums to provide for interest and amortisation. As a consequence, the ex-
penses actually increased in some of the countries; and especially with the
falling off in new loans, there was everywhere at first a necessity for aug-
mented taxes. It was not for some time that it became possible to introduce
a period of gradual reduction.
The increasing revenues immediately after the Armistice were due to
new and higher taxes. The new taxes are found primarily in France and in
Germany, with a sales tax in France and a whole host of new taxes in
Germany. The increase in the rates of existing taxes is found primarily in
the income tax, which in 1920 reached its maximum in England and the
United States and was greatly increased in both France and Germany. The
inheritance tax underwent a substantial increase in Great Britain, the United
States, and Germany in 1919. But the chief cause of the greater tax rev-
enues immediately after the war was the legislation of 1918 mentioned above,
which now showed its fiscal effects.
The result was a scale of graduation never before attained. By 1920 the
progressive rate in the income tax had reached the maximum of 77% in the
United States and of 60% in Great Britain, France and Germany. In the
inheritance tax the rate in Great Britain had risen to a maximum of 50%
(40% for the estate duty plus 10% for the legacy and succession duty);
and in the United States to a maximum of 25%, to which should be added
the state inheritance taxes, a few of which reached a maximum of 15%
in the direct line, and of 30% in the collateral line. In Germany the law of
1919 increased the maximum inheritance tax rates to 70% together with a
possibility of local additions. In France the law of 1920 increased the tax
on the estate to a maximum of 39% and on the shares to a maximum of
59%. As this would have made possible a total tax of 98%, it was pro-
vided that in no case should the tax exceed 80%. The excess-profits tax
which in Great Britain had been reduced in 1919 to 40% was increased in
1920 to 60%. In .France it had stood since 1917 at 50%-80%, and was raised
to the same figures in Germanv in 1919. Finally, the capital levy was intro-
duced into Germany in 1919 through the Imperial Emergency Sacrifice Tax
(Reichsnotopier) with rates 10-65%., and in Italy in 1920 with the rates
4i%-50% The high-water mark, however, was reached by the German
law of 1919 which imposed a property-increment tax (Kriegsabgabe vom
Vermogenszuwachse) ranging from 10 to 100%. A similar tax imposed in
Italy in 1920 (Impo^ta straordinaria svl patrimomo) went up as high as 80%
of the assessed valuations.
The peak was reached in the United States in 1920 after which a reduc-
tion was made in both the income and the excess-profits taxes, followed later
by the decrease or abolition of other taxes. In England the peak was
reached in 1921, in France not until 1922. By that time the excess-profits
taxes had been everywhere abolished, and gradual remissions were being made
in other taxes.
T. » T — VOL. 1 — 28
434
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
trNITED KINGDOM
The total revenues for each of the five years 1920-1924 were £1,340,
£1 426 £1,125, £914 and £853 (estimated) million, of which the tax revenues
WCTe respectively £999, £1,032, £857, £775 and £732 (estimated) million.
The reduction in expenditure made possible the decrease of the normal
income tax from 6s. to 5s. in 1922 and to 4s. 6d. in 1923, thus reducing the
mftvimiini rate from 60% to 52i%. But for the funding of the British debt
to the United States in 1923, it would have been possible to make a further
su b st rftPt iBl reduction. The excess-profits tax was reduced from 5d. to 2id.,
and reductions were made in some of the beverage taxes and the entertain-
ment duty.
The abolition in 1920 of the land-value taxes was, however, not due to
fiscal reasons, as the small revenue had been more than coimterbalanced by
the cost of assessment. On the other hand, the estate duty was raised in
1919 from a mavimnm of 20% to 40%, applicable to all estates over two
million poimds.
It was during this period that the great increase in local rates took
place. In Great Britain alone (excluding Ireland) these amounted in 1922
to £192,008.000. Assuming that the total local taxes amounted to about £200
million in 1922, to £225 million in 1923 and to £250 million in 1924, this
would bring the total tax burden in Great Britain in 1921 to almost £1.250
million, in 1922 to about £1,060 million and in 1923 to about £1,000 million,
and in 1924 to about £980 million.
FRANCE
The tax revenues increased from a little over 9 milliards of francs
or, in exact figures, 9,180 millions in 1919 to over fourteen milliards in
1920, to about sixteen and a half milliards in 1921 ; and while they grew to
about nineteen and a half milliards in 1922. they receded in 1923 to about six-
teen and a half milliards.
The local tax revenues amounted to 1,048 millions in 1919, to 1,606
millions in 1920, and to 1,999 millions in 1921. Assuming that they amounted
to about 2i milliards in 1922 and about 2i milliards in 1923, this would
bring the total tax revenues of France in 1922 to a little under twenty-two
milliards, and a little over nineteen milliards in 1923.
This increase during the past few years has been due to various causes.
The chief source was the war-profits tax which, although reaching its peak in
1920, continued to sdeld almost as much revenue in 1922. A close second
was the sales tax (impdt mr le chijfre d’affaires) introduced in 1920, at rates
running up to 10% according to the character of the goods sold, with a tenth
additional for local purposes. Of growing importance was the income tax,
which had been increased in 1920 so that the rate of the scheduled taxes
varied from 6 to 10% and that the rate of the general income tax graduated
from 2%-50%, with 10% additional for childless married persons, and 25%
additional for bachelors and childless divorcees, this making a total possible
rate of 72^% on incomes over 550,000 francs. Moreover, in 1920 the rates
were increased on certain registry and stamp taxes, as well as on drinks, alco-
hol, amusements, sugar, chocolate, tea, pepper, vanilla, gasolene and automo-
biles. The turnover tax was considerably increased, and the inheritance tax
was raised to a maximum of 39% on the estate and 59% in the share mak-
EDWIN R. A. 8EUGMAN
436
ing a possible tax of 98%. To obviate this, the maximum was fixed at 80%.
Finally, in 1923 still further increases were made in French postal charges.
In considering these figures it must' be remembered that it has only now
(January, 1^4) been possible for France to balance its ordinary budget.
The extraordinary budget for reconstruction which up to 1924 aggregated a
total of about one hundred thousand millions (milliards), will, it is hoped,
some day be repaid by Germany out of the reparation fimd. But in January,
1924, owing to the fall of the franc, a 20% increase of taxation was proposecL
with the suggestion that the extraordinary budget for reconstruction shoula
thereafter be met out of this increase of tax revenues. Early in 1924 the
franc fell to about 3.10 cents, but the measures taken to restore its value
brought it back to 4.72 cents by March 15.
OEBMANT
After the war the taxes were greatly increased. In 1919 the tax on
tobacco, as well as postal charges were again raised, new taxes were imposed
on playing cards, illuminants and real-estate transfers, and the turnover tax
was raised to 1^4% with 10% on luxuries. The Federal inheritance tax
was graded up to 70%, and an excess income tax for the year was graded
up to 70% for individuals and up to 80% for companies. A special tax was
imposed on the increment of property, running up to 100% on sums of 375,-
000 marks, and an Emergency Sacrifice tax (Reichsnotopfer) or capital levy
was assessed, running up to 65%. In 1920 the postal charges were again
raised, and the tax on sparkling wines increased. The income tax was raised
to a maximum of 60%, and a new tax in interest {Kapitalertragsteuer) was
introduced. In 1921 a further raise was made in postal charges and in the
stock-exchange tax In 1922 a compulsory loan, running up to 10% of the
property, was levied, the companies tax was raised to 20%, the capital levy
was graduated from 1 to 10%, and the capital increment tax was fixed at
the same rates Finally a 25% tax on house rents was imposed to aid in the
construction of new buildings. In 1923 additions were made to tiie taxes on
beer, wine, mineral waters, transportation, tobacco and matches, the stamp
taxes were raised and the coal tax was doubled (to 40%). The timover
tax was increased to 2%, with 15% on luxuries, and a new tax on admissions
was levied.
The most important change, however, consisted in the centralisation of
the tax system. After 1920 all taxes except those levied by the states on
land and business, and by the communes on land-increment and minor
sources were to be levied by Federal officials. In order, however, to provide
an adequate revenue for state and local purposes, it was decided that a share
of the Federal revenues should be distributed to the localities. In the in-
come and the corporation tax, the national Government retains only one-
third; in the inheritance tax the states receive 20%; in the land-transfer
tax 50%; in the sales tax 20% and the localities 5%. As a result of these
measm^s, the Federal tax revenues aggregated 92 thousand million (milliard)
marks in 1919, 53 in 1920, 149.6 in 1921 and (estimated) 1,071.6 milliards
in 1922 and 5,640.9 milliards in 1923-1924. Adding to the Federal figures
the state and local tax revenues for which no exact figures are yet available,
the total tax burden in 1921 was about 200 thousand millions of marks. It
must be remembered, however, that this period witnessed the collapse of
the German currency, which, beginning in 1920 and 1921, assumed cataclys-
mic proportions in 19^, until in the early part of 1924 it took four and a half
thousand million marks to buy one dollar.
436
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
immSD STATES
The nonnal income-tax rate was reduced in 1920 from 6-12% to 4-8%
and in 1922 the supertax was reduced from a maximum of 65% to 50%.
In the same year, 1920, the excess-profits tax was reduced from 30-65% to
20-40%. On the other hand, the Federal estate tax was increased to a maxi-
mum of 25%. Beginning with 1921 there came a reduction in some of the
miscellaneous taxes, especially the taxes on communication and the so-called
“ nuisance ” taxes. As a consequence, while the customs revenue grew from
324 millions in 1920 to 562 millions in 1923 and (estimated) 570 millions in
1924, the total tax revenue fell from almost six thousand millions in 1920 to
about three and a half thousand (3,630) millions in 1922; a little over
three thousand millions (3,204 millions) in 1923 and (estimated) 3,375 mil-
lions in 1924.
The decennial census of 1923 gives the total state and local tax revenue
as 4,229 millions. The result is that the total tax burden was about 7,859
millions in 1922, 7,558 millions in 1923, and about 7,850 millions in 1924.
IV. Comparison and Conclusion
In comparing the tax burden in the various countries we are confronted
by great difficulties. If we take the amounts of tax revenues the figures are
misleading, because of the changes in the value of money. From 1900 to
1913, although there was a perceptible rise of prices during that period, the
difficulty is not serious, because the rise was approximately the same in the
various countries. From 1913 to 1919, on the other hand, the index number
of wholesale prices rose from 100 to 206 in the United States, to 235 in the
United Kingdom, to 356 in France, and to somewhat less in Germany. By
1922 the figures had fallen to 141 in the United States, to 159 in the United
Kingdom, to 327 in France, and had risen to 34,200 m Germany
In the table herewith we present the comparative figures of tax revenues
reduced to dollars. As the figures are only approximate, at the best, the
£ is taken as $4 87, the franc at 19.34 cents and the mark at 23 84 cents.
1900-1901
1913-1914
1918-1919
1921-1922
In Millions
In Millions
In Millions
In Millions
United States
United Kingdom
France
Germany
92,250 - $2,250
£256 « 1,237
fr 5,080 = 980
mk 4,500 1,07]
$6,704 * $6,704
£897 -= 4,368
fr 6,219 = 1,199
mk 11.250 « 2,677
$7,859 »
£1,060 *
fr 18,547 »
mk 200.000 «
$7,859
5,162
3.580
47 600
We do not attempt to reduce the above figures to the 1913 level because
this would still mean little. More promising would seem to be the calculation
of taxes per head of population, given in the following table, still maintaining
the above assumption of £1 = JK.87, 1 franc = 19.34 cents, 1 mark = 23.84
cents.^
1900-1901
1913-1914
1918-1919
1921-1922
Population
m
Millions
Tax per
Capita
Population
in
MHlioiu
Tax per
Capita
Population
in
Millions
Tax per
Capita
Population
in
Millions
Tax per
Capita
United States ..
United Kingdom
77
$18 18
95
$22 94
106
$63 94
109
$72 29
42
40
26 89
46
94 96
48
107 54
Pnmoe
39
39
25 12
39
30.74
39
80 97
57
1 9 19 1
67
15 98
60
44 61
62
767 74
1 But 1 mark « .000.000,000,022 on Maoh 14, 1924 — Eorroa
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN
437
According to this table the tax per capita had by 1919 increased over
five times in the United Kingdom and Germany; about four times in the
United States and only about one-half in France; but by 1922 the tax per
capita had risen about thirteen per cent in the United States and in me
United Kingdom, had more than doubled! in France and had enormously
grown in Germany.
A little reflection, however, will show that such per capita figures are
also of no significance in the endeavour to ascertain comparative tax bur-
dens. For the imi^rtant thing is not how many units are paid, but what
proportion of individual or social income is taken in taxes. A small tax per
capita in a poor country or in a modest stratum of society may be a much
heavier burden than a somewhat lar^r tax per capita in a richer country or
in a wealthier class of the community. It is important, therefore, in the
next place, to ascertain the revenue per capita.
Such an endeavour, however, is fraught with great diflSculty. It requires
an exact estimate of the total national wealth and the total social income.
Such estimates arc at best attended with error. If we use the most accurate
figures like those of the census and of the Bureau of Economic Research in
the United States, of Sir Josiah Stamp and Sir Chiozza Money in the United
Kingdom, of de Foville and Colson in France, and of Helfferich in Germany,
wo have the following table.
1900-1901
1913-1914
1918-1919
Social income m
thousand millions
Income
per
Capita
Social income in
thousand millions
Income
per
Capita
Social income in
thousand millions
Income
per
Capita
United States
$18 » $18
$234
$33 5 = $33 5
$.143
$66.8 >> $66 8
$637
United KmKdom
£1 75 = 8 52
203
£2 25 = 10 96
238
403
France
fr 26 = 5 02
129
fr3b » 6 94
178
f r 50 « 9 65
247
Germany
mk.28 = 0 66
115
mk 43 * 10 23
152
mk 65 =» 15 47
256
We do not attempt to give figures for 1922 as there are as yet no trust-
worthy estimates available.
From the above it appears that the comparison of income per capita
presents a different picture from that of taxation per capita, Germany and
France creeping up on the United Kingdom until 1913, but losing thereafter.
Possessing the per capita figures of both income and taxation, it is obvious
that we can reach a closer approximation to a statement of tax burdens in
the various countries by comparing the per capita taxation with the per
capita income If we compute from the above figures such a ratio of per
capita taxation to income, the results expressed in percentage would be as
follows:
1900
1913
1919
United Statoa
. . 777
668
10.03
United Kingdom
. .. . 9.99
1129
23.56
France
1496
14.11
12.44
Germany
7.99
lOAl
17.42
In other words, our conclusion is that at the beginning of the century
the average tax burden, measured in the ratio of taxes paid to income re-
ceived, was greatest in France and least in the United States; that at the
outbreak of the war the disparity between France and Great Britain was
less, the burden having relatively diminished in France but increased in the
United Kingdom, while the burden had become heavier in Germany, and still
lighter in the United States ; and that in 1919 several months after the close
438
TAXATION BEYOND ALL PRECEDENT
of the war the tax burden was greatest in the United Kingdom where it had
a little more than doubled, considerably less in Germany where it had in-
creased about two-thirds, much lighter in France where it was actually
less than at any time since the beginning of the century, and lowest in the
United States, despite an increase of about one-half in ihe burden.
Even these figures do not present an accurate picture of the true situation.
For in estimating tax burdens in a community attention must be paid to
the difference between direct and indirect taxes. Where the major share of
the tax revenues is derived from indirect taxes, most of which reflect them-
selves in an increased price level, the burden on the lower incomes is relatively
great because the rise in wages proverbially lags behind that of price, while
the tax burden upon those in receipt of larger incomes and who are there-
fore better able to pay is relatively slight. In countries, on the contrary,
where the great mass of revenues is derived from direct taxes, the burden on
the lower incomes is relatively small; not only because of the graduated in-
come tax but also because of the property taxes, capital levies, and inheritance
taxes from which are exempted the recipients of smaller incomes that are
able to amass’ little if any capital. On the other hand, the burden on the
richer classes and the wealthier business men is relatively great. The social
effects of excessive taxation, in retarding business enterprise and the ac-
cumulation of capital, are therefore especially marked in countries with
a preponderance of direct taxation. From this point of view the above
figures must be modified in the sense of declaring the tax burden to be
relatively heavier in countries like the United States and Great Britain and
relatively lighter in countries like France, where indirect taxes play a far
^ater role. It is accordingly questionable whether France should really en-
joy the dubious distinction of having suffered the heaviest tax burden in 1900
and 1913, and there seems to be no doubt that in 1919 the real tax burden was
lowest in France, far and away lower than in the United Kingdom and Ger-
many, and really lower than in the United States.
No attempt is made to bring the figures down to date, especially so far
as Germany is concerned. A progressive depreciation of the money unit on
the stupendous scale in which it has occurred in Germany is equivalent to
the heaviest kind of taxation. It is also the worst form of taxation because
while excessive taxation is ordinarily a drain upon individual or social
revenues, the gigantic inflation of prices which has occurred in Germany since
1922 has meant a wiping out not only of incomes but of capital wealth.
While it may be true that certain business men have made paper fortunes
through speculation, it is beyond all peradventure of doubt that the German
people have become impoverished and that they have suffered through this
catastrophic inflation a burden of taxation out of all comparison with that
m any other country. So far as other countries are concerned, some interest
is attached to the table below, in which the conditions of 1923 and 1924 are
compared. The figures if available would probably show the next heaviest
tax burden (after Germany) in Great Britain with a considerably lower
1922-
- 1923
1923 — 1924
Tax Revenues in
Millions
Tax per
Capita
Tax Revenues
m Millinna
Population
in Amiions
Tax per
Capita
United States
$7,554 » $7,554
£054 - $4,636
111
$ 68 05
$7,849-$7,849
£080-$4.773
112
United Kingdom..
48
96 58
49
$89 43
Ftanee... .
fr 21,747 - $4,197
39
107 61
fr 19,040-$3.675
39
$94 23
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN
burden in France and a still lower burden in the United States. For not
only was the per capita taxation in 1921 lower in France than in Great Brit-
ain, but the per capita income has during the last few years undoubtedly
been increasing faster in France than in Great Britain, while almost two-
thirds of the French tax revenue is still derived from indirect taxes. And
while the per capita taxation in France m 1922 slightly exceeded that in
Great Britain, by 1923 it was again lower so that the tax burden in relation
to income in 1922 was probably less m France than in Great Britain, and in
1923 assuredly less.
An accurate comparison of the tax burdens for the future, when the cur-
rency situation will have again returned to normal, will depend not only
upon the preceding considerations but also upon the effectiveness with which
the tax laws are actually enforced and upon the degree to which the various
strata of society are subject to actual taxation. It would be necessary, for
instance, to compare not only the effectiveness of the income tax in reaching
the wealthier classes in the different countries, but also the actual proportion
of individual incomes paid by the poor, the moderately rich and the wealthy.
There are, unfortunately, no statistics available for such investigations.
Until they become available, a comparative study of tax burdens, past and
present, will have to content itself with the inadequate figures given above.
CHAPTER XXIII
SOCIAL AND KEVOLUTIONARY UNREST
By Thb Rt. Hon. Philip Snowdbn, MP.
Chancellor of the Exchequer Chairman of the Independent
Labour Party, 1903-1906 and 1917-1919 Author of The Socudiet
Budget; Socudism and Syndicalism , The Living Wage, Labour
and the New World; etc.
The student of Historical, Social and Revolutionary movements must be
impressed by two important facts: first, the apparent spontaneity with which
these outbursts arise simultaneously in different countries; and second, that
while there can be detected in them a common cause and a common purpose,
the form of the agitation is determined largely by national and racial tem-
perament and tradition.
Since the Industrial Revolution there has been no period when social and
economic discontent did not exist, though for a time it has subsided, only to
burst into activity again, on each revival assuming a more definite and
intelligent form. In the conscious aims of the Social and Revolutionary
movements of the present century, the historical student can recognise the
Jess-developed theories and policy of former agitations, such as the Syndi-
calist aim of Robert Owen’s Grand Confederation of Labour and the bitter
quarrel on methods between Marx and Bakunin.
The spontaneous and contemporary character of these outbreaks of prole-
tarian unrest may be eiqilained by the world-operation of economic and
moral influences, but also, in later years, by the closer association of the
workers in international organisations for a definite and common purpose.
But owing to the fact that both the evolution of capitalist industry and of
political institutions, as well as national and racial characteristics vary, the
social unrest assumes a diversity of form in different countries, though in each
there are features common to all.
PERMANENT CHABACTEB OP PRESENT SOCIAL UNREST
There are certain facts which lead to the conclusion that there are ele-
ments of permanence about the social imrest which has existed without inter-
mission, but in varying degrees of intensity, during the present century
which former revolutionary periods did not possess. These facts may be
summarised under seven heads: (1) the firm establishment of large and
powerful industrial organisations ; (2) the international association oi
Labour and Socialist organisations; (3) the greater intensity of the
struggle between capital and labour, and the organisation of employers
federations and the growth of powerful trusts; (4) the necessity of ai
aggressive policy by the Labour Unions and the political Labour partiei
to justify their existence and to keep the support of their members; (5]
440
© Underwood & Underwood
Post-war uiiemido3nnent in England* A typical procession of unemployed in London marcfiSng
along the Thames Embankment in the direction of Trafalgar Square, the chief meeting-ground for
British agitators.
PHILIP SNOWDEN
441
the extension of the political franchise, and the use of it by the workers
for industrial and economic aims; (6) tiie cheap and widely circulated Press,
which acts not merely as a medium for giving news, but as a bond of unity;
(7) the better education of the workers through the extension of popular
education.
Former outbursts of social unrest were sporadic and ineffective because
they had not a permanent form of organisation. In most countries now
the Labour Unions have the more important sections of the workers perma-
nently organised, and in Great Britain, and in many of the Continental
countries. Labour is powerfully organised in political parties. Assuming,
as we must, that these industrial and political organisations of Labour are
permanent, the problem resolves itself into the question of what aims these
great organisations will pursue, and what methods they will adopt. It is
a vety important historical fact, and one to be very carefully noted in con-
sidering the form which social unrest may be likely to take in any country,
that resort to force or revolution always comes from an agitation which
has no large organisation. It is the accepted theoiy of the revolutionary
that a revolution never needs more than a small minority to carry it into
effect. That is why revolutions never permanently succeed. On the other
hand, a large organisation is inherently conservative. It has been taught by
long experience the difficulties of building up a powerful organisation. It
has won concessions by great efforts and sacrifices, and these it is unwilling
to jeopardise by rash and inconsiderate acts. It has developed forms of
democratic government which minimise the authority of leaders, and allow
differences of opinion to moderate policy. On the contrary, a weak organ-
isation must adopt more dramatic and spectacular tactics, and seek to give
the impression of a strength it does not possess by shouting loudly and
acting rashly.
We find these two methods illustrated very clearly in the social and
industrial movements of the last 23 years. The first year of the new cen-
tury saw the birth of the British Labour party, which has made such remark-
able progress, which now exercises a profound influence on the international
working-class movement, and which is looked upon both on the continent of
Europe and in America as the model to be copied and the example to be
followed. The British Labour party is essentially British in its character,
and is a natural development of British constitutional methods. On the
continent of Europe the political Socialist parties came into being before the
industrial organisation of the workers, but it was found later to be necessary
to give the Socialist parties the foundation of an industrial oirganisation.
In Great Britain, on the contrary, the great Trade Unions were the first
form of working-class organisation, and these evolved the political Labour
party.
BBinSH TRADE UNIONS ADOPT POLITICAL ACTION
The strike is the Trade-Union weapon of attack and defence, and up to
the end of the last century it was the only weapon used by the Trade Unions
to maintain their gains and to improve their lot. But without abandoning
the strike weapon, while keeping it in reserve, the British Trade Unions,
towards the end of the last century, began to realise its inadequacy, and
indeed its futility as a single-handed weapon of attack or defence. So it
was decided to supplement Trade-Union activities by organised political
action. It was recognised at the same time that a political party must have
a broader basis and must make a wider appeal than Trade Unionism only,
442 SOaAL AND REVOLUTIONARY UNREST
80 while making industrially organised labour the basis of the new political
party, its constitution provided for the cooperation of political socialists and
^1 others who accepted its programme.
The British Labour party has given a definite, and what seems likely to
be a permanent trend to the movement for social and industrial reform in
Great Bntain. It has provided a constitutional channel for expressing social
and economic discontent, and for seeking redress and amelioration. It has
done more. By its success it has discredited revolutionary methods, and
practically destroyed all agitation of a violent or revolutionary character.
Even when the enthusiasm evoked by the Russian Revolution was most
pronounced, there was little disposition among the British workers to copy
Russian methods, and the advocates of revolutionary methods, and of the
Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Great Britain, have never been more than
a comparative handful, and are at this time an altogether negli^ble number.
It is true that for a time the Labour movement in Great Britain did feel
the shakings of the Russian Revolution to a slight degree, but there were
national causes much more responsible for the short period during 1919-
1920 when talk of “ direct action ” was common. The General Election of
1918 had filled the House of Commons with hard-faced men who had done
well out of the war.'' During war-time the Government had given the most
extravagant promises of social reconstruction, and expectations of a “land
fit for heroes" had been raised to a high pitch. Disillusionment came
quickly. The Government repudiated all their pledges. Wages began to fall
rapidly. The figures of unemployment rose. Dissatisfaction with Parlia-
ment developed. A section of the workers talked about “ direct action " to
force the Government to yield concessions. But that mood soon passed.
The great stnkes and lock-outs which followed in the mining and engineering
trades were nothing more than ordinary industrial disputes on wages.
LABOUB MOVEMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
In the first years of the new century two new Labour movements came
into prominence under the names of “ Syndicalism " and “ Industrial Union-
ism." These arose in France, Italy and the United States, and though these
two movements have something in common there are points of difference
between them. It is hardly necessary to deal at any length with Syndical-
ism, for the movement has apparently completely collapsed, and any interest
attaching to its brief spell of activity is now merely historical. But dis-
credited agitations have a habit of reviving, and as the Syndicalism which
flourished in recent years was the recurrence of a form of working-class
agitation which has broken out at intervals ever since the early part of the
last century, each recurrence spending itself in a brief period of activity, it
may be well to give a very brief outline of its character.
The Syndicalist movement was anarchist in its philosophy, but it differed
from Anarchism in its insistence upon industrial organisation. Syndicalism
was strongly opposed to State control, and was anti-political and non-parlia-
mentary. It looked to the industrial organisation of the workers only. Its
methods of achieving its revolutionary aim of securing the control of the
instruments of production was “direct action" or the General Strike, by
which it expected the capitulation of the capitalists. Syndicalism differed
from ordinary trade unionism in giving emphasis to the strike, not as a scries
and succession of guerilla conflicts with the capitalists to wring better con-
ditions from the employers, but as a supreme revolutionary act to overthrow
the capitalist system
PHILIP SNOWDEN
443
The Syndicalist movement grew rapidly in France and Italy from 1904
to 1912. It was the creed of the largest French trade-imion organisation —
the Conjederation Generate du Travail. In 1912 it claimed! a membership
of 400,000. In its brief career it was responsible for two or three disastrous
strikes — the railway strike of 1910, the Post-Office strike of 1909, and later
a railway strike which practically destroyed the Confederation. What re-
mains of it is now pursuing ordinary Trade-Union methods, and is affiliated
with the Amsterdam Trade Union International which repudiates revolution-
ary methods.
“ Industrial Unionism ” came into being in the United States where, in
1905, a number of very small revolutionary labour societies merged to form
“ the Industrial Workers of the World.^’ This American movement borrowed
most of its theones from French Syndicalism, but it differed from that by
not repudiating political action; and its quarrel with the Socialists and the
American Federation of Labour was that these bodies were not sufficiently
“ class conscious.” This organisation is credited with the responsibility for
a number of serious strikes with which violence and sabotage have been
associated. As its name indicates, it aims at the organisation of the work-
ers by industries instead of by crafts, and then the federation of these unions
into One Big Union This idea seized some of the younger and more im-
patient spirits of the Labour movement in Canada about 1920. A long strike
occurred at Winnipeg, which ended disastrously, and with its defeat the
movement collapsed. The I W. W. still remains numerically a very small
body, and it has not succeeded in gaining any recognised position in the
American Socialist or Labour movement.
The Syndicalist movement and Industrial Unionism, though they have
failed to establish any strong and permanent organisation, have by their
propaganda left some influence on the Labour and Socialist bodies in two
directions, though it is probable that other influences would have effected the
change had there been no propaganda of Syndicalism or Industrial Union-
ism. The Syndicalist attack upon the State as an instrument of tyranny,
which has been emphasised in Great Britain in recent years with great intel-
lectual vigour by the Guild Socialists, has led to a considerable modification
of the State Socialist ideas of the British Labour movement. While repudiat-
ing the Syndicalist plan of the ownership and control of industries by the
workers employed therein, it is now recognised that while the interests of the
whole body of consumers must be safeguarded there must be conceded to the
workers in each industry a considerable measure of internal control.
The central idea of Industrial Unionism, namely, organisation by industry
instead of by craft, has made still greater progress in trade unionism in Great
Britain. This has come to pass by the growing recognition of the unity of
interest among all the workers in an industry, and also by the obvious weak-
ness in a fighting organisation of innumerable autonomous regiments without
imity of command. This movement towards the consolidation of the unions
has not yet made much practical progress in Great Britain, but it is the
most prominent topic of internal discussion, and at the Trades Union Con-
gress in 1923 it took the form of a proposal to endow the National General
Council of the Trades Unions with powers to take command of the whole
Trade-Union forces for the defence of any trade or industry menaced by
aggression from the employers. But the sense of solidarity is not yet so
far developed as to induce the great unions to surrender their autonomy to
the control of the whole Trade-Union movement. However, the tendency is
in that direction, and the relative weakness of individual unions compared
with the highly-organised and consolidated forces of the employers will force
the pace of this movement towards an Industrial Unionism which has not
444 SOCIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY UNREST
the revolutionary aims of Syndicalism or the I. W. W., but which seeks the
consolidation of Labour forces for the constitutional purposes of Trade
Unionism.
CONSOLIDATION OP OPPOSING FORCES
The movement towards the consolidation of Labour forces, both indus-
trially and politically, naturally leads to a corresponding consolidation of the
opposing forces. In countries where the working-classes are strongly organised
in political parties the old division of parties on strictly political lines is
disappearing, and parties are being re-formed on an economic basis. In
Great Britain this process has reached an advanced stage. The old historic
Liberal party has almost disappeared, and its former adherents have gone
over to the Conservative or Labour party just as their economic interests
have dictated. The unsettled political conditions in the Continental countries
due to the World War have, for the time being, diverted the course of this
evolutionary development, but there were abundant evidences from 1900 to
1914 in the political movements in Germany, France, Italy, Holland and the
Scandinavian countries that events were developing in the same direction
When normal political and economic conditions are restored in these coun-
tries, when the special problems left by the war are settled, it is likely that
the course of political evolution will resume the old channel, and economic
struggle between the classes will be fought out on the political field much
on the lines on which it is being waged in Great Britain.
But the possibility of revolutionary methods must not be ignored, espe-
cially in the Latin countries where the spectacular makes a special appeal.
The Fascist movement in Italy is deserving of consideration in this connection,
as it is not improbable that similar revolutionai^ developments may take
place elsewhere if Labour departs from constitutional methods, or when the
anti-Labour and anti-Social interests see the possibility of being dispos-
sessed by the political domination of Labour
During the first 14 years of this century. Socialism and Trade Unionism
made remarkable progress in Italy. By 1914 things had gone so far that
the Trade Unionists and Socialists had attained a commanding position on
many of the local councils and great influence in Parliament. The proletariat
appeared to be on the eve of securing political domination. The war split
the Italian Socialist movement. Then came the Bolshevik Revolution, and
the latent forces of Syndicalism and revolutionary Socialism were roused to
emulate the achievement. There was a short and abortive attempt to seize
the control of workshops and to establish Soviets. The old evolutionary
Socialists lost control, and the forces of anti-Labour and anti-Socialism took
advantage of the disorganised condition of the Socialist movement to crush
the revolt and to establish a revolutionary Dictatorship.
At the outbreak of the Communist incident the Fascist movement was
small and unimportant, but it found its opportunity in the new situation.
Its character changed. It could succeed only by siding with the middle-
classes against the proletariat. It carried its offensive not only against the
Commimists but with equal violence against the Trade Unions and the non-
revolutionary Socialists. The more it succeeded the more violent became its
methods. The State maintained an attitude of neutrality, as it had done to-
wards the Commimist attempt to seize the workshops. This weakness of the
Government added to the strength of the Fascisti. Mussolini had no inten-
tion at one time of carrying Fascist intervention beyond the point of sup-
pressing the Communists, but a machine had been created and given an
PHILIP SNOWDEN 445
impetus which could not be stopped^ and eventually the Fascists overthrew
the Government and established a Dictatorship.
The Italian incident is interesting from the point of view of the possibility
of similar developments in other countries; but it is important to remember
the circumstances out of which Fascist intervention and success arose. Fas-
cism was a coimter-revolution; and if a proletarian revolution should break
out, in such a country as Great Britain, it is highly probable that such a
counter-revolution as occurred in Italy will take place. But if the revo-
lutionary aim of the proletariat be confined to constitutional action, it is not
likely that the opposition will resort to violence. Fascism in Italy is an illus-
tration of this point. Fascism is in a large measure recruited from fine young
men of ideals who are not anti-Labour, but who have joined the Fascist
movement because they believed that the aims and the methods of the Com-
munists were anti-national and against the real welfare of Labour. This will
inevitably happen everywhere when a constitutional movement resorts to
revolutionary methods. The violence exercised by the Fascisti in suppress-
ing the Communist rising was no necessary part of their general aim and
policy, but arose out of the conflict of forces.
FAILURE OF THE RUSSIAN FANATICS
The revolution in Russia and the constitutional revolutions in Germany,
Hungary and Austria were incidents directly arising out of the war, and in
none of these cases was the revolution in the first instance a rising of the
proletariat to effect a social and economic revolution. It is true that in
Himgary and Germany there have been unsuccessful attempts on the part
of the Commimists to turn the political revolution into an economic one;
but in every case, not least in Russia, the revolution was purely political in
its inception, due to war weariness and mise^. The weakness of the first
Revolutionary Government gave the Bolsheviks their opportunity, and the
power fell into their hands without a struggle as it dropped from the feeble
hands of Kerensky. Although the Bolsheviks made no secret during the
time they were attacking the Provisional Government, and for some time
after their accession to power, of their intention to establish a Communist
State, now that the failure of the experiment is obvious they seek to deny
such intention and represent the revolution as an elemental upheaval of the
masses rendered desperate by the inability of Kerensky and the moderate
Socialists to end the war and to solve the agrarian problem.”
The tragic failure of the Communist experiment in Russia may not deter
fanatics elsewhere who see in political disturbances and economic misery an
opportunity to usurp power. But the lesson of Russia is full of importance
to the proletarian movement everywhere. It is not necessary for the pur-
pose of explaining the failme of the Russian Communists to attribute to them
either malignity or corruption. Their failure is due to the fact that they
attempted the impossible. They tried to establish a social order for whicn
neither the economic conditions nor the people of Russia were ripe. At the
outset of their adventmre the leaders were compelled to suppress all demo-
cratic institutions, to establish a minority dictatorship maintained by force
and tyranny, and at the same time to compromise their ideals and suppress
their programme in order to retain their authority and avert a counter-
revolution. The external interference with Russia during the first two years
of the Bolshevik rigime no doubt did much to preserve national unity in
Russia and to maintain the Bolsheviks in power.
446 SOCIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY UNREST
After three years, when the Communist experiment had brought Russia to
the lowest point of economic exhaustion, Lenin annoimced the new economic
policy, which involved the abandonment of Communism, and the adoption
of State Capitalism — that is, of a system where the control of production
will be in private hands, regulated as to leases, taxation and labour condi-
tions by the State. Under this arrangement the economic life of Russia is
slowly recovering, but the revival will remain slow until the Bolshevik Gov-
ernment has proved by its actions that it is to be trusted with the confidence
of foreign capitalists whose help it is anxious to enlist.
The lessons of the Communist experiment in Russia are valuable. It
teaches the futility of trying unduly to force economic development. Transi-
tion cannot jump immense gulfs. It proves, too, that progress can only be
made and permanently maintained by carrying with it the intelligent ap-
proval and cooperation of the people. But it proves two other important
things: first, that violent changes which arise from chaos and misery are
never rational. These are not the conditions on which the foimdation of a
lasting order can be laid; and second, that the moral character of the men
and women who are to work a new social order is of supreme importance.
The war had undermined both the nervous force and the moral fibre of vast
numbers of people and in consequence had rendered them less capable of
restraint and of calm judgment, and less scrupulous of methods and obliga-
tions. This fact has been strikingly illustrated in all the revolutionary inci-
dents since the war.
SOCIAL JUSTICE THE ONLY REMEDY FOR SOCIAL UNREST
The conclusion to which we are brought by a survey of the social move-
ments of this century, the events of which have provided such valuable
material for study, is that the proletarian imrest is a permanent feature of
modem life, and that it will remain, while varying from time to time in the
character and intensity of its expression, until the deep-seated and just
causes of it are removed. Cross currents sometimes disturb the general
course of the social movement, but its destination is clearly indicated by a
long view of its history, and especially of its course from the beginning of
this century to the outbreak of war, and even since then in those countries
where political and economic disturbances due to the war have not greatly
upset the normal life of the people.
There is a disposition in some quarters to regard the present social unrest
and the economic breakdown of Europe as solely due to the devastating
effects of four years of war and to the failure to make peace; but that is a
very superficial view. Before the war the economic system was being
challenged everywhere, and the forces of the proletariat were being organised
industrially and politically to change it.
The deep root of social unrest is to be found in an economic system which
fails to provide for the masses the conditions of a healthy, intellectual and
civilised life, or to give them a fair share in the advantages of progress.
The wide disparities of wealth and poverty, the uncertainty of work, and
the mechanical dmdgery of much of the work, offend all ideas of social
justice.
The social unrest is the prompting of an awakened social consciousness.
And this is by no means confined to those who are victims of poverty and
hardship. It is a very hopeful thing that the working-classes in their
struggles for a better life have the support of a growing number of those who
are themselves in positions of comfort and security.
PHILIP SNOWDEN
447
The organised working-class movements of the world hold the idea in
common that industry must be organised on a Collectivist basis. The British
Labour party, which may be regarded as the most conservative and the
most constitutional of the Labour parties of the world, holds that as its
fundamental idea, as strongly as the Marxian socialists of Europe. It was
an epoch-marking event, when on March 20, 1923, the Labour party, as
the official Opposition in the British House of Commons, directly challenged
by motion the existing economic and social order, and declared that when
the party becomes the Government of the country it will conscientiously
direct its legislation to the gradual supersession of the capitalist system and
to the establishment of a cooperative Commonwealth. And in moving this
resolution the British Labour party spoke with the support of over four
million voters behind it.
The General Election of December, 1923, gave the British Labour party
a considerable accession of Parliamentary strength. It increased its repre-
sentation from 144 to 192. As soon as Parliament met the Conservative
Government was defeated on a vote of censure moved by the Labour party
and supported by the Liberals. The Government resigned and the leader
of the Labour party was called upon to form a Government. The Labour
party, though in office, is not in power as it does not command a majority
of the House of Commons. It will have to rely upon the support its measures
can command from the Liberals. But Uie advent of the Labour party to
office in Great Britain is an event of great historical importance and of world
interest. It remains to be seen what its contribution to the solution of the
problem of social and industrial unrest will be.
It would be foolish to dogmatise as to the precise course which social
unrest will take in the future, just as it would be unreasonable to expect
its course will always be on constitutional lines. There will be in the future,
imdoubtedly, as there have been in the past, periods of spasmodic revolt.
Young, impatient men and fanatical doctrinaires will try to force the pace
of progress, but after exhausting their energies in futile efforts they will
settle down again to normal methods. There is only one effective way of
dealing with social unrest, and that is for constitutional governments to find
out if it arises from well-founded grievances and injustices. And if it does,
then to remove the causes of it.
CHAPTER XXIV
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
By O. P. Austin, A M.
Statistician, The National City Bank of New York Formerly
Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce.
Professor of Commerce and Statistics, Georj^e Washington Uni-
versity, 1903-1914. Author of ISt^s in our Territorial Expansion;
National Debts of the World; Economics of World Trade; etc.
Expert estimates of the wealth of the principal countries of the world
at dates approximating 1900, 1913 and 1921 are presented in the tabulation
given on page 456. The term “ expert estimates ” as designating the char-
acter of the figures presented is used advisedly, for in practically every
instance the authors of the respective statements included in the tabulation
make no claim that the figures which they present are the results of actual
measurements. Even in the United States where periodical statements of the
wealth of the country are officially published by the Census Bureau, the word
estimate is constantly used in describing the process by which the values
of the various classes of property are determined. Only one country, Aus-
tralia, has attempted an official wealth measurement by requiring each citi-
zen to make returns to the census office declaring the amount of his entire
wealth. In a very large proportion of the wealth statements which have
been given publicity and awarded wide recognition, the figures are at the best
conclusions arrived at by painstaking individuals as a result of long and
careful analytical studies. In fact, it is to these painstaking, thoughtful in-
dividuals, economists and statisticians of the present and preceding genera-
tions that the world is indebted for the best and practically the only attempts
at measurement of the tangible wealth of the principal countries of the globe,
except in the cases, as above noted, of the United States and Australia, and
of certain of the new post-war political units of Europe which have recently
issued official estimates of their wealth.
METHODS OP MEASURING NATIONAL WEALTH
The principal methods by which these wealth estimates have been made
are (1) studies of the Governmental revenue from taxation of incomes; (2)
official ertimates of the value of the properties upon which Governmental
taxation is levied; (3) the official census method which requires each citizen
to make returns to the Government of his entire wealth, in whatever form;
(4) the “ inventory ” method by which official or individual estimates are
made of the value of the several classes of property in the respective countries.
'nie first-named method, that of working back from the Governmental
receipts from taxation of incomes to determine the value of the capital from
which the income is obtained, is available in only a limited number of coun-
tries where incomes are thoroughly appraised for taxation purposes. This
448
© Hart»ooK © Key intone View Co.
Mr. Herbert Hoover, U. S. Secretary of Com- Mr. J. P. Morgan, head of the banking firm
merce, 1921- of J. P. Morgan and Company.
O. P. AUSTIN
449
method is liable to inaccuracies resulting from tax evasions, and in some
instances from the fact that a part of the income may come from invest-
ments in other countries or from properties in the country in question owned
by citizens of other parts of the world. This method, however, was the chief
reliance of the distinguished statistician and economist. Sir Robert Giffen,
in his various estimates of the wealth of the United Kingdom and certain of
the British colonies.
The second-named method, of estimates based upon Governmental valua-
tion of taxable capital, encounters difficulties by reason of the fact that
certain classes of wealth are not included in the properties on which taxation
is levied, and also in the fact that the reported valuations of personal prop-
erty are notoriously incomplete, while the further fact that in many countries
and states the taxable valuation of real estate is only a fraction of its real
value adds to the difficulties of obtaining accurate estimates of wealth by
this process.
The third-named system, that of requiring each individual to make returns
to the Government of his entire wealth, whether in the form of farms, city
property, manufacturing establishments, stocks and bonds, household effects,
etc., is now utilised in a single coimtry, Australia, and has been, as already
stated, attended with difficulties in obtaining the full cooperation of certain
elements of the population, especially in view of the fear that the statements
might be utilised as a basis for taxation, rendering it highly probable that in
many instances individual wealth returns are materially below the truth.
The fourth-named system, the ‘‘ inventory method, which arrives at an
estimate of the aggregate value of each form of wealth irrespective of in-
dividual ownership, is necessarily dependent upon such statistical material
as may be available m official or other form as to the value of each
class of property, including Governmental valuations of real property for
taxation purposes; railways, telegraphs and telephone systems; estimates of
the value of livestock; capital invested in stocks, bonds, and other securities
including foreign investments; machinery and its equipment; agricultural or
manufacturing industries; mining properties estimated by the annual out-
turn of the mines; precious metals; stocks of raw material; business organi-
sations valued by the invested capital or the net profits; shipping, measured
by an estimated value per register ton;' and such share of the annual out-turn
of the farms, factories and forests as seem likely to be held in warehouses
or the hands of dealers ; also such share of the yearns imports as are in ware-
houses or the hands of dealers. This “ inventory system is in fact the
basis of a very large proportion of the individual studies by statisticians and
economists the world over, and is also the chief reliance of the American
Census Office m its periodical measurements of the wealth of the United
States.
THE UNITED STATES WEALTH-CENSUS
The details of the method pursued in the United States, which is in fact
based upon the inventory ” system, are so impiortant in their relation to the
periodical wealth estimates of the country of greatest wealth, that a descrip-
tion of the processes followed may be justified. While the so-called “ inven-
tory ” method is the basis of the study, the process differs in certain respects
from that of other countries, especially in the fact that the studies in the
United States are carried on simultaneously by several hundred trained ob-
servers distributed over the coimtry at a date fixed by law, and making official
studies upon a uniform basis supplied by the Census Bureau, while in the in-
T B. T. — VOL. 1 — 29
460 the wealth OF NATIONS
ventory studies in other countries tiie details are usually analysed by single
individuals, or at least an extremely small working force, thus minimising
the opportunity to make the various statements applicable to a single year
or fraction of a year. Furthermore, it may be properly assumed that the
value of these periodical studies, as made by the United States Government
at intervals since 1850, improves both in the matter of accuracy and detail
from census to census, as a result of the experiences of the same office in tiie
preceding years. The description which follows r^arding the metiiods pur-
sued is based upon statements appearing in tiie official returns of the latest
recorded wealth-census, that of 1912. It is understood that the census of
1922 wealth, now in preparation, utilises the same general methods.
The broad general basis of the official wealth estimates of the United
States assumes that all forms of wealth may be grouped into two great classes,
(o) “ real property and improvements,” and (6) “ personal and other prop-
erty.” The class “ real property and improvements ” is defined as “ lands
and structures thereupon exclusive of lands used for railways, telegraphs,
electric light and power stations, and privately owned water works.” Two
subdivisions of this real property class give separately the ” real property and
improvements taxed,” and the “ real property and improvements exempt from
taxation,” the second subdivision consisting in chief of lands, buildings, etc.,
of the national, state and municipal governments, and also the real property
of religious, charitable and educational institutions exempt from taxation.
Ihis first great group, real property and improvements thereon,” formed in
the 1912 wealth-census about 59 per cent of the total estimated wealth of the
country; the subdivision described as “taxed” being 52.5 per cent and that
“ untaxed ” 6.5 per cent of the total wealth. The values of the real property
and improvements thereon are obtained by utilising as a basis the assessed
valuation and determining the real value by a consideration of the per cent
which the assessed valuation formed, state by state, of the true value of the
property.
The second great class, “ personal and other property,” includes railroads
and their equipment, telegraph and telephone systems, shipping and canals,
street railways, live^ck, machinery and implements on farms and in fac-
tories, minmg products, personal properties, privately owned waterworks and
electric light and power stations, and such share of the out-turn of the farms
and factories as is estimated to be in the hands of the public at the date
of the census, also a fixed share of the imports of the year in question. The
methods used in estimating the values of these respective groups are, m the
case of railroads and their equipments, the reports of the Interstate Commerce
Commission for the latest available year; in farm and factory machinery a
given percentage of the annual out-turn by factories of machinery of these
classes; for street railways, telegraph and telephone systems, etc., the latest
figures of the organisations by which they are established and maintained;
for foodstuffs and manufactui^ products in ihe hands of the people a fixed
percentage of the out-turn in tiie latest year for which figures are available;
and a given pro^rtion, usually about one-half, of the merchandise imported
during the yew in which the census occurs. The valuation of the factories,
business buildings and residences, whether urban or rural, are of course in-
cluded in the first great group “ real property and improvements.”
O. P. AUSTIN
461
COMPABATIVB STUDIES DIFFICULT
It will readily be seen from the above description of the various processes
followed in estimating the wealth of the various countries of the world that
any attempt to present the figures in form suited for comparative studies
is hed^ about with many difficulties. The estimates made in the various
countries are in most cases those of individuals who, however conscientious
and painstaking, have not conducted their respective Judies upon any agre^
or uniform basis, nor do the studies themselves appertain to conditions in
any uniform year or period of the year, each investigator reaching his individ-
ual conclusions by such processes as seem to him best suited to the class of
information rendered available by the laws and customs of the respective
communities, while dates represented by the studies are also those most
convenient to the individuals conducting them. While it might have been
expected that studies of this character made during the opening years of the
century would relate to the year 1900, it appears that only about one-third
of the thirty odd studies of this character made in the first decade of the
twentieth centi^ did in fact relate to that year. In the more recent studies,
however, the disposition of the investigators has been to apply their studies
as far as practicable to the year immediately preceding the war, and in the
post-war studies to base the estimates upon conditions in 1920.
Sir Robert Giffen says on the dangers of comparisons between nations as
to aggregate wealth, that it is hardly possible to obtain an accurate view of
the wealth of any country on any basis that can give a minutely accurate
result, and it is the more difficult to obtain such accounts for any two nations,
made up in the same way. Before any comparisons can be made at all the
methods observed in each case must be carefully followed.’^
Still another difficulty, which confronts any attempt to compare wealth
statements of the post-war period with those of the pre-war years, lies in
the changes in the value of the currency units in which the statements are
made. While the great currency inflation in certain countries of Europe and
a consequent change in the purchasing power of the monetary units has de-
veloped chiefly in post-war years, this i^ation and change in the purchasing
power of the moneta^ unit did exist, in a considerable degree, during the
war period and especially during its closing years. In fact there had been
even during the decade preceding the war a slow but plainly perceptible world
inflation through the enormous additions to the world’s stocK of gold, which
in turn materially affected the purchasing power of cmrency imits, thus
adding to the difficulty of a comparison of wealth figures at the close of the
war with those at earlier periods.
Commenting on this difficulty in comparing the wealth figures of to-dav
with those of pre-war years. Sir J. C. Stamp, in his Wealth and Taxable
Capacity (1922), remarks that although the aggregate of British individual
wealth has moved from 11,000 millions in 1914 to about 15,000 millions at
June, 1920, these are merely expressed in money values — the increase in real
or intrinsic values is certainly almost negligible.”
In the tabulation which follows, the figures of estimated wealth of the
respective coimtries in post-war years have been transformed to United States
dollars at the annual average rate of exchange for the year in which the
estimate was made. For pre-war years the transformation to United States
currency was of course based upon the official rates of exchange as proclaimed
from time to time by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
4S2
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
AUTHCnOTlES QVOTBD
Care has been exercised in preparing tiie accompanying tabulation of
wealth estimates; to select from the mass of available material of this
character Uie estimates of the most widely known and generally accepted
students of this subject, and especially those whose estimate cover the years
}2J40
tatnb
unigny
BaUmi W/m/////// 7 /777mm;/7m/ 777777m t\m
Fnnce W////^
Smden V77777/7/7/77//7/7//7/7777//7i 1snt
PuiMna
Denmark
mnnjmmnznznm'm
Spam
Soutb/tfrici
Mend
m
7///////////M
m
Damany
Japan
7////////j/m
m
Wl
iiiiy
British Empire
BidKaria
CBChO’Shwalda
Brazil
China
India
UTTTrn m^
^1116
Eatss
United
States
rn WMlIimximm
\ 1913 wmj7//m777M %mmmm
1921 w///////////7/////////m//A xmamm
UbiM (1900^^$72,998,(IOIUIOO
_ 1913 Fm!7l MftmMO.OflO
Kingdom ( JJ 2 , g2EZZZa»*«W)0(MIOO
Germany
i90oE2ZZ]Ma6nw,ooo
1913^22ZZ3I8037MMII»
1921 ES 129, Tsom^
(l900 BZat «.7»9DIKM)W
Fnnct ]M13 K^ t58m(W0.0C0
( 1921^3 149, 200,00a000
The left hand diagram diows the present per capita wealth of die chief naticms oi
the world, the United States heading the list with S2,740, and India at the bottom
with (88. The lower or right hand diagram shows the total wealth of the four great
nations, the Umted States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. The figures m
the case of Germaiqr are particularly significant as diowing the devastating effect of the
Woild War on her national wealth, which in 1913 slightly exceeded that of the United
Kingdom, only to shrink in 1921 to less than one-third of tne wealth of the latter country.
most nearly approximating the dates to which this study is intended to apper-
tain, i.e., 1900, 1913 and 1921, and in every instance the authority for the
figures quoted is indicated in the notes attached to and forming a part of
the tabulation, also the years represented by the respective estimates.
O. R AUSTIN
453
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPEBTY IN WEALTH ESTIMATES
Quite naturally, necessarily perhaps, the students and statisticians who
have estimated the wealth of the various countries find it convenient both
for themselves and for those desiring to utilise the information to classify
the various forms of wealth which they measure in groups and sub-groups,
and finally in the aggregate. While the classes into which they divide and
subdivide the property have certain characteristics common to all, the sub-
divisions differ widely, due in part to the detail in which the Governmental
records are stated and probably in some degree to the personal views of the
compilers as to the detail in which the statement shall be worked out. Sir
J. C. Stamp, for example, in his estimate of the wealth of Great Britain in
1914, in which he obtains a total of £14,319,000,000, divides the wealth of
the country into 19 groups. Peret divides his estimate of the wealth of France
into 12 ^oups; the Italian experts divide the wealth of Italy into nine groups;
Barthe in his estimates of the wealth of Spain names 10 groups; Stamp sub-
divides the wealth of Japan into 11 groups, while the United States wealth-
census of 1912 names no less than 21 groups or sub-groups. Real estate and
buildings thereon are in all cases the largest single item, forming about 32
per cent of the estimated total in Great Britain, 42 per cent in Belgium and
Germany, 46 per cent in Canada, 50 per cent in Italy, 54 per cent in pre-war
Austria, 59 per cent in the United States and Argentina, 63 per cent in Japan,
and 68 per cent in Australia. The comparatively low percentage which real
estate and buildings thereon forms of the British total, is apparently the
result in some degree of the large foreign investments of her citizens, their
heavy bond and other security holdings, and the large sums of capital repre-
sented by their shipping industry. Sir J. C. Stamp's classification includes
railways out of the United Kingdom," foreign and colonial securities,”
and income accrued abroad and not remitted.” In the German classification,
“ capital investments abroad ” form an important factor in the grand total,
while the classifications of many countries include the term ‘‘ state debt ” or
“ national and local debts,” presumably representing the domestic holdings of
the national or state stocks, bonds and securities of this character. Railways
in most cases form the second largest item in the grouping of the various
classes of wealth, though difficulty has been encoimtered in any attempt to
determine the percentage of the railway valuations supplied by foreign capital
in the countries and colonies in which railways have been developed in part
by foreign loans.
The methods of grouping the various classes of wealth are illustrated by
the two tabulations here presented, that of Sir J. C. Stamp on the 1914 wealth
of Great Britain and that of the United States Census Office on the 1912 wealth
of the Umted States.
454
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
ESTIMATED WEALTH OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1914
By Bm J. C. Stamp
Lands
Houses, etc
Other profits
Farmers’ capital
National debts, etc
Railways in the Umted Kingdom
Railways out of the United Kingdom
Coal and other mmes
Ironworks
Gasworks
Waterworks, canals and other concerns
Indian, colomal and foreign securitiea
Coupons
Other profits and interest
Business not otherwise detailed
Income accruing abroad and not remitted
Income of non-income tax paying* classes derived from capital .
Movable property, etc., not yielding income (furniture, etc ) .
Government and local property
Capital value
Million £
1,155
3,330
22
340
1,148
1,143
655
179
37
182
278
621
383
276
2,770
400
200
800
400
Total Valuation 14,319
ESTIMATED WEALTH OF THE UNITED STATES, 1912
By U S Onbus Bubeau
Real property taxed $98,362,813,569
Real property exempt 12313,519,502
Livestock 6338,388,985
Farm implements and machinery 1368.224348
Gold and silver coin and bullion 2,616,642,734
Manufacturing machinery, tools, etc 6,091,451,274
Railroads and their equipments 16,148332,502
Street railways 4,596363392
Telegraph systems 223352316
Telephone eystems 1,081,433327
Pullman and private cars / 123,362,701
Shippmg and canals 1,491,117,193
Irrigation enterpnses 360365370
Privately owned watei works 290,000,000
Electnc light and power stations (private) 2,098.613,122
Agricultural products 5340,019,651
Manufactunng products 14,693361,489
Imported merchandise 826,632,467
Mining products 815,552333
Clothing and personal ornaments 4395,008393
Furniture, carriages, etc 8,463316322
Total $187,739,071,090
O. P. AUSTIN
456
ESTIMATED WEALTH OF THE PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
Approximately 1900, 1013, 1921
Estimated Wealth
Argentina. .
Australia . . .
Austna
Belgium . . . .
Bolivia .. .
Brazil .
British Empire
Bulgaria. . . .
Canada
Chile. . .
China
Colombia .
Costa Rica
Cuba .
Czechslovakia .
Denmark .
Ecuador . .
Eftypt . . .
Finland
France
Germany .
Greece
Guatemala . .
Haiti
Honduras . . .
Himgary.
India .
Italy . . . .
Japan
Latvia
Mexico ...
Netherlands .
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Panama .
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines. . .
Poland .
Portugal. . .
Russia
Salvador . .
South Africa . .
Spain
Sweden. ..
Switzerland .
Umted Kingdom
Umted States
Uruguay . .
Venezuela .
fiUton
3,500
4,779
13,140
9.050
no data
no data
108,036
1,800
6,750
no data
no data
no data
no data
no data
1,946
no data
no data
46,789
48,660
1.300
no data
no data
no data
16,600
14,599
16,059
6,472
1900 1918
6,200 g-18
7,815 m-19
18,590 h-20
11,679 i-6
no data
no data
121,600 g-11
4.000 f-22
11,140 k-33
no data
25,000 i-29
no data
no data
1.000 k-29
My 1918 Ap^nmuMy 1991
Dollart JhiiUton DoUara
10.000 s-34
10,665 0-11
no data
10,615 q-34
1.000 s-34
7.000 8-34
180,000 8-36
2.200 8-39
22,483 O-30
4.000 8-34
50.000 8-1
2.500 8-34
600 8-34
6.500 8-34
4,750 8-27
2,585 n-1
850 8-34
5,135 0-11
1,511 0-1
49.200 q-10
29.750 cf-8
no data
650 8-34
600 8-34
150 8-34
no data
28,270 n-11
15,229 8-12
25.000 8-36
953 8-28
b-40
d-14
a-15
f-5
d-2
b-40
d-2
b-4
b-4
c-13
e-41
a-41
d-2
f-5
d-31
2,200 i-40
440 i-23
no data
58,884 5-10
80,297 1-7
2,100 h-40
no data
no data
no data
8,420 h-20
17,520 g-11
21,800 k-5
11,673 k-3
Pee Capita Wealth
Approx%maU3y
no data
no data
7,000 8-34
—
—
451
4,283 a-15
5,110 g-26
6,400 q-37
823
848
936
807 a-15
1,557 g-11
2,336 0-11
1,009
1,390
1,903
no data
no data
300 8-34
—
—
470
1.070 a-15
1,440 g-41
1,732 8-1
486
604
654
no data
no data
400 8-34
—
—
889
no data
no data
350 8-34
—
—
350
no data
no data
3,000 8-34
—
—
650
350 d-32 1,250 j-lO
2,000
31,250
no data
2,900
11,580
3,730
2,820
72,998
88,517
no data
no data
a-15
a-15
d-2
a-15
f-16
b-17
d— 2
b-1
2,700 g-41
58.390 j-9
no data
3,200 g-40
14,307 m-25
4,575 5-3
3,893 h-3
80,200 k-11
187.739 h-1
no data
no data
5.500 q— 35
17.610 i-l
no data
no data
450 8-34
4,740 0-11
15.800 0-11
5,750 O-40
4.500 q-40
94.800 0-11
300,000 q-38
2,200 8-34
1.500 8-34
510
667
300
689
742
974
1,165
2,003
2,740
1,538
621
a 1896
b 1900
1 Official
2 Giffen
3 Stamp
4 Webb
5 Gini
6 Maroi
c 1902
d 1903
12
13
14
15
16
17
7 Helfferich 18
8 Von Glasenapp 19
9 Neymarck 20
10 Thery 21
11 Crammond 22
e 1907 g 1910 5 1913
f 1908 h 1912 k 1914
Pelligrini 23 Sucre
Schmoller 24 Ansiaux
Coghlan 25 Barthe
Mulhall ' 26 Stuart
Flodstrom 27 Hotowitz
Steiger 28 Kolning
Latzina 29 Ghele
Knibbs 30 Coats
Felner 31 Japanese Year
Gottlieb Book
Friedman 32 Philippine Census
m 1915 o 1920 q 1922
n 1919 8 1921 r 1923
33 Canadian Bankers Asso-
ciation
34 Pan-American Union
35 Wood-Forbes Mission
36 Armament Conference
37 Netherlands Chamber of
Commerce
38 N. Y. Sun and Herald
39 Associated Press
40 Estimate
41 Bnqfdopedia Americana
CHAPTER XXV
HAVE REAL WAGES GONE UP1
By A L. Bowlby, Sc D , F3 A.
Professor of Statistics in the University of London at the School
of Economics and Pohtical Science. Author of Wages in the
United Kingdom m the Nineteenth Century; National Progress
in Wealth and Trade; Change and Distribution o] Income; The
Cotarse oj Prices and Wages During the War.
1. INDEX NUMBERS
Ip it is said that prices have risen, it is usually meant not that prices of
all goods have changed 'equally in some definite proportion, but simply that
of the varying movements observed most are upwards. When we come to
the measurement of the change, which is wanted for comparison between
two countries or between the increases of prices and of wages, it is necessary
to combine the movements of prices of different commodities by some
process of averaging The actual process is a matter of statistical technique,
to which great attention has been paid in recent years, and cannot be dis-
cussed here; the results are expressed in “ index-numbers^^ thus: — the index-
numbers of wholesale prices in the United Kingdom, according to the
Statists computation, were 188 and 155 in 1921 and 1922, when the number
for 1913 is taken as 100 — that is, a carefully chosen average of price
changes shows an increase of 88% from 1913 to i921 and of 55% from 1913
to 1922. The numbers depend on the class of commodities from which selec-
tion is made (whether imported goods, materials, manufactures), and to
some extent on the importance given to various groups (cereals, meat, metals,
etc.), and they are influenced slightly by the method of computation. Index-
numbers compiled by different statisticians ostensibly to measure the same
price change seldom agree exactly, and the divergence is the greater, the
greater the changes measured, and statisticians have not adopted any uniform
and universal method in all countries. Consequently the numbers must
always be considered as only approximate, subject to an error of at least
2%. This is especially necessary in comparisons between countries or be-
tween prices and wages, but if we are using only one line of numbers we
can take them as substantially accurate.
Index-numbers are used for measuring changes in wholesale and in retail
prices and also in wages. Their use in retail prices is principally to measure
the change in the cost of living, which is generally taken to mean the cost
of purchasing some definite group of commodities, the amount of bread,
meat, etc., that makes a week's housekeeping of an average family; this
may be taken in the restricted sense of the cost of food only, or extended to
include clothing, fuel, rent and other expenditure. For international compari-
sons it is safer to confine the number to food, since the expenditure on clothing,
fuel and rent depend so much on climate and custom; but for consideration
in relation to wages in a single country, measurement should be as compre-
hensive as possible.
466
© Ktystone View Co
M. Albert Thomas (on the right), formerly French Minister of Munitions, a contributor to this
book. Left: Mr. Samuel Gompers, President American Federation of Labour.
© Keystone View Co
Dr. Karl Liebknecht, German revolutionary
leader.
© Keystone View Co © Keystone Vtew Co.
M. Jean Jaurds, French sociaUst, assassinated Mr. Bertrand Russell, who contributes the
July 31, 1914. chapter on Propaganda to this book.
A. L. BOWLEY
467
An index-number of wages is similarly intended to represent an average
movement. It reflects rates of wages, for a definite number of hours' work
or a definite task, and not earnings which depend also on the amount and
regularity of employment; but the rates are generally those for the full
customary working-week, which has been shortened in most countries since
the World War, so that if the index shows an increase of 70% from 1913 to
1922, it should be added that the rates are paid for about 6 hours less per
week at the latter than at the former date. The movement of wages has
not been the same for all occupations and the index-number must give due
importance to the numbers employed in the occupations when wages have
changed rapidly or considerably. Average wages over a county are affected
not only by changes in rates but also by the gradual change in the relative
importance of different industries ; index-numbers generally implicitly assume
that there has been no change in the relative numbers, and for the purposes
of this study this assumption is proper, but if the change of the economic
position of the working-class as a whole is in question, we should have
to consider whether the better-paid occupations were becoming more com-
mon or not.
While there are fairly adequate accounts of wholesale prices in most
important countries since the beginning of this century, the information
about retail prices is very deficient till the war period. If, however, we are
not aiming at very accurate measurements, we may assume that retail prices
of food move in the same direction as, at the same time or a few months
later than, and in nearly the same proportion as, wholesale prices of food,
so long as the change is not very rapid, and to a more limited extent wo
can use general wholesale price index-numbers to measure the change of
prices in general as they affect retail purchasers. But in times of rapid
changes retail prices rise less than wholesale prices (unless a temporary short-
age makes it possible for troders to inflate prices), and fall less, partly
because the expenses of handling and shop-keeping vary slowly and partly
because prices are steadied by custom.
Information regarding wages is very limited; even since the war no ade-
quate international account of wage-changes has been possible. The inter-
pretation of wage-statistics is so much a matter of local knowledge, that
no general account can be given for any country except by a statistician in
that country, and for the present we can only use the few index-numbers
that have been compiled locally.
In the tables (pp. 461, 463, 465) are assembled those index-numbers
which appear to be general and valid for 17 countries. They can be used as
they are given for the summary account in this chapter; but for a more
exact and detailed study it would be necessary to refer to the original com-
pilation in each case, or at least to the comparative accounts in the publica-
tions of the League of Nations or of the Institut International de Statistique,
in order to appreciate the nature, accuracy and comparability of the
calculations.
2. THE PERIOD 1901 TO 1913
Before the war, when the currencies of all trading nations were based
on a gold or silver standard and (whatever the coins or paper used) were
freely convertible into precious metal, ^ wholesale prices of all goods that
could be exported or imported could vary from country to country by little
more than the cost of transport and duties, and consequently the ifidex-
^ In Italy prior to 1902 the lira was not freely convertible and was depreciated-— 4%
in 1901.
HAVE REAL WAGES GONE UP?
458
numbers of wholesale prices in the different countries show the same ten-
dencies. After a general fall of prices from about 1873 to 1895, a general
rise began which continued with approximate uniformity till 1913. Tne fall
had been due to an increasing demand for currency based on gold at a time
when there was no great development of the gold supply; the rise was due
to the development of the South African mines so that the output of gold
increased rather more rapidly than the need for it. There was a special
inflation of prices, connected with the South African War, about 1900, and
the reaction was not complete in 1901, so that in some countries a slight fall
is recorded from 1901 to 1902. In 1907 there was again a special rise in
prices, due to one of the periodically recurring inflations of trade, with a
reaction in 1908. The general movement can thus be best shown by com-
paring 19(^ and 1908 with 1913:
GBNDtAL InDEX-NUMBEBS OF WHOLESALE PRICES
1902
1908
1913
United States
85
91
100
Canada
86
91
100
United Kingdom
82
86
100
France
. . 81
87
100
Denmark
84
88
100
Germany
. . .. 80*
91
IQO
Italy
.. .. 87
94
100
Australia
97
102
100
New Zealand
93
96
100
India (Calcutta)
70
98
100
Japan
73
92
100
• In 1901.
The variations from country to country are only in part to be accounted
for by the difference in method of compilation. In Australia and New Zealand
the numbers fell in 1903 to 82 and 88 respectively.
Thus in America and in Europe prices advanced at from 1 to V/j per
cent per annum from 1902 to 1913 and in the eleven years increased by
approximately one-Sfth. There was very little change in the twelve months
before the outbreak of war.
In the United Kingdom wholesale food prices increased rather less rapidly.
Index-numbers or Wholesale Prices in the United Kingdom
{Statist)
1898
1902
1908
1913
Vegetable food
... 97
91
101
100
Animal food
... 78
88
00
100
Food generally
... 88
87
04
100
Minerals
... 63
74
80
100
Textiles
... 61
73
74
100
Matenals generally
... 67
78
81
100
Food and materials ...
... 75
82
86
100
These figures, which relate principally to commodities subject to inter-
national trade, are probably typical for most industrial countries; but when
we come to retail prices of food usually consumed we may expect more
variation owing to the inclusion of dairy produce and home-grown meat.
459
A. L. BOWLEY
iNMbC-MUMBEBS OF KeTAIL PhICBS OF FoOD
1902
1908
1913
United States
74
84
100
Canada
70*
95*
100
United Kingdom
88
94
100
France
93
100
100
Netherlands
87
94
100
Belgium
77
88
100
Norway
80
87
100
Italy
90
93
100
Australia
84
86
100
* 70 in 1900, 75 in 1905, 95 in 1910.
The general run of numbers is similar to that of wholesale prices, thou^
the countries would come in different orders if tabulated according to their
rates of increase. In the United Kingdom the numbers are practically the
same as those showing wholesale prices of food, though the basis is quite
different. The United States and Canada show the greatest increase, namely
one part in three in eleven years or 2% per cent per annum.
The rate of change in the most rapidly moving of these numbers is
only equivalent to an annual growth in expenditure from (say) £40 or
$200 to £41 or $205, and since it was masked by seasonal variations and
by upward and downward movements of the prices of separate commodities,
it could not have been recognised by the ordinary purchaser, unless he
was living in the same circumstances throughout the period and keeping a
careful account of expenditure. Nevertheless, it was sufficient to exercise a
cumulative pressure on wage-earners. Our next task is to compare the
movements of wages and prices.
Unfortunately statistics of wages in the period before the war are specially
scanty and imperfect. In hardly any country except the United Kingdom
have general averages been computed over a series of years, such as are
necessary for forming a precise judgment. All the records agree in showing
a slow advance in rates of wages during the period under review, comparable
with the increase of prices, sometimes a little more rapid, in others so nearly
equal as to be indistinguishable from it. (See Table, p. 465.) In other
words, real wages, that is wages interpreted in terms of what they will
buy, in general changed very little in the 10 or 15 years preceding the war.
There was certainly no general increase such as that recorded in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, nor was there any marked decline.
In the United Kingdom the comparison is made difficult by the fact that
in the years 1898 to 1900 wages rose more rapidly than prices,, and part
of this increase was maintained till' 1902, so that if we began our comparison
at that year we get a misleading view. The diagram shows the facts.
United Kingdom, 1888 to 1913
Average rate of wages
» ■■■— Retaii prices of food in London
460 have real wages GONE UP?
If all circumstances were taken into accoimt it would be found that the
average of all wages had risen more rapidly than prices in the 15 years
owing to the more rapid growth of the better-paid industries. The com-
parison in the diagram, however, gives a true view for the majority who
did not benefit by this tendency.
3. wholesaij: pbices, 1914 to 1923
During the World War prices rose from two causes: one, the sudden and
urgent demand for all materials and apparatus used in the conduct of war,
combined with the interruption of means of supply and the withdrawal of
men from civil work, which affected all industrial countries whether belliger-
ent or neutral, and has been a common experience in all important wars;
the other, the divorce of the currency of many countries from any close
relationship to a metallic standard. Such a divorce has often taken place
before in time of war and of revolution, notably in the United States during
the Civil War, after the French Revolution of 1789, and to a trifling extent
in England in the Napoleonic Wars.
It arises as follows: — A county has a limited supply of gold, suflEicient
for its normal trade, and supporting a mass of paper currency and silver
tokens, etc., which can be freely converted into gold. At a shock to credit
or security people hurry to exchange their paper for gold and very quickly
the gold becomes insufficient. In the first days of the World War in Eng-
land this exchange stopped, and paper money, that became in fact incon-
vertible, was issued, and similar methods were followed in other countries.
Once the test of convertibility is removed, there is no limit to the possibility
of extension of the amount of paper, except the difficulty of getting it into
circulation. A government being faced with an immediate expenditure for
war purposes, which cannot at once be met by increased taxes (which take
some time to mature), can at first borrow the necessary amounts; but
presently the loans that can be raised, even combined with the yield of
increased taxes, prove to be insufficient, and governments take the easy course
of paying for goods and services by newly printed currency notes of legal
tender. The increased supply of money raises prices, subsequent payments
are at higher rates, and more and more paper is needed and issued This
process can be checked by heavy taxation and frequent and large loans, and
was so checked in the United Kingdom; it comes to an end when a govern-
ment is a^in able to “ balance its budget,” that is, to meet the year’s ex-
penditmel including interest on debt out of the year’s taxation. When it
is not th\is checked the issue of paper continues and its value falls till, as
in Russia, Austria, Poland and Germany, it no longer circulates freely, and
a state of barter is reached, or drastic measures are taken to reconstitute
the whole currency on a sound basis.
That part of the movement of prices which did not depend on the issue
of inconvertible paper is best studied in the statistics relating to the United
States in Table I. 'There the index-number of wholesale prices increased
nearly regularly from the middle of 1915 to the middle of 1920, at which date
it showed that prices in general were about 2^ times those before the war.
After the Armistice came a short-lived boom in trade, caused in part by the
call for materials for reconstruction and replenishment of stoeks, and in part
by ill-founded optimism. A collapse followed in the early autumn of 1920
and prices fell rapidly for nearly twelve months, till in June, 1921, they were
about above the pre-war level; in the following two years there were
only slight movements, such as usually take place in normal periods. In
Index Numbers of General Wholesale Prices, 1901 to 1923, Compared with 100 in 1913 in Each Country
A. L. BOWLEY
461
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HAVE REAL WAGES GONE UP?
462
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, which never moved far
from the gold standard, prices followed a similar course. In the United King-
dom the rise began immediately after the outbreak of war; by June, 1916, it
had reached 60% (as compared with 29% in the United States), after which
the indexes in the two countries rose at nearly the same rates till the break
was reached in 1920. Prices at first fell more slowly in the United King-
dom, but by the end of 1922 the indexes in the two countries showed nearly
equal increases above the pre-war level. Actually there was very little
movement after January, 1^2, the Board of Trade index varying only be-
tween 164 and 162 till at least September, 1923 (pre-war 100).
In France and in Italy the infiation was much greater; for a few months
in 1920 the index-number in France was over 500 and in Italy over 650.^
In France the index fell till 307 was reached in February, 1922, but rose
again till it was over 400 through most of 1923. In Italy the index fell
only to 600, near which it remained in 1921, 1922, and 1923. In Germany
the wholesale price index moved similarlv to that in England during the
war; after the Armistice it increased rapidly in spite of some checks till the
d4bficle in 1923. Here, and in Russia, Austria and Poland, it is impossible
to follow the comparative movements of wholesale and retail prices and
wages in a summary accotmt. The course of prices in the Netherlands and
in Scandinavian countries, which did not altogether escape the world-move-
ment of inflated currency and high prices, can be studied in the tables.
In the autumn of 1923 the indications pointed to a general settling down
of prices at 50 or 60% above the level of 1913 and at rather less than double
that of 1902, each country coming into line as the convertibility of its
currency is restored That the general movements of prices was world-wide
can be well seen by converting the index-numbers of each country from the
local currency into dollars by the rates of foreign exchange. Index-numbers
are 100 for 1913
Umted
United
France
Italy
Sweden
3rd Quarter, 1920
Wholesale index-numbers in currency
States
Kmgdom
251
297
510
631
363
Exchange, per cent of panty
100
135i
272
410
132
Wholesale index-numbers in dollars
251
211
188
154
275
June, 1923
Wholesale index-numbers in currency
153
159
409
614
166
Exchange, per cent of parity
100
105J
310
419
101
Wholesale index-numbers in dollars
153
152
132
146
165
In 1820 in France and Italy, when the exchange was bad, internal prices did not fully
reflect the depreciation of the franc and lira.
4. BETAIL PRICES OF FOOD, 1914 TO 1923
The measurement of retail prices during the World War is specially
difficult owing to the official fixing of prices and rationing of consumption
(which tend to destroy the meaning of index-numbers), to the uncertainty
as to what prices were really paid (since legal prices were oRen evaded),
and to the change in the contents of the weekly budget by the substitution
of one food for another and the general reduction in quantity, processes which
the index-numbers do not reflect. These difficulties apply to neutral as well
as to belligerent coimtries, for the shortage of food and attempts at its
regulation were common to all Europe. For these reasons the figures in
Table II for 1914-1918 are not precise measurements of any definable entity,
^ Bachi’fl numbers; Ottolenghi’s reckoning diows over 800.
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464 have real WAGES GONE UP?
but only show the dates and indicate roughly the rates of increase. It wiU
be found on comparing the figures for wholesale prices in general with retail
prices of food that the latter rose less than the former in every country
during the war. So far as countnes were self-supporting, retail pricra, even
after correction for depreciation of currency, can differ from one country to
another, and governmental efforts to ensure the supplies of necessary foods
and to keep down prices were successful to a considerable extent. The cal-
culated increase, measured in local currency, from 1913 to (the average for)
1918, varied from 21% in Bombay to 172% in Norway, the index-numbers
for retail food prices (100 in 1913) being in ascending order: Bombay 121
South Africa 124, Australia 138, New Zealand 141, United States 165, Am-
sterdam 176, Canada 177, Denmark 182, United Kingdom 219, Switzerland
222, French provincial towns 233, Sweden 253, Rome 259, and Norway 272.
After the Armistice the regulations affecting the supply and purchase of
food were gradually relaxed and people returned in great measure to their
pre-war habits of consumption, so that the relation of index-numbers to
experience was closer. After a brief fall in the winter of 1918-1919 prices con-
tinued to rise till the middle or autumn of 1920, the index-numbers reaching
218 in the United States in June and 291 in the United Kingdom in October.
Then a considerable fall took place, during nearly the same period &s the
fall of wholesale prices, in the United States, United Kingdom, Scandinavia
and Holland, and a smaller fall in France. In Italy, on the other hand,
prices continued to rise. In countries where the currency was not disorgan-
ised, as in Germany, nor seriously depreciated, as in France, Belgium and
Italy, the net rise in the ten years 1913 to 1923 was much the same in retail
as in wholesale prices, though there are small differences due in part to the
inclusion of materials as well as food in the index-numbers of the latter.
In France, Belgiiun and Italy the internal retail purchasing power of the
currency depreciated less than its wholesale purchasing power. In no coun-
try for which statistics are available, except Germany and Poland, is there
any ^eat variation in the twelve months ending August 1923; even in
Austria prices only varied 15% above and below a mean 12,300 times their
pre-war level; and there is no indication of further change at the time of
writing.
5. WAGES, 1913 TO 1923
Since 1914 the contrast between nominal wages, that is wages eqiressed
in cuwency, and real wages^ that is wages expressed in terms of the com-
modities they can purchase, must always be kept in mind. After we have
measur^ the change in money wages, we must use a measurement of the
change in the cost of living to find how real wages have moved. We can in
fact g^erally only measure roughly the change in food prices as it affects
wage-earners; in few countries are there any valid figures which include also
rent and the prices of clothing, fuel and miscellaneous goods. There is
reason to thi^ that working-class rents have generally changed less and the
cost of clothing more than have food prices, so that these items tend to
balance each other, and food is not only by far the most important category
of expenditme, but also its index-nmnber reflects fairly well the movements
of an ideal index-number including all expenditure. In the end we can only
form a rough judgment on the question whether wages or prices have changed
most. There is just sufficient information to substantiate the following gen-
eral summary, which applies to most countries for which fairly adequate
statistics exist.
Index Nuiibebs of Average Monet Rates of Wages, 1900 to 1923, Compared wTth 100 in 1913 or 1914 in Each Go
A. L. BOWLEY
465
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466 HAVE KEAL WAGES GONE UP?
After the outbreak of war, rates of wages moved upwards more slowly
than did prices, but owing to full employment, earnings at least kept pace
with prices. After perhaps two years, wages in occupations least affected
by the war failed to keep pace with prices, but frequent increases took place,
so that the fall in real wages was slight, while actual earnings were increased
by overtime, and since all possible members of working-class families were
employed, real family earnings were rather higher in the last year of the
war than in 1914, though their expenditure was restricted by the shortage of
food-supplies. Immediately after the Armistice prices fell a little while
wages kept up; in the boom that followed wages gained on prices, and real
wages reached a maximum in the latter part of 1920 and were received in
payment of a week’s work reduced by about one-tenth. When prices began
to fall in the latter part of 1920 in those countries where the currency was
not continually inflated, wage-rates remained nearly at their maximum for
a few months; but soon unemployment became acute and rates fell rapidly
till the autumn of 1922. During the following year there were few changes,
and in September, 1923, the computed net increases above pre-war levels
of wages (still payable for the shortened week) were so nearly equal to
those of prices, that it was doubtful which was the greater. In some indus-
tries a little advantage was preserved, in others there was a deflnite loss.
Thus, at the end of nine years real wages have returned to their original
level, but the working-class has secured for the present the advantage of
increased leisure.
During the war there was a considerable levelling up of the wages paid
to unskilled workers, to women, and generally to classes and in districts
where wages had been specially low, so that the differences between grade
and grade became relatively less. This happened partly from the feeling that
for mere nourishment the needs of all were the same and the regulated in-
creases were based on food prices and tended to add the same sum to all wages,
thereby giving a greater relative increase to the lowest, and partly from a
deliberate policy which the circumstances of regulation made possible. As
wages fell after 1920 there has been some reaction from this policy, and the
forces of competition have tended to bring wages back to their former relative
position; but in Great Britain, at any rate, the differences between districts
are less than before the war and unskilled labourers have maintained a
slightly greater increase than skilled; agricultural labourers, however, have
hardly improved on their low pre-war real wages.
In Table III is given a rough general table of wage-changes in those
countries for which the statistics are at all adequate. The index-numbers
should be compared with those of retail food prices in order that a rough
judgment may be formed on the movement of real wages. The following
paragraphs summarise the results for some countries.
Vfdted Kingdom. The following index-numbers [from Prices and Wages
in the United Kingdom, 1914-19B0 (Bowley), pp. 104-5, brought up to date.
See pp. 72-75 for the modifled index-number] show the principal movements
of rates of nominal weekly wages.
A. L. BOWLEY
467
Middle of Year
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
Bricklayen
100
102
108
122
157
185
235
222
168
161
Engineering Artisans
100
no
in
134
173
197
230
230
188
146
Coal-miners
100
113
129
136
187
222
242
208
133
130*
Bncklayen’ labourers
100
103
115
134
185
224
300t
278
185
177
Agricultural
100
112
—
. —
189
226t
227t
277
192
168
General Average
Cost of Living
100
{ 105-
\ no
115-
120
135-
140
175-
180
210)
215)
260
264
197
176
Official
100
125
145
180
205
210
252
219
184
169
Modified
—
120
135
160
180
185
220
210
180
165
* Earnings have not fallen so much as these rates,
t Raised to these levels in August.
t Including food, clothing, rent, fuel and miscellaneous.
The calculations of the Ministry of Labour indicate slightly lower num-
bers for average wages in the last two years.
United States, The maximum in 1920 was about 230 when the index
for retail food was nearly 200. There is no adequate information about the
extent of the subsequent fall.
France. Such information as exists indicates that real wages in 1919
were a little above the pre-war level; in 1920 money wages rose less than
prices so that real wages fell to below the pre-war level, but in 1921 money
wages fell less than prices till real wages were 10 to 20% up. Part of this
advantage appears to have been lost in 1922 and 1928.
Italy According to Professor Mortara it is probable that real wages
in 1919 were still below the pre-war level, that they exceeded it in 1920,
were some 20% above it in 1921, and had fallen back to it in 1922.
Norway The maximum in 1920 varied from 320 to 440 in different
occupations (compared with pre-war 100), when the food index was 325.
By the end of 1922 real wages were in several occupations approximately
the same as in 1914.
Sweden, Rates of wages increased less rapidly than food prices till 1920
when they were both at a little over 300. In 1921 prices fell but wages
remained up. In 1922 real wages fell generally so that for skilled workers
they were nearly at their pre-war level; unskilled workers and women
preserved some advantage
Denmark. Average weekly wages had risen considerably more than food
prices by the end of 1919, and kept most of this advantage at least till
the end of 1922.
The Netherlands. In the metal trades, public works and mines, the same
remarks apply as in Denmark.
Canada. In skilled occupations wages had risen less than food prices
from 1913 to 1920; by 1921 the increases were nearly equal; in 1922 food
prices fell more than wages. Till 1922 unskilled wages had a greater
advantage.
Australia. The increase of wages lagged behind that of food prices
especially in 1914 to 1916. Wages did not catch up till prices fell in 1921;
in 1922 the index-numbers were nearly equal.
South Africa. Men’s real wages were estimated to have fallen 8% be-
tween 1914 and 1920, and then to have risen till in 1921 there was a net
gain of 11%. In 1922 real wages fell, not improbably to the 1914 level.
Women’s wages rose more than men’s.
CHAPTER XXVI
GKEAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
By Sir John A. R Marriott.
M. P for York; late M P. for Oxford Honorary Fellow,
formerly Fellow and Lecturer of Worcester College, Oxford
Author of The Remaking oj Modem Europe; Endfiah Political
Inattiuiions ; England Since Waterloo; etc.
On January 22, 1901, Queen Victoria died, full of years and honour,
having reigned sixty-three years, seven months, and three days. The death
of the aged Queen meant much more than the end of a reign, thou^ that
reign was certainly the longest and perhaps the neatest in all English his-
tory; it meant the close of an historical era. The mere substitution of a
King for a Queen was in itself a shock to ingrained habits of mind. Three
generations of Englishmen had grown up to think of a Queen regnant as
part of the established order of the universe, or at least of that important
part of it which acknowledged the sway of the Queen of Great Britain and
Ireland and Empress of India. Could a ** King however popular occupy
quite the same place in the hearts of the people as the ‘‘ old Queen ” 7 Any-
way, the news of Queen Victorians death caused something like consternation
throughout the empire of which for more than sixty years she had been the
living symbol, as well as the Sovereign Lady.
Moreover, the moment of the Queen^s death added poignancy to the
grief of her people. The stubborn resistance of the Boer republics in South
Africa; the defeats which in the opening months of the war they had in-
flicted upon the picked troops of the British army; the unlooked-for pro-
longation of a struggle which most men had, in its inception, regarded as
one more of the “ little wars ” in which the empire, on its frontiers, was so
constantly engaged; the outburst of sympathy for the Boers among almost
all European countries; the sudden revelation of the jealousy and dislike
of most foreigners, and of the dangerous diplomatic isolation in which Great
Britain consequently stood — all this had tried the nerves of a nation which
was already mourning the loss of many of its best and bravest sons. Nor
had the Queen ever shown herself more conspicuously representative of the
feelings of her people, more indisputably the corner-stone of the national
polity, than in the last years, and particularly in the last months of the
reign. After a long period of mourning and seclusion she had emerged in
1887 to celebrate the Jubilee of her reign; her personal popularity had
steadily grown during the years that followed and seemed to reach its zenith
in the great Imperial Pageant of 1897. The reverses in South Africa served
only to brace the octogenarian Queen to greater and greater activities; she
visited the sick and wounded solaiers; she comforted the mourners; she went
in and out among her people, as never before. In April, 1900, after an
interval of forty years, she revisited Ireland. An act of tardy repentance,
the visit might have been, but for untoward events, a means of reconciliation.
The hearts of the Irish people were as deeply touched as was the Queen’s.
466
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
469
“ I am deeply gratified ” — so she spoke in reply to an address of welcome
from the Lord Mayor of Dublin — that I have been able to see again the
motherland of those brave sons who have borne themselves in defence of
my Crown and Empire with a cheerful valour as conspicuous now as ever in
their glorious past.” Gratified the Queen well might be by her reception in
Ireland; but it was an exhausting effort.
Within nine months the Victorian era was ended; a King reigned in
England.
EDWARD VII KING
The first Council of the new reign was held on January 23, 1901; the
King took the oaths of Sovereignty under the style of Edward VII, and
expressed his determination to be a “ constitutional sovereign in the strictest
sense of the word, and as long as there is breath in my body to work for
the good and amelioration of my people.” The testing-time was, unhappily,
not prolonged, but the pledge was faithfully redeemed. Bom on November
9, 1841, King Edward was in his sixtieth year when he came to the throne.
Rigorously excluded by the Queen’s orders from all official knowledge of
matters of State, he had been entrusted with a “ Cabinet Key ” only so lately
as 1896. None the less his apprenticeship had been arduous, and his ex-
perience of affairs both varied and full. He had sedulously cultivated the
acquaintance of every ruler in Europe, and of statesmen and publicists of
all parties. Every current of opinion was familiar to him, and though he
was no student in the technical sense, he had neglected no opportunity of
picking the best brains in Europe He had travelled constantly and widely,
as no Heir Apparent had ever travelled before.
No King had ever come to the throne with such a knowledge of the world
and its peoples, especially of the peoples he was destined to rule. By assid-
uous attendance at public ceremonies of every kind, by serious service on
Royal Commissions, and in other ways, he had manifested his genuine in-
terest in all that concerned the moral and material* welfare of the people,
while his keen zest for sport, his obvious joie de vivre, his personal charm
and unfailing tact had endeared him to all classes. In the choice of a con-
sort too he had been exceptionally fortunate. The beauty and kindliness of
Queen Alexandra had made her the idol of the populace long before she
became the first lady in the land.
The portents for the new reign were therefore, as regards persons, all
of the happiest. Politically the sky was not so clear. The clouds which
had lowered over South Africa were not in January, 1901, entirely dis^-
pated: nor was the diplomatic position in Europe quite easy. Moreover,
the greatest of the elder statesmen of England and of Europe was nearing
the end of his long service to Crown and country. After the general elec-
tion of 1900 Lord Salisbury handed over the Foreign Office to Lord Lans-
downe, and in July, 1902, the former ceased to be Prime Minister, being
succeeded by his nephew, Mr. A. J. (afterwards Earl of) Balfour. Nor did
he long survive the surrender of office. In 1903 he died.
A NEW REIGN AND A NEW ERA
A new era opened with the new reign. A reaction against all that savoured
of “ Victorianism ” was quick to disclose itself: in Art, in Letters, in Society,
in Politics. Was it that in all these spheres the presence of an old lady on
the throne had imposed a measure of restraint? Was it the quickening of
470
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
intellectual activities due to the closer contact of man with man in the new
industrial cities? Was it the increasing restlessness to which new methods
of transport and communication were manifestly ministering? Was it merely
an ebullition of youthful exuberance frequently noted as a result of war?
Whatever the explanation, the signs of a change were indubitably manifest.
It may be well, at the outset, to indicate some of the directions it took.
In domestic afifairs the accession of Edward VII coincided with the
advent of Democracy. For half a century the middle classes had been in
power. Enfranchised by the Parliamentary Reform Act of 1832 they had
for the most part left the work of administration in the experienced hands
of the great Whig families: Russells, Greys, Spencers, Stanleys and Caven-
dishes had filled their accustomed places. A Canning, a Peel or a Gladstone,
with Eton or Harrow and Oxford to help them, might push their way to the
front through the aristocratic ranks, but not until after the death of Palmers-
ton (1865) did the middle classes come into their own. By that time Disraeli
was making ready to shoot Niagara, and twenty years later the franchise con-
ferred in 1867 upon the urban artisans was extended to the rural labourers.
Already the fortress of the middle classes was undermined, but it was an-
other twenty years before it surrendered, and a really democratic regime was
inaugurated.
Never had England been better governed than between 1832 and 1867; but
the dominant note was that of the middle classes. Preeminently respectable ;
moderate in all things; industrious, thrifty, peace-loving, England prospered.
Queen Victoria typified in her own person all the virtues which were ad-
mired by her people and were reflected in the art and literature of the era
which bears her name
After 1901 things changed rapidly No longer was policy dictated and
expenditure curbed by those who had something to lose; power passed to
those who thought they had something to gain. Puritan simplicity was re-
placed by extravagance (not of money only) and ostentation. No privacy
was respected. Men and women, of good repute and ill-repute, were alike
dragged into the arena of publicity and butchered to make a Roman holiday.
People, ^eat and small, began to live their lives under the public gaze. The
Press daily gained in power, social and political.
A subtle change of temper began to manifest itself, and was reflected in
current legislation. Self-reliance had been the watchword of the middle
classes; the newly enfranchised began to look to the State The doc-
trine of laissez faire/^ as preached by Bentham and the Utilitarian philoso-
phers, had indeed enjoyed a very fleeting triumph. England might open her
ports to foreign products, but she could not leave the women and children
in cotton-mills and mines to the cold comfort of unfettered competition; the
new town-dwellers asked for protection in their lives if not for their trade.
Hence a large crop of legislative measures between 1832 and 1867 for the
amelioration of the lot of the manual workers. With their enfranchisement
the pace naturally quickened. When the people had seized the reins of
power they were no longer reluctant to invest the State with extended func-
tions. Thus political democracy begat State Socialism. The great Leviathan
became socially as well as politically omnipotent.
The doctrine of the State Omnipotent had its influence also on foreign
politics, on the external relations of nation and nation. General Smuts has
observed that ‘Hhe cardinal fact of geography in the twentieth century is
the shortening of distances and the shrinkage of the globe. . . . The result
is that problems which a century ago or even fifty years ago were exclusively
European now concern the whole world.” That is true, but the truth is politi-
cal as well as geographical: and it is connected not remotely with the exalta-
tion of the idea of the State, and the growth of national self-consciousness.
SIR J. A R. MARRIOTT 471
The Economic Nationalism of List has found its counterpart in the desire
of each self-conscious nation for “ a place in the Sun.”
That desire has been greatly stimulated by the marvellous development
in the arts of industrial production, necessitating on the one hand a con-
stant supply of raw materials, and on the other markets for the disposal of
surplus products. Many of the sources of the essential materials are foimd
only in tropical lands; most of the available markets are among non-Euro-
pean peoples. Thus have the forces of Industrialism and Commercialism
reacted upon that of Imperialism; thus have European politics merged into
Welt-Politik.
Under the operation of these forces: Democracy, Collectivism, Industrial-
ism, Commercialism, Imperialism, the twentieth century moves on. Its
progress will be indicated in the pages that follow.
The Last Years of the Unionist Government. 1900-1905
When Edward VII came to the throne the Unionist party had been in
power for a period of fifteen years, broken only by the three years (1892-
1895) of Liberal rule under Gladstone and Lord Rosebery. Gladstone’s con-
version to the policy of Home Rule for Ireland had given to the Conservatives,
reinforced by an influential secession from the Liberals, a great opportunity.
THE IRISH PROBLEM
As regards Ireland the opportunity was redeemed. Lord Salisbury who
had been called in 1885 to the leadership of the Conservative party, had
declared that what Ireland needed was twenty years of resolute government.
For nearly twenty years his party was in a position to administer the
prescription. In face of a widespread agrarian agitation; in spite of much
disorder and many outrages, the supremacy of the law in Ireland was grad-
ually vindicated. But resolute government formed only one ingredient in the
dose. By a succession of Land Purchase Acts the landlords were brought out
and the tenants were enabled, on easy terms, to become the owners of their
farms. The Congested Districts Board set up by Mr. Arthur Balfour miti-
gated the poverty of some of the poorest parts of Ireland, while the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, under the enlightened and
vigorous direction of Mr. (now Sir) Horace Plunkett, helped to raise Irish
agriculture to a condition of unprecedented prosperity. Under the wise ad-
ministration of Mr. Arthur Balfour (Chief Secretary 1887-1892) and Mr.
George Wyndham (Chief Secretary 1900-1905) everything was done to pro-
mote the economic and social regeneration of the country: local government
was popularised; elected councils were set up in counties and districts, and
the position of Poor Law Guardians was reorganised (1896). So effective
was the policy that in 1905 emigration — a sure index of prosperity in Ire-
land — touched the lowest figures hitherto recorded (30,676) , and Mr. Birrell,
on taking office as Chief Secretary in January, 1907, like his immediate prede-
cessor, Bryce, deliberately declared that Ireland had never been so peaceful
for the last six himdred years. Even more remarkable was the testimony
of John Redmond who speaking at Waterford in 1915 contrasted the Ireland
of 1915 with that of the ’eighties. To-day the people broadly speaking own
the soil; to-day the labourers live in decent habitations; to-day there is ab-
solute freedom in the local government and the local taxation of the coun-
try. . . . The congested districts, the scene of some of the most awful hor-
rors of the old famine days, have been transformed, the farms have been
472 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
enlarged, decent dwellings have been provided, and a new spirit of hope and
independence is to-day among the people.”
That the Irish “ problem ” was not finally solved either by firm adminis-
tration or by legislative benevolence will become painfully clear in subsequent
chapters, but impartial history is bound to admit that tiie Unionist party
had no cause to be ashamed of the record of their twenty years’ government
of Ireland.
In the first years of the new century the preoccupation of the country and
of the Government was not, however, with Ireland, nor even with England,
but with South Africa.
THE SOUTH AFBICAN PBOBLEM
From the time when England, having twice conquered the Cape Colony,
pxurchased it from the Netherlan^ (1814), there had been friction between
Britons and Boers in South Africa. Irritated beyond endurance by what
they regarded as the meddlesomeness of the English Government the Boer
farmers at last determined to seek freedom in the vast hinterland of South
Africa. With their wives, their children, their household gods and their
cattle they trekked to the north (1836-1840), and ultimately established the
two Boer republics: the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The policy
adopted by successive British Governments towards these states was griev-
ously vacillating. Now they would proclaim (as in 1848) the sovereignty
of the Queen; now as by the Sand River Convention (1852) and the Bloem-
fontein Convention (1854) they would virtually acquiesce in Boer independ-
ence. But Boers and Britons were not alone in South Africa. The natives
far outnumbered both, and but for British intervention the Boers of the
Transvaal would probably have been “ eaten up ” by the Zulus and the
Matabele. In 1877 the Transvaal was annexed to the Crown, and in 1879 a
British force broke, not without difficulty, the power of the Zulus. The
Boers could once more breathe freely; the English having destroyed their
enemies, had now to meet the Boers in the field. A disastrous war (1880-
81) ended in the retrocession of the Transvaal to the Boers.
Meanwhile, a new strain had been introduced into South African society,
first by the acquisition of the Kimberley diamond-field, and later by the de-
velopment of the gold-mines of the Transvaal As Sir Charles Lucas has well
said: “ The digger, the capitalist, the company promoter jostled the slow-mov-
ing Dutch farmer and quickened the pace of life.” This jostling issued in the
Jameson Raid in 1895, and four years later in the outbreak of war between
Great Britain and the two Boer states. Essentially the cause of the conflict
is to be discovered in the incompatible ideas and ideals of the Boer farmers
and the British settlers. Never since 1815 had it been decided which of the
two was to prevail. The wobbling of the British Government enhanced the
uncertainty. Had Great Britain in 1814, or in 1836, or even in 1877, an-
nounced a definite policy and unflinchingly adhered to it, war might perhaps
have been avoided. That a handful of Dutch farmers, inspired though they
were by high courage and by a fanatical devotion to outworn ideas, could
permanently arrest the development of their countiy and its great natural
resources, was impossible. Equally im^ssible was it that settlers of British
blood should permanently accept a position of political inferiority in a land
which, ownmg the suzerainty of their Queen, was to be their home. Behind
Kruger’s obstinacy in 1899 was the memory of a hundred irritations, easily
magnified into “wrongs,” inflicted on the earlier European settlers by the
later comers. But if the Boers were looking to the past, Rhodes and Jameson,
Chamberlain and Milner were looking to the future. The recent partition
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
473
of Africa among the European Powers, in particular the German acquisitions
to the north-east and to the west of British possessions, still further compli-
cated the problem.
Sir Alfred (now Viscount) Milner was appointed Governor of Cape Colony
and High Commissioner of South Africa in 1897, and soon came to the con-
clusion that matters could not remain as they were. The Boers, naturally
enough, attempted to take advantage of the failure of Jameson’s raid to
obtain from Great Britain an acknowledgment of their complete independ-
ence: but against this Chamberlain was adamant. Lord Milner, on the
other hand, vainly attempted to obtain from Kruger some concessions for the
British settlers — the Uitlanders, in the Transvaal
Recourse to arms was almost inevitable, and the Boers declared war on
October 10, 1899. With the military details of the struggle this narrative
is not concerned. Suffice to say that the British Government underrated the
gravity, and mistook the military character of the war in which they were
involved. The forces at first sent out were inadequate in numbers, and in-
appropriately equipped. Hence the disasters of the Black week ” in Decem-
ber, 1899. Lord Roberts who went out in January, 1900, with Lord Kitchener
as Chief of the Staff, quickly redeemed the military situation. The siege of
Kimberley was raised on February 15; Cronje was compelled to surrender
with over 4,000 Boers at Paardeberg on the 27th; Ladysmith, held by
Sir George White with superb courage, was relieved on the 28th; and
Mafekmg on May 17th. Meanwhile Lord Roberts had entered Bloemfontein
on March 13, and on May 28 proclaimed the annexation of the Orange Free
State, and that of the Transvaal (after the occupation of Pretoria, June 5)
in September.
It was too hastily assumed that with the taking of Bloemfontein and
Pretoria the Boer opposition would collapse, and in November Lord Roberts
returned home and left it to Lord Kitchener to clear up the mess. The
process proved to be prolonged and costly.
Meanwhile, the Parliament elected in 1895 was nearing its natural term,
and the Unionist leaders deemed it prudent to take advantage of the en-
thusiasm aroused by the victories in South Africa to secure a renewed lease
of power. Parliament was accordingly dissolved in September, 1900, and the
“ Khaki ” election, held in October, gave the Unionists a majority of 134
over all other parties combined. To this brilliant result the extraordinary
vigour displayed by Chamberlain in the electoral campaign largely contrib-
uted. Yet for him and for the Unionist party the victory was in a sense
Cadmaean.
Between Liberal Imperialists,” such as Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward (now
Viscount) Grey and Mr. (now Viscoimt) Haldane, and men like John Morley
and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman there was a considerable cleavage; but
it was insignificant compared with the fissure which was presently to reveal
itself in the Unionist ranks and to condemn that once-powerful party to im-
potence. But that is to anticipate events. The earlier part of the new Par-
liament was, save on the item of education, not greatly concerned with
controversial issues.
KING EDWARD VII
The opening of a new reign necessarily concentrated attention upon the
Crown, Despite his mourning the King opened Parliament in person on
February 14, 1901. Not since 1885 had Queen Victoria performed that cere-
mony, and only seven times in all during the last forty years of her reign.
A select committee was promptly appointed to consider the provision that
474 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
should be made for the maintenance of the King and the royal family in the
new reign and on its report, imanimous save for Mr. Labouchere’s opposition,
the new Civil List was based. The new Kmg, like Queen Victoria, relin-
quished on his accession the chief hereditary revenues of the Crown; the
Duchy of Cornwall, with revenues of £60,000 a year, passed to his eldest
son, and he himself succeeded to the Duchy of Lancaster, with revenues
of a like amount. The new Civil List was fixed at £470,000 a year, or £85,-
000 in excess of that enjoyed by Queen Victoria. The surrendered hereditary
revenues had, however, during the late Queen’s reign increased in value from
£245,000 to d^5,000. The nation, therefore, made a good bargain with the
new sovereign. Annuities of £20,000 and £10,000 were also voted to the Duke
and Duchess of Cornwall and York respectively, and £18,000 to the King’s
daughters. A significant addition was also made to the Royal Titles the
form of which was henceforth to be: “ Edward VII by the Grace of God of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of aU the Bri^h
Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India.”
The italicised words were new, and were added with the general assent of all
British parties, a unanimity in striking contrast to the bitter feeling evoked
by the addition, only twenty-five years before, of Empress of India to the
style of Queen Victoria. So fast had imperial sentiment deepened. Further
recognition of the same fact was afforded by the tour of the Dominions un-
dertaken dunng the first year of the new reign by the Duke and Duchess ot
Cornwall and York. On their return in November the Duke was created
Prince of Wales, under which title he visited India in the winter of 1905-
1906.
The South African War had not been ended by the annexations of the
Boer States. Through the autumn of 1900, and all through 1901, Louis Botha,
De La Rey and De Wet waged guerilla warfare with consummate ability,
but at last the grim tenacity of Kitchener reaped its reward; Boer women
and children were collected into concentration camps, and by a system of
blockhouses the whole country was slowly but effectually subdued. Yet
even at the end of 1901 the prospects of peace seemed remote. Towards the
end of March, 1902, however, negotiations for peace were opened, and after
prolonged discussions, terms were at last agreed to at Vereeniging on May 31
THE UNION OP SOXrrH AFBICA
No question of a restoration of the independence of the Boer States was,
or could be, entertained; they remained incorporated in the dominions of the
Crown. Generous terms of amnesty were, however, granted to the defeated
combatants: a sum of £3,000,000 was placed at their disposal for the repa-
triation of the people and the restoration of their country; the continued
use of the Dutch language in schools was assured, and representative gov-
ernment, as a prelude to complete self-government, was to be conceded as
soon as circumstances should permit to the two annexed States.
'The generosity of these terms was promptly justified. Under the wise
administration of Lord Milner and his successor the Earl of Selborne the
work of reconstruction was carried through so quickly and so successfully
that it was found possible to confer responsible government upon the Trans-
vaal in 1906, and a year later upon the Orange River Colony. But responsible
government now enjoyed by all the four colonies in South Africa could not,
in itself, solve the constitutional problem. The common interests of the four
colonies necessitated some form of union between them. In particular there
were four Questions of insistent importance in some degree common to all
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
475
the colonies: railway rates and communications; tariffs; the labour question;
and above all the fact that Boers and Britons taken together were vastly out-
numbered by the indigenous tribes of South Africa. Common action on these
and other matters was imperative, but whether circumstances enjoined a
federal or a unitary form of political cooperation was a point hotly debated.
Delegates from the four colonies met at Pretoria in May, 1908, to consider
questions of railway rates and tariffs; but discussion on these questions
soon made it clear that no permanent solution would be foimd so long as
Cape Colony and Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony re-
mained separate political entities. Consequently, later in the year, a con-
vention met at Durban to consider the larger problem. In December the
discussions began at Durban were continued at Cape Town, and after three
months of detailed discussion, behind closed doors, a scheme for union was
agreed upon, and was later approved by each of the colonial legislatures.
The scheme as ultimately w^orked out was not federal but unitary in
character. The four colonies agreed to merge their separate identities in
that of a United South Africa, and to accept the status of Provinces. To
this decision two considerations, among others, mainly contributed: (1) that
distinctions in South Africa ran essentially upon lines not of locality, but
of colour; and (2) that the urgent economic problems were more easily
soluble under a unitary constitution. The terms of the agreement reached
in South Africa were embodied in a bill which in 1909 was enacted with the
cordial assent of all parties, in the Imperial Parliament, and on May 31, 1910,
the Union of South Africa was proclaimed and Viscount (formerly Mr.
Herbert) Gladstone took the oath of office as first Governor-General. Before
that happy consummation vras finally reached, a new King reigned in Eng-
land It has seemed convenient to complete the sketch of South African
affairs, but we must rapidly retrace our steps.
No Englishman w'as more anxious to see the end of hostilities in South
Africa than Edward VII. That he should go to his coronation in the shrine
of the Confessor, while his soldiers were still battling in South Africa,
seemed to Edward the Peacemaker unthinkable. Yet the Peace of Vereeniging
was signed only just in time (May 31), for the Coronation was fixed for
June 26. On the 24th the public learned to their consternation that the
King was seriously ill, that an immediate operation was imperative and that
the Coronation must be postponed.
The whole empire, eagerly awaiting the news that the King-Emperor
had been crowned, was suddenly plimged into deep anxiety. Happily the
operation was successful; recovery was rapid; on July 5 the King was pro-
nounced to be out of danger, and on August 9 he was crowned at Westminster
with high ceremonial pomp and amid scenes of immense popular enthusiasm.
The Coronation of Edward VII was rendered memorable by the fact that
for the first time the ceremony was attended by the statesmen and princes
not only of the motherland but of the daughter states of the empire and by
representatives of India and other dependencies and colonies. Other cere-
monies, mostly illustrative of this new and momentous feature of the Corona-
tion, followed in quick succession: on August 12 there was an Investiture
and parade of colonial troops; a parade of Indian troops on the 13th, and
a Naval Review at Spithead on the 16th — a ceremony in which the Boer
Generals, Botha, De Wet and De La Rey, so lately in the field against Great
Britain, arrived just in time to participate. On October 24 the King and
Queen made a progress through some of the poorer parts of London and
lunched with the Lord Mayor at the Guildhall, and two days later their
Majesties attended a solemn service at St. Paul’s Cathedral to render thanks
for the King’s restoration to health.
476
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
THE FAB-FLUNQ BRITISH EMPIRE
The visit of the statesmen of the outer empire was not merely ceremonial.
Advantage was taken of their presence at the Coronation to hold another
Colonial Conference — the fourth of a lengthening series. The first stone
of this new Imperial structure had been laid in 1^7, coincidently with the
first Jubilee of Queen Victoria; a second was added at Ottawa in 1894; a
third coincided with the second Jubilee in 1897. From the first the Colonial
statesmen had expressed themselves strongly in favour of closer commercial
relations between the homeland and the colonies. The Ottawa Conference
declared for preferential trade within the empire and in 1897 Mr. Chamber-
lain who, for the first time, presided as Colonial Secretary showed himself
to be sympathetic with colonial views, but the existence of commercial
treaties between Great Britain and Prussia and Belgium, and the most fa-
voured nation principle, constituted a serious obstacle to the realisation of
the scheme. After the Conference of 1897, however, these treaties were at
the request of the Premiers of the self-governing colonies, denounced, and
Canada promptly gave a lead to the empire by according a preference to
British imports, with results to British trade which were encouraging.
In 1902 the colonial Premiers agreed to recommend to their several Par-
liaments preferential treatment for British goods, and at the same time urged
upon the home Government “ the expediency of granting in the United King-
dom preferential treatment to the products and manufactures of the Colonies.^’
Thus was the challenge flung down to the principle which for sixty years
had dominated England's fiscal policy: a challenge destined to raise a new
and large issue in the domestic politics of the motherland.
Apart from this Imperial problem, the record of the first years of the
new reign is not of outstanding interest or importance. The services of Lord
Roberts and Lord Kitchener in South Africa were recognised by Parliamen-
tary grants of £100,000 and £50,000 respectively, and, in view of the defects
revealed by the recent war, attempts were made in 1901, 1904 and 1907 to
reorganise the army, without recourse to the principle of conscription. Of
these the third carried through by Mr. (now Viscoimt) Haldane was the
most important. A First Line of defence was to be furnished by a regular
army of 160,000 men; and a Second by a Territorial and Home Force — to
consist of the old militia, the old Yeomanry, and Volunteer — of 300,000
men. These forces formed the nucleus of the vast armies sent over sea from
1914-1918, and, as far as they went, proved themselves a model of efficiency.
More important, however, than any scheme of army reorganisation was the
establishment (1903) on Mr. Balfour’s initiative of a permanent Committee
of Imperial Defence.
Lord Salisbu^ survived by only thirteen months his resignation of the
Premiership. His death (August 22, 1903) marked the passing of the last
of the great statesmen of the Victorian era. Premier for a longer period
than any of his Victorian predecessors he will be remembered chiefly as a
great Foreign Minister, who by his caution, his skill, and above all by his
high character and essential magnanimity inspired great confidence not only
among his own countrymen, but among all the diplomatists of Europe. His
detestation of Turkish misgovemment induced the confession that in the
recent past, England had, in Near Eastern affairs, ‘‘ put her money on the
wrong horse”; but though essentially peace-loving and devoid of jealousy,
he was adamant when, as in Egypt, essential British interests were involved.
Of the diplomatic legacy which he bequeathed to Lord Lansdowne more will
be said hereafter.
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
477
THE EDUCATION ACT OP 1902
Mr. Balfour signalised his succession to the Premiership (July, 1902) by
an attempt to solve the thorny problem of national education. The Act of
1902 abolished the specially elected School Boards which since 1870 had
controlled the education of all children except those who attended ** volun-
tary ” schools, and vested the control of all secular education alike in the
state provided ”) or voluntary (“ non-provided ”) schools in the County,
Borough or District Councils. Religious instruction in the Aon-provided
schools was still to be controlled by Managers appointed by the Denomina-
tions who on their part were to remain responsible for the upkeep of the
buildings. Large provision was also made for secondary and higher educa-
tion It was a courageous attempt to reconcile the divergent views of de-
nominationalists and dissenters: but it was bitterly resented by the latter
who organised widespread resistance against the payment of rates the pro-
ceeds of which were to be applied to teaching tenets of which they disap-
proved. In time the agitation, somewhat artificial in its inception, died down,
and the Act of 1902 proved itself to be a considerable landmark in the history
of national education, and has indeed formed the keystone of the educational
arch from that day to this
Meanwhile, Mr. Balfour’s principal colleague, Mr. Chamberlain, was mak-
ing a triumphal progress in South Africa (November, 1902-March, 1903),
whence he returned to find to his chagrin that his colleagues had decided to
repeal the registration duty of one shilling per quarter on imported wheat,
only revived in 1902. The duty had produced a revenue of £2,000,000
without affecting the price of bread; but the strict Free-Traders were alarmed
lest even so minute a duty should open the door to a revival of protection.
Undoubtedly, the advocates of an inter-imperial trade policy, both at home
and in the colonies, did regard the 1/- duty with the gratitude that hopes
for more. Obsta principiis was the retort of the Free-Traders.
TARIFF REFORM
Nor was Mr. Chamberlain slow to take up the challenge. In a speech
addressed to his constituents in Birmingham (May 15) he boldly declared
himself in favour of a complete reversal of recent fiscal policy; of preference
for colonial products, and of the imposition of retaliatory duties against foreign
countries which had erected tariff barriers against British goods.
Thus was the Tariff Reform campaign inaugurated. It caused much per-
turbation in Parliament, in the Unionist party, and most of all in the Cabi-
net which was hopelessly divided on the subject. Mr. Balfour, to allay
apprehensions, was constrained to announce that the fiscal question would
not be dealt with in the existing Parliament; but his influence could not avert
a break-up of the Cabinet; in mid-September Mr. Chamberlain resigned and
was followed into retirement by four of the free-trade wing of the Ministry:
Mr. Ritchie, Lord George Hamilton, the Duke of Devonshire and Lord
Balfour of Burleigh.
What did these resignations portend? Had the Premier surrendered to
the Tariff Reformers or to the Free-Traders? The personnel of the recon-
structed Cabinet afforded no decisive clue; Mr. Austen Chamberlain sue*
ceeded Mr. Ritchie as Chancellor of the Exchequer, but Mr. Victor Cavendish,
heir to the Dukedom of Devonshire, became Financial Secretary to Ihe
478 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
Treasiuy, while Mr. Lyttelton on Lord Milner’s refusal, became Colonial
Secretary. Mr. Balfour’s dexterity held his Government together for two
more years, but Ihe centre of interest had already shifted from Parliament
to the platform, and the Press. Mr. Chamberlain displayed imtiring energy
m the campaign, and gathered round him a band of stalwart helpers. But
the free-trade citadel was not to be carried by storm, still less could it be
carried by the tactics preferred by Mr. Balfour. In November, 1905, Mr.
Chamberlain appealed to the Unionist party to declare unequivocally for
tariff-reform, and Mr. Balfour, realising the hopelessness of postponing de-
cision any longer, resigned office. The long period of Unionist ascendancy
was over; would the “ Union ” survive?
Democbacy in the Saddle — Social Refobm, 1906-1912
The task of forming a new Ministry was entrusted to Sir Henry Campbell^
Bannerman, who became First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister —
the first Englishman to whom as Prime Minister official precedence was ac-
corded. The Liberal party had been out of office for more than ten years
and in the interval had been rent by dissensions, personal and political.
Lord Rosebery had resigned the leadership of the party in 1896, and
Harcourt had withdrawn tw'o years later; but the latter’s death in 1904
following that of Lord Kimberley in 1902, and combined with Lord
Spencer’s serious illness (1905), cleared the path for the man who, in the
darkest hour of Liberalism (1899), had been chosen as leader of the party
in the House of Commons. Not that Campbell-Bannerman experienced any
difficulty in forming a Ministry, exceptionally strong both in administration
and debate. Asquith (who became Chancellor of the Exchequer), Grey at
the Foreign Office, and Haldane as Secretary for War, represented Liberal
Imperialism; Lloyd George at the Board of Trade and Morley at the India
Office gave strength to the left wing; John Bums, the first Labour member to
attain Cabinet rank, went to the Local Government Board; while among the
junior members of the Government then were such promising “ youngsters ”
as Winston Churchill, R. McKenna, L. V. Harcourt, W. Runciman, Herbert
Samuel and many others. Lord Crewe, Sir H. H. Fowler, Bryce and Birrell
were in the Cabinet. Campbell-Bannerman survived his accession to the
Premiership for only seventeen months, but in power as in opposition, he
led his party with great shrewdness and good humour, and among all parties
in the House of Commons he left, when he passed away, a fragrant memory.
OVEEWHELMING DEFEAT OP THE UNIONIST PABTY
The result of the General Election which followed (January, 1906)
quickly upon the formation of the new Ministry illustrated the tactical error
of resignation. Had Balfour dissolved instead of resigning, the result might
have been laetter for the Unionist party — it could hardly have been worse.
The main issue submitted to the electors was that of Free 'Trade v. Tariff
Reform, but great play was also made with the cry of “ Chinese Slavery,”
in allusion not quite ingenuous to the introduction of a niunber of Chinese
labourers into the South African mines, under the Chinese Labour Conven-
tion (1904). The Unionist party, hopelessly divided on the Tariff question,
was smitten hip and thigh, and secured only 157 seats; the Liberals numbered
377; the Irish Nationalists 83, but the new political portent was the return
of no fewer than 53 members strictly pledged to adherence to the “ Labour ”
Bush House in the Strand, London (completed 1923), with
the church of St. Mary-le-Strand in the foreground. (Inset)
Mr. Harvey Wiley Corbett, the architect of Bush House.
Jx^xr'
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
479
programme. Only one “ Labour ” member, Mr. Bums — a man of autocratic
thou^ kindly temper and of strong individualistic instincts — found a place
in the Cabinet, but the appearance in such strength of a Socialist party could
hardly fail to colour the legislation even of a Liberal Government returned
on the issue of laissez-faire. To placate the right wing of Liberalism the
Irish question had been tacitly dropped — for the moment. The production
(1907) of a measure of Devolution ” to set up an Irish Council soothed the
consciences of the English Home Rulers; its rejection by a Nationalist Council
in Dublin grieved nobody. Mr. Birrell who early in 1907 succeeded Bryce
as Chief Secretary, on the latter's happy selection as British Ambassador to
Washington, had however the satisfaction (1908) of establishing a really
adequate and efficient Roman Catholic University in Ireland. The problem
had baffled many previous efforts; its solution removed an ancient and
genuine grievance.
ASQUITH PREMIER — LLOYD GEORGE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCHEQUER
On Campbell-Bannerman's resignation (April 6, 1908) Mr. H. H, Asquith
succeeded to the Premiership. A brilliant Balliol scholar and a successful
barrister Asquith had come so quickly to the front in politics as to attain
Cabinet rank in 1892 ; only six years after his entry into the House of Com-
mons. A successful Home Secretary in Gladstone's last Ministry, he had
since 1895 played a conspicuous and honourable part in opposition. Cool in
temperament, terse, lucid and incisive in speech, a sound economist, with no
love for extremes in either direction, he was plainly marked out for high
place. In 1908 he attained the highest. His principal lieutenant and succes-
sor at the Exchequer was Mr. Lloyd George. The two men were strongly
contrasted, though their gifts were perhaps politically complementary. A
young Welsh solicitor, without tradition or much education of the formal
kind, but endowed with a gift of magical eloquence, of ardent temper, gen-
erous sympathies and indomitable courage, Lloyd George had been a real
force in opposition to the Unionist Government The idol of Wales, he had
risked opprobrium as a champion of the Boers; a strong Nonconformist he
had encouraged passive resistance to Balfour's Education Act of 1902. Ap-
pointed to the Board of Trade in 1906 he had revealed unsuspected powers
of administration and great patience in negotiation. Convinced that finance
was the key to constructive radicalism he had (if the jade speaks truly)
claimed the second place in 1908, and though his party was rich in ability
his was the driving power behind the coach during the Asquith Premiership
(1908-1916).
LIBERAL MEASURES
The new Government was remarkable for its large output of social legis-
lation. An Act to facilitate, under public authority, the provision of allot-
ments and small holdings for cultivating tenants was passed in 1907. In
1908 an Act was passed for providing pensions for persons over 70 years of
up to a maximum (on a sliding scale of income) of 6/- a week. Persons
with incomes of £31 10., or in receipt of poor relief (other than medical)
were excluded. In the same year an elaborate effort was made to deal with
the sale of intoxicants, under licence, but the Bill which was hotly opposed
both in Parliament and in the coimtry was, after passing through the Com-
mons, rejected by the Lords. An Act establishing a maximum eight-hour
480 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
day for coal-miners was, however, passed, though not without serious mis-
givings which experience has justified. The 1909 crop included a Develop-
ment Act authorising grants or loans from the Exchequer for agriculture,
forestry, rural transport, harbours, canals, etc., and setting up a Road Board
to construct new roads or make grants on loans to highway authorities, and
a Housing and Town Planning Act. More important, however, than any
legislation was the publication in that year of two searching Reports by the
majority and minority of a Royal Commission on the Poor Laws which had
for some years been investigating the problem under the chairmanship of
Lord George Hamilton, an ex-Minister of great ability and long and varied
experience. The Reports made a profound impression but did not immedi-
ately issue in legislation.
Even more important. was the judgment (December, 1909) of the Supreme
Court of Appeal, which decided that the payment of Members of Parliament
by Trade Unions was illegal. This “ Osborne judgment was directly re-
sponsible for a Constitutional innovation of the first magnitude* — the pay-
ment of £400 a year from the Exchequer to Members of Parliament (carried
in August, 1911), and also for an amendment of the law by which, with some
safeguards for dissentients, Trade Unions were permitted to devote a portion
of their funds, earmarked for the purpose, to political objects. The position
thus created is bitterly resented by those Trade Unionists who do not share
the Socialist opinions to the propagation of which the Act has plainly con-
tributed.
Political interest in the year 1909 was, however, concentrated upon Mr
Lloyd George’s first Budget which raised highly controversial issues and
eventually precipitated a grave Constitutional' crisis, to which reference will
be made later on.
THE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE ACTS
Supplied, as he erroneously supposed, with fresh financial resources, and
fortified by two fairly successful appeals to the country (January and De-
cember, 1910), the Chancellor of the Exchequer went on his way rejoicing.
To mitigate the evils of unemployment Labour Exchanges were set up m 1910,
and before Easter 100 were open and had registered 270,000 persons seeking
employment. These Exchanges have hardly satisfied expectations; they are
expensive to maintain, and they have not won the full confidence either of
employers or wage-earners. Of much greater importance were Mr. Lloyd
George’s proposals (1911) for a national scheme of insurance Already in
1906 by the Workmen’s Compensation Act the liability of employers for in-
juries to persons in their employment had been practically extended to cover
all manual labourers, and indeed all employees earning less than £250 a
year. The Act of 1911 applied primarily to insurance against sickness, the
cost being divided, in unequal proportions, between the workman, the em-
ployer and the State. All employed persons earning a weekly wage, or less
than £160 a year, were, with few exceptions, such as soldiers, sailors and
teachers, to be insured, to the total number of 15,000,000. They were to
receive free medical attendance and an allowance of 10/- a week for a maxi-
mum of 26 weeks; women were to receive a maternity benefit of 30/-; and
local authorities were to be helped to build sanatoria for tuberculosis cases.
The total charge was estimated for the first year at JTO, 000,000 on employers;
£11,000,000 on employees and £1,742,000 on the State, but the State’s liability
would obviously increase rapidly.
Another part of the same measure laid the foundations of insurance
against unemployment. This was to apply only to some 2,400,000 wortomen
SIR J. A R. MARRIOTT
481
engaged in the particularly precarious trades of shipbuilding, engineering and
building. Employers and employees were to pay 2^d. per week, per man, and
the State one-fourth of the whole cost. The scheme was received with much
criticism, and even some derision, but it was conceived on bold and broad
lines, and has been abundantly justified in its results. The cost, however,
is heavy and the benefits are inadequate. Of the many contingencies to which
the wage-earner is liable, only some are covered by the Act. It has, indeed,
done something to dissipate the sense of insecurity which is preeminently the
curse of modern industrialism; but though the benefits have been increased
and the scope of the scheme has been much extended since 1911, much still
remains to be done. Unrest and discontent among the manual workers, still
more the baneful tendency to a limitation of output, are largely due to the
sense of insecurity, which only adequate benefits provided under a compre-
hensive scheme of insurance can dissipate.
SOCIAL UNREST — AN EPIDEMIC OP STRIKES
The unrest which prevailed among important sections of wage-earners
presented, indeed, to all classes a grave problem. Various causes — psycho-
logical, political and economic — were at this time combining to accentuate
it. The younger workmen, at once better educated than their fathers and
more pleasure-loving, craved more leisure both for amusement and for self-
improvement; other classes seemed to be increasingly bent on “ having a
good time^^ why not they? Political enfranchisement — the Acts of 1867
and 1884 had not brought much satisfaction to the wage-earners; the aggre-
gate wealth of the country was rapidly increasing, but the share of it which
fell to the manual workers seemed to them inadequate; the benefits promised
by the working-class movements of the nineteenth century, notably Trade-
Unionism and Cooperation, had fallen far short of expectations; wages
seemed to them too low and hours too long. Hence sporadic unrest and not
infrequent strikes Thus at midsummer, 1911, on the eve of the Coronation
of King George V, the merchant seamen struck and wrung important conces-
sions from the powerful shipping Federation; the dockers, the carters and
finally the railwaymen came out in August, at a moment when relations be-
tween England and Germany had almost reached the breaking-point. How
far the root of the trouble was economic, how far the movement was political;
whether it was due to propaganda by revolutionary syndicalists; whether,
unknown to the men, foreign influences were contributing to unrest — it is
not, even now, possible to decide. Be the causes what they might, the symp-
toms were profoundly disquieting. In all 100 new disputes began in August,
involving no fewer than 373,615 workmen, and resulting, for August alone,
in a loss of 2,323,800 working days. The crisis was one of real gravity;
troops were called out to protect the railway lines, stations and signal boxes,
and the Government, notably Mr. Lloyd George, worked incessantly to re-
store peace. On August 19 at 11 p.m. a truce was patched up with the rail-
waymen, and the men returned to work. On October 10 the Government
announced that an Industrial Council, nominated by the Board of Trade and
equally representative of employers and employees, would be set up under
the chairmanship of a great conciliator. Sir George (now Lord) Askwith,
to deal with industrial disputes. This Council was intended to supplement
and strengthen the operations of the Board of Trade, in the discharge of its
duties under the Conciliation Act, 1896, but it possessed no compulsory powers,
and it has functioned less effectively than was hoped.
Early in 1912 industry was again threatened with paralysis by a strike
T. B. Y. — VOL. I — 31
482 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
of the coal-miners which lasted from February 26 to April 11. Railway
traffic was disorganised and much suffering was caused to casual labourers
and the workers in the pottery, glass and other trades. That the revolution-
ary syndicalists had been active in preaching their subversive doctrines,
especially in South Wales, admits of no doubt; but happily saner coimsels
prevailed and, combined with the enactment of a Minimum Wage Bill, se-
cured temporary peace in the coal-fields. Under this measure a minimum
wage for underground workers was to be fixed in each district by a District
Board. The Boards w’ere to be equally representative of employers and work-
men, with an independent chairman, appointed by agreement, or failing
agreement by the Board of Trade. Precautions were also taken to safeguard
regularity and sufficiency of output. Admittedly introduced as an emergency
measure, the Act contained the germ of a principle capable of wide application.
The foregoing summary, though brief and not exhaustive, will suffice to
show that domestic politics between 1906 and 1912 were by no means devoid
of interest, incident and excitement ; but throughout the whole period forces
were operating in Europe which were destined to issue in a world-cataclysm
of dimensions so gigantic as to overshadow all other interests, while in the
latter half of it attention was concentrated at home, upon a struggle which
beginning with fierce contention as to the details of a Budget widened out
into a Constitutional issue of the first magnitude.
Democratic Finance and the Second-Chamber Problem
On April 29, 1909, Mr. Lloyd George introduced to the House of Com-
mons, in a speech of four hours' duration, a Budget which may fairly be
described as historic. It was under discussion on 72 Parliamentary days,
including several all-night sittings, and finally passed the House of Common's
on November 4 by 379 to 149 votes. But that was only the beginning ol
the great fight. The House of Lords, while admitting that in matters of
pure finance the House of Commons must be supreme, contended that Mr
Lloyd George's proposals were political rather than financial and were in-
tended to prepare the way for a social revolution which the House of Lords
was, at its peril, bound in the national interest, to arrest Mr. Winston
Churchill frankly admitted that the Budget embodied “ a new idea, pregnant,
formidable,” and the Lords insisted that changes so revolutionary ought not
to be accepted by them without the express sanction of the Electorate. Con-
sequently on November 30, on Lord Lansdowne's motion they rejected the
Finance Bill by 350 votes to 75. The Commons retorted by a resolution,
that, ‘^the action of the House of Lords in refusing to pass into law the
financial provision made by this House for the service of the year is a breach
of the Constitution and a usurpation of the rights of the Commons ” Par-
liament was then prorogued and on January 10, 1910, was dissolved. To
Caesar both Houses had appealed.
In that appeal there were in fact two issues: (1) the financial proposals
of 19jD9; and (2) the much larger and more permanent question as to the
constitutional relations of the two branches of the Legislature.
the financial problem
Finance was not a simple problem. Social reform costs money; the navy
was calling for more money too, and to meet an increased expenditure of
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
483
£16,000,000 it was proposed to tax motor-cars; to increase the duties on
spirits and tobacco; to increase the liquor licences, the death duties on the
larger estates, and the tax on the higher incomes; and to impose three new
land taxes: (1) an increment tax on site values; (2) a tax of 10 per cent on
leasehold reversions: (3) a tax of ^d. in the £ on undeveloped building land;
and (4) a tax of five per cent on mining rents and royalties. The land taxes
would seem to have combined almost all the vices which taxative imposts
can possess. Ill-designed for pmposes of revenue; grotesquely unequal and
unfair to individuals; uncertain in their incidence; pregnant with possibilities
of friction; vastly complicated; expensive to collect; and above all almost
certain to intensify the social evils which it was their avowed purpose to
assuage. Experience has completely justified the critics. Instead of encour-
aging building and development, the new taxes arrested them and have been
largely responsible for the shortage in housing accommodation which is one
of the most deplorable features of the contemporary situation.
Against the Budget as a whole and the new land taxes in particular a
loud outcry immediately arose Described by its author as “ The People^s
Budget,” it unquestionably constituted a fierce attack upon accumulated
wealth and especially on that portion of it invested in land. Mr. Lloyd
George claimed that the land clauses . . . must have the effect eventually
of destroying the selfish and stupid monopoly which now so egregiously mis-
manages the land.” Such language betrayed the animus which inspired the
proposals, and it was the animus even more than the proposals which aroused
strenuous opposition
Financially they proved a complete fiasco. They involved landowners
in great trouble and expense, they created infinite friction, but they produced
no net revenue; they never even paid the expense of collection and in 1921
they were repealed, with hardly a protest from any responsible quarter, by a
Government of which their author was the head.
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS VS, THE HOUSE OF LORDS
If, however, we accept the view, the object of ‘‘ The People’s Budget ” was
political rather than financial, it cannot be denied that its success was im-
mediate and decisive It provided an occasion for that trial of strength be-
tween the Lords and the Commons to which many Radicals had long looked
forward with eager anticipation. Some of them regarded it as a pious duty
bequeathed to the party by Mr Gladstone, for the old statesman’s last speech
in Parliament (March 1, 1894) was a vigorous assault upon the coordinate
legislative authority of the Second Chamber. In 1893 the House of Lords
had contemptuously rejected Gladstone’s second edition of Home Rule; in
February, 1894, the Lords had so amended the Employers’ Liability Bill as
to lead the Government to abandon it; and in the same month had carried a
scries of important amendments to the Parish Council Bill. The cup of their
iniquity was, in Gladstone’s view, nearly full. The Government accepted the
amendments, but speaking, as Morley tells us, with “ rising fire ” Gladstone
said: “We are obliged to accompany that acceptance with the sorrowful
declaration that the differences, not of a temporary or casual nature merely,
but differences of conviction, differences of prepossession, differences of men-
tal habit, and differences of fundamental tendency, between the House of
Lords and the House of Commons, appear to have reached a development
in the present year such as to create a state of things of which we are com-
pelled to say that in our judgment it cannot continue. . . . The issue which
484 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
is raised ... is a controversy which, when once raised, must go forward to
an issue."
During the ten years of Unionist rule which followed so soon upon Glad-
stone's retirement no more was heard, naturally, of the iniquities of the
House of Lords, but many of the more serious politicians on both sides felt
that those years offered an opportunity to Conservative reformers, the neg-
lect of which argued extraordinary political recklessness. Be that as it may,
the Liberals were no sooner back in power, than the old game recommenced.
In 1906 the Lords rejected a Plural Voting Bill, and so amended an Educa-
tion Bill that the Government dropped it. Consequently in 1907 Campbell-
Bannerman moved a resolution, “ that in order to give effect to the will of
the people as expressed by their elected representatives, it is necessary that
the power of the other House to alter or reject bills should be so restrained
by law as to secure that within the limits of a single Parliament the final
decision of the Commons shall prevail "
Nothing came of this resolution, and the Lords proceeded to " fill up
the cup.” In 1907 they rejected a Land Values Bill for Scotland, and a
Licensing Bill in 1908. In 1909, taking their courage in both hands, they
rejected the Finance Bill.
RESULTS OP THE ELECTION
The issue was now joined; yet it was less clear than it might have been.
The questions submitted to the Electorate were two: (1) do you approve
of the Budget proposals? (2) do you endorse the claim of tlie Lords to
reject it? The answer was consequently not free from ambiguity. The
Electorate returned Liberals and Unionists in virtually equal numbers (274
to 272) ; Labour representation was reduced to 42; the Nationalists numbered
84. Assuming that Labour sided with the Liberals on the main issue, the
Nationalists plainly held the balance. Nor did they fail to use their ad-
vantage. A coordinate Second Chamber was an insurmountable obstacle to
Home Rule. But if the Nationalists (who in the Budget controversy had
taken no sides) were to help the Liberals to curtail the “ veto ” of the Lords,
the Liberals must pledge themselves to use their new powers to carry Home
Rule.
The bargain was virtually, if not verbally, struck, and the King’s Speech,
read by King Edward in person on Februarv 21, 1910, foreshadowed pro-
posals “ to define the relations between the Houses of Parliament so as to
secure the imdivided authority of the House of Commons in finance and its
predominance in legislation.” This promise was fulfilled; in March resolu-
tions were proposed and carried, and at the end of April were embodied in
a “ Veto ” Bill. The Bill provided that if for more than one month the Lords
withheld their assent to a Money Bill, it might be presented to the King,
and on his assent become law; that the Speaker should certify whether a
Bill was or was not a Money Bill ; that ordinary Bills, if passed by the Com-
mons in three successive sessions might, on their third rejection by the
Lords, be presented for the King’s assent; that two years must elapse be-
tween the introduction of such a Bill and its final passage through the Com-
mons, and that the maximum duration of Parliament should in future be
limited to five years.
On April 14 Mr. Asquith declared in menacing terms, that if the Lords
rejected the proposals of the Government, they would tender advice to the
Crown, and if they found themselves unable to give statutory effect to
their policy ” in the present Parliament, they would resign or recommend
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
486
a Dissolution. ** Let me,” he proceeded, “ add this, that in no case shall we
recommend a Dissolution except under such conditions as will secure that
in the new Parliament the judgment of the people, as expressed at the elec-
tion, will be carried into law.” However veiled his language, Mr. Asquith’s
meaning was unmistakable: the King was to be asked to give a contingent
guarantee that, in the assumed event, he would create a sufficient number of
new Peers to overcome the resistance of the Lords.
Before the threat could materialise a tragedy intervened; King Edward
returned from Biarritz only to die (May 6, 1910) , and was succeeded by his
only son as George V.
THE KING IS DEAD — LONG LIVE THE KING
The death of an exceedingly popular King, a man, moreover, of great
experience and exceptional shrewdness, was a profound shock to the nation,
and, for the moment, hushed political controversy. People had felt great
confidence that King Edward’s calm judgment, his perfect tact and temper,
his mellow wisdom and almost unfailing sagacity would have found a way
out of the political dilemma. It might well have been so; but anyway the
King’s death, at this juncture, was an irreparable loss to his people. And
not to them only, as the next chapter will show.
To his son King George the genuine sympathy of the whole nation was
extended, alike for the loss of a beloved father, and for his accession to the
throne under circumstances so embarrassing to its occupant. Under an im-
pulse common to all parties the leaders endeavoured to secure a settlement
by consent. A small conference of eight persons, drawn equally from the
two parties and from both Houses, met on June 17 behind closed doors. By
July 29 Mr. Asquith was able to announce that such progress had been made
that negotiations would be resumed in the autumn, but after more than 20
meetings the Conference finally broke down on November 10, and on the 18th
Parliament was dissolved
Two days before the Dissolution Mr. Asquith and Lord Crewe had an
interview with King George, and placed before him a Cabinet memorandum
in the sense announced by Mr. Asquith in April. According to the accoimt
of that interview, given by Lord Crewe to the House of Lords in the historic
debate on August 8-9, 1911, the King faced the contingency with “ natural
and . . . legitimate reluctance.” It was understood that His Majesty was
told that if he accepted the alternative — the resignation of the Asquith
Ministry — he might place himself in the awkward position of bringing the
Crown into a party controversy ” Thus, in the words of Lord St. Aldv^n
(August 9, 1911) the King was placed ‘‘in the most cruel position in which
any Sovereign could be placed.”
The General Election took place in December; but the electors had not
changed their minds since January, and the result for parties was “ as you
were.” The Nationalists were still masters of the situation; nor were their
terms modified.
The Parliament or “ Veto ” Bill, on the lines already indicated, was in-
troduced in February; the second reading was carried by 368 to 243 on
March 2, and the third by a similar majority on May 15. During the next
two months, pageantry and politics were strangely intermingled. The King
and Queen were crowned, amid great demonstrations of national — nay of
Imperial — loyalty and affection on Jime 22, and in July the young Prince
of Wales, an ingenuous and engaging lad of 17 was, with picturesque and
moving ceremonial, invested at Carnarvon Castle. The inspiration was a
486 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
happy one and the occasion peculiarly auspicious; for anxious days were in
store for the Crown. Would the Peers yield before the storm? Was it not
their plain duty to resist to the end, and go down, if need were, fighting?
Would the King assent to their coercion? If the hereditary branch of the
Legislature were submerged under the democratic fiood, could the hereditary
monarchy survive?
THE HOUSE OF PEERS SIGNS ITS DEATH-WARRANT
Such were the anxious questions men put to themselves and each other
in the summer of 1911. Meanwhile, Lord Lansdowne and the Unionist Peers
had propounded an alternative to the Parliament Bill. The Lords had al-
ready in 1907 shown their willingness to reform themselves and their House
by the appointment of a Select Committee under the chairmanship of Lord
Rosebery — a life-long advocate of Second Chamber reform. The Report of
this Committee (1908) marked an epoch in the history of the question; it
proved that the leading Peers were agreed that a radical* reform of the
Second Chamber was imperative, and were agreed also on the main lines
of such reform. In the autumn of 1910 the Lords afltaned, again on the ini-
tiative of Lord Rosebery, two important propositions: (1) that henceforward
no Lord of Parliament should be permitted to sit and vote in the House of
Lords merely in virtue of hereditary right; and (2) that it was desirable that
the House should be strengthened by the addition of new elements from the
outside.
Lord Lansdowne^s Bill of 1911 was framed in the spirit of these resolu-
tions. The new Second Chamber was to consist of 325-350 members, repre-
senting three distinct elements: (1) 100 Lords of Parliament elected by the
Peers from among such Peers as were qualified by public service; (2) 100
Lords nominated by the Crown; and (3) 120 Lords chosen by some metliod
of indirect election. The Princes of the Blood Royal, the two Archbishops
and five Bishops, and the Law Lords were to find places in a Chamber which
would number less than 350 in all.
The effort was heroic but it was too late. Had it been made in 1900 it
might have altered history. But the fate of the Parliament Bill was still
uncertain. Would the Peers pass the Bill or compel the Government to the
methods of coercion already foreshadowed? Would the King feel bound by
the hypothetical promise (if promise there was) extorted from him in No-
vember, 1910? The Peers were divided between “ Hedgers and “ Ditchers
between a party which thought it better to accept the Parliament Act and
avert the shame of being “ swamped ” by the creation of some 500 Radical
Peers, and those who wished to die in the last ditch and compel the Crown
and its Ministers to employ a weapon as odious as it was dangerous. The
Hedgers ” prevailed, and amid scenes of unparallelled excitement the Par-
liament Bill was allowed to pass. On the same day (August 10) that the
Peers signed their own death-warrant, the Members of the House of Commons
voted salaries of £400 a year to themselves.
THE THIRD HOME RULE BILL PASSED
The new weapon supplied by the Parliament Act was not allowed to rust.
The Irish Nationalists promptly and naturally claimed their wages, and in
1912 the third Home Rule Bill was passed through the House of Commons
and sent up to the Lords who contemptuously rejected it. The Third Edition
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
487
of Home Rule differed somewhat from the two previous editions. The Bill
of 1886 had abolished Irish Representation in the Imperial Parliament; that
of 1893 retained 80 members in the House of Commons; but they (and the
Irish representative Peers) were not to be entitled to deliberate or vote
on any question exclusively affecting Great Britain “ or some part thereof.”
The inconvenience of this in and out ” arrangement was so palpable, that
in 1912 Mr. Asquith decided to retain 42 Irish members in the British House
of Commons for all purposes. The Bill specifically and emphatically re-
aflSrmed (for what such affirmation might be worth) the ‘‘ supreme power
and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.” The Irish Parlia-
ment was to consist of the King and two Houses; a nominated Senate and a
House of Commons, and was to be debarred from dealing with certain sub-
jects, such as the Crown, the army and navy, treaties with foreign Powers,
treason, etc. The Executive was to be responsible to the local Legislature,
and to be subject to the same limitations of jurisdiction. Ulster, despite
its own grim determination and repeated protests, was to be brought into the
scheme. The whole structure was a piece of ingenious and elaborate mosaic;
here a bit of black stone, and there a bit of white; with something for the
ardent separatist, something for the timid devolutionist, something for the
well-meaning federalist.
The Bill was again proposed in 1913; passed through the Commons in
1913 without the change of a comma (as required by the Parliament Act),
and rejected by the Lords.
In 1914 it was again passed and rejected, but before it could receive the
royal assent the empire was involved in the World War. Negotiations be-
tween parties ensued; and when, on September 18, 1914, the royal assent
was given to the Bill a Suspensory Act was simultaneously passed under
which the operation of the Home Rule Act was suspended for 12 months in
any event, and if by then the war was not ended, imtil such further date,
not later than the date of the termination of the war, as might be fixed by
Order m Council. In fact, the Act never came into operation, being repealed
by an Act for the better Government of Ireland, similarly still-born, in 1920.
During the summer of 1914 a dangerous situation had developed in Ire-
land. North and South had alike armed themselves; it looked as though
the passing of the Home Rule Act would give the signal for the outbreak of
civil war in Ireland. To avert it the King summoned a conference attended
by Mr Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Bonar Law, Sir
Edward Carson, Captain Craig (afterwards the first Prime Minister of
Northern Ireland) , Mr. John Redmond and Mr. Dillon. The King urged an
agreement, but the conference, after several meetings, dissolved without
result. A few days later war was declared against Germany.
DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHURCH IN WALES
If the Irish Nationalists got their pound of flesh from Mr. Asquith, so
did the Welsh Nonconformists. The Welsh people had long ago desired the
disestablishment and disendowment of the English Church in Wales, and in
1912 a Bill to effect this object was passed through the House of Commons
and rejected by the House of Lords. The subsequent history of this measure
was precisely parallel with that of the Home Rule Bill, save that on the
termination of the war the Welsh Bill became operative and the Irish Bill
did not. The Welsh dioceses were divorced from the Anglican Establish-
ment, all endowments prior to 1662 (about £173,000 a year) were alien-
ated, and a Welsh Commission was set up to take over existing Church
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
488
property (including the endowments since 1662) and to administer it. So
energetically have the churchmen in Wales set about the reorganisation of
their polity and their finances that the Church in Wales is stronger, both in
a financial and administrative sense, than it was before the Act. The alien-
ated income has passed partly to the Umversity of Wales, and partly to the
County Councils.
Apart from Ireland and Wales, and recurring industrial disputes, already
noticed, the domestic history of Great Britain was, in the years immediately
preceding the war, almost a blank. Commg events on the Continent were al-
ready casting their shadow before them, and to a review of the policy of
England, in connection therewith, we must next turn.
Great Britain and Its Neighbours
FOREIGN POLICY, 1902-1914
The Boer War revealed to England the fact that she was none too popu-
lar among her neighbours, and to her neighbours the fact that however great
England’s potential strength, naval and military, she was incapable of deal-
ing a swift military blow. Yet, paradoxically, the first result of the Boer
War was to improve Anglo-German relations. Not that they had yet become
really bad. Bismarck, though half mistrustful and half contemptuous of
England, saw in her primarily a potential enemy of France, and true always
to his policy of isolating France, encouraged the English occupation of Egypt.
Moreover, England had shown herself conspicuously friendly to German en-
terprise in Africa and in the Pacific. It is true that at the moment of the
young Kaiser’s accession (1888) many Germans were bitterly indignant at
what they conceived to be the intrigue of the two august Englishwomen who
had, as they thought, secured for the Princess Royal of England the position
and dowry of an ex-Empress. Nevertheless, the Kaiser’s first inclinations were
towards an accord with England, and the Anglo-German agreements of 1890,
1898 and 1899 were the result.
Consequently in November, 1899, Lord Salisbury could say with complete
sincerity “ our relations with the German nation are all that we could desire.”
His most influential colleague went even further. In that same month
Mr. Chamberlain was invited to meet the German Emperor and his Foreign
Minister, Count (afterwards Prince) von Bulow at Windsor, and was induced
by Billow to make a public pronouncement in favour of ‘‘ a new triple alli-
ance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-
Saxon race.” The pronouncement was, however, badly received in Germany,
and Billow was base enough (in the Reichstag, December 11, 1899) to reject
the advances made at his own instance. “ In the new century,” he declared
with emphasis, “ Germany must be either the hammer or the anvil.” The
application of the analogue was unmistakable.
RELATIONS WITH GERMANY IN THE NEW CENTURY
In 1900 Coimt von Billow succeeded to the Chancellorship and, despite
the good-will evoked by the Kaiser’s attitude at the time of Queen Victoria’s
death, he set himself deliberately to keep the two countries apart. He even
credited England with a Machiavellian design to embroil Germany in a con-
flict with Russia and France, in order that, profiting by the preoccupation of
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
489
all her rivals in the colonial field, England might pick up unconsidered tnfles
in Asia and Africa. The progress of Germany, colonial, naval and commer-
cial, was, in his view, bound sooner or later to bring her into conflict with
England.
Had the German navy been ready, the conflict might have come while
England was pre-occupied in South Africa. Germany’s neutrality was, as
Billow confesses, “ solely inspired by weighty considerations of the national
interests of the German Empire.” Nevertheless, the two Powers cooperated
in bringing Venezuela to reason in the winter of 1902-1903, though the co-
operation of the two fleets was far from popular in England, while Count
Bemstorff, at that time Secretary to the German Embassy in London, thought
that Germany was unwise to take joint action in this matter with Great
Britain.
Relations were not improved, either by the refusal of England to facili-
tate the completion of the Bagdad railway (1903), or by the threat of Ger-
many to retaliate against England as she had already retaliated against
Canada, because the Dominion had given a preference to British goods.
Meanwhile, Von Tirpitz was pushing on as rapidly as possible the fulfil-
ment of the naval programme in Germany, and England was retorting by
the construction of a first-class naval base at Rosyth, by bmlding big battle-
ships and by concentrating her strongest fleet in the North Sea. Still, Lord
Roberts entirely failed to rouse any general fear of a German attack.
THE ALLUNCE WITH JAPAN
Nevertheless, the orientation of British policy was imdergoing a complete
if gradual change. In 1902 the world was astounded to learn that the island
Empire of the West had emerged from the splendid isolation which had been
characteristic of its relations with its neighbours, and had concluded an
actual treaty of alliance with the island Empire of the East. The Allies were
to cooperate to preserve peace in the Far East, to maintain the integritjr of
China and Corea, and the “open door” to commerce with those countries;
Japan was assured that, in the event of an attack upon her by Russia, the
British fleet would keep the ring and would intercept any European interven-
tion on behalf of Russia. Great Britain on her part secured a strong naval
ally in the Pacific, and converted into a friend a Power whose rapid develop-
ment was anxiously regarded in Australia.
Such a treaty was plainly of first-rate diplomatic significance, and its
value to Japan was demonstrated when in 1904 war broke out between that
country and Russia. At one moment it seemed likely that England would
herself be involved in the war. On October 21, 1904, the Russian Baltic
fleet, under the command of Admiral Rodjestvensky, finding itself in the
midst of a flotilla of British trawlers off the Dogger Bank, opened fire upon
them with fatal effect. In the face of this monstrous blunder — if blunder
it was — and of the excitement aroused by it in England, the English Gov-
ernment showed commendable restraint, and, after an impartial enquiry, ac-
cepted an apology and compensation. As for the Baltic fleet it no sooner
reached Japanese waters than it was sent to the Itottom by Admiral Togo.
The battle of Tsushima finished the war, which imposed a definite check
upon Russia’s advance in the Far East and at home gave a powerful stimulus
to the reform movement. In the East Japan henceforth occupied a position
of unquestioned preeminence.
Nor were the reactions of the war confined to the combatants.
490
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
THE ‘‘ ENCIRCLEMENT OF GERMANY
Edward VII had not been long on the English throne before he began
to exercise a powerful, if intangible, influence upon the foreign policy of his
country. It had long been his habit to take his liolidays upon the Continent,
and he was connected by ties of blood and friendship with most of the
European dynasties. Uoncle de VEurope was an appellation as accurate
as it was suggestive. That he deliberately set out to encircle Germany, or
to upset the existing equilibrium of Europe is probably untrue ; but it is cer-
tain that he discerned more clearly than most of his subjects and even some
of his Ministers the danger which threatened the peace of Europe and the
security of England, from the side of Germany. Nor had anyone more accu-
rately gauged the instability of the Kaiser's character and the consequent
menace to the tranquillity of his neighbours
In the spring of 1903 King Edward after visiting Lisbon and Rome made
his first ceremonial visit as King to Pans. His reception though correct was
chilly. Anglo-French relations had not been cordial for many years past,
and at times had been severely strained. But the Fashoda crisis (1898) had
cleared the air and the appointment of M. Paul Gambon to London, and of
Delcassc to the Quai d’Orsay, were of good omen for a better understanding
between the two countries. King Edward, in a few days’ visit, completely
captivated the heart of Paris and of France In a memorable speech he tes-
tified to his attachment to Paris, and stated with emphasis his conviction that
** the days of hostility between the two countries are happily at an end.” That
King Edward was the author of the Entente is not, of course, true; but it is
undeniable that his tact and charm did an immense deal to promote an
atmosphere of good-will.
In July President Loubet, accompanied by Delcasse, returned King Ed-
ward’s visit; in October an arbitration treaty between Great Britain and
France was concluded; and in April, 1904, there were signed a number of
Conventions and Declarations which formed the basis of the Anglo-French
Entente, and paved the way for the Grand Alliance of 1914. The Preoccupa-
tion of Russia in the Far East left France in an exposed position vis-d-insi
Germany in the West Great Britain, on her side, vras becoming increasingly
alive to the menace of the German fleet. It was natural, therefore, that the
Western Powers should draw together.
The settlement was comprehensive and included in its ambit Africa, Asia,
Australasia and North America. French fishing rights in Newfoundland had
caused friction between the two countries ever since the Treaty of Utrecht
(1713). By the new arrangement France retained certain fishing rights, but
abandoned any claim to monopoly. In West Africa England made impor-
tant concessions to France on the Gambia and the Niger and in Guinea.
Boundary questions in Siam, tariff difficulties in Madagascar and Zanzibar
respectively, with various small points in regard to the New Hebrides, were
satisfactorily adjusted. But the central point of the agreement was, of course,
North Africa. Briefly, France recognised, for the first time, the actual posi-
tion of England in Egypt; England recognised the predominant claims and
interests of France in Morocco.
VISITS OF KING EDWARD
Such was the kernel of the famous Entente How far it was from an
attack upon Germany, or from an attempt to ‘‘ encircle ” her is plain, not only
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
491
from the summary given above, but from the fact that in July, 1904, Great
Britain concluded with Germany an Arbitration Treaty precisely parallel
with that concluded with France in 1903, and that in the same summer King
Edward, with the First Lord of the Admiralty in attendance, visited the
Kaiser at Kiel. Some years later he paid, with Queen Alexandra, a state
visit to Berlin. Nothing indeed was omitted by King Edward to maintain
the friendliest personal relations with the reigning monarchs of Europe and
their Ministers. Rome, Lisbon, Athens, Madrid, Copenhagen, Stockholm,
Christiania were visited in turn, and most of the reigning Soverei^s were en-
tertained in England. In 1906 the King and Queen paid a state visit to Paris,
and in 1908 an English Sovereign for the first time visited St. Petersburg.
Scarcely a year, however, passed without an interchange of visits between the
English and German courts, and in 1907, after a vreck at Windsor where he
was accompanied by the Empress, the Emperor spent nearly a month at
Highclifife Castle in Hampshire. Thrice King Edward visited the aged Aus«»
trian Emperor; thrice during his brief reign he visited Ireland. So far as
personal intercourse can maintain good political relations. King Edward
laboured assiduously in the cause of peace
But the stars in their courses worked against him and the cause he had
at heart The German Chancellor and his representative in Paris alike
acknowledged that Germany had no reason to object to the Anglo-French
Entente w’hich was very natural and perfectly justified.” Nevertheless,
the Kaiser immediately set himself to prepare a counter-stroke. First, he
tried to detach Russia from France, or failing that to form a Franco-Russo-
Gcrman alliance against England and Japan. The famous Willy--Nicky CoT’-
respandence (published in 1917) harped on this theme, and in July, 1905, the
Kaiser so far prevailed over the weak mind of the Tsar Nicholas as to induce
him to sign the secret Treaty of Bjorko. This treaty provided that if any
European Power should attack either of the two empires, the other should
come to its assistance At the instance of the Tsar^s Ministers the treaty
was subsequently modified, but it none the less illuminates the workings of
the Kaiser's mind at this juncture. His second plan was to put a public
humiliation upon France.
THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE
On March 31, 1905, the Kaiser visited Tangier and had several con-
ferences with the Sultan's representatives, and ostentatiously took under his
protection the independence of Morocco and the rights of its Sultan. He
was indeed reported to have declared that he had come there to enforce
the sovereignty of the Moroccan ruler, the integrity of Morocco, and the
equality of commercial and economic interests. This impertinent speech
was followed by an arrogant demand that France should dismiss her Foreign
Minister, Delcasse (as the ostensible author of the Entente) j and should
submit the question of Morocco to a European Conference. Delcasse held
that there was no necessity for a conference, but Prince Billow used menacing
language and after a period of much stress, M. Delcasse resigned (June,
1905) and France, conscious of her unreadiness for immediate war, gave way
on both points, and in January, 1906, a Conference met at Algeciras, Its
results, as summarised by Billow, were: (1) to bolt ‘‘ the door against the
attempts of France to compass the Turcification of Morocco ” ; and (2) to
provide “ a bell we could ring at any time should France show any similar
tendencies again.” Less partial opinion concluded that the Conference in-
stead of disproving, as Germany had hoped, the solidity of the Anglo-French
understanding, served only to demonstrate it afresh.
492
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
AN XJNDEEBTANDING WITH RUSSIA
In the Entente, however, there was one weak link. France was allied with
Russia, and England had reached a good understanding with France; but
between England and Russia there had not, until Algeciras, been any rap-
prochenvent During the next eighteen months, however, there was a frank
interchange of views between London and St. Petersburg, and, in August,
1907, an agreement was happily reached. It was no less comprehensive than
that with France, covering all the questions outstanding between the two
Powers in Central Asia, with particular reference to Tibe.t, Afghanistan and
Persia. Both parties pledged themselves to abstain from all interference in
the internal affairs of Tibet and to seek no concessions there. As regards
Afghanistan Russia agreed, subject to the consent of the Ameer (never yet
obtained) , to recognise Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influ-
ence,” and “ to conduct all political relations with it through the intermediary
of Great Britain ” ; while Great Britain declared that there was no intention
of changing the political status of Afghanistan, and undertook to exercise her
influence in a pacific sense and not to encourage any steps against Russia.
Both countries were to enjoy equality of commercial opportunity in
Afghanistan.
The most important agreement, however, concerned Persia. There was
to be an “ open door ” in Persia for all nations and the integrity and inde-
pendence of the country were to be respected by England and Russia, but
three spheres of influence were, at the same time, mapped out. The Russian
sphere embraced the north and centre, including the cities of Tabriz, Teheran,
Ispahan. The British sphere was in the south and east, and embraced the
coastal district of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean up to the frontiers
of Baluchistan. Interposed between them was a neutral zone in which both
Powers were free to obtain such political or commercial concessions as they
could.
On points of detail the Anglo-Russian agreement was unquestionably open
to criticism; but the significant fact was that any agreement should be reached,
and France in particular rejoiced that her two friends, so long estranged,
could at last shake hands.
Germany naturally looked askance at this further instalment in the policy
of “ encirclement,” but, as usual, the Kaiser was ready with his coimter-stroke.
The opportunity for it was afforded, as so often, by Balkan politics.
Ever since his accession the German Emperor had manifested a keen
interest in the solution of the problem of the Near East, and had ostenta-
tiously held out a hand of friendship to one of the bloodiest tyrants who
ever reigned at Stamboul — “ Abdul the damned.” Ceremonial visits were
paid to Constantinople in 1889 and (just after the Armenian massacres) in
1898. The second was followed by a concession of the port of Haidar Pasha
to the German Company of Anatolian Railways. A railway was to be con-
structed from Constantinople to Bagdad, and thus to form a link in the chain
which already stretched from Hamburg to Constantinople, and which might
be further eidended from Bagdad to Basra. Had the scheme been completed
it would, by a continuous land route, have turned the flank of the Sea Empire.
Meanwhile Germany’s Habsburg ally was in Bismarck’s phrase gravitat-
ing” towards the Aegean and the Adriatic. His calculated gift of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1878), supplemented by the military occupation of the
Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, increased the momentum. In 1908 the Balkans were
in ferment. A committee of Young Turks deposed Abdul Hamid and pro-
ceeded to Europeanise Turkey; Prince Ferdinand proclaimed the independ-
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
493
ence of Bulgaria; Crete united itself to Greece, and the Emperor Francis
Joseph announced the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hither*
to only administered ” by Austria) to the Habsburg Empire.
The action of Austria-Hungary in thus tearing up the Treaty of Berlin
was profoundly disturbing to all the Powers. Serbia which saw the last
hope extinguished of an enlarged Yugoslav Kingdom with access to the
Adriatic, appealed to them for intervention. Russia would gladly have gone
to her help, but Russia was rent by internal discords and had not yet recov-
ered from the defeat inflicted upon her by Japan. In February, 1909, war
seemed indeed inevitable, but was averted — for the moment — by the melo-
dramatic appearance of a knight in shining armour at Potsdam who bluntly
told Russia that if she joined Serbia in an attack on Austria she would have
to fight Germany.
PEACEMAKER
Edward the Peacemaker, watching events with profound anxiety from
Balmoral, saw the result of his handiwork crumbling, and predicted with pre-
scient accuracy the exact course of events which led to Armageddon.^ In the
events of 1908 the World War of 1914 was indeed implicit, and King Edward
shrewdly recognised it. Germany could browbeat and humiliate Russia in
1908; but the Russian Government dare not accept a second diplomatic
defeat in July, 1914; nor would Serbia.
THE AGADIR INCIDENT
Towards the cataclysm things moved rapidly during the next five years.
In 1911 another crisis in Moroccan affairs reproduced the situation of 1905-
1906 with redoubled intensity. Germany thought she saw her chance in
the domestic difficulties which seemed likely to paralyse the two Western
Powers. In France every six months saw a new Ministry, while industry
was dislocated by a series of syndicalist strikes; in England the struggle be-
tween Lords and Commons reached its zenith in the summer of 1911, and
simultaneously a profound upheaval among the wage-earners culminated in
August in a great railway strike. On July 1 the French Government was
officially informed that a German gunboat, the “ Panther,” had been des-
patched to Aeadir, an open roadstead on the west coast of Morocco, in order
to protect the lives and interests of German subjects in that turbulent country.
In the coup of Agadir Germany’s object was plainly twofold; again, as
in 1905, to humiliate France and to drive a wedge into the Triple Entente,
In both objects she failed. To a German demand for the partition of
Morocco France hotly retorted that she meant to defend her position as the
paramount Power in that country. England ranged herself solidly behind
France. Mr. Lloyd George was selected by his colleagues to announce to
Germany in unmistakable terms (at the Mansion House, July 21) that peace-
loving as England was, she refused to be treated “ as of no account in the
Cabinet of Nations.” Mr. Balfour at the same time uttered an impressive
warning that if the enemies of England counted upon domestic diflBculties
and party quarrels to paralyse her right arm they ‘‘utterly mistake the
temper of the British people and the patriotism of the Opposition.”
The effect of these speeches was to divert German hostility from France
1 See Lord Redesdale’s Memories, 1. 178, and The Recollections of John, Viscount
Morley, 11. 277.
494 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
to England. Germany recognised England as her real enemy. . . . The
conflict between us ... is now more than ever inevitable.^’ For the mo-
ment, however, the centre of interest shifted to the Near East. On Septem-
ber 27 Italy suddenly presented to Turkey an ultimatum demanding the
consent of the Porte to an Italian occupation of Tripoli, and two days later
declared war. On the day (October 18, 1912) when the Treaty of Peace was
signed at Lausanne between Italy and Turkey, Greece declared war upon
Thrkey.
THE BALKAN WARS
Greece was not alone. A miracle had happened. The Balkan States had
80 far laid aside their mutual jealousy and hatred as to combine against the
common enemy. A second miracle then took place. Within the brief space
of one month,” as Gueshov, Premier of Bulgaria, wrote, the Balkan alliance
demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries with a population of
some 10,000,000 souls defeating a great Power whose inhabitants numbered
25,000,000.” After this brief and brilliant campaign the belligerents ac-
cepted an armistice proposed to them by the Powers (December 3), and
ten days later their delegates met in London to discuss terms of peace. The
ambassadors also met m conference in London, imder the presidency of Sir
Edward Grey, to watch the development of events. Grey’s supreme anxiety
was to avoid an extension of the quarrel, and in particular to prevent Russia
and Austria flying at each other’s throats; and while Grey did his best to
persuade Russia and, through Russia, Serbia and Montenegro to moderation,
Germany exercised a mediating influence upon Austria. Peace between the
Balkan League and the Turks seemed to be in sight when on January 24
the Young Turks, under Enver Bey, effected a coup d^etat in Constantinople,
and the London negotiations came consequently to an abrupt end (February
1, 1913). Fighting was at once resumed and went on until April 21 when the
League accepted the mediation of the Powers. Negotiations were accordingly
reopened in London on May 20, and on the 30th the Peace Treaty was signed.
The Powers, and England in particular, could congratulate themselves
upon a remarkable achievement: an age-long problem had been solved; save
for a remnant of territory in Eastern Thrace the Turks had been turned,
bag and baggage, out of Europe, not by a Great Power or any combination
of Powers, but by the original owners of the soil of the Balkans.
Congratulations were, however, premature. Hardly was the ink on the
Treaty of London dry when the victors started to quarrel over the spoils. Bul-
garia, already dissatisfied at her share, was encouraged by Germany to make
a sudden and treacherous attack upon her late allies. Rumania, however,
came in to the assistance of Serbia and Greece, and after a month’s fighting
(June 29~July 20), Bulgaria was beaten to the earth and peace was signed
at Bucharest Bulgaria was severely but justly punished: not only by her
late allies but by the Turks who recovered Adrianople.
LORD Haldane’s special mission to beslin
The Balkan wars formed the immediate prelude to the larger struggle.
Great Britain had been making, especially after the passing of the danger-
ous crisis of 1911, persistent efforts for peace. Lord Haldane was despatched
on a special naission to Berlin (February, 1912) to try and establish better
relations and in particular to limit the naval rivalry. Unfortimately the
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
496
mission was vain. The true inwardness of the situation was revealed by the
cool request of Germany that, in the event of war with France, England
would maintain a benevolent neutrality. This request was, of course,
promptly refused by Great Britain, and almost simultaneously General
Bernhardi, the most influential writer on military problems in Germany, pub-
lished his famous book Qermany and the Next War. The whole argument
of the book was based upon the thesis: Delenda est Britanrda. Germany,
he insisted, must claim not only “ a place in the sun, but a full share in
the mastery of the world.” To achieve this the command of the sea must be
wrested from England. Yet notwithstanding such ominous utterances as
these ; notwithstanding the attempt of Germany to secure English neutrality
in a war elearly envisaged against France, the English Government still
laboured and seemingly hoped for peace. But every day with less chance of
success.
The correspondence between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Gambon, the
French Ambassador in London, indicates the acute apprehensions of both
Governments. That England could have permitted a disposition of French
naval forces which left the Channel ports undefended and then have aban-
doned France to face alone an attack by the German navy is, of course, im-
thinkablc. But there was no formal agreement; no actual alliance. Common
prudence dictated conversations between the military and naval advisers of
the two Governments, and we have Mr. Asquith’s word for it that Sir H.
Campbell-Bannerman, perhaps the most peace-loving of all British Prime
Ministers, encouraged such conversations from 1906. (The Origins of the
War, p 59.)
The Entente was further cemented by the state visit of King George and
Queen Mary to Paris in April, 1914, the significance of the visit being em-
phasised by the fact that for the first time since he had taken oflBce Sir
Edward Grey left England in attendance upon the King. Grey was so much
impressed by French opinion that on his return he plunged into negotiations
with Russia for a Naval Convention. Before the Convention was concluded
England was at war as the ally of Russia and France.
That England struggled up to the 59th minute of the last hour to main-
tain European peace can be denied by no one who will be at pains to examine
the facts. Yet it is equally certain that Germany was obsessed by the idea
that it w-is the purpose — successfully attained — of English diplomacy to
“ encircle ” her. So far back as 1904 the Kaiser approached King Edward,
while he was his guest at Kiel, with a proposal for an Anglo-German alli-
ance. King Edward refused to admit the necessity for such a step “ since
there was no real cause for enmity or strife between the two countries.”
The Kaiser in his apocryphal memoirs interprets King Edward’s refusal “ as
a plain sign of the English policy of encirclement,” while the Chancellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking in the Reichstag in August, 1915, declared that
it was King Edward’s conviction that his principal task was to isolate
Germany, and that “the encirclement by the Entente with openly hostile
tendencies was drawn closer year by year.” Yet four years earlier (1909)
his predecessor Billow had welcomed the Austrian triumph of 1908 as marking
“ the final failure of the encircling policy of Edward VII.”
The simple truth is that the menacing attitude of Germany, on the one
side towards Russia, on the other towards England and France, compelled the
threatened nations into unwonted friendliness. The imagined “ encircle-
ment ” was, in fact, in Mr. Asquith’s words, “ self-isolation.” Had her con-
duct been neighbourly and her intentions pacific, there would have been
no war in 1914.
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
49lS
The War and the Peace
The World War and the Peace Treaties are treated in detail in other
chapters of this book. The present chapter will deal, therefore, only in
summary fashion with the part played by the British Empire in these great
events.
Years ago Bismarck had predicted that the great conflagration would be
started by a match dropped in the Balkans. It was. The occasion of the
World War was found in the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,
heir to the Habsburg Empire, at Serajevo on June 28, 1914. Its cause lay in
the determination to dominate the East which had for years past formed
the keystone of Hohenzollern and Habsburg policy. Athwart the path of their
ambition lay Belgrade. The Hohenzollern could not reach Constantinople,
the Habsburgs could not push their way to Salonika, so long as the Serbs
held the gate. Behind the Serbs was Russia. An attack upon Russia would
involve France. England could not look on unconcerned while France was
crushed by Germany. To displace the guardians of the gate ” at Belgrade
the whole world was to be involved in war.
On July 5 the Emperor William promised his full support to Austria, in
any pimitive measures which she might take against Serbia. The Austro-
Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia was delivered on July 23. Serbia did her
utmost, by all but complete submission, to avert war ; but the Central Powers
were convinced that the hour had struck; on July 28 Austria declared war
upon Serbia and two days later Belgrade was occupied.
Even then Sir Edward Grey did not abate his efforts to circumscribe the
conflict and maintain the general peace. As to England's duty his own mind
was made up, but while refusing to encourage the war party in Berlin and
Vienna by a promise of neutrality, he would not promise support to Russia
or France. Had he come out boldly in support of France* would it have
averted war at the eleventh hour? Would the Cabinet have supported him?
And Parliament? And the country? These are grave questions, but no
positive answer can be given. In the light of subsequent events it is, how-
ever, clear that in such action lay the last remaining hope of peace.
On July 28 Berlin attempted to restrain Vienna; but Russia had already
partially mobilised her army, and on the 29th the order for general mobilisa-
tion was si^ed by the Tsar. Still England could not give France the assur-
ance for which she pressed. On July 31 Sir Edward Grey asked both Germany
and France whether they would respect the neutrality of Belgium. France
promptly promised; Germany replied evasively, and on August 2 Germany
annoimced her intention to march through Belgium; on the 3rd she declared
war on France, and on the 4th on Belgimn.
THE INVASION OP BELGIUM
The violation of Belgian neutrality was the final provocation to Great
Britain, and the immediate occasion of the British declaration of war on
Germany (August 4) .
Apart from the specific guarantee contained in the Treaty of London
(1839), the integrity and independence of the Low Countries have, for at
least five hundred years, been objects of profound concern to England. In
the sixteenth century she defended them against the Habsburgs; in the
seventeenth against the Bourbons; a century later against Napoleon Bona-
parte. The attack on Belgium by the Hohenzollern in 1914 brought England
and the British Empire into the World War.
SIR J. A. R MARRIOTT
497
For more than four years (August, 1914-November, 1918) masses of
British troops were poured into France to ward off the German blows at
Paris, and through Paris at the Channel ports. The fight was waged on
French soil, but not solely in defence of France. France formed for the
time being the menaced frontier of England, though the western front was
by no means the only front.
SEA-POWER IN THE WORLD WAR
The influence of sea-power upon world-strategy was never more brilliantly
illustrated than in the World War. Before the end of 1917 Germany had
ceased to own one foot of territory beyond the confines of Europe, By
Articles 118 and 119 of the Treaty of Versailles Germany renoimced in favour
of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her over-
seas possessions. Full details of their disposition is given in other chapters
of this book.
Despite all the efforts demanded of her in Africa and Asia, Great Britain,
having at last adopted compulsory service in May, 1916, was able to main-
tain an immense army on the western front; to contnbute a contingent to
the Allied force at Salonika (October, 1915) ; and to send much-needed suc-
cour to Italy after her defeat at Caporetto (October, 1917). But it was on
the western front that her greatest and most sustained effort was made; with
what gallantry, despite all set-backs, the names of the Marne and the Somme,
Ypres and Arras, of Vimy Ridge and Messines, of St. Quentin, Bapaume and
Peronne, will to all time eloquently tell.
Yet can anyone doubt that Mr. Asquith was truly inspired when he wrote:
‘‘ It was the control of the sea by the British navy which fed and equipped
the Allies, by successive stages drained the life-blood of the enemy, and won
the war.” The history of the British navy during the World War will be
told, however, by other pens: the vigilant watch, never relaxed but for the
most part silent, in the bleak wastes and harsh climate of the North Sea, in
the English Channel, the Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic Ocean;
the brilliant victory of Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee off the Falkland Islands,
that far-off colony of Great Britain in the South Atlantic Ocean; the superb
achievement of the ‘‘Dover Patrol”: Admiral Sir Roger Keyeses raid on
Zeebrugge in Belgium (April 23, 1918) undertaken with the intention of block-
ing the harbour which was being used by the Germans as a submarine base —
an exploit described by a French Admiral as “ the finest feat of arms in all
naval history of all times and all countries”; the humble but heroic laboirrs
of the mine-sweepers, and the superb courage of the merchant seamen —
these things will not lack their chronicler. To have countered the terrible
submarine menace; to have kept virtually inviolate the coasts of Great
Britain; to have transported across salt water 10,000,000 men or more from
England and from such distant points as Canada, Australasia, India, South
Africa, the West Indies and the United States of America; to have carried
many of them to and from the half-dozen theatres of war; to have safeguarded
the commercial routes and to have kept Great Britain and her Allies supplied
with food, munitions of war and raw material — such was the superb achieve-
ment of the British navy and mercantile marine. Fitting it was that to the
British navy the German navy, the German submarines and her High Sea
Fleet should at the end of the war be surrendered. “ The German flag will
be hauled down at sunset to-day, and will not be hoisted again without per-
mission ” — such was Admiral Beatty's si^al to the fleet on November 21,
1918. The permission has not yet been given.
T. B Y. — VOL 1 — 32
498
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
THE PRICE OP VICTORY
But tiie price was terrific. In all, Great Britain contributed to the
Allied cause over 6,000,000 men; the rest of the British Empire over 3,000,000,
m akin g a total of 9,496,370. Of these 3,266,723 were killed, wounded and
missing, and those who actually gave their lives was little short of a million.
The losses suffered by the British mercantile marine were relatively the high-
est in the war; 14,661 men of the merchant service were drowned or killed,
and 30,000 men were severely wounded, while no less than 9,000,000 tons of
shipping were destroyed. The naval casualties amounted to 27,175, of whom
no fewer than 22,258 were drowned or killed. The heroism of the men of the
mercantile marine was not inferior even to that of the fighting force; before
the close of the war many men had been torpedoed six or seven times, and yet
there is no single instance on record of a man having refused to ship.
The sacnfice of wealth was on a scale parallel with that of men. Be-
tween August 3, 1914, and March 31, 1919, the Exchequer issues totalled
£9,590,000,000, of which something less than £7,000,000,000 was derived from
loans and over £2,700,000,000 was raised by taxation — a gigantic but per-
haps insufficient proportion. About £1,500,000,000 was lent to the Allies,
and £153,000,000 had been spent (down to March 31, 1923) on Mandated
territories. The value of shipping and cargoes lost by enemy action was
estimated at £750,000,000. To these sums there ought to be added a vast
expenditure, directly resulting from British participation in the war which
can hardly be put at less than £1,000,000,000. The submarine war, the
blockade, the peace negotiations and the League of Nations will receive
separate treatment. Meanwhile there is a temptation to ask whether the
tremendous British effort as outlined in these pages was “ worth while ” ?
To attempt an answer while the world is under the influence of post-war
disillusionment and reaction would be in the highest degree misleading. A
final answer must be postponed; the contemporary historian can only say
that it was inevitable.
England Dtoing the W\r and After
FINANCE, commerce AND INDUSTRY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE
How was England herself — in commerce, industry and finance — affected
by the outbreak and prolongation of the war and by the coming of peace?
Economic conditions — since they are primary and fundamental — may
claim attention first. London was, and is, the financial capital of the
world, the nerve centre of credit. It was, therefore, naturally anticipated that
the outbreak of war would administer a terrible shock to a structure so
delicately poised. Nor were anticipations wholly at fault. The first presage
of the coming storm was given on Thursday, July 30, by the raising of the
Bank rate from three to four per cent. On the following day there was some-
thing like a panic on the Stock Exchange, and to avert further disaster the
Exchange was closed, and New York quickly followed London’s example.
Suddenly eve^ security in England was frozen, and a great part of the huge
fabric of credit was imperilled. The Exchange remained closed until January
4, 1915, and when it reopened it was under severe restrictions. The Bank rate
was raised on Friday to eight per cent; on Saturday to 10. In less than a week,
however, confidence was reestablished ; on August 8 the Bank rate was reduced
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
499
to five per cent. This happy result was due partly to the lucky accident
that the critical moment coincided with the August Bank Holiday (August
3) , partly to the promptitude, courage and wisdom witii which the crisis was
met by the Government and their advisers in the City. The Bank Holiday
was extended for three extra days; the Bank Charter Act was suspended;
a general moratorium (terminated on December 4) was declared; and Cur-
rency or Treasury Notes for £1 and 10/-, having legal tender value, were
issued in order to conserve the stock of gold. Had these notes been ready
at the outbreak of war, no suspension of the Bank Act would have been
necessary. As it was, the suspension practically operated only for three days
(August 7-10) , and the amount of notes issued by the Bank, in excess of their
ordinary powers, hardly exceeded £3,000,000. Treasury Notes, on the other
hand, were ultimately issued to an amount exceeding £350,000,000. The
Government took over the control of all the principal railways, and continued
in control until August 15, 1921. On August 4 they obtained a Vote of
Credit for £100,000,000.
England’s uninjiibed cbedit
So good was England’s credit that no serious difiBculty was experienced in
raising the funds necessaiy for the conduct of the war, and England acted
as the Banker of the Allies. But the cost was tremendous. On March 31,
1914, the National Debt stood at £661,473,765 and the annual charge for
interest and management was £24^ million. By 1921 the Debt had mounted
to £7,831,744,300, imposing an annual charge of £349| million. The rate
of interest at which War Loans were issued varied from 3| to 6 per cent.
dvsiness and employment
War involved, also, a grave dislocation of the industrial system. But
in this sphere, anticipations were curiously belied. The first apprehension
was lest war should cause great distress to the wage-earning classes. A com-
mittee was therefore set up (August 4) to deal with the prevention and
relief of distress. Local authorities were urged to initiate or accelerate
schemes and so provide work; and a National Relief Fund, to which the
Prince of Wales lent his name, was opened. Within a week £1,000,000 was
subscribed, and it subsequently mounted to about £7,000,000.
Organised labour was not less apprehensive of unemployment than was
the Government. An industrial truce was promptly proclaimed, and during
the autumn of 1914 there was an almost complete cessation of trade disputes.
For about three months serious dislocation did indeed ensue. In the cotton
trade, unemployment which at the end of July was 3.9 per cent rose by the
end of August to 17.7, and did not ^t back to the July level until January,
1915; and other trades suffered similarly, though (except tobacco) less
severely. After twelve months of war, however, the percentage of persons
who were unemployed fell to less than one — the lowest point ever recorded
in the country.
This phenomenon ought to have been foreseen. An enormous demand for
commodities, an unlimited amount of capital raised on ^vemment credit,
an ever-increasing drain of men and women for military and auxiliary services
— the problem was not how to find employment, but where to find the men
and women for the work which urgently needed to be done.
500
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
WAB TAXATION
The response from all classes was, on the whole, very good. But as regards
field service, it was inadequate. The Government shrank from compulsion;
in 1916, however, it became inevitable, and on January 6, 1916, Mr. Asquith
introduced a Bill for compulsory military service in Great Britain. The
sequel proved that a grave error was committed in not applying the principle
of compulsory national service more promptly to the whole adult population,
and one of the first acts of the new Government, which in December, 1916,
was formed under the Premiership of Mr. Lloyd George, was to mobilise all
the labour reserves of the country and to appoint a Director-General of
National Service. Had this been done in 1915, or even in January, 1916, and
had there been one uniform rate of pay for civilian and military service,
together with a scheme for the conscription of all ‘‘excess” profits; if in
fact the same principle had been applied to every form of labour and service,
to the provision of capital and the production of commodities, much heart-
burning would have been avoided, and less injustice have been wrought.
As it was, wages for every form of home service — real wages as measured
in the enhanced price of commodities — rose rapidly; the rate of interest on
capital rose; and in some industries phenomenal profits were made. An
Excess Profits Tax was indeed imposed in 1916, but only at the rate of 50
per cent over pre-war standards. The rate was increased to 60 in 1916, and
to 80 in 1917. In 1920 it was reduced to 40 per cent; increased again to 60
in 1921, by which time the yield (including the original munitions levy) ex-
ceeded £1,121,0(K),000. By the autumn of 1920 the inevitable reaction in trade
had set in, and, in 1922, the tax was repealed. Strong pressure was, after the
war, put upon the Government to impose a capital levy upon accumulated
war wealth, and after an exhaustive enquiry as to the possibility and ex-
pediency of such a levy, experts estimated that the aggregate wealth of the
people had increased by some £4,180,000,000, but found it impossible to dis-
criminate between the increment arising from excessive war profits and that
which was due to patriotic thrift and saving. The Government, therefore,
declined to proceed with the project.
INDUSTRIAL PEACE NOT SECURED
The Industrial Truce proclaimed in the autumn of 1914 was not, un-
fortunately, maintained. With the dissipation of all fear as to unemploy-
ment, strife recommenced. Before the war was three months old, there were
ominous indications that existing industrial methods would not suffice for an
adequate supply of munitions. The employers complained that even the
grave national emergency had not banished ca^ canny, slack time-keeping,
even sabotage from the workshops. The men were fearful lest they should be
rushed into a surrender of the privileges, won, in days of security, only after
a long struggle. The Government was compelled to intervene. “ Output,”
said Mr. Lloyd George (February 26, 1915) , “ is everything,” and, while
intimating the intention of the Government to place limitations on profits,
he appealed to the Trades Unions to relax their customary restrictions on pro-
duction. In the same month the Government took powers under a second
edition of the Dejence of the Realm Act to commandeer factories and plant.
Still the supply of munitions was inadequate. In June Mr. Lloyd George ex-
changed the Exchequer for the new Ministry of Munitions, and in July the
Munitions of War Act was passed. This gave drastic powers to the Minister
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
601
to con^l fairies and workshops; it limited profits and authorised severe
penalties against strikes and lockouts. The Minister and the Act together
solved the problem of supply, but at tremendous cost. In a few months the
price of munitions trebled.
Yet, despite high wages, industrial peace was not secured. No fewer than
18,000,000 days’ work were lost throu^ trade disputes, during the war; and
during the last nine months of hostilities, when coal production was vital to
success, 255,000 miners were involved in 31 strikes.
OBEA.T UNEMPLOYMENT
Since the Armistice things have been even worse. The number of wage-
earners out of work owing to trade disputes, has reached an average, for the
years since the war, of 1,615,000 per annum, while the number of days of
work lost, through this cause, has reached the appallmg total of 167,291,000.
In one month alone of the great coal strike of 1921, the loss of time amounted
to 65,000,000 days.
This unrest among the manual workers is, unquestionably, one of the
gravest symptoms of the body politic. Nor is it attributable to any single
cause. The discontent is partly political, partly intellectual and psychologi-
cal, most of all economic. Enfranchised by the Acts of 1867, 1884 and 1918,
the manual workers are dissatisfied with the results. Perhaps they hoped too
much from the democratisation of Government. The Chartists pinned their
faith wholly to political reform. Carlyle and Charles Kingsley chided them
for their belief in the fetish of the franchise; but they clung to it, and they
are now suffering the inevitable disillusionment.
How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure.
The manual workers are sadly discovering the truth of this aphorism.
LITTLE KNOWLEDGE A DANGEROUS THING
The spread of popular education has also contributed, if not to discon-
tent, at least to the realisation and to the expression of it. The manual
workers have learnt enough to know that knowledge is power; and they de-
sire more knowledge to get more power; but not for that reason only. They
desire it, in Lord Goschen’s words, “not merely as a means of livelihood,
but as a means of life.” Unfortunately the only real remedy was not applied
quickly enough. A wise thinker predicted, thirty years ago, that elementary
education, imless crowned by higher education, would prove not merely use-
less but dangerous. “ It is not,” he said, “ safe to teach the democracy to
read, unless you also teach it to think.” The higher education of the citizen is,
beyond question, one of the most urgent problems of these after-war days.
Such education ought in logic to have preceded the political emancipation of
the manual workers. But, sixty years ago Robert Lowe was one of the few
who apprehended the truth that “ We must educate our masters.” The little
Imowledge imbibed in the primary school has proved dangerous. The only
sound prescription is a further application of homoeopathic doses. Only thus
can we achieve Aristotle’s ambition — the equalisation not of possessions but
of derires
502
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
POVEETY AND WEALTH
Meanwhile, the passion for greater equality in the distribution of the
product of industry has taken strong hold of the mind of the manual worker,
and must be accounted the primary cause of the prevailing discontent. The
passion has been fanned partly by the contemplation of the vast fortunes
arising from successful business enterprise, and by the vulgar ostentation with
which “ new wealth ” is sometimes displayed. As a fact there is grave mis-
conception as to the aggregate wealth of the community. Professor Bowley,
one of the most eminent of living statisticians, wrote in 1919: “ The wealth of
the country, however divided, was insuflScient before the war, for a general
high standard; there is nothing as yet to show it will be greater in the future.''
Only 72,307 persons were in 1920-1921 in receipt of incomes of over £2,000
a year, while only about five per cent of the population have more than £250
a year. Were the fortunate five per cent deprived of all their incomes in ex-
cess of that modest standard, the increment to the remaining 95 per cent would
be quite inconsiderable.
Nevertheless, the idea that there are gross and even grotesque inequalities
in the distribution of the product of industry, is wil^y prevalent and is
undoubtedly responsible alike for much unrest among the less fortunate, and
for much of the sympathy manifested with it by the more fortunate.
Discontent among the wage-earners might perhaps be abated if not dis-
sipated were the facts more clearly apprehended. The burdens borne, mostly
in silence, by the well to do " since 1914 have been, and are, extraordinarily
heavy. Out of a total taxation per head of £17 12. the amount of direct
taxation is still (1923) £11 7. 3. Income tax which was at Is, 2d. in 1914 was
raised to 3/- in 1915, to 5/- in 1916 and to 6/- in 1918, though in 1922 it
was reduced to 5/- again, and to 4/6 in 1923. But this takes no account of
the super-tax which in the case of the largest incomes exceeds (with income
tax) 10/- in the £. Indeed, if account be taken of Death Duties (which
on the largest estates now amount to 40 per cent for Estates Duties only), it
would probably be no exaggeration to say that at least 75 per cent of the
incomes of the very rich is intercepted at various points by the State.
INCREASE IN WAGES AND PRICES
During the war trade enjoyed that semblance of prosperity which the
spendthrift can always — for a limited period — diffuse. Some trades were
genuinely prosperous, and wages rose by leaps and bounds. In the building
trade craftsmen whose wages in 1914 ranged from 7d. to ll^d. an hour, went
up until in 1920 they were 2/ld to 2/Aid. In the coal industry average wages
rose from £82 19. 2 in 1914 to £219 13. in 1920. On the North Eastern rail-
way the average earnings of men of all grades rose from £73 (in 1912) to £257
in 1920. The cost of living rose with great but not equal rapidity, reaching its
zenith (like wages) in November, 1920, when it was 173 above the pre-war
point. ,
That the cessation of war activities must necessarily induce a severe
reaction was foreseen and foretold by responsible economists. But no one
heeded the warning: neither statesmen nor business men, nor the general
public. The experience of the lean and distressful years after Waterloo was
neglected. “ Circumstances had changed.” Men may pay lip-homage to the
aphorisms of the Economists, but few people are really persuaded that lavish
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
503
expenditure can be otherwise than a benefit to trade: that waste really in-
duces wwt. That the combatants could spend £50,000,000,000 on a great war
without imparting to trade a “ lasting ” stimulus seemed to most people in-
credible. Considerable portions of continental Europe would need to be
reconstructed: the demand for labour and commodities would be enormous.
“ Demand ” has not been lacking, but it has not been effective. Mere desire
will not keep factories in work.
The Economic momentum of the war lasted for about two years after
the Armistice. Then ominous signs began to manifest themselves. Elxports
began to shrink; the ranks of the unemployed were rapidly swollen; the de-
mand for industrial capital slackened and labour became a drug in the
market; agricultural prices fell quickly, and tenants who had bought their
farms during the boom of the war years were hard hit; wages began to
droop, and wage-earners who had been deluded by visions of the new world
which Peace was to inaugurate, became querulous and presently quarrelsome.
THE POLLY OP INDUSTRIAL STRIPE
At a moment when the maintenance of industrial harmony was vital both
to the community and to all parties engaged in industry, preeminently to
the wage-earners, there ensued a series of disastrous disputes culminating,
in the early summer of 1921, in a complete stoppage in the coal industiy
(April 1-June 27). The percentage of unemployment which in 1913 was
about 2.0 was approximately 60 at the beginning of 1921; at the end of
June it was 23. No commentary upon the disastrous folly of industrial strife
could be more illuminating than these figures. That the responsibility for
strife rested wholly on one side cannot be supposed. Employers have, in
some cases, been slow to discern the signs of the times, and not too sympa-
thetic towards the new psychology of the modem wage-earner. That manual
workers who are politically the equal of the employers and who in many cases
are hardly less well educated — though in a different school — should
permanently accept the “ status in industry which was good enough for
their grandfathers, is not to be expected. Moreover, they are mistrustful,
often with good reason, of the eflBciency of management. They see things
going wrong which they could put nght — were they consulted. Inefficient
management is not less responsible than ca’ canny, for a low rate of produc-
tion, for low wages and irregular employment. The men know it; the masters
are naturally slow to acknowledge it.
On the other hand, the men are obsessed with the fallacy of the “ lump
of labour.” Believing that there is only a limited amount to be done they
impose all manner of restrictions on production. If they go slow there will
be more jobs for their fellows to-day, and more for themselves to-morrow.
For ail this the remedy would seem to be a quicker apprehension of eco-
nomic truth (a deficiency not confined to the wage earners), and a large
scheme of comprehensive insurance which shall give to those who live by
weekly wages a real sense of security, and some ^arantee against the
material effects of the ordinary contingencies of industrial life. Adequate pay
during sickness, or unemployment; pensions for young widows and dependent
children; an adequate provision for the declining years of life — a compre-
hensive scheme on these lines would go far to eliminate the primary motive
which inspires obstinate adherence to restrictions which impede production.
The matter must not be pursued in detail; but this would seem to offer an
essential, though not an exclusive, remedy for the economic consequences of
the war and for the disquieting phenomenon of war’s aftermath.
m
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
Paruament Parties and Politics 1914-1923
Inter arma silent leges. From 1914-1918 public attention was naturally
and rightly concentrated upon one supreme object — the winning of the war.
But modem wars are not won only on the field of battle. The World War
represented a conflict not merely of bayonets but of brains; it was largely a
war of chemists, and it was won largely in the factories and laboratories, in
the mines and workshops of Great Britain.
For the vast war-production which supplied the armies in France and
Flanders; in Mesopotamia and Macdeonia; on the peninsulas of Gallipoli and
Palestine, civilians were primarily responsible, and they worked in obedience
to orders from Whitehall.
Moreover, it seemed likely that the war would leave a permanent mark
upon the development of political institutions, both in the homeland itself
and in the British Commonwealth as a whole. Some attention, therefore,
must be given to politics and politicians during war time.
PARTIES AND POLITICS
The outbreak of war found the Liberal party in power under the leader-
ship of Mr. Asquith who had been continuously in office since 1905 and at
the head of the Government since April, 1908. His principal lieutenants were
Mr. Lloyd George at the Exchequer, Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office
and Mr. Churchill at the Admiralty. When the question of peace and war
was in the balance, and when the Liberal Cabinet was understood to be
seriously divided on the question. Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law
conveyed to Mr. Asquith (August 2) the opinion of the Conservative leaders
that it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to
hesitate in supporting France and Russia ” at that juncture, and to offer their
“ unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider
necessary for that object.’’ That this patriotic assurance stiffened the attitude
of Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and those Ministers who shared their
views cannot be doubted. Nor did Mr. Bonar Law and his colleagues ever
deviate by a hair’s breadth from the pledge implied in that letter. Lord
Morley and Mr. John Bums were the only Cabinet Ministers who actually
resigned, and Mr. Asquith carried on with an exclusively Liberal Cabinet
until May, 1915.
By that time, however, the position of the Ministry was seriously shaken ;
partly by their failure to bring the war to the speedy and successful termina-
tion which many people had been foolish enou^ to anticipate; partly by the
revelations as to the lack of munitions; partly by the failure of the attack on
the Gallipoli peninsula; and most of all, perhaps, by the resi^ation of Lord
Fisher, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, in consequence of serious differences
of opinion with Mr. Churchill, its civilian head. Once again Mr. Bonar Law
and his Conservative colleagues came patriotically to the help of the Govern-
ment, and at the end of May, 1915, a Coalition Government was formed.
Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey retained their posts, but Mr. Balfour
succeeded Mr. Churchill at the Admiralty, Mr. Bonar Law went to the
Colonial Office and Lord Lansdowne, Lord Curzon, Mr. Austen Chamberlain,
Sir Edward Carson, Mr.* Long and Lord Selborne, formed the Conservative
wing of the Cabinet. Mr. Arthur Henderson, as representative of the Labour
party, entered the Cabinet as Minister of Education; Mr. Lloyd George re-
nounced the Exchequer in favour of Mr. McKenna, in order to take up the
new and difficult post of Minister of Munitions.
sm J. A. R. MARRIOTT
505
REBELLION IN IRELAND
Within twelve months the energy of Lloyd George had done much to
secure a regular and adequate supply of munitions for the armies abroad;
but in June, 1916, on the tragic death of Lord Kitchener, he was summoned
to the War Office. By that time, however, the first Coalition was palpably
tottering. Mr. Asquith’s position had been shaken by the rebellion which
at Easter, 1916, had broken out in Ireland. In the early days of the war a
hope was entertained that the sympathy of Roman Catholic Ireland for
Belgium might lead southern Ireland to fling itself into the war not less
ardently than had Ulster. The hope faded during 1915 ; the disloyal section
gained the ascendant in southern Ireland, entered into treasonable corre-
spondence with Germany, and in April, 1916, broke out into open rebellion.
The rebellion came as a shock to those Englishmen who had imagined that
the enactment of a Home Rule Bill would at once heal the secular discord
between the two countries. The rebellion was promptly crushed ; it did noth-
ing to weaken the war-arm of Great Britain; but it damaged the prestige of
the Government and added to their anxieties. Moreover, the military situa-
tion on the Continent seemed to be approaching stalemate. The valour of
the French had saved Verdun, but the long-drawn-out battle of the Somme
(July-November) seemed, despite the terrible sacrifices it entailed, to have
accomplished nothing. The conviction began to gain ground, not least rapidly
in the inner Councils of the nation, that the genius of Mr. Asquith was not
well adapted to the successful conduct of a World War.
MB LLOYD OEORGE PKIME MINISTER
At the beginning of December (1916) matters reached a crisis. Mr.
Asquith learnt that some of his most important colleagues had reluctantly
decided that though he might retain the titular Premiership, the supreme
conduct of the war must be committed to other hands.
On December 5 Mr. Lloyd George resigned, and Mr. Asquith followed his
example. Mr. Bonar Law was entrusted by the King with the formation of
a new Ministry, but the state of parties in the House of Commons negatived
an appeal to the country, under the circumstances unthinkable by a purely
Conservative Government, without a general election; the Liberal chiefs
would not coalesce, without Mr. Asquith; and on December 7 the King sent
for Mr. Lloyd George who kissed hands as First Lord of the Treasury and
Prime Minister.
CONSTmjTIONAL INNOVATIONS OP GREAT SIONIPICANCE
His chief colleagues were Conservatives, thou^ a dozen Liberals and
three Laltour members found places in the Ministry. But the new Premier
was responsible for a constitutional innovation of great significance. He in-
sisted that war could not be successfully waged by a Sanhedrim — in other
words bv a Cabinet of the time-honoured design. Consequently he formed a
War Cabinet or Directory; he enlarged the Ministry; and he called into
^ing an Imperial War Cabinet.
TTie “ Directory ” was to consist of five members, of whom one only was
to be the head of an administrative department — Mr. Bonar Law who was
506 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
to be Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons.
The other members were Lord Curzon (Lord President of the Council and
leader of the House of Lords), Mr. Lloyd George himself, Lord Milner and
Mr. Arthur Henderson (Labour) , the two latter being “ without portfolios.”
General Smuts, the distinguished South African statesman and soldier, was
added to the Directory in June, 1917, and Lord Carson in July, 1917, but the
latter resigned in January, 1918, while Mr. G. N. Barnes had succeeded Mr.
Henderson as representative of the Labour party in August, 1917. The idea
of the War Cabinet was that half a dozen of the leading statesmen, relieved
of all departmental responsibilities, should be free to give their whole time to
the prosecution of the war. The new arrangement was undoubtedly an im-
provement upon the “ Sanhedrim,” and the country saw with satisfaction that
the war — at this its most critical stage — was conducted with greater vigour.
During its first year of existence the War Cabinet held more than 300
meetings. Every meeting was attended by the Foreign Secretary, by the
First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
and in addition 248 persons, experts on Foreign, Colonial and Indian affairs,
on Finance, Education, Shipping, Agriculture, Railways, etc., attended its
meetings. Attached to the War Cabinet w’as a Secretariat of eleven members,
who kept the minutes, prepared agenda, circulated reports and attended to
correspondence. The institution of this Secretariat and the functions per-
formed by it constituted conspicuous innovations. The Secretariat rapidly
grew in numbers and importance, and had its growth not been abruptly
checked by the vigilance of the House of Commons, it might easily have
developed into a sort of super-department of State, interposed between the
Prime Minister and the ordinary departments, and with a tendency to endow
the Prime Minister with quasi-Presidential authority. During the war, the
Prime Minister naturally and necessarily exercised an almost dictatorial
authority. After the conclusion of peace the continuance of this authority
was regarded with jealousy by old-fashioned constitutionalists, and the earlier
practice of Cabinet Government was reestablished.
Outside the War Cabinet was a body of Ministers (substantially increased
in number by the creation of new offices) who in ordinary circumstances would
have been members of the Cabinet. Their position was indeed somewhat
ambiguous. They did attend Cabinet meetings, but only when the affairs
of their several departments were under discussion, when they brought with
them “ any experts either froip their own departments or outside,” whose
advice they considered might be useful, but they were relieved from the
constant necessity which rested upon them under the old Cabinet system of
considering those wider aspects of public policy which often had nothing to
'do with their departments, but for which they were collectively responsible.”
(Report of the War Cabinet for 1917, p. 24.) Collective responsibility was
indeed of the essence of the old system: the new system, like that which has
always prevailed under the Presidential Constitution of the United States
of America, was frankly departmental. A semblance of coordination was
maintained through the medium of the War Cabinet, but the responsibility of
the heads of departments was rather to the Premier-President than to the
War Cabinet or to each other. In effect, however, the chief Ministers out-
side the Directory formed a quasi-Cabinet for Home Affairs.
For his departmental Ministers the Prime Minister, by a dering but well-
jmtified innovation, went in some cases outside the ranks of members of
either House of Parliament. Thus Sir Albert Stanley, a successful business
man, became President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, a
distinguished scholar. President of the Board of Education. Seats in the
House of Commons were promptly found for them, and later on, for Sir
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
507
Eric Oeddes, a successful railway official, who, on the resignation of Sir
Edward Carson (July, 1917) , was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, but
not for Sir J. P. Maclay who became Shipping Controller. This was a new
office, necessitated by the war, as was that of Food Controller filled first by
Lord Devonport, and afterwards by Lord Rhondda. Two prominent Labour
leaders, Mr. Hodge and Mr. G. N. Barnes, were appointed respectively to
the newly created Ministries of Labour and Pensions. For the rest all
the Secretaryships of State and indeed most of the important offices were com-
mitted to well-known Conservative politicians.
THE ORGANISATION OP THE EMPIRE
Of even greater significance was a third innovation by which Mr. Lloyd
George signalised his accession to the Premiership. The Prime Ministers of
the Dominions and representatives of India were, in December, 1916, invited
by the Home Government to visit England to attend a series of special and
continuous meetings of the War Cabinet in order to consider urgent questions
affecting the prosecution of the war, the possible conditions on which, in
agreement with our Allies, we could assent to its termination, and the prob-
lems which will then immediately arise.^* The invitation was accepted; and
the Imperial War Cabinet, consisting of the five members of the British War
Directory; the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, India and the Colonies;
three representatives of Canada, two of New Zealand, one of South Africa
and one of Newfoundland, met for the first time in March, 1917. Three
representatives of India were also present to advise ” the Secretary of State.
So completely successful was the experiment that Mr. Lloyd George informed
the House of Commons (May 17) that it had been decided to hold an annual
Imperial Cabinet** and that it was the general hope that the institution
would become an accepted convention of the British Constitution.** Sir
Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, expressed his conviction that
“ with that new Cabinet a new era had dawned and a new page of history
had been written.**
The experiment was repeated in 1918 when, in addition to the other
Dominions and India, Australia was able to be represented, and when the
Peace Conference opened in Paris, the Empire Cabinet was virtually repro-
duced as the British Empire Delegation.** As such it played a most im-
portant part in the protracted deliberations of the Conference. Apart,
however, from the Empire Delegation, the Dominions claimed and obtained
separate representation, and in the Plenary Conference Australia, Canada and
South Africa were each represented by two delegates, being treated as small
nations on the same level as Belgium; New Zealand was represented by one.
That the Dominions were fully entitled to separate representation, if they
wanted it, goes without saying; but it is clear that the concession of the
claim rendered their position at Paris and that of the British Empire some-
what ambiguous. Nor has it made the League of Nations (on which they
are similarly represented) more palatable to the United States. Of the
ultimate significance of the incident it is, however, too soon to judge.
Meanwhile, it is undeniable that the temperature of Imperial sentiment,
which rose to fever heat in 1917 and 1918, has fallen since the Treaty of
Versailles. The Imperial Cabinet instead of meeting annually has never met
again. The representatives of the Dominions and India were summoned in
1921, and they attended, but not eo nomine. The term Cabinet ** was
dropped, and the official report was given out as “ A Summary of the Pro-
ceedings at a Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United
508 GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
Kingdom, the Dominions and India.” The “Conferrace” resolved that
while it was desirable that the Prime Ministers of the Empire should meet
annually, “ or at such longer intervals as may prove possible,” no advantage
would be gained, “having regard to the constitutional developments since
1917,” by holding a constitutional conference. In other words, the door was
slammed in the face of a Federal Commonwealth. The British Empire might
remain a Staten-bund; it was not to become a Bundes-Stat.
An Imperial Conference of the pre-war type met in London in the autumn
of 1923 and side by side with it a special Imperial Economic Conference.
The value of such conferences cannot be over-rated, but they do not indicate
any progress in the constitutional evolution of the empire, such as seemed
possible, if not certain, in the fervour of 1917.
For the sake of lucidity we have anticipated the sequence of events, and
must now turn back to the history of domestic affairs.
DOMESTIC AFFAIBS 1918-1923
The Second Coalition remained in power until October, 1922, thou^, as
will be seen, imder conditions Widely different from those described above.
It was responsible for a considerable body of legislation, some portion of
which was admittedly temporary in character; other parte such as various
Agricultural Acte, and the Act of 1920 for the “ better government of Ire-
land,” were designed for permanence but proved abortive; the smallest part
was of permanent significance.
Incomparably the two most important items of legislation were the Parlia-
mentary Reform Act (1918) and the Education Act which became law in
the same session.
THE NEW EDUCATION BILL
Mr. Fisher’s Education Bill was introduced on August 10, 1917. It was
based on the assumptions that “ Education is one of the good things of life
which should be more widely shared than has hitherto been the case ”; that
it should be “ the Education of the whole man — spiritual, intellectual, phys-
ical ”; and that “ the principles upon which well-to-do parents proceed in the
education of their families are valid also, mutatis mutandis, for the families
of the poor.” Administratively the Act was based upon the Act of 1902, and
did not involve any radical alteration in machinery, but it abolished the
“ half-time ” system and all exemptions for children between the ages of
5 and 14; it provided for the establishment of part-time day continuation
schools, at which attendance for all boys and girls should be compulsoiy up
to the age of 18 for 320 hours per annum, except in cases where l£e children
had been under full-time instruction up to 16; it removed the limit im-
posed by the Act of 1902 on the amount to be raised for the higher forms
of education; it imposed upon local authorities the duty of “providing for
the progressive development and comprehensive organisation of education,”
and provided for the consolidation of education grants, by establishing the
“ block grant system.”
The Act discriminated unwisely against “ fee-paying schools,” and tended,
perhaps unintentionally, towards the elimination of that wholesome variety
in educational methods which has been the strength of the educational sys-
tem in this coun^; but on the whole, it was a bold and comprehensive
measure which might, had its provisions ^en carried out, have gone far to
meet the reproaches frequently made against the English system of education.
© KeyhUme Vxew Co
Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener.
© Keystone View Co
Marquis Curzon.
^^01 ja
/ nU rnalwmil A < </vsrt ( I
Viscoimt Grey.
Keyiiione View Co
The Rt. Hon. Phihp Snowden.
O Keystone View Co
The Rt. Hon. Wm. Hughes.
© Vandyk
Major-General Sir F. Maurice.
MEN PROMINENT IN BRITISH PUBLIC LIFE
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT 509
Owing, however, to the great increase in the expense of education, and to the
imperative need for retrenchment, many of the more important provisions of
the Act have remained a dead letter. In the thirty years between 1891 and
1921, expenditure on education increased from about £11^ million to £84,000,-
000, while in the same period the cost of pauperism (which education, it was
hoped, would eliminate) rose from £9,500,0(X) to £33,000,000. Public opinion
refused to tolerate further expenditure, and the most important reforms em-
bodied in the Fisher Act have, therefore, been indefinitely postponed.
THE NEW PABLIAMENTARY REFORM ACT — VOTES FOR WOMEN
The Parliamentary Reform Act has, on the other hand, come into full
operation. The genesis of the Bill was among legislative achievements of
this kind unique. It proceeded, more or less, as an agreed measure ” from a
conference of some thirty members of both Houses ‘‘ eminently representative
of the various shades of political opinion in Parliament and in the country,*^
selected and presided over by the Speaker (Mr. J. W. Lowther) of the House
of Commons. The result was a comprehensive measure, dealing with the
franchise, the registration of electors, the method of election, the cost of elec-
tions, and the distribution of seats. As regard the franchise: in addition to
various temporary provisions for soldiers and sailors who were serving or had
served in the war, and for the disqualification of conscientious objectors, it
was provided that all men of 21 years of age who were qualified by six
months’ residence or occupation of business premises, and all women of 30
years of age who were Local Government electors or wives of such electors,
should have a parliamentary vote. The property qualification was abolished,
but a man might vote in two constituencies: (1) on a residential qualification;
and (2) either for his business premises or as a University voter. Registers
of voters were to be prepared twice instead of once a year, and the State
and the local rates were to share the expenses of registration equally be-
tween them. Returning ofiicers’ expenses were to be paid by the Treasury,
and the maximum scale of election expenses was severely restricted.
As regards the distribution of seats, the principle of equal electoral dis-
tricts, each returning one member, was to be as far as possible observed. In
Great Britain there was to be one member for approximately every 70,000
of population; 44 old boroughs were extinguished, and 31 new boroughs
created, including 13 in greater London and 8 in Lancashire. Representa-
tion was given to the new Universities, thus bringing up University repre-
sentation from 9 to 15. The total membership of the House was increased
from 670 to 707 (including 105 Irish seats) . By the grant of Home Rule to
southern Ireland and the curtailment of Ulster’s representation in the Imperial
Parliament, the total membership was in 1923 again reduced to 615.
The great change effected by the Act was, of course, the enfranchisement
of women and the immense increase in the number of electors. By the Act
of 1832 about 450,000 electors were added to the roll; by that of 1867 about
1 million; by that of 1894 about 2 millions. It was estimated that the Act
of 1918 would increase the electorate from 8,357,000 to about 16,000,000. As
a fact it increased it to about 21,000,000, including 9,000,000 women, whose
enfranchisement was largely due to the fact that the work performed by
women during the war had broken down most of the opposition to the woman
suffrage movement. The women had cooperated loyally in the war and had
supplied the place of men in numerous occupations at home and even in
France. One after another the most pronoimced opponents of the movement
declared themselves converts; and the Commons accepted the proposal to
enfranchise women by an inunense majority.
510
GREAT BRITAIN SEES IT THROUGH
COALITION UNDEB LLOYD OEOB6E SWEEPS THE COUNTRY
The first election under the new franchise took place in December, 1918.
The Armistice had been concluded on November 11 ; the Peace Conference hac]
not yet opened. Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law, the two chiefs of
the parties which since 1915 had coalesced to form the Government, issued
a joint appeal to the electors to continue the system under which the war
had been brought to a triumphant issue. Mr. Asquith, at the head of a small
band of “independent” Liberals and the Labour party, advocated, on the
contrary, a return to the old order and fought the election on party lines.
The Coalition swept the country; 369 Coalition Unionists, 133 Coalition
Liberals and 10 National Democrats being returned in support of Mr. Lloyd
George and Mr. Bonar Law. Neither Mr. Asquith nor any of his principal
lieutenants were returned; the “independent” Liberals found themselves in
the new House a small band of 28 members, wholly leaderless, while Labour
increased its membership from 42 to 62, thus becoming the “ official ” Opposi-
tion.
EUROPEAN CHAOS
The chief task of the Coalition Government between 1918 and 1922 was
to “ clear up the mess ” left by the war, abroad and at home. The task
proved to be gigantic — perhaps beyond the limits of human capacity. The
Treaty of Versailles so far from providing a settlement of Europe, brought
to it neither settlement nor repose. A series of supplementary Congresses in
which Mr. Lloyd George played the most conspicuous part served only to
make the darkness visible. Of the debts — over £1,500,000,000 in amount —
owed by the Continental Allies to Great Britain, not one farthing has been
paid; nor have these debtor countries been too successful in balancing their
own budgets. Austria has been saved by the League of Nations and the
credit of the Powers, but Germany has sunk lower and lower into fraudulent
bankruptcy, and Hungary is in a condition of hopelessness. Greece, vaunt-
ing herself unduly, has been stricken on the field of battle by a Turkey which
has shown a wonderful power of recuperation, and has virtually dictated terms
of peace to the Powers by whom in the World War she was defeated. Russia,
a political and financial wreck, remains under the heel of an iron despotism
masquerading as the latest manifestation of democratic liberty. Italy has
been rescued from chaos by a great statesman, Mussolini, and a great pa-
triotic and anti-Bolshevik organisation known as the Fascisti. Spain also
has found salvation for the moment in a military dictatorship, which like
that of Italy is deferential to the Crown^ though contemptuous of parlia-
mentary institutions. France though now (1924) indebted to England in
the amount of over £600,000,000 and to the United States in the amount of
$3,000,000,000 and burdened with a total debt of about 250,000 million of
francs, has again shown her characteristic capacity for recuperation; so has
Belgium, but both are speculating upon the recovery of reparations from
Germany and have spared their respective peoples the terrible load of taxa-
tion which is crippling English trade. Exasperated by the evasions of
Germany, France, in January, 1923, occupied the industrial area of the
Ruhr; but this step, while intensifying the economic dislocation and political
disintegration of Germany, has thus far brought to France no tangible
advantages. Thus the European situation has gone steadily from bad to
worse, and it seems likely that for at least a generation to come victors and
vanquished will alike be paying a heavy penalty for the crime committed
bv the Hohenzollem and the Habsburgs in 1914.
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
511
IRELAND
Ireland fills a large space in the history of the years since 1918. The
rebellion of 1916 was followed by the proclamation of martial law, but while
Sir John Maxwell was administering that law with firmness and discretion
from Dublin, the English Government were considering a plan by which, with
general consent, the Home Rule Act might be brought into immediate opera-
tion. But Mr. Lloyd George, on succeeding to the Premiership, resolved to
try a fresh device. He summoned a convention to Dublin, representative of
all parties and interests in Ireland, and threw upon it the responsibility of
devising a scheme of Irish government. The Government undertook, if the
Dublin Convention could reach substantial agreement, to give le^slative
effect to its recommendations. The Convention duly reported in April, 1918,
but the measure of agreement was insufficient and the Government, therefore,
determined once more to produce a scheme on their own responsibility.
Meanwhile military conscription was tardily applied to Ireland (1918),
but it remained a dead letter, since Ireland was now in the grip of the Sinn
Fein revolutionaries. Between May 1, 1916, and September 30, 1919, no fewer
than 1,293 outrnges were perpetrated in Ireland. Attacks on British soldiers
and the Royal Irish Constabulary were almost daily reported, nor were they
at all abated by the enactment (1920) of a Bill for the better government of
Ireland Under this latest edition of Home Rule, two Parliaments, with
Executives responsible thereto, vrere to be established in Dublin and Belfast
respectively, and each Parliament was to contribute twenty members to an
all-Ireland Council, which it was hoped might, in time, develop into an all-
Ireland Parliament. The Nationalists in Ireland would, however, have none
of partition the Sinn Feiners demanded an independent republic. In
southern Ireland the scheme was still-born; Ulster accepted and is working
it as at least a preferable alternative to Home Rule of the Gladstonian type.
Meanwhile the social condition of southern Ireland went from bad to
worse. The British Government applied methods of repression with a half-
heartedness which was cruel to all parties and calamitous in its effects.
Soldiers and police sacrificed their lives in support of a Government unworthy
of their devotion. The end came with dramatic suddenness. On June 22,
1921, the King and Queen visited Belfast to open the Ulster Parliament. In
an historic speech King George appealed to ‘‘ all Irishmen to stretch out the
hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and forget and join in making
for the land which you all love a new era of peace and contentment and
good-will.” ^ . . . •
The response was immediate. The Prime Minister invited Sir James
Craig, the Ulster Premier, and Mr. de Valera, the Republican leader, to a con-
ference in London. The former promptly accepted the invitation: the latter
with hesitation and conditionally. On July 11 a truce was, however, pro-
claimed in Ireland; all the members of Dail Eireann — the revolutionary
convention — were released, and on July 14 Mr. de Valera and his colleagues
arrived in London. After lengthy negotiations the British Government offered,
under certain conditions, ‘‘ Dominion Status ” to southern Ireland, but on
August 10 the offer was refused by Mr. de Valera, in consultation with Dail
Eireann. The Dominion Status offered was, he declared, illusory; nothing
less than “ complete detachment ” would satisfy Ireland. Independence the
British Government would not concede; but the better sort in Ireland were
weary of anarchy, and after prolonged manoeuvres Mr. de Valera at last
accepted an invitation to further conference (October) , and on December 6,
1921, a “ Treaty ” was signed. Ireland was, under conditions, to enjoy the
612 GREAT BRITAIN SEIS IT THROUGH
full Dominion Status of Canada, under the style of the Irish Free State,
northern Ireland bavin| the nght to contract out of it. On March 31, 1922,
the Royal Assent was given to a Bill embodying the terms of the “ Treaty.”
In Ireland fbe “ Treaty ” had been approved by Dail Eireann on January
7 by a narrow majority (64 to 57), and despite a passionate protest from
De Valera. Three days later Mr. Arthur Griffith was elected head of the
Provisional Government, and on Jwiuary 22 the “ Treaty ” was unanimously
approved by the southern Irish Parliament. The British army evacuated
Ireland, the Royal Irish Constabulary were disbanded, and the last vestiges
of tihe British Government were removed from Dublin Castle. Ireland was
abandoned to anarchy and civil war. The Republicans with De Valera at
their head carried on a guerilla war against the new Government and inflicted
great damage upon the country and terrible suffering upon the people. The
virulence of the Republican party was demonstrated by the murder in
London of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, a distinguished English soldier,
the military adviser of Ulster, and one of the most patriotic citizens of the
empire (Jime). Two months later Mr. Michael Collins, the Commander
of the Irish Free State troops, was ambushed and killed in Ireland, only a
few days after the sudden and somewhat mysterious death of Mr. Arthur
Griffitii.
Mr. Cosgrave succeeded Mr. Griffith as President, and in December Mr.
T. M. Healy, for many years a distinguished member of the Imperial Parlia-
ment, was sworn in as Governor-General. They set themselves at once to
the insistent task of restoring peace to a distracted country. How far they
can succeed time only will show. Anyway, the fate of Ireland is now exclu-
sively committed to her own hands.
ENGLISH POLITICS
The Irish difficulty produced, as always, its reactions in English politics.
The Conservative wing of the Coalition party had from the first manifested
great uneasiness as to the Irish policy of the Cabinet. To save Ulster
from subordination to a Dublin Parliament they assented to the Bill of
1920; but the outrages in Ireland, and the bitter humiliations inflicted upon
soldiers of the Crown in Ireland and upon the Royal Irish Constabulary,
above all the negotiations for the “ Treaty,” led to a revolt among a con-
siderable section of the rank and flle of the Conservative party.
Ireland was, however, only the last straw. The stricter sect of Conserva-
tives had long suspected the Lloyd George Government of a sneaking sym-
pathy with socialistic doctrine. The 73 members of the Socialist party in
Parliament appeared to them to exert an influence upon administration and
legislation out of all proportion to their numbers. A policy of nationalisation
as applied to coal-mines and railways was believed to find favour in influential
quarters, while the administration of certain departments gave evidence of a
similar influence in operation. With the approach of the period for the dis-
solution of the “ Armistice Parliament,” a large majority of the Conservative
party resolved to break up the Coalition and to resume their old party inde-
pendence. Mr. Bonar Law was induced to emerge from partial retirement,
and on the resignation of Mr. Lloyd George (October, 1922) became Prime
Minister at Uie head of a purely Conservative Cabinet.
An appeal to the coimtry in November confirmed the new Government in
office and gave the Conservatives a majority of 79 over all other parties com-
bined. The Labour-Socialist party at tiie same time increased its repre-
sentation from 73 to 142. After a few months of office Mr. Bonar Law’s
SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT
513
health gave way (he died October 30, 1923) and he was succeeded in the
Premiership by Mr. Stanley Baldwin, who had taken a prominent part in the
Conservative revolt of the previous autumn and had become Chancellor of
the Exchequer under Mr Bonar Law.
Convinced that economic conditions in England — notably the continuance
of unemployment — called for a drastic change of fiscal policy in favour of
some measure of protection, the new Premier appealed to the country for a
mandate to give effect to his convictions (November, 1923) . The response
was unfavourable: the Labour-Socialists again increased their representa-
tion from 142 to 191 ; the Liberals from 117 to 155, while the Conservatives
decreased from 347 to 259.
A situation is thus created to which there is no precise parallel in English
histo^. Of the three parties in Parliament, none has an absolute majority,
and, in the absence of a fresh coalition, the idea of which is equally distasteful
to all parties, one party must hold office on the sufferance of one or both of
the other two. On the meeting of the new Parliament (January, 1924) Mr.
Asquith moved a vote of no-confidence in Mr. Baldwin’s Ministry. Supported
by the Labour-Socialists, and by all save a handful of Liberals, the motion
was carried by a large majority. Mr Baldwin immediately resigned, and the
King entrusted the formation of a new administration to Mr. Ramsay Mac-
Donald, the leader of the Labour-Socialists in Parliament. Mr. MacDonald
has formed a Government with himself as Prime Minister and Foreign Sec-
retary, Mr. Clynes, who began life as a Lancaster mill-hand, as Lord Privy
Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, and Mr. J. H. Thomas, an ex-
railway servant, as Colonial Secretary ; Mr. Snowden, a strong Socialist of an
academic type, has become Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Sidney
Webb, a well-known Fabian Economist, President of the Board of Trade.
Lord Haldane has greatly facilitated the formation of a Labour Government
by resuming his seat on the wool-sack, and also four other Peers have joined it.
The advent of a Government of an entirely unprecedented type has been
received in England with complete and characteristic sang-^froid. The older
parties and almost the entire Press seem determined to give the new Ministers
something more than fair-play, and indeed to assist them, in all legitimate
ways, to walk worthy of the high vocation to which they are called True,
the full implications of a new experiment are somewhat disguised by the fact
that the new Ministers are not the masters, but the servants, of the House of
Commons, and that thus far they have shown themselves conscious of this
governing fact. But when all deductions have been made, it remains true
that January, 1924, has marked an era of no small significance in En^ish
history.
T. B. Y. — VOL I
33
CHAPTER XXVII
lEELAND’S PROBLEMS
By The Rt. Hon. Sib Horace Plunkett, K.C.V.O , F.R.S., LL.D.
Founder of the Irish Agncultural Organisation Society; Member
of Parliament (189^1900); Commissioner Congested Distncta
Board, Ireland; First Vice-President of Department of Agri-
culture and Technical Instruction, Ireland; Chairman Irish Con-
vention, 1917-1918. Author of Ireland m the New Century; etc.
INTRODUCTORY
The history of almost every civilised country in the first quarter of the
twentieth century will centre round the gathering and breaking of the World
War storm and its aftermath of woe. In Ireland, on the other hand, the
realities of the war seemed but to hasten the centuries-old Irish Question ”
along its predestined road. The space at my disposal permits but a very
restricted treatment of my subject. I shall, therefore, concentrate upon this
distinguishing aspect of Ireland’s latest story. I shall tell of the political
and military struggle by the majority of the people to put an end to the
legislative and administrative control of the British Government, in which
they succeeded, and, at the same time, to maintain the legislative and
administrative unity of the country as a whole, in which they failed. To
understand this strange and momentous chapter in Irish history, it will be
necessary to have a clear conception of the positions held respectively at the
beginning of this period by the three forces in action — the Irish majority,
the governing class in Britain and the Protestant community of Ulster.^
These three positions I will very briefly state
History had taught the Irish majority to regard England as the enemy.
The fact that this majority was Catholic acted as a check on every attempt
to fuse Ireland into one whole with Great Britain. The space limit precludes
an adequate consideration of the ever-present religious factor in the Irish
problem. But two things may be noted. During the period to be reviewed
there was a distinct decline in the political power of the Roman Catholic
clergy. The Irish Catholics found it natural to accept the cult of national-
ibm, and to claim for Ireland the right to the undivided allegiance of all
Irishmen. It is also essential to realise that the Irish mind cleaves to the
historic claim for Ireland’s independence, with power to develop her own
civilisation and take her place among the nations.
The governing classes of Great Britain, predominantly Protestant, held
that the fiscal union of the British Isles, and a single undivided control over
British armaments and British foreign policy, were essential for the peace
and prosperity of the then United Kingdom, to which the whole of an Irish-
man’s loyalty was due.
XI. Ulster is commonly used, and I shall henceforth use it here, to specify
the Protestant community in that provmce.
514
O Underwood & Underwood
The historic ** Four Courts ” in Dublin in flames and ashes after the battle between the Free State
and irregular troops in 1922. These law courts were erected between 1786 and 1796.
SIR HORACE PLUNKETT
515
The Ulster Protestant subscribed to this doctrine. He saw in a separate
tariff system, controlled by a Dublin Parliament dominated by farmers
ignorant of modern industrial conditions, economic ruin for the whole fabric
of manufacturing industry he had laboriously built up. By sentiment and
tradition he felt himself to be a citizen of the United Kingdom no less than
an Irishman. If one side of this dual nationality must go, he was determined
that it should not be the British side.
THE HOME RULE CONFLICT BEFORE THE WAR
The British Liberal party had, since 1885, been committed to the doctrine
of Home Rule, subject to the above-named fiscal, military and foreign policy
reservations. To the Tories, Irish nationalism was fimdamentally separatist:
a Dublin Parliament would be a powerful lever in the hands of an implacable
adversary. Both these parties hoped that a policy of land reform and other
ameliorative legislation would counteract the desire for complete independence
and the reliance upon violent agitation for the removal of political griev-
ances. The Tory view went further, and indulged the illusion that material
prosperity through governmental assistance would lead to the final accept-
ance of British rule.
Between 1891 and 1911 a series of enactments, too numerous to specify,
tried out the ameliorative policy. The Congested Districts Board ^ dealt
with the problem of overpopulation on the barren mountain sides of the
western seaboard — the legacy of CromwelPs alternative Hell or Con-
naught.” A land settlement, supplemented with a remarkably successful
cooperative movement, and the provision, under the Department of Agri-
culture and Technical Instruction,^ of a modem system of agricultural and
industrial development, had raised the standard of comfort, which had been
deplorably low, more rapidly than it had risen during these same decades
in Britain. Agricultural labourers were provided, at public expense, with
decent houses. Local administration had been made as democratic as in
England. On the surface there was peace.
The material and social benefits of these measures were admittedly great:
their political result was the reverse of what had been expected. Increased
wealth and improved education had given the Irish Catholic leisure and
facilities for examining the histo^ of England. His attention was concen-
trated upon the commercial restrictions and Penal Laws of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. In 1896 the British Financial Relations Com-
mission had admitted a grave overtaxation of Ireland. The Irish Catholic
looked back to the old Gaelic civilisation which had been destroyed by
successive invaders. He saw that, with the passage of the land back from
the landlords to the native Irish, the political centre of gravity would shift
from the Protestant ascendency to the descendants of the Gael. He dreamt
of restoring or creating a Gaelic civilisation, free from all taint of British
influence. In the ’eighties the Gaelic Athletic Association had revived
Irish games, excluding supporters of the British connection from participa-
tion therein. The Gaelic League,* on the other hand, sought to make converts,
following ParaelTs dictum that Ireland could not spare a man. But it was
no less wholehearted in persuading the country to turn its back on Great
^ Created in 1891. Its powers and funds were added to in subsequent years.
^ Created in 1899 and commenced work in 1900. It has laid the foundations through
improv^ vocational education for rapid material advancement when the countiy is
again settl^.
^ Founded in 1892.
IRELAND’S PROBLEMS
516
Britain. It relied chiefly upon the revival of the Irish lan^age for building
up a Gaelic culture. It professed to eschew politics, but its political effect
was immense.
It was Arthur GriflSth who first saw the need for the political incarnation
and practical application of the spirit of the League. In 1906 he founded
Sinn Fein^ as an organisation created to promote his policy. To conciliate
the Irish Protestant he spoke not of undoing the conquest but of restoring
the Constitution of 1783, in winning which the Ulster Protestant had played
a leading part. But the end in view was political, economic and spiritual
independence, to be attained by refusing to recognise the validity of the
Union, boycotting the British Parliament and peacefully building up the
machinery of an independent government in Ireland. GriflSth^s policy did
not attract many supporters. It was generally regarded as impracticable.
But the spirit which inspired it had the sympathy of the rising generation.
Even from the Irish Labour world, led by Connolly and Larkin, came unex-
pected support. Harsh experience had taught them the doctrine of the class
war, but they were both by instinct strong Nationalists. Suspecting that
the strength of the Irish employer lay in the support he received from Eng-
lish capitalism, they felt that an Irish Republic was the shortest road to
the Irish workman's rights — a doctrine they preached in the Labour press.
Thus in the first decade of the twentieth century Young Ireland could be
seen everywhere threatening to overstep the bounds set by British states-
men for the Irish nation. Nevertheless in 1912, the Liberal Cabinet, having
removed the chief obstacle to Home Rule, the veto of the House of Lords,
brought forward a bill embodying its Irish policy. It was plain that Home
Rule could be enacted and, unless Ulster showed that she would resist it
by force, carried into effect.
The Ulster Protestants resolved to resist. They bound themselves by a
solemn covenant to refuse obedience to an Irish Parliament. In the tv;o
years before the World War, they planned a Provincial Government and
raised and armed a volunteer force of 100,000 men — proceedings thoroughly
in harmony with Ulster traditions and quite spontaneous. But, as the dis-
like of Home Rule was based not merely on an objection to being forced
under a Dublin Parliament, but also on a desire to remain in union with
Great Britain, Ulster looked for support from that quarter, and received
it in full measure. Mr. Bonar Law pledged the Tory party to support the
armed resistance unless the Government submitted their bill to the verdict
of a new election.
It was now clear that the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament would
either have to yield to the Ulster challenge or be upheld by military force.
A new factor seemed to preclude the second alternative. It was common
knowledge that British officers of standing would offer to resign if called
upon to act against Carson's volunteers. The war clouds were gathering
over Europe, and the merest suspicion of discontent in the British army,
whose expeditionary force was relied upon to preserve the nicely calculated
balance of power in Europe, mi^t expedite Armageddon. The scales fell
from the eyes of the Irish Parliamentary party. Ulster knew, and they knew,
that the Liberals would not coerce the northern province, and that Young
Ireland would tolerate no such denial of their ideal, ‘‘ Ireland a Nation,” as
would be the exclusion of a province, which the Liberal Government now
began to suggest. They had no solution of ttieir own to offer, and could do
nothing but watch the course of events with helpless anger and dismay.
^ ^ Literally translated “ we ourselves ” and pronounced Shin Fane “ Ireland for the
Irish ” would best signify the chief implication of the term.
SIR HORACE PLUNKETT
617
The situation grew worse and worse. The physical force policy had been
abandoned because the Liberal-Irish alliance seemed to give promise of
Home Rule. But now that a Liberal Government had allowed Ulster to arm,
how could it prevent Nationalist Ireland from arming too? Labour was early
in the field. Beaten in the Dublin stnke of 1913, Connolly and Larkin had
organised the Irish Citizen Army to act in Labour’s interest. Its numbers
were small — under 2,000 men — but their temper and Connolly’s personality
made it dangerous. The intellectuals were equally swift to seize the oppor-
tunity. In November, 1913, a dozen advanced Nationalists met in Dublin
and decided to bring into being an Irish volunteer force. These men belonged
to different organisations and different schools of thought and their aims
differed. None of them desired to see the Irish volunteer force turn its
weapons against the Ulster volunteers; some intended that it should be used
to win Ireland’s independence when the hour of England’s difSculty arrived.
Now the Home Rule Bill reserved the control of military forces to the
British Parliament and the appearance of an Irish volunteer force, whose
programme declared it to be a permanent organ of the Irish nation, was a
startling confirmation of the Tory contention that the reservations and restric-
tions in the Home Rule Bill were illusory. The Irish Parliamentary party,
now depending for their very existence on British adoption of their policy,
naturally disapproved of the Volunteer movement. But the provocation
offered by Ulster was too great. The country took up the challenge, and it
was plain that the controllers of the Irish volunteer force would soon be
dangerous rivals to the party. Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary
party, tried to get control of the force by nominating for the governing com-
mittee men he could trust. But it was too late, and the danger to the Govern-
ment would now be in direct proportion to the possession of arms by the
volunteers. In April, 1914, the Ulster volunteers landed rifles and ammunition
at Lame. No action was subsequently taken by the Government to secure
control of these arms, which were everywhere publicly displayed. Three
months later the Irish volunteers landed rifles at Howth. A Dublin police
officer called out the military and endeavoured to seize the rifles when they
were in the hands of the volunteers. The incident was unaccompanied by
loss of life, but a rumour reached Dublin that there had been a massacre.
An angry crowd stoned the soldiers on their way back to barracks. They
fired, killing three and wounding some forty men, women and children. A
flame of anger shot up in all Nationalist Ireland. Two days previously had
come the news of a break-down in a final effort to bring about a compromise
on the Home Rule Bill, and it seemed certain that the Liberal Government
would proceed with an amendment of the bill which Redmond would not
dare to accept. So signal a failure of the Parliamentary party would be the
end of constitutional methods.
THE UNSETTLED IRISH QUESTION IN THE WORLD WAR
The outbreak of the World War merely postponed the evil day. John
Redmond, the leader of the old Irish Nationalist party in the British Parlia-
ment, chivalrously promised Ireland’s cooperation without bargaining for any
reward. His hope was that Ulster might be won if Nationalist Ireland showed
herself loyal to Great Britain in the hour of need. Redmond’s magnanimity
was loudly applauded in England. It was assumed that he spoke for Catholic
Ireland: it was hoped that Ulster would shake hands with her old adversary
and that all would be harmony within the British Isles. Ulster held back,
IRELAND’S PROBLEMS
518
utterly mistrusting Catholic Ireland — a mistrust shared by the War Office
which declined to arm, train or recognise the Irish volunteers.
Redmond’s policy was from the first sharply challenged by the yoimgc]
Nationalists, and when in September, 1914, he called on the Irish volunteer*
to furnish recruits for service in Prance, the original governing committei
retorted by expelling his nominees. Redmond then formed a new force
the National volunteers, and his name was still strong enough to drav
away about 160,000 out of the 170,000 Irish volunteers. But the men were
half-hearted, and it was now plain that Redmond’s policy was doomed unless
he could persuade the British Government to commit itself to putting Home
Rule for the whole of Ireland, with liberal guarantees to Ulster, into opera-
tion after the war. The British Cabinet could make no such offer. The
leaders of the Irish volunteers increased in influence daily and carried on a
vigorous and successful anti-recruiting campaign.
From the outbreak of the war, the possibility of an armed insurrection
with German aid had been contemplated by the Irish Republican Brother-
hood, a secret society in the Fenian tradition, which furnished some of the
Irish volunteers. Throughout 1915 touch with Germany was maintained
largely through Irish-American channels. Under pressure from Labour’s
Citizen Army the Irish volunteers agreed, with much misgivings, to a plan
for a rising at Easter, 1916. A German ship was to land arms in Kerry.
While they were being distributed to the volunteers in the south and west,
the Dublin brigade of the volunteers and the Citizen Army were to seize
and hold the city. The plan miscarried, and the German ship had to sink
herself to avoid capture. When the news reached Dublin, there was division
in the councils of the volunteers. MacNeill (now Minister of Education)
cancelled the orders for a mobilisation. Pearse, who was then proclaimed
President of the Republic, Connolly, and Clarke, a Fenian leader, declined
to accept this decision and chose to strike and be beaten rather than submit
and be disarmed. It was a forlorn hope; but these men reckoned that their
failure would raise up in Ireland a spirit that England could neither placate
nor subdue.
The Irish Government was taken by surprise. Though not more than a
thousand volimteers turned out on Easter Monday, they succeeded in seizing
most of their objectives in the city. The plan was simply to hold what
they had seized as long as possible, in the hope that the Irish people would
rise to support them. They were left unsupported, to be hemmed in by
reinforcements from England and overpowered by artillery. The fact was,
the Irish people were angered by the useless sacrifice of innocent lives and,
but for the military and political mishandling of the situation, Sinn Fein,
instead of being greatly strengthened, might have lost its influence. Had
the army, whose comrades were fighting for the very existence of their
country, indulged in a bloody suppression of the rising, they would not have
been too harshly judged. But that is not the British way. When the rebels
had capitulated, 15 of their leaders, several of them poets and dreamers,
were tried and executed. Some 3,000 Irishmen, taken at random, as it
seemed, were interned in Britain It became known that an insane British
officer had arrested Sheehy Skeffington, a well-known pacifist, and executed
him with two others, without even the formality of a trial. Asquith came
to Ireland, promised the abolition of Castle Government and delegated the
task of an Irish settlement to Lloyd George. Castle Government remained,
and no settlement was reached. The moral authority of the British rSgime
vanished. The country could now be held by force alone.
At Christmas, 1916, shortly after Lloyd George became Prime Minister,
the interned Irishmen were released. They forthwith sank their differences
SIR HORACE PLUNKETT
519
and settled down to the work of organising Ireland to secure her inde-
pendence. America’s entry into the war made it impolitic to rely longer
upon German aid. On the other hand, President Wilson’s doctrine of self-
determination suggested that the Irish claim might be brought up at the
Peace Conference. It was therefore decided to rely in the first instance on
an appeal to that quarter. By-elections in 1917 showed that Nationalist
Ireland had swung over to Sinn Fein. The volunteers were drilling, and
arming themselves by raids on private houses. In the west the people were
taking the law into their own hands and dividing up the land. The cooler
heads in Sinn Fein had difiiculty in restraining the physical force men. The
young of both sexes were straining at the leash.
Meanwhile Lloyd George, having to consider the unsettled Irish Question
as a factor in America’s attitude to the British and the World War, turned
his mind again to the search for a settlement. The Irish Convention was
set up and invited to frame a constitution for Ireland within the empire.
He promised to give effect to its proposals if a substantial measure of agree-
ment were attained. The Convention, which sat from July, 1917, to April,
1918, was representative of all that five years previously had been influential
in Ireland. But Sinn Fein, which now commanded the allegiance of the
young, declined to participate. Still the Convention struggled hard to find
an acceptable solution for the Irish problem based upon “ a single Parlia-
ment for an United Ireland ” admitted by Lloyd George in a letter to its
chairman (the present writer) to be “ an essential of a settlement.” On
this basis the representatives of the southern Unionists could have made
terms with those of Irish Nationalism if only Ulster would come in. But
Ulster could not be moved
A settlement was not arrived at in the Convention, but its majority
report might have led to further negotiation but for an untoward circum-
stance. Wien the result of its deliberations reached the British Cabinet
early in April, 1918, military disaster in France made it urgent to reinforce
the shattered armies. Driven by a demand from England, Scotland and
Wales for the conscription of at least the young men of Ireland, Lloyd George
induced Parliament to extend compulsopr service to that country while its
long-promised Parliament was interned in the statute book. This affront to
Irish Nationalism united the Irish as never before. It soon became evident
that the trained soldiers who would have to be employed would outnumber
the raw recruits who could be dragged to the front. The British Govern-
ment shirked the contest, thereby losing for ever its prestige and moral
authority. There was as yet no Irish Government to take its place, and the
political demoralisation of the country grew apace.
POLICY AND FORCE AFTER THE WAR
After the Armistice of November, 1918, came the General Election. A
Home Rule Act was on the statute book, but not yet in force. The powers
given by the Act were less than the most moderate Nationalist now de-
manded, and Ulster had wrung from almost every British statesman the
promise that it should never be compelled to come under a Dublin Parlia-
ment. Sinn Fein had saved Ireland from conscription, and confidently
believed that America might be induced to compel England to reco^ise
an Irish Republic. The Parliamentary party had failed, and the chief issue
of the election was its extinction. Few realised that in voting for Sinn Fein
they were committing the country to waging war singlehanded against Eng-
land. But the political victory of Sinn Fein was complete.
520
IRELAND’S PROBLEMS
In January, 1919, the Sinn Feiners elected met at Dail Eireann^ and
proclaimed Ireland an independent Republic. De Valera was elected Presi-
dent. An Irish delegation having failed to obtain recognition at Versailles,
Sinn Fein decided to set up a native government side by side with the British
Government, to claim for it the allegiance of all Irishmen, to equip it with
machinery for enforcing its claims, to capture and control the local self-
governing bodies, and thus to oust the British. The process was to be
gradual and, as far as possible, peaceable, a high standard of probity and
eflBciency being maintained. Obviously the British Government, which ever
since the Easter Rebellion had been striving to disarm and suppress the
Irish volunteers, must sooner or later strike at the whole machinery of
the Irish Republic. Then the Irish volunteer force, or the Irish Republican
Army, as it was now called, would be compelled to wage a defensive war.
On the whole the Sinn Fcin programme was carried out according to plan,
though probably few members of Dail Eireann foresaw the ugly and de-
moralising nature of the war they were entering upon. The military leaders
would have to do whatever might be necessary to attain their objective.
So long as the British Government was receiving full information, it could
at any moment seize the Sinn Fein leaders, raid their stores of arms and
thus paralyse the republic. The first essential step was to deprive the Govern-
ment of its eyes and ears by destroying the police and intimidating the
would-be informer. Here Sinn Fein could reckon on the active sympathy
of nine-tenths of Catholic Ireland. It had friends in all the Government
oflBces, and especially in the Post Office. Its secret service was thus able
to censor ofiicial communications, the Viceroy’s post-bag not being immune.
Not only those who sold their side for money, but also Irish Unionists who
gave information, such as warnings of ambushes, being in conscience bound
to protect the forces of the Government, were treated as spies. Those engaged
in secret-service work were executed ” with or without the formality of
a trial. Service on British court-martials was held to justify assassination.
Against the police force, backed by the Army of Occupation, as it was
commonly called, Sinn Fein had the young men organised in the Irish Repub-
lican Army, as a territorial militia under local leaders. But at first very
few of the men had arms. Wearing imiform or acting in permanent forma-
tions which could easily be distinguished from the civil population, they
would have been easily demolished. Their one chance of success was to live
unrecognised among the civil population, employing all the devices of guerilla
warfare. Many unarmed individuals were slain, and at times the conflict
degenerated into cold-blooded murder. There were signs that the conscience
of the country was being revolted by some of the outrages peit)etrated, when
the British Cabinet took the disastrous step of announcing a policy of re-
prisals, including the burning of the rebels’ houses. Their reply was for
every cottage a castle ” — no idle threat. With few exceptions the regular
army, charged with a most distasteful political mission, acted up to its
humane tradition, and it would be wholly unjust to make them responsible
for the acts of a minority of the irregular forces brought over to deal with
the emergency and turned loose upon the country. ^
The British Government could not make their strength felt without
admitting a state of war in Ireland, and thereby drawing the world’s atten-
tion to the spectacle of England denying to Ireland the right of self-deter-
mination, while asserting it in the case of other small nationalities. This
1 The Parliament of Ireland, pronounced Dawl Ehrhann.
2 These consisted largely of men discharged from the army. They came in
uniforms, and, in the process of changmg into the dark green umforms of the police, were
nicknamed The Black and Tans.”
) Keystone View Co.
Roger Casement.
I Keystone View Co
Michael Collins.
Of these six men prominently identified with recent Irish history, two met with a violent deatiiy
Casement having been hanged and Collins perishing at the hands of irregulars; Griffith died sud-
denly and for a considerable period De Valera’s life was in nArii
SIR HORACE PLUNKETT
521
consideration precluded resort to a blockade, the destruction of villages or
the other wholesale methods of terror which can be defended by — and only
by — the existence of a state of war. The army was hopelessly handicapped
and compelled for the most part to stand on the defensive, boycotted, insulted
and exposed to attacks which to it seemed treacherous murder. The military
were concentrated and kept under strict discipline, the brunt of the struggle
falling on the police who were scattered in small barracks over the country-
side. Resignations, induced by boycott and intimidation, seriously depleted
the ranks of the famous Royal Irish Constabulary. The remaining police,
with an increasing proportion of imported men ignorant of the country, did
what they could. They raided for arms, enemy correspondence and wanted
men. But they were often ambushed, and any man who showed conspicuous
zeal or ability was marked down to be shot. BafHed and enraged, some of the
police broke through all restraints and tried to strike terror into the county-
side. They would revenge the death of comrades by burning a cooperative
creamery, wrecking a town or shooting a prominent Sinn Feiner, often the
best and most respected man in a county. When they laid hands on a man
whom they believed to be an active member of the Republican Army, they
shot him where they found him, even if it were in the presence of his
wife They became aware that opinion in both countries was against them.
Their morale broke down. They lost faith in their leaders. Some looted.
Many drank. They alienated friends as often as they intimidated a foe.
On the other side, the Sinn Feiners were confident in the justice of their
cause, which the opinion of the world had supported. They had faith in
their leaders, knew the country, had early and accurate information and,
if entirely ruthless, were rigidly sober. Every blow they struck went home.
Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister, in deference to the prejudices of the
party dominant in the Coalition, and heavily preoccupied with world affairs,
postponed time after time a political settlement, and as soon as American
opinion ceased to be of vital importance, abandoned all efforts at conciliation
in favour of force.
THE SETTLEMENT THAT DID NOT SETTLE
By the summer of 1921 the British Cabinet had come to see that Ireland
could not be reconquered without the wholesale application of measures
hardly less cruel than the sporadic excesses of the auxiliary police and of
the undisciplined forces on the other side which neither English, nor indeed
world opinion, would tolerate. So Lloyd George was allowed to call a truce
and make a great bid for peace At an earlier stage, while the events just
summarised were absorbing public attention to the complete exclusion from
the Irish mind of political action in far-off Westminster, he had induced
Parliament to pass a new Home Rule Bill which Ulster did not want and
the rest of Ireland simply ignored. Briefiy, it set up two Parliaments for
two areas, now for the first time placed upon the British political map.
“ Northern Ireland included six counties of Ulster, and ‘‘ Southern Ireland ”
the other 26 counties of Ireland Thus Ireland and Ulster were both parti-
tioned, the Covenant being scrapped in the three predominantly Catholic
counties of the northern province. Two of the six counties, Tyrone and Fer-
managh, almost wholly agricultural, would if allowed self-determination have
thrown in their lot with the 26 counties. But then the Ulster leaders would
have had to face the danger of a Labour majority. It was attempted to gild
the pill of partition by setting up a “ Council of Ireland upon which the six
and the 26 counties were to be equally represented. This institution has so
IRELAND’S PROBLEMS
522
far “ failed to materialise.” Its powers were to be nominal unless both Parlia-
ments agreed to increase them. It dangled before the patriot the vision of
an all-Ireland Parliament.
Now, however, Lloyd George had realised that his peace offer must go
the length of Dominion status for Ireland outside the six north-eastern coun-
ties — a concessioi^ he had been implored by moderate Irishmen to make
when it might have saved all the horrors of the period after the Armistice.
The offer was accompanied with certain reservations suggested by the strategic
and economic interdependence of the two islands. The oath of allegiance
common to the British Commonwealth was an essential condition.
The Sinn Fein leaders had now seriously to consider their duty. Were
they to ask Ireland to fight on rather than accept an oath of allegiance
which after all meant little more than a promise of such friendship and
cooperation as Irish leaders had always professed that a liberated Ireland
would be ready to give? Was Ireland to compel Ulster to come in against
its will, a question which could be asked only by those wholly ignorant
of Ulster? There was a division of opinion in the Sinn Fein Cabinet, but
De Valera was at length persuaded to enter into negotiations: a truce was
made and a delegation, which included Collins and Griffith but not De Valera,
was sent to London In the subsequent negotiations England conceded Ire-
land’s right to fiscal autonomy. Collins and Griffith were now satisfied that
the terms offered gave Ireland the essentials of freedom They had formed
the opinion that England would fight rather than give way on the questions
of naval security, Ulster and allegiance to the King. When therefore the
British Cabinet refused to allow negotiations to drag on any longer, Collins
and Griffith and their colleagues on the delegation decided to accept the
Free State offer.
The treaty, signed on December 6, 1921, at once split the Sinn Fein Cabi-
net. De Valera issued a manifesto denouncing it, and, when the Dail Eireann
met, there were long and angry debates. At last on January 8, 1922, the
treaty was ratified by a narrow margin, 64 votes to 57. De Valera resigned
his office. Griffith was elected President of Dail Eireann in his place and a
Provisional Government was set up in accordance with the terms of the treaty'.
It was generally agreed that the decision of the Dail had the approval of
at least three-quarters of the population, but the minority refused to be
bound by it. Numerically weak thou^ it was, the minority was dangerous
as it included a large section of the Irish Republican Army. The rank and
file of this army and many of its leaders were little more than boys. They
had been told that they were fighting not for Home Rule but for an Irish
Republic — they knew nothing and cared nothing about the difference between
Gladstonian Home Rule and Dominion status. 'The oath to an English
King was poison to them, and they did not see how any Irishman could take
it. Encouraged by idealists, appealed to by women infuriated by the suffer-
ing of their menfolk at the hands of the Black and Tans, they saw in com-
promise nothing but dishonesty and dishonour. Not a few were disinclined
to abandon a life of not unprofitable adventure for the laborious paths
of peace.
This minority denied the right of a war-weary majority to disestablish
the republic for the sake of peace with England. By obstruction and open
defiance they endeavoured to destroy the authority of the Provisional Govern-
ment and with it the treaty. Failing in this, they reverted to guerilla war —
this time against their own countrymen. They struck at the lives and
properties of active supporters of the Free State and at the economic life of
the country which they sought to paralyse by destroying the railways and
the roads. Government buildings, many containing priceless records, were
SIR HORACE PLUNKETT
523
burned to the ground. The only tangible result of this wanton destruction
was to rob Ireland of the prosperity which her food production in the war had
brought within her easy reach. Far more serious than the material loss was
the general demoralisation of the country-side, where th.e habit of obedience
had perished, the machinery of the law had been destroyed and the pay-
ment of taxes had lapsed. The Republican army, which had hitherto kept
order in a rough and ready way, was now rent in sunder by faction from
top to bottom. There was no authority anywhere. Even the Church had
lost its influence in the sphere of morals. The high-handed and the dis-
honest became a law unto themselves Just when the threat of chaos was
at its worst, Griffith was killed by overwork and Collins by a Republican
bullet.
But in spite of these calamities the Free State Government saved the
situation by extraordinary courage and perseverance. In the midst of civil
war, it built up a new and serviceable army. It resolutely declined to be
drawn into fresh debates on the Terms of the Treaty, and it did not shrink
from drastic measures to bring a murderous guerilla warfare to a close.
By July, 1923, the Republicans had been forced to abandon the policy of
armed resistance, and at the General Election held in August there was little
disturbance or intimidation. The election gave 46 seats to Republicans and
107 seats to the supporters of the treaty. In the following month the Free
State of Ireland was formally admitted into the League of Nations. It also
took part in the Imperial Conference which assembled in October, 1923.
THE TWO IRELANDS
We must now turn back to Ulster At the end of the war, it was generally
admitted that Ulster’s hostility to Home Rule had weakened Labour was
beginning to think of its own class interests and to see the need for union
between Protestant and Catholic wage-earners. But if Sinn Fein’s tactics
in 1920 and 1921 proved successful in bnnging England to terms, they were
equally effective in repelling Ulster. In July, 1920, the Protestant ship-
yard workers in Belfast rose against their Catholic fellows, presuming them
to be in sympathy with their co-religionists in the south, drove them out of
the ship-yards, and later fired their houses under cover of night. Gunmen
of the Irish Republican Army came to their rescue from the south and, for
the next two years, riots and bloodshed were constantly recurring in the
streets of Belfast or in other parts of the six counties. It was not till July,
1922, that the newly formed Northern Government could claim that life
and property were secure within its jurisdiction. By that time Ulster had
hardened in its resolve never to enter into any form of partnership with
Catholic Ireland, and the unedifying spectacle of civil war in the Free
State increased a hundredfold the strength of its determination. But
northern Ireland was not yet freed from anxiety.
The Treaty of December, 1921, drafted and signed without consultation
with Ulster’s representatives, provided for the appointment of three com-
missioners by the Free State, northern Ireland and the British Government
respectively, to rectify the boundary between northern Ireland and the
Free State. The commissioners were to have regard to geographical and
economic conditions and to the wishes of the inhabitants. This provision of
the treaty threatens Ulster with the loss of the counties of Tyrone and
Fermanagh — and the city of Londonderry, all of which if granted self-
determination would, by a small but safe majority, give their allegiance to
the Free State. The loss of these areas would be a deadly blow to the
IRELAND’S PROBLEMS
524
pride of Ulster. Londonderry and Enniskillen are the holy cities of the
Ulster tradition, and there are strong Protestant populations in Tyrone and
Fermanagh, armed and organised to resist separation. On the other hand,
it is not easy for the Free State to forget the Catholic population in the
border counties. The appointment of the Boundary Commission was post-
poned owing to the Republican outbreak, but the Free State Government
is now demanding that it shall be called into operation. Some hold that
this demand will give rise to a dispute likely to lead to a rupture between
members Britain and the Free State) of the League ’’ of Nations, which
its council declared on September 28, 1923, to be within its duty to deal
with tmder Article 15 of the Covenant.
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
Any reader, looking back over the period I have traversed, will note one
outstanding change for the worse. At the beginning an effort was being
made by moderate men eveiywhcre to reconcile the conflicting claims of
Great Britain and Ireland Similar work of conciliation was needed to meet
the Ulster difficulty But the policy of the predominant party in Ireland
had no patience with — or worse, affected to ignore — the strange but none
the 'less genuine ideal of that community. To this failure of statesmanship
may be attributed the passing of all influence upon the conduct of Irish affairs
into the hands of extremists on both sides of the Irish Sea, and the stirring up
again of the religious and racial animosities, whose fires had been dying down.
In the end. Great Britain, Ireland and Ulster have all had to surrender their
principles. To-day there is a tariff wall in the once United Kingdom between
the Free State and Great Britain and Ulster. Ireland is partitioned, but
remains in the British Empire Ulster is separated wholly from the rest of
Ireland and largely from Great Britain.
On the brighter side of the outlook, reckless destruction has subsided into
sullen obstruction; and this too is yielding to the sobering influence of time.
The Free State Government has shown a high degree of courage and signs of
real statesmanship. It has, on the whole, reacted to the wishes of the ma-
jority of the Irish people The economic problems to be faced are of appalling
dilBculty, but the material resources of the country, being mainly agricul-
tural, cannot have been destroyed, however their development may have been
retarded. The demoralisation incidental to the events recorded was not of
sufficiently long duration to have gone very deep. Circumstances will impose
cooperation in many matters on the two Irelands. The Intransigents must
take up their work as a constitutional opposition or cease to count. The
moderate majority has shown itself willing to make ample allowance for the
unprecedented difficulties of the Government. Under such conditions, the
recovery of Ireland, with all that it means for herself and the world, is not
only possible, but need not be long delayed.
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD
POWER
By John H Latan6
Professor of American Histoiy and Creswell Lecturer on Inter-
national Law m Johns Hopkins Umversity Author of America
as a World Power; The United States and Latin America;
History of the United States; etc.
NEW EPOCH MARKED BY THE SPANISH WAR
The war with Spain marked the end of the long period of political, finan-
cial and economic reconstruction which followed the Civil War. The attention
of the American people, absorbed for more than a generation by internal
problems, was directed once more to questions of foreign policy which had
lain dormant for half a century. Expansion to the south, at a standstill since
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, was resumed, and the long-delayed,
but inevitable, advance into the Caribbean, a favourite policy of the ^fifties,
was at last begun. The project of an Isthmian canal, laid aside at the begin-
ning of the Civil War, was now taken up with a definiteness of purpose
which insured success. In a brief quarter of a century the United States
has established itself so firmly in the Caribbean that its control of this im-
portant strategic area is no longer questioned, a fact which has caused no
little alarm to its southern neighbours W^th the Spanish War the United
States also resumed policies in regard to the Pacific, which had been promi-
nent in the ^fifties. Not only were the Hawaiian Islands annexed — an old
project — but also the Philippines, which brought America into intimate
relations with Eastern Asia, then the storm centre of world politics. John
Hay's Open Door ” was but the restatement of a policy which found earlier
expression in the first American treaty with China, signed in 1844, and in
Commodore Perry's famous expedition to Japan ten years later. Expansion
in the Caribbean and in the Pacific made inevitable the construction of a
Canal and the building of a big navy.
The emergence of Japan from the war with Russia as a first-class Power,
with the ambition to dominate Eastern Asia and to contest with the United
States the mastery of the Pacific, made American foreign problems infinitely
more complex and, in fact, drew the United States into the full current of
world politics. For a century or more there had been the European system
of the balance of power, with the United States as the only detached nation.
There were now two Great Powers outside the European system, and Japan
had no traditional aversion to taking a hand in world affairs, a situation
that would inevitably draw the United States into future combinations.
ROOSEVELT'S SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY
The United States was scarcely launched on its new career as a World
Power when Theodore Roosevelt succeeded McKinley in the presidency.
525
526 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
The new pilot had none of the political caution of his predecessor, but he
believed that his ship was seaworthy and he did not hesitate to steer her
into new waters. In spite of his declaration on taking the oath of office that
he would “ continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley,”
bis attitude from the first was that of bold and aggressive leadership, and
during the next three years he broke many of the precedents of American
political histoiy.
The combination between politics and big business, which McKinley’s
adviser and campaign manager, Mark Hanna, had openly proclaimed, had
encouraged and accelerated the formation of great industrial combinations.
About the time that Roosevelt came to the presidency, the most gigantic of
all combinations was formed when the United States Steel Corporation pur-
chased the stock of eleven great companies, thus bringing under one man-
agement capital aggregating over a billion dollars. In his first annual message
the new President alarmed the capitalistic classes by attacking trusts and
large aggregations of capital, and followed it up by the successful prosecution,
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, of the Northern Securities Com-
pany, which had been formed for the purpose of holding a majority of the
stock of the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific railroads. He discon-
certed the politicians by pushing forward the investigation of extensive public
land and postal frauds, resulting in the conviction of two United States
Senators. He antagonised the South by inviting a coloured man, Booker
Washington, to his table and by the appointment of a negro postmistress in
Mississippi and a negro collector at Charleston. He astonished the public
in October, 1902, by intervening in the great anthracite coal strike, which had
lasted for five months and had caused a general coal famine throughout the
country. He called John Mitchell, head of the United Mine Workers of
America, and the presidents of the coal-carrying railroads, which consti-
tuted the coal trust, to a conference at the White House Mitchell consented
to arbitration, but the railroad presidents refused As a last resort, Roosevelt
sent for J. P. Morgan, the financial backer of the coal trust, and persuaded
him to bring the railroad presidents to terms. The President was bitterly
assailed for this and other acts by certain classes, but public sentiment in
the main sustained him. Roosevelt introduced a new epoch in American
politics. His appeal was always to the moral sense of the average American,
and he showed little regard for special interests, classes or sections.
THE PANAMA CANAL AND THE NEW CARIBBEAN POLICIES
The greatest achievement of Roosevelt’s administration was the construc-
tion of the Panama Canal. Before this great task could be undertaken by
the United States, it was necessary to secure the consent of the British Gov-
ernment to a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention of 1850, which
recognised England’s joint interest in any canal that might be built between
the two oceans. Before the close of McKinley’s first term, John Hay had
negotiated a new treaty which was tom to pieces by the Senate. Roosevelt
had concurred in the Senate’s objections to this treaty, and soon after coming
into office he directed Hay to re-open negotiations along new lines. There
resulted the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which cleared the way for a
canal to be constructed, operated and fortified by the United States.
^ The next question was the choice of a route. This question was com-
plicated by the French concession at Panama. The House favoured the
Nicaragua route and passed a bill directing the President to build a cana
at that point. The President and Senate favoured the Panama route, and £
© Ktysiotu View Co
WiUiam McKinley, President 1894-1901.
rii.,
*. ‘
© KeyRtone View Co,
Theodore Roosevelt, President 1901-1909.
© KeyUone View Co. Etching by Pierre Nuyttens, eourteey of the Randolph
Collection
WiUiam Howard Toft, President 1909-1913. Warren G. Harding, President 1991-1918.
F01TR RECENT AMERICAN PRESIDENTS
JOHN H. LATANfi 627
compromise was finally reached in the so-called Spooner Amendment, which
directed the President to proceed to construct a canal at Panama, provided
he could secure a clear title to the property of the French Company and
a right of way from Colombia “ within a reasonable time and upon reason-
able terms.” If he could not do this, he was directed to construct a canal
through Nicaragua.
The French Company was able to give a satisfactory title, and on January
22, 1903, Secretary Hay signed with the Colombian representative in Wash-
ington a treaty by the terms of which the United States agreed to pay
Colombia $10,000,000 and an annual rental of $250,000 for tbe lease of a
strip of land six miles wide across the Isthmus of Panama. This treaty was
ratified by the United States Senate, but it was rejected by the Colombian
Senate August 12, 1903, by a unanimous vote. The advocates of the Nicar-
agua route now began to take courage, and had things continued in this
situation until the meeting of Congress in December, the President would
in all probability have been directed to build the canal through Nicaragua.
This Roosevelt was determined not to do.
Meanwhile there was much dissatisfaction in the State of Panama at the
failure of the treaty and open talk of secession from Colombia. On Novem-
ber 3 Panama proclaimed its independence, and American marines were im-
mediately landed on the Isthmus with instructions from the President to
prevent the landing of Colombian troops within fifty miles of Panama. A
week later the Republic of Panama was formally recognised by the United
States as an independent state. Such hasty recognition of a new republic
was without precedent in the history of American diplomacy, and naturally
confirmed the rumours that President Roosevelt had indirectly fomented the
revolution A treaty was promptly signed with the new republic by which
the United States secured the right of way for the canal on the same terms
that had been offered to Colombia. The Panama episode created strained
relations with Colombia and made a bad impression throughout Latin America.
Several years later Mr. Roosevelt, in a public speech, said: “If I had fol-
lowed the traditional conservative methods I should have submitted a dig-
nified state paper of probably two himdred pages to the Congress and the
debate would be going on yet, but I took the Canal Zone and let Congress
debate, and while the debate goes on the canal does also.”
The construction of the canal was finally placed in the hands of General
Goethals and a corps of army engineers, and it was opened to commerce
August 15, 1914, though it was not completed at that time and traffic was
subsequently interrupted at times by landslides.
The building of the Panama Canal and the advance of the United States
into the Caribbean led to the development of new political policies in what
has been called the larger Canal Zone, that is, the West Indies, Mexico, Cen-
tral America, Colombia and Venezuela. Some of these policies, which have
already been pretty definitely formulated, are the establishment of protecto-
rates, the supervision of finances, the control of all possible canal routes, the
acquisition of naval bases and coaling stations, and the policing of disorderly
countries. Porto Rico was annexed at the close of the Spanish War and Cuba
became a protectorate, the terms of which were defined by the Platt Amend-
ment; the Canal Zone was a little later acquired, and the Dominican Republic
came under the financial supervision of the United States; President Taft
landed and maintained a body of marines in Nicaragua, and proposed to
place both that country and Honduras under financial supervision, but the
Senate refused to ratify the treaties that had been si^ed; President Wilson
wmt further and assumed the administi'ation of Haitian affairs, leased from
528
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
Nicaragua for a term of ninety-nine years a naval base on Fonseca Bay, and
purchased the Danish West Indies.
In 1904 President Roosevelt made a radical departure from traditional
policy in proposing that the United States should assume financial supervision
over the Dominican Republic in order to prevent certain European Powers
from forcibly collecting debts due their subjects. Two years previously Ger-
many had made a carefully planned effort to test the Monroe Doctrine by
making a naval demonstration against Venezuela in conjunction with Great
Britain and Italy. The object of the expedition was to collect certain claims
of their subjects. As soon as Venezuela, through the mediation of Herbert
Bowen, the American Minister, agreed to submit the claims to arbitration,
England and Italy accepted the offer and withdrew their squadrons. Ger-
many refused to arbitrate and continued the blockade of Venezuela. How
Roosevelt compelled Germany to withdraw, under a threat to send Admiral
Dewey with the entire American fleet to Venezuela, was made public in a
rather sensational way in Thayer’s Lije and Letters of John Hay.
In 1904 Germany was again threatening to coerce an American republic
for the purpose of collecting debts. This time the delinquent state was the
Dominican Republic, and the only effective method of collecting the interest
on the foreign debt appeared to be the seizure and administration of the
custom houses. President Roosevelt did not care to have a repetition of the
Venezuelan episode and he foresaw that the threatened occupation of Domini-
can custom-houses would, in view of the large debt, constitute the occupation
of American territory by a European Power for an indefinite period, and
would, therefore, be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He concluded,
therefore, that if it was necessary to place a bankrupt American republic in
the hands of a receiver, the United States must undertake to act as receiver,
and take over the administration of its finances. He boldly adopted this
policy, and when the Senate refused to ratify the treaty which he had made
with the Dominican Republic, he proceeded to act under an informal agree-
ment, and after two years forced the Senate to acquiesce.
As long as the Monroe Doctrine was merely a policy of benevolent pro-
tection which Latin-American States could invoke after their unwise or evil
conduct had brought European Powers to the point of demanding just retribu-
tion, it was regarded with favour and no objection was raised to it; but the
Roosevelt doctrine, that if the American Government was to continue to
protect Latin-American states against European intervention, it had a right
to exercise an international police power over them and to see that they re-
frained from conduct that was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite
a different thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition. Yet
Roosevelt’s position was entirely logical, and his policy was continued by
both Taft and Wilson.
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The United States not only took a prominent part in establishing the
Pennanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, but had the honour of ap-
pearing before it in 1902 as the first litigant m the case of the United States
V. Mexico in the matter of the Pious Fund of the Califomias. To President
Roosevelt was also due the submission of the second case to the Hague Court,
for he suggested that tribunal as the proper body to decide the question of
preferential treatment demanded by the Powers who had resorted to force
against Venezuela in 1902 as against other creditor Powers.
The convention establishing the Hague Court did not bind any Power
JOHN H. LATANfi 629
to submit any dispute to arbitration. Resort to the Court was purely op-
tional, but in 1903 and 1904 a number of European Powers concluded treaties
binding each other to submit to arbitration disputes involving points of law
or the interpretation of treaties, provided they did not affect ** the vital
interests, the independence, or the honour’^ of the contracting parties. In
1904 Secretary Hay negotiated similar treaties with France, Great Britain,
Germany, and a number of other Powers, but the Senate amended them in
such a way as to prevent the President from submitting disputes to arbitra-
tion under the treaties without securing the consent of the Senate in each
case. Roosevelt regarded this action as nullifying the compulsory feature
of the treaties, and did not refer them back to the other Powers in their
amended form.
In 1903 Roosevelt succeeded in bringing about a settlement of the Alaskan
boundary dispute through arbitration. The international boundary between
the southern strip of Alaska and British Columbia had not been surveyed
when gold was discovered in the Klondike. As the shortest routes to the
gold-fields lay through this strip by way of Dyea and Skagway, the Cana-
dians set up a claim to certain deep-water ports which was at variance not
only with tlie treaties and other documents relating to the boundary, but also
with a long scries of maps issued year after year by the Canadian Govern-
ment. Roosevelt finally proposed that the question be referred to a commis-
sion composed of three Americans, two Canadians, and Lord Alverstone,
Lord Chief Justice of England. If Lord Alverstone should decide with the
American members of the commission, the United States would win; if he
should decide with the two Canadian members, there would be no decision.
Fortunately he decided with the Americans; the two Canadians dissented.
It was charged by some in Canada that Lord Alverstone had sacrificed their
interests in order to promote the British policy of friendly relations with the
United States.
At the second Hague Conference, held in 1907, Mr. Joseph H. Choate,
head of the American delegation, acting under instructions from Secretary
Root, proposed the establishment of a permanent international court of
justice The creation of an international court of justice whose decisions
would have the force of law, as distinguished from a court of arbitration
whose decisions are usually arrived at by compromise, had long been advo-
cated by advanced thinkers, but had usually been held by men in public life
to be impracticable and idealistic. The serious advocacy of the proposition
at this time by a great nation like the United States and the able arguments
advanced by Mr. Choate marked an important step forward and made a
profound impression Two difficulties stood in the way of establishing such
a, court. In the first place, the delegation of the United States was the
only one which had instructions on the subject, and in the second place it
was found to be impossible to agree upon a method of selecting the judges.
The United States was still advocating the project and trying to remove the
diflSculties in the way of its realisation when the World War began.
Roosevelt’s activity in world politics
In 1904 Roosevelt was reelected, his opponent being Judge Alton B.
Parker, who represented the advocates of a return from Bryanism to safe
and sane democracy.” Roosevelt received the largest popular vote and the
largest popular majority that had ever been recorded for any President. He
carried even Missouri, while Parker did not carry a single state outside the
T. B. T. — VOL 1 — 34
530 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
South. With the renewed confidence derived from such an overwhelming
victor}", Roosevelt was more inclined than ever to disregard precedents and
established traditions and to take the initiative in both foreign and domestic
affairs. In the field of diplomac}^ the most important events of his second
administration were connected with the Russo-Japanese War and the
Moroccan crisis.
John Hay’s efforts to maintain the open door in Manchuria were not
successful, and as a result of the Russian advance Japan finally delivered an
ultimatum which resulted in war. Throughout the remarkable contest that
followed, the sympathies of the American people were largely with Japan.
Notwithstanding a series of brilliant victories on land and sea, Japan finally
found herself approaching the end of her resources, and at the suggestion of
the Japanese Emperor, as we now know. President Roosevelt intervened dip-
lomatically and succeeded in getting the two belligerent Powers to appoint
commissioners for the purpose of negotiating peace.
The commissioners of Russia and Japan met aboard the President’s yacht
at Oyster Bay, August 5, 1905, and then proceeded to Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, where the treaty was signed a month later. The terms of the
Treaty of Portsmouth were a bitter disappointment to the Japanese people,
who had been kept in ignorance of the real state of affairs, and the Japanese
commissioners undertook to shift the burden from their shoulders by stating
that President Roosevelt had urged them to abandon all claim to an indem-
nity. A Japanese military victory had again, as at the close of the war with
China, been followed by a diplomatic defeat, and for this defeat Japanese
public opinion held the President of the United States responsible.
In 1906 the Japanese claimed that their treaty rights in California were
being violated by the action of the San Francisco School Board, which had
passed a resolution directing all Japanese, Chinese and Korean children to
be sent to an oriental public school especially provided for them. President
Roosevelt directed the district attorney to assist the Japanese in their efforts
to have their rights protected by the courts. The incident created great
interest throughout the country, and raised the question as to whether the
United States has the constitutional right to make a treaty which overrides
the laws of a state. The question was temporarily adjusted by the so-called
gentleman’s agreement,” by which the Japanese Government promised not
to issue passports to Japanese labourers desiring to come to the United States,
and the consent of the San Francisco School Board to admit Japanese children
to the ordinary schools under certain limitations of age and ability to use the
English language.
President Roosevelt was so greatly annoyed at the attitude of Japan that
in the autumn of 1907 he decided to send a great American fleet on a voyage
around the world and to have it visit Japanese waters as an object-lesson.
The fleet made the long voyage from Hampton Roads around the Horn and
across the Pacific, was received with marked courtesy by the Japanese Gov-
ernment, and continued its long journey around the globe without any
untoward incident.
President Roosevelt’s intervention in the Moroccan crisis was an even
more radical departure from the traditional American policy of isolation.
His object was to preserve the balance of power in Europe which had been
seriously disturbed by the Japanese victories over Russia. As soon as France
was rendered helpless by the military reverses suffered by her ally, Russia,
the Geman Kaiser challenged France’s position in Morocco. The situation
was critical in the extreme when Roosevelt intervened and persuaded all
Powers concerned to submit the whole Moroccan question to a general con-
ference. The conference which convened at Algeciras, Spain, turned out to
© Kajttone Vtfw Co
The Pan-Amencan Building m Washington, where the meetings of the Washington Disarmament
Conference were held in 1922.
© Keystone View Co,
The Roosevelt Dam, Salt River, Arizona, built in 1911 at a cost of $4,091,000. It is one of the
largest in the world, being 280 feet high and 1,126 feet in length, with a storage capacity of 426,235
million gallons.
531
JOHN H. LATANfi
be a bitter disappointment to Germany. Not only did France receive the
loyal support of England, but she was also backed by the United States
and even by Italy — a warning to Germany that the Triple Alliance was in
danger. The United States participated nominally on the ground of safe-
guarding its rights imder the commercial treaty of 18M, and was represented
by Henry White, at that time Ambassador to Italy, and Samuel R. Gummer5,
Minister to Morocco. As the United States professed to have no political
interests at stake, its delegates were instrumental in composing many of the
differences that arose, and their influence was exerted to preserve the European
balance of power. The facts in regard to Americans part in the conference
were carefully concealed from the public. Had the part Roosevelt was really
playing been known at the time, he would not have been upheld either by
the Senate or by public opinion. When the Senate found out what had taken
place, it attached to the resolution ratifying the treaty a long preamble de-
claring that American participation was “ without purpose to depart from
the traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by the
United States m the settlement of political questions which are entirely
European in their scope.” And yet Roosevelt had averted for a time a general
European war.
THE ROOSEVELT POLICIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF TAFT
Roosevelt's indiscriminate attack on big business and “ predatory wealth ”
reacted on the credit conditions of the country and led to serious financial
disturbances in the fall of 1907. A number of banks failed and the financial
leaders became alarmed They claimed that the attack on trusts, the passage
of new laws, and the enforcement of pure-food regulations had brought about
the panic.
One of Roosevelt's greatest services to the country was the movement to
conserve the national resources. Not only had a large part of the public
lands been acquired by railroads and other corporations, but private interests
had also secured control of most of the coal, lumber and water rights. In
1902 Congress passed the Newlands Bill, which began the great work of
national irrigation In 1908 President Roosevelt invited the governors of all
the States to a conference at the White House, at which they were urged to
cooperate with the National Government in the great work of conservation.
Roosevelt announced upon several occasions that he would not be a can-
didate for a third term. As the policies which he had developed and advo-
cated in his characteristic way during his second term were still on trial, the
important question was who should be selected to carry them out. The
names of Root, Taft and Hughes naturally suggested themselves, but before
the opening of the campaign of 1908, the President let it be known that Taft
was his choice, and he employed all the influence of his administration in
securing Taft delegates to the Republican National Convention. Taft was
nominated m the first ballot, and a platform endorsing the Roosevelt policies
was adopted. The Democratic convention nominated for the third time
William Jennings Bryan. The Democrats claimed that Roosevelt had adopted
most of the Bryan policies, and that Bryan could no longer be regarded as
a radical. Taft was elected by a large majority, and immediately after his
inauguration Roosevelt set out on a hunting trip to Africa.
Roosevelt had been keenly alive to the new social and economic conditions
created by modern industrialism, and he had caught the new spirit of democ-
racy that had arisen in the West and was sweeping over the country. He
tried earnestly to make the Republican party progressive, but he did not
succeed in divorcing it from its alliance with big business. Taft was at heart
532
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
a conservative, and the business interests were quick to seize the opportunity
to sidetrack the Roosevelt policies. Before the close of his administration,
Taft had a divided party on his hands, and the way was open for the return
of the Democratic party to power.
The trouble in the Republican party began over the tariflF, which in the
Payne-Aldrich Bill was revised up instead of down as promised in the party
platform. This created great dissatisfaction among the Republicans of the
Middle West. The controversy between Dr. H. W. Wiley, who had charge
of the enforcement of the pure-food laws, and his chief. Secretary Wilson,
and the dismissal of Gifford Pinchot (head of the Bureau of Forestry and
an intimate personal friend of Roosevelt), who had become involved in a
controversy with Secretary Ballinger, convinced the public that the Taft
administration was not carrying out in good faith the Roosevelt policies.
The party became split into two factions, the conservatives, or standpatters ”
as their opponents called them, and the “ insurgents,” led by Senators La-
Follette and Cummins, both of whom aspired to the presidency. In the
House of Representatives the chief of the standpatters ” was Speaker
Cannon, who exercised more despotic sway than had ever been dreamed of
even by “ Czar ” Reed in the days of Harrison and McKinley. In March,
1910, the insurgents united with the Democratic minority and changed the
rules so as to deprive the Speaker of many of his most important powers.
In the elections of 1910 the Democrats chose a majority of the House and
elected governors in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and
Indiana.
Several important acts were passed during President Taft’s term, the most
important being that of June, 1910, establishing a system of postal savings
banks, and the Act of August, 1912, introduced by a Democrat, David J.
Lewis of Maryland, establishing a parcels post. The income tax amendment,
proposed by President Taft in 1909, was proclaimed as the Sixteenth Amend-
ment in February, 1913, and the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the
direct election of United States Senators by the people, which had passed the
House half a dozen times, was finally adopted by the Senate m 1911 and
submitted to the States. It was proclaimed May 31, 1913, shortly after the
close of Taft’s administration.
THE ELECTION OF WOODROW WILSON
In June, 1910, Roosevelt returned from his hunting trip in Africa to find
that many of his warmest personal friends had parted company with Taft.
He soon plunged into the thick of the fight. In a speech at Osawatomie,
Kansas, August 31, he laid down a new political creed called the New
Nationalism.” In this address he embraced the whole Western programme:
Federal regulation of trusts, a graduated income tax, tariff revision, labour
legislation, direct primaries, and the recall not only of administrative officers,
but of judicial decisions. In February, 1912, in an address before the Con-
stitutional Convention of Ohio, he came out strongly for the initiative, refer-
endum and recall. He ignored LaFollette, who had organised a National
Progressive Republican league, and in February, 1912, announced that his
hat was in the ring, and began an active campaign for delegates to the
Republican National Convention. As the Republican machine stood by Taft,
he had a safe majority of the delegates that came to the Chicago convention,
though Roosevelt carried the States in which primaries were held and secured
over 400 delegates. Roosevelt also contested on various pretexts the seats
of 250 Taft delegates, thus claiming a majority of the convention. When
JOHN H. LATANfi 633
the National eommittee rejected these claims and the convention renominated
Taft, Roosevelt denounced the action as theft,” addressed a mass convention
of his followers, and sent them home to organise a new party.
The Democratic convention met in Baltimore, and on the forty-sixth
ballot nominated Woodrow Wilson after a bitter fight between his followers
and the delegates who supported Champ Clark. In the campaign that fol-
lowed, the antagonism between Republicans and Progressives became exceed-
ingly bitter. Roosevelt fought with his characteristic vigour, but his attack
was directed against Taft rather than against Wilson. Although Wilson's
popular vote was nearly a million less than the Republican and Progressive
votes combined, he received 435 electoral votes to Roosevelt's 81 and Taft's 16.
It was some time after the inauguration of Wilson before the politicians
began to comprehend the new type of man whom the people had called to
the presidency. They readily admitted his extraordinary intellectual gifts,
but what they could not understand was his grasp of the details of political
organisation, of the game of politics as actually played, the quickness with
which he interpreted the popular will, and his ruthless use of publicity as a
weapon of coercion. Although Roosevelt had developed latent presidential
powers to a striking extent, even he had failed to realise the full possibilities
of the office Wilson's belief in presidential initiative and party leadership,
based on principle and derived from a profound study of English as well as
American politics, was more consistently exercised. He broke the precedents
of a hundred years, disconcerted the politicians, and astonished but pleased
the people by going before Congress and personally urging legislation on im-
portant matters. No President had ever been so successful in forcing the
hand of Congress and compelling that body to enact into law party pledges
and popular demands.
He called Congress to meet in extra session in April, 1913, and appeared
before a joint session to urge a revision of the tariff. The Underwood Act
of October 2, 1913, was a revision downward of the Payne-Aldnch Tariff,
and was framed with a view to encouraging rather than restricting foreign
trade The Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, radically revised the
financial system which had grown up under the National Banking Act of
1863. Its object was to decentralise credits by establishing reserve banks in
convenient centres throughout the country and thus to prevent the accumula-
tion of reserve currency in New York banks. It made the currency more
elastic and greatly diminished the danger of financial panics to which the
old system frequently gave rise. It successfully stood the test of the war,
though the extraordinary demands of the period led to unforeseen develop-
ments, particularly in the direction of closer governmental control than had
been designed by its authors. Other measures adopted by this Congress were
the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Anti-Trust bills, which were
passed after months of debate in October, 1914. Congress then adjourned,
having been in almost continuous session for eighteen months and having
enacted more constructive legislation of far-reaching importance than any
Congress since the Civil War.
THE MEXICAN QUESTION
The President was not to be permitted, however, to give all his time to
domestic legislation. His administration was scarcely under way when the
attention of the country was drawn once more to the anti- Japanese agitation
in California. This time the State Legislature proposed to deny to aliens
who were ineligible to American citizenship the right to acquire agricultural
534
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
land. The President sent Secretary Bryan to urge moderation upon the
legislators. He was not wholly successful. The act as finally passed safe-
guarded the treaty rights of aliens, but as existing treaties with Japan did
not specifically cover the point in question, the Japanese were left without
redress.
Another question that had to be carefully handled was the dispute with
Great Britain over the Panama Tolls Act, passed during the Taft administra-
tion, which exempted American vessels engaged in the coastwise trade from
the payment of tolls. Great Britain claimed that this act was in violation
of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. President Wilson believed that the British
interpretation of the treaty was correct, and he had the difficult task of
persuading Congress to repeal the exemption clause of the Tolls Act. This
was done June 15, 1914.
The Mexican question was bequeathed to Wilson by the Taft administra-
tion. In May, 1911, Porfirio Diaz, who had been President of Mexico since
1884, was forced to retire, and Francisco Madero, the leader of the revolt,
was elected President. On February 18, 1913, Madero was seized and im-
prisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, Vic-
toriano Huerta, and four days later he was murdered. Henry Lane Wilson,
the American Ambassador, urged his Government by cable to recognise
Huerta, but President Taft, whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took
no action. President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face
when he assumed control of affairs at Washington. As Huerta was a self-
constituted dictator, whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs
in various parts of the country, the President refused to recognise him. This
refusal was resented by Huerta, who thereafter paid little attention to the
personal or property rights of Americans. On April 20, 1914, President Wilson
asked Congress for authority to employ the armed forces of the United States
in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of American marines at Vera
Cruz, and the next day Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom-house
at that port. This he did after a sharp fight with Huerta^s troops in which
nineteen Americans were killed and seventy wounded, while the casualties
among Huerta’s forces vrere reckoned at several hundred. The American
charge d’affaires was at once handed his passports, and all diplomatic relations
between the United States and Mexico were severed.
A few days later the representatives of the so-called ABC Alliance,
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, tendered their good offices for a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute, and President Wilson promptly accepted their mediation.
The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20, was not successful in its
immediate object, but it resulted in the elimination of Huerta, who resigned
July 15. On August 20 General Venustiano Carranza, head of one of the
revolutionary factions, assumed control of affairs at the capital, but his
authority was disputed by General Francisco Villa, another insurrectionary
chief. On Carranza’s promise to respect the lives and property of Americans,
the United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz in November, 1914.
In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson, the six ranking
representatives of Latin America at Washington made an unsuccessful at^-
tempt to reconcile the contending factions of Mexico. On their advice
President Wilson decided in October to recognise the Government of Carranza,
who now controlled three-fourths of the territory of Mexico. This action
angered Villa, who began a series of attacks on American citizens and raids
across the border, which in March, 1916, compelled President Wilson to send
a punitive expedition into Mexico and later to dispatch most of the regular
army and large bodies of militia to the border.
The raids of Villa created a very awkward situation. Carranza not only
JOHN H. LATANfi 535
made no real effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously opposed steps taken
by the United States to protect its own citizens along the border, and even
assumed a threatening attitude. There was a loud and persistent demand
in the United States for war against Mexico. American investments in land,
mines, rubber and sisal plantations, and other enterprises were very large,
and these financial interests were particularly outraged at Wilson’s policy of
“watchful waiting.” The President remained deaf to this clamour. No
country had been so shamelessly exploited by foreign capital as Mexico.
Furthermore, it was very generally believed that the recent revolutions had
been financed by American capital. President Wilson was determined to
give the Mexican people an opportunity to reorganise their national life on a
better basis and to lend them every assistance in the task. War with Mexico
would have been a serious undertaking, and even a successful war would
have meant the military occupation of Mexico for an indefinite period.
After the entrance of the United States into the World War, many of those
Americans who had dissented radically from the President’s Mexican policy
became convinced that his refusal to become involved in war with Mexico
was most fortunate. Furthermore, Wilson’s Mexican policy convinced the
world of his sincerity, and paved the way for the moral leadership vrhich he
exercised during the World War.
President Wilson’s Mexican policy was avowedly based on his larger
Pan-American policy. Its most novel feature was his acceptance of the
mediation of the ABC Powers and his subsequent consultation with the
leading representatives of Latin America. This action brought the Pan-
American ideal almost to the point of realisation. It was received with
enthusiasm, and it placed the relations of the United States with Latin
America on a better footing than they had been for years.
THE WORLD WAR
When the war began in Europe in August, 1914, President Wilson, fol-
lowing the traditions of a hundred years, issued as a matter of course a
proclamation of neutrality, and he thought that the more scrupulously it was
observed the greater would be the opportunity for the United States to act
as impartial mediator in the reestablishment of peace. As the fierceness of
the conflict developed it became evident that the role of neutral was not an
easy one to play, and that the vital interests of the United States were in-
volved to a far greater extent than any one had foreseen.
Notwithstanding the large German population in the United States and
the propaganda which the German Government had systematically carried
on for years, the invasion of Belgium and the atrocities committed by the
Germans soon arrayed public opinion on the side of the Allies. This was
not a departure from neutrality, for it should be remembered that neutrality
is not an attitude of mind, but a legal status. As long as the Government
fulfilled its obligations as defined by the law of nations, no charge of a
violation of neutrality could be justly made. The rules of naval warfare,
especially tfiose relating to contraband and blockade, were in an unfortunate
state of uncertainty as a result of the codification made by the London Naval
Conference of 1909, which had not been ratified by all the Powers. The
United States proposed that all belligerents agree to adopt the Declaration
of London for the period of the war, but on the refusal of Great Britein,
France and Russia to accept this proposal, it was promptly withdrawn.
Great Britain and France immediately took steps to cut off as far as
536 THE UNITfiD STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
possible the foreign trade of Germany and Austria. The naval supremacy
of Great Britain made it comparatively easy for her to stop all direct trade
with the Central Powers in articles contraband of war, but this would have
been of little avail had Germany been permitted to import those articles
throu^ the neutral ports of Italy, Holland and the Scandinavian countries.
Under these circumstances, an ordinary blockade of the German coast would
have had little effect. Therefore, no such blockade was proclaimed by Great
Britain. She adopted other methods. She enlarged the lists of both absolute
and conditional contraband, which she had a right, within reasonable limits,
to do, and under the doctrine of continuous voyage seized articles on both
lists bound for Germany through neutral countries, a practice more open to
dispute. The United States protested vigorously against this policy, but the
force of its protest was weakened by the fact that during the Civil War the
American Government had pursued substantially the same policy in regard
to goods shipped to Nassau, Havana, Matamoros and other neutral ports
adjacent to the Confederacy. In fact, the doctrine of continuous voyage or
transshipment in the form in which En^and was applying it, was an Amencan
doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court to justify the seizure of British
goods during the Civil War.
The sudden interruption of international trade, particularly of cotton ex-
ports, caused general business depression in the United States, and the
country was saved from a serious financial panic only by the operations of
the Treasury Department under the new Federal Reserve Act. Business
revived, however, when American firms began taking orders from England,
France and Russia for large supplies of arms and munitions of war. A few
months later, Germany and Austria protested against this trade as one-sided
and, therefore, unneutral, and held that it justified the submarine policy which
was adopted in February, 1915. They were fully aware that their arguments
had no basis in international law or practice. Indeed, their protests were
probably designed to influence public opinion and help the German propa-
gandists, who were making a desperate effort to get Congress* to place an
embargo on the export of munitions.
Under pressure of what amounted to a stringent blockade, the German
naval authorities decided to employ their large submarine flotilla, which had
been unable to inflict any serious damage on the British navy, in an attack
on British commerce. On February 14, 1915, Germany proclaimed a war
zone around the British Isles, including the whole of the Channel, declared
that all enemy merchant vessels encoimtered in these waters after the 18th
would be destroyed, even though it might not be possible to save the passen-
gers and crews, and added the warning that neutral vessels could not always
be prevented from suffering from attacks intended for enemy ships. Against
this decree President Wilson at once protested, and warned the German Gov-
ernment that it would be held to a ‘‘ strict accountability ” for the destruction
of American ships or the loss of American lives. The submarine policy was
nevertheless inaugurated on the date set, and within a few weeks two Stand-
ard Oil tankers bearing the American flag were torpedoed and several Ameri-
can citizens killed. Before definite action had been taken on these cases, the
whole world was startled by the deliberate and carefully planned destruction
of the British liner Lusitania '' by a submarine attack off the southern point
of Ireland, May 7, 1915. She was bound from New York to Liverpool with
nearly 2,000 men, women and children on board, of whom 1,153 perished,
including 114 Americans. The German press hailed the sinking of the
” Lusitania ” as a triumph of the submarine policy. In America it was de-
fended only by the extreme pro-Germans. There was a strong demand for
war and for the immediate dismissal of the German Ambassador, but Presi-
O Keystone View Co
A group in the Library at Sagamore Hill, Theodore Roosevelt’s home at Oyster Bay, L. I. Mr.
Roosevelt is holding his youngest grandchild, the son of Archibald B. Roosevelt, and about him are
the baby’s mother; Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt; Mrs. Richard Derby and her children, Richard, Jr.,
and BtheL
537
JOHN H. LATANfi
dent Wilson determined to exhaust the resources of diplomacy before severing
relations. Dming the course of the correspondence over the Lusitania,”
Secretary Bryan, who feared that the President was leading the country into
war, resigned, and Robert Lansing was appointed Secretary of State. Mat-
ters were brought to another crisis in August by the torpedoing of the White
Star liner “ Arabic,” causing the death of two American citizens. In order
to avoid drawing the United States into the war, Count Bemstorff, the Ger-
man Ambassador, gave assurance that henceforth liners would not be sunk
by submarines without warning and without saving the lives of non-com-
batants, provided they would not attempt to escape or offer resistance. This
pledge was not kept in good faith, and the torpedoing of the Sussex ” in
March, 1916, created a third crisis. The German Government repeated even
more solemnly the pledges Bemstorff had given a few months before, and
for a time there was a cessation of submarine activity.
Meanwhile the German propagandists, having failed to get Congress to
place an embargo on the export of munitions, formed an extensive conspiracy
to break up the trade by criminal methods. Numerous explosions occurred
in munition plants, destroying many lives and millions of dollars of property,
and bombs were placed in a number of ships engaged in carrying supplies to
the Allies. The Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, and the German military
and naval attaches, Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed, were found to
be involved in these activities and their recall was demanded. These con-
spiracies were not confined to foreigners, but many naturalised Americans of
German origin were involved. The term ^‘hyphenated” American was ap-
plied to them, and played an important part in the presidential campaign.
REELECTION OP WILSON
The Congress which met in December, 1915, passed a number of measures
of far-reaching importance. The National Defence Act provided for a regular
army of 186,000 oflScers and men, a federalised National Guard of over 400,-
000 men, a system of civilian training camps for reserve officers, and the
establishment of plants for the production of nitrates and other products used
in the manufacture of munitions. The failure of Congress to adopt a some-
what different plan advocated by the Secretary of War and the general staff
caused Secretary Garrison to resign in February, 1916, and a month later
Newton D. Baker of Ohio was appointed Secretary of War. The Naval
Bill, passed several months later, provided for an expenditure of over $500,-
000,000 for new construction within the next three years In order to provide
for increased army and navy expenditures, a new revenue act was passed in
September increasing the tax on incomes, on inheritances, and on the earnings
of corporations. Another important measure was an act establishing a
Shipping Board. The strong leadership displayed by Wilson in putting
through his legislative programme . insured his renomination for the presi-
dency, notwithstanding the severe criticism which his foreign policy called
forth. When the Democratic National Convention met in St. Louis, June
14, 1916, he was renominated without opposition. The Republicans had
held their convention in Chicago a week earlier and nominated Justice Charles
E, Hughes of the Supreme Court. He was chosen by the Conservatives of
his party as a candidate who would be acceptable to the Progressive party
and thus prevent that party from again placing Roosevelt in the field. The
Progressives nominated Roosevelt, but he declined and urged his followers
to support Hughes. Throughout the greater part of the campaign. President
638 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
Wilson remained at his summer residence in New Jersey, where he receivec
delegations and made a number of carefully prepared addresses. He ap-
pealed to his record, and paid little attention to the criticisms of his oppo-
nents. Hughes, on the other hand, travelled from the Atlantic to thi
Pacific, and later made a tour through the Middle West. He assailed vio-
lently Wilson’s Mexican policy, but on the vital issues raised by the Euro-
pean War he was non-committal. He was apparently trying to hold the
German-American vote, which was normally Republican. Roosevelt, how-
ever, more than made up for any reserve on the part of the candidate. He
created widespread enthusiasm among native Americans by denouncing in
emphatic terms the misdeeds of Germany and the failure of Wilson to proteci
American lives and property.
In August a new turn was given to the campaign by the threat of a general
strike of railroad men for an eight-hour day and extra pay for overtime. A1
a White House conference of labour leaders and railroad managers Presideni
Wilson proposed that the demands of the men be provisionally conceded and
that Congress authorise him to appoint a commission to investigate the whole
question. The railroad presidents refused to accept this proposal. The
strike was ordered for September 4, and on August 29 the President went
before Congress and urged immediate legislation. Congress promptly passed
the Adamson law adopting the eight-hour day, extra pay for overtime, and
the commission to investigate. The strike was averted, but the President’s
course was widely assailed as a surrender under pressure to the labour leaders,
who had taken advantage of the political situation at home and the delicate
state of foreign relations to gain their ends. Hughes eagerly seized the
Adamson law as a campaign issue and made it the main target of his attack
during the rest of the canvass.
The election turned out to be one of the closest in the history of the
country. By nine o’clock of election night it was evident that Hughes had
carried New York, Indiana and Illinois, and many of the Democratic papers,
including the New York Times, conceded his election. The election turned
on the Progressive vote of the West more than on any other one factor. This
was particularly true of California, where Hughes, during his visit to the
State, had identified himself with the leaders of the reactionary faction of
the Republican party, with the result that while Hiram Johnson, former Pro-
gressive nominee for Vice-President, was elected to the Senate on the Repub-
lican ticket by a majority of 300,000, Hughes’ vote fell 3,800 short of
Wilson’s. Hughes carried West Virrinia, Delaware and all the northern
States east of the Mississippi except New Hampshire and Ohio; west of the
Mississippi he carried onlv Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota and Oregon.
The remaining thirty-one States were carried by Wilson.
THE FAILURE OP NEUTRALITY AND THE DECLARATION OF WAR
During the summer and fall of 1916 the European armies were at a dead-
lock on the western front. In the east the Germans made a successful drive
into Rumania, and early in December occupied the capital city of Bucharest.
A few days later the German Government, acting for itself and its allies,
announced through a note to President Wilson, which he was requested to
transmit to the Entente Powers, its willingness “ to enter forthwith upon
negotiations for peace.” President Wilson transmitted the note without
comment, but a few days later he addressed an identic note to the Govern-
ments of all the nations at war, requesting them to state definitely the terms
JOHN H. LATANfi
on which they would deem it possible to make peace. This demand, resented
at first by England and France as unwarranted intermeddling, caused a
searching of hearts everywhere, led to a restatement of aims on the part of
the Allies, and threw the Central Governments on the defensive. In formulat-
ing their replies the Allies were somewhat embarrassed by their secret treaties
with Italy and Russia, later to be made public by the Bolsheviki, but they
stated fairly definitely the measure of reparation and restitution and the
guarantees which they considered indispensable conditions of a permanent
peace. The German reply contained no statement of territorial claims and
gave no pledge even as to the future status of Belgium.
In reporting the results of this interchange of views to the Senate, January
22, 1917, President Wilson delivered the first of that series of addresses on
the essentials of a just and lasting peace which made him the recognised
spokesman of the liberal element in all countries and gained for him a moral
leadership that was without parallel in the history of the world. For the
first time he outlined the principles on which the United States would be
willing to enter into a League for Peace, hoping that if a satisfactory basis
for the future peace of the world could be established, the war might be
brought to a close. He advocated first of all a peace without victory,” and
had Germany been willing to make material concessions in response to the
President’s peace move of December, she might have secured a negotiated
peace instead of the dictated peace that was finally imposed upon her.
Germany was not yet ready to concede anything. On January 31 the
German Ambassador handed Secretary Lansing a formal note announcing
a new zone around Great Britain and France, and warning him that after
February 1 all ships, those of neutrals included, found within the zone would
be sunk. On February 3 the President appeared before Congress, and in calm
and measured tones announced that Count Bemstorff had that day been given
his passports, and that all diplomatic intercourse with Germany was at an
end. This announcement was received with enthusiasm by the great majority
of the American people, who thought that the President had exercised patience
with the German Government until patience had ceased to be a virtue. The
President said, however, that he would wait for an “ overt act ” before
recommending further action.
Meanwhile shipowners were unwilling to send their vessels to sea, and
American commerce was tied up in American ports under a practical embargo
laid by decree of the German Government. Under these circumstances
President Wilson again appeared before Congress, February 26, and asked
for authority to arm American merchantmen. The House voted oveiyrhelm-
ingly for the resolution, giving the President the necessary authority, but
under the rules of the Senate piermitting unlimited debate, a small group of
eleven senators, led by LaFollette of Wisconsin and Vardaman of Mississippi,
prevented a vote being taken, and Congress adjourned March 4 without action
by the Senate.
Popular indignation against the recalcitrant Senators was raised to a
fever heat by the disclosure on March 1 of the “ Zimmermann Note,” in
which the German Foreign Secretary invited Mexico to unite with Germany
and Japan in a war against the United States. The dispatch was addressed
to the German Minister in Mexico, and had been transmitted through Bem-
storff at Washington, but it had been intercepted and delivered to the State
Department. Both Mexico and Japan indignantly denied any connection
with such a scheme. The Senate met in extra session March 5 , and in re-
sponse to the demands of public opinion revised its rules, placing reasonable
limits on debate, and making it impossible for a small group to delay action
indefinitely. When Congr^s convened at the call of the President on April
640 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
2. he appeared before a joint session and urged a declaration of war against
Germany. The Russian revolution, which had overthrown the Tsar^s govern-
ment in March, had changed the political situation materially. The new
Russian Government repudiated all imperialistic aims and adopted the
formula: ** Self-determination, no annexations, no indemnities.” Poland was
given her freedom, and the demand for Constantinople was abandoned. The
Allies were thus relieved of one of their most embarrassing secret treaties.
The Russian revolution enabled the President to proclaim a war of democracy
against autocracy. He declared that the quarrel was not with the German
people, but with the Prussian autocracy, and that the world must be made
safe for democracy., The resolution declaring that a state of war existed
between Germany and the United States was passed April 6, 1917, the
Senate having supported it on April 4 by 82 votes to 6, and the House of
Representatives the day after by 373 to 50. This resolution did not include
Austria-Hungary.
FINANCING THE WAR
Although the historic policy of American isolation precluded the idea of
a formal alliance even with England and France, it was manifest that the
closest cooperation would be necessary in order to win the war. A few days
after war was declared, British and French missions, the one headed by
Arthur J. Balfour and the other by former Premier Viviani and General
Joffre, sailed for the United States. The purpose of these missions was, in
the first place, to negotiate loans; secondly, to urge the dispatch of large bodies
of troops to Europe; and thirdly, to give the United States the benefit
through the experts that accompanied them, of their three years^ military and
naval experience. On April 24, $7,000,000,000 was appropriated by Congress
for calling on the war, and of this sum $3,000,000,000 was voted for loans
to foreign Governments. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Rumania
each came in for a share, and as the war progressed new loans to foreigr
Governments were made amounting in all to nearly $10,000,000,000. These
loans were not advanced in gold, but in credits in American banks with whicl
the Allied Governments purchased supplies in America. Every purchase fron
the Allies by the United States Government was, however, paid for by thai
Government in gold.
The vast sums required for carrying on the war and for loans to the Allies
were raised by the sale of bonds and War Saving Stamps and by increasec
taxation. Five loans were floated during or immediately after the war; th(
first four were known as the Liberty Loans and the last popularly as th(
Victory Loan, though technically as the Victory Liberty Loan. All of then
were largely oversubscribed, and the total amount raised was over $21,000,-
000,000. The successive Liberty Loan “ drives ” were organised very skil-
fully under the general direction of Secretary McAdoo, and were made th<
occasions of great patriotic demonstrations Although the bonds were re
garded as a safe investment, they bore a low rate of interest and soon fel
below par, but the people continued to subscribe as cheerfully as ever, thei
prime object being to win the war.
The War Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, formed the basis of war taxa
tion. It increased greatly the tax on incomes, levied an excess-profits tai
on corporations and partnerships, increased the internal revenue taxes an<
import duties, and raised the postal rates. During the entire period of th<
war, taxation provided about 28 per cent of the total expenditures of th(
Government, or 39 per cent if the amount loaned to the Allies be deducte<
and regarded as an investment. Few wars have been financed so largely
by taxation.
JOHN H. LATANfi
£41
MILITARY PREPARATIONS
Ab soon as war was declared, Congress began the consideration of a bill
to organise an army on the old principle of volimtary enlistments. The
President considered this measure utterly inadequate, and urged that resort
be had to the method of a selective draft. His interference with pending
legislation was resented in the House, where Speaker Clark and the Demo-
cratic leader, Kitehm of North Carolina, both opposed the President’s plan.
The House Military Committee finally adopted it, however, and it was re-
ported to the House by Julius Kahn of California, the ranking Republican
member of the committee. After passing the House the bill was amended
in the Senate by the friends of ex-President Roosevelt so as to authorise the
President to raise four divisions by voluntary enlistment. The bill was finally
signed by the President May 18, 1917, and Roosevelt came down to Washing-
ton to get permission to raise a division. But the general staff was strongly
opposed to the volunteer principle, and the President refused the request of
Roosevelt and let it be known that he did not intend to avail himself of
the amendment.
By this law the President w’^as authorised to increase the regular army to
287,000 by voluntary enlistment, to take into the service of the United States
all members of the National Guard, and to raise immediately by selective
draft a force of 500,000, and later, if necessary, successive drafts of 500,000
each. To this end he was authorised to enroll all men between the ages ot
21 and 31. On June 5 over 9,500,000 men were enrolled. As the men regis-
tered in their several districts, each was given a serial number by the local
board.
The first draft took place in Washington, July 20. When a certain number
was drawn, the men having that number in the nearly 5,000 districts through-
out the country were called to the service, imless coming within one of the
exempt classes The law provided for the exemption of State and Federal
officials, ministers of religion, members of churches forbidding resort to arms,
munition workers and others engaged in industries essential to the war, persons
mentally or physically unfit, and men on whom others were dependent for
support. There were special exemption boards to administer this part of the
act. Contrary to the predictions of its opponents, the selective draft was
carried out with amazing success. Never in all history had so many men been
called to the colours with so little friction or complaint.
To provide officers for the vast army that was to be raised, training camps
were opened in June at Fort Myer, Plattsburg, and other points, where can-
didates for commissions went through three months of intensive training, and
were then sent to the great cantonments to train the men who were called
to the colours. Sixteen cantonments, each a city in itself, with water supply
and sewerage systems, barracks, hospitals, laundries, storehouses, and post-
offices, were constructed during the summer, at great expense, it is true, but
with such success that by September 6 they were ready to receive the first
drafted men. By the end of the year there were in training, including the
Regular army and the National Guard, 110,000 officers and over 1,400,000
men.
To provide the necessary equipment for such an army was, for a country
not accustomed to military preparations, a stupendous task. Furthermore,
the whole character of warfare had changed so completely in the three years
of fighting on the western front that Americans were mere novices at the
game. Trench warfare had developed every diabolical device that the in-
542 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
genuity of man could conceive, and science had devoted its great resources,
to an extent never before imagined, to the destruction of human life. The
airplane, gas, and the tank were the most novel and important factors in the
struggle.
American manufacturers had been making rifles and machine-guns for
the Allies, and were furnishing a large part of the ammunition used by the
French and British. But the rifle they were making did not have the same
bore as that used in the American army, and adjustments had to be made,
which caused unexpected delay, before they could supply the needs of their
own Government. Although the airplane was an American invention, the
British and French — not to speak of the Germans — had developed during
the first three years of the war combat planes that were far superior to any-
thing the United States had. Nevertheless, great things were expected of
American inventive genius, and an Aircraft Production Board was organised
imder the Council of National Defense and $640,000,000 appropriated for
the purpose. Instead of adopting an English or French model, the board
decided to design an American plane and an American motor. After months
of delay the ** Liberty Motor ” was finally perfected, but when the great
German drive began in March, 1918, no planes had been sent to Prance, and
the public began to ask why. The President finally appointed Charles E.
Hughes, his opponent in the campaign of 1916, to investigate the whole situa-
tion. A similar delay was experienced in the machine-gun programme. These
delays, and reports that the men in the camps were suffering from lack of
blankets and winter clothing, led to a general attack in and out of Congress
on the war administration in general and on Secretary Baker in particular.
In January, 1918, Senator Chamberlain of Oregon, Democratic chairman
of the Committee on military affairs, made a speech in New York in which
he declared that the military establishment had almost stopped functioning
“because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the
Government of the United States.” He had already introduced two bills, one
to establish a new Department of Munitions, and the other to establish a
War Cabinet to be composed of three distinguished citizens of demonstrated
ability. The friends of ex-President Roosevelt hoped in this way to compel
his appointment to a high position in the war administration. In fact, he
and a ^oup of friends came down to Washington and exerted all their in-
fluence in favour of Chamberlain's proposals. This carefully planned effort
to take the conduct of the war out of the hands of the Secretary of War was
but the beginning of a general attack on the Administration, and President
Wilson met it promptly. The dav after Chamberlain's speech was published
in the papers, the President issued a statement in which he declared that the
War Department had “performed a task of iinparallelled magnitude and
difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency.” He admitted that
there had been delays and disappointments, but he declared that they were
insignificant compared with what had been accomplished. In conclusion he
said: “My association and constant conference with the Secretary of War
have taught me to regard him as one of the ablest public officials I have
ever known.”
To meet some of the criticisms the President appointed Edward R. Stet-
tinius, of J. P. Morgan and Company, as Surveyor-General of Army Pur-
chases. The attempt to create a war cabinet did not meet with much support
throughout the country, and the measure was not pushed in Congress. The
President demanded instead that he be given greater powers. The full powers
he asked were not granted, but the Overman Bill authorised him to reorganise
the departments and bureaus of the Government so as to produce greater
efficiency.
© Keystone View Co
The first Wilson Cabinet. Seated around the table are President Wilson, Mr. McAdoo, Mr. McReynolds, Mr. Daniels, Mr, Houston, Mr. William B. Wilson,
Mr. Redfield, Mr. Lane, Mr. Burleson, Mr. Garrison and Mr. Bryan.
JOHN H. LATANH
543
THE NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE
The expansion of the navy, while nothing like as great as that of the
army, was nevertheless unparallelled in history considering the short time the
United States was engaged in the war. On April 6, 1917, the navy comprised
364 vessels of all kinds, 4,376 officers and 64,680 enlisted men. When the
Armistice was signed, there were in service over 2,000 vessels, 32,452 officers,
607,607 enlisted men, and over 70,000 marines.
The destruction of ships by German submarines during the two years
preceding the entrance of the United States into the war seriously interrupted
foreign commerce, of which only a small part was carried in American ships.
In order to develop a merchant marine, the United States Shipping Board
was established by Act of September 7, 1916. This board was authorised to
purchase, construct and operate ships throu^ the Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration, which was to be financed by the Government. As soon as the
United States entered the war, a great ship-building programme was adopted,
and enormous sums placed at the disposal of the board. The Emergency
Fleet Corporation constructed the great majority of its ships at Hog Island
near Philadelphia.
High wages and the high cost of material made the programme of creating
a merchant marine exceedingly expensive, and charges of waste and ejctrava-
gance were soon made, which led to the reorganisation of both the Shipping
Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, It took some time for the
programme to get under way, but some idea of the magnitude of the work
accomplished may be gained from the statement that on July 4, 1918, ninety-
five steel, wood, and composite ships, aggregating nearly 500,000 tons, were
launched. At the time of the Armistice the average monthly construction
was about 140 ships. What to do with all these ships, constructed at war
prices, later became a serious problem. The great losses sustained by the
Government after the war was over, in selling or trying to operate them,
were of course a part of the cost of the war.
MOBILISATION OF NATIONAL RESOimCES
By Act of August 29, 1916, Congress provided for the creation of a Council
of National Defence, composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior,
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labour. In accordance with the provisions of
the act, an advisory commission was later organised with Daniel Willard,
president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as chairman. The work of
this body became of very great importance. It lay in the direction of de-
veloping and mobilising the resources of the nation for war. Through various
subordinate committees it brought into the service of the Government many
of the leading financiers, business men, and technical experts of the country.
It also suggested to the States the organisation of state councils, which ren-
dered valuable service in directing the war activities of every description.
Throu^ these organisations thousands of citizens gave their services to the
Government without cost.
In order to conserve and increase the food supply for home needs, the
armies abroad, and the Allies, the Council of National Defence, created a
committee on food supply and prices with Herbert C. Hoover as Ahnirmim
He was later made Food Administrator and given very extensive powers
under an Act of Confess. In order to encourage the farmers to produce as
much wheat as possible and to prevent speculators from holding it, the
544 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
Government agreed to purchase for the army and navy and foreign Govern-
ments, all that was offered of the crop of 1917 at $2.20 a bushel. The price
for the 1918 crop was fixed at $2.00. This fixing of price in advance greatly
stimulated production. Meanwhile a general campaign for increased pro-
duction of all food products and for economy in the use of food was carried on
under the slogan “ Food will win the war.”
In August, 1917, Harry A. Garfield, president of Williams College, was
appointed Fuel Administrator, and given extensive powers to regulate the
price and distribution of coal. The large consumption of coal in the various
war industries and the increased demands of shipping, together with the wage
demands of the miners and the difSculties of transportation, rendered prices
uncertain and interrupted the normal distribution to such an extent that by
December there was a serious coal shortage, and in January, when the weather
became unusually severe, the situation grew desperate. It became necessary
for a time to close manufacturing plants in order that private homes might
be supplied and the btmkers of ships, loaded with supplies for the troops
abroad, be filled.
The difficulties which the railroads experienced in handling coal and in
forwarding military and naval supplies to the ports led the President in
December, 1917, to take over the railroads of the country for the period of
the war. On December 27, William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury,
was appointed Director-General of Railroads with full power to operate
them. Government management proved expensive, but the object was to
move coal, military supplies and troops, and not to make money for the
roads. The Government had to make good the losses, but the centralised
railroad administration was necessary to win the war.
When the United States entered the war, the general impression in America
was that the Allies needed food and munitions more than men, and that the
main task would be to supply their needs and use the navy in convoying
cargo ships and overcoming the German submarines. General Pershing and
the First Division were sent over in June and July, 1917, mainly for the
purpose of encouraging the Allies and letting them see that America was
really in the war. Before the end of the year, however, came the Austrian
victory over the Italians and the Bolshevist revolution in Russia, followed
a few months later by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Russia had deserted
her Allies, and in March, 1918, Germany was free to concentrate her forces
in a great drive on the western front. The German attack on the Bntish
lines in the St Quentin sector was probably the most formidable onslaught
in history, and the British were forced to give way. At this critical moment,
largely through the influence of President Wilson and Colonel House, General
Foch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British, French and American
armies. The British commander. General Haig, made a noble appeal to his
men to hold their positions until French reinforcements could arrive, and
Lloyd George appealed to the United States to throw its man-power into the
line of battle with all possible speed. He described the struggle as a race
between Wilson and Hindenburg. On the 6th of April, the first anniversary
of the declaration of war. President Wilson made a notable address at Balti-
more, declaring that the situation called for force, force to the utmost, force
without stint or limit.” From that time until the Armistice American troops
were rushed to France. At the outset transportation was not very rapid,
since shipping was far from plentiful; but as former German vessels were
pressed into service, embarkations increased at a rate of roughly 50,000 a
month. In December, 1917, 49,515 men were transported to France; in March,
1918, 84,889; in May, 245,945; and finally in July the peak was reached when
306,^0 soldiers were carried overseas.
JOHN H. LATANfi
545
THE WAE AIMS OP THE UNITED STATES
The Bolshevist Revolution of November, 1917, had been followed by
peace negotiations with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. The Russian
proposals were the evacuation of occupied territories, self-determination for
nationalities not hitherto independent, no war indemnities or economic boy-
cotts, and the application of these principles to the settlement of all colonial
questions. The Central Powers agreed to a part of this programme, provided
the Allies would accept the offer of a general peace. The conference called
on the Allies for an answer by January 4. No direct reply was made to this
demand, but the Russian proposals had made a profound impression on the
labouring classes in all countries, and both Lloyd George and President Wilson
felt called on to define more clearly the war aims of the Allies.
In a speech delivered January 5, 1918, Lloyd George made the first com-
prehensive and authoritative statement of British war aims. He had con-
sulted the labour leaders and Viscount Grey and Mr. Asquith, as well as
some of the representatives of the overseas Dominions, and he was speaking,
he said, for the nation and the Empire as a whole.” He explained first
what the British were not fighting for. He disclaimed any idea of over-
throwing the German Government, although he considered military autocracy
a dangerous anachronism ” ; they were not fighting to destroy Austria-
Hungary, but genuine self-government must be granted to “ those Austro-
Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it”; they were not fighting
** to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Thrace,
which are predominantly Turkish in race,” but the passage between the
Mediterranean and the Black Sea must be ** internationalised and neutral-
ised.” The positive statement of aims included the complete restoration of
Belgium, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, rectification of the Italian
boundary, the independence of Poland, the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro
and the occupied parts of France, Italy and Rumania, and a disposition of
the German colonies with “ primary regard to the wishes and interests of the
native inhabitants of such colonies.” He insisted on reparation for injuries
done in violation of international law, but disclaimed a demand for war in-
demnity. In conclusion he declared the following conditions to be essential
to a lasting peace: “First, the sanctity of treaties must be reestablished;
secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-
determination or the consent of the governed; and lastly, we must seek, by
the creation of some international organisation, to limit the burden of arma-
ments and diminish the probability of war.”
On January 8, 1918, three days after Lloyd George’s speech. President
Wilson delivered before the two Houses of Congress the most important of
all his addresses on war aims. It contained the famous Fourteen Points, for
a summary of which see page 220 of this volume. Between this date and the
Armistice the President delivered other addresses in which he elaborated the
same principles. Of special significance were his speeches of February 11,
July 4 and September 27. In this connection H. W. V. Temperley, in what
is so far the most important history of the Peace Conference at Paris, says:
“The utterances of President Wilson have a unique significance, not only
because they were taken as the legal basis of the Peace negotiations, but
because they form a definite and coherent body of political doctrine. This
doctrine, though developed and expanded in view of the tremendous changes
produced by the war, was not formed or even altered by them. His ideas,
like those of no other great statesman of the war, are capable of being
T. B. T. — VOL. I — 35
546 THE XJNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
worked out as a complete political philosophy. A peculiar interest, therefore,
attaches to his pre-war speeches, for they contain the germs of his political
faith and were not influenced by the terrifying por^ts of to-day. The
tenets were in themselves few and simple, but their consequences, when
developed by the war, were such as to produce the most far-reaching results.
It is not possible or necessary to discuss how far these tenets were accepted
by the American people as a whole, for, as the utterances of their legal rep-
resentative at a supreme moment of world history, they will always retain
their value.”
It appears now from the published memoirs of German and Austrian
statesmen that President Wilson’s speeches made a profoimd impression on
the peoples of Central Europe. His utterances in behalf of the oppressed
nationalities, not only Belgium, Serbia and Poland, but also the Czecho-
slovaks and the Yugoslavs, became stronger and more frequent during the
spring and summer of 1918, and solidified the opposition to Germany at a
critical period of the war. On September 3 he recognised the Czechoslovak
National Council as a belligerent Government. This meant the break-up of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had not been contemplated at an earlier
period, but, as he stated in his reply to the Austrian request for an armistice
in October, conditions had changed since the announcement of the Fourteen
Points, and these people would no longee be satisfied with mere autonomy.
When the March drive of 1918 was finally checked and the Allied advance
began, the German military leaders knew that the game was up, but they did
not have the courage to face the facts, for an acknowledgment of defeat
meant the overthrow of the old system of government based on military suc-
cess. They waited in vain for some military advantage which would give
them an opportunity to open negotiations without openly acknowledging de-
feat. Finally the state of demoralisation at Headquarters became so complete
that there was no alternative but to ask for an immediate armistice. It
order to pave the way for this step, the Ministry resigned October 1, anc
Prince Max of Baden was called on to form a new Government. On the 4th
he dispatched a note to President Wilson through the Swiss Government
requesting him to call a peace conference and stating that the German Gov-
ernment “ accepts the programme set forth by the President of the Unitec
States in his message to Congress of the 8th of January, 1918, and in hh
later pronouncements, especially his speech of the 27th September, as a bash
for peace negotiations.”
In reply the President asked for a clearer understanding on three points
(1) Did the Imperial Chancellor mean that the German Government acceptec
the terms laid down in the President’s addresses referred to, and “ that ih
object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practice
details of their application? ” (2) The President would not feel at libert 3
to propose a cessation of arms to the Allied Governments so long as the armiei
of the Central Powers were upon their soil. (3) The President asked whetiie
the Chancellor was speaking for the constituted authorities of the empire wh<
had so far conducted the war.
The German reply of October 12 was satisfactory on the first point. Witl
respect to the withdrawal of their troops from occupied territory tiiey pro
posed a mixed commission to arrange the details. On the third point it wa
stated that the new Government had been formed in agreement with the grea
majority of the Reichstag. Having accomplished this much, the President^
next step was skilfully taken. He replied that the process of evacuation ant
the conditions of an armistice were matters which must be left to the judg
ment of the military advisers of the United States and the Allied Govern
ments, but that he would not agree to any arrangement which did not pro
JOHN H. LATANIS 647
vide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance
of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and
of the Allies in the field.” Referring next to submarine warfare, he declared
that the United States and the Allied Governments could not consider an
armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and
inhumane practices which they persist in.” In conclusion he referred to a
clause contained in his speech of July 4, now accepted by the German Gov-
ernment as one of the conditions of peace, namely, “ The destruction of every
arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single
choice disturb the peace of the world.” He added: The power which has
hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is
within the choice of the German nation to alter it.” He demanded that the
United States and the Allied Governments should know beyond a peradven-
ture ” with whom they were dealing. To a peace-note received from Austria-
Hungary, he sent a separate reply on October 18.
In reply the Chancellor assured the President that a bill had been intro-
duced in the Reichstag to alter the Constitution of the empire so as to give
the representatives of the people the right to decide for war or peace, but the
President was not satisfied that there had been any real change. “ It may be
that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people,
but the present war has not been ; and it is with the present war that we are
dealing.” He was not willing to accept any armistice which did not make
a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. If, he concluded,
the United States must deal with the military masters and the monarchi-
cal autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them
later in) regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it
must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained
by leaving this essential thing unsaid.” This note was written October 23.
Four days later the Chancellor replied: *^The President knows the deep-
rooted changes which have taken place and are still taking place in German
constitutional life. The peace negotiations will be conducted by a People^s
Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in accordance with
the Constitution, and to which the Military Power will also be subjects. The
German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice which will
introduce a peace of justice such as the President in his manifestations has
described.”
The terms of the armistice were drawn up by the Interallied Council at
Versailles and completed by November 5. They were much more severe than
the public had expected them to be. Germany was required immediately to
evacuate Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxemburg; to withdraw her
armies from the entire territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and from Russia,
Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and Turkey; she was to surrender enormous
quantities of heavy artillery and airplanes, all her submarines, and most of
her battleships, cruisers and destroyers. This was practically unconditional
surrender. Contrary to general belief at the time, it is now known that
Foch and Haig considered these terms too severe and feared that Germany
would not accept them. They wanted an armistice that Germany would
accept. General Bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand “ the complete
disarmament and demobilisation of the military and naval forces of the
enemy.” In America there was much criticism of the President for being
willing to negotiate with Germany at all. “ On to Berlin ” was a popular
cry, and it was thought that the President was preventing a complete mili-
tary triumph. On October 10 Senator Lodge declared in the Senate: “ The
Republican party stands for unconditional surrender and complete victory,
just as Grant stood. My own belief is that the American people mean to
548 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
have an unconditional surrender. They mean to have a dictated, not a
negotiated peace.’'
After reviewing the armistice negotiations Andre Tardieu, a member of
the French Cabinet and delegate to the Peace Conference, says: What re-
mains of the fiction, believed by so many, of an armistice secretly determined
upon by an American dictator; submitted to by the European Governments;
imposed by their weakness upon the victorious armies, despite the opposition
of the generals? The Armistice was discussed in the open li^t of day. Presi-
dent Wilson only consented to communicate it to his associates on the triple
condition that its principle be approved by the military authorities and its
clauses drawn up airectly by them; that it be imposed upon the enemy and
not discussed with him; that it be such as to prevent all resumption of hos-
tilities and assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms of peace.”
The terms of the Armistice were delivered to the Germans by Marshal
Foch November 7, the Kaiser abdicated and fled across the border into
Holland on the 9th, and the document was signed and went into effect on
the 11th. In two particulars the Wilson principles had been modified by
the Allies. In the American note to Germany of November 5 Secretary
Lansing stated that the President had submitted his correspondence with the
German authorities to the Allied Governments and that he had received in
reply the following memorandum: “The Allied Governments have given
careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the
President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to
the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace
with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the
President’s Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of
settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. They must point out,
however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom
of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not
accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this
subject when they enter the Peace Conference. Further, in the conditions of
peace laid down in his Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President
declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated
and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed
to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that com-
pensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian popu-
lation of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land,
by sea, and from the air.” In transmitting this memorandum Secretary
Lansing stated that he was instructed by the President to say that he agreed
with this interpretation.
With these modifications the Wilson principles were accepted by all parties
as the legal basis of the peace negotiations.
THE PRESIDENT AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE
It was agreed that the Peace Conference should meet at Paris, and Presi-
dent Wilson considered the issues involved of such magnitude that he decided
to head the American delegation himself. Great Britain, France and Italy
were to be represented by their Premiers, and it was fitting that the United
States should be represented by its most responsible leader, who, furthermore,
had been the chief spokesman of the Allies and had formulated the princi-
ples upon which the peace was to be made. But the decision of the President
to go to Paris was without precedent in American history and, therefore, met
JOHN H. LATANfi 549
with criticism and opposition. When he announced the names of the other
members of the delegation, the criticism became even more severe. They
were Secretary of State Lansing, Henry White, former ambassador to France,
Colonel Edward M. House, and General Tasker H. Bliss. There had been a
widespread demand for a non-partisan peace commission, and many people
thought that the President should have taken Root, or Roosevelt, or Taft.
Mr. White was a Republican, but he had never been active in party affairs
or in any sense a leader. In the Senate there was deep resentment that the
President had not selected any members of that body to accompany him.
President McKinley had appointed three senators as members of the com-
mission of five that negotiated the Treaty of Peace at the close of the Spanish
War. With that exception, senators had never taken part in the negotiation
of a treaty. President Wilson was attended by a large group of experts on
military, economic, geographical, ethnological and legal matters, some of
whom were men of great ability, and in their selection no party lines were
drawn.
But just before the signing of the Armistice, the President had suffered a
serious political defeat at home. There had been severe criticisms of Demo-
cratic leadership in Congress and growing dissatisfaction with some of the
members of the Cabinet. In response to the appeals of Democratic Con-
gressmen, the President issued a statement from the White House on October
25, asking the people, if they approved of his leadership and wished him to
continue to be their “ unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and
abroad,” to vote for the Democratic candidates for Congress. He acknowl-
edged that the Republicans in Congress had loyally supported his war meas-
ures, but he declared that they were hostile to the Administration and that
the time was too critical for divided leadership. The statement created a
storm of criticism, and did more than any other act in his administration
to turn the tide of public opinion against* the President. The elections re-
sulted in a Republican majority of thirty-nine in the House and two in the
Senate. The President had followed the practice of European Premiers in
appealing to the people, but under the American constitutional system he
could not very well resign. Had he not issued his appeal, the election would
have been regarded as a repudiation of the Democratic Congress, but not
necessarily as a repudiation of the President. The situation was most un-
fortunate, but the President made no comments and soon after announced
his intention of going to Paris. In December Lloyd George went to the
country, and on pledging himself to make Germany pay for the war and
to pimish the Kaiser, was returned by a substantial majority. These pledges
were imnecessary and had a most imfortunate influence on the subsequent
negotiations at Paris.
The President sailed for France December 4, leaving a divided country
behind him. His enemies promptly seized the opportunity to assail him.
Senator Sherman of Illinois introduced a resolution declaring the presidency
vacant because the President had left the territory of the United States, and
Senator Knox of Pennsylvania offered another resolution declaring that the
Conference should confine itself solely to the restoration of peace, and that
the proposed league of nations should be reserved for consideration at some
future time.
While his enemies in the Senate were busily organising all the forces of
opposition against him, the President was welcomed by the war-weary peoples
of Europe with demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm such as had been the
lot of few men in history to receive. Sovereigns and heads of States bestowed
the highest honours upon him, while great crowds of working-men gathered
at the railroad stations in order to get a glimpse of the man who had led
560 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
the crusade for a peace that would end war and establish justice as the rule
of conduct between the nations of the world, great and small alike.
No mortal man could have fulfilled the hopes and expectations that cen-
tred in Wilson when he landed on the shores of France in December, 1918.
The Armistice had been signed on the basis of his ideals, and the peoples of
Europe confidently expected to see those ideals embodied in the Treaty of
Peace. He still held the moral leadership of the world, but the war was
over, the German menace ended, and national rivalries and jealousies were
beginning to reappear, even among those nations who had so recently fought
and bled side by side. This change was to be revealed when the Conference
met. There was no sign of it in the plaudits of the multitudes who wel-
comed the President in France, in England, and in Italy. He returned on
January 7, 1919, from Italy to Paris, where delegates to the Conference from
all the countries which had been at war with Germany were gathering.
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT
At a plenary session of the Conference January 25, 1919, President
Wilson made a notable speech in which he proposed the creation of a League
of Nations, and a commission under his chairmanship was appointed to
draft a constitution for the League. On February 14 the first draft of the
Covenant of the League was presented by him to the Conference, and on
the following day he sailed for the United States in order to consider the
bills passed by Congress before the expiration of the session on March 4.
The first draft of the Covenant was hastily prepared, and it w^ent back to
the commission for revision. As soon as the text was made known in the
United States, opposition to the Covenant was expressed in the Senate.
During the President's brief visit to Washington, he gave a dinner at the
White House to members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for the purpose of explain-
ing to them the terms of the Covenant. There was no official report of
what occurred at this dinner, but it was stated that some of the senators
objected to the Covenant on the ground that it was contrary to the tradi-
tional policies and inconsistent with the Constitution and form of govern-
ment. On March 4, the day before the President left New York to resume
his duties at the Conference, Senators Lodge and Knox issued a round robin,
signed by thirty-seven senators, declaring that they would not vote for the
Covenant in the form proposed, and that consideration of the League of
Nations should be postponed until peace had been concluded with Germany.
That same night, the President made a speech at the Metropolitan Opera
House in New York City in which, after explaining and defining the Cove-
nant, he said: “When that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will
find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to
the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without
destroying the whole structure.’^ In this same address he also said: “ The
first thing I am going to tell the people on the other side of the water is that
an overwhelming majority of the American people is in favor of the League
of Nations. I know that this is true. I have had unmistakable intimations
of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings true in every case.”
The President was evidently quite confident that public sentiment would
compel the Senate to ratify the Peace Treaty, including the Covenant of
the League. A nation-wide propaganda was being carried on by the League
to Enforce Peace and other organisations, and public sentiment for the
League appeared to be overwhelming. The President took back to Paris
© Kn/Htone View Co © Keystone View Co
Senator Oscar W. Underwood. The Hon. Andrew W. Mellon.
© Keystone Vteiv Co,
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. The Hon. Charles B. Hughes.
SIX MBH PROMHIBIIT HT AMERICAN FDBUC ABFAIRS
JOHN H. LATANfi
551
with him various suggestions of changes in the Covenant, and later ex-
President Taft, Elihu Root, and Charles E. Hu^es proposed amendments
which were forwarded to him and carefully considered by the commission.
Some of these suggestions, such as the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine
and the right of withdrawal from the League, were embodied in the final draft.
When the President returned to Pans he found that Secretary Lansing
and Colonel House had consented to the separation of the League from
the Treaty of Peace. He immediately reversed this decision, but the final
adoption of the Covenant was delayed by the demand of Japan that a clause
be inserted establishing the principle of equality of nations and just treat-
ment of their nationals,” which would have brought within the jurisdiction
of the League the status of Japan’s subjects in California and in the British
dominions. France urged the inclusion of a provision creating a permanent
General Staff to direct the military operations of the League, and Belgium
insisted that Brussels rather than Geneva should be the seat of the League.
Meanwhile other national aspirations were also brought forward which
delayed the general Treaty of Peace. France wanted the entire left bank of
the Rhine; Italy put forth a claim to Fiume; and Japan, relying on secret
agreements with England, France and Italy, insisted on her claims to Shan-
tung. No economic settlement had as yet been agreed upon, and the question
of reparations was threatening the disruption of the Conference.
The most difficult problem that the Conference had to solve was the
establishment of a new Franco-German frontier. The French! argument
for the military occupation of the Left Bank was set forth again and again
at length and with great skill. The fact was pointed out that the destruction
of the German fleet had relieved England from all fear of German invasion,
and that the Atlantic Ocean lay between Germany and the United States,
while France, which had suffered two German invasions in half a century,
had no safeguard but the League of Nations, which she did not deem as
good a guarantee as the Rhine bridges. Finally Wilson and Llovd George
offered the guarantee treaties, and Clemenceau agreed to take the proposal
under consideration. Three days later he came back with a counter-
proposition and a compromise was reached. France gave up her demand
for a separate Rhineland, but secured occupation of the Left Bank, including
the bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen 3 ^ears as a guarantee of the execution
of the treaty. In return the United States and Great Britain pledged them-
selves to come to the immediate aid of France, in case of an unprovoked
attack, by an agreement which was to be binding only if ratified by
both countries.
On most of the questions that were hotly contested compromises of a
more or less unsatisfactory character were finally adopted. It was charged
that President Wilson had agreed to these compromises in order to save
the Covenant of the League and that the treaty as a w^hole was bad. On
May 7 the completed treaty was presented to the German delegates who
had been summoned to Versailles to receive it. When the text was made
public in Berlin there was an indignant outcry against the alleged injustice
of certain provisions which were held to be inconsistent with the pledges
given by President Wilson in the pre-Armistice negotiations, and the Ger-
mans made repeated efforts to draw the Allies into a general discussion of
principles. They were, however, finally given to understand that they must
accept or reject the treaty as it stood, and on June 28 it was signed in the
Hall of Mirrors at Versailles — the same hall in which William I had been
crowned Emperor of Germany forty-eight years before. Probably history
can show no greater reversal of fortune than when in the palace of France’s
former kings that scene was staged in which the conquerors of but one gen-
eration before now became the delegates of a broken and humiliated nation^
552
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
THE TREATY BEFORE THE SENATE
The day after the treaty was signed President Wilson sailed for the
United States, and on July 10 personally presented the treaty to the Senate
with an earnest appeal for prompt ratification. The Committee on Foreign
Relations, to which the treaty was referred, proceeded with great delibera-
tion, and on July 31 began a series of public hearings which lasted until
September 12. The Committee called before it Secretary Lansing and
several of the technical advisers to the American delegation, including B. M.
Baruch, economic adviser, Norman H. Davis, financial adviser, and David
Hunter Miller, legal adviser. The Committee also called before it a number
of American citizens who had had no official connection with the negotiations
but who wished to speak in behalf of foreign groups, including Thomas F.
, Millard for China, Joseph W. Folk for Egypt, Dudley Field Malone for
India, and a large delegation of Americans of Irish descent, who opposed
the league of Nations on the ground that it would stand in the way of
Ireland’s aspiration for independence. The rival claims of Yugoslavs and
Italians to Fiume, the demand of Albania for self-determination, the
claims of Greece to Thrace, and arguments for and against the separation of
Austria and Hungary were all presented at great length to the Committee. On
August 19 the President received the Committee at the White House, and
after submitting a written statement on certain features of the Covenant,
he was questioned by members of the Committee and a general discussion
followed.
Meanwhile, the treaty was being openly debated in the Senate. The
President had been an advocate of publicity in diplomacy as well as in other
things, and the Senate now undertook to use his own weapon against him by
a public attack on the treaty. Although the opposition to the treaty was
started in the Senate by Lodge, Borah, Johnson, Sherman, Reed and Poin-
dexter, it was not confined to that body. Throughout the country there were
persons of liberal views who favoured the League of Nations but objected to
the severe terms imposed on Germany, and charged the President with
having proved false to the principles of the Fourteen Points There were
others who did not object to a severe peace, but who were bound fast by the
tradition of isolation and thought membership in the League of Nations
would involve the sacrifice of national sovereignty- The main object of
attack was Article X, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political
independence of all the members of the League. President Wilson stated to
the Senate Committee that he regarded Article X as “ the very backbone of
the whole Covenant,” and that without it the League would be hardly
more than an influential debating society.” The opponents of the League
declared that this article would embroil the United States in the internal
affairs of Europe, and that it deprived Congress of its constitutional right
to declare war.
In the Senate there were three groups: the small number of “ irrecon-
cilables ” who opposed the ratification of the treaty in any form ; a larger
group who favoured ratification without amendments, but who finally ex-
pressed their willingness to accept interpretative reservations and a large
group composed mainly of Republicans who favoured the ratification of the
treaty only on condition that there should be attached to it reservations safe-
guarding what they declared to be the fundamental rights and interests of the
United States. This group differed among themselves as to the character of
the reservations that were necessary, and some of them became known as
mild reservationists.”
5S3
JOHN H. LATANfi
It is probable that at the outset only the small group of “ irreconcilables
hoped or intended to bring about the defeat of the treaty, but as the debate
proceeded and the opposition to the treaty received more and more popular
support, the reservationists determined to defeat the treaty altogether rather
than to accept any compromise. The Republican leaders were quick to
realise that the tide of public opinion had turned and was now running
strongly against the President. They determined, therefore, to ruin him at
all hazards, and thus to bring about the election of a Republican president.
When President Wilson realised that the treaty was really in danger of
defeat, he determined to go on an extended tour of the country for the
purpose of explaining the treaty to the people and bringing pressure to bear
on the Senate. Beginning at Columbus, Ohio, on September 4, he proceeded
through the northern tier of states to the Pacific coast, then visited Cali-
fornia and returned through Colorado. He addressed large audiences who
received him with great enthusiasm. He was “ trailed ” by Senator Hiram
Johnson, who was sent out by the opposition in the Senate to present the
other side. Johnson also attracted large crowds. On the return trip, while
delivering an address at Wichita, Kansas, September 26, the President showed
signs of a nervous breakdown and returned immediately to Washington.
He was able to walk from the train to his automobile, but a few days lat6r
he was partially paralysed. The full extent and seriousness of his illness
was carefully concealed from the public. He was confined to the White
House for five months, and had to abandon all efforts in behalf of the treaty.
On September 10 the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty
to the Senate with a number of amendments and reservations. The Com-
mittee declared that the League was an alliance, and that it would “ breed
wars instead of securing peace They also declared that the Covenant
demanded “ sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty which
would in no way promote the world^s peace,” and that the amendments and
reservations which they proposed were intended “to guard American rights
and American sovereignty.” The following day the minority members of
the Committee submitted a report opposing both amendments and reserva-
tions. A few days later Senator McCumber presented a third report repre-
senting the views of the “ mild reservationists.” It objected to the phrase-
ology of the Committee’s reservations as unnecessarily severe and recom-
mended substitute reservations. The treaty then became the regular order
in the Senate and was read section by section and debated each day for over
two months. The amendments of the text of the treaty were all rejected
by substantial majorities for the reason that their adoption would have made
it necessary to resubmit the treaty not only to the Allies but also to Ger-
many. The majority of th^ senators were opposed to such a course. The
Committee, therefore, decided to substitute reservations for amendments,
and Senator Lodge finally submitted, on behalf of the Committee, fourteen
reservations preceded by a preamble, which declared that the ratification of
the treaty was not to take effect or bind the United States until these reserva-
tions had been accepted as a condition of ratification by at least three of the
four principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely. Great Britain, France,
Italy and Japan.
The most important of the Lodge Reservations were those declaring
that the United States assumed no obligations under Article X and forbidding
the use of the military or naval forces of the United States under any article
of the treaty without the consent of Congress, excluding domestic questions
from consideration by the League, reserving from the jurisdiction of the
Lea^e the Monroe Doctrine and the exclusive right to interpret it, with-
holding the consent of the United States from the provisions of the treaty
554 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
recognising Japan’s claims to the province of Shantung, requiring the con-
firmation by the Senate of all delegates from the United States to the League,
and declaring that the United States would not be bound by any action of
the Council or Assembly in which any member and its self-governing
dominions cast in the aggregate more than one vote. The Lodge reservations
were adopted seriatim by small majorities. A number of other reservations
were offered and rejected. Under the rules of the Senate, amendments and
reservations to a treaty may be adopted by a majority vote, while a treaty
can be ratified only by a two-thirds vote. A number of senators who were
opposed to the treaty voted for the Lodge reservations in order to insure
its defeat. When the vote on the treaty with the reservations was taken
November 19, it stood 39 for and 55 against. A motion to reconsider the
vote was then adopted, and Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic leader, pro-
posed five reservations covering the right of withdrawal, domestic questions,
the Monroe Doctrine, the right of Congress to decide on the cmplojrment of
the naval and military forces of the United States in any case arising under
Article X, and restrictions on the voting powers of self-governing colonies
or dominions. These reservations were rejected, the vote being 41 to 50.
Another vote was then taken on the treaty with the I^dge reservations, the
result being 41 for and 51 against. Senator Underwood then offered a
resolution to ratify the treaty without reserv^ations of any kind. The vote
on this resolution was 38 for and 53 against.
It was now evident that there was little prospect of securing the ratifica-
tion of the treaty without compromise. On January 8, 1920, a letter from
the President was read at the Jackson Dav dinner in Washington, in which
he refused to accept the decision of the Senate as final and said : “ There
can be no reasonable objection to interpretations accompanying the act of
ratification itself. But when the treaty is acted upon, I must know whether
it means that we have ratified or rejected it We cannot rewrite this treaty.
We must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it, and
then, after the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkable
task of making another and separate kind of treaty with Germany.” In
conclusion he declared. ^Mf tliere is any doubt as to what the people of
the country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out is to
submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of the nation,
to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum, a refer-
endum as to the part tlie United States is to play in completing the settle-
ments of the war and in the prevention in the future of such outrages as
Germany attempted to perpetrate.”
During the last week of January a compromise was discussed by an
informal by-partisan committee, and the President wrote a letter saying he
would accept the Hitchcock reservations, but Lodge refused to accept them
On February 9 the Senate again referred the treaty to the Committee on
Foreign Relations with instructions to report it back immediately with the
reservations previously adopted. After several weeks of fruitless debate a
fifteenth reservation, expressing sympathy for Ireland, was added to the
others, by a vote of 38 to 36. It was as follows: “In consenting to
the ratification of the treaty with Germany the United States adheres to the
principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the
aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted
by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when such governnofent is
obtained by Ireland, a consummation which it is hoped is at hand, it should
promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations.”
With a few changes in the resolutions previously adopted and an un-
important change in the preamble, the ratifying resolution was finally put
JOHN H. LATANfi 555
to the vote March 19, 1920. The result was 49 votes for and 36 against,
less than the required two-thirds. On the following day the secretary of
the Senate was instructed by a formal resolution to return the treaty to the
President and to inform him that the Senate had failed to ratify it.
THE CLOSE OF THE WILSON ADMINISTBATION
By his Jackson Day letter President Wilson had made the treaty the
leading issue in the presidential campaign, but unfortunately it was not the
only issue. The election proved to be a referendum on the Wilson adminis-
tration as a whole rather than the treaty. The Republican Convention met
in Chicago June 8. The leading candidates for the nomination were General
Leonard Wood, Governor Lowden of Illinois, and Senator Johnson of Cali-
fornia. As so often happens, there were so many combinations against the
leading candidates that no one of them could win the nomination, and on
the tenth ballot Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio was nominated. Gov-
ernor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts was named for Vice-President.
The Democratic Convention met in San Francisco June 28. It had been
generally supposed that William G. McAdoo, the President's son-in-law,
would be the nominee, but Mr. McAdoo did not push his candidacy, and
Governor James M. Cox of Ohio was finally chosen, with Franklin D. Roose-
velt of New York as candidate for Vice-President. In the campaign that
followed Harding attacked the Wilson administration for its arbitrary and
unconstitutional methods and advocated a return to “ normalcy.’’ He op-
posed the Wilson League, but said he favoured an association of nations and
an international court. Cox spent the earlier weeks of the campaign trying
to prove that the Republicans were raising a huge fund with which to buy
the presidency, but as the campaign progressed he gave more attention to
the treaty. The election resulted in an overwhelming victory for Harding.
He received 404 electoral votes to Cox’s 127, and a popular plurality of about
seven million votes.
The President had been too ill to take any part in the campaign His
administration had been the chief issue, and the people had for Qie time
being repudiated it. He accepted the result philosophically, content to leave
the part he had played in the great world crisis to the verdict of history.
After the rejection of the treaty he had withdrawn largely from European
affairs, and after the election he let it be known that he would do nothing
which might embarrass the new administration in its handling of foreign
affairs. The opposition to him in the election had been so overwhelming that
a reaction was not surprising, and before he turned the office over to his
successor there were evidences of a greater appreciation of his services both
at home and abroad. In December, 1920, he was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize.
Two amendments to the Constitution of the United States were adopted
during Wilson’s second administration, the ratification in both cases being
urged by the President and hastened by war conditions^ The Eighteenth
Amendment, prohibiting the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxi-
cating liquors for beverage purposes within the .jurisdiction of the United
States, was proposed by Congress December 18, 1917, and, after ratification
by three-fourths of the States, was proclaimed January 29, 1919. The
National Prohibition Act, commonly known as the Volstead Act, was vetoed
by President Wilson, but passed over his veto October 28, 1919. This law,
in the opinion of many, went much further than the Amendment warranted
in its definition of intoxicating liquors. It placed under the ban all liquors
566 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
with an alcoholic content of more than one half of one per cent. The Supreme
Court, however, held that Congress had the right to define the term intoxi-
cating liquors, and it declared the law constitutional.
The Nineteenth Amendment, extending the suffrage to women, was pro-
posed by Congress in June, 1919, and, after ratification by three-fourths of
the States, was proclaimed as part of the Constitution August 26, 1920, in
time for women to vote in the presidential and congressional elections in
November.
One of the most important laws passed by Congress between the close of
the war and the end of the Wilson administration was the Esch-Cummins
Act of February, 1920, providing for the return of the railroads to the
operating control of the owning companies. But the new law went much
further than that and gave the Interstate Commerce Commission far greater
powers than it had before. The original Act of 1887 gave the Commission
the power to prevent discrimination. The new law gave it the power to fix
rates on the basis of a fair return upon the value of the railroad properties.
For the first two years the fair rate of return was to be five and a half
per cent, with an extra half of one per cent (six m all) to make provision
for improvements chargeable to capital accounts. The rate fixed was to
apply to all the railroads, or to all in territorial groups, three of which
were later established by the Commission, the Eastern, the Western and the
Southern. The act afforded no relief for railroads earning less than six per
cent, while those earning more than six per cent were required to pay half
the excess to the Government The amounts so paid are to be held by the
Government as a reserve fund with which to assist the weak roads by loans.
The Interstate Commerce Commission was further directed by the act to
prepare and put in effect a plan for the consolidation of the railroads of
the Country into a limited number of systems. The act also created a Rail-
road Labour Board to pass upon questions relating to wages
INAUGURATION OF HARDING AND WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Harding was inaugurated March 4, 1921, with very simple ceremonies
After taking the oath of office, he attended an executive session of the Senate
and personally announced his Cabinet appointments. Charles E. Hughes,
Secretary of State, and Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, were men
in whom the country had the greatest confidence, and Andrew W. Mellon,
the new Secretary of the Treasury, although not well known at the time, was
soon to win the public confidence and respect in a marked degree.
With a Republican majority of 150 in the House and 22 in the Senate
the path of the new Administration appeared smooth enough, but large
legislative majorities are not easily managed, and few Congresses in the his-
tory of the country have accomplished less in the way of constructive legisla-
tion than the one that was convened by President Harding shortly after
his inauguration. The President believed that he had received, by an
imprecedented popular majority, a great mandate from the people, but he
was not quite certain what it was. In fact, the campaign had been based
on criticism of the party in power rather than on a constructive programme.
All the dissatisfied elements in the country, and they were many and diverse,
had voted the Republican ticket. Of one thing the new President became
convinced, whether rightly or wrongly, and that was that the American
people had overv^helmingly repudiated the idealism of Woodrow Wilson.
He decided, therefore, to withdraw from all active participation in European
affairs, but as this purpose proved impracticable. Secretary Hughes soon
JOHN H. LATANIS 667
instituted the system of sending American representatives to sit as “ob-
servers ” at the sessions of European conferences and commissions.
Following the war there had been a slump not only in idealism, but a
slump in industry, a slump in commerce, and a slump in agriculture. In
January, 1921, the Department of Labour announced that there were 3,473,000
imemployed, and by August the fi^re had mounted to 5,735,000. TEe
expansion in foreign commerce that it had been predicted would follow the
war had failed to materialise, and the merchant marine that had been built
at such great expense during the war was now costing the country millions
of dollars annually and driving the Shipping Board into drastic efforts to
sell or lease ships at whatever terms were offered. The Board was reorgan-
ised by President Harding, who appointed Albert D. Lasker chairman. The
President was determined to keep the American flag on the seas, and soon
urged upon Congress the granting of a ship subsidy. The slump in agricul-
ture extended to both the cotton and wheat sections. The crops of 1920
had been planted and gathered at the highest wages known in the history
of agriculture, and had to be sold at prices lower than any known since the
beginning of the European war in 1914. The farmers complained that the
laws of the country were framed in the interest of the manufacturing, finan-
cial and commercial classes, and they were determined to force from the
Administration some consideration of their claims. As a result there appeared
in Congress for the first time an agricultural bloc, having as its leaders Sena-
tors Capper of Kansas, Kenyon of Iowa, and LaFollette of Wisconsin.
One of the most surprising and fantastic expressions of the social unrest
following the war was the revival and rapid spread of the Ku Klux Klan.
It adopted the name, ritual, costume and methods of the Klan of Reconstruc-
tion days, but its aims were more closely allied to those of the old Know-
Nothing party of the ^fifties. It was avowedly hostile to Roman Catholics,
Jews, negroes, pacifists and Bolshevists. It was organised in the Southern
States with headquarters in Atlanta, and notwithstanding the exposure of
its financial operations by the New York Times in 1921 and the ridicule that
was heaped by the Press upon it generally, it continued to survive in the
South and spread rapidly through the Northern States, even into remote
country districts of New England, where the Know-Nothing party had been
strong. In some States, notably Texas and Oregon, it entered actively into
politics with a considerable measure of success. In 1923 the indications were
that the Klan was not so strong in the Southern States east of the Mississippi,
but that it was gaining ground in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.
In May, 1921, Congress passed an act limiting immigration in order to
prevent the country from being flooded with refugees from the disorderly
and debt-burdened countries of Europe. The act provided “ that the number
of aliens of any nationality who may be admitted under the immigration
laws to the United States in any fiscal year shall be limited to three per
centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident
in the United States as determined by the census of 1910.” Another measure
of importance was the Act of June 9, 1921, establishing a national budget.
This measure had been advocated for years by political reformers, and a
budget bill had been passed by Congress during tha administration of
President Wilson, but he objected to certain features of the bill and vetoed it.
During the presidential campaign Harding’s position on the League of
Nations had been so equivocal that the public knew not what to expect,
but when Hughes and Hoover were appointed members of the Cabinet, it
was generally expected that the new Administration would go into the League
with reservations. This expectation was nojb to be fulfilled, however, for
the President persistently ignored the existence of the League, and took no
668 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
notice of the establishment of the permanent Court of International Justice
provided for in Article XIV of the Covenant, notwithstanding the fact that
the United States had first advocated such a court, that Elihu Root had
helped to draft the statute creating the court, and that an American, John
Bassett Moore, had been elected one of the judges.
Meanwhile a technical state of war with Germany existed and American
troops were still on the Rhine. On July 2, 1921, the President signed a joint
resolution of Congress declaring the war at an end, but undertaking to reserve
to the United States “ all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advan-
tages ” to which it w’as entitled under the terms of the Armistice, or by
reason of its participation in the war, or which had been stipulated for its
benefit in the Treaty of Versailles, or to which it was entitled as one of
the Principal Allied and Associated Povrers, or to which it was entitled by
virtue of any act or acts of Congress. On August 25 the United States
Government, through its commissioner to Germany, signed at Berlin a
separate treaty of peace with Germany, reserving in detail the rights referred
to in the joint resolution of Congress. About the same time a similar treaty
was signed with Austria, and the two treaties were ratified by the Senate
of the United States October 18. Tlie proclamation of peace produced no
immediate results of any importance. American troops continued on the
Rhine, and there was no apparent increase in trade, which had been carried
on before the signing of the treaty under special licences.
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
Prior to his inauguration Harding gave no indication of any intention of
making the limitation of armaments an administrative policy. In fact, he
repeatedly declared that the United States must have a na\»y “ second to
none.” But there developed throughout the country a strong sentiment
against large naval and military expenditures. Both General Pershing and
General Bliss declared that the time had come for some reduction, and the
army was cut down to 175,000 men by Act of Congress In response to the
general sentiment. Senator Borah introduced a resolution authorising the
President to call a conference between Great Britain, Japan and the United
States to consider the question of naval reduction. Later he succeeded in
putting through an amendment to the Naval Appropriation Bill directing the
President to call such a conference. The administration at first opposed the
amendment, but suddenly consented to its passage, and on August 11, 1921,
issued formal invitations to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to a
conference to be held at Washington November 11. One of the main objects
of the conference was the settlement of a number of questions that had
arisen as a result of Japan’s activity during the World War. The invitation,
therefore, linked the subject of Limitation of Armament with Pacific and
Far-Eastern questions. On the latter question Belgium, the Netherlands,
Portugal and China were invited to confer with the other Powers. The
question of the continuance of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance was also
involved. This subject had been discussed at the British Imperial Con-
ference, which met at London in the early summer, and it became known that
the overseas Dominions, particularly Australia and New Zealand, were
strongly opposed to a renewal of the alliance with Japan.
The Washington Conference convened in plenary session November 12,
1921, in Memorial Continental Hall. The question of open diplomacy, which
had been much discussed, was settled at the first session by Secretary Hughes,
who, in his introductory speech, boldly laid the American proposals for the
559
JOHN H. LATANfi
limitations of navies before the Conference. He proposed (1) that all pro-
grammes for the construction of capital ships, either actual or projected, be
abandoned; (2) that a large number of battleships of older types still in
commission be scrapped; and (3) that the allowance of auxiliary combatant
craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines and airplane carriers, be in
proportion to the tonnage of capital ships. These proposals, it was claimed,
would leave the Powers imder consideration in the same relative positions.
Under this plan the United States would be allowed 500,000 tons of capital
ships, Great Britain 500,000 tons, and Japan 300,000 tons.
Japan objected to the 5-5-3 ratio proposed by Secretary Hughes, and
urged a 10-10-7 ratio as more in accord with existing strength. The Ameri-
can proposal included the scrapping of the “ Mutsu,” the pride of the Japanese
navy, which had been launched but not quite completed. The sacrifices
voluntarily proposed by the United States for its navy were much greater
than those which England or Japan were called upon to make, and in this
lay the strength of the American position. The Japanese refused, however,
to give up the Mutsu,” and they were finally permitted to retain it, but
in order to preserve the 5-5-3 ratio, it was necessary to increase the tonnage
allowance of the United States and Great Britain. In the treaty as finally
agreed upon, Japan was allowed 315,000 tons of capital ships and the United
States and Great Britain each 525,000 tons.
In presenting his proposals at the opening session, Mr. Hughes had said
flint the tonnage allowance of France and Italy would be considered later.
Wlien, after the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, the question of the allowance
of the capital ship tonnage for France and Italy was taken up in committee,
the other powers were wholly unprepared for France^s demand of 350,000
tons of capital ships. According to Hugheses figures based on existing
strength, she was entitled to 175,000 tons. It is not probable that the French
delegates intended to insist on such a large tonnage. It is more likely that
they put forth this proposal in the committee in order to give the other dele-
gates to understand that France could not be ignored or dictated to with
impunity and in order to pave the way for their submarine proposal. Unfor-
tunately the French demands were given to the Press through some mis-
understanding and caused an outburst of criticism in the British and Ameri-
can papers. In the committee the relations between the British and French
delegates became very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon the
submarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarine tonnage.
On December 16 Secretary Hughes cabled an appeal, over the heads of the
French delegation, to Briand, who had returned to Paris. As a result, the
French finally agreed to accept the 1.75 ratio for capital ships, but refused to
place any reasonable limits upon cruisers, destroyers, submarines or aircraft.
Italy accepted the same ratio as France. Thus an important part of the
Hughes programme failed. As a result, the treaty leaves the contracting
parties free to direct their energies, if they so desire, to the comparatively
new fields of submarine and aerial warfare.
By Article XIX of the naval treaty the United States, Great Britain and
Japan agreed ^ maintain the status quo as regards fortifications and naval
bases in the islands of the Pacific, with certain exceptions, notably the
Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and New Zealand.
The French insistence on the practically imlimited right to build sub-
marines caused much hard feeling in England. The British delegates had
proposed the total abolition of suomarines, and this proposal had been ably
supported by the arguments of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee. Unfortunately
the United States delegation stood for the submarine, proposing merely cer-
tain limits upon its use. The five naval Powers finally signed a treaty re-
560 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
aflSrming the old rules of international law in regard to the search and seizure
of merchant vessels, and declaring that “ any person in the service of any
Power ,who shall Violate any of these rules, whether or not such person is
under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated
the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act
of piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities
of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found/’’ By the
same treaty the signatory Powers solemnly bound themselves to prohibit the
use in war of poisonous gases.
The committee on Pacific and Far-Eastern questions held its first meeting
November 16, It was commonly supposed that the United States delegation
had prepared a programme on the Far-Eastern Question, and that this would
be presented in the same way that Hughes had presented the naval pro-
gramme. If this was the intention there was a sudden change of plan, for
between one and two o’clock at night the Chinese delegates were aroused
from their slumbers and informed that there would be an opportunity for
them to present China’s case before the committee at eleven o’clock that
morning. They at once went to work with their advisers, and a few minutes
before the appointed hour they completed the drafting of the Ten Points,
which Minister Sze read before the committee. These Points constituted a
Chinese declaration of independence, and set forth a senes of general prin-
ciples to be applied in the determination of questions relating to China.
Several days later the committee adopted four resolutions, presented by
Mr. Root, covering in part some of the Chinese principles. By these resolu-
tions the Powers agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity
of China, to give China the fullest opportunity to develop and maintain an
effective and stable government, to recognise the principles of equality for
the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China,
and to refrain from taking advantage of present conditions in order to seek
special rights or privileges. This somewhat vague and general declaration
of principles appeared to be all that China was likely to get. Had Mr.
Hughes presented a Far-Eastern programme and obtained nothing more than
this, it would have been a serious blow to the prestige of the United States.
That is probably why he decided at the last moment to let China present
her own case.
At the fourth plenary session of the Conference the treaty relating to the
Pacific islands, generally known as the Four-Power Treaty, was presented
by Senator Lodge. By the terms of this treaty, the United States, Great
Britain, France and Japan agreed ^Ho respect their nghts in relation to
their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific
Ocean,” and in case of any dispute arising out of any Pacific question to
refer the matter to a joint conference for consideration and adjustment.
This article appeared harmless enough, but Article II seemed to lay the
foundations of an alliance between these Powers. It was as follows: ‘‘If
the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power,
the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and
frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient
measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the
particukr situation.” This treaty is to remain in force for ten years, after
which it may be terminated by any of the High Contracting Parties on
twelve months’ notice. It supersedes the Anglo- Japanese Alliance which^ it
expressly pro\dded, should terminate on the exchange of ratifications.
In presenting the treaty, Senator Lodge assured his hearers that “ no
military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or under cover
of these plain and direct clauses,” and Secretary Hughes in closing the dis-
JOHN H. LATANfi
561
cuBsion declared that it would probably not be possible to find in all history
“ an international document couched in more simple or even briefer terms,
but he added, “ we are again reminded that the great things are the simple
ones.” In view of these statements the members of the Conference and the
public generally were somewhat bewildered a few days later when Secretary
Hughes and the President gave out contradictory statements as to whether
the treaty included the Japanese homeland. Hughes stated to the cor-
respondents that it did, and the President said it did not. Whereupon some
wag remarked that at Paris President Wilson did not let the American dele-
gation know what he did, while at Washington the delegates did not let
President Harding know what they were doing. In deference to the Presi-
dent's views and to criticisms of the treaty in the Japanese press a supple-
mentary treaty was later signed expressly declaring that the term “ insular
possessions and insular dominions ” did not include the Japanese homeland.
Meanwhile the Shantung question was being discussed by China and
Japan outside of the Conference, but with the representatives of the Ameri-
can and British Governments sitting as observers ready to use their good
oflSces if called on. The reason for not bringing the question before the
Conference was that Great Britain, France and Italy were parties to the
Treaty of Versailles, which gave Japan a legal title to the German leases in
Shantung. The restoration of the province to China was vital to a satisfac-
tory^ adjustment of Chinese affairs generallv. Japan, however, was in no
hurry to reach an agreement with China, wishing for strategical purposes to
keep the matter in suspense to the la^^t, if not to avoid a settlement until
after the adjournment of the Conference and continue negotiations under
more favourable conditions at Peking or Tokio
By Christmas it seemed that the Conference had accomplished about all
that was possible, and that it would adjourn as soon as the agreements
already reached could be put into treaty form and signed. At the end of
the first week in January it looked as if the Chinese and Japanese had
reached a deadlock, and that the Conference would adjourn without a
satisfactory adjustment of any of the Chinese problems Mr. Balfour and
other important delegates had engaged return passage, and all indications
pointed to an early dissolution of the Conference. But the unexpected
happened. At an informal gathering of administration leaders at the White
House on Saturday night, January 7, stock was taken of the work of the
Conference, and some of the Senators present expressed the opinion that
if it adjourned without doing more for China, there would be little hope
of getting the treaties ratified. As a result Secretary Hughes persuaded
the British and Japanese delegates to cancel their sailings, and with char-
acteristic energy and determination took personal charge of the Far-Eastern
situation, which up to this time had been left mainly to Mr. Root. After
a little pressure had been brought to bear on the Chinese by President
Harding, and probably on the Japanese by Mr. Balfour, Secretary Hughes
was finally able to announce at the plenary session of February 1 that
Japan and China had reached an agreement as to the terms on which
Shantung was to be restored. At the same session the agreements in regard
to China reached by the Committee on Far-Eastern affairs were announced.
These agreements were finally embodied in two treaties, one dealing with the
tariff and the other with the open door, and a series of ten resolutions.
In the treaty relating to the open door, the Contracting Powers other than
China pledged themselves to the following principles:
'' (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and
administrative integrity of China;
T. B. T. — VOL 1 — 36
562 THE UNITED STATES BECX)MES A WORLD POWER
“ (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China
to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and
maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry
of all nations throughout the territoi^ of China;
'' (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order
to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects
or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to
the security of such States.”
China on her part accepted fully the principle of the open door, and
pledged herself for the first time to respect it.
The achievements of the Conference, although falling far short of the
extravagant claims made by the President and the American delegates
were undoubtedly of great importance. The actual scrapping of millions ol
dollars’ worth of ships in commission or in process of construction gave
the world an object-lesson such as it had never had before. One of the
most significant results of the Conference was the development of a complete
accord between England and the United States, made possible by the settle-
ment of the Irish question and furthered by the tact and gracious bearinj
of Mr. Balfour. One of the unfortunate results was the increased isolatioi
of France, due to the failure of her delegates to grasp the essential element!
of the situation and to play any but a negative role. The success of tin
Conference was due largely to Secretary Hughes who, though handicappec
at every point by fear of the Senate and by the unfortunate commitment
of President Harding during the last campaign, may be said on the whoh
to have played his hand reasonably well
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
On April 1, 1922, the coal-miners in both the anthracite and bituminou
fields went on a strike which lasted for five months and caused an alarmin
shortage of coal. The object of the strike was to maintain the old wag
scale against the proposal of the operators to return to what they considerei
a more normal wage; 550,000 union miners joined in the strike, and they wer
followed, to the surprise of the public, by 90,000 men in the non-unio
fields of Pennsylvania and West Virginia The situation was aggravated b
the strike of the railroad shopmen July 1, which interfered with the shipmen
of coal from the Southern fields. In August an agreement was entered int
by the miners and operators in the bituminous field, by which the old wag
scale was to continue until March 31, 1923 A similar agreement was reachc
a little later in the anthracite field, by which the old rate of wages was t
continue until August 31, 1923. A condition of both agreements was th
appointment of a commission to ascertain and report the facts. Such
commission was organised in October, in pursuance of an Act of Congres
with John Hays Hammond as chairman.
The strike of the railroad shopmen was the result of a twelve per cer
reduction in wages effective July 1, The authority of the Labour Boar
established by the Esch-Cummins Act was directly challenged, and when tl
Board issued subpoenas to railroad managers and union heads to appes
before it, the latter failed to obey the summons, with the exception of
few who had not ordered the strike. President Harding summoned bot
sides to a conference at the White House, but without results. Meanwhi
the railroads, which had a considerable surplus of rolling-stock, were n<
as badly crippled as the strikers had expected. On September 23, by ti
@ Underwood d: Underwood
CALVIN COOLIDGE
563
JOHN H. LATANfi
terms of the Willard-Jewell agreement, the men abandoned most of their
demands and agreed to return to work, provided the railroads would restore
to the positions held June 30 all except those who had been proven guilty
of acts of violence. As compared with earlier contests on a large scale, the
coal and railroad strikes of 1922 were remarkably free from serious
disturbances.
On September 21, 1922, the President signed the Fordney-McCumber
Tariff Act, which put into effect the highest duties the country had ever
known. The warning from banking centres that Europe could not pay its
debts if the United States put up the rates so high as to exclude European
^oods, fell on deaf ears. Every industry, including agriculture, clamoured
for the highest duties it could persuade Congress to give it.
In the Congressional elections of November, 1922, the Administration
and the Republican party received a rebuke. The Republican majority in
the House was cut down from 150 to 15, and in the Senate, from 22 to
10. The Radical bloc, headed by Senator LaFollette, was greatly strength-
ened by the accession of several new senators from the agricultural States
of the north-west.
On November 21, 1922, President Harding delivered a message to Con-
gress outlining at length his ship-subsidy programme. During the war the
nation had spent three billions in creating a fleet to carry men and provisions
to Europe. The ships had been built at war costs, and waste and extrava-
gance had been inevitable. After the war there were twice as many ships
in the world as were needed. American ships were hopelessly handicapped
by Acts of Congress designed to protect seamen, which increased the cost of
operation. The Government still had on hand 1,400 ships, but only 400
were in use. There was no sale for them, and the Shipping Board was
operating at an annual loss of $50,000,000. The President declared that
the entire project of a merchant marine was likely to fail unless Confess
should adopt measures of relief. He pointed out that the Government aided
industry through tariffs, and railroads by land grants and loans. Why not
aid shipping? A bill was drafted, and adopted by the House, providing
for a large subsidy, and establishing discriminating duties on imports, tonnage
and port dues. Much to the President's chagrin the Senate refused to pass
the bill.
Meanwhile the farmers were clamouring for relief, and in December the
ship-subsidy bill was, on motion of Senator Norris, displaced on the calendar
of the Senate by the Rural Credits Bill. In 1916 Congress had passed an
act establishing twelve regional farm loan banks under the supervision of
a Federal Farm Loan Board These banks lend money on mortgages for
long terms, but they do not help in the moving and marketing of crops. For
short-term credit the farmer was dependent to a large extent on local stores
and on purchasers of and dealers in farm products. The farmer complained
that the financial institutions of the country were designed to provide credit
for industry and commerce, but not for agriculture. The Agricultural
Credits Act of 1923 was passed in March just before the adjournment of
Congress. It established twelve intermediate credit banks located in the
cities now having Federal land banks, to be managed by the oflScers and
directors of such banks. These credit banks were empowered to discount
and purchase agricultural and live-stock paper from banks, live-stock loan
companies, agricultural credit corporations, and vaVious classes of farmers'
cooperative associations.
In response to a widespread demand from the men who had served over-
seas during the war. Congress passed, shortly before the end of the session in
March, a Bonus Bill, which the President courageously vetoed. The feeling
564 THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
of the men was that, in view of the high wages and war profits made by
those who stayed at home, the soldiers were entitled to a bonus. The Presi-
dent and Secretary Mellon opposed the increase in appropriations for the
further issue of bonds, and strongly favoured a reduction of taxation. The
advocates of the bonus were again prepared to urge the question upon Con-
gress in December, 1923, and there was some doubt as to whether the
Bonus Bill or Secretary Mellon’s plan for the reduction of taxation would
receive first consideration.
Throughout 1922 and 1923 the enforcement of the National Prohibition
Act continued to receive a large amount of attention. Notwithstanding the
increased appropriations for the enforcement service, bootlegging was steadily
on the increase, and the demand was made that liquor be excluded from
foreign ships in American waters, and that the jurisdiction of the United
States be extended beyond the three-mile limit for the purpose of breaking
up the so-called rum fleet engaged in smuggling. On April 30, 1923, the
Supreme Court of the United States delivered an important decision, by a
vote of seven to two, declaring that imder the Eighteenth Amendment and the
Volstead Act American ships could carry liquor outside the three-mile limit,
but that no ships, American or foreign, could carry liquor within the ter-
ritorial waters of the United States. The prohibition agents proceeded to
seize sealed liquors on board foreign vessels in American ports, and Great
Britain and other Governments protested. Secretary Hu^es proposed to
the British Government that if it would consent to the search of British
ships beyond the three-mile limit, the United States would agree not to dis-
turb liquors brought into American ports under seal. Lord Curzon promptly
rejected the offer. The matter was discussed, however, at the Imperial Con-
ference held at London during the summer of 1923, and, as a result of the
views expressed there by some of the representatives of the overseas domin-
ions, the British Government changed its attitude toward the Hu^es pro-
posal, and on October 31 signed a treaty permitting the United States to
seize rum ships within a twelve-mile zone. It seemed probable that this
treaty would encounter strong opposition in the Senate.
THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
In May, 1921, Secretary Hughes directed Colonel George Harvey, the
American Ambassador to England, to attend the meetings of the Conference
of Ambassadors at Paris as “ official observer.” He also took steps to be
represented “ unofficially ” by Mr. Boyden on the Reparations Commission.
The system of “ observers ” thus inaugurated was objected to by some as
an involvement ” in European affairs, and ridiculed by others as a wholly
inadequate means of rendering assistance to Europe or of properly safe-
guarding the interests of the United States. In March, 1922, Secretary
Hughes notified the Italian Government that the United States would not
participate in the proposed Genoa conference on April 10, on the ground that
the conference was to be political rather than economic. He also refused
to participate in a conference of economic experts on Russia at The Ha^e,
on the ground that Russia was in an unsatisfactory political condition.
Nevertheless, Mr. Richard Washburn Child, Ambassador to Italy, sat at
the Genoa conference as a silent “ observer.” At the Lausanne conference,
which met November 20, 1922, to patch up a peace with Turkey, the United
States was represented by three observers,” Ambassador Child, Admiral
Bristol, .^erican High Commissioner at Constantinople, and Joseph C.
Grew, Minister to Switzerland. This time the “ observers ” were not silent.
JOHN H. LATANfi 666
In fact they talked so much in explaining America’s position in matters
affecting American interests in Turkey, and there was so much talk outside
the conference by representatives of American oil companies, that the term
“ petroleum diplomacy ” became coimected with the American Department
of State. As the United States had not been at war with Turkey, but had
merely severed relations, it did not become a party to the general treaty of
Lausanne.
After the signature of the Allied Treaty, Mr. Grew entered into negotia-
tions with the principal Turkish delegate, and on August 6, 1923, signed two
treaties: one a treaty of Amity and Commerce, and the other an Extradition
treaty. The United States had to follow the example of the Allies and sur-
render most of the privileges which its citizens formerly enjoyed in Turkey.
It remains to be seen whether the Senate will ratify the treaty. Considerable
popular opposition to it had developed even before its submission to
the Senate.
In the autumn of 1922, Stanley Baldwin, later Prime Minister, was
sent from England to arrange the funding of the British debt to the United
States. It had become evident that proposals for the general cancellation of
war debts were not making any headway in the United States. So Great
Britain determined to make the best terms she could. The amount of the
funded debt was $4,600,000,000. It was agreed that it should bear interest
at three per cent for ten years, and thereafter at 3^/^ per cent. This settlement
was reached February 2, 1923, and accepted by both Houses of Congress
shortly before adjournment in March.
The determination of the French Government to occupy the Ruhr dis-
trict led the United States Senate to adopt a resolution, January 6, 1923,
favounng the immediate withdrawal of the American Army of Occupation
from the Rhine, in order to avoid embarrassment during the advance of
the French troops. About 1,000 American troops were still on the Rhine
imder command of General Allen, The British troops as well as the German
population were very reluctant to see them depart, but there was no reason
for keeping them there after the signing of the treaty of peace with Germany.
While President Harding would have nothing to do with the League of
Nations and repeatedly declared that it was a dead issue, one of the last
important measures which he advocated was the participation of the United
States in the Court of International Justice. On February 24, 1923, he
addressed the Senate on this subject, and undertook to demonstrate that
while the League had appointed the commission of jurists who drafted the
statute of the Court, the Court now rested on an independent protocol, and
that the United States could participate in this without in any way com-
mitting itself to the League. The only relation between th6 League and the
Court was the fact that the Assembly and Council of the League elected the
judges. The United States could send special representatives to these when
sitting as electoral bodies. The President and Secretary of State urged
the ratification of the Court protocol with reservations. The Senate failed
to act on this suggestion prior to adjournment, and it became evident that
strong opposition might be expected from the “ irreconcilables.” Public
sentiment throughout the country was, however, strong for the Court. In
order to overcome the opposition of certain senators, the President shifted
his position in an address at St. Louis June 21, 1923, in the course of which
he proposed that the Court be completely divorced from the League even
in ^e matter of the election of judges, and that the Court should become
self-perpetuating, its own members filling vacancies as they occurred. This
proposal, so utterly at variance with his former proposal and with the views
of Secretary Hughes, had the effect of ditching the whole proposition.
566
THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A WORLD POWER
DEATH OF HABDING AND SUCCESSION OF COOLIDGE
The St. Louis speech referred to was the first of a series of public ad-
dresses made by the President on his trip across the continent preparato^
to sailing for Alaska. He succeeded in creating a degree of enthusiasm in
some places, but the task he essayed was a difficult one, that of convincing
the Western farmer that with agricultural prices lower than they had been
since 1914 the coimtry was none the less prosperous. On the return trip from
Alaska, the President was taken suddenly ill in California and died at San
Francisco August 2, 1923. Although not a leader, President Harding had
endeared himself to the American people in many ways and he was sincerely
mourned. The Vice-President, Mr. Cahdn Coolidge, at once assumed the
presidency, and announced that he would carry out Harding’s policies.
During the summer the country was again threatened with a coal strike
in the anthracite field on account of the inability of the operators and miners
to arrive at a new agreement to take the place of the one that was to expire
August 31. The Coal Commission had made a preliminary report July 8,
opposing Government ownership or operation, but recommending Federal
regulation and an Act of Congress empowering the President to take over
the operation of the mines and the distribution of coal whenever operators
and miners should come to a deadlock over wages. The strike was finally
averted through the mediation of Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania.
Lloyd George’s speeches in the United States in the autumn of 1923 re-
vived the proposal made first by Mr. Hughes for an adjustment of the repara-
tions question by a commission of financial and economic experts. This
proposal had been made by the Secretary of State in a speech at New Haven
December 29, 1922, but without immediate results On September 12 the
British Government addressed a note to the United States on the subject of
the Hughes proposal. Great Britain vras ready to engage in such a con-
ference, and so were Italy and Belgium. On the 15th Mr. Hughes replied
that the United States would agree to representation on the commission,
provided there was unanimity in Europe There followed negotiations with
France, in which it was made plain that while France would agree to an
inquiry into Germany’s ability to pay, she was not willing to have the Ruhr
question brought in, nor to have her rights and claims under the Versailles
Treaty called into question. She insisted on maintaining the full authority
of the Reparations Commission. Mr. Hughes, on the other hand, was not
willing to have the cancellation of debts discussed. There seemed to be no
chance of an agreement. Later the suggestion was made that a committee
be appointed imder the general authority of the Reparations Commission to
consider Germany’s ability to pay and some way of getting at German credits
in foreign countries. This plan was still under discussion in December, 1923.
The new Congress, elected in November, 1922, convened in regular session
December 3, 1923. President Coolidge’s first annual message made a favour-
able impression on the country. He stated his views and policies in no
uncertain terms. He still opposed America’s joining the League, but
favoured participation in the International Pourt. He stated his reasons for
refusing to recognise Soviet Russia. He did not favour cancellation of inter-
Allied debts, but saw no objection to adjusting them according to the prin-
cmles adopted for the British debt. He approved Secretary Mellon’s plan
of tf« r^uction, but opposed the bonus. He declared it his duty to enforce
prohibition. He favoured restriction of immigration. He urged Congress to
pass a law authorising him to appoint a coal commission with power to deal
with crises through ascertaining and publishing the facts. He favoured in-
JOHN H. LATANE
567
direct relief to the farmer, but warned against resort to the public treasury.
The strength of the agricultural bloc in the Senate was shown as soon as
Congress reassembled by the refusal of the radical Senators to accept the
Bepublican nominee for the chairmanship of an important conunittee and an
attempt to make a deal with the Democrats.
On December 2 the hundredth anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine was
celebrated quite generally throughout the country. Secretary Hughes availed
himself of the opportunity to discuss, in a speech delivered in Philadelphia,
the place of the Monroe Doctrine in the scheme of the foreign policies of
the United States as a World Power in the twentieth century.
CHAPTER XXIX
“CANADA A NATION”
By W. S Wallace
Librarian of the University of Toronto Formerly Profe‘*dor of
History at McMaster Umversity, Toronto. Editor of The
Canadian Htsioncal Remew. Author of The United Empire
Loyalists (Chromcles of Canada).
‘‘The nineteenth century was the century of the United States; the
twentieth century will be the century of Canada.’^ These words of Sir
Wilfrid Laurier express the optimism with which, at the dawn of the twentieth
century, Canadians looked to the future. The long commercial doldrums of
the last quarter of the nineteenth century was over. Trade was on the
increase. The vast vacant spaces of the west were being filled by a tide
of immigration that doubled itself year after year. Best of all, the exodus
of Canada’s youth to the United States had been staunched. What Canada
had needed above all was population and capital; and both these had begun
to flow toward her in copious measure
There had been, moreover, a marked increase in Canadian national spirit.
In 1867, when the Dominion had been formed, vague hopes had been enter-
tained that Confederation would lead to the creation of a “ new nationality.”
Now the new nationality was a fait accompli. By the year 1900 Canadian
autonomy was virtually complete. Indeed, it was in that year that the
last British troops left Halifax, and that Canada took over the full respon-
sibility for her military defence. Under these circumstances, a new spirit of
self-reliance and self-consciousness had sprung up among Canadians; and
references to “ Canada a nation ” were becoming more and more frequent.
As Kipling sang of “ Our Lady of the Snows ” —
Daughter am I m my mother's house,
But mistress in mine own ”
At the same time there was a striking improvement in Canada’s position
abroad. For this two events were mainly responsible. The inauguration of
the Imperial preference in 1897, and the exploits of Canada’s sons on the
battlefields of South Africa, both served to bring Canada into the limelight
as never before.
SIR WILFRID laurier: A CANADIAN NATIONALIST
The government in power in Canada in 1900 was that of Sir Wilfrid
Laurier. The so-called Liberal-Conservative party, which had, with one
brief interlude of five years, controlled the destinies of Canada since Con-
federation, had gone to pieces after the death of Sir John Macdonald in 1891,
and in 18% it had been swept from power by the Liberals under Sir Wilfrid
Laurier. Laurier had surrounded himself with a strong administration —
568
© Ktjj'itone Vtew Co, © Keystone View Co,
Sir Robert Borden, Premier from 1911 to 1930. The Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime
Minister from 1921.
© Keystone V%ew Co, © Intemattonal Newsreel
Sir Wilfred Laurier, the first French-^^ana- Lord Byng, who commanded the Canadian
dian to become Prime Minister, 1896-1911. troops in the World War, and in 1931 be-
came Governor-General of Canada.
PROMINENT FIGURES IN CANADUN HISTORT
W. S. WALLACE
660
it was not improperly described as a “ Ministry of all the talents ” — and
this administration was still in its first term of office when the new century
opened.
There had been those in 1896 who had doubted Laurier’s qualities of
leadership. An orator of the first rank, either in French or in English, he
was yet essentially a student and a scholar, with little of that aptitude for
business details so essential in the Prime Minister of a country where so
many people resemble the gentleman who said his politics were “ contracting.”
Never were expectations more si^ally falsified. By 1900, Lamier was,
without question, master of the administration; and the fact that he remained
Prime Minister of the Dominion for fifteen years — a longer continuous period
of office than had been enjoyed even by Sir John Macdonald — proved that
he was not wanting in the art of politics. As one of his own supporters has
said, if he had affinities with Sir Galahad, he had also afffiiities with
Machiavelli.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier was a Canadian nationalist — perhaps the greatest
of Canadian nationalists. This entailed with him two things: In the first
place, it meant that the French and the English in Canada should dwell
together in national unity. “ Our respective forefathers,” he said in his
maiden speech in the Quebec Legislature in 1871, “ were enemies and waged
bloody war against each other for centuries. But we, their descendants,
united under the same flag, fight no other fights than those of a generous
emulation to excel each other in trade and industry, in the arts and sciences
of peace.” This ideal he kept steadily before him; and it is only fair to
say that, during his premiership, there were none of those conflicts between
the “ two races ” in Canada which have marred other periods of Canadian
history. To bring about harmony between the French and the English in
Canada was perhaps his dearest and devoutest ambition; and if, in the end,
faced with an ineluctable dilemma, he clave, like Ruth, unto his own people,
who shall blame him?
In the second place. Canadian nationalism meant for him Canadian
autonomy within the British Empire. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was a loyal
subject of the Crown. His Liberalism was of the British rather than of
the French type. He was in favour neither of independence nor of annexa-
tion to the United States. But he resented and opposed any and every
attempt, from whatever quarter, to bring Canada again under the leading
strings of the mother country He conceived of the British Empire — to use
his own eloquent phrase — as “a galaxy of free nations.” There was one
Crown, but the Canadian Cabinet were as much the advisers of His Majesty
for Canadian affairs as the British Cabinet were for British affairs. Both
on Parliament Hill and at repeated sessions of the Imperial Conference,
he championed this view against all comers.
Laurier’s contributions to the growth of Canadian autonomy were many.
Not only was it under his rSgime that the last British troops were withdrawn
from Canada and the fortifications at Halifax and Esquimault handed over
to the Canadian authorities, but it was under him that the Canadian militia
ceased even to be commanded by an Imperial officer, and it was under him
that the policy of a Canadian navy, as distinct from the British navy, was
launched — that Canada assumed, in short, the full responsibility for her
own defence, toth military and naval, internal and ^eternal. It was under
him that the right of Canada to control and regulate British immigration
was first successfully asserted by the Immigration Act of 1910, whereby in
effect British citizenship was limited in Canada. And it was under him that
the interests of Canada in connection with the signing of Imperial treaties
was finally safeguarded, by the arrangement arrived at in 1908, whereby no
"CANADA A NATION”
670
Imperial treaty should be binding on Canada without Canada^s explicit
consent; and that Canada acquired the right of negotiating direct with foreign
states in regard to commercial matters. To say, as is sometimes said, that
Canada acquired the treaty-making power is not perhaps technically correct;
what she obtained was the right to make informal agreements with foreign
states to bring in concurrent legislation. But this was, to all intents and
purposes, the equivalent of the treaty-making power in commercial matters.
In domestic affairs, perhaps the most striking feature of the policy of the
Laurier Government was its aggressive immigration policy. The Minister
of the Interior, Mr. (now Sir) Clifford Sifton, was a westerner, and under-
stood fully that the chief need of the Canadian West was settlers. When he
took oflSce in 1897, he established immigration agencies all over the United
States, the British Isles, and even continental Europe. At first, the results
were small. Some of his agents in the United States resigned in despair
“ The people,” said one of them, “ did not even know where Canada was ”
Gradually, however, the stream of immigration began to flow. In 1897, the
total number of immigrants from the United States was less than 2,500; by
1907 this figure had increased to over 60,000; and by 1911 it had reached as
high as 125,000. In 1897 the total annual immi^ation into the Dominion
had been barely 20,000; by 1911 the total annual immigration had grown to
nearly a third of a million. These figures did not take into account the
contemporaneous exodus to the United States, of which satisfactory statistics
were not available; and there was some controversy as to the net gain in
population which had resulted from immigration. The census of 1911 did
not show, by nearly a million, the increase m population which had been
expected. But the figures were, with all deductions, sufficiently impressive,
and constitute one of the most notable achievements of the Laurier regime.
THE ERA OP RAILWAY EXPANSION
The opening up of the country which resulted from this immigration
entailed on the Government a policy of railway expansion. Since 1885
Canada had had in the Canadian Pacific railway a transcontinental line
which linked Halifax with Vancouver; but it became clear that this alone
would soon be inadequate to meet the demands of the rapidly growing west.
The single line from Winnipeg to Port Arthur was a bottle-neck in which
freight traflSc was already becoming hopelessly congested. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Grand Trunk railway, the oldest railway corporation in
eastern Canada, which had long felt the need of through connections, applied
to the Government for aid in building a second transcontinental railway, the
Grand Trunk Pacific. At the same time, two daring and ingenious Canadian
railway-builders. Sir William Mackenzie and Sir Donald Mann, by buying
up the charters of a network of small railways, had created the beginnings
of a third transcontinental system, the Canadian Northern; and they too
applied to the Government for aid. Sir Wilfrid Laurier made an attempt
to bring the Grand Trunk and the Canadian Northern together; but the
two were unable to come to an agreement, and each pursued its plans irrespec-
tive of the other. The Government chartered the Grand Trunk Pacific, to
run from Winnipeg to the Pacific, and it undertook itself to build an exten-
sion of the Grand Trunk Pacific, which was to run through northern Ontario
and Quebec from Winnipeg to Moncton, to be known as the National Trans-
continental. This line the Grand Trunk was to lease from the Government
for 50 years at a small rental. Meanwhile, by the guarantee of bonds and
even by cash subsidies, the Canadian Northern continued to seek and obtain
W. S. WALLACE 671
aid, both from the Dominion Government, and from some of the provincial
governments.
This ambitious railway programme was the storm-centre of much con-
troversy, and it was the occasion in 1903 of the resignation of Laurier’s
Minister of Railways, Mr. A. G. Blair. There would appear to be no doubt
that Sir Wilfrid Laurier, after his abortive attempt in 1903 to bring the
Grand Trunk and the Canadian Northern together, became convinced that
Canada could support three transcontinental systems. In nothing, perhaps,
during his period of office, was Laurier’s lack of business capacity more
signally, more tragically displayed. It is usual to attribute the disastrous
results of the Laurier railway policy to the World War and the conditions
created by it, conditions which bore hard on railways in all countries; but
the conclusion is irresistible that the Laurier railway policy would have
ended in disaster, even if the World War had never taken place. The
National Transcontinental, built under political auspices, cost in the end
three times as much as the original estimate had allowed for; and it was a
white elephant from the beginning. Before they were completed, both the
Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern had to come down on the
Government for further aid; and the solvency of both railways, when the
war broke out, was open to grave question. The war, without doubt, greatly
aggravated the situation. But no one can now deny that Laurier’s weak
handling of the railway problem constituted the chief blot in the record of
his regime.
WEANING FORTUNES OP THE LAURIER REGIME
The leader of the Conservative opposition to the Laurier Government
was, after the retirement of the veteran Sir Charles Tupper in 1901, Mr. R. L.
(now Sir Robert) Borden. Mr. Borden was a Halifax lawyer of high ideals,
strict integrity, and few oratorical pretensions. He had little of that personal
magnetism which had endeared both Sir John Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid
Laurier to the people of Canada; and in two successive elections, those of
1904 and 1908, he led his cohorts to defeat at the polls. On at least one
occasion there was a cabal against his leadership. But his upright character,
his moderation, his business-like attitude toward public affairs won for him
the support of the majority of the party; and as time went on, he gradually
strengthened his position in the country.
Meanwhile, the fortunes of the Laurier Government were on the down
grade. There is in the case of governments a law of diminishing returns.
The first fine frenzy of reforming zeal is in time replaced by the adminis-
trative mind ” and a mere desire to cling to office. Such was the fate of
the Laurier Cabinet. By its third parliamentary term it had become mainly
an office-holding administration. Of Laurier^s first colleagues, moreover, one
after another had fallen by the wayside. A striking feature of LaurieH's
premiership was the ruthless way in which he discarded the lieutenants who
crossed his will. First, Israel Tarte, his chief lieutenant in the province of
Quebec, parted company with him over the question of the tariff; then A. G.
Blair, the Minister of Railways, was forced out of the Cabinet on the railway
issue; and in 1905, Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the Interior, was com-
pelled to resign over the question of separate schools in the North-west.
These ministers were replaced by new men whose chief qualification was
often their party loyalty. When he was remonstrated with by an old friend
on the score of one of these appointments, Laurier’s reply was that “ So-and-
so has never made any trouble for me.”
672 ''CANADA A NATION"
Inevitably, under these circumstances, rifts began to appear in the party
lute. The first serious dissension occurred in 1906, over the question of
separate Roman Catholic schools in the new provinces of Alberta and Sas-
katchewan. It might have been expected that Laurier, who had resisted the
coercion of Manitoba in regard to separate schools in 1896, would have been
careful to avoid coercion in 1905. But by this time political conditions had
changed, and Laurier was loth to defy the French-Canadian bishops again.
In the end, he made some concessions to the opponents of separate schools;
but the incident cost him his Minister of the Interior, and it seriously under-
mined his position with many Liberals in Ontario and the west.
"^at Laurier himself, however, regarded as a more serious matter was a
movement away from his hegemony which had been growing up in the
province of Quebec. This movement was headed by Henri Bourassa, a
grandson of the famous Papineau, who had broken with Laurier in 1900 over
the question of the dispatch of Canadian contingents to the Boer War.
Bourassa described himself as a Nationalist, but he and his followers were
really French-Canadian, rather than Canadian, nationalists. Unlike his
grandfather, he was strongly clerical and ultramontane; and he seemed to
regard the preservation of the French language and the existence of the
Roman Catholic Church in Canada as indissolubly wrapped up together.
He was bitterly anti-imperialistic; and even Laurier’s naval policy — the
creation of what the Imperialists called a tin-pot navy ” under purely
Canadian control — was denounced by him as an attempt to drag the sons
of the habitant into the vortex of British militarism. It came to look as
though Bourassa would supplant Launer as the favourite son of the Quebec-
quois; and when Laurier’s old constituency of Drummond-Arthabaska re-
turned in 1910 a Nationalist candidate, it was regarded as the handwriting on
the wall.
THE RECIPROCITY ISSUE AND ITS RESULTS
As the elections of 1911 drew near, it became clear that something would
have to be done to rehabilitate the Government with the electors. Some bold
stroke was necessary if the Government was to be saved from the fate which
threatened it. By what seemed singularly good fortune, it was discovered
that the Republican administration of Mr Taft in the United States was
favourable to a measure of reciprocity in trade arrangements with Canada.
Reciprocity in trade with the United States had long been a lodestar with
Canadian politicians. The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854-1866 had been a com-
mercial boon to Canada; and at repeated intervals since 1867 Canadian
statesmen had sought to renew closer trade relations with the Great Republic
— only, however, to be met with repeated rebuffs. If the Laurier Govern-
ment could now succeed, where all previous administrations had failed, in
negotiating an agreement whereby the great market of the United States
would be thrown open to Canada, it was thought that this achievement would
open before it a new lease of life.
Mr. Fielding, the Canadian Finance Minister, went to Washington and
negotiated an agreement for reciprocity in natural products. On this plat-
form, the Laurier Government appealed to the country. The result was an
election of exceptional bitterness. The Conservatives, the traditional ex-
ponents of the " National Policy ” of high protection, used every argument
both economic and political, on which they could lay their hands. They
represented the reciprocity agreement as merely the precursor of commercial,
and possibly political, union. They pointed out that, since 1867, Canada
had followed a policy of inter-provincial and inter-imperial trade, with rail-
673
W. S. WALLACE
ways spanning the country from east to west; and they contended
that to open up even partial free trade from north to south, would be to
reverse that policy, with perhaps disastrous results. They raised against the
Liberals the old cry, so deadly in a country settled originally by the Loyalists
of the American Revolution, of disloyalty to the empire; and it was unfor-
tunate that both Mr. Taft and Mr. Champ Clark, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives in the United States, used language which seemed to give
colour to their cry. Mr. Taft, for instance, spoke about Canada being ** at
the parting of the ways ” ; and a significance was attached to his remark
which it was probably not intended to bear.
When the electoral returns were in, it was found that the Government
had been decisively defeated. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the
election was the result in British Columbia and Ontario. In British Colum-
bia not one Liberal was returned, and in Ontario there were only 10 Liberals
elected as against 72 Conservatives. In the Maritime provinces, in Quebec,
and in the Prairie provinces, the Liberals had a slight advantage; but even
here their losses had been great. In the province of Quebec, only 38 Liberals
were returned, as against 27 Conservatives and Nationalists. This result
was due to the fact that, in Quebec, the imperialist Conservatives and the
anti-imperialist Nationalists had joined hands in what was not unfairly
described as an unholy alliance,” with the result that, while Laurier wae
assailed in Ontario as too French to be Bntish, he was attacked in Quebec
as too British to be French. Such are the devices to which political parties
sometimes resort.
THE BORDEN MINISTRY
The administration which was formed by Mr. Borden, on the resignation
of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, had behind it a decisive parliamentary majority of
45 in the House of Commons. But it was confronted by an equally decisive
majority in the nominated Senate — the aftermath of 15 years of Liberal
supremacy; and it contained within itself an element of weakness in the
Nationalist members of the Government. Sir John Macdonald had been able
to drive in double harness the orange and the bleu; but it remained to be
seen whether Sir Robert Borden (as he now became) could do the same.
The full difficulties of the Government's position were seen in the debate
on the naval question in the session of 1912-1913, The British Government, ^
alarmed at the menace of the German naval programme, were pressing the
Canadian Government for some action in naval matters that would impress
on the world the solidarity of the British Empire. The Borden administra-
tion, relying on their majorities in the English provinces of Ontario and
British (Columbia, decided to make a gesture which would be immediate and
emphatic in its effect. They decided, while leaving for future consideration
the policy of a Canadian navy, to present to the British Admiralty three
dreadnoughts of the latest design. This proposal met with the prompt and
unmeasured opposition of the Liberals. Sir Wilfrid Laurier ridiculed the
idea that any emergency existed; and the Liberal majority in the Senate
proceeded, without compunction, to throw out the bill in which the proposal
was embodied. As events proved, their action was most unfortimate; but
there is little doubt that they thought they were faced with an imperialistic
plot, and did not fully realise the consequences of their action.
Sir Robert Borden might, after the defeat of the Naval Bill, have appealed
again to the country; but he probably hesitated to inflict on his supporters
another election at so short an interval, and he may have had doubts about
the popularity of his policy with the electors. At any rate, he accepted his
"CANADA A NATION
574
defeat; and when the World War broke out in 1914, Canada was probably
as ill-prepared as any of the countries which entered it at the outset. Her
navy was a mere nondnis umbra; and her militia was the same costly and
ineffective organisation aS had repelled with difficulty the Fenian raids of
half a century before.
CANADA IN THE WORLD WAR
The story of Canada^s participation in the World War will be dealt with
elsewhere; and all that will be necessary here is to deal with its effect on
the domestic history of the Dominion. The outbreak of hostilities discovered
in Canada a wonderful unanimity of sentiment. Hardly a dissentient voice
was raised when it was decided to send to the European theatre of war an
expeditionary force of one division; and when this force embarked, it
actually numbered 33,000 men — the largest military force which had hitherto
ever crossed the Atlantic at one time. In the special war session of the
Canadian Parliament, which was called in August, 1914, the attitude of Sir
Wilfrid Laurier and his followers was unexceptionable; and it must forever
be a matter of regret that Sir Robert Borden did not, at this juncture, invite
the Liberals to join with him in the formation of a national government.
He failed, however, to do so; and when, three years later, the wisdom of
uniting all sections of the Canadian people in the prosecution of the war
became evident, the time for complete union had gone by.
The expectation, fostered by the economists, that the war would be of
short duration, gradually disappeared; and, as the needs of the situation
became clear, the Canadian Government authorised first a second, and then
a third, contingent. In the end, a total enlistment of half a million men
was aimed at; and of these over 400,000 actually proceeded overseas, out
of a population of about eight millions. The overwhelming proportion of
these recruits were obtained by voluntary enlistment; and in Flanders fields
they proved themselves the equal of the professional armies of Europe.
As time wore on, however, the stream of recruits began to dry up. After
the first shock of the economic disturbance caused by the war, Canada em-
barked on a period of exceptional prosperity. The produce of Canadian
farms was in great demand in Europe; and Canada had moreover entered
upon the manufacture of munitions of war upon a scale which necessitated
the employment of large numbers of operatives. Under these conditions,
the slacker ” found it easy to convince himself that his duty lay on the
“ home front ” ; and if Canada’s military effort was not to fall off, it became
clear that some form of compulsory military service must be adopted. Sir
Robert Borden and his Minister of Militia, Sir Sam Hughes, had from 1914
to 1917 set their faces against conscription but when enlistments fell far
below the casualty lists, they were compelled to change their minds, and in
1917 the Government introduced into Parliament a measure imposing com-
pulsory military service on all unmarried men and childless widowers of
military age.
During the early stages of the war Sir Wilfrid Laurier had proclaimed
a political truce; and in a measure this truce had been maintained up to
1917. There had been criticism of various features of the Government’s
conduct of affairs, criticism in many cases not without just foundation; but
there had been no open political warfare. With the adoption of the policy
of compulsory military service, however, the buttons came off the foils.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier was constitutionally averse from “ conscription.” In any
case, he saw no chance of carrying Quebec with him in the adoption of any
© Underwood & Underwood
The largest grain elevator in the world is found at Port Arthur, Ontario, its capacity being 10,000
bushels daily.
© International Newsreel
The area of Canada is nearly four million square miles, and a recent estimate of
Canada’s stand of timber is 903,000,000,000 feet. Canada’s forest wealth is the
greatest in the world.
W. S. WALLACE
575
such programme; and the conciliation of Quebec had become with hhn, since
his overwhelming defeat in Ontario in 1911, a cardinal point of his policy.
It was unfortunate that there had sprung up, since 1912, a controversy over
the use of the French language in the so-called bilingual schools of Ontario,
which had stirred the province of Quebec profoundly. The redoubtable Mr.
Bourassa was again on the warpath; and Sir Wilfrid saw that, unless he
was to forfeit the leadership of his own people, he must oppose the I^litary
Service Act with all his vigour.
It was a tragic choice. With bitterness in his heart, Laurier saw himself
deserted by large numbers of the Liberals of Ontario and the west. The
Liberal party was, in fact, rent in twain. The Military Service Act became
law. But Laurier refused to alter his course. When Sir Robert Borden
invited him to enter a Coalition Cabinet, to put the Act into operation,
Laurier rejected the invitation with decision. It had come too late. The
result was, what had hitherto been avoided, a war-time election; and in this
election, Laurier believed that, with a solid Quebec behind him, he could
carry the country.
The hope was unfounded. Sir Robert Borden succeeded in forming a
Coalition Government, in which many leading Liberals accepted portfolios;
and though, in the elections of 1917, the anti-conscriptionist Liberals carried
Quebec by overwhelming majorities, they were defeated by equally over-
whelming majorities in most of the English-speaking provinces. Laurier
came back from the polls with a following of only eighty-two in a House
of 235, and of these no less than sixty-two came from the province of Quebec.
Canada as a whole had responded to the appeal of her dead soldier-poet:
“Take up our quarrel with the foe,
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith witii us who die,
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.”
The Coalition or Unionist Government formed by Sir Robert Borden and
supported by the Conservatives and the conscriptionist Liberals, had oversight
of the destinies of Canada during the remainder of the war and during the
period of reconstruction that followed. Its record was one in which Canada
might well take pride. Under the Conservative war administration which
preceded it, there had been some impleasant scandals in connection with the
manufacture of war mimitions and supplies; and the vagaries of the Minister
of Militia, Sir Sam Hughes, had roused widespread criticism. But imder the
new order of things, the very breath of scandal disappeared, and the prose-
cution of the war took on a new vigour. The Military Service Act, it is
true, proved in operation to be somewhat of a disappointment, since it was
administered unequally in different parts of the country, and yielded only
something less than 100,000 recruits. But the objective at which Canada
had aimed, a total of half a million enlistments, was more than surpassed;
and at the same time Canadian farms and factories made contributions to
the Allied cause of which no one in 1914 would have deemed them capable.
The problem of financing this war effort was, however, great. Canada had
been before 1914 a debtor country, and especially after 1917, when the United
States entered the struggle, the countries from which she had borrowed were
not able to lend. The problem was solved by domestic loans; and the success
of the Minister of Finance, Sir Thomas White, in floating the Victory Loans
of 1917, 1918, and 1919 was one of the most admirable features of the
Government’s record.
576
“CANADA A NATION”
Canada’s new states
The Unionist Government came also into closer touch with the central
direction of the war than its predecessor. In 1917 there was held an Im-
perial Conference; and out of this conference there grew the interesting but
short-lived experiment of the Imperial War Cabinet, of which Sir Robert
Borden, like the prime ministers of the other Dominions, was a member.
Both at the Imperial Conference and at the sessions of the Imperial War
Cabinet, Sip Robert Borden, it is worthy of note, took up what was prac-
tically the same nationalist attitude as had always been maintained by Sir
Wilfrid Laurier. When he went to Versailles in 1919 as a member of the
British Empire Delegation to the Peace Conference, he insisted on Canada
and other Dominions signing the Treaty separately, on their being given
representation in the Assembly of the League of Nations, and even on their
being made eligible for election to the Council of the League. He inherited
from Laurier the theorem that the Canadian Government was as much the
adviser of the Crown in regard to Canadian affairs as the British Govern-
ment was in regard to British affairs. This idea was accepted by the British
authorities, in principle at least; and thus, it may be said, Canada was given
a new status in the empire. It became a distinct national unit in a British
Commonwealth of Nations, and indeed, in some respects, a unit in inter-
national affairs.
In 1783 a Treaty of Versailles had marked the completion of the Ameri-
can Revolution, whereby the United States achieved independence of the
mother country; in 1919 another Treaty of Versailles marked the consum-
mation of what may be described as the Canadian Revolution, whereby
Canada has achieved virtually the same independence — but this revolution
has taken place, not as the result of a bloody fratricidal war, leaving in its
train an aftermath of hatred and ill-will, but as the result of a long and
peaceful process, which has left behind it nothing but the most cordial
loyalty and good-will.
With the signing of the Peace Treaty, the Canadian Government turned
to the task of demobilisation and reconstruction. Demobilisation was com-
pleted with much less diflSculty than had been anticipated, thanks to the
excellent arrangements of a new Department of Soldiers’ Civil Rc-establish-
ment, which the Unionist Government had created; and the transition from
a war to a peace basis was accomplished in the country with comparative
smoothness. The Government did everything that a government could do
to break the shock of readjustment. There were, however, problems which
almost defied solution. Chief of these was that of finance. The national
debt of Canada, which had been $332,000,000 in 1914, had been quadrupled
during the war; and although taxation had been greatly increased, the bur-
dens imposed by the war were so great that it seemed impossible to bring
revenue and expenditure once more to an equilibrium. Had there b^n only
debt charges, pensions, and such things to consider, the situation might not
have been hopeless; but the war had ruined all the railways of Canada, with
the sole exception of the Canadian Pacific railway, and since it would have
been fatal to allow these railways to go into bankruptcy, the Government had
teen compelled to take over the Grand Tnmk, the Grand Trunk Pacific, and
the Canadian Northern, and to meet their huge deficits, totalling tens of
millions of dollars each year, out of the public exchequer. The railway
policy adopted by the Laurier Government had, with startling and unexpected
rapidity, come home to roost.
W. S. WALLACE
677
GROWING HOSTILITY TO THE UNIONIST GOVERNMENT
The way in which the Unionist Government grappled with the problems
of the post-bellum period will probably merit the high praise of future his-
torians; but the Government itself incurred the unpopularity of post-bellum
Governments, and esj^cially of Coalition Governments, everywhere. One
by one the leading Liberals in the Cabinet deserted the ship. In Ontario
and the west, where the Government's chief strength lay, there sprang up
an organised political movement among the farmers, which was hostile to
both the old political parties, but especially to the Unionist party. The new
party, which described itself as Progressive, but was really the result of
a class movement, captured the Government in several of the provinces, and
won bye-election after bye-election in the Federal sphere. Sir Robert
Borden, worn out by nine years of oflBce during perhaps the most trying
period in Canadian history, read the omens, and in 1920 he submitted his
resignation to the Governor-General. He was succeeded in the Prime Minis-
try by one of his lieutenants, Mr. Arthur Meighen.
Mr. Meighen, a man of marked ability, made a gallant attempt to restore
the fortunes of the Government; but the stars in their courses were fighting
against Sisera. He was confronted by the embattled farmers, under the
leadership of Mr. Crerar, a former member of the Unionist Government,
and by the reorganised Liberal party, imder the leadership of Mr. Mackenzie
King, who had succeeded Sir Wilfrid Laurier as leader of the Liberal opposi-
tion, on the death of the latter in 1919. In 1921, Mr. Meighen, with the
intrepidity of a leader of a forlorn hope, went to the country; and in the
elections that followed he suffered a crushing defeat. His supporters in the
new House numbered only fifty. The Liberals, with a solid phalanx of 65
members from Quebec, outnumbered both the other parties by a majority
of one; and Mr. Mackenzie King was therefore invited to form the new
Government.
MR. MACKENZIE KING AS PREMIER
Efforts were made by Mr. Mackenzie King to effect a coalition with the
Progressives; but these efforts were unsuccessful, and the administration
which he formed was purely Liberal in its complexion. Though given an
informal support by the Progressives, the Mackenzie King Government has
been seriously handicapped by its narrow majority, as well as by its de-
pendence on Quebec; and its policy has been marked by caution, not to s^
inaction. Severe criticism has been directed against it for its failure to fulfil
some of its rather rash preelection pledges. But it has done good work in
consolidating the Grand Trunk, the Grand Trunk Pacific, and the Canadian
Northern with the Canadian Government railways ; and it has succeeded in
doing what its predecessor failed to do, namely in making revenue and
expenditure meet.
Never perhaps has there been such urgent need of a strong and aggressive
government in Canada as at the present. A cloud of problems is pressing
for solution. In the first place, there are the problems affecting the Canadian
Department of External Affairs. Included in these are the hundred and one
questions arising from Canada^s new position in the British Empire and in
the League of Nations. Is machinery to be created for making effective
Canada’s participation in the foreign policy of the empire? And if so, how
far is Canada to commit herself to entanglements in European affairs? Linked
— VOL. 1 — 37
T. B Y
''CANADA A NATION”
578
up with these questions is the problem of Canada’s relations, both political
and economic, with the United States. Is Canada to have at Washington,
as has been proposed, a representative of her own? And if so, what relation
is he to bear to the British Ambassador at Washington? On the answer to
these questions, as will be evident, much depends.
No less important are the problems connected with Canada’s internal
affairs. The most immediate and urgent of these is perhaps that of public
finance. Though taxation in Canada is not as heavy as it is in some countries,
it is too heavy for a country where capital is both exceptionally scarce and
exceptionally necessary. Can taxation be lessened, and the cost of living re-
duced, so as to release the money required for the development of the un-
doubted natural resources of the country? Connected with this problem is the
railway question. By what methods, and under what conditions, can the
enormous deficits of the Canadian Government railways be reduced or
eliminated? And connected with this problem is that of immigration. The
Canadian railways can never pay until there are more people in the country ;
but how far can Canada safely go in opening her doors to immigration?
Unr^tricted immigration would be, without doubt, a profound mistake; and
yet it would be equally a mistake to carry restriction too far.
Another domestic problem is the relation of the two races in Canada. On
the whole, French Canadians and English Canadians have got along re-
markably well together, as will be evident from a comparison of the history
of Canada with that of Ireland, or Poland, or the Balkans, where races
similarly diverse in language, religion, and historical antecedents have been
placed in juxtaposition. But their relations have never been wholly har-
monious; and the events of the war did not contribute to bridge the gap that
exists. Statesmanship of a high order is necessary if complete harmony is to
be achieved.
But perhaps the greatest problem facing Canadian statesmen to-day is
not the divorce between the French and the English, but the divorce between
the east and the west. The creation of the Dominion of Canada was, to a
much greater extent than most people realise, a triumph over geography.
The Canadian west is, from the standpoint of economic geography, much
more closely related to the American west than to the Canadian east. A
wilderness of several hundred miles separates the agricultural and pastoral
provinces of Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia from
the more industrialised provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is not strange that the outlook of the east and the west should
be different, especially in regard to economic questions, or that sympathy
between them should be imperfect. If Confederation is to be a success,
something must be done to reconcile the conflicting claims of its component
parts.
There are those, both in Canada and the United States, who have
prophesied that the ultimate fate of Canada will be absorption in the United
States. To such a conclusion, perhaps, the facts of geography point. Yet
it must be confessed that the idea of the union of Canada and the United
States is now farther from the field of practical politics than ever before.
The Canadian people believe that there is room on the North American con-
tinent for two experiments in democracy; and, despite the problems which
confront them, they would appear to be more intent than ever on preserving
their national identity, within the circle of the British Empire.
CHAPTER XXX
FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER
ON THE CONTINENT
By Albert Thomas
Director of the International Labour OflSce, Leajoie of Nations,
Geneva Minister of Munitions in French War Cabinet.
It is diflScuIt and perhaps unwise to seek to discern in the history of the
first twenty-five years of the twentieth century, cut into by a devastating
war, an explanation of those confusing and formidable problems whose solu-
tion is to-day the torment of the whole world. What traditional forces will
influence mankind? Towards what destiny is it marching or does it believe
that it is marching? What is its aim? All these are questions in which per-
sonal convictions are likely to separate facts from their correct interpreta-
tion. If there is, however, one history which permits of such examination, it
is that of France.
French evolution, indeed, is not dominated by racial oppositions; at the
moment when national consciousness first awoke all over Europe, the claims
of minorities were unknown in France, which offers a model of national,
conscious, deliberate and almost perfect unity.
Neither is French evolution dominated by economic pressure. Blessed
with a strong and healthy agriculture, endowed with a sufficiency of indus-
trialism, France enjoys an economic autonomy and a material independence
greater than those of most nations.
As her great historian Michelet observed, her history is, so to speak, more
conscious, more free — more political, in a word — than that of many other
nations. And this history proceeds by crisis — crisis of conscience, crisis
of vision, crises which are frequently feverish, but in which the sharp opposi-
tion of ideas permits the desires of statesmen and the direction of each
movement to be more clearly understood.
I. Republican Politics 1900-1906
THE FAMOUS DREYFUS AFFAIR
At the opening of the twentieth century Prance was in the throes of a
crisis; that of the Dreyfus affair.
In December, 1894, an artillery captain, Dreyfus, a Jew, had been con-
demned for treason; he was accused of having delivered to Germany certain
secret military documents. This case had stirred the country profoundly;
for since 1870 public opinion had never ceased to fear German hostility.
It hated traitors and it had no love for Jews, and even after 1886 anti-
Semite propaganda had had throughout the country a certain measure of
success.
579
580 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
However, several men — Bernard Lazare, a Jewish journalist; Lieutenant-
Colonel Piquart, a staff officer, and Scheurer Kestner, an Alsatian senator,
convinced that Dreyfus was innocent, sought to persuade the Government of
the necessity of a new trial. The Government, fearing an outbreak of public
opinion, refused a re-trial. A second War Council even acquitted another
officer, Esterhazy, suspected of having committed the treason with which
Dreyfus had been charged. It was at this moment, in January, 1898, that
the famous novelist, Emile Zola, in an open letter, entitled J^accuse, accused
the War Councils of having condemned Dreyfus on secret evidence and ac-
quitted the real traitor, Esterhazy, in the hope of covering up the first il-
legality. He thus succeeded in raising in the public mind the very storm
that the Government had wished to avoid. Zola was condemned by a
Cour Assises in February, 1898. But a campaign in favour of the revision
of the trial was suddenly begun. A little handful of “ intellectuals,” writers
and professors, supported Emile Zola and demanded a new trial, guided
in their action by their desire to see justice rendered to an innocent man,
and by a dislike to alt State politics which were opposed to the individual
rights due to every citizen.” They protested against the authority of military
chiefs as a substitute for the examination of facts. Jaures, the great Socialist
orator, and Clemenceau, the former Radical chief whom the Panama scandals
had temporarily removed from the field of politics, plunged into the battle
from its opening. Revolutionaries, anarchists. Socialists also ranged them-
selves against the defenders of the army ” in meetings and manifestations.
But against the Dreyfusards ” were ranged all military officers, a large
part of the clergy, the Catholic Conservatives, and Nationalists of every
shade.
In the beginning, and on account of prejudice and patriotic tradition, the
larger part of public opinion favoured the adversaries of Dreyfus. The
Republicans attempted to suppress all allusions to the Dreyfus affair in the
electoral campaign which took place in May, 1898; nevertheless, the
“ Affair ” influenced the results. Although the moderate Meline Ministry
was overthrown and a Republican Cabinet constituted, Cavaignac, the War
Minister of this Cabinet, still claimed to be able to furnish the Chamber
with irrefutable proofs of the guilt of Dreyfus. He was applauded by the
Assembly. But soon, amidst the most critical disclosures, it appeared that
the pretended proofs were false; one of their authors killed himself ; Cavaignac
resigned in September, 1898; the Dreyfus trial was sent before the Cour de
Cassation. The Criminal Chamber of the Court declared the request for
revision to be in order; and in June, 1899, it was imanimous in cancelling
the verdict.
But as a result of all these struggles, political passions were stren^hened
and heightened. In January, 1899, not only did the League of Patriots, an
old society founded by Paul D6roulfede for a “ revanche ” against Germany,
range itself against the League for the Rights of Man, founded by the re-
visionists, but there was also formed a League of the French Motherland
(Pa^ne) which was joined by nearly all the members of the Academy.
President Felix Faure having died, M. Loubet was elected President of the
Republic on February 18, 1899, and a tentative coup d^etat took place. It
failed. The Ministry, suspected of weakness in regard to the nationalists,
foimd itself in the minority. After a long-drawn crisis, a Ministry, called a
Ministry of Republican defence, was constituted. It had for its chief an
eminent statesman, cold of character, lucid of mind, exercising an amazing
authority over the superior men whom he was able to group around him,
an upholder of government that was at once strong and mindful of law and
justice. This man was Waldeck-Rousseau. Associated with his Cabinet
581
ALBERT THOMAS
was a Socialist, Millerand (June, 1890). In order to support it, he appealed
to a coalition of the Left groups, Socialistic radicals and moderate Repub-
licans.
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
How had a limited agitation for the revision of the trial of a Jewish
officer — an agitation begun outside party strife — been able to bring about
such results? In order to understand it, it is necessary to recall the political
struggle which, from the time of the French Revolution, has, so to speak,
never ceased. When the intellectuals, partisans of the reopening of the case,
began a public agitation, they at once found facing them officers anxious to
defend the honour of the army which, in their view, was about to be attacked
by the rehabilitation of a traitor, and the officers were sufficiently deeply
engaged in resistance to dream even of attempts at a military cowp d^etat.
Many amongst these last belonged to the old aristocracy which remained
faithful to tlie tradition of the past. On the other hand, the clergy entered
the lists against Jews and Protestants. Now, since the Revolution and under
every regime, the clergy as a whole have been traditionally hostile to the
republic. Throughout the Dreyfus affair they were dangerously active. Dat-
ing from the electoral campaign in 1898, the “ Justice-Equality Com-
mittee” was directed by the Fathers of the Assumption; the same Fathers
published La Croix (“ The Cross ”) a daily paper which served as a model
for all the “ Crosses ” published in a great number of dioceses. The result
was that Republican opinion, at first hostile to the “ Dreyfusards ” for patri-
otic reasons, finally placed itself entirely on their side and against the officers
who desired to cast doubts upon the supremacy of civil power,” and against
the Church allied with, or even the inspirer of, the Conservatives of every
shade who sought an authoritarian government.
The Republicans denounced the alliances of “ the sabres and the holy-
water sprinklers,” and in particular directed their blows against the Church,
of whose organised and persevering action they were fully aware. To many
nations and above all to those whose religion is completely separated from
the State, French anti-clericalism is incomprehensible; but it is only a form
of the secular struggle between the “ whites ” and the ‘‘ reds,” which, under
diverse forms, has been perpetuated since the Revolution.
On all occasions when strife between capital and labour and the pre-
occupations of foreign politics allow some respite, and even during these
times, this opposition has remained constantly the basis of French history:
the opposition between Left and Right; opposition between the republic and
authoritarian forms of Government based on the past. Since the introduction
of universal suffrage, it is not too much to say that this struggle is found
to exist in every French village. Men of independent means, lawyers, doctors,
officials — alt lead the Republican peasants in this struggle against the
squire and the cure. The formulae are changed according to circumstances
and facts; but the struggle remains the same from crisis to crisis. It is
athwart this struggle, it must be understood, that the conception of the
republic is consolidated and refined — a conception that France is anxious
to establish and justify before the world.
A government of Republican defence, constituted for the defence of the
rigime against the factitious attacks of officers and partisans of bygone
systems, and against the persistent hostility of the Church, the Waldeck-
Rousseau Ministry had for its first task that of enforcing respect for dis-
cipline in the army. Those generals who protested against a revision of the
trial were disgraced. Dreyfus was tried at Rennes (September, 1899), again
6g2 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
declared guilty, but with extenuating circumstances, by a verdict of five to
two. The Government pardoned him, and the War Minister in an order to
the army declared that the incident was closed.” The nationalist agitators
were arrested and brought before the High Court; and DeroulMe, foimd
guilty, was exiled.
But it was chiefly against the religious associations, ^'against political
monks and business mon& ” that the Government was most anxious to stress
its policy of Republican defence. After 1899, a few months after its constitu-
tion, it brought forward a project concerning those monastic congregations
partly formed or directed by foreigners — that is to say, against all religious
associations which, from then on, would need a Government permit in order
to exist. Waldeck-Rousseau declared that it was imperative to arrest the
growth of property in mortmain, instrument of domination to-day, war
treasure to-morrow.” He denounced the dissension which, according to him,
was the result of the teaching of the monastic congregations. ‘‘ In this
country,” he said, “ whose moral unity has constituted . . . her strength . . .
two distinct younger generations, less separated by their social conceptions
than by their education, are growing up each unknown to the other. . . .
Thus are gradually being formed two distinct communities.”
MENACING ATTITUDE OP THE GOVERNMENT
After a year of struggle, the Government by the votes of both Chambers,
passed the law of July 2, 1901, which established complete liberty in the
matter of associations, but which nevertheless considered the constitution of
reli^ous congregations as a dangerous derogation of common right and
justice, and which insisted on the authority of law in order to establish any
congregation, and of a decree for each new association proceeding from an
already existing congregation. Strengthened by this new weapon, which per-
mitted him to watch, subdue or, if necessary, entirely suppress congregations,
and desiring above all to rid France of those Assumptionist or Jesuit religious
orders which had plunged into the fray, Waldeck-Rousseau methodically
and with firmness set himself to conquer the resistance of the Church.
Nevertheless, his policy was one of strict moderation.
But the elections of 1902 were soon to take place; the electoral campaign,
after so long a struggle, would naturally centre around religious policies.
Without possessing a programme common to each group, the various parties
grouped themselves into two coalitions — that of the Right, composed of
Conservatives, Progressives and Nationalists ; and that of the Left, formed of
Socialists with their doctrinal programme, of Radicals, partisans of the
traditional democratic reforms (imposition of an income tax, reduction of
military service to two years, disestablishment of the Church) and of the
moderate Republicans of the Republican Alliance, who were hostile to the
Socialist programme, but who remained supporters of Republicanism. The
partisans of the Government were victorious ; the coalition of the Left repre-
sented a total of 368 seats against about 220. Waldeck-Rousseau, ill and
worn-out, resigned on May 28, 1902; but a radical Ministry was constituted
under the presidency of Combes, a former seminarist, a former Minister in
the Bourgeois Cabinet, a provincial soaked with the sentiments that the
bitter struggle for the republic engenders in the provinces. It was his inten-
tion to continue the combat against the groups of the Right, the monastic
congregations and the Church.
One of his first cases was to declare by means of a circular to the Prefects,
** that the favours at the disposal of the republic should only be accorded
ALBERT THOMAS
» those persons and bodies sincerely devoted to the administration/’ In
is way he sought to ensure the cohesion of the Republican groups. Faithful
► the spirit which had inspired the electors, he stressed the point that the
ruggle against the Church was to be throughout the republic, a struggle
ir the republic — a struggle between “ whites ” and “ reds.”
Parliamentary battles from that time onward became heated and continu-
IS, frequently assisted by demonstrations of the Leagues, and even some-
mes by street disturbances.
DRASTIC ACTION AGAINST THE RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS
The Ministry supported by its majority and by the popular parties, suc-
ssively closed the schools which had been opened since July 1, 1901, exacted
permit from more than 3,000 schools which had been opened before the
issage of that law and closed the majority of them as they refused to
)ply for the permit. Then it proceeded to demand and obtain from the
[lambers the dissolution of 54 monastic associations (March, 1903) which,
ider the law of 1901, had applied for licenses. About 18,000 men were
fected by this dissolution. The Ministry also rejected en bloc the applica-
Dns of 81 convents for permits (June, 1903) . And in spite of the financial
fficulties which the closing of the schools involved, it took away from the
embers of the dissolved monastic congregations which had become secular-
sd, all right to teach for three years in the communes in which they had
sen established.
Such actions could not fail to excite a vigorous attempt at resistance on
e part of the Church and of all Catholics. Since the time of Napoleon,
e Church and the State existed under the regime of the Concordat, an act
tiich respected ecclesiastical authority, but which submitted the clercry
rules of public order, assured them of State emoluments and thus partially
aced them under the control of the State. As a matter of fact, temporal
id spiritual power had, under every regime during the nineteenth century,
isted more or less in accord. In particular the Concordat entrusted the
overnment with the nomination of bishops and the Pope with their canoni-
.1 institution. In fact the Government and the Holy See had always been
agreement on the nomination. But in order to show his hostility to this
adition and to the Combes Ministry, the Pope refused to institute the
shops, whom he wished to nominate also. In 1904, the publication of a
-•cular that the Pope had sent to all Governments save that of France on
e occasion of a visit of President Loubet to the King of Italy, which was
fensive to the Holy See, almost brought about a definite rupture.
But Combes hesitated definitely to relinquish those rights of control and
ithority that the Concordat had enabled the State to exercise over the
srgy. In spite of the radical programme on this point, he remained antag-
listic to the idea of a complete separation between Church and State. But
s Ministry was shaken first by vehement accusations directed successively
;ainst the Minister of the Navy, Pelletan, and the Minister of War, Gen-
al Andr6, and in January, 1905, it was obliged to resign, Combes not
iving dared to deal vigorously with this reform.
But just as great ocean storms force the waves upon the coasts, where
e shifting deposits of sand and stones are durable witnesses to their work,
e battle fought throughout so many years was to end in new laws and
stitutions which even their promoters had not foreseen.
The law of 1901 regarding associations, in establishing an organic statute
liberty in France, had gone beyond the narrow limit of the rules that the
584 FRANC3E AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
militant monastic congregations hail promoted. In the same way, the anti-
clerical battle was to end, under the policy of conciliation that the next
Ministry — the Rouvier Ministry — hoped to inaugurate, in tiie separation
of Church and State.
THE STORM BURSTS
After long discussion, in which the Socialist, Aristide Briand, distinguished
himself, the law of December 9, 1905, was voted. By this law, France broke
officially with the system of Concordats by which the State gave official
recognition to religion. It declared that ‘‘the Republic assures liberty of
conscience, that it guarantees the free exercise of religious cults but that
it does not recognise or pay or endow any cult.'' It resembled in a word the
American system, leaving the organisation of religious cults to private enter-
prise.
The chief debates had dealt with the practical decisions that the applica-
tion of these principles demanded. According to what laws should religious
associations be constituted? How could the ecclesiastical hierarchy be main-
tained and respected within the laws? How, finally, could the property of
the public ecclesiastical establishments, which were suppressed, be transferred
to new associations?
Each of these questions was the object of violent struggles up to the
end of 1908.
It was first of all a question of inventories. The law had prescribed the
taking of inventories of the property of the Church. Some Catholics at-
tempted a forcible opposition to this. Then by the Vehementer Encyclical,
the Pope condemned the law and even the principle of separation. The
legislative elections following in May, 1906 (elections in France take place
every four years, and since 1900, no dissolution has ever disturbed their
regularity), "assured the Radicals, in spite of this agitation or perhaps because
of it, of a decisive triumph. A Ministry presided over by Clemenceau was
formed, which proposed to carry out the whole Radical programme.
The political experience of Clemenceau was unique, and from an early
period after entering the Chamber of Deputies in 1876 he had exercised in it
a degree of influence surpassed by few
This was the Ministry which had to handle the conflict raised by the
Papacy, concerning the law of separation. And while it was breaking the
last link between the Government and the Papacy by expelling the Charg6
d^Affaires who had remained in Paris since the departure of the Papal Nuncio,
it strengthened the law of separation by a whole series of additional measures.
It allowed ecclesiastics to officiate in churches in their quality “ of occupants
without judicial right ” It took possession of church buildings and handed
them over to the state and the communes.
All these measures served gradually to accustom both Catholics and the
whole country to the new regime of separation.
Thus, by means of organic reforms, and by a new conception of the rela-
tionship of Religion and State — that is to say, in a final analysis between
the citizen and the State — was achieved that tremendous crisis which had its
origin in the Dreyfus affair.
But true understanding of this crisis would be tacking and a false con-
ception of its results would be established if the traditional conflict between
Republicans and Conservatives be isolated, for it was merely an illustration
of this crisis. As a matter of fact, those Ministries, whose chief activity was
absorbed by these conflicts, were the initiators or supporters of the reforms
which are the basis of democratic organisation.
M. Rene Viviani. M. Delcas86. M. Paul Patnlev6.
M. Joseph Caillauz. M. Aristide Briand.
LEADING FIGURES IN FRENCH POLITICAL LIFE
Photos © by Keystone View Co except M Painlevi © by Wide World Photos
ALBERT THOMAS
885
OTHER rAB-BEACHmO MEASURES
The same year that the law of separation was voted (1905) there was also
voted — and after simitar struggles almost as lengthy — the military law
reducing the length of military service to two years and making it truly
equitable by suppressing the dispensations that the law of 1889 had estab-
lished for numerous classes of citizens. This law was a new step in the
direction of the organisation of a national army. It tended to efface all tiiat
yet remained of the old professional army, the danger of which had been sensed
at the time of the Dreyfus affair.
And again, in fiscal matters, “the ministries of republican defence or
action” as they styled themselves, had re-adopted the principle of a pro-
gressive income tax in place of certain direct taxes established in the time
of Napoleon. And in the same way, by the proposition for the repurchase
of the Western railway or by new plans concerning mines, the Clemenceau
Ministry, charged, by its majority of May, 1906, to continue the Republican
policy inaugurated by the preceding Ministries, aspired to defend collectivism
against monopoly.
Indeed, from the time of the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry to that of Cle-
menceau, both by means of legal measures for the protection of labour and by
the announcement of a system of pensions for old workmen, each succeeding
Ministry gave proof that in the social domain it was allied to the labouring
masses and that it counted on them in the great political struggle that they
were facing.
The “ Republican Bloc ” — that is to say, the organised coalition of the
Left against the Right in both the Chamber and the country — is not an
accidental formation m France. The history of these eight or ten first years
of the twentieth century reveals to what a point it has been bound to the
traditional political life of the country for a century and how it is the very
heart of its Constitution.
But at the very moment when the Republican Bloc had, in the domain'
of religion, achieved success, it was also, owing to the effect of social de-
velopment, being torn by interior struggles and threatened with dissolution.
II. The Labour Problem, 1906-1911.
The Republican Bloc in Parliament was composed of moderate Repub-
licans of the Democratic Alliance, of Radical groups, and also of Socialist
groups, representatives of the labouring classes. This was the traditional
grouping. At all period of crisis, when the Liberal bourgeoisie and the Re-
publican artisans were engaged in battle against the conservative forces, the
working classes had always — in 1792, in 1830, in 1848 and in 1869 — lent
them their support. It was not merely on account of his glowing eloquence
and his incomparable parliamentary tactics that the Socialist, Jaurls, was,
from 1900 to 1904, the real leader of the Left; it was also owing to the
social and political constitution of France.
France is not essentially an industrial state as England is, for example,
and as Germany tended to become in her pre-war evolution. She remains
for the most part an agricultural country. Industrially, she possesses an
artisan class, many luxury crafts, and a large retail trade. Certainly, in
her great mining and textile centres, she has not escaped from the modem
phenomena of large-scale industry — the concentration of capital and enter-
586 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
prise and the syndical organisation of the wage-earners. But economically
as physically and ethnologically, France is a land of ‘‘ mingling, equilibrium
and harmony.”
The consequence is that from the sociological point of view, she has not,
in the real sense of the term, a Labour party as have the great industrial
countries. All of the many attempts that have been made to establish ^
purely working-class party or a Labour party in France have failed.
And for similar reasons, Socialism in France was originally political
Socialism. It was an offshoot of the Republican doctrine. The formula
often used by its theorists and propagandists is that political democracy
should terminate in social democracy,” that “ political equality to become
real, should have as its complement or even its condition, social equality.”
This Socialism remains at bottom a reforming Socialism. It must consider
the enormous dispersion of property which exists chiefly in agriculture, and
also in the arts and crafts. But, if it is to succeed — if it is to realise its
programme, it must also consider the aspirations and programmes of the
rest of democracy and its struggle for liberty and political equality.
The word Socialism ” does not in France carry with it that disquieting
meaning which, since the opening of the nineteenth century, it has acquired
in America. Violent parties are known as “ Anarchists ” and “ Communists,”
and for a long time past Socialism has been respectable in republican France.
Such is the explanation of the position which Socialism since 1900 has
obtained in the Left Bloc, formed after the Dreyfus affair.
VARIETIES OP FRENCH SOCIALISM
To tell the truth, at the end of the nineteenth century the French
Socialist forces were still in a scattered and embryonic stage. They formed
a whole series of schools of thought and, it might even be said, of chapels ”
or sects ” Their adherents were extremely divided. Some, the followers
of Jules Guesde, a man of harsh apostolic character, attempted, by the
application of Marxian doctrines, to establish at all cost a purely working-
class party in the industrial centres — a class party, isolated from all others,
and looking for, as a result of the inevitable industrial concentration, the
possibility of a complete social revolution. Others, amongst whom was
Edouard Vaillant, a doctor and philosopher of encyclopaedic information,
were followers of Blanqui ; and yet others, amongst whom was the workman
Allemane, aspired to continue the working-class traditions of the Parisian
Commune of 1871. These were, properly speaking, only revolutionary Re-
publicans, faithful to the generous socialist traditions of the Parisian people.
Others, again, preferred to take no part in the conflict but to dominate it
by the force of their mentality. The schools of thought thus constituted,
attempted to put an end to internal struggles and to harmonise the whole
of Republican aspirations as well as the measures involved in the trans-
formation of the regime of property to that of collectivism. Amongst these
were found such men as Jaures, Millerand, Viviani and Briand.
In 1896, at Saint-Mand6, Millerand had made a speech designed to
formulate a minimum programme that could be defended by these independ-
ent Socialists in the Chamber and at the same time accepted by the revolu-
tionary working-class parties. But the campaign for the reopening of the
Dreyfus trial had put a stop to this first effort towards union. Jaur&s,
almost alone, had been sensible of the immense political reach of this cam-
paign, and almost alone he had had the courage deliberately to hurl himself
into it. Millerand, for some time, believed it prudent for Socialism to abstain
ALBERT THOMAS
587
from this scuffle. The Guesdist working-class declared itself neutral in this
war between two bourgeois parties. But the threats of military coups
d^etat that certain generals during the course of 1898 breathed aloud, led
to the reunion of the Socialists in a committee of mutual understanding
which had as its aim “ the organisation for the republic of all the revolu-
tionary and republican socialist forces.” In the battle against the Right,
Socialism made its presence felt; and with the same blow it realised the
beginning of its unity.
Indeed, under various forms and up to the end of the Combes Ministry,
and in spite of the doctrinal reservations of certain of its leaders, it was
destined to be the firmest prop of the republic.
The first consequence was the entry of Millerand into the Waldeck-
Rousseau Ministry, June, 1899.
Undoubtedly, the intransigents would accuse him of having placed his
hand in that of the butcher of the commune — Galliffet, the Minister of
War; imdoubtedly he would be declared to be no longer anything but a
“ Socialist on leave,” separated for the moment from his party. Undoubtedly,
the Socialist Congress of 1899 would proclaim that “ this participation of a
Socialist in a bourgeois Government could be justified only under excep-
tional circumstances and that the whole forces of Socialism should be mobil-
ised in opposition to the forces of the bourgeoisie.** Undoubtedly, again,
after the strike incidents at Chalon-sur-Saone in 1900, when the strikers were
in collision with their union, the working-class Guesdist party broke away
from the Socialist unity and, in 1901, at Lyons, the Blanquiste group with
Vaillant did the same. This led to the formation of a Socialist Party of
France (Guesde- Vaillant) and of a French Socialist party (Jaures-Mille-
rand). The majority of Socialist societies remained faithful in the ensuing
battle; and Millerand, from 1899 to 1901, was able to accomplish in the
Waldeck-Rousseau Government a task which proved the will of even the
moderate Republicans to make an effort in the direction of social justice.
REFORMS IN LABOUR LEGISLATION
In August, 1899, various decrees regulated the conditions of labour in
the public undertakings of the State, the departments and the communes.
The Conseil Supeneur du Travail (Upper Council of Labour), created a few
years before, was reorganised, and representatives elected by the working-
class syndicates entered it. The system of inspection of labour was also
reorganised. An eight-hour day was accorded in the postal and telegraphic
service, and the law of March 10, 1900, established a ten-hour day in alh
those concerns in which men, women and adolescents were engaged. A plan
for labour pensions was brought forward; but for two years during the
Combes Ministry, the development of these reforms was not proceeded with,
for the political struggle absorbed all energies. Until 1904, however, and
in spite of the accusation hurled against the Government by Millerand (who
had left the Socialist party) of neglecting social legislation,” the Socialists
upheld the Combes Ministry.
BEGINNING OF THE SYNDICALIST MOVEMENT
But it is at this time that several new symptoms appeared.
In 1897 an important syndical movement had begun in France. This
movement, in its general features, differed widely from English trade union-
688 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
ism. It was certainly not indijfferent to questions of self-defence, to efforts
to obtain better pay and better conditions of work. But the pure profes-
sional spirit existed chiefly in some of the great federations of the same
trade, such as the Book Federation or the Mechanics* Federation. But
district by district, the working-class syndicates converted themselves into
Bourses du Travail (Labour Exchanges) which united the local syndicates of
different trades. Several anarchists — some of them, such as Fernand Pelon-
tier, very remarkable men — then created a Federation of Bowses du Travail
and endowed it with a political doctrine.
By virtue of this doctrine, the working men grouped in these trade organ-
isations must neglect the conquest of political power by electoral methods,
such as the Socialists had urged. Class orpnisation, syndical organisation
by means of partial strikes, would result in a general strike, deliberately
brought about by the mass of workers, and one which would transform
society more certainly than could parliamentary action.
The syndicalist propagandists declared themselves partisans of direct
action, of direct pressure by every means — strikes, boycotts, sabotage exer-
cised on masters and on the State. They declared themselves anti-militarist
and preached from the housetops a general strike m case of war. Georges
Sorel, an engineer and philosopher, became the theorist of this doctrine of
revolutionary syndicalism as opposed to reforming syndicalism, which demo-
cratic Governments, and particularly at the moment of Millerand*s measures,
sought to encourage and to solidify.
In 1902, the Confederation Generale du Travail (General Labour Con-
federation) which had been founded in 1895 at Limoges by the Bourses du
Travail, was reorganised as a result of the union of the Federation des
Metiers (Federation of Crafts and Trades) and the Bourses du Travail,
The revolutionary syndicalists possessed a majority in it and set to work to
win the new organisation to the adoption of revolutionary methods.
This syndical movement, even imder this political form — so different
from that prevailing in general in other countries — originated in the French
industrial development of the first years of the century. The theory of
Sorel and of some intellectuals who supported him would not have become
a political force if new economic circumstances had not developed.
In this economically well-balanced France, where social classes are mixed
and interpenetrate, as has been briefly described above, modem industry,
since the end of the nineteenth century, had greatly developed. In 1896
the number of wage-earners in industry and transportation was 3,304,000.
In 1906 this number rose to 3,871,000, mostly concentrated in increasingly
large establishments. In 1896, 36% of the workers were found in concerns
employing from one to ten people. In 1906 the same concerns employed
32% of the total number of industrial workers. From 1896 to 1906, the
number of workers grouped in establishments employing more than 100
people rose from 1,124,000 to 1,542,000.
An inevitable consequence of this evolution was, as in all other countries,
a new development of labour organisation.
The reform policy of the Republican Bloc and, in particular, of the
Socialist reformers, was added to this natural consequence. It is calculated
that during the time of the Millerand Ministry, the number of syndicalists
rose from 419,000 to 588,000.
The precise and often subtle distinctions that the leaders drew between
purely professional defensive action and general syndicalist political action
as often as not did not exist in the popular mind. Indeed, a vast move-
ment was leading the labouring world — or at least that part of it which
acted politically, together with the leaders of the Socialist parties — towards
ALBERT THOMAS
a greater independence in regard to all the bourgeois parties, which were
considered as representing interests opposed to those of the organised labour-
ing class, and towards tactics, if not of total isolation, at least of separation
from the coalition of Republicans and Democrats of which they formed a
part.
Here again we witness the repetition of those alternative movements
which, during the course of the nineteenth century, had several times been
reflected in the evolution of French ideas and parties. Between two periods
of crisis of Republican defence or of Democratic struggle, sometimes by
political ideas, and sometimes under the pressure of economic facts, the
Labour or Socialist groups were thus isolated from the other advanced
parties of democracy.
The man who, since the opening of the Dreyfus afiair, best symbolised in
all its unity and in spite of its dissensions the aspirations of the French
working masses, was Jaures. He understood the drift of affairs and decided
to break away from the Left Bloc He did so, but he did not, as has so
often been said, surrender to the intransigent resolution of the International
Congress of Amsterdam, when the Socialist parties of every country, favouring
a formula adopted by the German Socialists in 1903 at Dresden, condemned
those “ attempts at revision which tended to replace the proved and mag-
nificent tactics founded on class warfare by a policy of concession to the
established order of things.” As long as he believed in the necessity of hold-
ing together the various democratic groups, Jaures continued to support the
Combes Ministry. But when, as the year 1904 was drawing to its close and
the Democratic majority was found to be decreasing, Jaures, who was both
an exceedingly clever politician and a realist, understood that m one way
or another this newly-arisen situation must be reflected politically, and that
by means of unity between the various factions of Socialism, a political ex-
pression and political action for this purely labour movement — a move-
ment that he had always followed with the closest attention, greatest interest
and frankest sympathy — must be sought.
In 1904, again, a few weeks after the International Congress at Amster-
dam, there took place at Bourges a Congress of Syndicates, which for the
first time revealed to the general public the new strength of the Confedera-
tion Generale du Travail The Congress had resolved to start a vigorous
agitation, based on that which took place in America in 1886, in favour of
the eight-hour day. On May 1, 1906, the day fixed in Europe as Labour Day,
the Confederation Generale du Travail invited all workmen to work no longer
than eight hours
In 1905, in order to facilitate the passage of the important laws concern-
ing military service and the separation of Church and State, the Socialists
supported the Rouvier and Sarricn Ministries against the Right. But Social-
ist unity between all the political groups, realised at Easter, 1905, by the
formation of a sole Socialist party, together with the isolated electoral policy
of this party in May, 1906 — a policy frequently directed against the
Radicals — were to lead to a bitter struggle between tihe Clemenceau Ministry
and the working masses.
The three years during which M. Clemenceau was Minister of the Interior
and later President of the Council in the Sarrien Cabinet, were entirely oc-
cupied by these struggles. The Radical chief of the party, who, in the
early days of Radicalism, had made the most violent attacks against
“ bourgeois society ” in defence of the wage-earners, refused either to con-
sider or admit the new professional movement or to recognise in their often
violent agitations the profound aspirations of which they were the natural
expression.
690 PRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
VIOLENT DISTURBANCES IN THE LABOUR WORLD
Formidable strikes of miners in the north, following on the catastrophe
of Courriferes, in March, 1906, led to such violent incidents in connection
with the strikers’ aflSliation as the following: before May, 1906, the arrest
of the Secretaries of the Confederation Generate du Travail; in June, a com-
plete rupture in the Chamber between the President of the Council and
Jaures; prohibition of manifestations in favour of a weekly holiday; sensa-
tional strike of electricians in Paris, which plunged the capital in darkness;
strike of naval conscripts; bloody strike of the terrace- workers of Draveil
and Villeneuve (1907) ; general strike of the building industry following on
new arrests of members of the Confederation; disturbances of the vine-
growers of the south, who complained of no longer being able to cover their
cost of production in view of the fall of wine prices — disturbances at first
tolerated, but which later brought about arrests and police action, and even
led to the mutiny of an infantry regiment sent to quell the agitators; agita-
tion of officials who criticised the regime of favouritism under which they
worked, or even the incompetency of certain of their chiefs; disturbance of
teachers who claimed the right to establish a syndicate and to belong to the
Confederation Generate du Travail; double strike of the postal employes,
followed by hundreds of dismissals (1909). The battle between the working
masses, their nerves on edge, tom by all kinds of new ideas, and the Radical
majority, supporters of order and authority and fearful of compromising the
realisation of its programme of reforms in provoking reactions, was intermi-
nable.
Discussions of the project for labour pensions; the vote for the repurchase
by the State of the railway system of the Western Railway Company, which
was badly run; and, finally, the vote in the Chamber of an income tax — all
this appeared to be an entirely insufficient compensation for a policy which
the Socialist working-class opposition did not hesitate to denounce as a
policy of repression. Clemenceau was violently attacked for his policy of
reaction.
But the movement went even beyond the men. In spite of the fact that
the Briand Cabinet, on its formation after the fall of Clemenceau, in July,
1909, outlined a policy of social welfare, in October, 1910, the railway strike
broke out — a professional movement which was originally caused by the
low pay and indifferent working conditions of the railway workers, but which,
in interrupting the public transportation service, appeared to the Govern-
ment to menace the security of the State. The Government accordingly
determined on a general mobilisation of the workers and all railway men
of military age were called to the colours.
Up to the end of 1911 campaigns for the reinstatement of the men dis-
missed on the occasion of this strike, fresh disturbances such as that of the
Building Federation, and, finally, new anti-militarist propaganda, continued
to demonstrate the stren^h of the movement, and it was thought that im-
portant social changes would take place in the near future.
But the Radicals, the Democrats who, on occasions, had appeared to be
tempted to widen their doctrines to the point of adhering to a moderate type
of Socialism, now became more hostile in their attitude to the labour masses.
And it is in this opposition of the Radicals and Socialists — a consequence
of all the new social claims — that one must look at least in part for the
origin of a new movement of political reform — that of proportional repre-
sentation, which from 1909 to 1914 occupied the attention of Parliament and
the parties.
ALBERT THOMAS
691
DRASTIC ELECTORAL REFORMS
After 1889, the ballot system in France was by arrondissement (dis-
trict). Following on the Boulanger movement, the Republicans had aban-
doned ballot by list, which was not without its dangers. The system of
ballot by arrondissement carried with it two consequences. On the one hand
it limited the fight and gave it a local character. The ‘‘parish fights” be-
tween “ whites ” and “ reds ” were thus clear and vigorous. The majorities
which after 1900 existed in the Chamber were the outcome of these struggles.
But, on the other hand, the use of the second ballot by any candidate who
had not obtained an absolute majority with the first, necessitated alliances
of the candidates of various parties of the Left against the candidates for
the Right. The policy of the Bloc had its root in the electoral coalition of
the Left.
Now, after the separation of the Church and the State, which marked the
conclusion of the anti-cIerical struggle, not only the Conservatives, but also
the moderate Republicans thought that as new questions had arisen (in par-
ticular those social questions which disquieted certain Democrats as much
as the Conservatives) it was not desirable to perpetuate governments or
coalitions of parties which rested on unstable bases. The policy of the
arrondissement ran the risk, also, of being reduced to personal conflicts. “ A
purer and wider wind should blow above the stagnant little marshes of the
arrondissement/^ said Aristide Briand. On the other hand, the Socialist
party, anxious to constitute and maintain its unity and isolation, sought a
ballot system which, without compromising the Republican forces, could give
it the assurance of an equitable representation founded on its own pro-
gramme.
This led to the proportional representation campaign, which, although it
was directed by men of every party, found its chief support in the parties
in opposition. The Government party, a Radical party, was more or less
hostile to this campaign, since it was possible for the new system to en-
danger the balance of which it might have need on the Left for the re-
election of its deputies or the maintenance of its majority.
Perhaps the establishment of proportional representation, carried out
under these conditions and at this hour, would have constituted that organic
reform which, after all the social conflicts of the first years of the twentieth
century, ought to have marked the opening of a new evolution. Propor-
tional representation should have permitted, at the end of some years’ ex-
perience, a clearer and more accurate representation of the classes of the
nation. It should have given a clearer political expression to the aspirations
of all. It should have permitted the realisation of reforms, inspired by the
idea of justice, between the various social classes. But the struggle which
took place between those in favour of proportional representation and the
adversaries of electoral reform dragged on from Ministry to Ministry, between
the Senate and the Chamber, from 1910 to 1913. And at the end of 1912
other problems were already absorbing men’s thoughts. It was no longer a
question of deciding to what political party the (Government of the nation
belonged or of knowing what share of it was due to the working-class. TTie
relations between the European nations became more strained every day and
the menace of war darkened the horizon. The Socialist leaders themselves
were conscious that the most desired reforms, whatever they might be and
however moderate, could not possibly be carried out if the regime of armed
peace endured and if the people were not freed from the burden which
weighed on their daily life.
m FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
III. National Security, 1911-1914
During the first years of the twentieth century, it had appeared that the
establishment of normal, if not cordial, relations between all the European
peoples was on the point of easing the regime of armed peace which had been
imposed on the Continent after the war of 1870, and of removing — perhaps
forever — the horror of war from all its peoples. At the end of the nineteenth
centuity, indeed, during the years 1899 and 1900, important progress in this
direction seemed to have been made.
Although in the years immediately following the Treaty of Frankfort,
1871, French minds were haunted by a desire for revenge and by the fear
of a new German invasion, this double thought had since begun to lose its
sha^ness. Certainly, the idea prevailing in 1871, that it was contrary to
justice that populations, ^Hreated as cattle,” should be torn, against their
will, from the nation to which they voluntarily belonged, remained the firm
conviction of apparently all Frenchmen. And the protest of the Alsatians
and Lorrainers — a protest continued in spite of all the necessities of daily
life — would have sufficed to support this belief. But those Frenchmen whose
over-excited patriotism could, even at the time of the Dreyfus affair, imagine
a war of aggression, constituted only a small minority. The majority of the
people dreamed of a peaceful reparation of Germany's crime. They dreamed
of a development of European democracy which would terminate in new
solutions, by which Alsace-Lorraine would be enabled to participate again
in French life, or returned in exchange for a colony. All lulled themselves
in the hope which Gambetta had formulated of immanent justice.”
On the other hand, after France’s hard years of total isolation following
on the constitution of the Triple Alliance — a defensive alliance of Ger-
many, Austria and Italy, of which the consequences might be aggravated by
the conflicts which might break out with England on the other continents —
the French had lulled themselves into some idea of security, for in 1891
negotiations for an understanding with Russia had been begun and bad ended
in 1894 in the Franco-Russian Alliance.
A precarious Continental equilibrium, founded on the existence of 12,000,-
000 armed men, was the result of this opposition of the Double Entente and
the Triple Alliance
More than that, since 1891 the new German Emperor, William II, break-
ing with Bismarck’s policy, which had been hostile to all expansion, had
adopted the idea of Weltpolitik — of a German world-policy, founded on
a strong navy and in an almost fatal opposition to England. About 1895
he had sought, through the good offices of Russia, a rapprochement with
France, and French warships had been present at the inauguration of the
Kiel Canal. A policy of Franco-German rapprochement would probably nol
have gone very far before the inevitable question of Alsace-Lorraine was
raised; and the various tentative appeals to public opinion, which had been
made at this time, met with little response in either country.
But a few reciprocal diplomatic attentions between the two coimtries ir
regard to Eastern affairs had at least brought about a pause. It was at this
time, in 1899, that the Tsar had invited the Governments of the world to take
part in a Conference at The Hague with a view to the limitation of arma-
ments. The objections of Germany prevented this conference from establish-
ing a proportion between the military forces and the population of ead:
state, but at least it made several new rules concerning the usages of wai
and created a Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. For the firsi
time, Leon Bourgeois, on this occasion, referred to the League of Nations.’
ALBERT THOMAS
503
FRENCH COLONIAL EXPANSION
Nevertheless, there was still a cloud hanging over France^s foreign policy.
This was the menace of colonial rivalry with England and the numerous con-
flicts to which it could give rise. Here again France was confronted with
one of the ancient struggles of her history — a struggle to which her geo-
graphical nature condemned her. France is a maritime as well as a con-
tinental nation, and the ocean winds call from afar to the hardy dwellers on
her coasts. In the eighteenth century, France, time and time again, hesitated
between a continental and a colonial policy. Grievously tried in 1871 on
the Continent, she again turned instinctively to the sea — not owing to any
suggestion of Bismarck, but because of the audacity of her people and the
adventurous spirit of her officers and civilians who desired her to widen her
over-seas empire.
Jules Ferry, ignoring insults and injustice, made a colonial policy success-
ful in France. At the opening of the twentieth century this task was coming
to an end. France had strengthened her empire in Northern Africa; she had
stretched her territories into Darkest Africa; she had united the Congo with
Algeria, across the Sahara and French Sudan, she was colonising Indo-China;
she was established at Madagascar. In this work she had won more than
wealth and territory. She had raised her conquered soul.” She experienced
a new sense of pride and felt herself capable of great things. These senti-
ments calmed the anxiety of the country.
Nevertheless, France had met with all sort^ of rebuffs in America, in
Asia, in Oceanica and above all in England. In 1898 the two countries nar-
rowly escaped a serious conflict when Captain Marchand hoisted the French
flag at Fashoda before the arrival of the British troojis But here again the
early years of the twentieth century witnessed a happy progress. Delcasse,
who was for seven years Minister of Foreign Affairs (1898-1905), was re-
sponsible for a rapprochement with England. The Convention of April 8,
1904, settled all disputed questions between the two countries. At the same
time a rapprochement with Italy was accomplished It seemed as if those
who sought to multiply and bind a system of alliances between one another
and to establish, in a spirit of mutual understanding, an atmosphere of
peace at once more solid and less crushing, had everything to hope for.
But whatever the pacific feeling of the nations and more particularly
the apparently unanimous sentiment of the French, and whatever the hesita-
tions of most of the Governments face to face with the idea of an armed
conflict in western Europe, deep rivalries and warfare were nevertheless to
tear the world during the ten years which were to follow.
Owing to her high birth-rate, Germany's population rose from year to
year. Her industrial development was enormous. German public opinion
came to the conclusion that Germany needed outside expansion. She was
jealous of France, particularly of France's possessions in North Africa. The
preponderance which she had enjoyed since 1871, the hegemony which in
certain moments of Bismarckian triumph she had exercised, led her to be-
lieve that the development of her industrial strength could be neither pacific
nor conciliatory. On the other hand, and for the same reason, she could not
tolerate the idea that in Eastern affairs, in the conflicts between Turkey and
"Slavism” — that is, the Christian nations supported by Russia — her
authority should be questioned and that her ally and accomplice, Austria-
Hungary, should be hindered in her ambitions and in her push towards
Salonika.
T. B. T. — VOL. 1 — 38
594 FRANCE AGAIN THE DUMIJNAJNT ruWEK UIN inE
Moroccan and Oriental affairs occupied the attention of European diplo-
macy from 1905 to 1914, and it is because these questions were not settled
in accordance with German ambitions that Germany determined on war and
precipitated the ensuing catastrophe upon a world desirous of nothing but
peace.
Germany’s diplomatic miscalculations
There must be noted here, in a succession more than a little irritating for
her, Germany’s list of mistakes.
Let us first turn to Morocco. By the Convention of April 8, 1904, Eng-
land, as a compensation for the abandonment of French claims on Egypt,
had acknowledged France’s preponderating influence in Morocco. Germany,
at the time, offered no objection. In 1905, at a time when Russia was weak-
ened by her defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and by interior troubles,
William II landed at Tangier and, with theatrical gestures, proclaimed that
he considered the Sultan of that country as an absolutely independent sov-
ereign. This was his manner of announcing that he did not recognise France’s
special rights in Morocco.
A few days later, the German Chancellor declared in the Reichstag that
he would invite an international conference to settle the Moroccan situation.
Delcass6, supported bv England, did not desire the conference. War seemed
almost certain. The French Cabinet decided to accept the principle of the
conference. Delcasse resigned. The French Government and French opinion
desired peace. The German Government believed that it had won a victory.
But the Algeciras Conference proved to be a stern rebuff for Germany.
Prance, supported by Russia and England, which influenced even Italy, ob-
tained the recognition of her preponderant role in the organisation of banking
and of the police.
The nations again gave proof of their desire for peace, and they imposed
their desire on their Governments. In 1907, William II himself appeared
to have cooled down, and once more was anxious for a rapprochement with
France. A second peace conference took place at The Hague and completed
the work of the first. In 1908 France, England and Russia marked their
accord by diplomatic manifestations; the Triple Entente, a little unsteady,
stood opposite the Triple 'Alliance as a balance and a force for peace, but
not as a measure for war.
Germany, however, complained of a policy which tended to encircle her.
Possibly this was merely the idea of a few; but German opinion feared an
obstacle to her economic aspirations in this system. Once more, difficulties
began to appear upon the horizon. ^
Owing to the nearness of Algeria and as a result of the role which was
awarded to her since the Algeciras Conference, France found herself involved
in internal disturbances in Morocco and was gradually forced to send occu-
pation troops there. Each year brought fresh conflicts with Germany; in
1908 there was a ouestion concerning German deserters in the French For-
eign Legion; in 1910, after an effort for a Franco-German economic entente,
there was a difficulty concerning the Moorish railways; in 1911, when the
French troops entered Fez there was a fresh protest from Germany, and a
demand for compensation in the Congo. On July 1, 1911, under the pre-
text that German nationals were threatened by the natives in the region of
Sous in Morocco, a German gunboat anchored in Agadir.
A threat from England and the wise peaceful policy of Caillaux, the
French President of the Coimcil, terminated in a convention, November 4
1911, which recognised France’s protectorate ovp^ Morocco and reserved
© Keystone View Co,
© Keystone Vtew Co
M. L4on Bourgeois, French statesman, who
has devoted his career to the creation and
develoiiment of the League of Nations,
on which he contributes a ehapter to this
book.
M. Albert Thomas, French Labour Leader
and first Director-General of the Inter-
national Labour Bureau under fiie League
of Nations at Geneva. Author of the chapter
on France in this book.
ALBERT THOMAS 505
merely economic equality — “ the open door ” — for all coun^es. Germany
obtained in the Congo only “ the duck’s bill ” — two huge points of territory
which allowed access to the Cameroons in the Congo by crossing French
territory.
All this was a new and cruel blow for Germany. The Minister of the
Colonies resigned. From the beginning of 1912, in many circles, the spirit
of war reared its head.
In the east, Germany, supporting and inspiring Austria, was no more
fortunate. In 1908, no doubt owing to the Young Turk Revolution, ibe Aus-
trian Minister, Aehrenthal, decided to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tdth the
administration of which Austria had been entrusted in 1878; and Russia, after
having requested, in her irritation, the convocation of a conference, was
forced to abandon this idea when Germany opposed it. Serbia had to con-
tent herself with a vain protest. There is little doubt, too, that in the Young
Turk Revolution, it was Germany who had charge of the instruction of the
army. But in 1912, the Christians in the Balkans — the Bulgarians, Serbians
and Greeks — under the guidance of Russia, came to an understanding and
attacked Turkey. Their victory was celebrated by Russia and France as a
check to Germany, October, 1912.
When peace, after many vicissitudes and following on the victory of the
Serbians, Greeks and Rumanians over the Bulgarians, June, 1913, was defi-
nitely concluded, the growth of Serbia barred from Austria the route to
Salonika for which she had always hankered.
MEASURES TO INCREASE NATIONAL SAFETY
It was then that the extreme anxiety regarding exterior security arose in
France After the Agadir crisis, the Commission on Foreign Affairs in the
Senate refused to accept the concessions made by Caillaux to Germany in
order to obtain the Moroccan protectorate and above all to keep the peace,
January 10, 1912. A new Ministry, which had been constituted under the
presidency of Poincar^, declared that it did not wish “to leave France un-
protected in the midst of other nations ” and that it desired “ to give a senti-
ment of security to the country.” Millerand, the Minister of War, was
occupied in strengthening the army. When, on January 17, 1913, Poincare
was elected President of the Republic, he indicated, in his presidential mes-
sage, that it was possible for a nation “to be efficiently pacific only on
condition that it is always ready for war.”
In February, a Briand Cabinet, which succeeded the Poincar4 Cabinet,
learned that the German Government was preparing a project for extra credits
amounting to a thousand million marks to be spent on the equipment of the
German army. The standing army was to be raised to 815,000 men and
provided with new equipments. The reason was that Austria was menaced
“ by the recent victory of Slavism ” and might need support. On March 5,
following on a consultation of the Conseil SupSrieur de la Guerre (War Coun-
cil) , and without waiting for the German plan to be placed before the Reichs-
tag, the French Government introduced in the Chamber a law eyt^^nHin g the
length of military service to three years.
In March and April, incidents on the frontier, at Nancy and at Lun4ville,
irritated German opinion. The Press of the two countries became heated.
The Socialists who, in 1912 at Bale, during the Balkan War, had already
attempted to voice the pacific feelings of the labouring classes, made a new
attempt to band themselves against this agitation. In May, 1913, at Berne,
596 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
a meeting of French and German deputies voted a pacific resolution which
consisted chiefly m an appeal to arbitration.
But if the Socialists were attempting thus to utilise their international
relations in order to strengthen the peace movement, they were none the less
preoccupied with the problem of national security. In the heated discussion
on the question of the prolongation of military service, which lasted until
July, together with many Radicals they opposed this prolongation. They
criticised the project of the Staff and of the Government, not from an anti-
militarist point of view, but strictly from that of the more or less powerful
military force which would thus be placed at the disposition of the country.
Jaures, for several years past preoccupied with military questions, had in
his book The New Army cried aloud for the defence of France by the armed
nation. In this way he claimed to push her defence force to the utmost limit.
From tiie time of the debates on the reorganisation of artillery equipment,
which in the early months of 1914 followed the vote on the military project,
the Socialists again participated in the discussion for the purpose of demand-
ing indispensable improvements.
The discussions which took place during the whole of 1913, in spite of
their bitterness, served to prepare the whole country for an understanaing of
the menace which hung over it and the necessity of meeting it.
In May, 1914, the elections which took place seemed to indicate a recon-
struction of the Republican Bloc The struggle against the tendency towards
reaction which, from the Democratic point of view, was represented by a
prolongation of service in the regular army, as opposed to the system of an
armed nation, had again drawn together Radicals and Socialists The new
financial burdens which, as a consequence of military credits, would weigh
upon the country, made the desire for Democratic taxation reform all the
keener. The idea of a levy on capital was advanced against that of new
loans. Possibly a persevering effort lasting several years would have finally
calmed the anxiety of the nation and given it a military organisation that
was powerful and yet in conformity with Democratic aspirations. But the
time was too short. In June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was
assassinated and war was on the point of breaking out. France, at least,
was not surprised. She had been uneasy for many years past.
To other writers in this work will fall the task of tracing the beginnings
of the war, describing its vicissitudes and explaining the provisions of the
Peace Treaty which ended it. But the history of the first fourteen years of
the twentieth century demonstrates beyond a shadow of doubt the constant
peaceful intentions of France. Her colonial policy, her Moroccan policy m
particular, may be open to criticism. More cleverness, a more precise knowl-
edge of adversaries, and also a more conscientious moderation were demanded
by the opposition. France sought constantly to avoid a devastating conflict.
It has been proved that up to the moment when hostilities broke out
France sought to avoid war. It is this which in the war itself was her
strenirth, and it is this which constituted her unity at the hour of her
mobilisation.
On August 4, 1914, when the French Parliament met to hear the Govern-
ment communications and to vote war credits, the message of the President
of the Republic recalled the fact that during forty years France had silenced
her desire for reparation for the wrong of 1871 and that she had done all she
could to avert a war. The union saerSe (sacred union) of all parties was pro-
claimed. Jaures had been assassinated on July 31, by a madman acting under
the influence of nationalist passions. The Socialists crushed their desire for
vengeance and gave their full support to the Government.
Here, again, was one of the profound and ancient sources of French
ALBERT THOMAS
597
strength which now revealed itself once more. None of the differences, none
of the most violent political struggles had ever been able to achieve that unity
which constitutes the basis of the whole of French history. No theory of
peace, no idea attempting to place the solidarity of classes above national
solidarity was introduced at this hour. With one instinctive impulse all the
French people whose unity had been cemented of old by invasion, rose once
more to face the invader.
IV Fbance at Wab, 1914-1918
Four years of unexampled warfare, accepted deliberately by the whole
nation, were to absorb into the ranks of the army all men capable of fighting;
to associate the whole population — even old men and women — in the same
effort of defence ; to engulf the patrimony of past generations ; to pledge even
the future in the safeguarding of the existence of the nation. How would
these years react on the political, social and moral evolution which followed
after the opening of the twentieth century and which we have briefly de-
scribed? What was the inner history of the French people from 1914 to 1918?
There are three problems which at various times have stood out from
national preoccupations since 1900: the political problem of the definite
establishment of the republic and democracy against the hostility of the
Church and the partisans of bygone regimes; the social problem of the con-
dition of wage-earners and the place in the nation to which the labouring
class aspired; the problem of national security, which last was for four years
to occupy exclusively all minds All other preoccupations, all other tendencies
were lost m the eddy of a tempest such as no people had ever known before.
Nevertheless, the historians of the future or those at least wlio will be
anxious to discern the continuity of movements and ideas, temporarily broken,
will have no diflBculty m recognising that the pre-virar movements, effaced
and veiled, remained nevertheless more or less alive even during the tempest,
to be reborn with greater strength at the conclusion of peace.
Politically, the Chamber elected in 1914 was a Left Chamber. The
Ministry, which it accepted a few weeks before the war, was presided over by
Viviani and received its confidence because it was “ a government capable of
realising the union of the Left parties.” At the declaration of war, national
union was substituted for party politics Clericals, Protestants and Jews,
Royalists, Conservatives, Radicals and Socialists were all equally ardent in
the defence of the country All even aspired to be in the thick of the fight,
some because of the traditions which bound modern to ancient France, and
others because of the social and political ideal of which France seemed to
them to be the symbol. Following on the first successes after the victory of
the. Marne, when it was proved that united France could resist the “irre-
sistible ” rush of the Gorman attack, these last could with justice boast of
having given France those military institutions which had saved her.
“ France,” said General Joffre, “ has reason to be proud of the armies that
the republic has given her.”
BIGID wab MEASUBES
All the war Ministries — the Viviani Ministry, the double Briand Ministry,
the Ribot, Painlev6 and Clemenceau Ministries, were constituted on the basis
of the union sacree (sacred union). All had as their imique object, accord-
598 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
ing to the formula that Clemenceau proclaimed, the desire to “ make war/'
Measures of internal politics which were passed were dictated only by the
necessities of war. These included the laws of August, 1914, concerning ihe
state of siege, the censorship, the security of the State, the laws concerning
recruiting and the utilisation of mobilised forces (such as the law proposed
by Deputy Dalbiez in 1916), the income-tax law, voted by the Senate, the
economic measures by which the State attempted to organise the acquisition
and distribution of the provisions necessary for the feeding of the country,
as well as measures of political repression against the newspaper Le Bonnet
Rouge, suspected of having received enemy money; and those measures of
the Clemenceau Ministry which sent Malvy, a former Minister of the In-
terior, to trial (August, 1918), accused of weakness in his policy towards
agitators at home, and which prosecuted the former President of the Council,
Caillaux, accused of having entered into relations with the enemy. No other
motive was given for all these measures than the necessity to “ make war.”
TRADITIONAL HOSTILITY BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT
But it will suffice to take them one by one and to analyse all the parlia-
mentary debates which preceded them or which influenced the constitution
of the successive Ministries, in order to find at least some trace of the old,
profound hostility which separated the Right and the Left or, if it is desired
to go deeper, to find the two tendencies which traditionally torment the
French mind: that which consists in subordinating all internal preoccupations
to the absolute idea of security and national greatness, and that which, since
the French Revolution, seeks the indissoluble union of love of country with
love of the Republican and Democratic ideal.
When, for example, during the course of 1915, the deputies of the Left
were in conflict with Millerand, the Minister of War, suspected of having
followed too strictly all the suggestions of the military chiefs and of not
having sufficiently emphasised the supremacy of the civil power, they were
under the influence of the second tendency. When the greater part of public
opinion supported Clemenceau without reserve in his repressive measures, it
was following the purely nationalist tendency.
The electoral reform of 1919 was a compromise between these two spirits.
It substituted for the regime of sanitin d^arrondissement (ballot by arron-
dissement), dear to the majority of Radicals, a regime of scrutin de liste
(ballot by list) with a kind of proportional representation. But it weakened
the exact proportional representation by a system of premiums on both abso-
lute and relative majorities.
At the elections of 1919 it was proposed to establish a National Bloc, which
should unite all those who wished to perpetuate the policy of collaboration
between all parties inaugurated during the war. The Socialists and a great
number of Radicals were opposed to this policy. The National Bloc carried
the day by a large majority. But the bodies which were elected by the old
system (Municipal Councils, General Councils, Senate) kept their Left
majorities. After the obscure and sometimes scarcely outlined struggle of
war-time, the tendency towards the union sacree and a rapprochement of
parties was, temporarily at least, victorious. Nevertheless, the other ten-
dency reappeared full of strength.
It was the same thing in regard to social problems. Here again all the
struggles which had overwhelmed France during the years preceding the
mobilisation disappeared, Socialists and Syndicalists demonstrated unani-
mously that they were ready to accomplish their duty to the nation. Jaures,
ALBERT THOMAS
509
as we have seen, was murdered on July 31 and it was around bis cofiBn, ac-
cording to the phrase of Deschanel, the President of the Chamber, that the
union of all Frenchmen was sealed. On the day of his fweral Jouhaux:,
General Secretary of the Confederation Generale du Travail, declar^ that
all Syndicalists would unanimously respond to the order of mobiliwtion.
A few years before, measures had been prepared to arrest the revolutionary
chiefs and anti-militarists on the eve of mobilisation. The Government de-
cided, however, not to apply these measures. A Committee of National
Assistance was constituted in Pans for the distribution of help to the unem-
ployed and to the parents of the mobilised men. Jouhaux and several militant
Socialists were invited to join it.
When the French army met with its first check at Charleroi, the Viviani
Ministry was reconstituted. Two Socialists, Guesde and Sembat, entered it.
Later, a third Socialist, Albert Thomas, was chosen Under-Secretary of State
for Artillery, and later Minister of Munitions. He remained in the succeeding
Ministries imtil September, 1917.
For two years no labour claims were formulated. No agitation took place.
While strikes broke out in England and even in Germany, there was not tbe
slightest threat of a strike until July, 1916.
PEACE MOVEMENT WITHIN THE SOCIALIST BANKS
But here again, heated ideas or material conditions which, before the war,
had led to so many conflicts, were not completely abolished by the preoccupa-
tion of national defence. And more than this, the very necessities of a long
war were destined to excite pacifist opposition, and the formidable industrial
effort necessitated by the manufacture of munitions and war material
strengthened almost automatically the social position of the labour world.
It was in this way that at the latter end of 1915, in the heart of the
Socialist party, an opposition became apparent. It was soon known as a
minority opposition to the policy of national defence proclaimed by the party.
It had no doubt been recognised by all Socialists without exception that
at the opening of the war, France had been attacked and that it was a matter
of deepest importance to imiversal democracy and to Socialism that German
militarism should be beaten. But the Socialist party could not completely
forget its international scope of pre-war days. It could not forget that it
had proclaimed that peace was the supreme desire, above all for the masses.
To the idea of just and equitable peace that the Government declared to be
alone acceptable, there was opposed the idea of a hasty peace that would
spare all nations from numerous miseries and cruel losses.
At Zimmerwald, September, 1915, and at Kienthal, April, 1916, French
Socialists and Syndicalists met in conference with German and neutral So-
cialists. It was only with the greatest difficulty that in the party congresses
a majority was maintained until 1918 in favour of a policy of national
defence.
On July 30, 1918, the pacific minority became a majority. Those in the
majority, like those in the minority, ever since the moment at the end of 1916,
when the problem of the definition of war aims was presented by President
Wilson, voiced their desire for a peace founded on justice and one which ac-
cording to definite principles would effect a reconciliation of all the nations.
It is to the honour of the French Socialist party as a whole that during
the course of the war, it was the first to undertake a systematic campaign
in favour of a policy based on a League of Nations.
BOO FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
ASTONISHING GROWTH OP SYNDICALISM
At the very moment that the SociaKst party ceased to have any direct
influence on the councils of the Government, in 1917, the French S 3 mdicalist
novement acquired an authority and a degree of influence hitherto unknown.
This increase of influence was the result of the development of war industries,
[n the factories there had been gathered thousands of workers. Obeying a
^ort of instinctive movement, which manifested itself at the same moment
n the labouring classes of almost all of the warring countries, these wage-
tamers rniited The number of syndicalists who in France before the war
lad never reached more than 600,000 men and women, now rose to about
2,000,000. There was no need to exert any sort of pressure on the masters
3f the Government for the purpose of obtaining ameliorations. Not only
vere they granted immediately owing to the necessities of national defence,
3 ut even the masters recognised the fact that the labouring classes ought
\o be recompensed for the intense activity that they displayed during the
war.
It is from this movement that there emerged at the time of the peace
aegotiations, the important organic reforms — in particular the law estab-
lishing the eight-hour day — and the labour clauses inscribed in Part XIII
af the Peace Treaty (Labour Charter, International Organisation of La-
bour), and finally the idea of founding in France an Economic Council, en-
iowed, from the executive point of view, with a certain amount of power
tor the purpose of accomplishing big social and economic reforms.
But here again the opinion — an outcome of the war — that the solution
of social problems, as of political problems, should be subordinated to the
preoccupation of national security, was destined to carry the day. And the
belief, not shared by the workmen, that the country could not find in a policy
of social justice that interior and exterior force that it demanded, met also
with vigorous support.
Following on the rebuffs that the Socialists had experienced in the elec-
tions of November, 1919, and after the railway strikes in February and May,
1920, and the attempt, in May also, of the Confederation Generate du Travail
to bring about a general strike, the Government attacked, and diminished
considerably, the influence of the Syndicalist movement as represented by
the Confederation Generate du Travail, This organisation is peculiar in the
fact that it is not connected with or influenced by any particular political
party ; it is formed by delegates of regional unions on the one hand and of
national trade federations on the other, and groups labour representatives
nationally and regionally, vertically and horizontally.
But about this time a Communist movement was bom, inspired and sup-
ported by the Russian Revolutionary Government. It was destined to exhaust
both the political organisation, which was cut into two parties — Socialists
and Communists — at the Tours Congress in December, 1920, and the Syn-
dicalist organisation which, in its turn, was divided m 1922.
After the war, just as during the war, it was the national problem which
continued to dominate and overpower all others. From the time of the sign-
ing of the Peace Treaty in June, 1919, imtil the end of December, 1923, the
situation remained unchanged. It will probably continue so as long as the
treaty signed at Versailles is not completely carried out; as long as the solid
and durable peace desired by the whole French people is not established;
and for as long as the Republicans have not convinced the whole country
that even for the defence of the country and for its authority in exterior
questions, Republican policy is the most effective.
ALBERT THOMAS
601
V. The After-War Period, 1919-1924
From the signing of the Treaty of Versailles to the end of 1923, France
was obsessed by two anxieties. Two questions, the solution of which has not
yet been attained, dominated her whole policy.
One is probably only temporary, but it is serious: the question of Repara-
tions.
The other is permanent. It presses for a solution to-day, perhaps more
sharply, but it has appeared almost from the beginning of French history:
the question of national security.
The Chamber elected in 1919 has been constantly occupied by these two
problems. All the Ministries which succeeded the Clemenceau Ministry —
the Millerand Cabinet (January, 1920), the Leygues Cabinet (November,
1920), the Briand Cabinet (January, 1921), the Poincare Cabinet (January,
1922) — all attempted to find solutions.
THE VITAL QUESTION OP REPARATIONS
At the moment of writing, January, 1924, after four and a half years, the
question of Reparations is still unsettled.
The Treaty of Versailles, from the time it was signed, has given rise to
angry discussions. France, according to official statistics, had 594,000 houses
damaged, 20,000 factories ruined, 5,000 kilometres of railway destroyed.
Arbitrarily, perhaps, but more or less approximately, the losses of France can
be set down at 125 thousand million francs in cash. It was estimated during
the Versailles negotiations that the total damages for all the Allies combined
amounted to 350 thousand millions. The cost of the war was 700 thousand
million francs
It was decided at Versailles that the conquered countries would not have
to pay a war tribute or to bear the expenses of the war, but that they would
have to pay ‘‘ the reparation of all damage, inflicted against the civil popu-
lation of each of the Allied and Associated Powers and against the property
of these Powers.” It was further decided that they should pay the pensions
or compensations due to the military victims of the war and to the persons
of whom these victims were the support. A special commission, named the
Reparations Commission, was to fix the sum of the damages and establish
methods of payment. The Peace Treaty decreed that Germany would have
to pay twenty thousand millions in gold marks by May 1, 1921, the date on
which the sum for reparations was to be fixed.
It was soon apparent that no solution was possible if a sum for reparations
was not agreed on. Successively, various inter- Allied Conferences at Boulogne
(June, 1920), Spa (July, 1920), Brussels (December, 1920), Paris (January,
1921), attempted to fix the figure of the debt to be imposed on Germany, the
method of distribution of this debt and the mode of payment
Germany made protest after protest but paid nothing. The Allies, who
by virtue of the Peace Treaty, already occupied the provinces on the left bank
of the Rhine, then decided to occupy Dfisseldorf . Duisburg and Ruhrort.
In May, 1921, at London, the definite indemnity was lowered to 132
thousand millions of gold marks, payable in annuities of two thousand mil-
lions, plus 26 per cent to be levied on all German exportations.
Germany then outlined a policy for executing this plan. But in Decem-
ber, 1921, she declared that her financial and economic situation forced her
to suspend payments.
602 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
At Cannes, in January, 1922, she obtained a moratorium. In March, 1922,
the Reparations Commission reduced the annuity which was to be paid m
1922 to 720 million francs (instead of two thousand millions) plu^ 1,750
millions in kind.
Germany met these new terms of payment each month up to June 15,
when she requested a moratorium tmtil the end of 1924. She had up to that
time paid to the Allies eight thousand millions plus deliveries in kind.
By virtue of the repartition system fixed by the Spa Conference, France
was entitled to 52 per cent of the 132 thousand millions of gold marks fixed
in May, 1921 — that is, 69 thousand millions. On December 31, 1922, she
had received only 1,791 millions. If the repayment of advances which had
been agreed to at Spa for the exploitation of the coal-mines (about 200
millions) and the expenses of the Army of Occupation (about 1,300 millions)
be deducted, then France received as reparations a total sum of only 291
millions.
Germany demanded a moratorium. What ^arantees of payment were
to be given to France? Those offered at Paris in January, 1923, by the
British Government appeared unsatisfactory to the French Government, and
the conference of the Allied Premiers at which they were offered was dis-
solved almost immediately.
On January 11, 1923, France, in concert with Belgium, occupied the Ruhr
basin. Her intentions were to put pressure on the German Government in
order to force her to carry out her obligations and to hold in French hands a
pawn in case the payments were not made.
The industrial population of the Ruhr, in concert with the Government in
Berlin, organised passive resistance — that is, a suspension of work and public
services — in an attempt to discourage the isolated action of France and to
reduce the pawn to worthlessness. This passive resistance lasted up to
August, 1923, and it was only in November that a^eements for the continu-
ance of work were concluded between the industrial population or the ad-
ministrative bodies of the Ruhr and the French authorities.
In December, 1923, the Allies came to an understanding in regard to the
acceptance, with certain reservations, of the idea, formulated during 1923 by
the American Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, concerning the establishment,
by means of the Reparations Commission, of a Committee of Experts charged
to appraise Germany's capacity for payment. This decision may be taken
as a new attempt on the part of the Allies to find a solution in common. And
in addition, Germany seems to be disposed to seek an understanding with
France in regard to the reaime of the occupied territories.
There is no need to insist at length on the importance of the tremendous
problem which we have only outlined here.
The future of France will be burdened with heavy anxieties for as long
as this problem remains unsolved. It is a grave one from the financial
point of view. The work of reconstruction could not wait. France agreed
to pay to the sufferers in the invaded departments a sum of 86 thousand
million francs. On December 31, 1922, she had already spent for this pur-
pose 41 thousand millions, which she had raised by borrowing or by monetary
inflation, and without having received from Germany anything beyond the
291 millions to which allusion has already been made.
These charges are being added to the French public debt resulting from
the war. That public debt, estimated in 1914 at 35 thousand millions, had
grown by October, 1919, to 157 thousand millions. French exchange is af-
fected largely owing to this formidable burden and to the monetary inflation
which is the result of it. If payments are not obtained from Germany, vic-
torious France, in spite of the strength and stability of her national economic
situation, will be face to face with hardships which will be all the heavier
ALBERT THOMAS 603
in view of the fact that if she receives nothing from Germany, she will on
her side, remain the debtor of her Allies.
French opinion, in spite of several declarations which have created a con-
siderable sensation, does not consider that her financial engagements to her
Allies are void, but she is a little impatient of the idea that in view of her
heavy sacrifice in men, she ought to pay debts contracted in a common
cause, even when the conquered country has defaulted. She considers that
the two problems — that of reparation and that of inter- Allied debts — can-
not be dissociated.
If the policy of the various Governments during the last few years is to
be judged, it is important that the drift of French ideas should be thoroughly
understood.
The French Government has time and time again been accused of desir-
ing to indulge in a ruthless policy of domination and imperialism, and, since
the occupation of the Ruhr in January, 1923, of seeking the destruction of
the German economic system, and of wishing to reduce Germany to complete
pauperism. It is further accused of seeking the annexation of the Rhine-
land and even the Ruhr.
These annexational ideas do not exist in France except in the minds of
an infinitesimal minority of people, whose small numbers do not entitle their
opinions to any very serious consideration. In addition to this, it may at
once be definitely stated that the idea of attacking the German economic
system is absolutely contrary to the desire — indeed, it is not too much to
say the unanimous desire — of the French people, who are seeking neither
territorial aggrandisement nor the further humiliation of Germany, but merely
reparation for wanton damage inflicted by the enemy.
For the French are prone to cling obstinately to one idea: they desire
to be paid They have not forgotten the harshness of the German exactions
in 1871. They remember the great effort they made in order to pay the five
thousand millions claimed by Germany. Possibly they do not realise all
the difficulties of the transfer of the enormous sums demanded from the
nation which has been accounted responsible for the war, or of the German
economic and financial situation. But the systematic policy followed for
some time by the Germans themselves to lower the mark, the placing of
capital in foreign countries, the evident lack of good-will in keeping engage-
ments, the idea that the Allies themselves, in the grip of other anxieties, will
not give France the necessary support, have sometimes exasperated French
opinion and over-excited the desire for payment.
It may be that the French Governments have committed some mistakes,
and that they have not always acted in the way best calculated to influence
German opinion in the direction of peace. It may be also that the main-
tenance of a closer entente with England would have resulted in acceptable
engagements and guarantees, less susceptible of awakening hatred amongst
nations. But, it is quite certain that there will be no durable peace — no
possible peace, even — if those reparations, recognised as just, are not paid
to France.
It is not likely that there is any other viable solution, if the problem
is not deliberately internationalised. So long as France and Germany re-
main face to face, so long as conquered Germany seeks to avoid the obliga-
tion of payment to her conquerors, there will be no peace in Europe. Peace
can only come if obligations recognised by all as fair, are carried out, or if
an international loan transforms Germany’s obligation into an obligation
towards all states for the benefit of France and those countries which have
suffered by reason of her attack. The problem of Reparations is as much a
moral and political as a financial and economic problem, and it is lilted with
the problem of security.
604 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
THE GERMAN MENACE
France emerged from the war victorious. But the German menace con-
tinues to weigh on her. Numerous classes of the German population are
refusing to comply with the carrying out of the obligations of their country
and are talking of revenge. A strong nationalist movement has become
apparent in Germany.
The Peace Treaty imposed a limitation of armaments on Germany. It
reduced her army to 100,000 men, recruited by voluntary engagements of
twelve years. It forbade compulsory military service. But the inter-Allied
control suggested by the treaty is insuflScient to check the secret attempts
to rearm which may take place. A guarantee of peace can only really exist
in the will for peace of the people, and as long as this will does not flourish
in modern Germany, France will feel herself threatened with the ancient
menace of a German invasion.
Unsatisfactory again, in view of experiences in the recent war, are and
will be all measures for the limitation of war material, of disarmament and
the dismantling of all fortified places in the frontier regions. The war proved
by what methods the industries of each nation could be turned from their
peaceful ends and rapidly transformed into war industries. More drastic
measures must be considered.
Three plans for the purpose of assuring the security of France were con-
sidered at the time of the peace negotiations.
The first was that of territorial occupation. France, said her defenders,
and particularly Marshal Foch, should be permanently established on the
left banks of the Rhine, or at the very least buffer states, separated from
Germany, should be formed and placed under the control of France. The
western frontier of Germany should be pushed back to the Rhine. This
was in conformity with the old policy of natural frontiers. But it was in-
advisably judged from the point of view of the right of people to dispose of
their own destiny. France, the country par excellence of voluntary national
unity, could not claim for her profit the creation of ‘‘ another Alsace-Lor-
raine.” And such a security would probably have been more than a little
precarious
A second plan was that of the Covenant; a powerful League of Nations,
capable of imposing its arbitration on all states m case of conflict, and hav-
ing at its disposition a military force superior to that of no matter what
aggressor. A persevering effort could transform this idea into reality; its
realisation is desired by the masses, but at the time that it was formulated
and even partially inscribed in the Peace Treaty it appeared to be an unsat-
isfactory safeguard against future dangers
The security of France seemed to be found in a third plan; a plan of
^arantees given by England and the United States of America, who would
in the event of an attack on France, undertake to defend her.
The two guarantee treaties were not ratified either by the Senate of the
United States or by the British Government.
Since then, sometimes by means of direct negotiations between France
and England, and sometimes through the deliberations of the League of
Nations, established in 1920, and the Disarmament Commission that it insti-
tuted, new formulae for guarantees have been brought forward and are still
being studied. But they do not yet constitute the guarantee of security that
France needs. The problem remains unsolved.
To tell the truth, France at the present time is not threatened. At this
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Procession at the funeral of Sarah Bernhardt leaving the Church of St. Francis de Sales, Paris.
The death of Mme. Bernhardt, at the age of 78, brought forth distinguished tnbute to her genius
from every quarter of the globe.
© British OJfictal Photo
The onrush of the Germans into France brought ruin to sacred buildings as well as to homes and
factories. This church stood between the lines on the British western front.
ALBERT THOMAS
60f
moment (1924) she possesses the strongest army in the world. The military
monarchies which might have been a menace to her are now broken up. In
spite of divergences of policy, she remains allied to England and Italy. She
is closely united in daily action with Belgium. She is the ally and supporter
of the republics of Czechoslovakia and Poland and of the monarchies of
Yugoslavia and Rumania who, on their frontiers, face the same risks as
France.
Finally, and above all, Germany for the moment is not in a state to
attack. Secret armaments are not sufficient; the organisation of the country
is upside down. Owing to the trials they have undergone, many Germans arc
hostile to the idea of another war. But this security is precarious. It can
be destroyed by circumstances. The interests of France and the future oi
peace he in transforming the present state of affairs into a fixed principle,
and of so maintaining it by the will of nations.
Certainly it does not rest with France alone to settle the problems of
Peace. To do so depends still more on Germany and perhaps also on
France’s war-time Allies, including the United States But it depends also
on the policy that France will follow, on the influence that by firmness of
will she can exert on the development of world policy. This, in turn, will
depend on the solutions that she may find for the internal and external
problems that circumstances in general, resulting from the war, and from her
ancient traditions, have placed before her.
VI Questions of the Future
In the first place France must consolidate her internal strength and her
moral and material balance
She has given to the world the most perfect type of a nation constituted
by the free adhesion of all her citizens.
The Treaty of Frankfort, 1871, dealt a blow to this unity in detaching
from her, against the will of the inhabitants, Alsace and a part of Lorraine
The Treaty of Versailles decreed the necessary reparation. When French
troops entered Alsace they were hailed as liberators. A plebiscite was not
necessary.
The elections of November, 1919, demonstrated the unanimous desire oi
the Alsace-Lorrainers of all parties to become a part of France. Not a single
protesting delegate was elected. And more than this, those parties which
as a consequence of the half majority electoral law, failed to obtain repre-
sentatives in the Chamber, by a declaration affirmed their adherence tc
France.
A temporary regime, which is shortly to end, has been established in
Alsace-Lorraine. Difficulties may still exist and misimderstandings may
still arise. It would not be surprising if such did happen, considering thai
for a period of forty-eight years, the Germans attempted to wipe out all
French sympathies and leanings from the minds, the customs and life of the
people of these provinces. However, no serious tendency in favour of par-
ticularism has arisen. French unity has been reconstituted in its entirety.
But the return of Alsace-Lorraine did not suffice to restore the FrencI
population to its full force. According to the census of March, 1921, France
has a population of 39,209,000; out of this figure 1,709,000 come from the
annexed provinces. In the former territory of 1914, the population since the
outbreak of the war fell from 39,600,000 to 37,500,000. It was lower by
2,000,000 than the pre-war population.
606 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
II must be remembered that France, during four years of war, lost
1,364,000 men by death. But the evil is due for the most part, and in a
continuous manner, to the enormous decrease of the French birth-rate.
In the eighteenth century, France held the first place in Europe in point
of view of population. She has now, owing to the diminution of births,
fallen to the sixth place. This is the most painful problem that the coimtry
has to face, and in it is contained the whole question of security. The
persistence of the German menace is due to this.
Can any measures, legislative and otherwise, solve this problem? The
diminution of births is directly connected with the comfort of a population.
France remains a comfortable country.
Failing an increase in her birth-rate, which is so necessary, can France
inaugurate a feasible immigration policy?
The faculty of assimilation, of absolution of other races by the French
race, which was constituted in its origin from a mixture of neighbouring
races, has always been remarkable. But it will be an important matter to
choose the immigrants.
Many Italians in the past lived in France. Will Italian policy permit
the continuance of this movement? Poles, Czechoslovaks are to-day sys-
tematically called for and received. Will these prove capable of assimilation?
Is this plan, conceived by a certain number of writers and politicians,
for improving the quality of the French race and for endowing it with new
intellectual capacities, a more liberal education in order to permit it the
better to maintain its traditions and customs and to better assimilate the
new comers, practicable? Is a mode of controlling the population, directing
and framing the immigrants, so to speak, a feasible proposition?
Such are the more important of the lesser problems. If France fails in
this effort, the menace against her existence may increase. This inferiority
must in every way prove an obstacle during the early period of the estab-
lishment of peace — the period in which the traditional conceptions of the
balance of power between states remain stronger than the principles of inter-
national justice and authority.
OTHER PROBLEMS THAT AWAIT SOLUTION
A second series of questions, less clearly outlined, less frequently dis-
cussed, must soon engage the attention of politicians. What is to be the
equilibrium and what the directing principles of French national economics?
Up to the time of the war, France was for the most part an agricultural
country. The reentry of Lorraine into French unity has considerably in-
creased her mining and metallurgic industry. France has become one of the
greatest metallurgic countries in Europe. Her need to-day of coal and coke
is one of the greatest problems of international economic policy. This cir-
cumstance, more than any other, exacts a settlement between French and
German industry.
But, on the other hand, the French home markets cannot consume the
whole of the produce of this industry. French metallurgical industry must
have commercial markets. France must decide, as soon as the Reparation
problems are settled, whether she wishes to be — whether she is able to be —
a great industrial power, or not. The decision will guide her commercial,
financial and population policy.
French opinion has sometiines and in a contradictory manner accused
French industrialists of practising a Malthusian policy, of restricting pro-
duction, and of supporting a policy of imperialism. Both policies have their
ALBERT THOMAS
607
dangers. If it be true that France is, as is so often said, and often, indeed
with reason, a country of balance, measure and harmony, she must know
how to find that method which is most suitable to her internal stability, and
therefore, in a large degree, to her social stability.
In the social domain, as in many others, war only accentuated anil accel-
erated the evolutions which were in preparation before 1914. The picttire
that has been traced above of the French labour and syndical movement
is not modified; without having been wholly maintained since 1920, the
infiuence acquired by the syndical movement during the war has not been
lost.
Certainly, against the labour organisations, strong capitalist organisations
have been founded and have inoreased their power. They play an impor-
tant part in relation to public bodies. They are accused of attempting to
influence electoral propaganda by the weight of their money resources. But
also, between the two groups of organisations the practice of collective settle-
ments has developed. A kind of balance and stability has resulted therefore.
And from this there have arisen ideas of professional representation, of con-
sultation of interests in public affairs, of the establishment of an economic
Chamber side by side with a political Chamber, and of an Economic Council.
These ideas have lost more or less of their actuality since 1919, but they
still subsist and may possibly have a future before them.
In any case, since the war French opinion understands better to-day than
formerly that one of the conditions of normal and healthy production is a
just and equitable treatment of wage-earners. It may be noted that since
1919, the eight-hour day, frequently criticised and considered as dangerous
for production, has not been the object of one serious request for abrogation.
It is also to be noted that the National Bloc, whose conservative tendencies
are denounced by the Left, has received from the Government a coherent
and audacious plan insuring the wage-earners and even, optionally, a part
of the rest of the population, against the risks of illness, invalidity, accidents,
old age and maternity.
The crises i?vhich result from the instability of exchange and the cost of
living may possibly compromise the realisation of these reforms and bring
in their wake troublesome consequences. It does not seem as if the French
working-class, even by its most daring claims, threatens the country with
disorders in the near future.
For in addition to the desire for “ the general interest,’ ' to which they
constantly allude, the French Democrats and Socialists, who aspire “to
realise social justice ” even, if need be, by changes in the property system,
are forced to take into account in their programmes the strength and eco-
nomic power of the French peasantry.
The small and medium-sized peasant property which has been one of the
chief characteristics of French life since the Revolution, has increased in
wealth and influence since the war. The peasants have sold their produce
at high prices. Many of them have paid off the mortgages which burdened
tiieir property or have bought holdings which they operate as farmers. The
French Chamber remains largely a “ Chamber of rustics.” Hence the con-
servative tendency, which can never be ignored in French politics, and the
social stability prevailing even in the most disturbed periods.
Following on the Armistice, many countries, and the victorious amongst
them, believed themselves to be threatened by Communist agitations in-
spired by the Russian Revolution of 1917. Since 1919 there have been
Commimists at work in France. Since 1920 there has existed a Communist
party which met with electoral successes or enthusiastic popular support in
the great industrial centres and even in a few rural districts.
608 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
Nevertheless the fear of a Communist revolution has never been an
obsession of French statesmen, for there are few countries in the world in
which are united better than in France, in spite of her decrease of population
and wealth since the war, those conditions of social structure necessary for
the maintenance of internal equilibrium and the realisation of justice that
the masses desire. * Nothing but harsh and unwise resistance can compromise
this evolution, and such resistance would compromise the internal vitality
of the country.
There survives the political problem, the vicissitudes of which we have
outlined in this sketch of the history of the last twenty-four years. The
thesis that the political struggle between Frenchmen, and more particularly
the battles fought in the name of the republic, democracy and even socialism,
may possibly compromise the prosperity and external power of the country,
has frequently been developed. Parliamentary debates have been declared
inauspicious, parliamentary procedures ineffective and little adapted to the
new needs of the country.
If we may be allowed to mention a personal impression, we have been
struck, when we study the facts anew to write these lines, by the fecundity
of these struggles. The war has proved that the defensive organisation of
the coimtry was not compromised. The law of associations of 1901, the new
regime of the separation of Church and State, are positive institutions, mark-
ing progress in ideas and customs, and were the direct results of political
battles.
Is the anti-clerical battle, in which the fight for the republic was so often
involved, to be continued with the same harshness and bitterness?
In 1920 there were in the Chamber and the Senate majorities which voted
for the reestablishment of an embassy of the French Republic at the Vatican.
Many consider that the regime of the separation of Church and State should
be carried still farther and that a greater tolerance should be permitted in
the matter of instruction. Since the war, the Government and the public
authorities have, in their daily conduct, leaned towards rapprochements
with the clergy.
It will in a large measure depend on the Church whether a policy of
this nature can be developed But the Republicans are once more uneasy
about the initiatives of the ecclesiastical authorities, of their attempts to
exercise a new influence on the youth of the country by means of athletic
clubs, etc., and to use the influence thus acquired against the interests of the
Left parties.
At the end of 1923 it seemed as if there were a movement throughout
the country against the National Bloc which triumphed at the 1919 elec-
tions. This movement no doubt has its origin in fiscal and economic difficul-
ties, but it is also unquestionably connected with the ancient and persistent
tradition of the struggle for the republic and democracy — a struggle which
has been briefly outlined in the foregoing pages.
Once more, as in 1902 and 1914, a Bloc of the parties of the Left is
spoken of in France. The electoral struggle of May, 1924, will be of the
greatest importance in this respect. It has virtually begun Radicals and
Socialists have plunged into the battle— above all the battle of internal
questions — and desire ardently to renew the policy of a coalition of the
Left, which has been injured by the formation of the National Bloc, It is
generally agreed that this movement is influential and destined to succeed.
But whatever be the diflSculties which await it, and with the possible ex-
ception of the formidable problem of the birth-rate, France possesses enough
internal vitality, enough equilibrium, enough common conscience to have
lull confidence in her future.
ALBERT THOMAS
609
FRANCE^S EXTERNAL POLICY
But one sole problem must dominate and guide all her efforts — that of
her external policy.
If the Democrats, who hope to win at the elections of 1924, do not handle
this question firmly, if wise and clear solutions for obtaining the positve re-
sults which are expected, and, avoiding misunderstandings with other nations,
are not arrived at, the situation in France may be compromised.
The coming years will be decisive for the peace of the world. France,
let us repeat, will not alone be responsible for it, but the role that she will
play will be of the first importance.
We have described the preponderating situation in which she finds herself.
It corresponds, on the Continent, to that which Germany occupied after
1871. Whatever criticism may be directed against French policy, France
has not abused her position. Unquestionably, there is one risk which sub-
sists. France might be tempted, owing to Germany's persistent bad faith or
to her (France's) abandonment by her Allies, to impose by force certain
measures — and this time measures outside the legal scope of the treaties:
she might yield to the insistence of certain theorists who harp on the old
thesis of “ natural frontiers ” with a geographical basis, and who maintain
that even if the Rhineland populations did not formally consent, they would
nevertheless accept union with France. She might, again, be tempted to
use her power to change the peaceful and educative colonial policy that she
has hitherto followed
But at the moment, after the fatigue and exhaustion of war, these are
imlikely risks And more than this, the French masses, peasants and in-
dustrialists of varied shades, are, traditionally and unquestionably, deliber-
ately peaceful.
But the real risk is that, convinced of the power and authority which
they enjoy, confident in the present preponderance of the country, the French
Governments of the near future will not give to the systematic and universal
work for peace all that courageous application that it requires.
Old French legislators always spoke of a “ policy of interest " and a
“ policy of magnificence.” In the same way, the policy of preponderance
and the policy of peace may to-day find themselves in mutual opposition.
The policy of interest for France is the policy of peace.
FRANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
An increasing number of Frenchmen believe that peace can be created, as
the Treaty of Versailles proclaimed, by the development and strengthening
of the League of Nations. Whatever may be the opposition that the League
of Nations raises in great countries like the United States; however un-
satisfactory the covenant made by President Wilson, it seems as if, and
particularly for European countries, only the League of Nations, endowed
with uncontested authority, having at its disposition the military force that
the French delegation in 1919 suggested, is icapable of giving security to
France and to other nations.
The League of Nations since 1920 has not slept. It has settled a certain
number of international questions (Upper Silesia, Aland Islands, etc.). It
has administered the Saar territory and controlled the Danzig administration.
It has helped to raise Austria and to strengthen her finances. There appears
T. B T. — VOL 1 — 39
610 FRANCE AGAIN THE DOMINANT POWER ON THE CONTINENT
to be an increasing demand for it to play an important role in the methods
of settling Franco-German affairs. The day that Germany enters the League,
a great step will be made in the direction of peace.
But it must be admitted that if France, with Great Britain, has played
a preponderant role in the development of the League of Nations, she has
hesitated, not only in her governmental decisions, but even in her public
opinion, to give it complete authority, of which it has need in order to fulfill
its mission. Perhaps in some obscure way the old idea of preponderance is
opposed to this policy. There exists in France a repugnance to the idea that
the settlement of the grave problems of peace can be transferred to the
League of Nations. Perhaps, however, it is in this that lies the only certain
guarantee, the sole possibility of peace.
To-day the League of Nations does not possess a real authority. All
its power rests on the common consent of the nations composing it. Tradi-
tional systems of alliances, old methods of balancing power still remain the
only real guarantees in the minds of nations. But a nation placed in a posi-
tion of preponderance can help more than any other to transform all pacts of
special guarantees into a unique Pact such as the organisation of the League
constitutes. If France places her preponderances at the service of peace, she
will aid in developing democratic ideas and the will for peace in all nations.
She will have assisted powerfully in the establishment of peace, and at the
same time she will have assured her existence and her future greatness.
In concluding his great history of France, Ernest Lavisse said that the
supreme ambition of France was to ‘‘ present to the world the model of a
very free democracy, perpetually seeking a higher social justice, untroubled
by violence, not led astray by utopianism, reasoning, reasonable.” The
formula is happy.
It summarises well the ancient aspiration of France. It must be carried
through. Democracy in every country must work for peace. Itself, it is the
guarantee of peace.
In a world of friendly feeling, security and mutual understandings, that
with a democratic policy she will have helped to create, France must cherish
the ambition to attract once more that universal sympathy which in other
times — in the Middle Ages as in the eighteenth century — was the glory
of her history.
[This brief sketch of France during the past twenty-five years is not accompanied
by any references or bibliographical notes The Editor of these volumes asked of the
Author rather a statement of those problems of the present and future now facing
France and an attempt to make them better understood by foreign countries, and
particularly by the great Anglo-Saxon publics, than a work of critical and original
research.
The Author would merely point out that he has constantly referred, in verification
of facts, to the most accurate work at present existing on all that concerns the History
of France — to volumes 8 and 9 of the Histovre de France Contemporame published by
Hachette, under the editorship of Ernest Lavisse.]
CHAPTER XXXI
BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
By Brand Whitlock
Amencan Minister (later Ambassador) to Belgium during the
World War Member of the American Academy of Arts and
Letters, and of the Royal Academy of Belgium. Author of
Memories of Belgium under the German Occupation
At the beginning of the present century, Leopold II had been on the
throne of Belgium for thirty-five years, and he was to reign for nine years
longer. Few monarchs have done as much for their people or had such
achievements to their credit, and few have gone with less appreciation in
their lifetime. To the world at large, he was known chiefly by those facile
caricatures to which his striking figure lent itself. In appearance he was tall
and distinguished, with a long nose, a flowing white beard and flashing, im-
perious eyes. Those who knew him say that there was majesty in his port;
from head to foot he was a King, capable of inspiring awe, fear and devotion.
But bound within the narrow limits of a rigid Court etiquette, he had no
friends or intimates, and he led a life of intellectual loneliness. He suffered,
too, from domestic disappointments; among them, the death of his only
son, a grief from which he seems never to have recovered, though all this was
hidden under the mordant irony and the corruscating wit that came to ex-
press his attitude toward a life that early stripped him of all illusions and
left him to move amidst its scenes with an indifferent air of cynical hauteur.
THE CAREER OF LEOPOLD II
In most ways he was superior to the monarchs of his time; no statesman
in Europe could surpass him in intelligence, but his restless, ambitious spirit
was trammelled by treaties and constitutions. In international affairs, a
domain in which his genius would have played a dominating part, he was
bound by the Treaties of 1839, which set up the Kingdom of Belgium, and
imposed upon it a strict neutrality. In internal affairs, the Belgian Consti-
tution prescribed the narrowest limits for the exercise of the few powers it
conferred upon him, and left him few initiatives.
Fettered by such restrictions, and head of one of the smallest states in
Europe, Leopold’s imperial ambitions sought other outlets. He was a man of
wide culture; fond of the liberal arts and sciences; he knew all about architec-
ture — modern Brussels, one of the most beautiful cities in the world, is his
work — and he was a passionate lover of flowers, plants and landscape
gardening.
In 1853, when, according to the Constitution, as Duke of Brabant, a frail,
delicate young prince, he took his place in the Senate, he at once joined in the
debates and was found urging the necessity of encouraging the arts and
belles-lettres; he suggested the institution of prizes to be given to the author
611
BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
612
of the best plan for the embellishment of Brussels, and later he marked out
an extensive scheme of public works to be undertaken, not only in the capital,
but in Ghent, Antwerp, Namur, Mons, Liege, Charleroi and Verviers. He
took an interest in the betterment of conditions for the working population;
he devoted his influence to the improvement of the ports of Ostend and
Antwerp, and to the development of commercial relations with countries in
the Far East.
He urged Belgians, notorious stay-at-homes, to emigrate to Asia, to
Oceania and to Africa. He himself made long voyages all over the world,
visiting Africa, India and China. When, on the death of his father, Leopold 1
in 1865, he came to the throne, he saw the opportunity of realising those
projects which had haunted his spirit from youth For a while he wa?
under the tutelage of his great Ministers, Charles Rogier and Frere-Orban
but finally he shook off their influence and gave himself to the ambitious
design of his life.
THE ACQUISITION OP THE CONGO
To the south lay the mysterious continent of Africa, exercising on hii
mind the fascination of the unknown; he had followed, with avid interest
the adventurous efforts of explorers to penetrate its dark interior, and in 187(
he convoked in his palace at Brussels a geographic conference out of whicl
was bom the International African Association for the exploration and civili
sation of Central Africa. Later, he organised a national Belgian committe
to favour this scheme, but, like many of the King’s ideas, it seemed to every
body in Belgium a chimera; a national subscription was opened which pro
duced only 400,000 francs, and people laughed; but at the end of the yea
1877, Stanley, coming out on the western coast of Africa, revealed to th
world the course of the Congo and the riches of its immense basin. Leopol
II sent for him and charged him with the command of further exploration
for which he, out of his own fortune, provided the means.
In August, 1879, Stanley left Banana and plunged into the interior, an
when, in 1884, he handed over the command, he had explored the basin of th
Congo, and the International Association of the Congo had acquired posseg
sion of vast territories, had become an independent state with its own fla|
and had negotiated more than a thousand treaties with native chiefs.
In 1884, the conference of the leading Powers, convoked by Bismarck t
Berlin, recognised the new State of the Congo. There was a spontaneoi
demonstration in honour of Leopold II who, sparing neither personal effoi
nor pecuniary sacrifices, amidst universal scepticism and indifference, ha
conceived, and through so many obstacles had realised his great plan.
And now, of course, there was enthusiasm in Belgium; the Parliamei
authorised His Majesty, in addition to his title of King of the Belgians, i
assume that of the Independent State of the Congo.
The opening of the new century saw his long reign drawing to a clos
and the last phase, though crowned with achievements that are only no^
after so many years, beginning to be appreciated, was to be clouded by mi,
imderstandings. He was accused of exercising personal and despotic powe
the regime of the Congo was criticised, there were complaints and accusi
tions. In 1900, he had initiated an intensive exploitation of its resources; I
needed capital, and calling in financiers, companies were organised. Th<
prospered; he inade the Congo pay, and he was called a “ King of Business
Yet all this, as it turned out, was not for personal gain. He spent his mom
on the embellishment of his capital; on watering places like Ostend; on pari
boulevards, triumphal arches and museums.
© Keystone View Co
Cardinal Mercier, the heroic Archbishop of Malines, whose famous pastoral letter,
Patriotism and Endurance,” brought him world-wide renown.
® Kelurah CoUtngs, London
Brand Whitlock, American Minister to
Belgium, whose efforts in behalf of the
Belgian people and of Allied prisoners of
war will long be remembered.
General von Biasing, Goyemor-General of
Belgium from 1915 to 1918, who signed
the warrant for the execution of
Cavell.
BRAND WHITLOCK
613
In 1906, there was an inquiry into the regime of the Congo, and in 1906
Leopold II offered to turn over the Congo, of which he was the absolute
sovereign, to the nation. There were long and painful negotiations with
Parliament, but finally, in 1908, a settlement was reached; a treaty was
drawn up and approved, and Belgium took over the Congo as a colony. Thus
Leopold II saw one of his great ambitions realised; he had endowed his
country with an empire, and, in the poet Verhaeren's phrase, made a gift to
the world of a new continent. It had been one of the three great ideas that
had dominated his reign; another had been realised in the enlargement and
embellishment of the Belgian cities. A third remained: that of insuring the
defence of the national territory. With his vast political vision, he had long
foreseen the coming of an European war; he had predicted even its details and
had urged his Ministers to take the necessary measures of defence. He had
urged Parliament to adopt personal service for the army, but this had been
rejected. The Government, however, carried through laws providing for the
fortification of Antwerp and of the line of the Meuse.
In 1908, General Hellebaut, Minister of War, made a public expose of
defects in the army, and in 1909, after the institution of a mixed commission
to examine the question, M. Schollaert, the Prime Minister, succeeded in
passing a law that abolished the old system of recruitment by lot, and estab-
lished personal service Leopold II was on his death-bed, but he had seen the
fruition of his efforts to bring about military reform and, just before he died,
he had the satisfaction of signing this law.
He died, as he had lived, alone. His will closed with these lines:
I wish to be buried in the early morning, without any pomp. Ekcept my
nephew Albert and my household, I forbid anyone to follow my coflSn.’’
The long reign of Leopold II had been a period rich in works and in re-
forms, all of which had served to consolidate and develop the existence of
the young nation founded less than a century before. Belgium had greatly
prospered. The citizens were eminently practical; there was a strong love of
personal liberty and local self-government, inherited from the old free cities,
and jealously preserved in the autonomous communes which were the basis
of the nation^s organisation. The prevailing political conceptions were
those of a strict individualism as taught by the great liberal statesman of the
nineteenth century, Frere-Orban.
The nation was highly organised socially, politically and industrially; its
intellectual and artistic life was flourishing; there had been an amazing com-
mercial expansion which had made Brussels the seat of international com-
panies with vast enterprises in Brazil, Mexico, China and Africa. Her cities
had become opulent, luxurious and beautiful; living was cheap, the people
were industrious, happy and gay, fond of good cheer like their forefathers,
portrayed in the canvases of Jordaens and Teniers.
And this new Belgium, nch, proud, confident of itself and of its future,
was the work of Leopold II.
ACCESSION OF AL6EBT AND ELIZABETH
When on December 7, 1909, Leopold II died, his nephew Albert mounted
the throne, and on December 23, 1909, was crowned King of the Belgians.
He was the second son of the Count of Flanders, brother of Leopold II, and
came to the throne through the default of male issue, Leopold’s II’s son as
well as Prince Albert’s elder brother, both having died. He was then thirty-
four years old, a handsome young man, tall, broad-shouldered and strong, fond
of an active outdoor life, his favourite sport being Alpine climbing. He had
BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
614
received a scientific and military education, had served in all the grades of
the army; was simple in his tastes, modest and retiring in disposition, cared
nothing for the pageantry of courts, was sparing of words and of gestures, a
keen, quiet, if somewhat detached observer of men and events with an extraor-
dinary fund of common sense, a sound judgment and that sense of humour
which characterises the Coburgs in general. Leopold II was fond of saying
that the Coburgs ripened late in life. Leopold 1 was fifty before he came
to his renown as a great diplomatist and the arbiter of Europe; Leopold II
had waited imtil he could shake off the tutelage of his Ministers, Rogier and
Frere-Orban, to become the coloniser and builder, and it was not until the war
of 1914 gave him his opportunity that King Albert was revealed as the
soldier. He was always popular; the Belgians liked him for his bigness,
his good looks, simple manner, easy approach, unfailing good humour and
because of his happy domestic life. In 1900 he had married the Princess
Elizabeth, Duchess of Bavaria, whose delicate charm and fragile beauty at
once won the devotion of the Belgian people whom she was so signally to
serve. They had three children, Prince Leopold Duke of Brabant, Prince
Charles Count of Flanders, and the Princess Marie-Jose.
INTERNAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS
During the early part of the reign of King Albert, the political thought of
the nation continued to be preoccupied by the four great political questions
that had engaged it since the fall of the Liberal party in 1884, and the acces-
sion of the Catholic partv to power — education, constitutional revision,
national defence and the Flemish question. When the Catholics came to
power in 1884, they had voted a law which changed the old school system
and gave to the communes the liberty to replace the existing public com-
munal schools by what w’^ere known as free schools; that is, schools in which
religion was taught. The communes were authorised to inscribe religious
instruction on their programme of education, and the State was to provide
subsidies for free schools.
This same period had witnessed the rise of the Socialist party with its
demand for manhood suffrage and with the organisation of that remarkable
system of cooperative stores which exists in Belgium, the most famous of
which is the Vooruit at Ghent. There had been labour troubles amounting
almost to insurrections at Liege and at Charleroi; factories were burned in
the Hainaut, and it was necessary to call on the army to reestablish order.
The Socialist party, definitely organised at a great Congress held in
Louvain in 1890, by its incessant agitation for universal manhood suffrage,
had compelled Beemaert to propose a revision of the Constitution, and after
long debates in the Chambers, manhood suffrage, as well as suffrage based on
educational qualification was rejected, and as the result of a compromise,
general suffrage, tempered by the plural vote, had been adopted; one vote for
every citizen over the age of twenty-five years, and one, and in some cases,
two additional votes for citizens possessing qualifications as to age, property
and education. The result of this system, which greatly enlarged the elec-
torate, had been fatal to the Liberal party; the fear of Socialism led many
Liberals to vote with the Catholics, so that in the cities, as well as in the
agricultural regions of Flanders, the Catholics were successful. Frfere-Orban
himself was defeated at Liege and there remained in the Chamber only a
small group of Liberals. In the industrial regions the Socialists were suc-
cessful and entered Parliament in noisy triumph, headed by Emile Vander-
velde, Anseele and Destree, all yoimg and eloquent.
BRAND WHITLOCK
615
The Catholic party had used its increased power to vote a new school
law that made obligatory the teaching of religion in schools, with a dis-
pensation for those children whose parents demanded it, and established the
right to State subsidies on the part of free schools. However, as a result
of the Socialist agitation, certain members of the Catholic party had realised
the necessity of satisfying the demands of the working classes, and in 1891
the Encyclique Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII had inspired a number
of young men in the party to organise the Democratic Christian Movement,
headed by Jules Renkin and Henri Carton de Wiart, both of whom became
distinguished political leaders.
With the Liberal party broken between the two extreme forces of con-
servatism and socialism, the political equilibrium of the country was de-
stroyed, and Leopold II urged his Ministers to find a remedy for this evil;
and after great agitation, the system of proportional representation was
adopted. Out of the new elections of 1900 the Liberal party emerged with a
stronger representation. At Brussels five Liberal Deputies were elected:
Louis Huysmans, Leon Le Page, Paul Hymans, Paul Jansem and Emile
Feron, thenceforth destined to play a considerable part in the political life
of the nation.
THE OLD PROBLEM OF THE SCHOOLS
From that time on, during the last years of the reign of King Leopold II,
and the early years of the reign of King Albert and almost down to the
World War itself, the political conflicts of the nation continued to centre in
the old question of the schools. In 1912, the Catholic party proposed a law
establishing equality between the subsidies given to communal schools and
those given to free schools. There were violent protestations on the part of
the Liberals and the Socialists who joined in a campaign against the pro-
posal. The vigour of this opposition so impressed King Albert that he con-
sulted his Ministers with the result that M. Schollaert, the Catholic Prime
Minister, resigned. The King then called Baron Charles de Broqueville to
reorganise the Government, and dissolved Parliament for new elections.
The Socialists and the Liberals formed a cartel and agreed on a programme
favouring obligatory instruction and electoral equality; but a great number
of Liberals resented the union with the Socialists, the cartel was badly de-
feated in the elections and the Catholic majority was again reinforced.
Baron de Broqueville at once proposed a new school law and a new mili-
tary law. The school law provided for obligatory instruction and for equality
between free and public schools in the distribution of subsidies, and despite
the opposition of the Socialists and the left wing of the Liberals, the law
was voted and the programme of the Catholic party in school matters thus
finally realised.
The question of the defence of the realm remained. In 1913 Baron de
Broqueville laid before the Chambers a law reorganising the army, estab-
lishing general service and providing that the annual contingent should not be
less than 49 per cent of the levy in mass. This law was a distinct advance
on any that had gone before, but, unfortunately, as was realised at the time,
it could not produce its full effects until after a lapse of years; and it had
not had time to bear fruit when, a year later, the world was plunged into
war.
616
BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
THE ODIOUS GERMAN R^IME THROUGH THE WORLD WAR
On August 2, 1914, the German Minister at Brussels presented an ulti*-
matum of the German Emperor demanding permission for the German armies
to pass through Belgium into France. The King held a Council of the Crown
and returned an instant and indignant refusal, appealing to the Treaties of
1839 which Prussia had signed with the other Great Powers. When German
troops crossed the frontier near Vis6, Parliament was summoned; the King
in the uniform of a Lieutenant-General, booted and spurred, rode through
cheering multitudes to Parliament House, made a sturdy patriotic address,
demanded a vote of credits which was instantly given viva voce, and strode
out from there to place himself at the head of his army at Louvain. Then
followed the memorable resistance of the Belgians at Liege which broke the
German plan of a rapid invasion of France and saved ten days for the Allied
armies. When Liege was taken the army fell back into the fortifications at
Antwerp, and there, for two months, engaged the attention of two German
army corps by constant sorties. Antwerp fell on October 8, but the Belgian
army slipped away in the night, reached the coast, and on the Yser the
King gave the order that they were to retreat no farther. The flood-gates
were opened, the Yser was allowed to overflow, and there, on that little
corner of Flanders, King Albert with his army stood fast for four years.
He never left that little strip of Belgian soil, the last remaining to him; he
refused to go even to Sainte Adresse where his Ministers were established;
he, alone of all the Kings and Emperors engaged m the war, commanded his
army in person, showing marked qualities as a general and tactician and
sharing all the dangers and hardships of the soldiers in the trenches ; with him
was Queen Elizabeth who, in the uniform of a Red Cross nurse, devoted her-
self to works of mercy. Both the King and Queen were continually imder
fire and became the idols of the army, the symbol and incarnation of the
valiant nation that was being tried in the fires of that conflict. The whole
of Belgium, save this little comer, was occupied by the Germans and sub-
jected to an odious regime of daily requisitions, humiliations and oppression.
The people, however, following the example of Cardinal Mercier and such
leaders as Burgomaster Max of Brussels, and fed, sustained and encouraged
by the efforts of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, an American organ-
isation directed by Mr Herbert Hoover and working in conjunction with
le Comite National, a Belgian organisation which had M. Emile Fran^qui
at its head, kept up a brave resistance.
The Belgian Government, having been driven out of its own country, after
a dreary voyage from Ostend, had foimd an asylum at Sainte Adresse, a small
sea-side resort near Havre at the mouth of the Seine, and here the Govern-
ment earned on throughout the war as best it could
Baron de Broqueville invited into the Cabinet M. Paul Hymans, the
distinguished Liberal statesman who, after a mission to America to acquaint
President Wilson with the sufferings of his people, had been sent as Minis-
ter to London, and the Count Goblet d^Alviella, also a member of the Liberal
party, and M. Vandervelde, representing the Socialist party. M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, had died and had been succeeded by Baron
Beyens, and when Baron Beyens left the Cabinet, M. Cooreman became
Prime Minister and Baron de Broqueville took the portfolio of Foreign
Affairs. Later on, in 1917, Baron de Broqueville resigned and was succeeded
by M. Paul Hymans When, after the dark days of the spring and summer
of 1918, the tide of battle turned and the Allies took the offensive. King
Albert advanced at the head of Belgium and American troops, drove the
BRAND WHITLOCK
617
Germans back, gradually liberating and occupying his own territory. After
the signing of the Armistice he was met at Lophem, near Bruges, by a delega-
tion of distinguished citizens from Brussels who came to welcome him; and
there a coimcil was held and it was decided to form a new Government
comprising representatives of all three parties, and to grant manhood suffrage.
The King made his triumphal reentry into his capital on November 22,
escorted by contingents of Belgian, French, British and American troops.
Once more, after the long night of the occupation, Brussels was gay; the
black, yellow and red flag was everywhere, with the flags of the Allies; the
people were filled with a solemn joy. The King, wearing the steel helmet
he had worn throughout the war, mounted on his charger, with the Queen
and the royal children by his side, passed the troops in review in front of
Parliament House. Before him, in the small Place de la Nation, was Burgo-
master Max, back from his long captivity in Germany ; and afterwards there
was a session of Parliament, strangely like that four years before, at the
beginning of the war. Generals of the Allied armies were there, and the
Cardinal, in his red robes. The King, in a speech from the throne, announced
the formation of the new Coalition Government with M. Leon Delacroix as
Prime Minister, and recommended the abolition of the system of plural
voting and the amendment of the Constitution to provide for manhood
suffrage.
GRAVE PROBLEMS AFTER THE WAR
The Government was confronted by the gravest problems, both internal
and external The highly organised industry of Belgium was prostrate and
in rums ; the Germans, during the occupation, having systematically destroyed
or carried off all the machinery The breeds of live stock for which Belgium
was famous had been borne away to Germany as well; the railway system
was m disrepair, factories had been burned down, mines flooded, whole towns
destroyed and fields laid waste All this was to be restored or rebuilt. The
nation^s finances were m disorder. During the occupation the Germans had
forced the people to accept the German mark at an arbitrary value of
francs 1.25, and there were in circulation and in the National Bank millions
of worthless paper marks to be redeemed. And overshadowing all other prob-
lems and inextricably involved with them, was the question of reparations.
THE SACRED UNION ”
Though the war had been a monstrous calamity it had united the Belgians
as they had never been united before. To quote a line of Verhaeren, cited
by M. Paul Hymans in a prophetic speech in 1913, they had at last known
the anguish necessary to make a strong race.” The old divisions had been
forgotten; Catholics and Liberals, Flemish and Walloon, had become one;
and if the nation had emerged from the long trial in sorrow, it had emerged
in hope and pride, with a strongly intensified national feeling. The great
Allied Powers, wishing to recognise Belgium’s heroism, raised their legations
to the rank of embassies and, instead of Ministers, as hitherto, accredited
Ambassadors to her Court. At the Peace Conference at Paris, Belgium re-
nounced the neutrality imposed upon her by the Treaty of 1839, and signed
the Treaty of Versailles as an independent Power, on an equal footing with
the Great Powers.
618 BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
Thus, under this tripartite government, called the “ Sacred Union,’' with
high hopes and the same courage she had displayed throughout the war,
Belgium entered upon the period of reconstruction.
In order to give immediate effect to its pledge, the Government brought
before the Chambers a measure providing that in the new elections for mem-
bers of a Constituent Assembly to revise the Constitution, a body chosen in
the same way as the Chambers, the system of manhood suffrage should be
applied. This measure, though thought to be of doubtful constitutionality,
was adopted. The Coalition Government was confronted by the innumer-
able diflBculties inherent in such a disturbed situation; the ‘‘Sacred Union”
was difficult to maintain; the Belgians, quick to ridicule, found much fault;
there were several crises. M. Jules Renkin, Catholic Minister of Colonies;
M. Paul Hymans, Liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs; and M. Paul Emile
Janson, Liberal Minister of War: each successively resigned his portfolio.
In the new elections the Socialists, as was to be anticipated with plural
voting abolished, made large gains and secured about seventy seats. The
LiWal party correspondingly lost, many Liberals, through a fear of Socialist
gains, having voted with the Catholic party. No party had a majority,
however, and recourse was again had to the expedient of a tripartite Cabinet.
After many difficulties, M. Henri Carton de Wiart organised a Government,
with M. Henri Jaspar as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and M. Georges
Theunis, a prominent financier, who heretofore had not been in political life,
as Minister of Finance.
In October, 1921, as the result of an incident at La Louviere in the
industrial region of the Hainaut where, during labour disturbances, a Socialist
meeting was held in which the Belgian flag was trampled on and the red
flag displayed, the Socialist Ministers in the Cabinet, Messieurs Vandervelde,
Destree, Wauters and Anseele, retired. In November, the Constitution hav-
ing been amended and the Constituent Assembly dissolved, new elections
were held which did not result in a material change in the relation of the
three parties. None of them had a majority and the Socialists, refusing to
join another tripartite Government, went into opposition and a coalition of
Catholics and Liberals was formed with M. Theunis as Prime Minister and
M. Jaspar in the Foreign Ofl5ce
PERPLEXING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEW FREEDOM
The new freedom from the trammels of neutrality, won by Belgium, and
the recognition of her as a first-class Power, were honours that inevitably
imposed their own perplexing responsibilities. The little nation that had
lived so long in tranquillity under the protection of a guaranteed neutrality,
found itself at once plunged into the dangers, the difficulties and the com-
plications of international politics at the most trying moment of all history.
In the discussions over reparations that were to go on between France and
England, after the withdrawal of America from European affairs, Belgium
had a difficult and delicate role to play. Her leaders adopted a policy that
implied the maintenance of her equilibrium between these two Powers. On
many occasions, Belgium’s mediation prevented a definite rupture of the
Entente between France and England.
The nationalist feeling was strong and led some of her public men to
believe that she should have compensation in territory; the cantons of
Malm^dy and Eupen, theretofore belonging to Germany, had been attributed
to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles, and while annexation was not con-
templated, it was sought by certain groups to bring about a reimion with
© Keystone View Co.
TTing Albert and Queen Elizabeth of Belgium. Their
courageous defiance of German might during the war
won for them world-wide admiration.
BRAND WHITLOCK
619
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This object, however, was not reali^,
though an economic agreement was made with the Grand Duchy which gives
Belgium certain commercial advantages.
rnFFICXILTIES WITH HOLLAND
In the Treaty of Versailles, Belgian diplomacy sought also to secme the
rectification of the frontier between Belgium and Holland, so as to include
in Belgian territory that part of Zeeland lying south of the Scheldt, thereby
assuring to Belgium at least partial control over the outlet of the port of
Antwerp, and that strip of the province of Limburg which had been lopped
off by the Treaties of 1839, and which would be valuable as a protection in
case of a new invasion from the east. These plans, however, were frustrated
by Dutch diplomacy at the Peace Conference m Paris. A commercial treaty
with Holland was discussed and was on the point of being signed, when the
Dutch representatives suddenly laid claim to the control of the Wieligen
pass, a channel in the North Sea, lying directly across the entrance to the
important Belgian harbour of Zeebrugge, not far from the mouth of the
Scheldt This had the effect of interrupting the negotiations, and after
many months during which the difiiculties between Holland and Belgium
seemed likely to reach an acute stage, the question was left unsettled.
The Conference of London of May 1, 1921, fixed the amount due to the
Allies from Germany at 132,000,000,000 gold marks, to eight per cent of which,
or 10,560,000,000, Belgium, under the accord of Spa, has a right.
Belgium up to the present time, has spent more than 171,500,000,000
francs to repair the damages of war, and has expended an additional sum of
7,500,000,000 francs to redeem at the rate of francs 1.25, the 6,000,000,000
marks which the Germans forced upon the Belgians at par during the
occupation. Besides, she has paid 3,000,000,000 francs to defray the ex-
penses of feeding the population during the occupation. All these sacrifices
do not take into account the invisible damages due to arrested production and
to the destruction, loss and depreciation of machinery during the war. The
Government has had to cover all these damages by loans and taxes, with the
exception of 1,500,000,000 gold marks which was received from Germany by
virtue of Belgium's priority in indemnities under the Treaty of Versailles.
Direct taxes in Belgium are 12 times higher than they were before the war.
To-day the State has a debt of 36,000,000,000 francs.
Thus, the high hopes that Belgium had entertained at the close of the war
were one by one frustrated and, disappointed in securing reparations from
Germany, she was led, on January 11, 1923, to join France in the occupation
of the Ruht.
THE PUZZLING LANGUAGE QUESTION
One of the long-standing problems in Belgian internal politics has been
the Flemish question, that conflict between the partisans of Flemish as
opposed to French culture. Belgian territory comprises nine ancient prov-
inces: the two counties of Flanders, the province of Antwerp, the duchy of
Brabant, the county of Hainaut, the province of Limburg, the province of
Namur, the province of Luxemburg, and the principality of Li6ge once ruled
by the Prince Bishops.
The two Flanders, parts of Brabant, the provinces of Antwerp and of
Limburg are Flemish, and there the Flemish language prevails; while that
part of Belgium lying to the south and east of this territory is the ancient
BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
620
Wallonia, where the Walloon, a dialect of the French language, is spoken.
French is the language of the Court, of society, of commerce and trade, and is
generally used in Parliament and in the law courts, though Flemish may be,
if desired; the two languages, French and Flemish, are official; all laws,
proclamations and official publications being printed in both. During the
German occupation an effort was made to divide the population, and Gen-
eral von Bissing, the German Governor-General, decreed a separation of
Administrations directing that the Flemish language alone should be em-
ployed in the Flemish provinces, and French in the Walloon provinces. This
separatist movement did not meet with the favour he had expected; the
Flemish leaders were too patriotic not to perceive the manoeuvre and to resist
it, though a few fanatical Flemish politicians were either the dupes or the
accomplices of the German intrigue, and these, after the Armistice, were
brought to trial in the Belgian courts, condemned for treason and sentenced,
some of them, to death; though as capital punishment, while recognised, is
never inflicted in Belgium — following a precedent set by King Leopold I —
their sentences were commuted to imprisonment for life.
For many years the controversy over the question of languages has cen-
tred in the University of Ghent, one of the two state universities, the other
being in Liege. In both these universities, French is the language em-
ployed in teaching, and certain partisans of Flemish have long sought to have
Ghent transformed into a Flemish University. Von Bissing, indeed, did
so decree, but here again the Flemish patriots resisted him, and two dis-
tinguished scholars of that University, Professor Pirenne, the famous his-
torian, and Professor Frederic were sent to German prisons for their refusal
to aid in the transformation. After the war, however, the old struggle was
renewed, and in 1923 the question was solved, at least temporarily, by the
adoption of a compromise, known as the Nolf law, from the name of its
author. Dr Nolf, Minister of Arts and Sciences, by which the University of
Ghent was transformed into a Flemish institution, with instruction, however,
in certain cases, continuing in French.
THE ARTISTIC LIFE OF BELGIUM
During the period imder notice the artistic life of Belgium has been
vigorous and flourishing, maintaining the splendid traditions of Flemish
painting. A well-balanced school of impressionism which realised a good
deal of solid work, notable for its passionate study of moving light, made its
debut in the commencement of the century with Fourmois, and developed
superbly with Verwee, Dubois, Artan, Boulenger, Coosemans, Asselberghs,
De Knyff, Cesar De Cock, and Baron. At Antwerp there was the nephew
and pupil of the great Lys, Henri De Braekeleer, who is just now beginning
to be appreciated, and Jan Stobbaerts. There was also Theodore Verstraete;
and at Brussels, Portaels, the son-in-law of Navez, opened a studio out of
which came Agneessens, Emile Wauters, Verheyden, Leon Frederic, Laermans,
Gouweloos, and R^ne Janssens. From the studio of Cluysenaar came Count
Jacques de Lalaing and Dalvin.
All of this work was impressionistic, evoking men and things in a mo-
ment of light, but the men and the things are always brought out in their
complete integrity; the style of their painting ennobles them and the har-
mony of their colour accentuates their beauty. Delbeke, the decorator of
the Halles at Ypres, which were destroyed during the war, and Mellery dis-
played a realism that was full of idealism. Then there were the landscape-
BRAND WHITLOCK
821
painters Conrtens, Heymans, De Greef and Verheyden, who worked with the
same taste for the power of changing light. Afterwards, Heymans became
exclusively a luminist and sacrificed himself somewhat, as did Claus, to the
school of pointillism; but both of them retained their ample and vigorous
vision. After them came Baertsoen of Ghent, and Gilsoul of Brussels, the
works of the one full of melancholy, those of the other all lyrical, but both of
them capable of speaking a harmomous and clear language so far as form and
colour are concerned.
Belgian painting has thus far escaped the decadent and often degrading
influence of futurist and other so-called schools in revolt against tradition.
In Leon Frederic, m Courtens, and Claus, in Laermans and Bastien, Wage-
mann, Hens, De Saedeleer, Van de Woestyne, Walles and Taelemans, there
are much force and sumptuous colour even in its sadness, a good deal of
splendour and savour of reality.
In sculpture the century has produced Count Jacques de Lalaing, Constan-
tin Meunier, Thomas Vin^otte, Egide Rombaux, Godfroid De Vreese, Samuel
and Charlier.
BELGIAN LITERATURE
In the last century Henry Conscience gave literary form to Flemish
by the great historical romances he wrote in that language, but since his
day the greater part of the literary expression of the nation, with the ex-
ception of the realistic novels of Cyrile Buysse, Styn Streuvels, and the
writings of Zimmermans, Vanderwoestyne, and Auguste Vermeylen has been
in French, subtly touched by something peculiarly Belgian.
It is in French that Charles de Coster wrote the great national epopee,
Thyl Ulenspiegel, which, in the form of a picaresque romance, gives a
marvellous picture of the sufferings the Belgian nation endured under the
Spanish domination, and by its poetic elevation expresses the soul of the
people
Towards the end of the last century, by one of those inexplicable spon-
taneous impulses of art, there sprang into being at Brussels a whole school
of young artists who wrote for a review called La Jeune Belgique, a name
that ultimately attached to the school itself, and this “ Young Belgium ” did
much to form the national spirit that burst forth in 1914.
Camille Lemonnier, in the novels and stories his prolific industry pro-
duced, left a series of pictures of Belgian life that won for him wide recogni-
tion in France. Emile Verhaeren, the poet, with something of Walt Whitman
in his free vigorous verse, shows the spiritual, almost mystic quality that
subsists in the Flemish nature, side by side with a love of colour and life.
M. Maurice Maeterlinck reveals this same mysticism in his philosophic and
poetic work. Other noted Belgian writers of this period were Max Waller,
the editor of La Jeune Belgiqm, who left some exquisite poems; Georges
Rodenbach, whose poems and novels are filled with the charm of Bruges;
Octave Pirmez, the author of meditative essays that have a sweet melan-
choly ; Eugene Demolder who wrote realistic novels full of the rich colour of
the old Flemish painters; and Charles van Lerberghe. Of the “ Yoimg Bel-
gium group, besides M. Maeterlinck, Albert Giraud and Ivan Gilkm, the
poets, Georges Eckoud the novelist, Gustave van Zype, the playwright and
critic, and Henri Carton de Wiart and Albert Mockel, Edmond Picard, Fernand
Severin, Lewis Delattre, Georges Virres, Paul Spaak, Max Elskamp, Victor
Kinon, Henry Davignon, and the poet E. Cammaerts, are still living.
In 1920 the Belgium Academy of French Language and Literature was
founded, and is in some sort the recognition and consecration of the work
BELGIUM AS I SAW IT
of La Jeune Belgique. In music, since the death of Gevaert, Cesar Franck,
Peter Benoit and Paul Gilson, the most prominent contemporary artists have
been Dubois, Sylvain Dufreis, Mathieu, Wambach, Joseph Jonger, Eugene
and Theo. Ysays, and Joseph Ryelandt.
BRIGHT OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
In the autumn of 1919 the King and Queen, with Prince Leopold made a
visit to the United States to thank the American people lor the aid extended
to Belgium during the war.
The Belgian people are practical and industrious, and by their own
labour have largely restored their country. The ruins of war have, to a
great extent, disappeared; industries have been rebuilt; factories reconstructed
and modernised; the railways reequipped; the finances of the nation, under
the supervision of M. Theunis, the Prime Minister, have been placed on a
sounder foundation and, for a coimtry lately so sorely tried, Belgium is in an
excellent condition.
No country in Europe possesses, in the same proportion, larger elements
of future prosperity. Besides the immense resources of the Congo, and the
mines and mills in the Borinage and La Louviere and the foundries and mines
in Liege, there are the undeveloped regions of the Campme, those plains
now covered with heather and gorse, that lie along the northern frontier
stretching from Antwerp to the Rhine. There the riches are untold. It
is estimated that enough coal for three hundred years lies there, and that
in ten or fifteen years this plain of arid sands will have doubled the national
fortune. Besides these coal-mines, a whole series of industries is being
created in this district some of which, new to Belgium, are destined to en-
large the nation’s economic field of action. In the little corner of Oolen, in
the arrondissement of Tumhout, radium is being extracted, and, near by, great
manufactories, established by American capital, are mechanically producing
glassware and bottles. The riches of the Congo are illimitable; tin, gold,
diamonds and radium are continually extracted in increasing quantities. In
the year 1923 alone, 60,000 tons of copper were extracted from the mines in
Katanga. In the Uele are great cotton-fields and other important products
that will serve the mother-country.
CHAJPTER XXXII
HOLLAND’S THANKLESS ROLE AS NEUTRAL
By PiETsai Geyl
Professor of Dutch Studies in the University of London.
When the present century opened Queen Wilhelmina, not quite twenty
years old, had reigned over the Kingdom of the Netherlands since 1898. Her
father, old King William III, under whom parliamentary government had
finally established itself, had died in 1890, and a regency had been necessary
during the interval. It had been ably conducted by his widow, Emma,
originally a Princess of Waldeck-Pyrmont
Constitutional kingship in Holland does not leave the monarch much more
influence on the actual government of the country than it does in England,
and it cannot be expected that the young Queen should have left a very deep
imprint on the period which we are about to review. Yet although most of
her work is done in the strict privacy of the innermost council chamber, this
much can already be said that the historian of a later date will not find
the Queen's personality a negligible factor. The girl of 1898 has grown into
a woman of considerable strength of will and capacity for affairs. Sep-
tember 6, 1923, the anniversary of the day, when twenty-five years ago she
was crowned at Amsterdam, was celebrated amid universal respect and ap-
preciation.
MODERN HOLLAND AWAKENS AFTER LONG DECAY
It was hardly a propitious moment for celebrating, for Holland was suf-
fering very grievously from the aftermath of the war. From its very nature
Dutch prosperity is liable to sudden eclipses. In its most brilliant periods it
is based not on natural wealth, not on the possession of a fertile soil or mineral
treasures, but on the industry of its inhabitants improving upon the situation
of the country at the mouths of great rivers, between the most important
European countries. After the Napoleonic wars Holland experienced a long
period of economic and intellectual decay. She awoke from the nightmare
of “ the French time ” to a new national independence to find the conditions
of her old economic activity vanished from the world around her. Only the
colonial possessions in the East Indies, which were restored to her by England,
remained as a legacy from the glorious history of the Republic of the United
Netherlands to be a source of wealth to the new kingdom. For the rest a
new position as a commercial and industrial state had to be built up all
over again with painful and slow effort. It was really only the foundation
of the German Empire and the sudden rise of Germany as an industrial power
of tiie first magnitude which gave an impetus to this development. The first
years of the twentieth century reveal Holland still working steadily and suc-
cessfully, full of energy and enterprise, improving her agricultural and horti-
cultural methods, founding new industries, expanding her commerce and
navigation. A great revival of intellectual activity had accompanied this eco-
624 HOLLANDS THANKLESS ROLE AS NEUTRAL
nomic development from its early stages round about 1880. Dutch literature,
however little known abroad, was pulsating with life and originality. Art
flourished again after nearly two centuries of comparative sterility. The
Dutch Universities had never lost their high prestige in the international
world of scholarship, but in the closing decades of the nineteenth century
Dutch contributions to science particularly began to flow with amazing
abundance.
During the pre-war years of Queen Wilhelmma’s reign this many-sided
movement continued and seemed still to be gaining stren^h. It is too early
to judge what effects the interruption of the economic development caused
by the war will have on it. It is possible, and it is devoutly to be hoped,
that the interruption may prove of so temporary a nature that the intellec-
tual life of the nation will be able to absorb the shock. So much is certain,
that for the moment Holland again finds herself in a world from which the
conditions of her former prosperity have been suddenly withdrawn. The
ruin of the German hinterland, the domination of France and Belgium on the
upper course of the Rhine, the debasement of the currency in nearly all
European countries affect Dutch exports, and Dutch international trade very
adversely. Instead of invigorating expansion, retrenchment is the order of
the day.
LONG ASCENDENCY OP THE LIBERALS ENDS
The early years of Queen Wilhelmina’s reign coincided with the closing
period of the long ascendency of the Liberal party in Dutch politics. Ever
since 1846, when a new Constitution conceded full ministerial responsibility,
the Liberal party had been the prime motive force in the development of
state and society along modern lines. Towards the close of the century it was
threatened from two sides. On the one hand there were the beginnings, slow
and late compared with other European countries where industrialism was
more highly developed than in agricultural and commercial Holland, of the
Socialist party; on the other hand there was the increase in strength of the
Confessional parties as well as the formation of a coalition between them.
THE GODLESS SCHOOLS
Holland is traditionally a Calvinist country, but in the nineteenth cen-
tury the ruling middle-class had little of the old zeal left. The Dutch
Reformed Church itself had become so latitudinarian that several seces-
sions of strict Calvinists had occurred. And apart from that, the Roman
Catholics, who never comprised less than one-third of the population, had
shaken off the apathy and difi5dence which had characterised their attitude
during the period of Calvinist ascendency, and claimed their share in political
as well as intellectual life. Calvinism, too, was galvanised into new life and
organised politically. The two Calvinist parties which exist to-day (1924)
find their adherents mainly among the landed aristocracy in the eastern
provinces, anoiong the peasants, and among the lower middle-class in the
towns. Their political importance increased with every successive electoral
reform which enfranchised the social strata below the well-to-do middle-
class of mainly Liberal persuasion. Even so they could never hope to win
an independent majority in the Second Chamber (the equivalent of the House
of Commons in England). The Catholics had as little prospect of ever
forming a Government by themselves. Yet Catholics and orthodox Protes-
tants had their hostility to the Liberal ascendency in common, and one
PIETER GEYL
625
grievance particularly they shared. The education which the State provides
in Holland is of a strictly “ neutral ” character. There is no bible reading,
there are no prayers. Many people looked upon this ‘‘ Godless ” education
with horror and felt obliged in their consciences to save their children from
its influence; but the private schools of the various sects, where the teaching
could have the religious character which they desired, were not subsidised
by the State. This situation at length, and in spite of the traditional enmity
between the two creeds, led to a coalition of the Calvinist parties and the
Roman Catholic party.
IN THE THROES OP BITTER RELIGIOUS STRIFE
The first real victory which this coalition won at the polls occurred in
1901. A new government was then formed under the premiership of Dr.
Abraham Kuyper, the leader of the more popular one of the two Calvinist
parties (the Anti-Revolutionary party), probably the most remarkable per-
sonality of the last generations of Dutch politicians. A brilliant writer and
orator, Dr. Kuyper was idolised by his followers, whose religious fanaticism
he knew how to rouse During his period of power Holland was in the
throes of bitter religious strife. Dr. Kuyper believed that for the purposes
of practical statesmanship he could divide the nation, on the lines of what
he called “ the antithesis, into a Christian and a “ Paganist ” part. In
practice, however, it soon became evident that the men whom he had united
on the basis of religious principle were much divided on political issues of
grave importance On the whole the conservative section of the coalition
set its mark on the administration; and the expectations of social reform
legislation, cherished by the more democratically inclined followers of the
roalition, were hardly realised On the contrary, the harsh methods by which
the railway strike of 1903 was crushed showed that the coalition would be
more definitely anti-democratic than the Liberals had been and greatly em-
bittered the Socialists, particularly against Dr. Kuyper personally.
The General Election of 1905 resulted in a stalemate. The “ parties of
the Left ” held just over half the seats in the new Chamber, but as the small
band of Socialists held aloof, the new Liberal Government rested on a
minority. It was m fact deplorably weak and came finally, after a few
inglorious years, to grief over questions of national defence. It was suc-
ceeded by another Coalition Cabinet, from which, however, as it, too, could
not count on a faithful parliamentary majority, the forceful personality of
Dr. Kuyper was excluded The great leader remained excluded when at the
new election of 1909 the parties of the Right gained a working majority. The
new generation of less trenchant but at the same time smaller minds main-
tained itself in the command. Mr Heemskerk was the leading member of this
Government. It again disappointed expectations, and the elections of 1913
resulted m its defeat.
The opposition parties, however, proved to be even more incapable than
in 1905 of assuming the responsibilities of government. The Liberals had
nothing like an independent majority, and the Socialists, who for the first
time had made considerable progress, refused to cooperate, although Dr. Bos,
the leader of the Radical section of the Liberals, who had been entrusted by
the Queen with the task of forming a Cabinet, intended to concede the de-
mand for manhood suffrage on which the Socialists had fought the election,
and to which the Liberal party had allowed itself to be converted too late
to save on the Left what it had lost on the Right.
T. B Y. — VOL. 1 — 40
HOLLAND’S THANKLESS ROLE AS NEUTRAL
THE DOUBLE PBOBLEM OF BXTFFSAOE AND EDUCATION SOLVIO)
In this difficulty an extra>parliamentary Cabinet was found by Mr. Cort
van der Linden. In conformity with the verdict of the electors it bore a
decidedly “ left ” character, but it set itself the task of ridding Dutch political
life of both the questions which had landed it into such a wearisome impasse
and which threatened to strike it with complete sterility. Mr. Cort van der
Linden and his colleagues proposed to bring about a revision of the Consti-
tution (for which purpose a two-thirds majority of the Chambers is required)
by an agreement of all parties. In it the Clerical groups would find the solu-
tion of the school problem, and the Liberal and Socialist parties the final ex-
tension of the suffrage.
In spite of the fact that this Government quite unexpectedly had to
withstand the terrible shock of the World War, it persevered with this task,
and indeed the quickened sense of national solidarity in the face of danger
from outside rather helped it to achieve its object than otherwise. In
1917, therefore, the salutary double compromise was translated into law.
Universal suffrage and proportional representation were introduced. At the
same time, the principle for which the Clerical parties had for so long con-
tended, of absolute equality with regard to the public exchequer of “ public ”
undenominational, or irreligious, education and “ private ” denominational
education, was conceded in full and written in the Constitution.
The first elections held under the new suffrage law (summer, 1918) re-
sulted in further disaster for the Liberal groups. The Cort van der Linden
Cabinet resigned and another Calvimst-Catholic Administration was formed,
under a Catholic Premier this time, Mr. Ruys de Beerenbrouck. This
Government’s mandate was confirmed by the elections of 1921, when the
Coalition parties increased their number of seats to sixty out of the hundred
which constitute the Second Chamber. The Socialists made further striking
progress at the elections of 1918 and, although they lost some ground at the
elections of 1921, they were still in January, 1924, after the Roman Catholic
party the largest single party in the Dutch Parliament. The 1921 election
was the first at which women’s suffrage was in full working order. Seven
out of the hundred seats are occupied by women in the present Chamber.
CONDITIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR
Holland is situated in a most dangerous spot, surrounded on all sides by
the principal Powers whose wars make European history. It seems little
less than a miracle that she managed to keep out of the conflict which raged
all around her for over four years. As a matter of fact once or twice she
escaped being drawn in only by a hair’s-breadth, and the war affected her
national life little less than it did that of the belligerents themselves.
Ever since the secession of Belgium in 1830-1831 Holland had had peace.
In the twentieth century she lived on the friendliest terms with all her
neighbours. A striking proof of the esteem in which she was held by the
rest of the world was the selection of The Hague for the holding of the Peace
Conferences in 1899 and 1907. It was with England that in the period
under review Dutch public opinion, if not the Dutch Government, had the
most serious quarrel. It took sides passionately in the Boer War, and not
unnaturally it was the small Boer Republics, peopled by men of Dutch
descent and Dutch language, which had all its sympathy. The Government
© Keystone View Co,
Rarely has a queen found herself in such a difficult position as Queen Wilhelmina during the World War. Her consort is Prince Henry of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin. This photograph was taken at The Hague on the occasion of her Silver Jubilee in 1916.
PIETER GEYL
627
could only show discreetly that it was in accord with this popular feeling when
it provided a man-of-war to convey the defeated President Kruger to Europe.
It took action more likely to influence the course of events when in 1902 it
offered a mediation which, although it was courteously declined by England,
was yet utilised by her to start the negotiations that were to lead to the
peace of Vereeniging.
Yet in the years immediately preceding the World War popular sentiment
in Holland was not anti-British. The grant of self-government to the con-
quered republics had obliterated much of the bitterness caused by the con-
flict, and the preponderating feeling of Dutchmen when they surveyed the
troubled world around them was one of aversion mingled with fear in the
face of the blatant militancy of the German Empire on their eastern frontier.
This does not mean that there was any inclination to range the country
on the side of the Entente in the dangerous political developments which were
now dividing Europe into two groups of antagonistic powers. Attempts were
made to draw Holland in. In Belgium a movement was started for a rap-
prochement between Holland and Belgium. That movement had nothing to
do with the linguistic and cultural sympathies of which at the same time the
Flemish population of Belgium began to be more and more conscious with
regard to their northern neighbours. On the contrary, its promoters belonged
exclusively to the Francophile circles of Wallonia and of Brussels, and their
motives were purely political. They were the advance guard of London and
Paris. This was fully realised in Holland where these openings were re-
ceived with rather chilling caution. Just before the outbreak of the war the
Entente press detected signs of a leaning towards the other side on the
part of the Dutch Government in the plans which it laid before Parliament
for the improvement of the fortifications at the mouth of the Scheldt. The
contention, however, that Holland was obliged, or even that it had the right,
to allow Entente forces to use the Dutch part of that river in case of a
German threat to Antwerp was quite untenable, nor did the Government
allow itself to be intimidated by these clamours.
GERMAN PLANS TO INVADE HOLLAND CHANGED
In fact, ivhile the English and French papers hinted that Holland was
acting under the compulsion of Berlin, the German General Staff had been
so much impressed by the reorganisation of the Dutch army which had taken
place some years earlier, that they had thought it necessary to rearrange
their marching plans in the event of a war with France It is now known that
in the time of General von Schlieffen they intended to violate not only
Belgian, hut Dutch territory, trusting that when they rushed their armies
westward through the Dutch province of Limburg (which juts out to the
south covering part of the eastern frontier of Belgium), the Dutch army
would remain inactive behind the water line,” the inundated area, which
protects only the heart of the country, the provinces of North and South
Holland. Von Moltke, realising that the Dutch army was made mobile and
would be used to strike even if only that outlying territory were violated,
decided to respect Dutch neutrality, even though the need to march round
the protuberant comer of Limburg would delay the German advance from
Crefeld by some precious days.
Holland’s attitude before the great calamity burst over Europe, therefore,
was strictly and impartially neutral. When the war broke out the Govern-
ment at once made it clear that this was still to be so. Doubtless there were
times when each belligerent group felt Holland’s neutrality as a burden, but
it was a practical necessity for Holland to maintain this policy.
HOLLAND'S THANKLESS ROLE AS NEUTRAL
A MHiLION BELGIAN REFUGEES IN HOLLAND
Public opinion, of course, could not be kept within the bounds of neutrality.
There was a group of German sympathisers in Holland, but it can safely be
said that the general trend of public feelmg was strongly anti-German. The
violation of Belgian neutrality was the decisive factor. It afforded an object
lesson of what Holland's fate would have been if the Germans had not for
reasons of their own seen fit to respect the Dutch frontiers. The impression
which the violation of Belgian neutrality made was deepened by the terrible
incidents that accompanied it, by the sack of Louvain, and then by the
stream of Belgian refugees, which swelled into a flood when the invaders
reached Antwerp. Thousands and thousands of homeless Belgians were hos-
pitably received on Dutch soil. At one moment the number exceeded one
million. Hundreds of thousands went back to their country when things
had settled down under the occupation. Hundreds of thousands remained
till the end of the war, and the way in which they were cared for by a nation
which was soon to suffer very heavy privations itself is one of the redeeming
features of the history of the war.
STRICT NEUTRALITY MAINTAINED
Meanwhile the Dutch Government successfully maintained its attitude
of strict neutrality. The army had been mobilised without a hitch in the
last days of July, 1914. It was kept in readiness through weary years of
waiting, at a big cost both financially and morally. Its strength was of
450,000 men. There were no serious incidents in which it had to lend a
hand. Some thousands of Belgian and English troops had to be interned after
the fall of Antwerp. Aeroplanes, too, both German and English, sometimes
strayed on to Dutch territory. The naval forces occasionally had to intern
a submarine or a destroyer, and to them fell the dangerous work of mine-
sweeping along the Dutch coast. But in the main the service which was
required of the armed forces of the country was the heavy one of keeping
ready and waiting for a call which never came.
Sometimes the actions of the Dutch Government were disputed by one
or the other of the belligerents as favouring their enemies. The Government
— Mr. Loudon was Minister of Foreign Affairs — had from the first moment
of the war decided to look for strength in a rigid adherence to International
Law, and it strove honestly to let all its actions in the carrying out of the
decree of neutrality be guided by its precepts, without fear or favour to either
of the warring parties. Unfortunately, International Law is law at its
vaguest, and cases were bound to arise in which it could be interpreted vari-
ously. Thus, for instance, England protested when Holland excluded armed
merchantmen from her harbours. The English contention was that the article
in Holland’s original proclamation of neutrality to which Mr. Loudon appealed
had been drawn up at a time when Germany’s resort to unrestricted submarine
warfare could not be foreseen; and it was in reply to those utterly illegal
methods that England had started arming her merchantmen. In this case
Holland was not to be moved from the position taken up. Another question
gave rise to a more acrimonious discussion, and at one time seemed to bring
the danger of her being involved in the war very near. This was the sand and
gravel dispute, which dragged on through the years 1917 and 1918. The
Entente Governments protested against Holland allowing the Germans to use
the Dutch waterways for the transport of sand and gravel to Belgium as it
PIETER GEYL
was there used by them for the construction of a new kind of ferro-concrete
dug*out8. Mr. Loudon did not consider himself free to stop the whole of
this traffic as sand and gravel was also used for works of peace, road repairs,
etc., and as a matter of fact large quantities used to be sent over Holland into
Belgium before the war. He consented, however, to ration the transport on
the footing of pre-war statistics. The intricacies of the matter afforded
material for endless disputes, and both belligerents put the severest pressure
on Holland. England penalised her for concessions to Germany, Germany
threatened her for concessions to England.
LUDENDORFF PLANS TO OVERRUN HOLLAND
At last, in the spring of 1918, when Germany was making her last des-
perate effort and seemed to be successful for a time, Ludendorff wanted this
question to be used as a pretext to overrun Holland too, and make a dash
for the Dutch ports. An ultimatum was actually presented, and it needed
the determined intervention of certain representatives of the civil power in
Germany to prevent the ruthless dictator from having his way. On the
whole it can be said that the Dutch Government, as befitted the Govern-
ment of Grotius' country, showed consummate ability in dealing with the
various problems of neutrality which arose in the course of those four years;
but all its ability would not have helped it if the honesty of its intentions
had been open to suspicion.
The most real difficulties, however, in maintaining the neutrality between
the belligerents were perhaps those contained in the economic situation of
the country, which moreover began to be of the most tragic importance to
the Dutch people when the war passed its first year. It is not what Holland
did to others, but what others did to her that constitutes her war history.
BOTH BELLIGERENTS HAMPER DUTCH COMMERCE
We have already had occasion to note that for Holland international
commerce is not a luxury but a necessity. Not only does it directly support
an important part of the community; Dutch industries are dependent on it
for their raw materials and coal, while only one-fifth of the grain consumed
by the Dutch people is grown in the country. Sea-borne trade was gradually
extinguished as the war went on. The Germans began by laying mines in
front of the English ports. The English retaliated by laying a mine-field
in the North Sea. In order to make th^eir blockade of Germany effective they
exercised an ever more stringent control over imports into the adjacent states,
regardless of the provisions of the Declaration of London. They prescribed
to neutral traffic a route along the south coast of England so as to be
able to examine cargoes at leisure. The Germans retaliated by prescribing
the route round the North of Scotland, and by declaring the Channel area an
area of war. In March, 1915, the Entente Powers did away with all distinc-
tions between legitimate and contraband trade and prohibited the import
into Holland of all goods, of whatever nature, which could be suspected of
being destined to be transmitted to Germany. All goods imported into
Holland had to be consigned to an unofficial body (the Netherlands Oversea
Trust) , which possessed the confidence of the Entente authorities, and which
undertook that they should go no further. In course of time the Allies pre-
tended to regulate the entire economic life of Holland, allowing her the bare
630 HOLLAND’S THANKLESS ROLE AS NEUTRAL
necessities of life, withholding anything that could be used to replace goods
sent to Germany. Even Holland’s trade with her own colonies was not free
from supervision. Protests were of little avail, especially after the only
really powerful neutral, the United States, had entered the war.
Meanwhile in 1915 Dutch vessels had begun to fall the victims of German
U-boats. After the unrestricted submarine war had been proclaimed early
in 1917, it proved impossible even to get a fleet of seven merchantmen which
had been held up in English ports safely home. Practically all traffic came to
a stop then. Food scarcity began to be almost as serious in Holland as it was
in the blockaded country itself. Bread was severely rationed. Meat was
very scarce as the lack of imported fodder had necessitated the slaughtering
of stock. Factories began to close down in 1917 for lack of raw materials
and coal. In the last stages of the war the industrial life of the country was
at a complete standstill. It is true, of course, that, particularly in the first
year or two, much money had been made by men who speculated in exports
to Germany. Those profits were as nothing compared with the losses of the
nation as a whole. What with the upkeep of the mobilised army, and the dis-
location and extinction of trade and industry, the war years added enor-
mously to the public debt and at the same time impoverished the Dutch
people.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOLLOWING THE ARMISTICE
It is small wonder that the conclusion of the Armistice was greeted with
indescribable relief in Holland. But the peace had disappointments in store
for Holland as for the rest of the world, and the new Government of Mr.
Buys de Beerenbrouck (in which Mr. Van Kamebeek was Minister of For-
eign Affairs) was not to have a much easier task than the old.
One big surprise was the discovery that Belgium proposed to advance at
the Peace Conference certain claims involving Dutch sovereignty. Holland
found herself decidedly unpopular in some of the Allied countries. What
she had done for the Belgian refugees appeared to have been forgotten. The
firm refusal of the Dutch Government to surrender the fugitive ex-Kaiser,
the only possible reply, as is now admitted on all sides, to a very ill-advised
request, gave rise to excited denunciations of Holland’s alleged tenderness
for the Hohenzollems. Holland’s attitude in the war was systematically
represented in the most unfriendly light. It was said in Belgnm that Hol-
land’s claim to sovereignty over the Scheldt mouth, and her action in closing
it against the Allied forces, had made the defence of Antwerp impossible,
while her possession of the province of Limburg, that narrow strip along the
Maas, had hindered the defence of Belgium’s eastern frontier, which ought to
have been based on that river. It might have been said with greater justice
that Dutch control of the Scheldt mouth rendered the possession of Antwerp
useless to the Germans once they had got there; and that Holland’s possession
of Limburg and her determination to look upon any violation of it as a
casits belli had delayed the German advance at its most critical initial stage.
All this was intended to serve the purpose of a group in Belgium, organised
in the so-called Comite de Politique Nationale, which advocated a programme
of annexations at the expense of Holland. For a time this question severely
strained relations between Holland and Belgium. There never existed any
doubt in the public mind as to the utter inadmissibility of any attempt on
the integrity of the country. Not a particle of right could be advanced on
behalf of these Belgian claims. The population of Limburg and Zeeland
Flanders (the two regions coveted by the annexationists) proclaimed strenu-
ously their loyalty to the Dutch fatherland.
PIETER GEYL
631
The Dutch Btandpoint was that there could be no discussion of claims in-
volving Dutch sovereignty as Holland had not been a party in the war and
had honourably fulfilled her obligations as a neutral. If a revision of the
1839 treaties (which had constituted the Belgian Kingdom) had become
necessary owing to Belgium’s wish to be relieved from her permanent neutral-
ity, the work should be done without prejudicing Dutch interests. Mr. Van
Kamebeek, however, did not refuse to go to Paris to explain this point of
view to the Council of Allied and Associated Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
who heard M. Hymans of May 20 and Mr. Van Karnebeek on June 3, 1919.
Their decision was entirely favourable to Holland, and it could not well
have been otherwise. Grievances relating to the economic regime obtaining
on the common waterways — for such, too, Belgium had put forward — were
referred to private negotiations between the two countries.
In spite of this decision the annexationist agitation in Belgium did not
die down, and that it still had the support of the Government appeared when
a secret circular to Belgian agents ” in Dutch Limburg was brought to the
light of day. The negotiations on new arrangements for the regime on the
Scheldt, on the Ghent Terneuzen Canal, etc., were thus carried on under
rather difficult circumstances. Yet Holland, although not admitting that the
rSgime of 1839 had been harmful to Belgian interests, adhered to her deter-
mination to meet grievances in a conciliator spirit. Early in 1920 a treaty
in which several Dutch concessions were laid down was ready for signature.
But all the work had been done in vain. A new dispute arose, about the
sovereignty of the Wielingen, that is, the channel which leads into the Scheldt
estuary and which runs out into the open sea along the Bel^an coast. Hol-
land has exercised sovereign rights over that water since mediaeval times, but
Belgium now refused to continue the negotiations and to sign the treaty un-
less her claim to it were acknowledged. As Holland refused to give way, the
negotiations were broken off and the economic regime of 1839 was continued.
It has continued ever since, and nothing is heard any more about the griev-
ances which loomed so large in 1919.
Many Dutchmen felt somewhat uneasy at the prospect of the dispute
with Belgium remaining unsettled in a Europe which seemed only too likely
to offer opportunities for picking quarrels and in which Belgium seemed to
be able to count on the active support of France. Undoubtedly, however, re-
lations have lately improved. It has not been lost upon the attention of the
Dutch people that the Flemings never took part in the anti-Dutch agitation
of the years after the Armistice; that on the contrary their most influential
leaders denounced it vigorously. It is an observation which has not missed its
effect upon the attitude of Holland with regard to Belgium. The development
of the Flemish movement, which opposes the absorption of Belgium by French
language and culture and attempts to rouse the racial consciousness of the
people of the Flemish provinces, is followed in the northern coimtry with
greater interest since its political significance is more accurately appreciated.
It should be explained — the fact is little known in other countries — that
Dutch and Flemish are two names for the same language.
Mr. Van Karnebeek’s conduct of the difficult Dutch-Bel^an dispute,
as well as of the question of the ex-Kaiser’s asylum, was eminently success-
ful, and added to the country’s prestige abroad. In 1921 he represented
Holland at the Washington Conference, and later in the same year presided
over the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva with great ability.
But Holland has little power to influence the course of events in the world
at large, and we have seen already that she is bearing her full share of suf-
fering in consequence of the disorganisation and impoverishment of Central
Europe. The fictitious prosperity which followed upon the cessation of
632 HOLLAND'S THANKLESS ROLE AS NEUTRAL
hostilities lasted no longer in Holland than it did in England, and a slack
time began of which the end was not in sight in January, 1924. Shipping
and ship-building particularly felt the effects, and no place suffered more
from the occupation of the Ruhr area and from the preference granted by
France to her own and Belgian commerce in Alsace-Lorraine than the great
port of Rotterdam. Unemployment began to be a drain on Dutch resources
no less than it was in En^and.
HOME AFFAIRS
We said that the Armistice had been ^eeted with relief by the Dutch
people. Yet about that time their attention was almost monopolised by
troubles of their own. Mr. Troelstra, the leader of the Dutch Socialist party,
his imagination fired by the spectacle of the German revolution, toyed with
the idea of imitating it among his own people. The attempt was a ludicrous
failure. The Government took strong measures, and the people rallied to
them. Yet a certain nervousness remained, and it is not perhaps unfair to
mention the shock of the November days ” as one explanation of a zeal
for social reform which characterised the years 1919 and 1920. Large sums
of money were voted in aid of building societies and building schemes of
municipal bodies. Not only were housing conditions greatly improved, but
as architecture had become a living art again in Holland and the best archi-
tects were called in, the new quarters of many a Dutch town afford fine
examples of modern building and have been studied and admired by the
experts of other countries. An Act was also passed for restricting the hours
of labour to forty-five a week. Holland was in advance of all other countries
with this piece of legislation.
But with the lean years a reaction against these tendencies set in, al-
though naturally the Trades Unions are not inclined to surrender without
a struggle what they have won On yet another point the stress of the times
has occasioned a revulsion of feeling against legislation passed almost with-
out opposition only a few years ago. The new Cabinet of the Right found
itself placed before the congenial task of carrying into practice the general
provision of financial equality for denominational education which their
predecessors had written into the Constitution. It is now felt that the multi-
plication of small schools supported by public money, which had been the
consequence of the Cabinet's measures, places an almost intolerable burden
upon the taxpayer.
Gradually during these last few years the financial situation has become
the central question of Dutch politics. Economy is the need of the hour.
Only by cutting down expenditure can the budget be balanced and the
stability of the guilder (which has so far wonderfully maintained itself) be
assured. In the early summer of 1923 the Government strengthened itself
with a new Minister of Finance, Mr Colyn, Dr. Kuyper's successor as
leader of the Anti-Revolutionary party, and ex-Minister of War, ex-Direc-
tor of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, and generally looked upon as the
strong man of Dutch politics. He was to carry out a programme of ruth-
less economy. A great sensation was caused by a plan for cutting down
by one-fifth all salaries paid by the State.
In January, 1924, all these plans were in the melting-pot. The Govern-
ment had come to grief over a proposal for the strengthening of the defence
of the Dutch East Indies. In spite of the Washington Treaties they con-
sidered the situation in the Pacific still to contain such threatening possibili-
ties that they felt unable to bear the responsibility of power unless the
PIETER GEYL
633
colonies were put in a better position to defend their neutrality in case of a
conflict. The Naval Bill in which their plans were embodied, however,
roused tremendous opposition from the public on whom at the same time
they were impressing the need of economy, and in October, 1923, the Second
Chamber rejected it by 50 to 49 votes. Ten Catholics voted with the parties
of the Left.
The situation thus created is full of interest. Ever since the school
struggle ” was settled many people hoped that the division of parties along
religious lines would be replaced by the more natural one in accordance with
economic and political opinions and ambitions. The rejection of the Naval
Bill seemed to emphasise the need for a regrouping of parties. In 1913 it
had been seen that the parties of the Left were unable to form a Government.
The defection of the ten Catholics seemed to prove that the Coalition of the
Right had lost its vitality. Many weeks have passed since Mr. Ruys de
Beerenbrouck offered his resignation and that of his colleagues to the Queen
in consequence of the defeat suffered over the Naval Bill, but no solution of
the crisis had been reached in January, 1924.
We are leaving Holland therefore in a rather unsettled condition politi-
cally, and economically and financially depressed. Yet Dutchmen need not
despair of the future. They have weathered many storms during the last
decade. Their country had come through unscathed, impoverished no doubt,
but with its credit unshaken, its material and intellectual equipment unim-
paired. The people are adapting themselves to the hard times, not indeed
without grumbling but bravely, and with that practical sense which has
helped them through difficult moments before. The prosperity of the colo-
nies is a bright spot even in the dark picture of to-day. If the intentions of
France and Belgium sometimes give rise to uneasy speculations, much is
hoped for from the steadying influence of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. And
as soon as normal conditions are restored in Europe, Holland will be found
in the front rank of European nations, ready to resume the forward march
which we may trust the w^ar has only interrupted.
CHAPTER XXXm
DYNAMIC ITALY
By Signor Francesco Nitti
Formerly Premier of Italy.
I. Geographical Extent
During the first quarter of this century Italy has undergone many
changes, but of all the great European continental countries it is the one
that has changed least territorially. After 1912 she acquired a new colony,
Libya; and after the World War, by means of the treaties of 1919, she
changed her boundaries; but these changes are of slight account* in com-
parison with those of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and France, which,
with Italy, were the five great continental countries of Europe previous to
the outbreak of the war. Italy is a country of very small geographical ex-
tent. Before the war her area was 286,600 square kilometres (about 110,000
sq. miles) ; since the war, Trent and the Upper Adige, Julian Venetia, the
little territory of Zara and a few islands in the Adriatic have been added,
but the total of this addition is less than 26,000 square kilometres.
A small territory, indeed, in view of the large population which inhabits
it — a population which is more than a third of that of the United States.
Yet the area of Italy is about equal only to that of Arizona, while it is
much less than one-half that of Texas. Tfie consequence of the small extent
of the area combined with a relatively very large population is that Italy
is necessarily a dynamic country. Of all the great countries of continental
Europe, Germanv and Italy have the largest populations in proportion to
their territory; they cannot live within their boundaries, but must export a
large number of men, a large quantity of manufactured goods, or both
together.
HIGH ITALIAN BIRTH-RATE
In all countries it has been observed that there is a diminution of the
birth-rate as civilisation increases. This holds good generally and is true
of Italy also; but in Italy the birth-rate still remains very high, while the
death-rate is decreasing. Consequently the number of Italians in Italy is
always increasing as does the number of Italians outside of Italy. In 1901
Italy had a population of 32,242,220; in 1905, it had increased to 33,138,033;
in 1910 to 34,205,795; in 1915 to 36,120,118; and according to the census of
1921, and counting also the inhabitants of the territories newly annexed by
Italy, 38,835, 941. This rapid increase in population is all the more remark-
able in view of the fact that Italian emigration, both before the war and
after, has always been very large. In 1900 Italian emigration to all the
countries of the world amounted to 352,782, and from that year until the
outbreak of the World War it always exceeded this figure — m some years,
indeed, as in 1906, being more than double, and in 1913 even reaching a
total of 872,598.
634
© U, S. Signal Corps Photo
The seaport of Fiume, long a bitter bone of contention between Italy and Yugoslavia, annexed by
Italy m 1924 in agreement with Yugoslavia.
© Keystone View Co
Gabriele d*Annunzio, poet and soldier, who with the aid of a band of volunteers seized Fiume,
September 11, 1919, and for fifteen months successfully defied the Italian Government and the
whole of Europe. In March, 1924, he was created a Prince by King Victor Emmanuel.
FRANCESCO NITTI
635
SOME EMIGRATION FACTS AND FIGURES
So large an emigration is only possible because, for the most part, it is
merely a question of Italian labourers going to European countries to work
at certain seasons and then returning home; or going to countries outside
of Europe for a few years, saving to form a small capital, and then return-
ing to their own country to take up their original work once more. About
three-quarters of Italian emigrants return. In 1913, the high-water year
of Italian emigration, 872,598 left Italy, of whom 291,000 went to Western
and Central Europe, 408,182 to North America (376,776 of them to the
United States), 811 went to Central America and 147,332 to South America.
Since the war, however, this state of affairs has changed, as Central Euroi^
is in a state of great economic confusion, while the United States has seri-
ously restricted immigration.
THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION ON ITALIAN POPULATION
But while emigration is a necessity for Italy at the present stage of her
development, it is by no means certain that it is a benefit to her. Italy
rears and trains workingmen who, arrived at the period of greatest returns,
leave for foreign lands to sell their working power. On the one hand they
send their savings to their native country; this is the credit side. But on
the other hand, if their savings do compensate or partially compensate for
the expenses of their training, they do not compensate for the demographic
and physical deterioration of the population. The most active elements are
removed and these either do not return at all or return under conditions of
physical deterioration.
But emigration is still a necessity for Italy. In the five-year period pre-
ceding the war — 1909 to 1913 — the number of births exceeded annually,
on the average, the number of deaths by about 430,000. Fecundity was so
marked that the population, in spite of losses, increased at the rate of 1.2
per cent a year. In the five years before the war the annual number of
emigrants was about 650,000, but 500,000 used to come back. The loss was
about 150,000 inhabitants a year. Since the war, however, emigration has
greatly decreased. In 1920-1922, an average of 325,000 Italians emigrated,
but only 110,000 returned to their country. Thus the growth of population
increases.
In the first ten years of the twentieth century through the difference be-
tween emigrants and immigrants, Italy lost one and a half million men;
while according to the calculations of an Italian statistician, in the period of
30 years from 1862 to 1891, there was a loss of four and a half millions
due to the excess of emigrants over immigrants — a greater loss than that
of any other country. It is these immigrants who have formed the nuclei of
the Italian colonies in foreign lands. In some parts of Brazil and particularly
in Sao Paolo, the Italians possess a large part of the wealth; there are also
very prosperous colonies of them in Argentina and in the United States of
America, although in the latter country they are frequently in a position of
inferiority, chiefly owing to their language and lack of organisation.
The World War has greatly injured the population of the European
states, especially through the death and invalidism of the best portion of
the young manhood. This has caused an economic and still more a moral
deterioration. But if the population has grown worse, the character of the
DYNAMIC ITALY
Continental states has grown much worse. Europe has become ‘‘Balkan-
ised ” in the sense that the various peace treaties have created a large
number of states which have no vitality, or whose composition condemns
them to a continual internal and external struggle.
ITALIAN COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT
After 1900 Italy began to develop her colonies; but they can in no
manner provide for the excess of her population both because the possibilities
of development are limited, as in the case of Erithrea, and because, even
though they are capable of being developed, as in the case of Italian Somali-
land, they need a great deal of time and large sums of money which can be
used more conveniently at home.
The colony of Erithrea has an area of 119,000 square kilometres with a
population of a little more than 400,000 natives and 4,500 Europeans, mostly
Italians. The climate and the agricultural conditions will possibly permit
of a moderate development of the colony, in which Italy has built more than
a hundred kilometres of railway and 1,200 kilometres of roads, and to which
she has established regular steamship lines. In spite of all efforts, however,
it has only been possible to develop the raising of animals and to lease a
little more than 17,000 hectares (32,000 acres) of land. Thus the colony,
even after many years, does not even pay the expenses of administration, its
receipts for 1922-1923 being estimated at a little more than 10,000,000 lire,
while the expenses amounted to more than 27,000,000 lire.
Italian Somaliland has a more promising future, and is the only colony
that has not involved Italy in a real war, for it was occupied practically
without bloodshed and has been held without military effort. As a result of
agreements made in London by Nitti in 1920 (in accordance with the London
Agreement, on account of which Italy entered the war in 1915), Great
Britain has made notable concessions in the southern part of Juba, and has
given in Kisimayo the possibility of a real port on the Indian Ocean. Ac-
cording to the London Agreement, Great Britain and France, in the event
of victory, were to revise their boundaries in respect to the Italian colonies,
making just compensation where necessary. England has shown that she
is prepared to observe this agreement in connection with Italian Somaliland,
but France has shown no inclination to do so beyond conceding a few districts
in the desert.
The area of Italian Somaliland is about 400,000 square kilometres and
the population about 400,000. Live-stock raising is fairly extensive, and
a census taken on July 1, 1920, indicated 1,246,461 cattle, 1,666,308 sheep
and 2,101,178 camels. In 1921-1922 the receipts of the colony were less
than 7,000,000 lire, while the cost provided for in 1922-1923 was a little
under 20,000,000 lire Nevertheless Italian Somaliland is capable of great
future development, and when Italy is able to invest a large amount of
capital in this colony, it may become an important source of revenue, and
may even slowly absorb bodies of colonists.
Libya is the colony which has cost Italy the greatest sacrifices, and not-
withstanding long wars and heavy expense, seems destined to remain forever
a heavy burden on the state’s budget and a constant cause of anxiety. It
is divided into the two colonial governments of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica,
and previous to the Italian occupation in 1911 belonged to THirkey. It has
always been a question why Italy ever went to Libya; the Government of
the day asserted that she went there because if she had not, someone else
FRANCESCO NITTI
637
would have done so. It is not clear whether France or Germany was meant.
The Italian occupation of the territory in 1911 brought on the war between
Turkey and Italy (ending in the Treaty of Ouchy), which in turn gave rise
to the Balkan Wars and to the ardent desire by Serbia for greater espansion.
Tripolitania has an enormous area of some 900, (KX) square kilometres and
a population of about 550,000, mostly Arabs, Berbers, etc., with a little
over 18,000 Italians. The territory is arid and for the most part desert and
is little capable of economic development, but Italy has made heavy sacrifices
to construct railways, to make roads, to establish steamship lines and to
organise the public services. But the results have been, and always will
be, very scanty. For 1922-1923 the expenditure was expected to be 141,000-
000 lire, while for 1921-1922 the receipts were only 22,000,000 lire, obtained
for the most part from the purchases of the Italian inhabitants themselves.
Cyrenaica, with a population of 225,000, of whom the majority are Arabs
and Berbers, has an area of 600,000 square kilometres. Like Tripolitania,
its soil, with the exception of a few districts, is very poor and incapable of
cultivation, but railways and roads have been constructed and steamship
lines established by Italy. In 1922-1923 the expenses provided for amounted
to 119,000,000 lire, the receipts for 1921-1922 being 19,000,0(X) lire. In a
word, for this immense and useless colony Italy has spent more than 3,(K)0-
000,000 gold lire.
II. Industrialisation op Italy
During the last 30 years Italy has solved the problem of intensifying
her agriculture and of forming the fundamental nuclei of industrial life,
^e establishment of her industry has been particularly difficult. Hitherto,
in all large modern countries, industry has been built up out of iron and
fed with coal. Now, Italy is almost destitute of either substance ; but among
countries of more than 20,000,000 inhabitants, Italy is the only one in the
world that has been able to create its industry, though lacking in both com-
modities and, indeed, in most raw materials. This transformation, full of
obstacles as it was, was begun during the last twenty years of the nineteenth
century and was completed mainly in the fourteen years of the twentieth
century which preceded the World War. The chief credit for this effort is
due to the persistence of the Italian people; but not a little is also due to
the actions of Germany. Being, up to the time of the war, a party to the
Triple Allianee, Italy was enabled to make use in no small degree of that
intellectual effort which had placed Germany in the front rank in Europe.
Germany’s influence was very great in the field of research and intellectual
studies, German technical knowledge was also widely used in Italian indus-
tries, and Italian banks were modelled essentially on those of Germany.
LACK OP RAW MATERIALS
In the years immediately preceding the World War, the situation in Italy
as regards the production of raw material was relatively extremely difficult
as she was not in a position to command any of the most important. In
the matter of grain, out of 4(X),000,0()0 quintals, which constituted the average
production for the period from 1909 to 1913, Italy produced little less than
50,000,000, and was consequently obliged to import on the average 14,500,000
quintals for her own consumption, a figure which became much larger during
and after the war.
Italy produces no coal at all. A considerable amount of lignite is pro-
038 DYNAMIC ITALY
duced, but this is difficult to utilise. In the world production of coal and
lignite for the year 1913 — 1,342,000,000 tons — Italy had only the insignifi-
cant share of 700,000 tons of lignite. The development of her mdustry as well
as that of her railways has been based on the importation of coal, nearly all
from England. In 1872 Italy imported 1,037,409 tons, a figure which rose in
1882 to 2,180,020 tons, and then to 3,877,571 tons in 1892, to 5,287,640 tons
in 1902, to 9,338,752 tons in 1910, and to 10,834,008 tons in 1913. This last
figure represents the largest importation, as during the war and as a con-
sequence of the war there was a great diminution, the importation in some
years having been as little as half this quantity.
Producing no petroleum, except in insignificant quantities, no cotton and
only restricted quantities of iron, Italy has consequently been forced to
build up her industry imder the most difficult conditions, importing practi-
cally all her raw materials.
But, owing to the dense population of her small territory, Italy still
imports, in spite of her increasing production, much of her food from abroad.
The amount of this importation may be roughly stated at from thirty to
forty metric quintals, or 100 kilogrammes (about 225 pounds) annually for
each inhabitant.
INTENSIVE FOOD CULTIVATION
Examining the agrarian statistics for the first quarter of the present
century, the following characteristic facts are notable: (1) the uncultivated
lands have been reduced to a much smaller area, and now amount only to a
little more than 1,500,000,000 hectares, which, on account of their slight fer-
tility or their situation, are unsuited to profitable cultivation ; (2) the propor-
tion of the area sown with ^ain has remained almost unchanged, but the
production has been greatly intensified; (3) the live-stock industry has de-
veloped greatly and the area of pasture land has increased; (4) the rich
arboreal culture has been stren^hened and developed, particularly the
vines and fruit trees.
CONTBAST BETWEEN ITALY AND FRANCE IN RAW MATBBIALa
Before the war, Italy imported about 30 million quintals of foodstuffs
every year. France produces almost all her own food, England only enough
for two days a week, and Italy sufficient for a little less than five days a
week. Being forced to obtain supplies from without and to exchange the
products of industry for the products of the soil. Great Britain’s interest
lies in a real peace policy. Since the war she has wanted peace, for harm
inflict^ on any great nation of Europe is harm infiicted on her, even though
it be in a different degree. On the other hand, France has an agrarian pro-
duction that suffices her own needs ; she possesses, especially since the Treaty
of Versailles, iron-mines that exceed her needs; she has appropriated, or is
endeavouring to appropriate, and by any means, great quantities of coal;
she possesses an abundance of fertilisers in her own territory and in her
colonies; she strives to develop her colonies and desires to carry out one
sole programme — to wit, the abasement and, if it is possible, the complete
ruin of Germany. While economic conditions may not determine moral ideas
and political programmes, they must inevitably exert a profoimd influence
upon these social phenomena.
FRANCESCO NITTI
639
ITAUAN COMMEBCE!
Previous to the war Italy’s foreign commerce had increased notably. In
1901, the total commerce amounted to 3,092,000,000 lire, that is, 95.04 lire
per inhabitant. Of this total amount 1,718,000,000 lire, that is 52.81 per
inhabitant, represented imports, while 1,374,000,000 lire, or 4223 per inhabi-
tant, represented exports. The development of this commerce, up to the time
of the war, had been steady, and in 1913, Italy’s total commerce amounted
to 6,158,000,000 lire, or 173.83 per inhabitant, the imports being 3,646,000,000
lire or 102.91 per inhabitant, and the exports 2,512,000,000 lire, or 70.92
per inhabitant.
The difference between exports and imports rose from 344,000,000 lire in
1901 to 1,134,000,000 lire in 1913. Notwithstanding this, the Italian lira was
at par with gold, and indeed often at a premium above gold. How, then,
did Italy, having no credits in foreign lands, pay this difference in the com-
mercial balance? Two items were of special assistance: the money sent
home by the emigrants abroad and the money spent by foreigners in Italy.
This last entry could be estimated for the period between 1901 and 1914 at
from 500,000,000 to 700,000,000 lire a year. Even more important were the
sums sent home by emigrants, which amounted in later years to almost a
billion lire at par with gold.
For over thirty years before the war, Italy sold her richest agricultural
produce to Germany, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland; she imported a
large part of her raw materials from Russia. As a consequence of the war
she has found herself in a state of real and destructive isolation.
Ships which left Great Britain with a full cargo — frequently of coal —
deposited this cargo in Italy, where they took on board goods for the Black
Sea. In the ports of the Black Sea they loaded oil, grain, etc., and returned
to England, having taken on a new cargo in Italy, and iron and pyrites
in Spain. For long periods of time Italy was able to obtain the most favour-
able freight rates and to buy coal at almost the same price that it cost in
England, the ships making their trips with full cargoes both ways. As a
consequence of the war, however, or perhaps of the bad and dishonest
treaties of peace rather than of tbe war itself, the whole Italian economic
structure has been greatly disturbed. Since America cannot sell in great
quantities to Europe, where everything is in a state of chaos, she is obliged to
limit immigration; consequently, Italy cannot count on her normal receipts
from emigrants; her former markets in Germany, Austria-Hungary and
Switzerland have in some cases disappeared; while the cycle of regular and
cheap navigation on the Great Britain-Mediterranean-Black Sea route has
been broken by the collapse of Russia.
During the period that Italy was at war, from 1915 to 1918, her imports
greatly exceeded her exports every year, the enormous difference being paid
chiefly by loans made in England and tbe United States.
The greatest evil is that since the war the difference in the balance has
been greatly reduced but has not entirely disappeared; indeed, in 1923 it
was still very large. Even in 1913 the imports were 16,623 millions and the
exports 6,065 millions; in 1920, 26,853 and 11,757 millions respectively; in
1921 and in 1922 there was still a difference of about 6,000,000,000 lire,
lliere has consequently been a greater diminution in these last years, but
we are still far from a normal situation, althou^ Italy, after 1920, has had
as little recourse as possible to borrowing abroad.
610
DYNAMIC ITALY
VIOLENT DEBANOEMENT OF ITALIAN EXCHANGE
From this situation, and from the inflation of paper money have arisen
the phenomena of the drop in exchange and the increase in domestic prices.
Before the war it was rare that the exchange was against Italy. Examining
the average course of exchange from 1881 to 1914, it is remarkable that
Italy maintained the par value of money, with unavoidable fluctuations,
except in the period from 1892 to 1901; from 1903 to 1911 her exchange was
very favourable. After the war, however, Italian money underwent a de-
preciation in some markets as great even as 59 or 75 per cent and this violent
disequilibrium of exchanges necessarily brought about a great disorder in
prices. After the war prices rose abruptly and there has never been a
period when they really dropped.
INFLATION OF CUHBENCY
On June 30, 1914, the circulation of paper money was only 2,698,000,000
lire and this figure has since risen to 21,000,000,000 lire, at the close of 1920
the circulation being eight times larger than when war was declared in 1914.
The rate of the paper lira compared to gold, which was 100 per cent in the
first six months of 1914, fell to 76 m the latter half of 1916, rose again to
82 in the second half of 1918 (in consequence of the measures taken by the
Minister of the Treasury, Nitti, and agreements made with Great Britain
and the United States of America) ; it later fell to 64 in the first half of
1919, to 28 in the first half of 1920, and since that year has varied pretty
constantly between 22 and 26.
Italy, of all the victorious nations, is the one in which the cost of living
is highest, prices since 1914 having risen on the average more than five times,
while the prices of some commodities have risen as much as ten or fifteen
times. If consumption has felt the effects of this state of things, production
has felt it even more.
GBOWTH OF ITALIAN INDUSTHY
Nevertheless many Italian industries, especially those that do not need
large quantities of raw materials, and in which workmanship counts for
more, have overcome the acute period of the crisis. In the years from 1903
to 1914 the power of steam boilers was doubled; great hydro-electric plants
arose, some of them among the largest in Europe; while many new industries
sprang up and many expanded considerably. The production of sulphur and
of a few of the minor industries has diminished on account of the general con-
ditions of the market, but the mechanical industries — the chemical, the
textile, above all the cotton industry — have developed very greatly. Pre-
vious to the outbreak of the World War, considerably the best customer for
Italian exportations was Germany, and the best market was the centre of
Europe.
The most important and characteristic factor in Italian industry from the
end of the nineteenth century to 1923 is the employment of hydraulic energy
as a motor force, which constitutes almost a necessity for Italy in view of
her total lack of coal; and in proportion to its area, no country possesses a
greater amount of hydraulic power, which constitutes what is practically a
necessitv for Italy bearing in view the fact of her total lack of coal ; indeed,
considering the question in proportion to its area, no country possesses a
greater amoimt of hydraulic power.
FRANCESCO NITTI
641
BliBCTRIC POWER
At the beginning of 1923 it was calculated that the power of the electric
S lants in Italy amounted to 1,900,000 kilowatts of which 1,600,000 was in
ydraulic plants and 400,000 in steam plants. In 1923 there were being con-
structed or plans were being prepared for plants developing 500,000 more
kilowatts. In proportion to its area it has utilised more by hydraulic power
than any other country whatever.
Italy can, without any very great effort, increase at least five times her
present hydro-electric plants, and can construct in a few years plants capable
of giving 9 or 10 million kilowatts. The average employment of the plants
is about 4,600 hours a year. In 1913, at the time that she consumed most
coal, Italy used only a little more than 11,000,000 tons. She will soon be
able to receive from her hydro-electric plants an amount of energy equal to
that which thirty-five to forty million tons of coal can give. Considering the
economic structure of Italy, this is a large figure, though it may seem a
small figure compared with the enormous energy at the disposal of the United
States of America and of Great Britain and Germany.
What particularly concerns Italy is the distribution of her water. Italy
is surrounded on the north by a great chain of mountains, the Alps. Another
great chain of mountains, the Appenines, runs through her entire length.
Being surrounded on every side, except the north, by the sea, Italy has a
large number of waterfalls within a small area. Moreover, while the rivers
in the north are highest in the summer, owing to the melting of the ice and
snow in the Alps, the rivers of the Appenines are fullest in winter. The
large number of reservoirs, which can easily be built throughout the whole
length of the peninsula, make it much more easy, not only to utilise the
power but also to employ it most conveniently, not merely in industry, but
also, and particularly, in electric traction for the railways. According to
ofiicial statistics, 76% of the consumption is in northern Italy, 16% in central
Italy and 8% in southern Italy and the islands.
III. Transportation
The development of means of communication and of transportation has
been very rapid in Italy. In 1860, when the Kingdom of Italy came into
existence, there were 48,028 kilometres of national provincial and communal
roads; in 1910 there were 148,380 kilometres; and before long Italy will have
200,000 kilometres of roads, almost all suitable for automobile transport.
In 1861 there were 2,189 kilometres of railways; in 1865 this figure had
risen to 4,367 kilometres; in 1900 it was 15,884 kilometres; in 1914 it was
18,614 kilometres and in 1923 it was a little less than 21,000 kilometres,
while the street car-lines which amounted to 5,523 kilometres in 1914 were,
in 1923, much over 6,000 kilometres. The railways in Italy have been built
under great difficulties, not only on account of the lack of coal and iron,
but also on account of the mountainous surface of the land and prevalence of
malaria in central and southern Italy. Italian labourers have a pronounced
taste for road-making; it is an old tradition handed down from the Romans,
who spread magnificent roads over all the known world of their day — roads
that are many of them still in existence; indeed, there are in Italy to-day
not a few districts where men still travel on the roads built by the Romans
twenty centuries ago.
T. B. Y. — VOL. 1 — 41
642
DYNAMIC ITALY
ITAUAN POBIB
Maritime navigation aleo developed in Italy under great difficulties.
Italy has nearly 7,000 kilometres of sea coast. But the development of mari-
time traffic depends, not on the extent of territory bordering on the sea,
W on the existence of well-equipped ports which have behind them a large
hinterland of production or of consumption. Now Italy before the war had
only a few large ports, mainly in the north, with a sufficient hinterland. Her
large number of small ports are of little importance. The port of Trieste,
which came to Italy after the war, is wholly inactive. It was the great port
of German Austria, of Bohemia, of other territories of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. To-day the breaking-up of Austria-Hunga^ has deprived the port
of Trieste of a large part of its importance, and it will be many years before
it can recover it. Unlike the great ports of Germany and of Central Europe
which have behind them a very large hinterland, none of the Italian ports,
with the exception of Genoa, some of the smaller Ligurian ports, and — in
part — of Venice, are capable of any great development. Naples is im-
portant only as a port of transit for passengers, in the sense that it is an
important disembarking port, for ships that go to or come from the Orient
by way of the Suez Canal. Vessels leaving Hamburg or Amsterdam for
East Africa or the Indies, China, Japan, etc., stop in the Mediterranean
to complete their cargoes; and in the same way on their return, stop to
unload goods for ports in the Mediterranean basin. They are thus enabled
to fill up their cargoes with ease and to offer cheap freight rates, and it is
this that has been the greatest difficulty in the development of Italian
shipping, and will continue to be so in spite of the intelligence of the Italian
seaman, unless, when it reaches the right stage of development, it does as
English, German and Norwegian shipping have done and goes in search of
freight in all parts of the world.
A FEW FIGURES CONCERNING ITALIAN SHIPPING
In 1900 Italy had a sailing fleet which in tonnage surpassed its steam-
ships; she had 5,511 sailing vessels with a capacity of 568,164 tons, and 446
steamships with a net capacity of 376,844 tons. But the proportion changed
rapidly, as it has in practically all countries. In 1914, when war broke out,
Italy had 4,773 sailing vessels with a net capacity of 348,959 tons and 949
steamships with a capacity of 933,156 tons. But the number of vessels has
greatly increased through acquisitions made on account of war necessities
and through the shipping acquired with the annexation of Trieste and of
the territory of Julian Venetia. In 1921 there were 825 steamships with a
net capacity of 1,433261 tons.
Many international statistics of tonnage are computed in gross tons —
that is, the internal capacity of the vessel. In the above the figures in-
dicating the increase in Italian shipping are given in net tons — that is,
that portion of the volume of the ship that can be used for the transportation
of goods and passengers. The greater part of the trade between Italy and
other countries goes by sea; of the total imports and exports in 1913 —
26,000,000 tons — 22,000,000 passed through the seaports. In 1921 the por-
tion of the 19,000,000 tons of Italian exports and imports that went by sea
was 14,000,000 tons. Much coal came by sea from Germany in 1921.
FRANCESCO NITTI
643
Italy’s place in world shipping
The effect of the war has been to increase the world’s tonnage. The
world’s fleet of steamers and motor-boats, which, in 1914, amounted to
44,000,000 gross tons, has risen to about 56,000,000 tons in 1^2, but sailing
vessels have been reduced to 4.7% of the tonnage of the world’s fleet, while
in 1914 they were still 7.9%. The total world’s fleet on Jime 30, 1914,
amounted to 45,404,000 gross tons, and Italy was in the eighth place wi1&
1,430,000; on June 30, 1919, the world’s tonnage was 47,987,000, and Italy
still held the eighth place; on June 30, 1922, it was 61,343,000 tons, and
Italy, with 2,699,000 tons, was fifth.
Considering the needs of the nation, the Italian fleet had not been
sufficiently developed; in the last five years of peace three-quarters of the
merchandise and one-half of the travellers going to or coming from abroad
who embarked and disembarked at Italian ports, were transported on Italian
ships, although only the coasting trade and the traffic ^tween national
ports were a monopoly of the Italian mercantile marine. The expansion
of Italian shipping, like that of the shipping of other countries, has come at
a time when trade was diminishing, and this has helped to make the crisis
more acute.
In 1913 the merchandise loaded or discharged amounted to 32,000,000
tons; in 1919-1921 the yearly average of goods loaded and unloaded was
only 19,000,000 tons.
DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF RAILWAY EXPANSION
The railways also are in a condition of uncertainty following on the
disorder wrought by the war. Since 1906 Italian railways have in a great
measure been operated by the State In 1923 about 16,500 kilometres were
operated by the State and 4,500 by private corporations. Italy has few
railways in proportion either to its population or its area — somewhat less
than seven kilometres to every 100 kilometres of surface, while the proportion
in Great Britain and Germany is 12 and in France is 10. Not only is the
construction of railways exceedingly costly in Italy, but the long shape
of the peninsula and the islands make it impossible to form great railway
centres except in the valley of the Po. Two-tenths of the Italian railways
have slopes greater than 1%; three-tenths are on curves, and at least one-
twentieth underground in tunnels. In addition, the poverty of the ground,
lacking fossil combustibles, and having very few metallic minerals, stands
in the way of supplying a great mass of transportation material, and this
makes operations more expensive.
During the war the Italian railways, like those of almost all continental
Europe, deteriorated greatly; there was a large increase in the numbers of
the operating force, and operation went on at a loss. Far from showing a
return for capital invested, the railways are now debtors, although the
indebtedness is being steadily reduced.
Italy has now a little less than 700 kilometres of railways run by
electricity; she will soon have more than 800. The operation of railways
by electriuty on a large scale as soon as it is possible, will be of great
advantage to Italy, because she can then dispense with imported carbon-
iferous fuel almost entirely, and will be better able to operate the
moimtain lines.
044 DYNAMIC ITALY
The automobile lines of the State and of the communes have greatly
developed; almost two-thirds of the communes possess automobile lines
subsidised either by the State or by the communes themselves.
IV. Italun Financbb
In a counfay such as Italy, the importance of State finances in regard
to national well-being is greater than in other countries. As a matter of
fact the State, even before the war, demanded of its citizens proportionately
even larjger contributions than did Great Britain, Germany and France.
But in spite of high taxation Italy increased her savings rapidly. The
total of the deposits with credit corporations, ordinary savings banks and
the postal savings banks, which, in 1900, was 2,512,000,000 lire, had more
than doubled in the year preceding tbe war, while on June 30, 1914, it
amounted to 7,595,000,000 lire. Italian savings also contributed largely to
the emission of public loans and to many worl^ of public utility. After the
war there came a great change in the situation. Apparently savings have not
diminished; on June 30, 1921, they amounted to 26,618,000,000 lire. Taking
into accoimt the loss of value of the lira, the ratio is not so very different.
But the country still saves slowly and laboriously.
CAPITALISATION
The yearly capitalisation also — that is, the increase of national riches
in all descriptions of economic goods, and of instruments of production, is
increased only with diflSculty; but if Italy is to avoid suffering she must
have an increase of riches greater than the increase in population, and this
does not happen every year, particularly since the war.
The State finances have received a heavy blow from the war, from which
fJiey are recovering only slowly and at a great sacrifice. The Tripoli under-
taking in 1911 was a slight blow to financial order; the World War was
a cyclone. In 1900-1901 the receipts of the State were 1,721,000,000 and
the expenditure 1,671,000,000 lire — an average expenditure of 51.50 lire per
inhabitant. Nevertheless, the taxes were regarded as burdensome. In
1913-1914, after the disasters brought about by the Libyan War, the re-
ceipts were 2,524,000,000 lire and the expenditure 2,738,000,000, the average
expenditure per inhabitant being 76.91 lire. Thus, even previous to the
World War a great increase in public expenditure on account of the de-
velopment of all public services, was already an established fact.
BEVENXTE AND EXFENDITXntB
But the ejpenses incurred during the war were necessarily so heavy, that
Italy was obliged to contract huge debts, not only at home, but also abroad.
In 1914-1915, the actual receipts were 2,500,000,000 lire and the actual ex-
penditure 5,4^,000,000 lire; in 1915-1916 the figures were 3,734,000,000 and
10,679,000,000; in 1916-1917 they rose to 5,345,000,000 and 17,634J)00,000;
in 1917-1918, 7,535,000,000 and 25,329,000,000; in 1918-1919, 9,674,000,000
and 32,452,000,000; in 1919-1920, 15,207 J)00,000 and 23,993,000,000; in
1920-1921, 18,^0,000,000 and 36,2^,000,000. Subsequently there has been
inevitably an increase of receipts and a diminution of expenses, and the
FBANCESCO NITTI 645
deficit has been reduced by between four ani five billion lire, with a distinct
tendency to still further diminution.
Duri^ the whole period of the war and in the following years, Italy
was obliged to make lar^ issues of loans, a proceeding adopted by nearly
all the Emopean coimtries. But in comparison with France, Italy's debte
are much smaller. Before the war the Italian public debt, in all forms, did not
amount to thirteen billions and a half; on May 31, 1922, having paid almost
all the war expenses, Italy had a debt of 114,000,000,000, calculating at par
the 21,000,000,000 of loans abroad, an unsatisfactory calculation, since the
Italian lira has lost greatly in value and the foreign debts are almost entirely
in dollars and sterling.
PUBUC DEBT
On this last-named date the debt was composed as follows; Public debt
preceding the war 13,358,000,000 lire; consolidated national loans 35,903-
000,000; ordinary yearly treasury notes, 25,253,000,000; notes due in ^ree
or five years or more, 7,238,000,000 lire; circulation of paper money, either
of the Btate or for the account of the State 10,328,000,000; loans abroad
particularly m England and the United States, calculating the lira at par,
21,361,000,000; deposits on account current bearing interest, in the depart-
ments of deposits and loans, 487,000,000; in all, 113,928,000,000 lire. At
the end of 1923 the debt was not far from 120,000,000,000 lire. When we
reflect that France with a population nearly equal to that of Italy, has a
debt that is almost three times larger, we realise that Italy’s debt is not as
heavy as it might be. If, on the other hand, we consider the economic
resources at Italy’s disposal, then the debt is undoubtedly very serious.
Italy has greatly increased her system of taxation in the hope of being
able to balance her accounts in a few years. While France has relied to
a large extent on the indemnities which Germany and the conquered countries
must pay, Italy has never attached any importance to this indemnity, being
convinced that she must rely on her own energy, most Italians feeling that
the best indemnity to be obtained from the conquered enemy consists of
the reestablishment of a real peace and a return to normal relations between
conquerors and conquered.
WILD FINANCIAL LEGISLATION
The renewal of economic and financial activity in Italy would have
been much more rapid if, in 1920, the Giolitti Ministry had not adopted a
number of financial measures which destroyed all credit and rendered in-
secure the condition of all industries. For no particular reason, and acting
on the impulse of demagogy, Italy instituted by law a parliamentary com-
mission to inquire into the expenses of the war. All the more important
industries had laboured in behalf of the State 'during the war; all found
that they were subject to parliamentary inquisitions, and as a result, in-
stead of passing from the period of crisis into one of production, they had
to think of defending themselves. Moreover, the min of a large number
of industries was brou^t about by a law unexampled in any country; in
violation of existing laws, it was insisted that all war profits be handed over
to the State. Everyone thought it ri^t that the State should have a large
share in war profits; but to take all was equivalent to forcing industries
m
DYNAMIC ITALY
into bankruptcy, or at any rate to injuring them very eeriously. And as if
this were not enough, the same Giolitti Ministry ordered that all bonds made
Dut in the owner’s name should be registered, while it abolished those pay-
able to the bearer. Finally, and with an utter want of judgment, it raised
the inheritance tax to a fig^ unequalled in any modem country, and by
imposing extravagant taxation, inflicted great harm on certain solid in-
dustries such as the automobile industry. All these provisions of financial
demagogy, created through prejudices, were later almost wholly abolished
t>y the Ministries which followed; but they had already done very great
larm, and Italian industry gave, after the war, the greatest proof of its
mdurance in not collapsing completely.
V. Italian Laboub Problems
In order to reestablish her economic security and her finances, Italy
must above all rely on her capacity for labour and her ability to produce,
[n her labour phenomena, however, Italy faces peculiar conditions. Mo-
bility is a characteristic of Italian labourers. At first labourers sold un-
skilled labour almost exclusively; but later, owing to the beneficial
influence of the schools and especially of the professional schools, and to
bhe marked development of Italian industry itself, Italy has been sending
}ut skilled labour in an increasing ratio.
ALABMINQ INCREASE OF STRIKES
The years between the end of the nineteenth century and the World
War were marked by a continual rise for Italian labourers, not only in
srages, but in a general improvement of the standard of living and in their
increased share in the life of the coimtry. In some years, however, the
srorkingmen have greatly abused this improvement by epidemic strikes.
While in 1881 there were only 44 strikes in industries, and one single agri-
cultural strike; in 1921 there were fully 1,042 industrial and 629 agricul-
tural strikes. The highest number was reached in 1907 with 1,881
industrial and 377 agricultural strikes and a total of 575,000 peasants and
vorkmen on strike.
The disorder among workingmen increased in the period immediately
following the war. There were psychological causes for this. During the
war strikes were prevented and were, in fact, very difficult to carry out.
]^e illusions about Russia before the truth was known, easily created ex-
jitement. Finally, after the war there was much restlessness almost all over
Europe, and the great strikes of this period had a contagious character,
[n some industries salaries had become too high; in others, the costs of
production had become so high as to make it difficult for even the best
crganised concerns to exist. It was natural that salaries should not de-
preciate as rapidly as the fall in value of the currency, but for a while a
paradox existed in that the increase in wages was proportionately greater
than the increase in prices and, therefore, than the increase in the cost
3 f living. From the middle of 1921 on, there has been a rapid tendency to
lower wages, while the cost of living remains nearly stationary or, in some
districts, actually rises.
Under the Giolitti Ministry during the summer of 1920, workingmen in
many parts of Italy took possession, almost without resistance, of a large
FRANCESCO NITTI
847
number of factories. They had no very definite aim and gave evidence of
no ability. Soon afterwards the illusions concerning Russia were dispelled,
chiefiy because a commission of Italian Socialists had gone to Russia and
had been able to see at first hand that Bolshevism was not a desirable
system. In the internal struggle between Fascist!, Socialists and Populars
(Catholics) that occurred later, the imity of action of the working-classes
had almost disappeared, and there had also arisen a strong spirit of resist-
ance among the industrial classes. But certain peculiarities of the Italian
situation caused this resistance, as we shall see below, to assume less deter-
mined form than elsewhere in Europe.
THE REACTION IN THE LABOUR WORLD
What depressed the condition of the working-classes, most, however,
after the summer of 1921, was the great lack of employment, which was
felt all the more acutely on account of the falling-off in emigration. Work-
ingmen do not strike when they know that it will be diflSicult for them to
find new work. Consequently, strikes have decreased and workingmen's
organisations have grown weaker. During the last year or so in Italy
there has grown up, even in political movements, a real reaction, which to
some degree seemed inevitable in view of the manner in which workingmen
had abused the advantages acquired through their organisations and the
democratic policy of Parliament. The reduction in wages and better dis-
cipline are the result, however, of deep-rooted economic causes rather than
of political causes, which in their nature are limited and not enduring. It
can be foreseen that the state of flaccidity and of indifference to work,
which followed the war in all European countries, will gradually disappear
and that we must necessarily come to smaller wages and to a marked de-
pression in the labour market.
The actions of Italian workmen have generally been exaggerated abroad;
these actions have often been rapid flashes without any depth. Italy is at
bottom a very conservative country; and the noisy manifestations of cer-
tain social classes which in the past have attracted attention, are very far
from being as serious as they would be in other countries, in which the
disaffected classes of society are both more extensive and more highly •
organised.
Italy for that matter is the only country in Europe which in about
2,000 years has never had a revolution nor a great religious war. Popular
uprisings of a local character, or municipal differences and partisan revolts,
are easier to deal with than great movements, extending over large areas,
which are more difficult to control.
THE WAR A SET-BACK TO ITALIAN CULTURE
The higher Italian culture made great progress between the end of the
nineteenth century and the period that preceded the war; at present there
is, as in all Europe, a feeling of dejection, especially on account of Germany,
which, formerly the great stimulator, has now dropped out. The condition
of the universities throughout Europe is less elevated as a consequence
of the war — a phenomenon which has been noticed in Italy also. Popular
instruction has made great progress, but, in spite of all efforts, less than
was hoped for, since illiteracy has not disappeared, but continues to exist
in a considerable degree in a large part of the country.
648
DYNAMIC ITALY
yi. Italy and the Tbifle Auijance
The Triple Alliance, of which Italy, Gennany and Aiutria-Hungaiy
were members, was to be essentially defensive. In its historical be^nings
it had a mission of peace; to restrain Russian Pan-Slavism and Prance’s
desire for reven^. When, at the end of July, 1914, the World War broke
out and the Triple Alliance lost its character of defence and peace and
Austria-Hungary and Germany decided on war without even notifying
Italy, the declaration of neutrality of August 2, 1914, became a necessity.
ITALIAN SEASONS FOB ENTERING THE WORLD WAR
It is difficult to say on whom rests the responsibility for the war. Hav-
ing examined not only all the yellow, red, white, green, blue, etc., books
published by the various Governments, and having also read all the docu-
ments, which the public for the most part does not yet know of, the author
has come, as did Lloyd George, to the conclusion that the responsibility for
the war rests a little on everyone’s shoulders, Russia’s and France’s, as well
as Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s. Italy kept out of war until the
spring of 1915, when she, too, took part in the conflict, joining the side of
the Entente. Occurrences and facts of various kinds influenced this de-
cision; the deep impression made by the violation of Belgium by Germany,
the mistakes and the violence of which the Germans were guilty in occu-
pied territo^, the menacing attitude of Austria-Hungary, which threatened
severe retaliation against Italy, which had not joined in the action of the
two Central Empires, in case these last should be victorious. Many Italians
also hoped to see the reunion of Italian territories — all Trent and Trieste,
the ancient aims of Italian irredentism.
Since she declared her neutrality before any other state, Italy made it
possible for France to unite all her forces in August, 1914, and thus to
make her resistance on the Marne. Entering into the war in the spring of
1915, when Russia was in a deplorable condition and already beginning to
collapse, Italy made resistance possible. After the fall of Russia she was
obliged to sustain alone the whole weight of the military action against
Austria-Hungary, which had far more soldiers, and was better equipped with
artillery and supplies.
Italy’s burdens and hardships in the world war
Of all the Entente countries, not counting Russia, it is Italy who bore
the greatest burdens in the war and was obliged, in proportion to her
wealth, to make the greatest sacrifices. Being an exclusively Mediterranean
coim^, she obtained supplies with extreme difficulty during the terrible
activity of the submarines, and for a long time her people were obliged to
subject themselves to the greatest privation. Tie economic and military
supplies of the Allies and their associates were directed chiefly to France
because the French war front was considered, perhaps erroneously, as the
most important. Finally, because Germany was believed to be the only
real enemy to be conquered, Italy, which was fighting alone against Austria-
Hungary in a most sanguinary and difficult war of exhaustion, often ex-
perienced very bitter hours of anxiety. Even after the terrible disaster of
FRANCESCO NITTI
648
Caporetto, which was more serious than, but did not differ from, other
disasters that befell the French and British troops, Italy managed unaided
to reestablish her forces for defence, and continued to fight alone against
Austria-Himgary up to the time of the final victory.
In this effort Italy not only lost 630,000 dead, but also a large part
of her wealth, accumulated by slow and persistent labour. Many of her
districts were devastated by the enemy, and she has rebuilt ihem by her
0 ^ effort alone, without awaiting the payment of reparations. The ter-
ritories conquered in the war are of value from the point of view of national
defence and of Italian patriotism, but they have slight economic value
and m this they differ from the territories acquired by the other conquering
nations.
ITALY AND THE DESTRUCTION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Of the 54 million population of the Empire of Austria-Hungary only 14
millions — to wit, those who are still inhabitants of Austria and Hun-
gary, now absurdly amputated — are considered enemies. The other 40
millions, changing the names of their nationalities, have been regarded as
friends and given all the privileges of the conquerors, and have been allowed
to annex many millions of Germans and Hungarians without any regard
for nationality and the principles of self-government. Austria-Hungary was
a name; the reality consisted in the peoples that constituted the empire.
Now these peoples, since the war, owing to the almost invariably unjustifi-
able annexation of foreign races, are compelled to defend the policy of
treaties and to maintain enormous armies.
As a consequence the political situation in Italy is now more secure than
it was before the war, while the chief commercial currents have been turned
away and the economic situation has grown much worse. This accounts
for the disturbed conditions that have existed in Italy since the war and
have manifested themselves in many different ways even in her foreign
policy.
VII. Giolitti in Power
The period from 1900-1914 was marked by a democratic policy and
was, on the whole, one of activity. On July 29, 1900, King Humbert I was
assassinated and was succeeded by his son, Victor Emmanuel III, who is
still reigning (1924). From the beginning of the century to the time of
the outtoeak of the World War, there were eleven Ministries; but we may
say that apart from short intervals, the whole period before the war was
ruled by Giolitti, who, for nearly nine years, was President of the Council
and directed all political action even when he was not in the Government.
It was of his own free will that he resigned from the Government in March,
1914, picking out Salandra as his successor. It was under the Giolitti-San
Giuliano-Sacchi-Nitti Ministry that, by law of June 30, 1912, universal
storage was panted to the people.
During this period all the Ministnes had a democratic character. The
real head of the opposition against Giolitti was Sonnino, who was twice at
the head of the Government, but he never held his office long and stayed
in only about a hundred days at a time. He represented the conservative
tendencies, but showed marked sympathy for democratic labour legislation.
The work of Giolitti was in great part spoiled by the expemtion to
Libya, which occurred in the autumn of 1911. This expedition resulted in
DYNAMIC ITALY
850
the proclamation of full sovereignty over Libya. In the North African
countries, Great Britain and France, in the presence of the demands of
Islam, have never declared their full sovereignty in such coimtries as Mo-
rocco, Tunisia and Egypt, but have retained the former sovereigns wth
reduced powers, or replaced them by new sovereigns acceptable to the faith-
ful. ^e inevitable war with Turkey, which arose out of it, led to the two
great Balkan Wars, which, while not the cause, were the particular incidents
that precipitated the World War. For it is very probable that the generally
bellicose attitude of the Central and Balkan Powers was largely due to the
events in the Near East in 1912-1913.
THE SALANDRA MINISTRY AND ENTRY OF ITALY INTO THE WORLD WAR
On March 30, 1911, Giolitti resided office, and Signor Salandra succeeded
him, finding himself without a majority of his own and at the head of a major-
ity belonging to Giolitti at the date of the declaration of the World War
in 1914. Having declared the neutrality of Italy, he attended to the increase
and development of her armed forces. In May, 1915, he made Italy enter
Ihe war on the side of the Entente Powers. With the command of the
troops entrusted to General Cadoma, Italy began the hardest war recorded
in her history. Giolitti had been opposed to the declaration of war, and
he was therefore the object of all kinds of accusations and unjust slanders.
He lived almost isolated until 1919, when he was able, as conditions changed
after the victory, to take up the Government again for the last time from
June, 1920, to June, 1921. The Salandra-Sonnino Ministry in April, 1915,
made the London Agreement, by which the conditions imder which Italy
entered the war were defined.
ITALY IN THE WORLD WAR
Italy did not declare war, however, until May 23, 1915 ; her armies crossed
the Isonzo on June 2. Milita^ operations met with little success in the
Trentino, and the discontent which resulted led to the resignation of Salandra.
In June, 1916, Signor Boselli succeeded him. Known and esteemed for his
mildness, Boselli was the oldest among the Italian parliamentarians, being
more than eighty years of age. An energetic man should have been chosen,
who could have united every one in the struggle for victory. Instead the
oldest was selected — one who was least disliked, and could lead to greater
and more sincere enthusiasm by his patriotic speeches. Boselli, instead of
gathering around him a few men of great energy, collected the most numerous
Ministry that Italy had ever had: there were twenty-four Ministers, five of
them without portfolio, two Commissary-Generals, sixteen Under-Secretaries
of State. Events hastened upon one another. The collapse of Russia also
helped to increase the military pressure on Italy, and painful incidents
happened, ending in the fight at Caporetto, where Italy lost about half of
her artillery and machine-guns, a great part of her supplies and a large
number of men, who were either made prisoners or disbanded. Notwith-
standing this military catastrophe, the responsibility for which has not yet
been fully determined, Italy pulled herself together quickly and with only
her own forces was able to check the invasion of the enemy at the river
Piave and to offer resistance which ended finally in the last fight at Vittorio
Veneto, by which the previous losses were in part redeemed.
FRANCESCO NITTI
651
FORMATION OF THR OBLANDO-NITTI-SONNINO MINISTRY
When the enemy was already on Italian territory, an Orlando-Nitti-Son-
nino Ministry was rapidly formed, whose task was to reorganise all the
national forces and restore confidence in victory. The command of the army
was changed; a Supreme War Council was formed which had broad powers
and was composed of the three Ministers mentioned, the military ministers,
the heads of the army and navy, and Signor Bissolati. Signor Orlando by his
patriotic speeches, roused public sentiment again; and Signor Nitti, as Min-
ister of the Treasuiy, found that conditions were almost desperate. Not only
was there nothing in the vaults of the Treasury, but there was a deficit of 2^
million lire. In a short time Nitti was able to restore all the war material
and also, when all lacked confidence, to secure more than six thousand mil-
lions of consolidated loans at home and large loans abroad. It was possible
to spend 25,000,000,000 lire in 1917-1918 and 32% billions in 1918-1919.
Thus victory was attained. But on the question of foreign policy and of
Italy’s attitude in Europe, there was no agreement. Signor Nitti desired
that at the Paris Conference, which paved the way for the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, Italy should stand for peace action in opposition to all imperialistic
tendencies, and that she should disarm rapidly in turn, without any desire
for adventure, to rebuilding the wealth that she had lost. Accordingly, in
January, 1919, he sent in his resignation as Minister of the Treasury, and
Signor Orlando, with Sonnino, Salandra and others, went to Paris.
THE PIUME CONTROVERSY
Great discontent was manifested in Italy at this time. On the one hand
the Nationalist elements were displeased because their nationalist aspira-
tions were not satisfied; they desired to annex all the territories included
in the London Agreement; also the city and territory of Fiume,
which was not included in the London A^eement. They further
wished to obtain a stronger position in the Adriatic through a protectorate
over Albania. The city of Fiume was not included in the London Agree-
ment as Sonnino wished it to be assigned to Croatia, whether Austria-Him-
gary remained united or broke up. On the other hand, America did not
recognise the London Agreement as it had not been communicated to her
when she entered the war; she did not approve of it, and therefore Wilson
was opposed both to the annexation of Dalmatia and to that of Fiume. In
the city of Fiume, not only the Italian elements, but also the Hungarian
elements, which are very numerous, were opposed to any annexation to
Croatia, which was to become a part of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State.
As all the historians of the 1919 Paris Conference have told, Italy had no
say and no direct responsibility for any of the decisions of the Paris Con-
ference. Her representatives busied themselves almost exclusively with
Fiume, the annexation of which was regarded in Italy as a necessity. Dis-
content was rampant. The Treaty of Versailles was drawn up and agreed
to before the fate of Fiume and the Adriatic had been decided, and the
fact that Signor Orlando and his chief assistants were absent from Italy
made the internal situation worse.
Disarmament proceeded so slowly that six months after the end of the
war, in March, 1919, 1,416,000,000 lire were still being spent on the army.
Discontent spread, and there were strikes almost everywhere. More than
DYNAMIC ITALY
m
five years had already passed since the Chamber was elected, and a Gen-
eral Election was necessary. But nearly everyone agreed that it should
not be carried out imder the old law and demanded new and enlarged
electoral districts on a proportional basis. The means of internal pro-
tection were lacking, because the Carabiniers and Royal Guards were re-
duced to less than half the needful number.
NITTI FORMS A MINISTRY
On the eve of signing the Treaty of Versailles, Signor Orlando resigned,
and in June, 1919, Signor Nitti was called upon to form a Ministry. As
he himself declared to the Chamber, he did not wish to accept an obligation
placed on him imder most difficult circumstances in which he would have
to incur every kind of unpopularity; but he accepted as a matter of duty.
And thus the Nitti Ministry came into being. It found itself confronted
with a most difficult situation, strikes being prevalent even in the public
service. It doubled the forces for internal protection. It had the elec-
toral law on a proportional basis approved. Not wishing to issue paper
money, it succeeded in floating the greatest loan Italy ever made — a loan
of more than twenty-one billions of consols — thus diminishing the number
of Treasury notes and stopping the increases of circulation. It was able to
make other loans abroad and thus to improve exchange. It introduced
new and heavy taxes and greatly reduced expenditure. Nevertheless, on
account of its attitude in matters of foreign policy, it greatly irritated the
Nationalist elements; and on account of its attitude in domestic politics, it
irritated still more the Conservative elements. The elections of 1919 brought
Socialists and Popularists in large numbers into the Chamber.
THE n^ANNUNZIO ADVENTURE — SYMPTOMS OF UNREST
In September, 1919, D’Annunzio, assisted by portions of the army and
navy, occupied the city of Fiume, which was in controversy, and had no
intention of leaving it, while Nitti did not wish to eject him with blood-
shed. During and after the war 1,100,000 suits had been begun against
soldiers who had either not presented themselves when summoned because
they resided abroad, or had been guilty of some slight failure in discipline.
Nitti issued a broad amnesty, excluding from it, however, all deserters; but
even this amnesty was a cause for dissatisfaction in Nationalist circles.
The Socialists were agitated by intemperate elements. Nitti, against the
opinion of all, insisted on their sending a commission of their own to Russia
to inspect the situation for themselves. Their journey proved a useful one,
for on their return from Russia, the Italian Socialists, with the exception
of a few enthusiasts, were all opposed to Bolshevism.
NITTfs ATTITUDE TOWARDS WORLD PROBLEMS
By his attitude in foreign politics. Signor Nitti had greatly jarred
French projects. At Paris in 1918 he was strongly opposed to the trial of
the Kaiser and of the German officers. At the London Conference he
upheld the necessity of reconstructing Europe and, with Lloyd George,
prepared an economic manifesto, which declared that the so-called Repara-
© Wide World Pluotoa
Signor Mussolini, Fascisti leader and Premier since October, 1922, photographed with his staff
in the streets of Rome after he had assumed control of the Itidian capital. Left to right: Signor
Del Bono, Signor Mussolini and Signor De Vecchi.
© Keystone View Co
The first meeting of the Mussolini Cabinet in October, 1922, when the political and economic prob-
lems confronting Italy were resolutely attacked by the Premier and his colleagues.
FRANCESCO NITTI
653
tion policy was the ruin of all Europe. But the clash became acute at the
San Remo Conference in the spring of 1920, over which Signor Nitti pre-
sided. Insisting upon his own ideas, he made the other members decide
on the Spa Conference; he wished to abolish the Reparation Commission
and to settle upon reasonable indemnities, in agreement with the Germans,
in order to proceed to the business of disarmament and a real peace policy.
He refused to send Italian soldiers with the occupation forces on the Rhine,
and protested strongly when the French troops in violation of the very
Treaty of Versailles, occupied cities on the right bank of the Rhine. After
the San Remo Conference, violent opposition was shown to Signor Nitti
not only on the part of the Nationalists, but also of the Democrats. There
were some riots in Rome on account of Dalmatia. The strangest and most
ridiculous things were said at the time, among them that Nitti was a friend
of English and American finance and that America had aims on the Adri-
atic and especially on Fiume.
Nitti was obliged to deal with the bread question. The State was losing
over a thousand million lire a month in its attempt to keep down the price
of bread; this condition of affairs had to end, and Nitti ended it by a decree
which aroused enormous and widespread agitation, provoked by Socialists
and encouraged by the Conservative elements. Consequently, in June, 1920,
Nitti sent in his resignation.
GIOLITTI IN OPPICE ONCE MORE
It was not easy to find a successor for him considering the condition of
men’s minds; so Giolitti was now summoned by those who had called him
the enemy of Italy. He remained in power from June, 1920, to June, 1921.
He, too, was obliged to provide by law for the price of bread. He did it
after great delay and consequently with less benefits to the finances. He
also adopted a system of financial regulations which did great harm to
production and upset the market just at a time when it should have been
given greater stability, and which included the parliamentary investigation
of all war expenses, the confiscation of war profits, the compulsory regis-
tration of securities and the heavy taxation of inheritances, automobiles,
etc. The market was so shaken by these measures that depression came
quickly. Giolitti had always wished to govern in accord with the Socialists;
not succeeding in this aim he fought them bitterly.
During his term, of ofiBce the invasion of the factories by the workmen
occurred. The foreign policy had been directed to agree completely with
the French demands to break up Germany. Thus the Spa Conference had
no significance for Italy. In the question of Upper Silesia she was on
France’s side, breaking away from Great Britain. Giolitti signed the
Treaty of Rapallo with Yugoslavia and cleared Fiume by force of D’An-
nunzio’s irregular troops ; with no great opposition he then gave up Vallona
also, the Italian possession of which was not only accorded in the London
Agreement, but was admitted even by Wilson to be necessary to Italy.
Giolitti resigned in June, 1921.
MUSSOLINI AND HIS FASCISTI
To the agitation over Fiume, there was added shortly afterwards, chiefly
through Benito Mussolini, the Fascist agitation, which at first developed
slowly, later spreading rapidly. Mussolini had always been a revolutionary
054
UyjNAMlU ITAJLiY
Socialist, and had directed tlie official newspaper of Italian Socialism.
Durin g the World War he declared himself in favour of the aims of the war,
left the official Socialist newspaper, and took part in the war. Later
he founded a newspaper, II Popolo d^Italia, which, however, appeared with
^e designation of “a socialist newspaper.” The Fascist movement in its
origin had amongst its aims: The Italian Constituent Assembly, intended
to be the Italian section of tiie International Constituent Assembly of the
People, which was to set to work on the transfomation of the political
and economic basis of social life and to secure, without intervening steps,
the development of civilisation; the proclamation of the Italian Republic,
with self-government for the districts, and popular sovereignty carried out
by means of the proper executive organs; the abolition of the Senate and
of every other artificial body that limits popular sovereignty; the abolition
of all caste titles; the abolition of obligatory conscription, with general
disarmament; the creation of great national organisms of credit; etc. At
fet, between 1919 and 1920, Fascism had a political-revolutionary char-
acter, and betrayed its Socialist origin. But the struggle between Fascist!
and Socialists, who had common beginnings, gave a national character to Fas-
cism and later, in spite of its origin, a Conservative character. The join-
ing of many men who had served in the war helped in bringing this about, and
of what had been its early programme, not even a memory was left. Every-
where the struggle between Fascist! and Communists became greater and the
Fascist! slowly took on a military organisation. There developed also in
them, as a reaction from the depression of the war which had arisen among
the Socialists, a spirit of patriotic enthusiasm. The Fascist! adopted as their
emblem a black shirt, and formed battalions disciplined in military fashion.
After the resignation of the Giolitti Ministry the Fascist!, who had already got
into the Chamber in large numbers, mostly on the list of Government
candidates, assumed the attitude of being the Government party and began
to declare that they intended to take possession of the Government by force.
THE BONOMI AND FACTA MINISTRIES
In the struggle that broke out between Giolitti and Nitti on account of
their opposing views regarding external policies, and the difference in the
value they set upon internal and financial policies. Signor Bonomi inter-
vened, succeeding Giolitti in June, 1921. He, also, had begun as a Social-
ist and had later become a Conservative. Unable to make a decision, he
neither accepted Fascism nor fought it; and in his foreign policy he
was equally undecided. After a short term of office he was obliged to re-
sign and Signor Facta succeeded him. He formed two Ministries that did
not last long. During his term of office, not wishing to assume responsibility,
he allowed things to grow worse. The Fascist party having the sympathy
of the Conservative classes, obtained arms and equipment; and the cowardly,
and. at the same time, demago^cal and vulgar behaviour of the Italian
Socialist party aided its development; it did not dare either to side with the
Revolution or with the existing order of things. It may be said that more
than an]rthing else the continuously undecided and pusillanimous, and at the
same time, irritating behaviour of Socialism contributed to the development
of Fascism. In view of the unquestionable weakness of the Government,
the Fascist! succeeded in creating not only a political organisation, but a
military organisation as well, hi^ly disciplined and equipped with cannon,
machine-guns and rifles.
FRANCESCO NITTI
666
MtTSSOUNI AT THE HEAD OF THE GOVBBNMENT
On the occasion of the Congress at Naples (October 24, 1922) , the Fas-
cist! desired to call together a large representation of their numerous forces.
But many had already decided to march on Rome and seize the government.
Signor Facta decided only on October 28 to publish a proclamation in
which he said that the Government was determined to use all means against
the seditious demonstrations which were destined to throw the country into
the greatest disorder, and to maintain public order at any cost. But these
were merely words, and the Fascist expeditions were already marching on
Rome. The King then decided to call upon Mussolini and to entrust him
with the charge of forming a Ministry. The new Ministry was formed on
October 30, 1922, composed not only of Fascist elements, but of men from
various sides of the Chamber. Signor Mussolmi kept for himself the two
Ministries of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs. In his speech at Naples
on the eve of these events, Mussolini did not speak of a republic, as he
had previously, but he showed his thorough contempt for Parliament and
democratic institutions.
Mussolini summoned the Chamber on November 16 and spoke with
violence. He declared that the Italian people had formed a Ministry for
themselves, outside of all parliamentary regulations. It was the Black Shirt
Revolution asserting its rights. “ I could have turned this dull grey hall
into a bivouac of Fascist battalions,” he said, “ but I have refused to abuse
my victory and I could have extended this victory.” With regard to a
programme, he declared that it was not programmes that were lacking in
Italy, but men, and the will to victory.
“ All the problems of Italian life,” he said, “ have already been solved on
paper; but the firm will to translate them into deeds has been lacking. The
Fascist Government must represent this firm and decided will. The leading
principles in internal politics must be economy, work and discipline.” Then
he asserted the need of squaring the balance-sheet and of reestablishing the
authority of the State.
SOME FASCIST MEASURES
The Fascist Government has repeatedly declared that it wishes to square
the balance-sheet and, therefore, to make great economies; that it desires a
powerful army and, above all, a large aviation force. After abolishing Hie
Royal Guards, it established a National Fascist Militia, directly dependent
on the President of the Council, an institution unknown in any other country
of Europe. Finally, he presented to Parliament an electoral reform based on
the idea that the party which has the largest number of votes has a right
to two-thirds of ^e representatives. The other third is divided up among
all the other parties, even if, when taken together, they have a much greater
proportion of votes. In some branches of Fascism, an open tendency to
imperialism has been made manifest; but this tendency has taken no con-
crete form, nor has Italy, since October, 1922, committ^ any act that could
be called imperialistic.
To Hie measures that it has taken, the Fascist Government has imparted
a conservative character. Having abolished registered securities, it has also
abolished the inheritance tax between ascendants and descendants, which is
a new thing in legislative finance. It has also adopted measures furthering
DYNAMIC ITALY
656
capital. The Fascist! have declared their aversion to Freemasonry; no
Fascist can continue to be a Mason. Many workingmen’s syndicates have
gone over from Socialism to Fascism. Mussolini has, even in his later
speeches, shown great indifference to constitutional form and to the forms of
democracy and liberty. He has avoided suppressions involving bloodshed and
has endeavoured to carry out Ihe Fascist Revolution without loss of life.
As Fascism has absorbed the Nationalist party, it has inherited many of
its inclinations, but in greater moderation, although it, too, through at least
a part of its representatives, still talks of Imperialism.
THE FABTIMO OF THE WAYS
It is too early to form any judgment or to make any prophecy. We can
only sa|y that Italy, among the ^at states of Europe, finds herself in a
wholly exceptional political situation, and that when order is restored, she
must either return to democratic institutions or else, after a series of crises,
turn to autocratic rule.
Italy is a land of great vitality whose native population possesses great
power of resistance as well as great power of expansion; Italy has working-
men that are sober and robust; and particularly, the Italians have an out-
spoken will to live and to assert themselves as a great nation. A number
of aberrations which foreigners find difficult to explain are the result of
this outspoken will^ which at times assumes striking forms and gives rise
to sharp contrasts. But incidents which in other countries would be extremely
grave, are not very serious in Italy, because of the genius of the Italian
people, who are very adaptable and by nature not inclined to excesses;
thus, they have never even had real revolutions or real religious wars. In
dealing with Italy, we are dealing with a dynamic country, whose strength
lies above all in its ancient civilisation, which is constantly being renewed,
in its rapidly increasing population, in the robust resisting power of its
native stock.
But in order to overcome all her difficulties, Italy more than any other
country on the European continent needs a true peace policy, a policy aim-
ing at the rehabilitation of European economic life, especially owing to the
peace treaties and the violent and unjust applications that have been made
of them.
CHAPTER XXXIV
JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
(1900-1924)
By M. Haniraba
Japanese Ambassador to the United States Forme^ Vice-
Minister for Foreign Affairs Japanese Delegate to the Washing-
ton Conference
When the curtain rose upon the twentieth century, the Orient revealed
a new world Power. Japan, by dint of achievements in the arts of peace
and of war, had emerged from obscurity and had taken her place in the
family of nations.
Although the world was prone to attribute Japan’s sudden rise in power
Co her victory over China in the war of 1894^-1895, that victory was only
a result of the internal reform, to which Japan had devoted a gleneration of
a most assiduous labour. No doubt it was a consideration of this internal
reform and the demonstrated capacity of the Japanese that caused the Powers
to consent to the abrogation of extraterritoriality that they had established
in Japan. Britain was the first to come to this decision, and by her action
inS 1894 caused the other Governments to follow suit. Almost simultaneously,
that is, in 1897, Japan succeeded also in obtaining a revision of the inequitable
customs tariff imposed upon her by foreign Powers when the first treaties were
concluded. In that year, too, Japan adopted the gold standard which en-
abled her to place her finances upon a sound basis.
The years 1896-1898 witnessed the promulgation of the new Civil Code
framed along modem lines after a stormy contest between the English and
French schools of jurisprudence, thus preparing the way for the enforcement
of the revised treaties, which were to put all foreigners under Japanese
jurisdiction by August, 1889. The same year was made notable also by the
organisation of the first party Cabinet under the leadership of Count (later
Marquis) Okuma. The Constitution had been in operation for nearly ten
years, and although its practical working was far from ideal, the constitu-
tional form of government had been established beyond any peradventure.
These important developments followed one another in rapid succession,
as Japan stood upon the threshold of the twentieth century. It was at this
time that a great politico-military upheaval in China, known as the Boxer
disturbance, unexpectedly brought Japan into greater prominence. In that
extraordinary incident, in which the lives of beleaguered foreigners, 1,000
strong, including the entire diplomatic corps, quivered in the balance for
more than fifty days, the western nations, situated far from the murderous
scene, naturally looked to Japan for rescue. And the Japanese responded
heartily and promptly. The strict discipline displayed by the Japanese
troops in the fight against the Boxers elicited universal admiration from
foreign observers. Not only did they prove themselves gallant, but few of
them were found guilty of participation in the pillage and massacre which
unfortunately followed in the wake of the rout of the Boxers.
T. B. T. — VOL. I — ^ 657
658 JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
Europe, particularly Great Britain, was not slow in appreciating the new
factor which was thus injected into Far-Eastern diplomacy, aye, into the
world situation. That appreciation crystallised in January, 19(^, in the Anglo-
Japanese Agreement, which was destined to play for twenty years a most im-
portant part in the diplomacy of the world.
THE FIBST SHADOWY ANGLO-JAPANESB ALLUNCE
For England the Agreement of 1902 was an unprecedented instrument.
She had deliberately descended from the dais of “ splendid isolation,” and
grasped in hearty greeting the hand of a new nation, not western but oriental.
For Japan the Agreement opened a new epoch, placing her for the first time
among the foremost Powers of the world.
The Anglo- Japanese Agreement of 1902 was not an alliance in the strict
sense of the term. Rather it was a mild promise for cooperation in the
interests of peace in the Far East. It simply provided that in case either of
the high contracting parties went to war with a third Power to defend its
interests in the Far East, the other would remain neutral but would employ
its infiuence to prevent other Powers from joining the war against its ally.
Only in the event of an outside Power or Powers coming to the assistance of
the Power warring against either contracting party, the other was to render
it armed aid.
For some years Britain had been watching with great apprehension
Russian encroachment upon China and Korea, and she looked to Japan as
the logical nation to checkmate that encroachment. To Japan the Russian
aggression spelt immediate menace to her existence. In the empire scheme
of the Tsar the absorption of Manchuria and Korea was regarded only as
a stepping-stone to the domination of Japan. What wonder that the latter
should come to a supreme determination to oppose the Russian advance at
any cost?
To realise Japanese fear of Russia we must go back to the Chino-Japanese
War of 189^1895. That war, though fought against China, was virtually
directed against Russia, because, in her attempt to annex Korea, China was
naught but a cat’s paw for Russia. Once Korea should come under Chinese
domination, Russia could act in the peninsula much as she pleased, as she
had already firmly established her influence in Peking. She had been covet-
ing an ice-free port in South Korea which she considered essential to securing
communication between Vladivostock and her prospective base in China or
Manchuria. When, therefore, Japan checked Chinese aggression in Korea,
she really frustrated Russian designs upon that country.
BU86UN ENCROACHMENTS IN THE FAR EAST
Russia’s act at the close of the Chino-Japanese War disclosed the omi-
nous nature of her designs. When China, humbled by Japan’s superior organ-
isation, offered the Liaotung Peninsula as the price of peace, Russia, bring-
ing Germany and France in her train, immediately intervened, and compell^
Japan, in the name of “ permanent peace of the Far East,” to retrocede that
territory to China. Of course the stage had been pre-arranged between St.
Petersburg and Peking. No sooner had the Japanese retroceded the territory
than the Tsar took it as the price of his “ services ” to China. From that
time the Russian advance in China became open and bold.
M. HANIHARA
659
The Boxer uprising naturally furnished Russia with the desired pretext
to pour troops into Manchuria, although that province was little affected by
the disturbance. Even after the disturbance was quelled by Allied efforts,
Russia showed no intention of withdrawing the troops from Manchuria. On
the contrary she was strengthening her position, intent upon staying there
permanently. Japan, backed by Britain and America, protested repeatedly.
Russia paid no attention. Japan, conscious of her deficiency in man-power
and financial strength, earnestly sought to avoid armed conflict with Russia,
and as a last resort endeavoured to obtain from the Muscovite a definite
promise that he would desist from encroaching upon Korea, in return for
Japan's recognition of his special interests in Manchuria. Again Russia
refund to consider the overture She was determined to absorb both Man-
churia and Korea. That was the last straw for Japan. The war that fol-
lowed immediately is known to the world and is described elsewhere.
RESULTS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
The Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, signed at Portsmouth, New Hamp-
shire, in September, 1905, agreed, among other things, upon these points:
(1) recognition of Japan’s paramount interests in Korea, (2) transfer to
Japan of the lease of the Kwantung Peninsula (more popularly Port Arthur
and Dairen) formerly occupied by Russia, (3) cession to Japan by Russia
of the southern half of Saghalicn Island, (4) cession by Russia of the railway
between Port Arthur and Chang-chun, (5) stationing of Russian and Japanese
railway guards, respectively, along the Russian and Japanese lines in Man-
churia, (6) abstinence of both Powers from using the Manchurian railways
for strategical purposes.
THE SECOND ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
While the peace negotiations were still going on at Portsmouth, or to be
exact on August 12, 1905, the world was surprised by the announcement of
the second Anglo- Japanese Alliance. This was not like the shadowy alliance
of 1902, but a defensive and offensive alliance in every sense of the term.
Its scope was broadened, including India in addition to the Far East. “ If
by reason of improvoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on
the part of any other Power or Powers, cither contracting party should
be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests ” in
these regions, “ the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance
of its ally.” The treaty insured the independence and integrity of China, and
recognised Japan's “ right to take such measures of guidance, control and
protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary,” while it recog-
nised England's right to take such measures in the proximitv of the Indian
frontier as she may find necessary for safe-guarding her Indian possessions.”
The raison d^itre of the alliance of 1905 was Japan's fear of Russian
revenge, and England's apprehension of Russian advance towards India,
while the rising tide of German influence also entered into consideration.
Plainly, the Anglo- Japanese Alliance aimed to forestall aggressive war
on the part of a third Power or Powers. It never was intended to be a weapon
of aggression. Although the pact was formed to protect the contracting
parties against possible Russian aggression, neither had any desire to provoke
Russian enmity On the other hand, both were desirous of befriending Russia
660 JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
80 that there would be no occasion for further conflict. It was with that end
in view ^at Japan, in 1907, signed a convention with Russia, putting the
two former enemies in the relationship of an entente cordiale. Almost simul-
taneously Japan concluded a similar agreement with France. This was fol-
lowed, in 1908, by an understanding with the United States, commonly known
as the Root-Takahira Note.
JAPANESE IMMIGRATION IN CALIFORNIA
All these agreements had a common object, namely, the preservation of
the peace of the Far East and in the Pacific. In spite of these agreements
Japan’s foreign relations were far from smooth. In the United States and
Canada Japanese immigration began to arouse antagonism on the part of the
native citizens. Then, too, Japan’s expansion in Korea and Manchuria,
though a result of the unforeseen march of events rather than of a pre-
meditated plan, occasioned growing suspicion and antipathy.
American opposition to Japanese immigration came to a head, when in
1906 the San Francisco municipal government ordered Japanese children out
of the public schools, and proposed to provide a special school for them. As
a matter of fact, the real cause of trouble was not the presence of a small
number of Japanese children in the public schools. What was really objected
to was the immigration of Japanese labourers The exclusion of the Japanese
school children was meant to be a vigorous and effective means of expressing
that objection.
President Roosevelt acted with characteristic firmness, intimating that
the action of the San Francisco municipality violated alike the Constitution
and the treaty with Japan. In his message to Congress he recommended the
naturalisation of the Japanese. Not only must we treat all nations fairly,”
he said in the message, “ but we must treat with justice and good-will all
immigrants who come here under the law.” Such expressions called forth
a storm of protests from California, whose delegation hurried to Washington
and made every effort to let the Federal authorities see the situation as
California would see it.
The upshot of it all was that San Francisco reinstated the Japanese
children in the public schools, while the Federal Government entered into
negotiation with Japan for the restriction of Japanese immigration. Japan’s
attitude on this question was conciliatory but dignified. She had no intention
of embarrassing any foreign government by sending immigrants where they
were liable to become a cause of friction with the native population. She
was, therefore, willing to listen to any reasonable proposal for the restriction
of Japanese immigration. At the same time, she maintained that such re-
striction should be done in a way that would not infringe upon her national
honour and prestige. She believed that the great nations, which had by
common consent admitted her into their family, would not stultify their own
estimate of Japan by adopting measures which might fix upon her the odium
of inferiority.
If international good manners meant anything, Japan was entitled to
respectable treatment. She recognised the right of any Government to exclude
or restrict foreign immigration, but such exclusive or restrictive measures
should not take the form of open discrimination and public insult before the
world. To put it plainly, Japan was ready to restrict of her own accord
the emigration of her nationals of the labouring class, but was unwilling
either to si^ a formal treaty for that purpose or to be subjected to arbitrary
discrimination.
© Keystone View Cu
Count Togo, • who annihilated the Russian
Fleet at the battle of Tsushima in the
Russo-Japanese War.
© Underwood & Underwood
His Excellency Mr. Masanao Hanihara,
Japanese Ambassador to the United States,
and the author of the chapter on Japan in
these volumes.
M. HANIHARA
661
THE gentleman's AGREEMENT
The result was the so-called Gentleman's Agreement made between
Washington and Tokyo in 1907, Almost simultaneously a similar agreement
was concluded between Canada and Japan known as the Lemieux Agreement.
The underlying idea of the Gentleman's Agreement was that Japan agreed,
voluntarily and under no treaty obligation, to restrict the emigration of
Japanese labourers to America or Canada. As far as formal treaties were
concerned, Japan was on a plane of perfect equality with the United States
or Canada. If she agreed to restrict emigration, that was entirely her own
affair, of which the outside world need take no cognisance.
With mutual forbearance and conciliation there is no reason why the
emigration question should not be adjusted amicably and without offering
unnecessary offence to Japan. After all, Japanese immigration to America
or Canada, when compared with immigration from European countries, is
almost negligible. According to the United States Census there were in 1920,
111,010 Japanese in the entire continental United States, that is to say, slightly
over one per 1,000 of the total population Of this total, 71,952 were in
California, or one Japanese to every 48 of the total population of the state.
At any rate the Japanese emigration question, as far as it affects the United
States or Canada, has ceased to be of any moment, as Japan has decided not
to send emigrants to countries where they are not desired. The real issue
now is whether or not the Japanese who are lawfully resident in foreign
countries should be accorded such fair and equitable treatment as is accorded
other nationals in the enjoyment of ordinary civil rights.
The author has discussed the emigration question and its consequent issue
at considerable length, as the latter still remains one of Japan's difficult
diplomatic problems. Her present and future policy in this respect will
unquestionably follow the line above indicated — conciliatory, accommodat-
ing, yet avoiding steps incompatible with her national dignity and honour.
THE RECORD OF JAPAN IN KOREA
Of greater moment are problems confronting Japan on the Asian con-
tinent. The course of events, unexpected by Japan but laid for her first
by China and then by Russia, forced her across the Straits of Korea and
made her a continental Power. In 1904, while the Russian War was still
raging in Manchuria, Japan concluded a protocol with Korea, in which the
Korean Government promised ‘‘ improvements in internal administration "
in accordance with Japanese advice, Japan on her part pledging herself to
** guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Korea. It had
been Japan’s true intention to regenerate Korea, infuse vitality and new spirit
into its decaying body politic, and thus make the country a buffer between
herself and her aggressive neighbours. Had Korea been a vigorous, efficient
nation, capable of repulsing Chinese and Russian aggressions, Japan would
never have fought against China in 1894 and against Russia in 1904. Follow-
ing this fixed policy Japan, immediately after the Russian War, urged upon
the Korean Government, such as it was, the necessity of reforming its ad-
ministrative system. But the decadence of Korean officialdom had reached
the stage where no outside help could regenerate it. Not only were the
Koreans ill-disposed to cooperate with the Japanese in the imperative internal
reform, but they obstructed the Japanese efforts at every turn, and even
JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
conspired to subvert the new order of things by invoking the assistance of a
third Power. Japan, alive to the evil possibilities of this anomalous situation,
resorted to the only alternative — she had to assume, in November, 1905,
authority to direct the foreign affairs of Korea. For that purpose Marquis
(later Prince) Ito was sent to Seoul as the first Resident-General of Japan.
This new arrangement did not affect Korea’s domestic administration.
Here the Korean Government still enjoyed freedom and continued the policy
of obstructing the reform measures suggested by Japan. The Korean Em-
peror and his oflScials, saturated with the corruption of centuries, would not
adjust themselves to the modem methods urged by the Japanese advisers.
Reluctantly, Japan had to admit the futility of half-way measures. Would
not Russia renew her nefarious schemes in the peninsula, if Korea remained
in this deplorable condition? To intensify Japan’s misgiving in 1907, the
Korean Emperor sent emissaries abroad, hoping to embroil Japan in inter-
national complications over the Korean question. Resident-General Ito,
weary of the insincerity of the Koreans, resigned in 1909, and was assassinated
by a Korean soon afterward. This sad incident furnished occasion for the
final action which Japan feared was inevitable.
ANNEXATION OF KOREA
And so Korea was annexed to Japan in August, 1910 — not by force, but
peacefully. The event was followed by redoubled efforts on the part of Japan
for the modernisation of Korea with the unstinted expenditure of money and
labour. Railways were extended, schools were opened, a modern judiciary
was instituted, lawful taxation replaced the old methods of extortion and
squeeze, footpaths gave way to modem roads, public works such as water
supply, electric lighting and telephone systems were introduced in the larger
cities, an efficient postal service took the place of the antiquated courier,
new industries were encouraged, scientific agriculture was fostered, refor-
estation was started on denuded hills and mountain-sides, and banks were
organised throughout the country, encouraging savings and establishing a
credit system unknown under the old regime.
In spite of all these constructive reforms accomplished for the benefit of
the Koreans, it will be a good many years before they cease to be a disturbing
factor in the body politic of Japan, as indicated in the independence agitation
of 1919.
MANCHURIA: CHINESE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS V JAPAN TREATY RIGHTS
In Manchuria Japan’s policy was formulated chiefly to keep herself in
readiness against any possible emergency developing out of Russia’s inherent
desire for southward movement and her secret intent for revenge. Having
defeated Russia in 1904-1905 Japan now found herself in much the same
position as the “ man riding the tiger ” — she could not dismount lest the
Russian tiger attack her. She had no alternative but to keep on riding,”
that is, entrenching herself where the Russians had fortified themselves. Again
it was the “inevitable march of events” (as Mr. Roosevelt said of the
American occupation of the Philippines) which established Japan in South
Manchuria.
By virtue of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty and of the treaty with China
of 1905, Japan became heir to former Russian holdings in South Manchuria,
while Russia occupied North Manchuria, by far the largest and richest sec-
M. HANIHARA
663
tion of the province. In operating the railways and the mines along them,
the Japanese endeavoured scrupulously to observe the sovereign rights of
China. Yet in practical administration it was not always easy to (hraw a
clear line of demarcation between Chinese sovereign rights and Japanese
treaty rights. Not a few Japanese contended that China’s attitude towards
Japan during and after the Russian War absolved Japan from obligations,
which she had of her own accord shouldered for the maintenance of China’s
territorial integrity. Throughout the deadly combat of 1904-1905, China
never showed sympathy for, much less helped, Japan. Nor was this any
wonder, because China had in 1896 entered into a secret treaty of alliance
with Russia, Article 1 of which said: ‘‘ The high contracting parties engage
to support each other reciprocally by all their land and sea forces in case of
any aggression directed by Japan against Russian territory in Eastern Asia,
China and Korea.” In view of this agreement Japan could, in the Russian
War, have regarded China as her enemy and demanded reckoning accordingly
at the end of the war. Nevertheless Japan preferred a policy of neighbour-
liness and was content with taking only the measures necessary to safeguard
her position against Russia.
It was the same motive which prompted Japan to refuse to sell the South
Manchuria railway to Mr. Harnman, the American railway magnate, just
after the Russian War, and to oppose the internationalisation of the same
road proposed by Mr. Knox, the American Secretary of State, in 1910.
PROBLEM OF JAPAN ’s GROWING POPULATION
About this time the Japanese immigration problem in Canada and the
United States became acute, while Australia most rigidly excluded Japanese
immigration Thus all avenues of Japanese emigration had been closed.
Japan, accepting the inevitable, resolved not to permit emigration to those
countries. Nevertheless Japan’s population problem remained to be solved.
She had to find outlet for her growing population, or provide means whereby
she might secure the welfare of her population upon her own soil in spite of
increasing congestion. It was Tvith that end in view that Japan sought to
turn the tide of emigration and enterprise towards the Asian continent, and
endeavoured to develop her commercial and industrial possibilities by draw-
ing raw materials from, and exporting manufactured goods to, the same con-
tinent. For both purposes enterprise in South Manchuria under Japanese
influence was deemed necessary.
THE STATE OP AFFAIRS AT HOME
Here we may pause and take a glance at Japan’s internal condition. Fear
of foreign aggression, and the wars of 1894 and 1904, had exercised great
influence upon Japan’s domestic affairs. Confronted by formidable hostile
nations one after another, Japan had to devote her best energies to the
preservation of her integrity. This meant military and naval expansion with
the resultant rise of the military men in power and influence. This condition
naturally enhanced taxation for armament to the neglect of much desired
reform in other directions. Although univeisal compulsory education had
been adopted, the schools were congested, while the teachers were underpaid.
Accommodation in higher educational institutions was so inadequate that
thousands of eager students were denied admission every year.
664 JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
Many problems of public utilities and of social welfare were left unsolved.
The protection of workingmen and the sanitation of the factories were far
from satisfactory. The freedom of the Press was at times thwarted. Demo-
cratic ideals were hindered by unfriendly forces. Moreover, the Government,
impelled by the necessity of producing and exporting goods to increase na-
tional wealth, subsidised various industries, a policy which served the purpose
for the time being, but resulted in the end in the creation of what Europe
and America would call “ interests.” From the same necessity, too, the
Government assumed a policy of non-interference towards the capitalists
who would endeavour to produce cheaply and sell quickly abroad. Naturally
wages were low and working conditions were, in many cases, deplorable.
SOCIAL tJNREST
Such conditions could not, of course, continue indefinitely. While the
country was in constant fear of foreign encroachment the masses were willing
to sacrifice their private interests in order to upbuild a strong nation. But
once Japan’s most formidable enemy, Russia, was defeated, the apparently
docile populace began to show signs of restlessness. Soon after the Russian
War the country witnessed numerous strikes and even violent outbreaks in
different parts. Fortunately for the ruling class these outbreaks were not
organised and therefore incapable of making any lasting or profound im-
pression upon the country. Nevertheless, to those who had the eye to read
they were the writing on the wall
It was in this atmosphere that Count (later Marquis) Okuma, the leader
of the Progressive party, organised in the early spring of 1914 a Cabinet,
which gave a promise of radical reform in domestic affairs. The occasion
was noteworthy in more senses than one. In the first place, Okuma’s return
to power after retirement of sixteen years was a great blow to the so-called
Sateuma and Chosu factions, which had exercised preponderating influence
for forty years. Satsuma and Chosu are two provinces which, in the early
stage of the Meiji era, furnished most of the leaders who guided the course
of the nation through storm and stress Incidentally the Chosu men implanted
their influence in the army, while the Satsuma men chose the navy as their
special field. Although much criticism was directed against the two cliques,
their power remained unbroken while the country, confronted by formidable
foreign enemies, had to rely upon military and naval prowess for protection.
As the memory of the Russian War receded among the things of the past,
criticism towards them became more and more adverse. As luck would have
it, the Satsuma faction and the navy dominated by it suffered a severe set-
back by a sensational scandal involving a few high naval officers. The ex-
posure resulted in the downfall of the Cabinet headed bv Admiral Count
Yamamoto, a Satsuma man Although the Admiral himself was absolutely
innocent, he held himself responsible for the apparent laxity of discipline
which had crept into the navy.
THE WORLD WAR IN THE PAR EAST
It was upon the crest of the popular indignation caused by the scandal
that Count Okuma rode into power in the spring of 1914. He assumed the
reins of government with the enthusiasm of a reformer He had promised to
reduce taxation enormously enhanced by the Russian War. He had declared
M. HANIHARA
666
himself in favour of curbing the powers of the military and naval cliques,
and of retrenching the expenditures of the army and navy. He had intended
to extend the suffrage which was limited by property qualifications. Had
the times been normal, Okuma might have carried out at least some of these
pledges. But the sudden outbreak of the World War in August, 1914, com-
pletely upset his plans. It could not but strengthen and prolong the very
power which he had promised to curb. As for the much-needed reduction of
taxation, Okuma^s promise was completely consigned to the limbo of oblivion.
As soon as England declared war against the Central Powers on August
4, 1914, Japt'in was called upon to follow suit, and under the terms of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance to render military assistance to her ally. The alliance,
it must be noted, had been renewed in 1911 for another ten years. The re-
newal was made no doubt partly in view of the growing menace of German
power both in Europe and in Asia.
And so Japan, on August 15, asked the German Government to withdraw
from Far-Eastern waters all its men-of-war and armed vessels, and disarm
those that could not be withdrawn, and to give up to her the leased territory
of Kiaochow, which Japan would eventually restore to China. Having re-
ceived no reply from Germany, Japan declared war against her and Austria,
and immediately sent a force of 30,000 men, aided by 2,000 British soldiers,
to capture the fortified zone of Kiaochow, the garrison of which capitulated
on November 7, 1914.
On sea the Japanese navy cooperated with the British on a large scale.
In the first year of the war it took charge of the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
using for that purpose a fleet twice as large as the pre-war British Eastern
and Australian fleets combined While the German cruisers were at large
in the Pacific, the Japanese men-of-war protected the coasts of Australia,
New Zealand and British Columbia, and safeguarded the lanes of trans-
portation from Hongkong to Vancouver, and from Sydney and Singapore
to Suez and Zanzibar. The British transports which carried Anzacs ” to
the various fronts were usually convoyed by Japanese warships. Japan’s
next task was to keep the Mediterranean routes of communication open
from Suez to Gibraltar, and from Marseilles to Alexandria in cooperation
with the Allied fleets
JAPANESE AID RENDERS BRUSSILOV’s OFFENSIVE POSSIBLE
Meanwhile Japan turned over to Russia two battleships and a cruiser,
and supplied the Russian army with 750,000 rifles as well as munitions to
the value of more than 295,000,000 yen (the yen being worth approximately
half a dollar). It was these supplies which enabled General Brussilov to
launch the great Russian offensive in June, 1916. Financially, Japan’s con-
tribution was not great. Yet she advanced 313,000,000 yen to Russia, 180,-
000,000 yen to England, 127,000,000 yen to France, and 49,000,000 yen to
China. These facts, insignificant in themselves, are noteworthy when we
remember that only three decades before, Japan had been a negligible quan-
tity in international affairs.
RELATIONS WITH THE BOLSHEVIKS IN EASTERN 8IBERU
After Russia collapsed under Bolshevist domination, Japan, in conjunction
with the United States, sent an army to Eastern Siberia, to rescue the 50,000
Czechoslovak soldiers, who were isolated in Siberia and were trying to join
666 JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
their comrades at home. The Allied forces, which were mainly composed
of Japanese and American troops, but including a very small contingent of
men representing each of the other main Allied Powers, arrived in Vladivo-
stock in August, 1918.
Although the American troops withdrew from Siberia in March, 1920,
Japan had to keep her troops there until the autumn of 1922 for the obvious
reason that there were in Eastern Siberia a considerable Japanese population
and many Japanese enterprises which had to be protected pending the resto-
ration of order and the conclusion of some sort of agreement with the powers-
that-were in that region.
Unfortunately, the Bolshe%’ik conception of international relations and
Bolshevik practice of diplomacy have been such that it is extremely diflB-
cult to find a common basis for a solution of problems between Russia and
Japan. The consequence of this sense of insecurity on the part of the
Japanese Government is that although a year and a half has passed since
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Siberia, no agreement between
Japan and Russia has been made.
THE PABIS PEACE CONFERENCE AWARDS KIAOCHOW TO JAPAN
In China Japan’s acts after the reduction of llie German citadel of Kiao-
chow were subjected to much criticism. From the beginning Japan declared
her intention of restoring Germany’s leased territory to China at the close of
the war. But in order to restore it to China, Japan felt it necessary to obtain
clear title from Germany with the consent of her Allies and associates in the
war. When, therefore, Japan concluded a treaty with China in May, 1915,
concerning the disposal of German holdings in Shantung, she stated in a
separate note to the Chine.se Government that “ if, upon the conclusion of
the present war, the Japanese Government should be given an absolutely
free disposal of the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay, they will return the
said territory to China.” With the same end in view the Japanese Govern-
ment in February, 1917, succeeded in obtaining from England, France and
Italy a full consent to the proposal of the Japanese acquisition of German
holdings in Shantung.
In spite of Japan’s declaration to return Kiaochow to China, her promise
was viewed with suspicion abroad, particularly in the United States. Al-
though the Shantung Treaty of May, 1915, when read in connection with
the separate agreement above noted, contained nothing reprehensible, it pro-
voked considerable discussion in the outside world because it was one of the
outcomes of the so-called “ Twenty-one Demands,” wliich were presented
to China by Japan in January, 1915. Nevertheless, the Powers at the Peace
Conference of Paris confirmed Japan’s right to the former German holdings
in Shantung, feeling themselves to be justified in trusting that Japan would
deal justly with China.
Soon after the Paris Peace Conference, Japan, true to her pledges to
China and the Powers, proposed to open negotiations with China for the
purpose of returning Kiaochow to her and of reorganising the management of
the Shantung railway as a Chino-Japanese joint enterprise. China resolutely
declined to enter into a conference still hoping, perhaps, that some outside
influence or external pressure might be brought to bear upon Japan and in
consequence alter in favour of China the verdict given at the Paris Con-
ference. Thus the matter stood when the Washington Conference was called
in November, 1921.
M. HANIHARA
667
THE FAMOUS TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
The primary object of the Twenty-one Demands ” ^ was to safeguard
Japan’s position in South Manchuria. Had Japan wisely limited her pro-
posals to those relating to Manchuria, there might have been no serious
objection to them. As a matter of fact, the Chinese Government, only
twenty-four days after the presentation of the Japanese proposals, practi-
cally accepted all the terms relative not only to Manchuria but also to
Shantung. There were, however, other well-intentioned, but apparently ob-
jectionable proposals which not only beclouded the true purpose of Japan
but caused prejudice among the Chinese as well as in the outside world.
The final agreements may be briefiy summarised. Japan secured the
extension of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen to 99 years, that is, from
1898 to 1997. The Japanese control of the South Manchuria railway, which
was to expire in 1939, was extended to 2002. In addition, China agreed to
allow Japanese subjects certain mining privileges and the right to travel and
reside in the interior of South Manchuria China also promised to safeguard
Japanese investments in the Hanyehping Iron Mining and Smelting Company.
As for miscellaneous wishes, known as Group V, they were entirely withdrawn
by Japan.
Space forbids a critical examination of the so-called “ Twenty-one De-
mands.” The author can only say that some of the criticisms made against
them seem unfair and unjust Most of such criticisms are made without
proper knowledge or appreciation of either China’s actual condition or the
bitter experiences Japan has suffered because of China’s tangled domestic
^ The so-called “ Twenty-one Demands ” as onginally presented consist of the follow-
ing proposals.
Group I — Concerning Shantung: (1) China lo assent to agreements to be made be-
tween Japan and Germany regarding the latter's rights in Shantung; (2) China not to
cede any part of Shantung to any other Power; (3) Japan to build railway from Cheefoo
or Lungkow to a point on the Shantung railway; (4) To open certain cities in the
province to foreign trade.
Group II — Concerning Manchuria: (1) To extend lease of Kwantung and concession
for the South Manchuria railway for 99 years. (2) To allow Japanese to travel and
reside in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to lease or own land for
farming and trade purposes, or to engage in mining in those regions; (3) China not to
grant to other Power or its nationals railway concession in South Manchuna and Eastern
Inner Mongolia, or to mortgage to any other Power local taxes of those territories, with-
out Japan’s consent; (4) Japan to be consulted in employing foreign political, financial
or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuna or in Eastern Inner Mongolia;
(5) China to let Japan manage the Kirin-Changchun railway for 99 years.
Group III — Concerning Hanyehping {Iron Mining and Iron Works) Company: (1)
China not to dispose of nghts and properties of this Company, in which a large Japanese
capital is invested, without Japan’s consent, and not to object to any agreement that
may be made with a view to joint undertaking between the Company and Japanese
capitalists; (2) China not to permit, without the Company’s consent, anyone but the
Company itself to work mines in the area adjoining the Company’s mines
Group IV — Concerning non-<dienation of territory: China not to cede or lease to
any other Power any harbour or bay or island on the Chinese coast
Group V — Matters wished by Japan: (1) The Chinese Government to employ
Japanese as political, financial and military advisers; (2) China to allow Japanese to
own land in the interior to be used for hospitals, churches and schools; (3) In certain
large cities, where Japanese reside in large numbers, the police department, to avoid
complications, to be jointly managed by Chinese and Japanese, or to employ Japanese
officisds; (4) Chma to buy from Japan certain per cent of munitions used Iw the Chinese
army, or to establish an arsenal as a Chino- Japanese joint enterpnse; (5) Japan to build
the Wuchuang-Nanchuang and the Nanchuang-Hangchow railways; (6) China to consult
Japan before raising foreign loan for mining enterpnse and railway and harbour con-
struction in Pidcien province; (7) Japan to enjoy the same pnvilege of religious preaching
as enjoyed by other nationals.
JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
668
and foreign affairs. Nor has the fact been duly considered that Japan’s
special relations with China — relations created, not by her own seeking, but
by geography — have placed her in a peculiar position wherein she is nat-
urally far more vitally interested in the establishment of a reasonably, safe,
orderly, and responsible China than would be any nation more remotely
situated and naturally less deeply concerned. To find parallels to Japan’s
policies and actions toward China we need not delve into the diplomatic
history of Europe or America. At the very moment this is written, forei^
representatives at Peking are, in connection with the Lyncheng bandit inci-
dent, discussing demands or proposals to be presented to the Chinese Gk)v-
emment, some of which seem more drastic than any of the “Twenty-one
Demands.”
THE WASHINGTON CONPEBENCB
We have seen that Japan’s activities in China, though springing from
motives of self-preservation, roused suspicion in foreign countries. Then,
too, her adoption of a naval programme known as the 8-8 programme, though
conceived purely as a defensive measure in the face of known naval pro-
pammes of other nations, created misunderstanding among the naval Powers
in the Pacific. To add fuel to such suspicions and misunderstandings, Europe
and America saw a plethora of books, magazine articles and press reports
and comments of a nature to prejudice the reading public against Japan and
her policy. Whether Japan at that time really deserved such adverse
criticisms or whether she was a victim of race prejudice or some international
machination, is for future historians to determine. At any rate it was in
such atmosphere that in November, 1921, the Washington Conference was
convened by the American Government for the purpose of halting naval
rivalry and of establishing harmony among the Powers in regard to Far-
Eastern questions.
Japan accepted the invitation to the Washington Conference with alacrity.
She knew that she had nothing to lose if the other Powers would agree to
stop naval expansion. To her, moreover, the Conference was a God-sent
opportunity to purge herself of the suspicions, with which the Powers had
b^n led to see her policy in China and elsewhere. The Cabinet, under the
able leadership of the late martyred Takashi Hara, rose to the occasion and
resolved to convince the world of Japan’s desire to remain friendly with her
neighbours and to maintain the peace of the Pacific and the Far East.
END OF THE ANOLO-JAPANESE ALLUNCE
At the Conference Japan gladly agreed to teminate the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, as desired by Great Britain and the United States. In spite of the
fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911 had a clause deliberately in-
cluded which was designed to absolve either contracting party of the obliga-
tion to aid the other in case of a war with the United States, many Americans
still regarded the Alliance with uneasiness. Nor were Great Britain and
Japan reluctant to dissolve the Alliance, since the elimination of Russia and
Germany had removed, or at least lessened, its raison d’etre. The Conference,
therefore, had little difficulty in terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and
launching a new treaty signed by Japan, the United States, Great Britain and
France, safeguarding the peace of the Pacific, and substituting friendly con-
ference for war in the adjustment of Pacific problems.
© IV ide World Photo
The Fuji cotton spinning mills plant at Kloyama» near Fuji in Japan, collapsed like a pack of cards
in the great Japanese earthquake of September, 19^3.
© Kadel & Herbert
The Crown Prince Hirohito of Japan making an address at the Guildhall in London on the
occasion of his historic visit to England in 1922. The Prince of Wales, the Duke of York, and the
Duke of Connaught are seated on the right.
M. HANIHARA
On the question of the naval retrenchment Japan readily subscribed to
the American proposal, scrapping certain battleships, and establishing a ratio
of three for her capital ships as against five each for the United States and
for Great Britain.
KIAOCHOW RESTORED TO CHINA
With regard to the Chinese question, Japan agreed to the renunciation
of certain privileges in Manchuria, and she further agreed to accept the
general treaties and resolutions re-asserting the Powers' intention to help
promote China’s welfare.
As we have already noted, the Shantung dispute between China and Japan
had remained unsettled when the Washington Conference was called. Japan
took the opportunity of the Conference to dispose of that dispute once for
all, and gladly availed herself of the good offices of Secretary Hughes and
Mr. Balfour to attain that end. Japan, in short, agreed to withdraw com-
pletely from Shantung, restoring Kiaochow to China and selling the railway
to her.
Within ten weeks after the adjournment of the Washington Conference,
Japan ratified with no reservation all the treaties made at that Conference.
Without even waiting for their ratification by other Powers, she began in the
summer of 1922 scrapping some of the capital ships destined to be destroyed
under the Washington agreement. Although the agreement placed no re-
striction upon the building of auxiliary ships, Japan of her own accord elimi-
nated from the original building programme a cruiser, 13 destroyers, and 24
submarines. Simultaneously a decision was adopted for the immediate re-
duction of naval personnel, retiring 949 officers, 415 warrant officers, 2,345
petty officers and 8,446 men — the total reduction amounting to 15.7 per cent
of the entire personnel of the navy. Further reduction in personnel is planned
for succeeding years. Such a radical retrenchment in the navy could not fail
to influence the army, although the Washington Conference arrived at no
agreement for the reduction of land armament. In the three years 1922,
1923 and 1924 the Japanese army is to discharge no less than 2,318 officers
and 60,228 men.
Japan’s compliance with the Shantung and other Chinese agreements was
as prompt as her execution of the Naval Treaty. By November, 1922, she
had completely evacuated Shantimg. It is extremely regrettable that con-
ditions in that province since Japanese withdrawal have been far from satis-
factoiy. The railway has degenerated and banditry has become rampant,
culminating in May, 1923, in th^e kidnapping of many American and European
passengers on a Tientsin-Nanking express train.
A MORE LIBERAL ADMINISTRATION IN KOREA
In Korea, since the uprising of March, 1919, Japan has adopted many
more liberal measures under the able administration of Baron Saito, the
present Governor-General. The preferment of Koreans in the civil service
has been improved; many well-equipped schools have been added; Japanese
officials serving in Korea have been encouraged to study and use the Korean
language in dealing with the natives; the contact of the Korean leaders with
the Japanese administration has been made closer through various new
measures; governmental red tape has been eliminated in connection with the
propagation of Christianity among the Koreans. In a word, the present
Japanese rule in Korea is characterised with liberalism and generosity such
as is seldom seen in any colony.
670
JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT INCREASES
At home Japan has since the World War been undergoing a remarkable
metamorphosis. The ideals of democracy emphasised by the Allied statesmen
during the war struck a responsive chord in the Japanese mind. Nor is this
surprising, since the Japanese, believing for centuries that they are descendants
of one and the same ancestral family, are essentially democratic. This tra-
ditional democratic idea was held in check by the rise of military potentates
and tiie consequent inauguration of feudalism. The undemocratic ideas and
institutions introduced during the feudal ages were not easily removed by
the abolition of feudalism. But the advent of the new regime in 1867 and
the adoption of the Constitution in 1889 proved a stimulus to the resuscitation
of the pre-feudal traditions of democracy. Small wonder that at the begin-
ning of 1924 the movement for manhood suffrage is steadily gaining ground.
As we have seen in a preceding paragraph, the suffrage in Japan before 1920
was limited to male citizens above twenty-five years of age paying a direct
or property tax of not less than ten yen, or about $5. The property qualifica-
tion, low as it was, restricted the franchise to about 28 in each 1,000 of the
total population. In 1920 the new election law lowered the tax to be paid by
the voter to three yen, or about $1.50. Under this law 2,860,000, out of the
total male population of 28,044,341, were registered as qualified voters. This
increased the ratio of voters to a little over 102 per 1,000 of the male popu-
lation. These voters elect 464 members of the House of Representatives,
that is, one representative to each 121,000 of the entire population. To the
Liberals the law of 1920 is only a step toward manhood suffrage. Since
that year every session of the Diet has seen the introduction of a Universal
Suffrage Bill. The Yamamoto Cabinet, which came to power in September,
1923, drafted a Manhood Suffrage Bill. Though the Cabinet had to resign
under untoward circumstances in December, 1923, before it had opportunity
to present the bill to the Diet, the adoption of the measure will not long be
deferred. Under Manhood Suffrage Japan would have some 13,000,000 voters.
SLOW PROGRESS OP THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
Temperamentally the Japanese are not revolutionary but evolutionary.
This has been indicated in the subversion of feudalism, in the adoption of
the constitutional government, and in the gradual extension of suffrage. The
same trait will characterise the labour movement. Soon after the Russian
War there were many strikes throughout the country. In 1912 the “ General
Federation of Labour ” was organised by a few labour leaders of the advanced
type. During the World War, the boom of industry and general prosperity
was not favourable to the progress of the movement. At the end of 1921
there were some 300 labour organisations with a total membership of about
365,700. These organisations are not yet fully developed, and their members
represent a small fraction of the entire body of wage-earners in Japan, of
whom factory, railway and shipping employees alone number approximately
two millions.
For the slow progress of the labour movement the labour leaders blame
the Police Law for the Public Peace,” which provides for the punishment,
imprisonment and fine, of those who seduce or instigate others with the object
of starting a strike. Without doubt this law is destined to be amended. But
at the same time it is to be noted that industrially Japan is still in a period
M. HANIHARA
671
of transition. The factory system has not yet completely replaced household
industry as in the case of the more advanced industrial countries. Even m
the factories the feeling of ‘‘ class struggle” does not seem as intense as in
the West. This is due, perhaps, to the fact that the mutual feeling of loyalty
and helpfulness prevailing between master and employee in olden days, still
exercises a potent influence in mitigating the harshness of relations between
capital and labour in these modern days. The Government is adopting liberal
views on labour problems, while the capitalists are realising the wisdom of
dealing justly with the working-class. The Factory Law enacted in 1911
and put into operation in 1916, and the State Life-Insurance Law of 1916
were designed to help increase the welfare of the working-classes, while
various mutual-aid societies of workmen are encouraged and subsidised by
the Government and employers. Whether or not these efforts will yield
results of so beneficent a nature as will keep Japan clear of serious labour
complications we have yet to see.
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION
Another important problem is educational reform. In the beginning of
1920 Japan had 41,950 schools, comprising 25,625 elementary schools, 12,845
technical schools of various grades, 866 middle and higher schools, seven
universities, and 2,607 schools of miscellaneous nature. The total teaching
staff consisted of 210,584 men and women, and the total number of students
was 9,636,853. The present compulsory system requires all children between
six and fourteen years of age to attend school at least six years. Under this
system, the percentage of attendance at the beginning of 1920 was 98.86.
Not only has the Government experienced little diflSculty in making the
parents send their children to school, but it is now pressed with demand for
the extension of the minimum period of compulsory education from the
present six years to eight years. There is also a persistent and highly sig-
nificant clamour, which is heard all over Japan, for increased facilities for
University, technical and liberal education. In 1919 the Diet extended its
approval to the Government plan which had as its object the increase and
improvement of all institutions existing for technical and liberal education.
This project involved the initial expenditure of a sum of no less than
44,000,000 yen, which entails a corresponding increase in annual expenditure
in the succeeding years.
As regards elementary education, the Central Government contributes
towards it an annual subsidy of over 60,000,000 yen, but the main portion
of the expenditure is borne by the local treasuries. For years the people
have been clamouring for an increase of the national subsidy. The reduction
of naval expenditure resulting from the Washington Treaty has given fresh
impetus to this public demand, and it is more than likely that the Government
will have to meet it. This intense and widespread desire for education
seems, as far as one can judge, to spring from the general conviction that
such a nation as Japan, possessing only an extremely limited territory of
some 173,786 square miles, the scant natural resources of which are barely
capable of supporting its ever-growing population, can survive only by de-
veloping the character, knowledge, skill and efficiency of the people.
In a previous passage we referred to the restriction of the freedom of the
Press. Fortunately, in recent years the Government has been following a
very liberal policy in this connection. Although a censorship law is still in
force, its application, except in times of war or of other emergency, has
become nominal. In 1871 Japan had only one daily newspaper. To-day
672 JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD ARENA
there ai« some 990 dailies and 2,040 periodicals. Some of these publications
have attained great influence and affluence. A few enjoy a daily circulation
as large as 800,000.
BCONOMIC PBOOBESS IN BECBNT YEABS
Space permits only a few words on Japan’s economic progress since 1900.
In 1900 her total foreign trade, both imports and exports, amounted to
523,000,000 yen in round figures. In 1920 it increased to 4,419,000,000 yen,
exclusive of the foreign trade of Korea and Formosa. These latter figures,
made possible by the war, are abnormal, but it is safe to say that Japan’s
foreign trade is now fluctuating at close to three thousand million yen.
In shipping and shipbuilding Japan has made an even greater progress.
In 1900 she had 150 steamers above 1,000 tons each. By 1920 this had
increased to 727 with a total tonnage of 2,356,477. Twenty years ago Japan’s
shipyards were negligible. To-day they are building merchant as well as
war ships, not only for domestic use but for foreign countries. During the
World War the Japanese yards built 93 ships for the United States, England,
Norway, Russia, France, Chile, Denmark, Spain and China. In 1919 Japan
turned out 134 ships of over 1,000 tons each, aggregating 619,558 tons.
HOPE POE THE FUTURE
In conclusion, Japan’s future safety and prosperity, the normal and whole-
some development of her political and economic condition, lie in the continued
peace of the world, particularly of the Far East. Unless she is allowed a
period of respite, wherein she may pause and take stock of what is about
her, she will not be able to carry out the domestic reforms which have been
regrettably delayed by external affairs demanding more immediate attention.
Japan is a nation pulled by external pressure to a height for which she was
not internally prepared. Naturally she has been going forward with make-
shifts devised as necessity dictated. What Japan needs is a relief from this
strenuous life, from the constant application of external pressure, so that
she may devote greater attention to the readjustment of her domestic affairs.
Shortly before this chapter was written, the greatest earthquake and fire
in the history of Japan, perhaps of the world, devastated, September 1, 1923,
a vast area in central Japan, taking a toll of over one hundred thousand lives,
and destroying properties valued at several thousand million dollars. This
unexpected disaster is bound to interfere once again with Japan’s desire and
^deavour for internal reform, as her energies and resources for some years
to come will have to be devoted to the task of reconstruction thrust upon
the nation by the unprecedented disaster.
CHAPTER XXXV
FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC: A CRITICAL
PERIOD IN CHINESE HISTORY
By His Excellency Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo
Minister of Foreign Affairs, China. Chinese Ambassador to the
United States, 1915-1921, to Great Britain, 1921-1923 Head of
Chinese Delegation to Pans Peace Conference
The history of China is at once fascinating and wearying, depending upon
the viewpoint of the person approaching it An empire which a few centuries
ago extended from the Pacific in the east to almost the English Channel in
the west and struck terror in the hearts of men from the Siberian steppes in
the north to the palmy plains of the Deccan Peninsula m the south, but
which IS to-day a compact, juvenile republic of four and a quarter million
square miles — namely, one-eighth greater than the area of the United States
— cannot but be a subject of intense fascination to the historian. On the
other hand, the same dramatic vicissitudes may weary him who reads while
running. This, in brief, appears to represent the attitude of those who either
are dejected by the discouraging appearances of China^s contemporary
history, or who take courage in spite of the ups and downs inevitable here
as elsewhere.
China has sometimes been described as a civilisation rather than a nation.
This description is perhaps not without its aptness, when it is borne in mind
that China has been synonymous with Chinese civilisation ever since its
annals began to be recorded four thousand years ago. Then Rome was
scarcely more than a city of seven hills, and the ancestors of modem Europe
painted their skins and ran wild in their forests. Egypt, Assyria, Babylon,
Greece and Rome were contemporaries of the Middle Kingdom,'* but the
inscrutable wisdom of the Arbiter of Nations has preserved the one while
allowing the others to disappear. Surely, this fact alone ought to invest
the history of China with more than usual interest. Again, foreign invaders
time and again imposed their own dynasties upon a vanquished people, but in
each case the conquerors were assimilated by the conquered race. The
cup of humiliation overflowed when the throne of the “ Son of Heaven ” was
occupied by an alien ruler, but the process of dethronement did not take
long to accomplish. Thus in face of the so-called ‘‘ anarchy " and disinte-
gration" obtaining in China to-day the Chinese are confident that, as in
the past so in the present, things will right themselves before long. If
foreign conquerors could be dethroned and assimilated, assuredly circum-
stances bom of change and progress will be similarly assimilated and brou^t
under control.
Taking it all in all, the history of China during the first quarter of the
twentieth century may be characterised as one of steady progress. Admirers
of China's Island Neighbour rightly point to the exemplary speed with which
she has modernised her life and institutions, but in fairness to the Chinese
it is to be remembered that the Island of the Rising Sun is scarcely one-tenl^
T. B T. — VOL. I — 43 673
FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC
674
tiie size of its continental neighbour; and this being the case, the latter’s
inertia must need a longer time to be overcome. To the outside world the
stories of civil strife and political dissensions in China are wont to receive
greater attention than the prosaic tales of slow, imperceptible progress, and
for ^is reason the universal impression is that the “ Celestial Empire ” is
too much tom asunder to ever progress at all. As a matter of fact, distance
exaggerates things, and appearances are proverbially deceptive. Eve^thing
considered, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that during the
twenty odd years imder review, greater and more solid progress has been
registered in China than was probably accomplished in Europe during the
same length of time. For not only has the form of government been changed,
but the very life of its people has imdergone a metamorphosis which few
thought could have been achieved in this short space of time. And if the
West was inclined to be impatient with China’s tardy progress, it may
soon complain that she is going too fast; this will be when the momentum of
her immense size and teeming millions gathers weight, and then the resultant
inertia of motion may be difficult to restrain or regulate.
For our present purpose the history of China may be discussed under the
following main heads: (1) Government and Administration; (2) Finance;
(3) Communications; (4) Industries and Trade; (5) Education; (6) Social
Life; (7) Tendencies and Possibilities.
I. Government, Administration and Foreign Affairs
Until the advent of the republic in 1912, China was an absolute monarchy,
but the monarchy was more in form than in fact. On the one hand the
emperor is recognised as the “ Son of Heaven ” whose person is sacred and
inviolable; on the other hand he is installed by divine sanction for the wel-
fare of the people. Therefore, when a ruler abuses his powers, he forfeits
his right to the exalted position, and the people in self-defence may dethrone
him or do violence to his person. Even in the height of absolutism there was
therefore some measure of democratic government, and while the viceroy and
magistrates of a province were appointed by the throne, in the villages and
big cities the village heads and gentry were more often than not the real
local authorities. Consequently when the republic was established in 1912,
the country was not ill-adapted for the change from a formless to a formal
democracy.
proclamation of the republic
Towards the close of the nineteenth century the Chinese began to see
their coimtry in its true light. Dominion after dominion had been wrested
from the “ Celestial Empire ” and, in 1895, the quondam Mistress of Asia
sued for peace from Japan, her former pupil. The talk of China’s partition-
ment was in the air, and a few Powers were already occupying portions of
her territory under leases extending from 25 to 99 years. Then the “ mid-
summer madness of 1900 ” increased the national indebtedness to the extent
of 450,000,000 Haikwan Taels (about $337,500,000 gold) , which at the end
of thirty-nine years at 4% annual interest would aggregate more than double
the original amount. Convinced of the utter incompetency of their rulers,
the Chinese began now to demand a greater share in the administration of
the country. The Manchus dilly-dallied, but in 1907 were constrained to
promise the grant of a constitution by 1913. An attempt to nationalise the
VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO
675
railways (they are now almost entirely Government-owmed and operated)
precipitated the gathering storm, and the Revolution of October 10, 1911,
broke out in Central China three weeks ahead of the prearranged schedule.
Province after province rallied to the revolutionary standard and, on January
1, 1912, the republic was proclaimed in Nanking, the “ Southern Capital.”
Forty-two days later (February 12) the Manchus abdicated, although the
Manchu boy-Emperor is to-day still permitted to enjoy imperial honours
within his exclusive sanctuary. The “ Provisional President,” Dr. Sun Yat-
sen, resigned in favour of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the seat of government was
transferred to Peking. The republic, however, was not recognised by most
of the Powers, with the exception of the United States, Brazil and Cuba,
until October of the following year.
** The Republic of China shall be a unified Republic forever. The Sover-
eignty of the Republic of China was vested in the whole body of the
People.” Thus read the first two articles of the Permanent Constitution
promulgated on October 10, 1923, to replace the Provisional Constitution
which was adopted in March, 1912. While democratic principles are not
new to the Chinese, a democratic form of government appeared to be a
novelty. The representatives of the people and the champions of autocracy
could not see eye to eye with each other, and Parliament itself was twice
illegally dissolved. Moreover, the very existence of the republic was twice
imperilled when, in the winter of 1915, Yuan Shih-k*ai sought to make him-
self emperor; and again in the summer of 1917, when the Manchu Monarchy
was restored for a fortnight and then collapsed.
PO^VERS OF THE PRESIDENT, THE CABINET, THE PARLIAMENT
The adminstrative power of the Republic of China shall be exercised
by the President with the assistance of the Cabinet Ministers.” So pro-
vides the fundamental law of the land. The President appoints the Cabinet,
but “ the House of Representatives may pass a vote of ‘ No Confidence ’ in
Cabinet Ministers ” When such contingency arises, “ the President shall
either relieve the Cabinet Ministers of their offices or dissolve the House of
Representatives; but the House of Representatives shall only be dissolved
with the concurrence of the Senate.” And “ during the tenure of office of the
same Cabinet Ministers or during the period of the same session there shall
not be a second dissolution.”
The President shall be a native of the country, who is over 40 years of age
and has lived in China for upwards of 10 years. “ The President shall be
elected by a Presidential Electoral College composed of the entire member-
ship of the two Houses of Parliament ” His term of office is five years, but
he may be reelected for another term. The Vice-President is elected in the
same manner and at the same time as the President. In case both the
President and the Vice-President are unable to function, the Cabinet will
administer the Government until Parliament elects a new President. The
Cabinet is composed of the Premier and the Ministers of nine executive
departments — Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, War, Navy, Justice, Edu-
cation, Agriculture and Commerce, and Communications. The appointment
of the Premier alone needs to be ratified by the House of Representatives.
There are 596 members in the House of Representatives, the ratio being
one for every 800, (XX) population. The Senate, however, represents the other
unrepresented interests — the 22 Provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, Chinghai, Cen-
tral Educational Society, and Chinese residing abroad — and its member-
ship is 274. The termi of the Representatives is three years, while that of
676 from empire TO REPUBLIC
the Senators is six years, one-third thereof retiring every two years. To
^e House of Representatives belongs the power to initiate money bills and
institute impeachment proceedings against the President, Vice-President and
Cabinet Ministers, while the Senate has the right to try the impeached
oflBcers, ratify the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
elect the Chief of the Board of Audit, and adjust controversies arising be-
tween the Provinces.
Large powers of self-government are now conceded by the Permanent
Constitution to the local areas — the province and the district — although
powers which appertain strictly to the nation are specified and exercised by
the Government. The province will have a single-chamber Assembly as
legislature and an Administrative Council as executive, while the District
will have an Assembly as legislature and a magistrate, with the assistance of
a Council, as executive. The Provincial Administrative Council will have
from five to nine members directly elected by the people, and the chairman
thereof will be elected by and from among the members. The magistrate
and the District Council will also be directly elected, but this system will
not be enforced until the ** completion of the Judiciary and the lower grade
self-government system.” All this, however, is for the future; during the
last ten years both the civil and military governors of the provinces as well
as district magistrates have been appointed by the Government, who are
assisted in an advisory capacity by provincial and district assemblies.
THE JUDICIARY
“ The judicial power of the Republic of China shall be exercised by the
Courts of Justice.” According to the Law of the Organisation of the Judi-
ciary published in 1910 there are four grades of courts: (1) Local Courts
(which have since been superseded by Branch Divisions of District Courts,
the District Magistrates exercising judicial functions, and district judicial
offices); (2) District Courts; (3) High Courts; and (4) Supreme Court
(Court of Cassation) in Peking. Corresponding to the courts are four grades
of procuratorates.
Aliens in China have until the last few years been granted the right of
extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction. The system, however, operates
to the constant embarrassment of the Chinese authorities, and when its
counterpart was abolished in Japan in 1899, China expressed a wish to
reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western
nations.” Great Britain, the United States and Japan responded in 1902-
1903 by agreeing to surrender their extraterritorial rights when each was
satisfied that “ the state of Chinese laws, the arrangements for their adminis-
tration, and other considerations warrant her in so doing.” Accordingly the
judiciary was reorganised, and a Law Codification Commission constituted
to revise as well as codify the existing laws.
The Provincial Criminal Code of 1912 has been twice revised and the
latest draft, which awaits ratification by Parliament, incorporates the latest
principles obtaining in other countries. Thus it is laid down that punish-
ment should be made to fit the individual rather than the crime; the criminal
responsibility of the feeble-minded is reduced, while the judges are required
to consider the circumstances, character, temperament, intelligence and
economic conditions of a criminal in determining the penalty. The revised
Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure have just come into force, while the
drafts of Civil and Commercial Laws are still in process of revision. On
the other hand, effect is already being given to various laws relating to
VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO
677
property, and other miscellaneous laws including the Commercial Arbitra-
tion Law, etc. And until the new laws are prommgated, the laws previously
enforced will be applied, provided they are not repugnant to the republican
form of Government. Moreover, at the direction of the Supreme Court the
inferior courts are guided in civil cases by the express provisions of the law;
in their absence by custom; and in its absence by legal principles.
In 1910 China participated in the International Prison Congress held in
Washington; since then model prisons, including juvenile and women prisons,
have been erected in most of the provincial capitals. Education is provided
for juvenile offenders, while the other prisoners are taught printing, carpenter-
ing, tailoring, weaving, and other useful handicrafts. Wages are paid for
such labour, and a prisoner may earn his conditional release by exemplary
behaviour.
“ The judicial officials shall be independent in the conduct of trials, and
no person whatsoever shall be allowed to interfere.” As long as the leps-
lature could not always enforce its will against the executive, the independence
of the judicial branch of the Government remained an ideal to be attained.
Nevertheless the judiciary may be said to be slowly and steadily asserting
its independence. Thus, on one occasion (1915) it worsted the redoubtable
Yuan Shih-k’ai himself until, exasperated by his failure to remove an upright
judge, he stigmatised the Supreme Court as being “ too subservient to the
law.” On another occasion 0916) which is reminiscent of the well-known
case in English constitutional history, Stockdale v. Hansard, it came into
violent clash with Parliament in the matter of jurisdiction over appeals
in election cases. The Legislature contended that the judiciary had no such
jurisdiction, while the Supreme Court maintained that according to its inter-
pretation of the law — a function which it alone possessed — it had such
jurisdiction. Thereupon Parliament passed resolutions denouncing the de-
cisions and declaring them null and void, but the Supreme Court retorted
that whereas Parliament could make laws, its resolutions had not the force
of law. Reason prevailed in the end, and Parliament gave in.
No person can be appointed a judge unless he has passed the required
examinations or been exempted therefrom in virtue of his having graduated
from a foreign university with a distinguished record. If successful, he will
be sent to a court or procuratorate on probation for two years, at the expira-
tion of which period he will be required to pass a second examination before
he can become a judge. Permanency of tenure is assured to members of the
judiciary.
FOBEIQN AFFAIB8
During the first decade of the nineteenth century China’s foreign rela-
tions were more or less uneventful. As a result of her successful war with
Russia, which was fought on Manchurian soil in spite of China’s protests,
Japan was enabled to entrench herself in north-eastern China, the Russian
lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan, etc., having been assigned to Japan,
while the renewal shortly before of her alliance with Great Britain paved
the way for her annexation of Korea. The outbreak of the World War
gave Japan a still tetter opportunity and, being in military occupation of
her territory leased in 1898 to Germany, she presented on January 18, 1915,
her famous Twenty-one Demiands on China, designed apparently to secure
at one stroke a dominant control over her weaker neighbour. Impotent as
it was, the republic was not overawed but yielded only inch by inch, and
Japan found it necessary at last (May 7) to send a 48-hour ultimatum in
order to compel acceptance. At the Paris Peace Conference four yews
678 from empire TO REPUBLIC
later, China, althou^ a co-partner with the Allied and Associated Powers,
was denied the consideration which the justice of her claims demanded, and
the leased territory of Kiaochow, together with an important railway leading
into the heart of Shantimg and other valuable rights, was awarded to Japan.
The estrangement between the two nations grew in intensity, and a boycott of
Japanese goods was enforced by the people. This resentment was not molli-
fied until the considerable amends were made by Japan at the Washington Dis-
armament Conference (1921-1922), when Tokyo agreed to return the leased
territory in Shantung to China and waived a number of the preferential
righte claimed by her under the Twenty-one Demands. The original lease
of Port Arthur and Talienwan terminated in March, 1923, but Japan claims
that the 26-year period has been extended by the Twenty-one Demands to
99 years. She therefore insists on retaining this extended lease in spite of
China’s protests.
THE WORLD WAR AND THE PEACE TREATY
On March 14, 1917, China broke off diplomatic relations with Germany
in protest against the latter’s indiscriminate submarine warfare, and five
months later she declared war against both Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Thereupon the Allied and Associated Powers assured the republic that they
“will do all that rests with them to insure that China shall enjoy in her
international relations the position and regard due to a great country.” The
Powers, however, found it diflScult to keep their promise, and China’s rep-
resentatives had to withhold their signatures from the Treaty of Versailles
because of the three articles awarding Shantung to Japan. When the other
Peace Treaties with ex-enemy countries were concluded, they were signed
also by the Chinese delegates, and the republic became thereby an original
member of the League of Nations.
At the Paris Peace Conference the Chinese Delegation submitted a memo-
randum entitled “ Questions for Readjustment ” and requested action there-
upon by the Conference. These included: (1) Renunciation of the Spheres
of Influence or Interest; (2) Withdrawal of foreign troops and police; (3)
Withdrawal of foreign post-ofl5ces and agencies for wireless and telegraphic
communications; (4) Abolition of the consular jurisdiction; (5) Relinquish-
ment of the leased territories; (6) Restoration of forei^ concessions and
settlements; (7) Tariff autonomy. On April 22, 1919, in the presence of
Premiers Clemenceau and Lloyd George, President Wilson assured the
Chinese delegates that as soon as the proposed League of Nations was estab-
lished, they would assist China to remove all inequalities as well as restric-
tions upon her legitimate rights, so that the Republic of China would truly
become a perfect, independent, sovereign, great state. Subsequently Clemen-
ceau, chairman of the Conference, suggested to the Chinese deleptes that
the questions for readjustment “ should be brought to the attention of the
Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function.”
These incidents have led the Chinese people to attach added importance
to the League and take a keen interest in all its activities. Acting upon the
Chinese proposition that the four non-permanent seats on the Council of the
League should be equitably distributed among the countries in Europe, North
and South America, Asia and the remaining parts of the world, the republic
was thrice elected to a seat in the Council of the League (1921-1923). A
Chinese jurist. Dr. Chung-hui Wang, was elected in September, 1921, as
one of the four deputy-iudges to the Permanent Court of International Justice,
and has since sat on the bench in several cases.
* iu
© International hewhreel
The Khutukhta of Mongolia, the ** Representative of God on Earth,** photographed in Moscow
while si g nin g an agreement between the Soviet Government and the new Mongolian National
Government.
I >
© Keystone View Uo,
President Tuan Shi-k’ai of China, elected in March,
1912. In 1915 he attempted to found a new Imperial
Dynasty in his own person. He failed, but refused
to resign the presidency and died in harness in 1919.
VI KUYUIN WELLINGTON KOO
679
THB WASHINGTON DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
The achievements of the Disarmament Conference are still fresh in the
world’s memory, and it suffices to dwell upon its accomplishments as they
concern China. As may be recalled, the first milestone registered by the
Conference was the signing, on December 13, 1921, of the Pacific Treaty
between the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan on the coming
into effect of which, the Anglo- Japanese Alliance of July 13, 1911, was to
terminate. While the Four-Power Pact is designed to preserve the general
peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to theii* insular pos-
sessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean,” it will by
abrogating the alliance between Great Britain and Japan be instrumental in
inaugurating a new regime in the Pacific, since the alliance has been re-
sponsible in the eyes of the Chinese people for the whole fabric of inter-
national relations in the Far East during the past twenty years, including the
foreign policy of Japan vis-d-vis China, especially in 1915.
Apprehensive of a possible renewal of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, con-
fronted with the Shantung deadlock, and anxious about the early settlement
of the questions brought up for readjustment at but left over by the Paris
Peace Conference, China wholeheartedly accepted President Harding’s in-
vitation to attend the Conference at Washington. The Chinese were aware
that the Conference could not redress overnight all grievances, but were con-
fident that it could, if it wished, assist the republic by removing many of
the existing limitations as well as violations of China’s sovereignty, territorial
integrity and administrative autonomy. Accordingly the Chinese Delegation
submitted a bill of ten principles, which were favourably received by the
Conference. The results attained are far-reaching in their consequences and,
although not complete, have encouraged the Chinese to hope that the day
will not be distant when their aspirations will be wholly realised.
The decisions of the Conference in relation to China are embodied in two
treaties — the Nine-Power General Treaty and the Nine-Power Chinese Cus-
toms Treaty — and ten resolutions. The salient features of these important
instruments may be briefly summarised. The first treaty binds the other
eight Powers to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the terri-
torial and administrative integrity of China,” to “ provide the fullest and
most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself
an effective and stable government,” to “ use their influence for the purpose
of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportu-
nity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory
of China,” and to ^ refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in
order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of
subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical
to the security of such States.” The same treaty reaffirms the Open Door
policy and discountenances the spheres of influence, and provides for a full
and frank exchange of views, when deemed necessary, between the contract-
ing parties, for the execution of the treaty. The second treaty raises tiie
existing Chinese import tariff to an effective five per cent ad valorem, and
authorises the convocation of a special conference in China to deal with the
abolition of likin and levying of surtaxes on luxuries and other dutiable
imports.
The resolutions adopted by the Conference provide for the organisation
of a Board of Reference to investigate and report on the execution of partic-
ular portions of the first treaty; the establishment of a Commission on Extra-
680 FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC
territoriality to inquire and report on extraterritoriality and administration of
justice; the holding of a full and impartial inquiry, ‘‘whenever China shall
so request/' into the issues involved in the withdrawal of foreign armed forces
and China's ability to protect foreign life and property; the abolition of
foreign post-ofiBces with certain exceptions; restrictions upon the operation
of foreign radio stations; publicity for all treaties, agreemente, contracts, etc.,
concerning China; unification of railways, reduction of military forces, and
better protection for the Chinese Eastern railway.
In addition the Conference was instrumental in the amicable solution of
the Shantung deadlock, mainly through the good offices of the American and
British delegates, and the relinquishment by Japan of a number of prefer-
ential rights claimed under the Twenty-one Demands. And in recognition of
the retrocession of Kiaochow, the former German leased territory, Great
Britain offered to restore Wei-hai-wei to China, while France declared her
readiness to return Kwangchowwan if other Powers were likewise prepared
so to do.
II. Finance
The Boxer Outbreak of 1900, with the heavy indemnity payments result-
ing therefrom, marked the beginning of a new epoch in the financial history
of China, which is characterised by extensive borrowing both abroad and at
home. Down to 1895, the national revenue had been below Tls. 90,000,000
(about $67,500,000 gold), yet there was usually some surplus over expendi-
ture. The war with Japan resulted in an indemnity of Tls. 200,000,000 (about
$150,000,000 gold), to be paid in eight instalments, and an additional Tls.
30,0(k),0()0 paid for the retrocession by Japan of the Liaotung Peninsula.
Every time an instalment of the indemnity fell due, some foreign loan was
arranged for making the payment. However, this obligation was fully paid
off three years before due date in 1898, and the national budget would have
been well readjusted in a few years, if not for the new indemnity burden of
1900.
THE BOXEB INDEMNITY
The amount of the principal of the Boxer indemnity was Haikwan Tls.
450,000,000 (about $337,500,000 gold), but as the annual revenue was so
meagre at that time, payment had to be extended over 39 years, making the
total of principal and interest payments Haikwan Tls. 982,238,150, or more
than twice the original amount. The payments were to be made out of the
Customs and Salt revenues, but this arrangement made it necessary for the
Chinese Government to borrow large foreign sums to meet ordinary expenses.
According to the tables published by the Finance Ministry, the total foreign
loans outstanding in September, 1922, were about $1,250,000,000 silver (or
^25,000,000 gold), including approximately $250,000,000 gold of the Boxer
indemnity still outstanding.
The above docs not include foreign railway loans which are actually
applied to railway construction or operation and which have little to do with
the general financial conditions. Their amortisation is taken care of by the
revenue from the railways themselves, and a substantial surplus has always
been left over, amounting sometimes to more than $20,000,000 gold a year
or about one-tenth of the total national revenue.
The other principal sources of revenue are the Customs duties, the salt
tax, the land tax, the likin, the wine and tobacco taxes and fees, the stamp
VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO 881
tax and the Peking octroi, tiie last item being important only to the Central
Government. All these and other revenues total about $225,000,000 gold
a year.
MANY NEW TAXES
Many new taxes were levied during the last decade of the Manchu rigmo,
and many more under tiie republic. The stamp tax was introduced in 1913,
and in three years the collection had increased from $28,000 gold to $1,800,-
000 gold. The wine and tobacco monoply fee was a new source of revenue
in 1915, and is now yielding approximately $7,000,000 gold a year. The
income tax, the title deeds tax, the mining royalty, and a number of sur-
taxes were all mtroduced during the last decade, while the Customs revenue
has also increased from $33,000,000 gold in 1913 to $44,000,000 gold in 1922.
A greater increase has been realised in the salt revenue, but taken all in all,
the Government receipts have not multiplied as fast as the disbursements,
which always include large sums for meeting the different loan services. This
necessitates further loans, which in turn give rise to further deficits.
Although all general foreign loans were, in a sense, occasioned by indem-
nity payment since 1895, and more particularly by the Boxer indemnity of
1900, the heavy military expenses have been mainly responsible for the con-
tracting of domestic loans. Formerly very little was spent on the army,
which was perhaps only one-tenth its present size. As late as 1911, the appro-
priations of the Ministry of War amounted only to $62,000,000 gold or less
than one-third of the total expenditure. At present they require about twice
that amount and more than one-half of the total budgetary disbursements.
Much of the soldiers’ pay is in arrears, but in spite of that and of the in-
crease of revenue, many domestic loans have been made of which about $220,-
000,000 gold is still outstanding.
DOMESTIC LOANS
The nature of the Government’s dependence on loans has changed during
recent years. At first the Government relied entirely on foreign loans.
Towards the end of the Manchu regime, a senes of domestic bonds was issued,
but was not well taken up by the public. The first domestic issue that was
actually floated was the Patriotic l^an Bonds of 1911, and the first dmnestic
loan that was fairly subscribed was that of the Third Year of the Republic
(1914). In fact, the later issue was over-subscribed, and since then almost
every year saw a new issue, varying from $5,000,000 to $48,000,000 gold.
More and more has the Government depended on native capital to finance
its deficits, but as the most reliable sources of revenue have already been set
aside to meet payments on the Boxer indemnity and foreign loans, much
difficulty is experienced in providing adequate secunty for domestic loans.
Nevertheless, no large foreign loan has been raised since 1921, and the Gov-
ernment now relies almost entirely on borrowing at home.
A brighter outlook is seen in private finance. Modem banks have grown
considerably in numbers. Twenty years ago there were only two or three
such banks, but now there are more than 100 of them with more than 350
branches. For 41 banks which reported details to the Shanghai Bankers’
Association in 1921, the total assets amounted to about $400,000,000 gold
and ^e deposits to $210,000,000 gold.
The National Currency Act of 1914 made the Yuan Shih-k’ai silver Hnllay
682 from empire TO REPUBLIC
the standard coin, but the exchange of the copper subsidiary coins still fluc-
tuates from day to day. A further complication ar^ from paper money,
representing silver or copper, being in many cases circulated at a discoxmt.
Nevertheless, this situation is a great improvement over conditions in 1900
or even 1911, when China depended on foreign coins (French, Spanish and
Mexican) for her currency, or used silver by weight. Now the Yuan Shih-
k’ai dollar circulates in all parts of the country.
The Central Government has now organised a Commission for the Re-
adjustment of National Finance to devise plans for the amortisation of the
floating debts, the preparation of a scientific budget and the adoption of a
good currency system. These questions are dependent one on another in
their solution, and China will not be rid of her financial difiiculties until all
of them are solved together. When that is done, and when the Special Tariff
Conference puts into effect the 2^2 per cent surtax in Customs tariff agreed
to at Washington in 1922, her financial conditions will then be greatly
improved.
III. Communications
At the beginning of 1912, the Chinese Government railways extended over
a distance of about 3,800 kilometres. In 1923, trains are running over some
7,000 kilometres of Government line, not counting the Shantung railway with
its 480 kilometres.
An increase of 3,200 kilometres in twelve years is not remarkable, but an
increase of 84 per cent during that length of time is a record which probably
no other country has achieved during this period. That the increase in
China was not greater is due not to the fault of China, but to the failure of
foreign contractors to fulfil contracts for construction. During the first
three years of the republic (1912-1914) China contracted for the construction
of nearly 10,000 kilometres of line, scarcely 500 of which have been built.
The lines whose construction was prevented by the World War would have
constituted a third north-and-south trunk line, a second east-and-west trunk
line, and the completion of the Canton-Hankow line
The increase in revenues has been greater than the increase in length
of line. The 3,800 kilometres of line in 1911 produced about $33,350,000
silver (about $16,675,000 in U. S gold currency). The earnings of the Gov-
ernment lines in 1922 were approximately $99,790,000 silver — treble the
1911 amount. China has had no inflation of currency nor any war stimula-
tion of industry to produce this result. On the contrary, industry is sup-
posed to have been more or less paralysed, first by uncertainty, later by
plague and famine, and finally by political settlement. Yet withal the rev-
enue per kilometre of line shows an increase from $8,450 to $14,250.
MANY IMPROVEMENTS
When the republic came into existence (1912) the twelve or thirteen Gov-
ernment lines were each as separate and distinct as if they had existed in
different countries. They ran their trains each with no reference to the
schedules of the other. A passenger had to buy a ticket over one line at a
time. He must be on hand at junction points to take charge of his baggage
and transfer it to the next line. Baggage which could be carried in the coupia
by one line must be checked on another, and parcels which could be checked
as baggage on one line would be refused on another. Tickets on the different
VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO
683
lines were printed in different languages. Distances and weights were calcu-
lated in different units of measurement. The equipment was constrocted
according to different designs. If a shipment was to move from one line to
another, the shipper must himself take the responsibility of transferring it
from the cars of the first line to the cars of the second line at destination.
The accounts were kept by different systems, and comparisons in the per-
formance of the different lines were impossible.
Now, after only eleven years of the republic, practically all of this is
changed. Through trains are run between the principal centres. The pas-
senger buys his ticket at point of origin for the complete journey, no matter
how many lines may be traversed, or even if his journey take him into Man-
churia or to Japan. His baggage, checked at point of origin, needs no further
attention on his part until the destination is reached. Parcels can be for-
warded in the same manner The rules governing the weight and character
of parcels which are accepted as baggage are uniform on all lines. The metric
system of weights and measures has been adopted by all lines. No longer
is it necessary to transfer freight at junction points, for interchange of
rolling-stock permits the shipment to go forward in the original car. Even
through bills of lading are used, and the auditing for all this inter-line
business is performed m the Railway Clearing House in the Ministry of
Communications.
The general accounting system of the railways has been made uniform
for all lines, and the fruit of this uniform system is an Annual Report which
combines the financial and physical results of the operations of the several
lines into a single volume. Statistics of length of line, capital investment,
revenues, expenses, financial charges, traffic carried, train and locomotive
kilometrage, and numbers of employees are given in statistical tables. These
tables are also subjected to a detailed criticism in which the performances
of the various lines are compared upon the basis of unit averages. This
Annual Report, of which seven issues have already appeared, was declared
by a Commission of the British Parliament to be a model of its kind, prob-
ably more up to date than that produced in any other country in the world.”
A start has been made toward standardising the rolling-stock of the Gov-
ernment lines. Standard designs for freight cars of the various types have
been agreed upon. Possibly as significant as any action is that whereby the
Ministry of Communications laid dowm standard rules for the handling of
tenders for purchase.
Before 1915 statistical comparisons were difficult to arrange. Since June,
1915, however. Permanent Government Investment has increased by $35,000,-
000 (silver). Additions to Property Through Surplus amount to $53,000,000
and Funded Debt Retired Through Surplus increased by $26,000,000. In
other words, the Government equity has increased by $li4, 000,000 in seven
years.
HOW THE MAILS ARE CARRIED
The Postal Administration under the Ministry of Communications is
almost exactly contemporary with the republic — being only eight months
older — although it was first constituted as a part of the Customs Adminis-
tration in 1896, with beginnings much further back than that.
In 1912, the number of pieces of mail matter posted was approximately
160,000,000 — about one piece for every two persons in the area served. In
1922, ten years later, the number of pieces was over 426,000,000, or about
one piece for every man, woman or child in the territory served. The increase
in the use of the parcel post was even greater. From about a million parcels
6g4 PROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC
in 1912, the number has sprung to over 4,500,000 in 1922. The weight of
parcels handled has increased from under 4,000,000 kilogrammes in 1912 to
nearly 24,000,000 in 1922. The former limit of three kilogrammes was raised
to five kilogrammes in 1916 and 10 kilogrammes in 1919. The accessibility of
the service has been increased about three times during the past ten years, as
the number of post-ofiBces has increased from less than 4,000 at the beginning
of 1912 to over 11,000 in 1922. In addition some 27,000 minor establishment
— rural stations principally — have been founded, thus extending the service
into rural villages.
But the penetration of the mail service into the hidden nooks and far-flung
spaces of the territory over which the five-barred flag flies is perhaps the most
(Carnatic part of the whole story. In 1911 the aggregate length of the major
courier lines was some 100,000 miles. In 1922 this length had increased to
155,000 miles, but in addition thereto minor courier lines, steamer, boat,
railway and motor-car routes have been added until the aggregate lenj^h of
routes is over 250,000 miles, or about the same as the length of the railway
lines in the Unit^ States. The longest stage courier route in the world
is in the Chinese service, that from Peking via Kalgan to Tihwa in Chinese
Turkestan. Naturally such a length of line encounters unexpected conditions,
and more different means of conveyance are to be found in the Chinese postal
service than in that of any other country. To the ordinary railway, steam-
boat, motor-car, bicycle, airplane, foot messenger, horseman, and pack animal,
China adds the wheelbarrow, mule litter, ox-cart, camel, sledges propelled by
sails and push-poles, rafts of inflated buffalo skins, and cables by which the
courier crawls over rivers
The Postal Administration has also taken on a variety of other functions
which add to its usefulness as a public convenience. For example, it takes
an unoflScial census and transmits money orders to the value of $75,000,000
(silver) a year. It has recently established a Postal Savings Bank which
already shows deposits measured in millions of dollars.
So regular has been the service, so loyal have been the servitors, that in
1921 at the Washington Conference no serious objection was interposed when
China asked that the foreign post-offices maintained by foreign countries
should be withdrawn. And on January 1, 1923, all except those which were
situated in the leased territories and the South Manchurian railway zone
were actually closed
The story of the Telegraph Administration during the past twelve years
is practically a repetition of that of the railway and the postal services.
Additional areas have been brought into immediate communication with the
rest of the world, and areas which already had been reached by the telegraph
have been more adequately served by the opening of additional oflBces or by
additional equipment for the handling of a greater business The telegraph
wires in China would reach twice around the world. The number of offices
approach 1,000 compared with a little over 500 in 1911 Wireless telegraphy
has been added, there being fourteen offices in 1922. The Telegraph Adminis-
tration exercises supervision over telephones to a certain extent, some 45,000
instruments being involved in December, 1923.
A small beginning has been made in the direction of commercial aviation,
but the venture is yet in its infancy. In the summer of 1921 a daily service
between Peking and Tsinan — a distance of 280 miles — was instituted, but
owing to various circumstances the service has been suspended. A daily
service between Peking and Peitaiho — a distance of 240 miles — is however
maintained during the summer season, carrying mails and passengers to the
popular summer resort. A National School of Flying under the control of
the Ministry of War was established in 1913 near Peking, and by the end
VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO 686
of 1918 it had trained 100 pilots. The Ministry of the Navy has also a
Seaplane Flying School in Foochow.
A National Conservancy Bureau was established in 1913 for the con-
servancy of China's innumerable waterways, including the Grand Canal, but
due to shortage of funds progress along this line has not been very marked.
An American engineering firm has, however, succeeded (November, 1923) m
diverting the Yellow River, known as “ China's Sorrow,” from its periodic
immdations, to its original channel as well as constructing a powerful dyke
to control ite waters. The value of good roads is appreciated and spurred on
by the Good Roads Movement, and efforts are being directed in many prov-
inces towards improving existing highways as well as laying out new roads.
During the famine of 1920-1921 in North China the American Red Cross
constructed nearly 900 miles of serviceable roads with the labour supplied by
famine refugees, and this example is proving a great incentive to the Chinese.
IV. Industries and Trade
China being essentially an agricultural country, approximately four-fifths
of her population are engaged in farming. Agriculture as an occupation has
been always highly regarded in China, and the farmer comes second in the
traditional system of social classification, viz., scholar, farmer, artisan and
merchant. Even to-day agriculturists in Western countries envy their Chinese
confreres' knack as well as knowledge of soil fertilisation, rotation of crops
and conservation of waste. Lack of scientific knowledge and modern im-
plements is, however, retarding normal development here as well as in other
phases of national activity.
With the establishment of the republic means have been devised to enable
the farmers as far as possible to keep up with the times. As a result, each
province has now an experimental station established by the local authorities,
and enlightened growers of cotton, tea and silk have established similar sta-
tions for the improvement of their produce. These publish periodical bulletins
in simple language for the information of the farmers, and stage lectures and
exhibitions for their demonstration. China is already the third largest cotton
producer in the world, and the extensive use of modern implements will
undoubtedly increase the output several fold. As evidence of the appreciation
of the value of cooperation, recent statistics show that there are 581 district
and 496 village agricultural associations.
The ravages of floods and inundations have brought home to the masses
the destructive effects of deforestation which hitherto had been indiscrimi-
nately practised, and Arbour Day every year is now set aside as a ‘‘tree-
planting festival,” when the official and student classes go out into the country
and plant trees. Thus is emphasised the value of tree planting and affores-
tation.
THE CAPITALISTIC SYSTEM INTRODUCED
During the period under review Chinese industries have been passing from
the handicraft to the modem capitalist stage. Almost all manufacturing was
done by hand in small workshops twenty years ago, but by 1923 there were
about 19,000 factories applying steam or electric power and labour-saving
machinery.
The order of - development is somewhat as follows. Attention was first
paid to the minihg industry, especially coal. The Kailan coal-mines of Chihli
686
FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC
were operated as early as 1878, but the period of greatest activity in that
industry was from 1897 to 1911. Most of the large existing mines were
opened during that period, including the Peking Syndicate coal concessions
in Honan, the iron-mines at Tayeh (Hupeh), the coal-mines at Pinghsiang
(Kiangsi), the Pen-hsi-hu coal and iron mines in South Manchuria, and the
Pao Chin coal-mines in Shansi. Iron and steel works were also established
during much the same period, but the heavy initial outlay and bad transpor-
tation conditions soon frustrated the development.
As China is the third largest cotton-producing country, it was easy for
the spinning industry to develop. The earliest cotton-mills were established
around 1890, but most of the existing mills came into existence after 1900,
and the greatest boom in this industry came when the World War curtailed
the importation of cotton yam and piece goods. Statistics compiled by the
Chinese Cotton Millowners’ Association show that the number of spindles
grew from 659,752 in 1919 to 1,593,034 in 1922, while the inclusion of those
owned by foreign mills in China and those in course of erection would bring
the total above two and a half million. The number of power looms also in-
creased three-fold in these four years, and the quality of the fibre has been
steadily improved through the introduction of American seeds.
The vegetable oil and the flour industries began to flourish after the
cotton-mills, and if small ones are counted, there are thousands of them in
Manchuria, the Yangtze Valley and the Northern provinces Electric light
and power works and telephone companies are now found in all the larger
cities of the country. Chemical industries had a longer period of develop-
ment than the flour industries, but they were on a small scale and have not
affected the general industrial conditions very much In view of the great
demand for their products, they are destined to play an important role in
the future.
An interesting fact is revealed by the Customs reports of the last two
years. Formerly China depended on foreign countries for manufactured
products, but Chinese factory products were exported to the amount of
Haikwan Tls. 97,036,023 and 127,702,280 in 1921 and 1922 (about $73,000,000
gold and $96,000,000 gold) respectively. They made up from one-sixth to
one-fifth of the total exports. This is an unmistakable sign of the industrial
development of the country.
Another sign is found in the nature of the imports. At first only manu-
factured goods for immediate consumption were imported Gradually de-
mand arose for half-prepared material, such as cotton yam, leather, steel
plates, etc., to be turned into finished products in China. Now there is an
increasing importation of machinery and machine parts with which to install
manufacturing plants.
A concomi^nt development is the appearance of the labour problem.
Wages have risen many fold during the last two decades, but the cost of
living has risen more. Labourers have formed organisations, and strikes have
become common occurrences. The Government recently promulgated certain
regulations for the protection of factory and mine labourers; and social service
organisations, in conjunction with the Government Bureau of Economic In-
formation, are making a careful study of the problem. It is hoped that a
satisfactory solution will be found without resorting to class wars.
The development of industries is faithfully reflected in China’s foreign
trade, with the result that whereas in 1910, the net foreign trade was valued
at Haikwan Tls. 843,798,222, its net value had been doubled by the end of
1921. On the other hand, the adverse trade balance between imports and
exports has increased from eighty million taels to three hundred million taels
during the corresponding period.
VI KYinN WELLINGTON KOO
687
V. Education
The aim of Chinese education in the past has been predominantly moral
and cultural. Its curriculum was largely limited to some standard books of
vocabulary and the classics; the former most rudimentary, the latter intensely
profound, both meaningless to children. Its method, to quote Paul Monroe,
“ is to compel the pupils, first, to remember, secondly, to remember, thirdly,
and ever more, to remember. ... It is as thou^ our whole aim in school
were to develop the ability to write essays similar in form, structure, and
sentiment to the Proverbs and Psalms'’
Great changes, however, have occurred during the last twenty years.
Early in 1903, a system of national education in which modem sciences were
given proper place was adopted, and the old-style literary examination was
abolished in 1905. In recent years, the scientific and vocational tendency
has replaced to a large extent the literary and cultural tradition. As to
method, learning by rote and “ pouring in ” has been gradually superseded
by the so-called developing method. The Herbartian Five Formal Steps
found a general reception a decade ago. Then the formality of it was sensed,
and teachers sought to reduce the amount of oral presentation by “ supervised
study.” At present, the “ project method ” of teaching is much in vogue in
elementary education. School discipline has also changed from its old harsh-
ness and rigidity to a spirit of freedom and self-control that is conducive to
democratic citizenship.
The educational system of 1903 was revised in 1912, and the latter, with
slight modifications, continued to be in force till 1922 when the present system
was adopted. This divides education into the following periods: (1) Ele-
mentary, from SIX to twelve years of age; (2) Secondary, from twelve to
eighteen (this period including normal and vocational schools) ; (3) higher,
from eighteen to twenty-four, for work in college or technical school, and
from twenty-four to twenty-six for graduate work.
In regard to the sources of support of the schools, generally speaking, the
Central Government is responsible for the higher education, the Provincial
Government looks after the seconda^ education, and the elementary educa-
tion is in the hands of district officials and the gentry of cities, towns and
villages.
The present educational situation may be summarised by the following
statistical table (data published by the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Education, Peking, 1923) :
No of Students
Grade of
No of
Institutions Institutions
Male
Female
Total
University and College
125
34,033
847
34,880
Normal School
275
31,553
6,724
38377
Normal Institutes
110
5,170
399
5369
Middle
547
100,136
3349
103385
Vocational (secondary)
164
18,908
1,452
20,360
Vocational (elementary)
439
18710
1,757
20,467
Higher primary
10,236
547^97
35,182
582,479
Lower primary
167,076
5,445315
368,560
5314375
Grand Total
178,981
6301,622
418,170
6,619,792
The above figures do not include the missionary schools without giving a due
account of which any survey of modem Chinese education must be incom-
plete. “ Christian schools were at first established not by professional edu-
688 from SMPIRB TO REPUBLIC
cators and not for the promotion of education for education’s sake, but as
an adjunct and aid to evangelisation. Once established, however, the schools
indicated their rij^t to live, not only by serving the end for which they were
originally founded but by contributing effectively to tiie other ends which
missionary work began to set for itself. As a result they grew in number,
size and variety of specific character, ran^g from the kindergarten to the
college, and even in a few cases undertaking post-graduate work.” The
following is a statistical summaij as found in the Report of the China
(Christian) Educational Commission of 1921-1922:
No. of Students
Grade of
No. of
Institutions
Institutions
Male
Female
Total
Kindergarten
139
4,324
Lower Primary
5,637
103,232
48,350
151382
Higher Primary
962
23,490
9,409
32399
Middle
291
12,644
2,569
15313
Normal
48
360
262
612
College
16
1358
159
2,017
Bible School
100
1,024
1,635
2,659
Theological
13
391
391
Law
1
27
27
Medical
10
485
78
563
Nurse traimng
106
1,380
Blmd
29
286
508
794
Deaf mutes
5
60
Orphanages
25
1,733
Orqnd Total
7,382
143,797
62,970
214354
THE CENTUMES-OLD WRITTEN LANGUAGE OP CHINA
The high percentage of illiteracy in China is explained by the difficulty
in leEuning the ideographic language and by the fact that the classical educa-
tion is only enjoyed by a privileged few. Initiative has been taken by the
National Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations to work out a
series of readers called Foundation Characters based on one thousand of the
most commonly used characters of the language. With the aid of lantern
slides, showing the characters with pictures on the screen, these lessons have
been presented successfully. The matter is now taken up by the National
Association for the Advancement of Education, and large-scale campaigns
have already been launched in Peking and Nanking. Among the agencies of
popular education that are under Government control may be mentioned the
public “ make-up school,” half-day school, the lecture hall, the newspaper
reading-room, and the public library. According to the latest report of the
Ministry of Education, there are 321 public “ make-up schools,” 1,552 half-
day schools, 2,139 lecture halls, 1,817 newspaper reading-rooms, and 61 public
libraries in the coimtry.
The Chinese written language, well developed centuries ago, is now very
different from the spoken lan^ge, which is further divided into a number
of local dialects. Since the written language has been little influenced by the
growth of living dialects, it has become static and inflexible, not closely related
to the needs of present life and inadequate as a medium of literary expression
for the common people. Again, since the written language is ideographic, not
phonetic, it is extremely hard to learn. To obviate the first difficulty, Chinese
educators have been advocating the substitution of the spoken language for
© Wide World Photon
The Pekin Union Medical College, built by the Rockefeller Foundation of New York and opened
in 1919. In front are the staff and student membership.
Dr. Wellington Koo, sometime Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs; has been
Minister both to Great Britain and to the
United States. He contributes the chapter
on China to These Eventful Years.
Dr. Sun Tat-sen, Chinese Revolutionary
leader. In 1921 he was elected President
by the Southern Government at Canton*
but was deposed in 1922.
PDV
VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO
the classical style of writing as the medium of literary expression, and already
numerous journals and periodicals are being published in the spoken language.
To partly obviate the second diflSculty, a system of phonetic symtols has
been made and adopted, consisting of forty symbols to be written side by side
with the written character as a means of learning the pronunciation of the
written character.
CHINESE SCHOLABS ABROAD
A significant movement in Chinese education has been the sending of
students to foreign countries to drink direct at the fountain-heads of Western
learning and inspiration. The movement began with Yung Wing in 1868
when he took over to the United States a band of thirty young students
under the auspices of the Government. In 1908, the United States gener-
ously returned the unexpended portion of the Boxer indemnity to China and,
out of appreciation and good-will, the Chinese Government has been send-
ing annually to the American universities and technical schools a number of
young men mostly trained and prepared in Tsing Hua College, Peking.
Japan at one time attracted the largest number of students, while the number
of those in England, France, Germany and other European countries is small
compared with that of those in America.
While students will continue for some time yet to pursue higher educa-
tion abroad, beginnings in original, scientific researches have already been
made at home. The Geological Survey of Peking and the Biological Insti-
tute of Nanking, founded in 1922 by the Science Society of China, are strik-
ing instances. In literature and philosophy there have also been some original
studies made. Finally, the visits of Exchange Professors from America and
Europe — e,g,, Dr John Dewey in 1919-1920, Mr. Bertrand Russell in 1920-
1921, and Prof. Hans Driesch in 1921-1922 — when they gave public lec-
tures in various parts of China and offered short courses in national univer-
sities, have stimulated not a little the impetus for educational research work.
VI. Social Life
In the manner of change from a formless to a formal democracy may be
seen the character of the social transformation which has been witnessed
since the establishment of the republic and which is still going on to-day in
the country. While the traditions of forty centuries cannot be renovated
overnight, the law of the survival of the fittest cannot be denied its opera-
tion. And the net result seems to be a distinct score for the new.
To begin with, the advent of a democratic form of government has tended
to democratise the life of the people Where there were irksome restrictions,
there is now judicious freedom, although at times this freedom is apt to be
mistaken for licence and abused. This is especially true of the co mming ling
of the sexes, where rigorous exclusion was the rule. The elaborate customs
of marriage have been reformed to the point of ultra simplicity, and the
future man and wife have more and more the liberty of mutual selection.
The benefits of education are being shared by the women, and they are not
slow to take advantage of their new status. A few of them have not hesi-
tated to agitate for woman suffrage, but the majority seem to prefer to go
slowly and instead win a larger place in the sphere of social and public
service.
Foreign customs and things foreign are becoming increasingly popular.
T. B Y — VOL. 1 — 44
FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC
Football, ♦■annia and other outdoor games are slowly displacing the old Chinese
calisthenics, while poker and bridge are rivalling the popularity of “Mah
Jongg ” (“ Sparrows ”) or “ Pung Chow ” in America and Europe. Forei^
music is being heard more and more in public functions, and the stranger in
the land is no longer held at arms’ length.
The cake of custom is steadily crumbling, and such practices as the wear-
ing of the queue, foot binding, early marriage, infanticide, opium smoking
are either being discarded or frowned upon. Disused temples have been
pulled down to make room for modern schools, and city walls demolished to
make way for macadamised roads. Life has begun to lose much of its former
drudgery, and there is more sincerity than formality in social intercourse.
ANCESTOR WORSHIP DISAPPEARING
Respect for the family elders there still is, but the former abject obedi-
ence is disappearing. The ancient virtue of filial piety practically remains
intact, but the so-called ancestral worship is assuming more and more the
form of rational veneration. The sanctity of the family is still being jeal-
ously guarded, but the guarding thereof is done with better understanding.
With the spread of education and imiversal enlightenment there is greater
general articulation. This is evidenced in the’ growth of newspapers and
periodicals, which in turn has sponsored the growth of public opinion. Public
opinion has its own forms of expression in China, and this opinion is coming
to exercise more and more a deciding influence in the life of the nation.
FAILURE OP THE OLD RELIGIONS — INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY INCREASES
The attitude towards religion is similar to that adopted regarding the
other problems of life: where there used to be blind faith and confidence,
there is now more rationalism and intelligent understanding. The ancient
religions of the country have been found wanting, and Christianity bids fair
to play an increasingly larger part in the mentality of the people. As among
the Christians so among the Confucianists, there is much heart-searching
going on, and while the Christian churches are striving to become indepen-
dent of foreign assistance in order to solve their own problems, attempts are
being made to revive Confucianism. Philosophy and religion go hand in hand,
since Confucianism and Taoism were founded on the moral teachings of two
of the nation’s greatest philosophers. Of late there has been renewed in-
terest in the writings of ancient philosophers. These are being reinterpreted
by some of the greatest contemporary writers, and endeavours are being
launched to construct something new out of the past.
The pendulum having swung enough to the two extremes is beg innin g to
settle down, and the attitude to-day is one of judicious discrimination.
While the minority experiments with an importation from the West, the
majority will wait. If the new is superior to the old, well and good; other-
wise the national tradition will be preserved.
PATRIOTIC DEMONSTRATIONS
Coni^rvatism as a characteristic of the people seems to be more and more
finding itself in patriotic manifestations. Thus when the republic was estab-
lished, the first Provisional President repaired to the tomb of the founder of
VI KYUIN WELLINGTON KOO 691
the last Chinese (Ming) dynasty and announced to the spirits of the departed
monarch that China had been recovered by the Chinese people, that the
power and prestige of the Manchus had been annihilated, and that a free
republic had been established. Again, when the Chinese Delegates return^
from the Paris Peace Conference, they repaired to the tonib of Confucius in
Shantung and offered formal sacrifices to the departed spirits. One announced
the recovery of the national patrimony from alien hands; the other expressed
the nation’s gratitude that the republic had not been deprived of its holy
land.
VIL Tendencies and Possibilities
With the size of China’s territory — four and a quarter million square
miles — with its teeming population — four hundred million inhabitants —
and with its immense natural resources — the coal supply of one northern
province alone is said to be sufficient to last the whole world a thousand
years — the possibilities of the republic seem to be almost illimitable.
While the progress noted in the foregoing pages is satisfactory enough,
the results could have been improved if the circumstances had been more
favourable. For example, if there had been 20,000 instead of the existing
7,000 miles of railway; if there had been peace and harmony in the country
instead of civil strife for the greater part of the past decade; if there had been
more extensive improved communications instead of the existing meagre scale
in face of which it was almost impossible to prevent floods, famines and other
preventable visitations; if the national treasury had been replenished instead
of impoverished with the consequent delay in the development of education,
industries and other phases of national activity; or if the republic had been
left to develop itself instead of being fettered by inequitable treaty restric-
tions, such as the limitation of the import tariff to a nominal five per cent,
ad valorem, and the existence of leased areas and extraterritoriality under
the cegis of which traflSc in contraband goods, including arms and morphia,
could be prosecuted almost with impunity.
For if the situation had been normal, the nation would have enjoyed a
reasonable spell of peace and tranquillity; the present incubus of superfluous
soldiery would be non-existent and the militarists would be deprived of
their lever; there would be funds enough to pay Government employees
and support the schools; more railways would have been constructed, more
waterways would have been conserved, many more thousands of miles of
good roads would have been built, and commercial aviation would have been
started in earnest; the development of industries and trade would have
forged ahead and multiplied; China’s foreign relations would have been
more logical and truer to herself ; the people would have come into their own
and the republic would not only have become a truer democracy but also
taken a more important part in the great world events of the past decade.
Such being the case, one may sympalliise with China in her Herculean task
of making a new democracy out of the old fabric of absolutism.
HOPEFUL OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
Yet handicapped as it is, the nation is slowly but steadily settling down
to an era of readjustment and reconstruction. The period of transition is
still in being, but the longer the ordeal the surer will the foundations be
laid. Public opinion is insistently asserting itself, and militarism as such
FROM EMPIRE TO REPOBUC
will ere loiig die a natural death; in fact, more and more it k already being
gradually shorn of its illegitimate power. The country seems to be too vairt
for one central government to govern efficiently, and the tendency to-day is
toward coordinated decentralisation. In at least two provinces the system
of provincial autonomy has been put into actual practice, with each a pro-
vincial constitution and an elects administrative head or governor, and
making a virtue of necessity, the new Permanent Constitution has made due
provision for granting to the local areas large powers of self-government.
The proper recognition that has hitherto Wn denied to China as a sovereign
. state is being slowly accorded, and since the Washington Disarmament Con-
ference a keener interest seems to be taken by the Powers in the progress of
the republic.
Those who are inclined to despair about China will do well to restudy the
history of the United States; its Federal Constitution required twelve years
to adopt. The problems of government, finance and the maintenance of
public order which Americans had to face in the early days of their republic,
of which an interesting account may be found in John Fiske’s The Critical
Period of American History, were quite as difficult as those facing China at
the present time.
Given time to adjust itself, time for the forces of retrogression and
obstruction to progress to be removed, time to reconstruct a real democracy
out of the old fabric, and given the necessa^ assistance, good-will and co-
operation of the rest of the world, China will not only come to herself to-
morrow as a peaceful, well-ordered and prosperous state but also become once
more a great civilising force as well as an element of weight in the concert
of Powers.
[The wnter wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Dr M T Z Tyau for his help
in preparing this article and to Messrs. D. K Lieu, H Y. Hu, Wunsz King, T. Z Chang,
H. C. Meng, and Stewart Yui for their assistance in collecting the necessary data.]
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